Political Culture of Individualism and Collectivism

by

Kwang-Il Yoon

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
(Political Science)
in The University of Michigan
2010

Doctoral Committee:

Professor Ronald F. Inglehart, Chair
Professor Gregory B. Markus
Professor Daphna R. Oyserman
Associate Professor Ted Brader

To my late father, Sung-Yong Yoon and my mother, Shin-Ok Kim

Acknowledgements

It is my great pleasure to acknowledge the help I have received in my graduate studies at the University of Michigan. I owe my success to the support and encouragement from people I met here.

First, I would like to thank the members of my dissertation committee. It has been my privilege to work with all these mentors to whom I owe an enormous intellectual debt. Professor Ronald Inglehart, who was the reason why I decided to study here, has been supportive of my research and generously allowed me to observe how he organizes the World Values Survey project. Professor Daphna Oyserman, whose work inspired this dissertation, has always been prompt to give me insightful feedback. Professor Greg Markus, who taught me political behavior, has reminded me how important it is, as a political scientist, to see a "big picture" when I deal with numbers and equations. Professor Ted Brader, who introduced me to political psychology, has taught me how to do a rigorous analysis in the field and how to teach students seriously.

Second, I cannot thank Maia Bergman enough for constant moral support and encouragement. She has always appreciated my work and gone out of her way to help me financially and otherwise by hiring me whenever I did not teach and need work. She is one of the nicest and kindest souls that I have ever known. I am extremely fortunate to know her.

I also would like to thank Okyeon Yi, Ha-Lyong Jung, Konsik Lee, Hyeong-ki Kwon, Byoung-inn Bae, Chang-Jo Lee, Myounghoon Jang, Eun Chul Kim, Won-Seop Song, Jegoo Lee, Won-ho Park, Junghwa Lee, Sang-Jung Hahn, Jeongwon Yang, Su-Hyun Lee, Nam Kyu Kim, Mi Hwa Hong, Na Youn Lee, and Hyeon-ho Hahm, friendship with whom helped me realize that there is a home away from home. Rex Patterson, who had been my boss at Rackham for quite some time, and Lili Kivisto and Michelle Spornhauer, who had always tried to help me find a job, also made me feel at home here and I thank them for their kindness and consideration.

The University of Michigan deserves my special thanks for generously supporting my education and family. Moreover, I have met all these amazing people here. This is a special place I will never forget.

Finally, I am especially grateful to my wife, Sun-mi Kim, who has patiently waited for me to finish this dissertation, working and raising our adorable daughter, Ann Yebin for the last two years in Korea. She deserves a special credit for that and I am sure that Ann will agree with me. She is a terrific role model to our Ann. I also would like to thank my mother, Shin-Ok Kim and my parents-in-law, Il Joong Kim and Sun Young Kwon, who have helped to raise Ann since she was born. They have always been there for me.

I am most glad that I can reunite with my family whom I love dearly.

Table of Contents

List of Tables

List of Figures

ABSTRACT

Political Culture of Individualism and Collectivism

by

Kwang-Il Yoon

Chair: Ronald F. Inglehart

The dissertation is based on the premise that culture affects individuals' political attitude and behavior via internalized cultural values and as "human-made" environments under which they think and act. It specifies culture as individualism and collectivism, which have been widely studied as the central organizing dimensions of culture. The constructs have also been advanced as crucial to the scientific study of culture.

The analysis draws on the limits and achievements of two theoretical frameworks: political culture and culture-oriented psychology. The political culture approach has been proposed to provide a unifying theoretical framework that bridges the gap between micro- and macro- level analysis. Existing empirical political culture literature, however, shows that the aggregate level analysis has been the dominant approach to the study of political culture. The alternative, culture oriented psychology has provided the ways to analyze how culture affects an individual's psychology but the effort to identify the cultural effects on political attitude and behavior has been largely absent.

Thus, the empirical analysis of this dissertation attempts to identify the cultural effects of individualism and collectivism on the individual's political attitude and behavior while disentangling the individual and national level effects based on multilevel modeling. It uses the five waves (1981-2007) of the World Values Survey for thirty OECD member countries and attempts to establish a stronger case for the external validity of the findings.

The analysis finds that in general individualism and collectivism matter both for the elements of civic culture/social capital and for political responsibility attribution. The significant cultural effects show up either at one level or at both: Individualism affects trust, tolerance, membership, and political participation positively while collectivism affects these civic culture/social capital variables negatively. In contrast, individualism affects national pride and political interest negatively while collectivism affects them positively. Individualistic cultures as well as collectivism at both levels affect subjective well-being positively. Furthermore, it finds that individualism enhances consideration of personal responsibility while collectivism facilitates consideration of government responsibility for maintaining basic personal welfare.

The dissertation concludes with discussion of the substantive implications of the empirical findings as well as future avenues of inquiry.

CHAPTER I

Introduction

In comparative politics, we need a theoretical framework that facilitates meaningful comparisons of politics across countries. Students of political science have advanced attitudinal or behavioral, institutional, and cultural frameworks to this end. Except for the cultural approach, however, there is a significant theoretical disjuncture that might hinder identifying the implications of individual, micro-level findings for aggregate, macro-level analysis or vice versa. In other words, we have done the division of labor under both macro-level analyses and micro-level ones for a long time. This has led to successes in developing sophisticated theories based on empirical findings at each level of analysis. However, the gap between these two levels needs to be bridged to reap the fruits of such specialization. The dissertation proposes that the cultural approach answer the call.

Indeed, the study of political culture has aspired to bridge the gap between these two major approaches in comparative politics since Almond and Verba's pioneering work:

> [this] relationship between attitudes and motivations of the discrete individuals who make up political systems and the character and performance of political systems may be discovered systematically through the concepts of political culture.. the connecting link between micropolitics and macropolitics is political culture" (1963, 32).

Lipset also emphasized the role of the political culture approach in bridging "a growing gap in the behavioral approach in political science between the level of microanalysis based on psychological interpretations of the individual's political behavior and the level of macroanalysis based on the variables common to political sociology" (1965, 8).

Culture-oriented psychologists have also recognized the need and attempted to develop integrative frameworks that should help the similar efforts in comparative politics. For example, they have examined cultural implications for individual's psychology and proposed unifying theoretical frameworks (e.g., Nisbett' sociocognitive system, Georgas' ecocultural framework, and Oyserman's socially contextualized model of cultural influences).[1]

The integrative efforts of the cultural approach do not claim cultural determinism as alternative to both the micro- and macro-level approaches. In fact, the cultural approach denies any determinism that might be built into those alternative frameworks while establishing culture as interdependent system of cause. Culture or belief systems are not viewed as mere consequences of economic, social changes and political processes as suggested by Barry (1978) and Pateman (1980) but shown to shape socioeconomic conditions and are shaped by them, in reciprocal fashion (Almond and Verba 1963; Almond 1980; Inglehart 1990 and 1997; Harrison and Huntington 2001).

However, the cultural approach has its own drawbacks: First, culture, the key concept of cultural analysis, is the point of contention. It has been used as a conceptual umbrella covering collective or shared attitudes, mass beliefs, emotions, meanings, values,

[1] For a review of each framework, see Nisbett (2001), Georgas (2004), and Oyserman et al. (2002b).

ideology, and so on. Besides this conceptual ambiguity is the question of what constitutes "political" in political culture, the key concept of cultural framework in comparative politics.[2] Thus, cultural analysis has been vulnerable to criticism of either tautology, i.e., culture explains culture (Jackman 1987) or "deus ex machina," i.e., cultural factors are often introduced as a *post hoc* explanation (Hall 1986; Eckstein 1988; Street 1993). Second, as related to the conceptual ambiguity, cultural analysis has yet to settle on an operational definition of constituent variables of political culture (Lane 1992; Reisinger 1995). In other words, we have yet to answer the question of "how do I know one when I see one?" about the variables we use in cultural studies (Ross 1997, 61). Third, a causal linkage has yet to be established between culture and individuals. Culture has been typically defined as an attribute of collective entities such as groups, countries, or civilizations. Hence, the descriptions and explanations of cultural framework have often been made at aggregate or macro-level – for example, classificatory studies about cultural differences across countries and "clash of civilization" (Huntington 1996) – and have yet to specify the implications of culture for psychology and behavior of individuals, who make up, share, and are constrained by, culture.

My dissertation begins with the recognition of these limits as well as the advantages of the integrative cultural approach, which is much need in the field of comparative politics. It will first review the previous works of political culture and political psychology in order to establish why students of political culture need to introduce such cultural frames as individualism and collectivism and how we can take advantage of achievements of cross-cultural psychology, in the study of the cultural

[2] For extensive review of conceptual problems of political culture, see Patrick (1984) and Reisinger (1995).

influence on citizen's political preference and behavior. Second, the dissertation will examine how individualism and collectivism affect the individual's political attitude and behavior while disentangling the effects of the micro-level cultural values from those of the macro-level cultural frames and political institution. It draws on the premise that culture affects individuals' political attitude and behavior via internalized cultural values and as "human-made" environments under which they think and act. Thus, it aims to establish a unified explanatory framework that consists of culture, attitude, behavior, and institution, all of which have been key constructs in comparative politics.

To investigate the implications of individualism and collectivism for individual's political attitude, policy preference, and behavior, I'll organize the dissertation in the following way:

Chapter II will present a critical review of literature and theory on political culture and individualism and collectivism in particular. Chapter III and IV will present empirical findings based on a series of multilevel statistical analyses. Specifically, Chapter III will present the findings of the implications of individualism and collectivism for political interest and behavior as well as for the theory of civic culture and social capital in order to contribute to the discussion of the conditions for successful democracy, the subject of which has been the main theme in the study of political culture since Almond and Verba. Chapter IV will present the implications of individualism and collectivism in the domain of political responsibility attribution. In Chapter V, I will summarize the findings, discuss the limit of the study, and consider the implications of the findings for the study of political culture and comparative political behavior in general.

CHAPTER II

Political Culture and Individualism and Collectivism
A Theoretical Review

"(P)sychologists have sought basic organizing principles of cultures that could move the field beyond both broad generalizations and particularized description and set the stage for predictive model building…To date the two constructs that most captured popular appeal are individualism and collectivism" (Oyserman and Uskul 2008, 146).

The purpose of this chapter is to review the previous works of political culture and political psychology in order to establish why we need to introduce such cultural constructs as individualism and collectivism in the scientific study of cultural influences on citizens' political preference and behavior. First, I will critically review select political culture literature and propose that the empirical investigation into the implications of political culture for the individual level has been largely missing, which needs to be addressed. Second, I will examine previous works about individualism and collectivism, primarily in cultural and cross-cultural psychology, in order to make a case for how we can enrich the study of political culture by taking advantage of interdisciplinary efforts.[1]

[1] The distinction between cross-cultural psychology and cultural psychology is conceptual, reflecting contrasting perspectives concerning the role of culture in psychological theory and the goals of culturally based research. The former aims to validate the claims to universality of existing psychological theories and assess a wider range of environmental effects by using the naturally occurring variation in social environments while the latter aims to identify new psychological constructs and theories based on interdisciplinary work (Miller 2002). For a further distinction, see Greenfield (2000), and Smith et al. (2006 Chapter 3).

Brief History of the Political Culture Studies

The intellectual interest in political culture is not a modern phenomenon. Since Plato and Aristotle, political philosophers have suggested that collective, bonding human psyches – e.g., ethos or mores – important for sustaining a political community of any form. In a similar vein, the cycle of political change explained in social psychological terms appears recurrently well into the nineteenth century. Thus, the general agreement that Almond and Verba's work (1963) is seminal in the study of political culture may be attributable to the fact that they made a case for the crucial role of political culture or "civic culture" to be exact, for a successful government drawing on the empirical analysis of one of the first large scale comparative surveys (for an overview on the intellectual history of political culture theory, see Almond 1980 and 1990).

The empirical inquiry into political culture has its share of ups and downs since its introduction to political science in the 1950s (for a brief overview on the development of the empirical political culture studies, see Pye 1972 and 1991; Almond 1990 and 1993, Dalton 2000). The initial popularity was largely due to its more scientific, rigorous methodological posture, utilizing statistical analysis of survey data gleaned from random samples across multiple countries and cultural groups accompanied by sophisticatedly constructed interview schedules, among others. This systematic, quantitative approach to the study of political culture was a clear breakaway from a psycho-analytical and anthropological "reductionism," which had dominated the field since the turn of the century. Thus, political culture studies in the 1960s and the 1970s contributed to pioneering modern comparative politics. They aimed to construct generalizable

knowledge about an individual's political attitude and behavior in different political regimes based on modern scientific methods and systematic comparisons.

The initial success of empirical political culture studies was eclipsed by academic challenges from the neo-Marxist on the left and rational choice advocates on the right. The former disputed the objectivity in general, and criticized Western ethnocentric tendencies in particular, of political culture studies. The latter discredited them for their atheoretical and frequent post-hoc approach that did not acknowledge its fundamental assumption of universal rationality. Rational choice or positive political theory began dominating in the discipline of political science in the late 1970s and 1980s while the influence of the neo-Marxist criticisms waned to a point of insignificance at least in the academic community, which was most likely facilitated by the crisis and eventual demise of the communist regime.

It is no coincidence that the popularity of modern political culture research declined in the same decades. However, the original rationale for the study was still valid as Reisinger (1995, 331) forcefully summarized by the question: "how can scholars satisfactorily explain cross-national differences in politics without attending to the subjective orientations of the societies' members?" By the late 1980s, such prominent scholars of political culture as Wildavsky (1987), Eckstein (1988), Inglehart (1988), and Almond (1990) had led a reaction to the criticisms and attempted to redress the balance in the field that had been dominated by rational choice models and to revive it.

The signs of the times were also favorable to the movement of "the renaissance of culture." There were a series of historical developments that were not accounted for effectively by economic factors alone. The influence of religion and tradition was felt all

over the world. Changes in the Catholic Church played a major role in the "third wave" of democratization in such traditionally Catholic countries as ones in the Mediterranean and Latin America as well as the Philippines, Poland, and Hungary. Muslim fundamentalism had become the most important political factor in the Islamic world. One cannot explain unprecedented, rapid economic development in East Asia without resorting to Confucianism. Moreover, in advanced industrial societies, religion and "post-materialist" values had been exerting not only a durable but increasing influence on electoral behavior while social class voting had declined markedly (Inglehart 1988; Huntington 1991; Pye 1997). All these social phenomena cried for a cultural explanation and students of political culture responded both with diverse perspectives and with the help of new technical and empirical capabilities.

Inglehart (1990 and 1997) and Inglehart and Baker (2000), for example, first empirically reconfirmed the validity of the basic thesis of *The Civic Culture* and refuted economic determinism and "linear" modernization theory. He made a cogent argument that political culture is a crucial *intervening* variable in the long-term relationship between economic development and the emergence of mass democracy and that it is a central factor in the survival of democracy. Inglehart also observed that advanced industrial societies had moved from the "Modernization phase" where traditional and survival cultural values are dominant, into a "Postmodernization phase," where secular-rational and subjective well-being cultural values are prevalent.[2]

What makes Inglehart's works distinguished among modern empirical political culture study is the fact that he convincingly established his case based on a body of

[2] Inglehart (2005) later relabeled subjective well-being with self-expression values.

evidence that was much larger than that available to Almond and Verba in terms of the number of countries and years covered. His *Culture Shift* (1990), which focused on advanced industrialized democracies, utilized not only the World Values Survey (WVS) of twenty five countries, 1981-1982 but also Euro-Barometers of twelve countries, 1970-1986, and a three nation panel study of the United States, West Germany, and the Netherland, 1974-1981. Inglehart verified his findings and extended them to forty three societies representing 70 percent of the world's population over the three decades 1970-1990, in his *Modernizations and Post-Modernization* (1997), where he used the two waves, 1981 and 1990-1991, of the WVS and the Euro-Barometer surveys from 1970 to the 1990s. Inglehart and Baker (2000) reconfirmed the primary author's previous findings based on the three waves of the WVS, which added the 1995-1998 survey and extended further to include sixty five societies and 75 percent of the world's population.

Putnam (1993 and 2000) is another successor to the tradition of *The Civic Culture* and responsible for the renaissance of the study of political culture in the recent decades. His quest for an answer for what it would take to make a good democracy led him to examine cultural variations within two countries, Italy (1993) and the United States (2000). His answer lied in the theory of social capital or "social networks and the associated norms of reciprocity," which has produced numerous policy as well as academic debates since. I will revisit his works in Chapter III.

Huntington also made a significant contribution to the revival of political culture research, especially after the fall of communism. He summarily hypothesized, "In the post-Cold war world, the most important distinctions among peoples are not ideological, political, or economic. They are *cultural*… the most important groupings of states are no

longer the three blocks of the Cold War but rather the world's seven or eight major civilizations" (1996, 21, *italics* is added).[3] Although his broad-brush treatment of cultural zones and adversarial view based on anecdotal evidence invited much criticism from diverse disciplines, it surely enriched the field of political culture by escalating again the role of culture in world conflicts as well as in modernization or civilization to a point of scholarly contention.

Recent political culture research has geared toward more global issues and perspectives, armed with even more data sources accumulated over a longer period of time across countries (for increased data resources in comparative political behavior, see Geer 2004; Kittilson 2007). Harrison and Huntington (2000), for example, gathered for the "Cultural Values and Human Progress" symposium prominent experts on such diverse topics as the link between values and progress, the universality of values and Western "cultural imperialism," geography and culture, the relationship between culture and institutions, and cultural change and asked them to shed light on the question of how culture "affects the extent to which and the ways in which societies achieve or fail to achieve progress in economic development and political democratization" (Huntington 2000, *xv*). According to Harrison (2000), despite the lack of consensus on the topics,[4] the participants agreed that cultural values and attitudes are an important and neglected factor in "human progress" and hence called for "a comprehensive theoretical and applied research program with the goal of integrating value and attitude change into development

[3] Huntington (1996, 20) defined civilization identities as culture and cultural identities "at the broadest level."

[4] For example, Sachs (2000) argued that culture is an insignificant factor for economic development by comparison with geography and climate.

policies, planning, and programming in Third World countries and in anti-poverty programs in the United States" (*xxxii*).

Inglehart has also expanded his lifetime perspective on political culture to "the theory of human development"[5] with the colleagues in psychology as well as in political science. He first formulated the theory with Welzel and Klingeman (2003) and elaborated on it with "the human development syndrome" with Oyserman (2004) and "the human development sequence" with Welzel (2005). His latest co-authored work addressed the relationship among development, freedom, and happiness (Inglehart et al. 2008). Based on the World Values Surveys among others, which now spans almost three decades and covers the majority part of the world, these authors attempt to demonstrate that socioeconomic development, emancipative cultural change and democratization constitute a coherent syndrome of social progress. This cultural pattern or "human development syndrome" as they put it, has been universal in its presence across nations and cultural zones and as a whole contributed to broadening human choice and freedom.

In sum, the history of political culture research is as old as the history of comparative politics. Since the turn of the century when modern political science began to establish itself as an independent academic field, the popularity of political culture research as one of the major approaches to understand political behavior across nations and cultural zones has waxed and waned. In the recent decades, the political culture approach has invited renewed interests with global policy concerns as well as favorable research environments. The political culture approach has now been considered one of

[5] The authors owed the idea to Amartya Sen.

the two viable scientific paradigms along with rational choice theory in political science (Wildavsky 1987; Eckstein 1988; Inglehart 1990; Ross 1997; Fuchs 2007).

Bring the Individual Back in Political Culture

There have probably been as many critics as defenders of political culture studies. In this dissertation, I will focus only on the aspect of political culture research that has motivated my inquiry into psychological implications of political culture. That is, existing political culture research, especially in the recent decades, has not paid due attention to the implications of political culture for the psychology of the individual whose political attitude and belief system constitutes, shapes, and is affected by, political culture. I observe that the neglect of the political psychology approach in the study of political culture is reflected in the definitions and the subsequent empirical approach dominant in the empirical study of political culture.

Psychological Definitions of Political Culture without Psychology

Culture and its particular type, political culture, have been typically defined and studied as a macro-phenomenon.[6] For example, Elkins and Simeon (1979) advanced that political culture is "the property of a collectivity" such as nation, region, class, ethnic community, formal organization, and so on. According to the authors, individuals do not

[6] In this dissertation, I do not intend to conceptually distinguish political culture from culture except that the former involves political objects and processes while the latter human affairs in general, subsuming the former as a field of study. Almond and Verba (1963, 12) made a similar distinction: "We speak of a political culture just as we can speak of an economic culture or a religious culture. It is a set of orientations toward a special set of social objects and processes." Therefore, statements about political culture in this dissertation also apply to culture in general and vice versa, otherwise noted. For a comprehensive conceptual distinction between political culture and culture, see Pye (1965, 8-9) and Verba (1965, 521-525).

have cultures but attitudes, beliefs, and values. They argued that we must develop precise means of identifying the *culture-bearing unit* in different situations in order to refine its utility as an explanatory concept beyond a descriptive category. Hofstede concurred by claiming that "culture presupposes a collectivity" (2001, 5) and defined it as "the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one category of people from another" (2001, 9) and used similar definitions in his other works including the first edition of *Culture's Consequences* (1980). He reserved the term "value" and "personality" to refer to the comparable concept of culture at the individual level. Triandis cited in several works (1995, 1996, and 2001; Triandis and Suh 2002) a renowned anthropologist Kluckhohn's definition that "culture is to society what memory is to individuals" and elaborated that "it includes what has worked in the experience of a society, so that it was worth transmitting to future generations" (Triandis and Suh 2002, 135).

In fact, there have existed "psychological or subjective definitions" of political culture that draw on such psychological terms as orientation, attitude, affect, cognition, feeling, evaluation, and so forth. Almond and Verba, for example, presented that political culture "refers to the specifically political *orientations – attitudes* toward the political system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the system" (1963, 12, *italics added*). We can find another typical example of psychological definitions in Verba's work. He defined culture as "the system of *beliefs* about patterns of political interaction and political institutions" (1965, 516, *italics added*) and those beliefs are fundamental, usually unstated, and unchallengeable, assumptions or postulates about politics. He also established a denotative criterion of political culture for subsequent

political culture studies by distinguishing it from other specific political psychological constructs such as partisan affiliations and attitudes or beliefs about domestic and international policy issues.

Even these psychological definitions, however, have not been intended to refer to psychology at the individual level but psychology of a collectivity. Almond and Verba, pioneer of the "individual-oriented" political culture approach was not an exception. Immediately after they offered a psychological definition, they elaborated on the political culture of a society as "the political system as internalized in the cognitions, feelings, and evaluations of its population" (1963, 13) and this is the working definition for the five nation comparative survey study. Their contemporary students of political culture made parallel definitions, which have been used without a fundamental modification since (Pye (1965), Verba (1965), and Almond and Powell (1966 and 1978)). Moreover, Inglehart who initiated the renaissance of political culture studies in the 1980s defined political culture in a similar fashion: "the *subjective* aspect of a society's institutions, the beliefs, values, knowledge, and skills that have been *internalized* by the people of a given society, complementing their external systems of coercion and exchange" (1997, 15). Harrison and Huntington and the *Cultural Values and Human Progress* project also defined culture "in *purely subjective terms* as the values, attitudes, beliefs, orientations, and underlying assumptions prevalent among people in a society" (2000, *xv, italics added*). Thus, a definition of political culture has been considered psychological to the extent that it involves psychological constructs regardless of the reference levels, that is, the individual or the aggregate.

The notion of political culture as a psychological attribute of collectivities, however, seems to have precluded or dismissed its core constituent element, the individual, in subsequent research.[7] The implications of this dismissal can be identified at least in two aspects: (1) the lack of elaboration on psychological implications (2) the preference for a macroexplanation.

First, the relationship between political culture of a collectivity and other psychological constructs at the individual level, which is a crucial part of psychological definitions of political culture, has not been well specified.[8] The effects of political culture on the individual are frequently posited in a definition but without much elaboration. Moreover, they are rarely subject to operationalization or to rigorous empirical testing.

Since Almond and Verba, students of political culture studies have rather casually used and expanded such psychological terms as attitude, orientation, belief, affect, feeling, cognition, value, and so on, often as components of political culture.[9] But at the same time, they have often conceptualized these psychological constructs as consequences of culture, explicitly or otherwise, even in the same work. Almond and Powell (1978, 25), for instance, defined political culture "as the set of attitudes, beliefs, and feelings about politics current in a nation at a given time" and suggested that "the attitude patterns that have been shaped in past experience have important constraining effects on future

[7] Reisinger (1995) suggested that defining culture as a societal-level attribute is a way to overcome the level of analysis problem.

[8] Notable exceptions include Wildavsky (1987) who attempted to specify the relation between political culture and preference and Eckstein (1988) who made a careful distinction among the components of a political culture at the different levels of analysis. Both of their works, however, are theoretical.

[9] Some of the examples are shown above.

political behavior." Although they acknowledged Barry's criticism (1978) on the lack of specification of causal mechanism in political cultural analysis and introduced such psychological terms as "attitude consistency" or "issue constraint," the authors did not expound nor present any evidence for, the causal mechanism between attitude and behavior, which has been one of the central problems in Western psychology (Markus and Kitayama 1991). Elkins and Simeon, who explicitly dismissed the idea of culture as a property of individual, also put forward "constraining effects" of political culture on the individual's cognition. They presented political culture as "a short-hand expression for a "mind-set" which has the effect of limiting attention to less than the full range of alternative behaviors, problems, and solutions which are logically possible" (1979, 128) yet did not elaborate on how political culture affects our attention. Almond (1980, 26) once advanced "the explanatory power of political culture variables is an empirical question, open to hypothesis and testing." However, students of political culture have not followed up this dictum at the individual level psychology.[10]

Second, the primacy of collectivity in political culture research has facilitated *macroexplanation* that "one social pattern, structure, or entity is explained by reference to other social phenomena" (Little 1991, 183). Fuchs (2007, 163), for example, advanced as one of the paradigmatic cores of the political culture research program that political culture must be considered as a macro-phenomenon so that it can feasibly influence another macro-phenomenon of regime persistence.

[10] By contrast, the cultural effects on individual psychology have been extensively studied empirically as well as theoretically in cultural and cross-cultural psychology. For example, culture is conceptualized as meta-schema or foundational schema (Oyserman et al. 2002b). It is also shown that culture often determines self-construal and subsequent psychological functioning (Markus and Kitayama 1991), emotion (Kitayama and Markus 1994), value (Triandis 1995), personality (Triandis and Suh 2002), and cognition (Nisbett 2003). However, existing literature in these fields have not addressed the cultural effects on political psychology of the individual.

The preference for macroexplanation, as with other tendencies in the empirical study of political culture, began with *The Civic Culture*, where Almond and Verba attempted to identify political culture *congruent* with democratic political system. Many students of political culture, especially in the field of political development and modernization, have followed their lead as they tried to identify the cultural requisites for democracy. In other words, they sought to determine cultural patterns of a nation that "fit" or "are linked with," a democracy.[11] We can also find, with relative ease, other types of macroexplanation in political culture research in the works of Inglehart (1990 and 1997) and Inglehart and Baker (2000) that have traced cultural value changes among the people of the world from traditional, survival culture to secular-rational, self-expression culture following the system level socio-economic changes; Huntington (1996) who predicted the post-Cold War conflicts based on major civilizations; Putnam (2000) who explained the performance of the state governments of the United Stated based on the stock of social capital of each state; Welzel and his colleagues (2003) and Inglehart and Welzel (2005) that have attempted to identify human development syndrome, among others.

However, we can rarely find the empirical studies of political culture that examine the cultural implications for an individual's political attitude and preference despite increasing accumulation of survey data across nations.[12] Indeed, the political culture approach so far has focused on the cultural linkage with various macro-socioeconomic and political phenomena such as democratization, stability and survival of democracy,

[11] For the review of congruence theory, see Dalton and Shin (2006, 5-13). Chapter II of the dissertation will revisit the congruence theory.

[12] There is a notable exception: Inglehart et al. (2008) examined cultural impact on subjective well-being at the individual level using multilevel modeling.

economic development, conflicts among nations, human development, and so forth, but largely neglected the cultural implications for political psychology of the individual. Hence, we do not have enough information how the individuals in different cultures think and respond to the issues relevant to politics. In other words, we have not explicitly tested the idea that political culture affects political attitude and behavior or more broadly political psychology of the individual. Students of political culture seem to have taken the individual for granted so far.

Issues in the Individualistic Approach to Political Culture

Granted, there is a strand of empirical work in political culture research classified as the individual-oriented, psychological approach to political culture. Reisinger (1995, 330) observed that most of recent defenders of political culture study fall within the individualistic, survey-based approach and it grew largely from the Almond's work. One should, however, note that the dominant approach in political culture, as he conceptualized, has not been individualistic if cross-national and has been liable to make a flawed inference about the aggregate cultural groups if in fact individual-oriented as true to its name.

First, drawing on the individual level survey responses does not make the political culture approach individual-oriented or psychological as Reisinger and others suggested (Lane 1992; Peters 1998; Wilson 2000). As discussed above, the preference for macroexplanation in political culture research has led to using survey data aggregated to various cultural groups or frequently to a country, which is the major unit of analysis in the field. Thus, survey-based cross-culture studies that these authors referred to as

examples of the individualistic approach would be, in fact, better understood as aggregate or country-oriented, especially if these studies made cross-national comparison.[13] Second, the individualistic approach that aims to make a "cross-level" inference without utilizing information at the aggregate level is vulnerable to "individualistic" fallacy, as Inglehart and others have pointed out. Individualistic fallacy – or "reverse ecological fallacy" according to Hofstede (2001) – refers to the *incorrect* assumption that one can draw aggregate-level conclusion from individual-level findings because an individual level relationship represents similar strength and direction at the aggregate level. Welzel and Inglehart (2007) advanced that the danger of making the fallacy pervades the entire political culture literature as *most* political culture studies examine the individual level determinants of attitudes that are assumed to have an impact at the societal level. In other words, aggregating individual level responses for cross-cultural comparison does not constitute individualistic fallacy but making a fallacious inference about properties or relationships at the aggregate level solely based on the individual level data does.[14] This has often been the case in political culture research (Peters 1998; Inglehart and Welzel 2003; Welzel and Inglehart 2007).[15]

To avoid this methodological pitfall and take advantage of the vastly expanded individual level data, the empirical analysis of the dissertation draws on multilevel

[13] Their examples include *The Civic Culture* and a series of work by Inglehart. It should be noted that for a considerable period between *The Civic Culture* and Inglehart's works, such cross-national studies remained quire rare (Dalton 2000).

[14] Seligson (2002) mistakenly argued to this effect.

[15] In fact, the issue of cross-level inference is not limited to political culture research but relevant to cross-national research in general where one of the central methodological problems is the linkage between individual and aggregate relationship (Eulau 1986; Peters 1998; Hofstede 2001; Welzel and Inglehart 2003 and 2007). I will discuss ecological fallacy, the other type of error of cross-level inference, when reviewing Hofstede below.

modeling mainly with the five waves of the World Values Survey data. In other words, the empirical approach of the dissertation is both individual-oriented and cross-cultural. I will elaborate on this analytic method in the last section of this chapter substantively and empirically in Chapter III.

In sum, this dissertation is motivated by the neglect of the individual by existing political culture literature, especially in the recent decades: the political cultural effects on the individual are frequently posited in a theory of political culture without proper elaboration or being subject to empirical testing. The relationship between political culture and other macro socio-economic phenomena has been the dominant subject of the field. Furthermore, the individual-oriented approach to political culture has been incomplete in the sense that it has been either in fact a society-centered study if comparative or a series of within-country studies if individualistic.

In this dissertation, I do not advance that we should redefine or approach culture as the psychological attribute of the individual nor the psychological definition and the comparative individualistic approach is superior to other society-oriented definitions and approaches. In addition, I do not intend to develop the microexplanation that culture must be explained by the individual, as advocates of methodological individualism would advance (Lukes 1973, Chapter 17). I maintain, however, that a study of political cultural implications at the individual level is long overdue, despite increasing accumulation of survey data across nations. So far we have gained rich understanding of how culture as a macro-phenomenon is located in the causal mechanism of system level variables, owing largely to Inglehart's work, but we have yet to learn how political culture affects political attitude and behavior of the individual.

Fortunately, we have a body of research in cultural and cross-cultural psychology we can draw on for this purpose.

Why Individualism and Collectivism?

Culture is usually reserved for societies – e.g., nations, ethnic or regional groups within or across nations, and various social organizations, as discussed above. In contrast, political attitude, preference, beliefs, and behavior are often reserved for the individual. Thus, in order to understand the way culture relates to the individual, we first need to specify *dimensions* of cultural variation (Triandis et al. 1988, 323 *italics added*).[16] In fact, the identification of dimensions of culture has been suggested as a major goal in cross-cultural psychology. According to Leung and Bond (1989), one must first be able to link observed cultural differences to specific dimensions of culture that are hypothesized to have produced the differences in order to build a truly universal theory in psychology that takes into account the influence of culture.

Psychologists who are interested in the cultural implications for the individual's psychological functioning seem to have agreed upon the most important dimensions of cultural difference, that is, individualism and collectivism. Triandis, one of the pioneers who introduced, popularized, and refined the dimensions in psychology, observed that there are "the striking similarities in behavioral patterns found in very different locations around the world" and they "apparently have in common only that the cultures are

[16] Dimensions can be identified empirically as in Hofstede's work or theoretically as in Schwartz's. Hofstede and Schwartz agree that dimensions represent fundamental problems of society (Hofstede 2001 and Schwartz 2004). For a further theoretical discussion of dimensions of culture, see Leung and Bond (1989), Hofstede (2001), Vinken et al. (2004), and Triandis (2004).

characterized by more collectivist or more individualist behaviors" (1994, 50). Greenfield (2000) theoretically justified the selection of these dimensions. She advanced that the deep structure of culture that generated behaviors and interpretations of human behavior in an infinite array of domains and situations consisted of the framework of individualism and collectivism. Oyserman and her colleagues confirmed the popularity of the cultural dimensions in the field. According to these authors, a major thrust of cultural psychology in the past two decades has been based on modeling culture in terms of differences across groups in levels of individualism and collectivism (Oyserman et al. 2002b, 111). Indeed, Triandis and his associates' work (1988) "Individualism and Collectivism: Cross-cultural Perspectives on Self-Ingroup Relationships" has been chosen as one of the studies that changed the discipline of psychology (Hock 2001).[17]

Then, how could students of political culture who attempt to analyze the cultural effects on the individual benefit from the academic achievements by the neighboring discipline? To answer this question, I will critically review select psychology literature, both theoretical and empirical, on these important cultural dimensions in the following section.

Utilities of Individualism and Collectivism as Cultural Dimensions

Among several potential cultural dimensions[18] that help us organize such diverse psychological constructs as attitude, behavior, affect, cognition, values, and so forth, of

[17] This single article was cited in over 200 studies from a wide variety of scientific fields between 1995 and 2000 (Hock 2002, 219).

[18] For example, Triandis (1989 and 1995) tight vs. loose cultures or cultural complexity; Inglehart (1997) traditional vs. secular-rational and survival vs. self-expression; Schwartz (2004) autonomy vs. embeddedness, egalitarian vs. hierarchy, and harmony vs. mastery. It is also worthy of note that Pye (1965, 22-23) used a similar dimensional term as a "theme" to organize fundamental cultural values discussed

the individuals, what is so special about individualism and collectivism? We can answer this question based on theoretical as well as practical grounds.

For practical reasons, one should begin with Huntington's observation. Huntington (1996) predicted, as discussed above, that the major world conflicts after the Cold War would occur along the "cultural fault lines separating civilizations" and suggested that the difference between *individualist* Western cultures and *collectivist* non-Western cultures would constitute major cleavages. Triandis (1995, 13-15) concurred and elaborated. He claimed that about 70 percent of the world population is collectivist and many in these groups disagree with individualism of Western civilizations. With the end of the Cold War, the contact between these two adversarial cultural groups has been increasing as the former Communist countries began to open their borders and changed from totalitarian, command economies, supposedly favorable to collectivism, to market economies, supposedly favorable to individualism.[19] In addition, ongoing rapid globalization that has been making the world smaller and smaller with unprecedented technological development in mass communication and transportation has facilitated the interaction, virtual as well as actual, between individualists and collectivists. Thus, the potential for different kinds of world conflicts has risen, too. Based on these down-to-earth observations of the socio-economic, political transformation in the world, culturalists has demanded a better understanding of those opposing cultural frames.

---

among political scientists in the 1960s. The themes include trust-distrust, hierarchy-equality, liberty-coercion, and parochial-national identifications.

[19] Triandis also presented the weakening of trade unions and the ascendancy of entrepreneurs as another evidence of "cultural shift" from collectivism to individualism.

Theoretically, as illustrated from the opening excerpt in this chapter, culture-oriented psychologists has advocated individualism and collectivism as essential for scientific development of the field of cross-cultural and cultural psychology. For example, cultural psychologists have maintained that individualism and collectivism clarify fuzzy constructs of culture and facilitate a direct linkage of psychological mechanism at the individual level to a cultural dimension at the aggregate level by conceptualizing and operationalizing parallel constructs at both levels of analysis. In addition, they have argued that individualism and collectivism offer more parsimonious, coherent, and empirically testable dimensions of cultural variation by providing the field with an organizing theme and focus for prediction and investigation. These cultural constructs also allow productive integration of knowledge accumulated in diverse fields of studies including anthropology, psychology, and political science, among others. Furthermore, individualism and collectivism suggest convergence across different methodologies (Triandis et al. 1988; Kim 1994; Hofstede 2002; Oyserman et al. 2002b; Oyserman and Uskul 2008).

In sum, the world after the Cold War has called for the renewed interests in individual and collectivism, two opposing cultural frames deemed as a major source of the world conflict in the future. With rapid globalization and the regime change of the Soviet system, the interaction between two cultural views is ever increasing – hence, the possibility of the world conflict – and a proper understanding of individualism and collectivism is needed. Theoretically, these dimensions have been advanced as the basic organizing principles of cultures that should be utilized in scientific model building in psychology.

Intellectual History on Individualism and Collectivism

As the scholarly interest in political culture is not a modern phenomenon, neither is the intellectual interest in individualism and collectivism. We can trace the origin of philosophical interest in these constructs to the Greek Sophists, Plato, and Aristotle in the West and the Confucian tradition in the East (Triandis 1995, 19-25; Nisbett et al. 2001; Nisbett 2003). [20] We can find the first intellectual exchange on these views in the normative debate between the Sophists and Plato in the fifth century BC. Individualism and collectivism were deemed as antagonistic and have largely been since. For example, the Sophists promoted *personal* agency, that is, the individuals are in charge of their own life and free to act as they choose without following the group norms while Plato criticized them for not having moral standards of what is good and proper and advocated a civic life. Plato's *Republic* that expounded an ideal state governed by philosopher kings has been considered a paternalistic, collectivist text. Collectivism was also advanced by Confucius, their contemporaneous philosopher in the East, who emphasized virtuous, ethical conduct and obligations among various relationships in the society. Indeed, the view that emphasizes virtue or proper behavior is implicit in most of the Eastern religions such as Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism, and Shintoism (Triandis 1995).

Aristotle, Plato's student, however, laid the philosophical foundation for individualism in the Western thinking along with the Sophists. His discourse on "the central, basic, sine qua non properties" or "essence" of an object represents the individualist epistemology in the Western tradition. According to Nisbett and his

[20] The West primarily refers to Western Europe and the United States and the East refers to East Asian countries that include China, Japan, and South Korea. Culture-oriented psychologists have been using these regional references for quite some time.

colleagues, the individualist epistemology that primarily focuses on an individual object and its attribute vis-à-vis its surrounding field is markedly in contrast with the collectivist epistemology in the Eastern tradition that focuses on the relationships between the object and the field (Nisbett et al. 2001; Nisbett 2003).[21]

Individualism and collectivism have been at the center of much thought and debate in the West (Lukes 1973; Triandis 1995; Oyserman et al. 2002a; Allik and Realo 2004) as opposed to in the East, where collectivist Confucianism has been dominant. In fact, there is a long Western tradition of contrasting individualistic and collectivistic ideas by contemporary thinkers. In the eighteenth and nineteenth century,[22] for example, one can contrast Locke's advocacy of inalienable individual rights to life, liberty, and property with Rousseau's ardent support for the general will of the people as a whole and Smith's laissez-fare capitalism with Marx's communism, in the context of the opposing views of individualism and collectivism. Individualistic ideas such as liberty and equality promoted by the French Revolution and the American Revolution provoked collectivistic reactions idealizing the old regime of collective social structure – e.g., Burke. One can also contrast John Stuart Mill's psychologistic reductionism that "human beings in society have no properties but those which are derived from, and may be resolved into, the laws of the nature of individual man" (1843/1963 Vol. 8, 879) with Durkheim's social facts "external to the individual, which are invested with a coercive power by virtue of which they exercise control over him" (1895/1982, 52) in explaining social phenomena.

[21] I will revisit their theory in the context of personal versus collective agency in Chapter IV.

[22] The terms individualism and collectivism were used for the first time by English political philosophers in these centuries (Lukes 1973, 1; Triandis 1995, 19).

It is worthy of note that not all the philosophical debates about individualism and collectivism in those periods were adversarial. The French intellectual de Tocqueville, for example, attempted to redefine individualism in a positive light, as more than just egoism that would jeopardize community as reactionaries to the French Revolution portrayed. In other words, he presented individualism as necessary to as well as the natural product of, democracy by linking the word with individual rights and freedom, equal opportunity, and limited government (1835 and 1840/2003).[23]

Furthermore, there have been intellectuals who acknowledged the similar cultural frameworks as individualism and collectivism and contrasted different cultures based on these organizing religious and philosophical themes. For example, Weber (1904/2002) contrasted individualistic Protestant societies with collectivistic Catholic societies. In a similar fashion, Tönnies (1887/1955) distinguished self-interest, association based relationships of urban societies (Gesellschaft) and community-focused relationships of small villages (Geminschaft).

Against the backdrop of these philosophical debates and beginning with the late nineteenth century, empirical investigation of various cultural groups increased. Anthropologists led the study of culture and suggested the cultural dimensions similar to individualism and collectivism (Triandis et al. 1988; Triandis 1995, 26-28; Hofstede 2001). Kluckhohn, for example, contrasted individual oriented with group-oriented relationship values (e.g., autonomous and active versus dependent and accepting) and with Strodtbeck distinguished linear (e.g., submission to elders), collateral (e.g.,

[23] Tocqueville was also aware of possibility that individualism should degenerate into selfishness: "individualism, at first, only saps the virtues of public life; but in the long run it attacks and destroys all others and is at length absorbed in downright selfishness" (1835/2003, 98).

agreement with group norms), and individualistic orientations (e.g., doing what self-conceptions dictate). In addition, Mead presented cultural dimensions such as cooperation, competition, and individualism based on the ethnographic study of primitive peoples.

Serious empirical work that draws on individualism and collectivism was, however, not launched in psychology until Geert Hofstede's comparative, multinational survey work *Cultural Consequences: International Differences in Work-Related Values* (1980).

The Empirical Approach to Individualism and Collectivism: Hofstede, Triandis, Schwartz, and Inglehart & Oyserman

Since first published in 1980, Hofstede's work has inspired numerous empirical, cross-cultural studies. It is considered the most influential of cultural classifications and one of the most cited sources in the entire Social Science Citation Index – cited 1,800 times through 1999 (Hofstede 2001; Kirkman et al. 2006). In a marked contrast with previous cultural research that is characterized by the relativistic, ethnographic approach among others, Hofstede's work aimed to build a scientific model of culture drawing on the empirical analysis of the extensive survey of the individuals from a large number of countries. It greatly facilitated empirical, cultural and cross-cultural research in subsequent decades by providing four overarching cultural patterns (e.g., dimensions) identified from the cross-national survey data.[24]

[24] The original four dimensions were extracted from paper-and-pencil survey results collected from over 88,000 employees of the IBM, one of the largest multinational corporations, in seventy two countries (reduced to forty countries that had more than fifty responses). The survey, which consisted of many work-related, was conducted twice, 1967-1969 and 1971-1973, producing a total of more than 116,000 questionnaires.

Hofstede's empirical model of culture consists of the five dimensions identified from the factor analysis of the national average scores of employees' ratings of workplace relevant values.[25] Individualism and collectivism (IDV), a central focus in his first edition, is one of these organizing cultural dimensions and defined as follows:

> Individualism stands for a society in which ties between individuals are loose: everyone is expected to look after him/herself and her/his immediate family only. Collectivism stands for a society in which people from birth onwards are integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups, which throughout people's life time continue to protect them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty (Hofstede 2001, 225).

As illustrated from the definition and methodology to identify the cultural dimensions, Hofstede's analysis of culture is *ecological* or aggregate-level based. In other words, he defined those cultural frames with reference to an aggregate not individuals as he did for culture and explicitly studied the origins and consequences of these cultural dimensions at the same aggregate level (e.g., national wealth, educational and political systems). In addition, one should note that he did not view individualism and collectivism as separate dimensions. That is, low IDV means high collectivism and high IDV means low collectivism, according to Hofstede's analysis.[26]

This path-breaking analysis has its own drawbacks relevant for the dissertation: First, the definition of individualism and collectivism is simplistic, centering on the relationship between the individual and in-group, i.e., whether individual is independent

[25] The other dimensions include power distance, masculinity, and uncertainty avoidance. In the second edition (2001), Hofstede added the fifth dimension, long-term vs. short-term orientation based on the expanded dataset.

[26] He did not provide an abbreviation for collectivism.

of or dependent on his or her in-groups. It appears that it has to do with the fact that the dimension was derived empirically not theoretically. Moreover, conceptualizing IDV as an attribute of a collectivity should keep one from analyzing diverse aspects of the construct. Second, as a macroexplanation, it could not explain the attitude and behavior of the individuals.[27] Indeed, Hofstede acknowledged that his work in fact did not intend to do so, arguing that a different unit of analysis, that is, individual or aggregate, requires a theoretically distinct approach to avoid "ecological fallacy" in his case. He advanced that in general we should not confuse the within-system relationship with the ecological, between-system relationship. This amounts to the fallacy the possibility of which increases when one infers properties or relationships at the individual level solely based on the aggregate level data.[28]

Hofstede's macro-analysis of individualism and collectivism has been followed by a host of the individual level analysis of the cultural frames, initiated by Triandis and his associates. The changes in academic focus on the level of analysis may have to do with the fact that the implementation of Hofstede's method is extremely time and resource intensive and that attention has shifted to the ways cultural frames affect individuals (Oyserman et al. 2002a).

Among the numerous contributions Triandis and his associates made to cross-cultural psychology, there are three important issues that are especially relevant to this dissertation. First, Triandis refined Hofstede's aggregate-centered definition of

[27] The second edition (2001) added a review of psychological literature on the implications of individualism and collectivism for personality and behavior (231-233).

[28] This is the reverse type of individualistic fallacy, the other type of mistaken cross-level inference discussed above. In the second edition, he mentioned, without much elaboration, multilevel analysis as an alternative to either level of analysis.

individualism (IND) and collectivism (COL) both conceptually and empirically. He, with the help of the associates, reported that the different methods of measuring these *cultural syndromes*[29] converge (Triandis et al. 1990; Triandis and Gelfand 1998) and provide four defining attributes that distinguish them: (1) The definition of self is interdependent in COL and independent in IND (2) Personal and communal goals are closely aligned in COL and not at all aligned in IND (3) Cognition focus that guides much of social behavior includes norms, obligations, and duties in COL and attitudes, personal needs, rights, and contracts in IND (4) An emphasis on relationships, even when disadvantageous, is common in COL while the emphasis is on rational analyses of the advantages and disadvantages of maintaining a relationship in IND (Triandis 1995 and 1996).[30] Triandis also conceptualized and measured collectivism independently as opposed to Hofstede and emphasized the "target-specific" nature of collectivism. He observed that collectivism is better construed as concern for a certain subset of people and interpersonal relationships – e.g., excluding strangers and foreigners – rather than as concern for the entire universe of human being (Hui and Triandis1986; Hui 1988; Triandis et al. 1988; Triandis et al. 1990). By this narrow specification, Triandis might have removed the normative aspect of collectivism but reminded the need for a clear operationalization of the construct.

Second, Triandis explicitly distinguished the two different levels of analysis, individual and aggregate, and tried to link them by formulating personality attributes

[29] Triandis (1995, 43) defined a cultural syndrome as "a pattern characterized by shared beliefs, attitudes, norms, roles, and values that are organized around a theme and that can be found in certain geographic regions during a particular historic period."

[30] He further classified individualism and collectivism, based on the type of relationships, into horizontal and vertical ones, making four types of IND and COL.

variables corresponding to the cultural syndromes, that is, *idiocentric* for individualism and *allocentric* for collectivism, and utilizing the dimensional approach (Triandis et al. 1985; Triandis et al. 1988; Triandis 1994 and 1995). This methodological ingenuity is significant because it suggested the way we incorporate these cultural constructs of both levels of analysis in the same model and has facilitated the investigation of the implications of the variations in a dimension at one level of analysis for the other level, which the empirical analysis of the dissertation aspires to follow.

Third, as related to the second point and suggested by the transition from Hofstede's aggregate analysis, Triandis and his fellow scholars made a significant contribution to the way empirical analysis of culture chooses and frames the subjects of investigation. In a sense, he pioneered and established the psychological study of individualism and collectivism, that is, the study of how these cultural syndromes affect the psychology of the individual (Hock 2001). Examples of the subjects include the influences of individualism and collectivism on self-concept (Triandis 1989), social behavior (Triandis et al. 1990), well-being (Suh et al. 1998), and personality (Triandis and Suh 2002). It is worthy of note, however, that Triandis largely speculated the implications of these cultural syndromes for politics in *Individualism and Collectivism* (1995). Furthermore, the focus was on the political system, not on the individual psychology.

Schwartz expanded the horizon of the field by putting individualism and collectivism in the context of the basic human values. His original intention to study individualism and collection was to refine the then-dominant definitions of these cultural constructs by Triandis, which are characterized by the defining attributes discussed above.

In doing so, Schwartz drew on his universal values framework he had developed and has continued to do until now (Schwartz 1990, 2004, and 2006; Schwartz and Bilsky 1987; Schwartz and Bardi 2001; Schwartz and Boehnke 2004).

Defining values as "desirable, transsituational goals, varying in importance, that serve as guiding principles in people's lives" (Schwartz and Bardi 2001, 269), Schwartz advanced that there exist ten *universal* value types[31] on the individual level he confirmed empirically based on a series of large-scale cross-national surveys.[32] Based on the criterion of "whose interests it serves," he classified these motivational goals into individual type values, which "serve the self-interests of the individual, not necessarily at the expense of any collectivity" and collective type ones, which "focus on promoting the interests of others" but again does not necessarily ask for individual's sacrifice. For example, values such as hedonism, achievement, self-direction, social power, and stimulation are classified into individual type values while values such as prosocial, restrictive conformity, security, and tradition, are classified into collective types. He determined that maturity values belong to both types because they "serve both individual and collective interests" (Schwartz 1990).

Despite this largely dichotomous classification of universal value types, Schwartz made a strong case against it. The dichotomy of individualism and collectivism, argued Schwartz (1990), leads one to overlook values that inherently serve both IND and COL (e.g., wisdom), ignores values that foster the *universal* goals of collectivities other than

[31] Drawing largely on Rokeach's work, Schwartz theoretically derived the ten basic values that exist in all cultures, hence universal human values. The label of each value type is self-explanatory so no further elaboration is offered here.

[32] Since 1992, he has developed the Schwartz Value Survey (SVS) that involved more than 60,000 individuals in sixty four nations on all continents and measured fifty seven values.

in-group (e.g., universal values such as equality and social justice), and promote the *mistaken* assumption that IND and COL values each form coherent syndromes in polar opposition. Moreover, he did not assume that individual and collective interests necessarily conflict, as illustrated from the value type classification.

Granted, the first two rationales call for more rigorous definitions of the constructs, which Triandis appears to have agreed. As discussed above, Triandis attempted to rid normative aspects of IND and COL and emphasized the target-specific nature of the latter. In addition, Triandis (1995) recognized the third rationale, namely, the possibility of *orthogonality* of these cultural syndromes, which I will address in the final section of this chapter in detail.

There are two other points that Schwartz made needs to be addressed here because they also inspired the dissertation. First, he warns against *post-hoc* interpretation of empirical analyses (e.g., exploratory factor analysis prevalent since Hofstede) of IND and COL at both levels of analysis and puts an emphasis on the theory-based, *a priori* specification of the cultural dimensions. Schwartz claimed that he derived those individual level universal values and cultural value orientations – e.g., autonomy vs. embeddedness, egalitarianism vs. hierarchy, and harmony vs. mastery – *a priori* instead of relying on ecological factor analysis as Hofstede did (1990, 1994, 2004 and 2006). One can easily agree that a barefoot, *post hoc* empirical analysis would lead us nowhere because any outcome of the analysis should be wide open to interpretation.

Second, he maintained that the individual and cultural levels must be distinguished for both conceptual and empirical purposes. He emphasized that whether or not different values at the individual level or other cultural level values go together at

each level would depend upon the factors operative at each level.[33] For example, it would not be easy to find an individual who endorses the value of being humble and of authority at the same time. Yet a nation in which there is strong average endorsement for authority tends to be the one in which there is strong average endorsement of being humble. In a nation characterized by a hierarchical culture, there should be a large number of people who value authority and a large number of other people who value being humble.

Both Hofstede and Triandis have also acknowledged the need of separate analyses in terms of level but it is Schwartz who carried them out based on a large-scale cross-cultural surveys. Indeed, he extended his individual level value framework to the cultural level analysis of "prevailing value emphases" and presented a separate, *quasi-circumplex* value structure for each level of analysis.[34] He also distinguished and confirmed empirically different factors operating at each level that affect values at the corresponding level (for individual level see Schwartz and Bilsky 1987; Schwartz and Boehnke 2004 and for cultural level see Schwartz 2004 and 2006).

In sum, Schwartz's work has allowed us to acknowledge the need to approach culture from both levels of analysis, based on *a priori* theory, in order to gain a fuller understanding of the subject. We now appreciate the fact that cultural logic is different from individual logic. The question is how we should incorporate separate analyses into a meaningful whole, utilizing the results from both levels.

---

[33] According to Smith and Bond (2006), Schwartz here addressed one of the most central and vexing questions in contemporary cross-cultural psychology: "How can it be that when the same data are analyzed at two-different levels, the results are not the same?" (41)

[34] Each value type at the individual level and each cultural value orientation at the national level is placed in a quasi-circumplex structure, depending on the theoretical and empirical compatibility among the types and among the orientations, respectively (Schwartz 2004; Schwartz and Boehnke 2004). In a sense, he extended his disapproval of the simple dichotomy and orthogonality of IND and COL to the overall value structures.

Finally, I will conclude this section with Inglehart and Oyserman's work (2004) that suggested possibly one of the most important research agendas for cross-cultural psychology in the future as well as offered an integrative analysis of the works of Hofstede, Triandis, and Schwartz.

Indeed, Inglehart and Oyserman were not the first authors who identified the commonality among these authors and attempted to compare and contrast them. For example, Hofstede (2001) validated his individualism and collectivism (IDV) with Inglehart's cultural dimensions and postmaterialist values found that his dichotomy was strongly correlated with Inglehart's "well-being versus survival" dimensions.[35] He also validated IDV with Schwartz's cultural value categories and found that it was positively correlated with Schwartz's autonomy and egalitarian commitment and negatively correlated with conservatism and hierarchy.

Schwartz (2004 and 2006) contrasted his cultural value orientations with the works of Hofstede (1980 and 2001) and Inglehart (Inglehart and Baker 2000) conceptually as well as empirically. He first verified the problem of the "catchall" nature of Hofstede IDV by showing that IDV correlates with all three of his cultural dimensions. Schwartz then observed that Inglehart's conceptualizations of the two cultural dimensions – i.e., traditional versus secular-rational and survival versus self-expression – shared the elements relevant to his embeddedness and autonomy dimension. That is, Inglehart's survival and tradition pole of the cultural dimensions both stress conformity to the in-group, submission to authority, limits on individual expression, intolerance toward out-groups, and rejection of change, which characterize embeddedness while secular-rational

[35] In this second edition, Hofstede validated all his five cultural dimensions with other cultural works that involved similar cultural constructs published since the first edition.

and self-expression pole both stress the opposite, hence share the elements of autonomy. Schwartz, however, disputed the orthogonality of Inglehart's empirical dimensions because "the prevailing value emphases" facing societies should not be independent.[36]

Inglehart and Oyserman also demonstrated that Hofstede's IDV, Triandis' individualism-collectivism, Schwartz's autonomy-embeddedness, and the first author's self-expression-survival value dimension significantly overlap both conceptually and empirically. In contrast with Schwartz, these authors focused on survival/self-expression values, the one dimension that not only has been measured over a longer periods of time but also can help integrate all these disparate dimensions into a meaningful theoretical framework. In fact, Inglehart and Oyserman confirmed that only one dimension emerged from Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and it accounted for fully 78% of the cross-national variance of those cultural dimensions. This dimension is remarkably robust emerging with the different measurement approaches, different types of samples, and different time periods. Thus, Inglehart and Oyserman made a cogent case that these cultural dimensions, independently identified by Hofstede, Triandis and Inglehart, tap similar underlying construct that reflects the extent to which people give top priority to autonomous, individual choice over survival needs.[37]

Armed with time-series data of the World Values Survey, spanning from 1980 to 2000, the extrapolative use of which is justified based on the robust identification of the common dimension, Inglehart and Oyserman also attributed to economic development a

[36] As noted above, Schwartz offered a quasi-circumplex structure of basic value dimensions at both levels of analysis, i.e., individual and cultural. The issue of the orthogonality of Inglehart's cultural dimension is a methodological one and needs a further study, which is beyond the scope of the dissertation.

[37] Inglehart and Welzel (2005, chapter 6) confirmed the result.

shift toward the free choice aspects of individualism and away from the traditional survival aspects of collectivism. In addition, they argued that this cultural shift was conducive to the emergence and flourishing of democratic institutions.

Inglehart and Oyserman's work made a significant contribution in the psychological study of culture in that it illustrated the way how students of culture integrate disparate works into a meaningful theoretical whole both theoretically and empirically and how we can take advantage of data resources collected over a long period of time to investigate the antecedents and consequences of cultural shift, which should constitute one of the most important research agendas in cross-cultural psychology in the future.

Oyserman et al.'s (2002a) Meta-Analysis of Individualism and Collectivism

Oyserman and her associates has done so far the most comprehensive review of the empirical studies of individualism and collectivism in their "Rethinking Individualism and Collectivism: Evaluation of Theoretical Assumptions and Meta-Analysis" (2002a), which covers more than 250 different studies from 1980, the year that Hofstede published the first edition, to 1999.

This broad, meta-analysis attempted to answer two crucial questions tackled by a wide variety of approaches and methods from existing literature in the field: Are European Americans higher in individualism and lower in collectivism than people from other societies? [38] Are theoretically derived implications of individualism (IND) and

[38] Oyserman and her associates acknowledged that no systematic test of the underlying assumption that European Americans value or behave more individualistically than others despite of the seeming consensus that European Americans are the prototype defining individualism. This illustrates the problem that within-culture variations of individualism and collectivism have not been tested in general. For a notable exception, see Vandello and Cohen (1999).

collectivism (COL) for psychological functioning in the domains of self-concept, well-being, attribution style, and relationality, borne out in the empirical literature?

The authors began the analysis by providing an overview of IND and COL as cultural orientations. Instead of offering alternative definitions of IND and COL, they present theoretical core elements of each construct and elaborate on the constructs based on existing operational definitions. That is, the core element of IND is the assumption individuals are independent of one another while that of COL is the assumption that groups bind and mutually obligate individuals. Based on the content analysis of the items that make up twenty seven available IND-COL scales, they identify seven components of IND such as independent, striving for one's own goals, personal competition and wining, focus on one's uniqueness, thought and actions private from others, knowing oneself and having a strong identity, and clearly articulating one's needs and eight COL components such as considering close others an integral part of the self, wanting to belong to groups, duties and scarifies, concern for group harmony, seeking advice for decision, self changes according to context, focus on hierarchy and state issues, and a preference for group work. According to the authors, these components or domains account for 88% of items across each of the scales included in the analysis, which illustrates that they are core elements of the existing empirical definitions of IND and COL.

As for the first question, the answer is complicated than expected. On the one hand, Americans are individualists as defined by their response to IND scales and the way they define themselves, and what evidence they find convincing and motivating. On the other hand, it is equally clear that they are relational and feel close to group members,

seeking their advice, all of which represent collectivistic aspects.[39] The answer for the second question is not so definite that there is not enough evidence for the need for *multiple psychologies* rather than a single, general psychology. In other words, observed psychological effects[40] of IND and COL tend not to be large and not to be replicated. In addition, focus on either a particular country comparison or a particular aspect of psychological functioning in a broader domain jeopardizes the generalizability of the findings of the studies.

In answering these questions, this comprehensive study highlights two problems of previous studies of individualism and collectivism that inspired my dissertation. First, one cannot help notice that there has been a notable absence of the studies that examine psychological implications of these cultural constructs in the domain of political psychology. Among the large number of studies included in the meta-analysis, one can hardly find a study that either analyzes cultural influence on the individual attitude or behavior *directly relevant* to political issues or explores political psychological implications of the findings. As discussed in the section above, there have been the renewed interests in political culture for theoretical and practical reasons. Yet macroexplanation – that is, culture affects macro socio-economic phenomena – has been dominant at least in political science. This may have to do with the tendency of the discipline, especially in comparative politics, that focuses on macro political, socio-

[39] This is consistent with Markus's observation (2001) that the portrait of America a nation of rugged individualists is incompatible with the empirical evidence as unalloyed endorsement or rejection of individualist value statements was *quite rare* among the survey participants. He also cautioned that it would be equally erroneous to conclude that Americans today are predominantly communitarian in their impulses.

[40] The effects in the meta-analysis refer to main effect, i.e., size and direction of differences in IND-COL and moderator effects, i.e., to what extent, scale reliability, scale content, and sample composition influence size and direction of main effect differences.

economic outcomes and choose a country as the unit of analysis.[41] Thus, it is remarkable that a study that examines political psychological implications of individualism and collectivism is yet to be done even in the field of cross-cultural psychology, where academic focus has been on the way cultural frames influence individuals (Oyserman et al. 2002a). Therefore, the dissertation aims to examine political psychological implications of individualism and collectivism for the individual's attitude and behavior, largely absent from the previous studies of culture at the individual level.

Second, there is an issue of external validity in the current culture oriented psychological studies of individualism and collectivism, as Oyserman and her associates acknowledged. One would be hard pressed to justify that the findings could be generalizable to the real world when most dataset were collected from undergraduates and worse from 2-3 countries. According to Oyserman et al. (2002a, 6), over 80% of studies in the meta-analyses used undergraduates and the bulk of cross-national research comes from comparisons of American undergraduates that supposedly represent the West with undergraduates from Japan, Hong Kong, China, or Korea that supposedly represent the East. This may be attributable to the fact that they selected the studies based on such explicit keywords as individualism, collectivism, independence, interdependence, allocentrism, and idiocentrism, which should have narrowed the scope of the analysis. We can address this issue of generalizability by utilizing a large scale cross-national survey that is far more representative, in terms of the number of countries and respondents and the way samples are selected, than the studies included in the meta-analysis. For example, we have Hofstede's IBM data expanded by Bond and his

[41] Hofstede (2001) made a similar observation that political science focuses on the aggregate level of analysis under "the division of labor among the social sciences."

colleagues, the Schwartz Value Survey (SVS), Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness (GLOBE) research program, and the World Values Survey (WVS) available for this purpose. To increase external validity, this dissertation utilizes the WVS that has measured attitudes, policy preference, and political behavior as well as values, of random samples of the individuals from almost all over the world, at multiple time points across more than a quarter century from 1980 to 2007.

Other Issues in the Study of Individualism and Collectivism

I conclude the theoretical review chapter with revisiting some of the issues raised here and organizing them into three research agendas. In addition, I will discuss how I will address them in the empirical analysis of the dissertation.

Level of Analysis and Multilevel Analysis

Many cross-cultural psychologists since Hofstede have argued that different levels of analysis, that is, individual or cultural, need to be distinguished for theoretical as well as for empirical purposes. Hofstede who carried out the county level analysis of individualism and collectivism emphasized that his "ecological" or aggregate analysis should not be used to explain individual psychology. Theoretically, argued he, "cultures are not king-size individuals: They are wholes, and their internal logic cannot be understood in terms used for personality dynamics of individuals" (2001, 17).[42] Empirically, he made an arguable claim to the effect that cross-level inferences would

[42] This reminds us of Durkheim's social facts discussed above.

lead to a fallacy of one kind or another, that is, ecological fallacy or reverse ecological (individualistic) fallacy.[43] In a sense, Hofstede justified the reason why he focused on the country-level cultural analysis.

Triandis agreed with Hofstede in the sense that he advanced different terminology – i.e., allocentric and idiocentric as personality attributes of collectivism and individualism, respectively – distinguish the individual level analysis from the cultural level one. Triandis, however, has focused on the individual level analysis without systematically incorporating the information at the cultural level except for review works (1989 and 1995).[44] In addition, he approached the issue of level of analysis as a "measurement" issue rather than the one of incorporating the information gained at either level of analysis (Triandis et al. 1990; Triandis 1995, Appendix).

Schwartz also acknowledged the importance of distinguishing levels of analysis in gaining a complete perspective on culture. He conceptualized and tested empirically separate value structures at each level of analysis and then related relevant individual level universal values and cultural value orientations to corresponding aspects of individualism and collectivism. By doing separate analyses and hence focusing on the differences between two levels of analysis, however, Schwartz appears to fail to incorporate the results from different levels of analysis more systematically despite the fact that he has used his own large scale cross-cultural survey data (SVS).

[43] He even maintained that the ecological fallacy is a special temptation for political scientist while the reverse ecological fallacy for social psychologist (2001, 16).

[44] This may have to do with the fact that his work has largely drawn on the studies that compared samples from two to three countries.

Inglehart has clarified what involves the aggregate level analysis of culture and when we need it. In doing so, he corrected the widespread misconception about ecological fallacy. According to Inglehart, the fact that culture consists of individuals does not *invalidate* any findings about political, socio-economic implications of culture without supporting evidence at the individual level. In other words, he made a convincing case that some relations are entirely ecological and *only* exist at the aggregate level as ecological *reality* and thus does not need empirical support from the individual level data. For example, democracy exists only at the aggregate level so the assumption that the beliefs of individuals affect democracy only mean that aggregations of these beliefs – i.e., cultural level mass beliefs – affect democracy (Inglehart and Welzel 2003; Welzel and Inglehart 2007).[45] One can understand why he has defended and made a significant contribution himself to, the macro-level analysis of civic culture and cultural shift. In addition, Inglehart has called for a proper specification of the level of analysis based on what one attempts explain.

In sum, many students of culture agree that we need separate constructs and approaches, both theoretically and empirically, depending on the level of analysis in the study of culture. Considering the implications of the dominance of collective oriented definitions of culture for the psychological approaches, the effort of distinct, conceptual and operational definitions of culture has been in the right direction. Moreover, students of culture in diverse fields of study seem to have worked in the spirit of the division of labor. Yet they rarely seem to have attempted to incorporate the information gained at different levels so far. In other words, it appears that the choice of analysis for the

[45] Hofstede also noted that some ecological correlations reflect properties of larger social structure and therefore are meaningful (1980, 29). In the second edition (2001), he removed this acknowledgement.

empirical study of culture has been limited to either the individual or the aggregate level, avoiding fallacies of cross-level inference, that is, ecological or individual fallacy.

That being said, in this dissertation, I will draw on the multilevel modeling (MLM) in which the cultural as well as the individual level information is incorporated in the same model to explain individual level attitude and behavior. This is a new generation analytic technique in cross-cultural psychology that takes account of the fact that individuals within the same context – in this case, the same nation – tend to be more homogeneous or clustered to use the terminology of MLM than others within different contexts.[46] In addition, it accounts for the fact that in this type of nested data structure, the variations at the individual level should be explained by the information at the contextual level as well as at the same individual level (Oyserman and Uskul 2008). Hofstede in fact suggested that MLM could be used to avoid both types of cross-level fallacies and could "provide crucial insights into the working of social systems" (2001, 17).

I advance that the multilevel approach is most appropriate for the empirical analysis of the dissertation since it is reasonable to assume that political values, attitudes, and behavior of the individuals in the same country are more homogenous than others in different countries considering that they are raised under the same educational system and share the same historical experiences. Furthermore, my dissertation aims to utilize the information at both the individual and the country level to account for political psychology of the individuals in the integrative analysis. I will elaborate on MLM in the

[46] Multilevel modeling is often referred to as Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM), the statistical analysis that deals with this type of the nested hierarchical data structure. The World Values Survey, the main dataset the dissertation draws on is also organized in a hierarchical structure, the individuals nested within a country.

empirical analysis of the dissertation focusing on the methodological justification of multilevel modeling.

Contrasting Constructs of Individualism and Collectivism

In the study of individualism and collectivism, one of the most important theoretical questions that has profound methodological implications is whether the concepts of individualism and collectivism is bipolar and opposite or domain specific and orthogonal (Oyserman et al. 2002a).[47] In other words, students of culture have debated whether values, attitudes, behaviors of individualists are directly opposite to those of collectivist. Thus, bipolar opposition granted, if you know someone is individualistic then you can safely assume that he or she is not collectivistic. At the cultural level, they have debated whether knowing how collectivistic a country is allows one to predict how individualistic it is.

In the dissertation, I conceptualize and operationalize individualism and collectivism as multidimensional constructs at the individual level and as unidimensional and bipolar ones at the cultural level. A the individual level, the multidimensionality of the constructs have been supported theoretically by Triandis' arguments on multiple key attributes and the orthogonal classification – i.e., vertical and horizontal – of the constructs, Schwartz's circumplex structure of values subsuming individualism and collectivism, and Oyserman et al.'s content analysis of the existing scales. The target-

[47] In statistical analysis, independent variables are said to be orthogonal if they are uncorrelated or independent of each other. Social scientists have borrowed this term to describe the similar case where knowing the effect of one variable does not give any information about that of another variable, on the outcome of interest. Thus, two variables are not orthogonal if two variables are somehow related – positively or negatively – or simply opposites in an extreme case.

specific nature of collectivism also supports the domain specific conceptualization of the construct. Thus, Oyserman and her associate observed that "it is probably more accurate to conceptualize IND and COL as worldviews that differ in the issues they make salient" (2002a, 5). In other words, individuals can hold two seemingly contrasting cultural values at the same time and the activation of either value depends on the situation and the issue content they deal with.[48] Hofstede, who initiated the bipolar approach at the cultural level, also supported a multidimensional model at the individual level (2001, 215-216).

At the cultural level, it would be more reasonable to conceptualize individualism and collectivism as unidimensional since such collective attributes would be robust to short-term, situational cues unlike individual cultural values as the multidimensionality at the individual level suggests. In addition, the bipolar unidimensional approach at the cultural level has to do with the way students of culture have identified the dimensions of cultural syndromes (e.g., ecological factor analysis based on the aggregate survey data). According to Oyserman and her associates (2002a, 8-9), the bipolar single dimension approach seems to have been more popular even among researchers studying psychological implications of these cultural syndromes. The majority of the 170 studies included in their meta-analysis measured only one of the constructs.

The decision for distinct conceptualization and measurement is consistent with the results of existing studies (Triandis et al. 1988; Rhee et al. 1996; Triandis and Suh 2002). In practice, I will construct a separate index for individualism and collectivism at the individual level based on the World Values Survey and utilize the country level measures

[48] According to Oyserman et al. (2002b), we need social psychological research and the social cognition approach to examine situation specific and cognitive, cultural effects, respectively, as suggested by the domain specific multidimensionality of individualism and collectivism at the individual level.

by Hofstede and Triandis. The empirical analysis, however, will not incorporate the idea of orthogonality at either level as some existing literature suggested because it is an observational study and draws on a large scale survey dataset, which is vulnerable to spurious correlations.

External Validity and the World Values Survey

As suggested by Oyserman et al. (2002a), the study of cross-cultural psychology has been vulnerable to the issue of external validity, that is, whether we can generalize the findings from the research to the real world.

The criticism has been valid to some extent. The vast majority of empirical studies of culture have compared samples from only two or three cultures, usually operationalized as different nations (Schwartz 1994; Oyserman et al. 2002a). The study of comparative political behavior, where cross-cultural research of individualism and collectivism such as this dissertation belongs, has also had the similar issue. According to Jennings (2007), cross-national studies for investigating contextual effects have been confined to a small number of countries since the pioneering five-nation study of *The Civic Culture*. In addition, cross-national comparisons that examine individual-level effects typically involve convenience samples of college students, many of them participate in the study while attending a psychology course (Oyserman et al. 2002a). Moreover, experiment, preferred research method in psychology especially for establishing causality at the individual level, has often been subject to the similar criticism of generalizability because of its highly contrived lab settings.

The problems of the small-n countries/cultures, unrepresentative samples are inevitable due to the limited research resources. Furthermore, since obviously cultural or national level variables cannot be manipulated, experimental methods can only be applied to the individual level analysis.[49] One should also acknowledge the fact that these problems themselves will not make any findings of cross-cultural studies that utilize at least one of these methods not generalizable or invalid. As suggested by Oyserman and her associates' extensive meta-analysis (2002a), there is not *the* only one way but exist multiple ways, to learn the scientific truth. Any findings from one research method can be and must be verified by others from different methods. It is worthy of note that Hofstede also advocated such a pluralistic method tradition, that is, "methodological triangulation" (2001, 5).

To address the issue of the generalizability of the research findings in the spirit of methodological triangulation, the dissertation draws on the five waves (1981-2007) of the World Values Survey, one of the largest cross-national surveys of representative samples. Out of the whole dataset that covers almost 80 percent of the world's population, the dissertation uses the data from thirty OECD (Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development) member countries that largely consist of the wealthiest nations in the world[50] and many of which have the history of administering standardized, scientific opinion surveys. I will describe technical details of the dataset in the next empirical chapter.

---

[49] The discussion about intricacies involving experimental methods and the necessity of comparison methods in comparative politics, see Peters (1998, 1-5).

[50] According to World Bank, twenty one member countries belong to high-income economies while the remaining 3 belong to upper middle-income economies.

CHAPTER III

Political Psychology of Individualism and Collectivism

"Political psychology is, at heart, concerned with the characteristics of individuals and of situations that are most conducive to a successful political system" (Mutz, 2007, 80).

The aim of this chapter is to explore political psychological implications of two major cultural frames and values, individualism and collectivism. As discussed in previous chapter, scholarly efforts to examine the cultural effects on individual's political attitudes, policy preferences, and behavior, have been largely absent not only in political culture research but also in cross-cultural study of psychology.

First, following the tradition of the civic culture study, this chapter will assess the effects of individualism and collectivism on a series of variables that are conducive to stable, successful democracy: trust, tolerance, subjective well-being, membership, and national pride. Second, it will analyze the cultural effects on political interest and participation, subjects of which have been of inherent interest to students of political culture as well as of comparative political behavior. These two variables can also be deemed as components of social capital as they measure "civic engagement." In both analyses, I attempt to disentangle the effects of cultural factors at the individual level from those at the cultural level, which has not been explicit in previous political culture research.

Civic Culture and Democracy

Since Almond and Verba's (1963) pathbreaking study, students of political culture who attempt to go beyond the descriptive, typological approach have focused on identifying the model of political culture congruent with the structure of the political system, which leads to the stability of political regimes and to stable democracy in particular. The authors, based on the one of the first large-scale comparative surveys of the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, and Mexico, argued that the civic culture, a mixture of more traditional cultures such as subject and parochial ones with more modern, rational, participatory culture,[1] is "particularly appropriate for" and "most congruent with" democratic political system.[2]

Eckstein concurred and elaborated on this "congruence theory." He expected governments to perform well to the extent that their authority patterns are congruent with the authority patterns of society. Moreover, he advocated "balanced disparities" or combinations of democratic and non-democratic traits as a condition for effective democracy (Eckstein 1969 and 1997). In fact, Almond and Verba attribute civic culture as the prescription to democracy to this blending of apparent contradictions by Eckstein (Almond and Verba 1963; Almond 2002, 198).

Inglehart, who initiated the renaissance of the study of political culture in the 1980's, reinterpreted civic culture as "a coherent syndrome of personal life satisfaction,

[1] Almond (1980) traced the origin of the idea of civic culture to Aristotle's conception of mixed government that is organized on both oligarchic and democratic principles with a predominant middle class.

[2] According to Lijphart (1980), the wordings such as "fit," "most appropriate," and "congruent" suggest that Almond and Verba were aware of the causality issue in political culture.

political satisfaction, interpersonal trust and support for the existing social order" (1988, 1203) and found that high level of civic culture was strongly correlated with economic development as well as with stable democratic institutions (1988 and 1990). Inglehart could make a stronger case for confirming congruence theory because he used a body of evidence that not only was much larger than that available to Almond and Verba but also covered a number of years.[3] In addition, he reaffirmed the finding of *interdependent* relationship between culture, economy, and democracy with the expanded World Values Survey data in later work (1997, Chapter 6).

Putnam has distinguished himself in the study of political culture by seeking more explicitly conditions not only for stable democracy but also for *good* or successful one, that is, "strong, responsive, effective representative institutions" (1993, 6). Putnam's approach was also ingenious in that he focused on cultural variations within a single country – in one study, Italy (1993) and in the other, the United States (2000). His answers, however, are not something completely new: culture, civic culture in particular, matters. Based on a multi-method, comparative study of Italy's regional governments, Putnam demonstrated that the stock of social capital, defined as "features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions," (1993, 67) [4] was positively correlated with the performance of regional and local governments.[5] He basically replicated this finding

[3] For these works (1988 and 1990), Inglehart used Euro-Barometers (twelve countries 1970-1986), the World Values Survey (twenty five countries 1981-1982), and three nation panel study (the United States, West Germany, and the Netherlands, 1974-81).

[4] In this sense, his conceptualization of social capital is very close to Inglehart's civic culture as discussed above.

[5] Putnam (1993) proposed twelve indications of institutional performance or effectiveness such as cabinet stability, budget promptness, statistical and information services, reform legislation, legislative innovation,

utilizing the extensive data about the performance of state governments of the United States (2001). For example, the states with high stock of social capital tend to perform better in such areas as education, child welfare, economy, health, crime rate, and so on.

Drawing on these works of political culture and civic culture study in particular, this chapter will explore the effects of individualism and collectivism at the individual level as well as at the country level on a series of individual level variables that have been shown to enhance the performance of democratic political system: interpersonal trust, tolerance, membership, subjective well-being, and national pride. In other words, it will examine the effects of the major cultural frames and values on the components of civic culture and social capital at the individual level.

In addition, this chapter will evaluate the effects of individualism and collectivism on political interest and participation, both of which have been suggested to measure civic engagement as social capital. Combined with the analysis of the cultural effects on the components of civic culture and social capital, this will help us understand how at the individual level cultural factors contribute to sustaining stable or successful democracy. Moreover, this analysis is relevant to one of the central problems in Western psychology, the inconsistency between attitudes and behavior (Markus and Kitayama 1991, 24). By exploring differential implications of individualism and collectivism for political attitude and behavior, this analysis attempts to contribute to the discussion of one of the enduring dilemmas in psychology.

The empirical analysis of the dissertation, which makes up Chapter III and Chapter IV, utilizes the information from both the individual and cultural level data in the

---

day care centers, family clinics, industrial policy instruments, agricultural spending capacity, local health unit expenditures, housing and urban development, and bureaucratic responsiveness.

same model, the approach of which breaks from previous political culture research that have drawn largely on the aggregate level analysis. Therefore, I will explain first the rationale behind the statistical analysis used in the dissertation: multilevel analysis.

Why Multilevel Analysis?

There are two methodological reasons[6] why multilevel analysis is most appropriate for the empirical analysis of the dissertation: First, the problem of dependent observations within the same cultural context necessitates multilevel modeling (MLM). We can reasonably expect people who live under the same culture to think and behave similarly to a certain degree that they are different from people who live under different cultures. In other words, individuals within the same culture are not truly independent. Although they do not directly address questions from cross-cultural studies, MLM experts Kreft and Leeuw concur with this assumption: "The more individuals share common experiences due to closeness in space and/or time, the more they are similar, or to a certain extent, duplications of each other" (1998, 9).

The fact that the observations are not independent entails serious statistical consequences. It violates the assumption that the errors are independent, which underlies the standard linear models such as analysis of variance (ANOVA) and ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models. Thus, if we pooled all the observations ignoring the dependence among them and apply the linear models, it will deflate the estimated standard errors and hence produce spuriously significant results, i.e., commit Type I

[6] For substantive justification, see Chapter II.

errors.[7] In fact, it has been shown that a slight ICC (Intraclass Correlation Coefficient), a measure of the degree of dependence of individuals can dramatically increase the Type I error, especially when the number of observations per contextual unit is large (Kreft and Leeuw 1998; Steenbergen and Jones 2002; Bickel 2007).[8] Considering the fact that the minimum number of the observations per country in this analysis is greater than 1,000 (Greece, N=1,142), the concern about Type I error is particularly valid.[9]

Thus, MLM is appropriate because it attempts to explain individual level variation with the higher level factors as well as the same level factors, taking into account the fact that individual level observations are dependent or share variation (Steenbergen and Jones 2002).

Second, the empirical analysis of the dissertation is a response to increasing call for utilizing contextual information in comparative political behavior as well as in the psychological study of culture (Hofstede 2001; Seligson 2002; Jennings 2007; Curtice 2007; Oyserman and Uskul 2008). The typical dataset in comparative political behavior is structured hierarchically. That is, the individual level data (Level 1) are collected and organized according to a country (Level 2) as in the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) or as in the World Values Survey (WVS), which is the primary data source of the dissertation. However, cross-cultural studies as well as the empirical study

[7] Steenbergen and Jones (2002), for example, showed that most predictors of EU support became significant once they ran OLS regression ignoring the multilevel structure of the Eurobarometer survey that consisted of 15 EU member states.

[8] It can also be called a measure of group homogeneity. Formally, it is defined as the proportion of variance in the outcome variable that is between the second-level units with data having a two-level hierarchical structure (Kreft and Leeuw 1998, 9).

[9] According to Kreft and Leeuw (1998, 10), a small ICC (say p=0.01) inflates the Type I error rate from the assumed 0.05 to an observed 0.17 for groups of mere 100 observations.

of comparative political behavior have under-utilized the information from this unique data structure. As discussed in Chapter 2, most comparative political behavior studies as well as cross-cultural psychological studies have done either a separate analysis per each country or compared samples from only two to three countries. In other words, neither of them has fully taken advantage of the contextual information, the incorporation of which into a multilevel model is likely to reduce model misspecification compared with a single level model (Steenbergen and Jones 2002, 219). In addition, MLM takes into account not only the uniqueness of each context but also what they have in common by incorporating contextual information, what Kreft and Leeuw (1998) would call "borrowing strength."

In sum, multilevel analysis is superior to traditional alternative methods that address the issue of dependent observations within contexts. For example, either we could run a single analysis based on pooled observations without correcting for dependent observations at the lower level or do a separate analysis per each country and compare the results. However, the former will be likely to entail spuriously significant results while the latter will discard the information at the contextual level, i.e., the country level in this case, as discussed. Moreover, the need for separate analyses for separate contexts contradicts the premise that countries are related to each other (Kreft and Leeuw 1998). For example, one can arrange all the countries along the cultural dimensions of individualism and collectivism.[10]

[10] Steenbergen and Jones (2002) found that the conventional approaches – e.g., dummy variable model and two-step analysis, both of which are implemented in an OLS regression analysis – in political science for multilevel data are not satisfactory: Dummy variables are only indicators of contextual differences and do not explain why the regression regimes for the subgroups are different. The two-step or "slopes as outcomes" analysis implicitly assumes that the macro-level predictors fully account for contextual differences by specifying the error components at the contextual level to be zero.

Data

The World Values Survey

The empirical analysis of the dissertation primarily relies on the five waves of the survey data of thirty OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) member countries from the World Values Survey (WVS).[11] The WVS has been most extensive of the academic survey program. The first wave of the project was conducted from 1981 to 1984 for twenty countries by the European Values Survey (EVS) group and each wave has since been administered in approximately every five years, with an average sample size of 1,400 respondents per each country per wave. The second wave was conducted in 1990–1993 for forty two countries, the third wave in 1995–1997 for fifty four countries, the fourth wave in 1999–2001 for sixty two countries, and the fifth wave in 2005–2007 for fifty seven countries. Surveys have now taken place in almost eighty societies that represent all major regions of the world and plan to carry out the sixth wave of surveys in 2010 – 2011. All WVS surveys are conducted t in face-to-face interviews, using a standardized sampling population of adult citizens aged eighteen and over (Heath et al. 2005; the World Values Survey website (www.worldvaluessurvey.org)).

The empirical analysis of the dissertation draws on the data from thirty OECD countries in order to increase the number of observations included in the analysis. They largely consist of the high-income economies that have a history of administering quality opinion surveys. In addition, other macro-level measures such as government size and individualism and collectivism at the country are available mostly for these countries.

[11] East Germany is included as a separate country even after the reunification, making the maximum level 2 number of observations thirty one.

Table 3.1 shows the number of respondents per country and wave that are included in the analysis (N=151,734).

Constructing Individualism and Collectivism Index at the Individual Level

At the individual level, individualism and collectivism represent cultural values. They are *cultural* because they are shared among members in a specific group and transmitted from one generation to another within the same group. Triandis supported this idea citing Kluckhohn's definition of culture: "Culture is to society what memory is to individuals. It includes what has worked in the experience of a society, so that it was worth transmitting to future generations" (2002, 135). North (1990, 37) also concurred by citing Boyd and Richerson (1985, 2) on the definition of culture: "the transmission from one generation to the next, via teaching and imitation, of knowledge, values, and other factors that influence behavior."

In addition, individualism and collectivism are *values* because they are deemed desirable and reflect something durable and trans-situations by the members of a specific group. In this sense, these cultural values are distinguished from attitudes, opinion, and preference, all of which tend to be specific and short-lived. By using the term "values" to refer to enduring cultural orientations of an individual, the analysis follows the distinction made by Hofstede who reserved the term to refer to the comparable notion of culture at the individual level: "In studying "values" we compare individuals; in studying "culture" we compare societies" (2001, 15).

The World Values Survey has an item that satisfies these properties and has been measured across all the five waves: "Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any, do you consider to be especially important? Please choose up to five!"[12] This question specifically invokes the transmissional nature of culture by referring to "children" and "encouraged to learn at home" and implicates desirable value by asking respondents to choose qualities that they consider "especially important." Moreover, it invokes family, which has been repeatedly demonstrated as "a prime agent of socialization" in political socialization literature (Jennings 2007).

Based on the discussion in Chapter II about critical components of individualism and collectivism at the individual level, each cultural value index is constructed using the following additive formulas:

Individualism = independence + feeling of responsibility + imagination + determination and perseverance

Collectivism = tolerance and respect for other people + religious faith + unselfishness + obedience

Specifically, I draw on the definitions and core attributes of each construct suggested by Hofstede (1980 and 2001), Triandis (1995), Schwartz (1990), and Oyserman et al. (2002a) in particular. Oyserman and her colleagues suggested seven individualistic value components and eight collectivistic ones based on the comprehensive content analysis of existing scales. The former includes independent,

[12] There are other value choices that are not included in the analysis because they were measured only one of the waves or determined as not relevant to the cultural values of interest. They include good manners, politeness and neatness, honesty, patience, leadership, self-control, loyalty, thrift saving money and things, and hard work.

compete, goal, unique, private, self-know, and direct communicate. The latter includes related, advice, belong, context, duty, group, harmony, and hierarchy.[13] The analysis determines that independence and responsibility belong to "independent" domain, imagination to "private," and determination and perseverance to "compete." It also decides that tolerance and respect for other people belong to "harmony" domain and unselfishness to "related" or "duty" or "harmony," and obedience to "hierarchy." The analysis determines that religious faith be included in the collectivism index at the individual level although the item does not fit well in any of Oyserman et al.'s eight collectivistic content categories.[14] The rationale behind the decision is Schwartz's universal value types, among others. I maintain that religious faith, without invoking any specific denominations, belong to tradition, one of his collective value types.[15] Schwartz explained that tradition represented "respect, commitment, and acceptance of the customs and ideas that traditional culture or *religion* impose" and listed "respect for tradition, accepting my portion in life, and *devout*" as examples (1990, 144 *italics added*).

The analysis constructs each cultural value separately because their component qualities are conceptually distinct. As discussed in Chapter II, it approaches individualism and collectivism at the individual level not as bipolar unidimensional

[13] Refer to Chapter II for description of each domain.

[14] Note that not all cultural value items fit perfectly in Oyserman et al. (20002a)'s fifteen (seven individualism and eight collectivism) components, which account for 88% of items across each of the scales included in their meta-analysis.

[15] The items of the individualism index also fit in Schwartz's individual value types, derived a priori. For example, independence and imagination with self-direction that represents "independent thought and actions" and includes "creativity, independent, imaginative, intellectual" values, determination and perseverance with achievement that represents "personal success through demonstrated competence according to social standards" and includes "sense of accomplishment, successful, ambitious, and capable" values.

values but as multidimensional ones. Some previous research has even shown that they are empirically orthogonal, especially when they are measured separately at the individual level (Oyserman et al. 2000a). Considering the fact this analysis draws on a large number of cases (N=151,734), which is likely to increase the possibility of spurious correlation, I decide not to include both of them in the same model. The analysis also confirms a relatively high correlation between two indices (r = -.24). Table 3.2 shows mean and standard deviation of each index across countries along with the country level ratings of individualism and collectivism, which is the average of the measures by Hofstede (1980) and Triandis (1990).

Figure 3.1 and 3.2 illustrate that individualism and collectivism as cultural values show relatively little change across the waves per country, which suggest the static nature of cultural values.

Dependent Variables

Trust

The first dependent variable "Trust" is measured dichotomously "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?" Paxton (2007) proposed this as a measure of "generalized trust," which is a critical component of social capital. Although it has been measured in all the five waves of the survey, it does not specify a group of people trusted. The wording "most people" may be problematic because collectivism as individual value has been shown to be target-specific (Hui and Triandis1986; Hui 1988; Triandis et al.

1990).[16] Therefore, the second dependent variable for trust, "Trust Index," is constructed using a series of questions in the fifth wave. It is an additive index that is composed of five items, each asking whether respondents trust their neighborhood, people they know personally, people they meet for the first time, people of another religion, and people of another nationality. The answer choices include "not trust at all," "not trust very much," "trust a little," and "trust completely." Thus, the higher the score, the more a respondent trusts others in general. Note that this variable excludes "your family" in order to distinguish the family members from the others when it comes to the target of trust or trustee.[17] In addition, trust beyond the family members or "generalized others" to use Paxton's term, is what matters to civic culture and social capital.

Figure 3.4 shows the distribution of trust in general and Figure 3.5 the distribution of trust index across countries.

Intolerance

The five waves of the World Values Survey have a list of ten outgroups or stigmatized groups[18] that respondents might not want to live nearby. In this analysis, "Intolerance Index" is constructed by counting the number of outgroups or stigmatized groups respondents would *not* like to have as neighbors among eight out of those minority groups that have most observations throughout the waves: people of a different race and immigrants/foreign workers as outgroups and heavy drinkers, people with a

[16] This is discussed in Chapter II.

[17] I constructed another trust measure based only on strangers, that is, people they meet for the first time, people of another religion, and people of another nationality. The results were essentially the same so I decide to use "Trust Index," a more inclusive measure but without the family component.

[18] Each country can add specific minority groups to the list of eight groups, common to most countries across the waves. There are a total of 41 minority groups that the WVS has asked or been given by respondents over the five waves.

criminal record, emotionally unstable people, people who have aids, drug addicts, and homosexuals as stigmatized groups. Thus, the higher the number is, the more *intolerant* a respondent is. Figure 3.6 represents the distribution of intolerance index across countries.

Membership

"Membership Index" is constructed using the items of the first four waves of the World Values Survey to maximize the number of observations included in the analysis. The survey asks whether a respondent belong to a series of social groups out of which (1) social welfare service for elderly, (2) religious organization, (3) education, arts, music or cultural activities, (4) labor unions, (5) political parties, (6) human rights, (7) professional associations, and (8) youth work groups are included. This is one of the two behavior measures in the analysis, the other being "Political Action Index" below. Figure 3.7 illustrates the distribution of membership index across countries.

Subjective Well-being

Since the first wave, the World Values Survey has measured "feeling of happiness" by asking "Taking all things together, would say you are: very happy, rather happy, not very happy, or not at all very happy?" and "life satisfaction" by asking "All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?" on a 10-point scale. Following Inglehart and his colleagues (2008, 267), subjective well-being (SWB) index is constructed using two measures of satisfaction with life (10 point scale) and feeling of happiness (4 point scale) as follows:

SWB = life satisfaction – 2.5* happiness.

Thus, the happiest and the most satisfied respondent would have a SWB score of 7.5 while the unhappiest and the most unsatisfied one would have a SWB score of -9. Figure 3.8 shows the distribution of SWB across countries.

National Pride

Each wave of the World Values Survey has asked how proud a respondent is to be his or her countryman on a scale from 1 to 4, 4 being very proud and 1 being not at all proud. The analysis includes this variable as a proxy measure for the degree that a respondent is satisfied with his or her political system, one of the key measures of Inglehart's civic culture. Figure 3.9 illustrates the distribution of national pride across countries.

Political Interest

All the five waves have the same question asking "How interested would you say you are in politics?" on a scale 1 to 4 and this item is used as "Political Interest" variable. Figure 3.10 represents its distribution across countries.

Political Action Scale

The World Values Survey has asked a question throughout all the five waves whether a respondent "has done" or "might do" or "would never under any circumstances do" a certain, non-electoral forms of political participation: signing a petition, joining in boycotts, and attending peaceful demonstration.[19] Political action scale is constructed by

[19] Each wave of the World Value Survey have a series of voting intention/preference questions framed as "which party would you vote for" and "you would never vote for." Only the newest fifth wave has a question of whether a respondent voted in the recent elections to the national parliament. Initially, I chose the latter question as a measure of political behavior but decided to exclude it in the current analysis because factors crucial to the individual's voting decision such as institutional contexts (Jackman 1987) – e.g., compulsory voting and parliamentary or presidential system – and country and time specific stakes could not be controlled appropriately at the time of the analysis. The preliminary analysis without those factors found that cultural effects did not seem to matter in one's voting decision.

adding these 3 scale items, making the score of 6 mean that a respondent has done all these difficult forms of political participation, 0 mean that he or she would never participate in any of them under any circumstances. This is one of the two behavior measures in the analysis, the other being "Membership" above. Figure 3.11 depicts the distribution of political action scale across countries.

Independent Variables

Other than Individualism and Collectivism cultural value indices discussed above, the following independent variables are included in the models.

Level 1: Individual Level

Left-Right

This is a 10 category measure for ideological self-identification, 1 being left and 10 being right. Survey research has shown that left-right scale is a powerful summary or "rule-of-thumb" measure of political discourse at least in Western democracies. That is, it has repeatedly suggested that the majority of voters in most Western democracies conceive of politics in terms of a left-right ideological dimension and can readily place themselves on left-right dimension, more than a sense of party affiliation (Inglehart and Klingemann 1976; Inglehart 1997). This ideological self-placement variable is included in the model for national pride and political action scale where it is considered relevant.

Employed

This is a dichotomous variable that collapses full time (thirty hours a week or more), part time (less than thirty hours a week), and self-employed into "employed" category while retired/pensioned, housewife not otherwise employed, student, and unemployed into "unemployed."

Income

Income is measured on a 10-point scale, where 1 indicates the lowest income decile and 10 the highest income decile. It measures household income that includes all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes that come in.

Education

Education is a 10 category variable that classifies the groups a respondent belongs to based on the age when he or she completed education.[20] There is another variable that measures a respondent's education level by asking "the highest educational level that you have attained." However, the analysis selected the age based education variable framed as "At what age did you (or will you) complete your full time education, either at school or at an institution of higher education? Please exclude apprenticeships" considering the fact that each country has different education system and more importantly it has more observations (n= 127,657) than the former (n=88,086).

Gender

This is a dichotomous variable that classifies the gender of a respondent.

[20] The variable is missing for New Zealand, making the maximum number of level 2 observations thirty in the multilevel models. When the analysis draws on only the fifth wave data as in "Trust Index," I use an 8 category education variable instead to maximize the number of observations included in the model.

Level 2: Country Level

Individualism-Collectivism Ratings at the Country Level (IND-COL)

This analysis utilizes an independent measure of individualism and collectivism at the country level in addition to the corresponding measures at the individual level. That is, it relies primarily on the measure by Suh and his colleagues (1998). The authors averaged the country level measures by the two leading experts on the cultural frames, Hofstede (1980) and Triandis (1990). The analysis complemented their measure by filling in missing values with available ones by either author. Table 3.2 shows the ratings of Individualism-Collectivism (IND-COL) ratings at the country level.

In contrast with the corresponding individual level values, this country level variable is considered bipolar, unidimensional, as discussed on Chapter II. In other words, the higher the rating of IND-COL, the higher individualistic but the lower collectivistic culture a country has. Figure 3 illustrates the distribution of IND-COL across the countries (M=6.49, SD=1.83, Max=9.55, Min=2.4). It shows that the countries in the West (the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom) have the most individualistic cultures while the countries in the East (South Korea and Japan), the former Soviet countries (Poland and Slovakia), religious or still developing countries (Turkey, Portugal, and Mexico) have more collectivistic cultures.

There are three reasons why the analysis uses the existing measure of cultural level individualism and collectivism instead of the country means of those cultural values of the individual level as some multilevel modeling literature might suggest. First, I theorize the bipolar unidimensionality of cultural level measures in Chapter II as the aggregate measure based on Hofstede and Triandis reflects. The individual level cultural

value indices used in the analysis are constructed in a way that they can represent the multidimensionality of individualism and collectivism at the individual level. Thus, it is difficult to interpret substantively or claim the unidimensionality of, the cultural level aggregate means of these indices. Second, I attempt to test the internal validity of one of the most studied measure (Oyserman et al. 2002a). One can cast doubt on the validity of IND-COL – i.e., whether this popular cultural level variable measures what it is supposed to measure – if it fails to show expected effects on the individual's political attitude and behavior. Third, more methodologically, it has to do to with the fact that the analysis uses grand-mean centering in every model and hypothesizes not only the intercepts but also the slopes at the first level (i.e., the individual level) are random across countries. If we reintroduce the group means of cultural values as second-level (i.e., the country level) variables into a group-centered model, it will become equivalent to a uncentered, "raw score model" with a random intercept but with a fixed slope (Kreft and Leeuw 1998, 109). This means that each country has different intercept but the same cultural value effect across countries. This is not what the analysis intends. Grand-mean centering can get around this problem. I will revisit the centering issue in multilevel models section.

Government Size

Government size is measured by government share of real gross domestic product per capita in % in 2000 Laspeyres constant prices (Penn World Table 6.2).[21] This is an institutional proxy variable that is assumed to represent the degree of collectivism at the macro-level. Note that Markus (2001) proposed "limited government" as one of three

[21] East Germany is the only country that does not have the measure and is excluded in Model 2 and Model 4 in the multilevel analysis.

individualistic values in American politics. Thus, I theorize that the size of the government will reflect the aggregate demand or tolerance of such individualistic values.

Cross-level Interaction

There is one cross-level interaction variable in the analysis: individualism or collectivism at the individual level (level 1) multiplied by individualism-collectivism at the country level (level 2). The cross-level interaction variable is included in the models to determine whether cultural level effects interact to amplify or dampen corresponding cultural values at the individual level beyond the sum of the effects from both levels.

Multilevel Model Analysis

Multilevel Models

For each dependent variable that measures political attitude and behavior, I run four multilevel models in order to estimate the effects of individualism and collectivism, disentangling their individual level effect as cultural values from their cultural level effect as cultural frames. The analysis specifies that the intercept and the slope of the cultural value indices of the individual level (i.e., level 1 or micro-level) are random, that is, vary over countries in all the multilevel models. Two country level (i.e., level 2 or macro-level) variables, “Individualism Culture” and “Government Size” are introduced to explain the variations of the intercept and the slope of the cultural value indices of the micro-level. “Individualism Culture” is included in all the multilevel models and “Government Size” is included in Model 2 and Model 4. “Individualism Culture” is also used to estimate the

cross-level interaction effect with its micro-level counterpart, cultural value index of individualism and collectivism in Model 3 and Model 4. Thus, Model 1 is the simplest one as it does not have government size nor the cross-level interaction term. Model 4, as a full model, has two level-2 variables and the interaction term of the cultural effect.

The other parameter estimates of interest are variance components, the statistical significance of which is used to test the assumption that there exist differential contextual effects and that each context is a legitimate macro-unit of analysis in multilevel modeling. The estimation of the multilevel models is based on the independently pooled cross-sectional data of thirty OECD member countries over the five waves of the World Values Survey.

Grand-Mean Centering

All the independent variables including the dichotomous ones are grand-mean centered. There are three reasons why the analysis decides to use grand-mean centering. First, grand-mean centered model is a better choice because the primary goal of this analysis is to measure the individual as well as the cultural level effects of individualism and collectivism on the individual's political attitude and behavior. An alternative, group-mean centered model is considered a better choice when a researcher's primary interest is in measuring relationships between group-level independent variables and group-level outcomes (Bickel 2007). Second, the raw score model and the grand-mean centered model are "equivalent linear models," giving the same fit, the same predicted values, and the same residuals, while the parameter estimates can easily be translated into each other. Thus, it will facilitate substantively meaningful interpretations of the estimates. In contrast, a group-mean centered model is a completely different model from a raw score

one in the sense that they are not equivalent linear models as between grand-mean centering and raw sore model and thus need a different theoretical justification (Kreft and Leeuw 1998). Third, centering helps avoid multicollinearity in multilevel models with cross-level interactions. Indeed, students of multilevel modeling recommend that grand-mean centering is the best choice in most applications (for centering issues, see Kreft and Leeuw 1998, 106-114; Raudenbush and Bryk 2002, 30-35; Bickel 2007, 137-144).

Multilevel models in the analysis for this chapter summarized as follows:

Model 1: Macro-level Individualism without Cross-level Interaction

Level 1: Individual
Components of Civic Culture/Social Capital or Political Interest/Participation
$= B_0 + B_1$ Employment Status $+ B_2$ Income $+ B_3$ Education $+ B_4$ Gender
$(+ B_5$ L-R Ideology$) + B_6$ Individualism or Collectivism $+ r_{ij}$

Level 2: Country
$B_0 = G_{00} + G_{01}$ Individualism Culture $+ u_{0j}$
$B_6 = G_{10} + u_{1j}$

Mixed Model
Components of Civic Culture/Social Capital or Political Interest/Participation
$= G_{00} + B_1$ Employment Status $+ B_2$ Income $+ B_3$ Education $+ B_4$ Gender
$(+ B_5$ L-R Ideology$) + G_{10}$ Individualism or Collectivism
$+ G_{01}$ Individualism Culture $+ u_{1j}$ Individualism or Collectivism $+ r_{ij} + u_{0j}$

Model 2: Macro-level Individualism and Government Size without Cross-level Interaction

Level 1: Individual
Components of Civic Culture/Social Capital or Political Interest/Participation
$= B_0 + B_1$ Employment Status $+ B_2$ Income $+ B_3$ Education $+ B_4$ Gender
$(+ B_5$ L-R Ideology$) + B_6$ Individualism or Collectivism $+ r_{ij}$

Level 2: Country
$B_0 = G_{00} + G_{01}$ Individualism Culture $+ G_{02}$ Government Size $+ u_{0j}$
$B_6 = G_{10} + u_{1j}$

Mixed Model
Components of Civic Culture/Social Capital or Political Interest/Participation
$= G_{00} + B_1$ Employment Status $+ B_2$ Income $+ B_3$ Education $+ B_4$ Gender
$(+ B_5$ L-R Ideology$) + G_{10}$ Individualism or Collectivism $+ G_{02}$ Government Size
$+ G_{01}$ Individualism Culture $+ u_{1j}$ Individualism or Collectivism $+ r_{ij} + u_{0j}$

Model 3: Macro-level Individualism with Cross-level Interaction

Level 1: Individual

Components of Civic Culture/Social Capital or Political Interest/Participation
$= B_0 + B_1$ Employment Status $+ B_2$ Income $+ B_3$ Education $+ B_4$ Gender
$(+ B_5$ L-R Ideology$) + B_6$ Individualism or Collectivism $+ r_{ij}$

Level 2: Country

$B_0 = G_{00} + G_{01}$ Individualism Culture $+ u_{0j}$
$B_6 = G_{10} + G_{11}$ Individualism Culture $+ u_{1j}$

Mixed Model

Components of Civic Culture/Social Capital or Political Interest/Participation
$= G_{00} + B_1$ Employment Status $+ B_2$ Income $+ B_3$ Education $+ B_4$ Gender
$(+ B_5$ L-R Ideology$) + G_{10}$ Individualism or Collectivism
$+ G_{01}$ Individualism Culture
$+ G_{12}$ Individualism or Collectivism*Individualism Culture
$+ u_{1j}$ Individualism or Collectivism $+ r_{ij} + u_{0j}$

Model 4: Macro-level Individualism and Government Size with Cross-level Interaction

Level 1: Individual

Components of Civic Culture/Social Capital or Political Interest/Participation
$= B_0 + B_1$ Employment Status $+ B_2$ Income $+ B_3$ Education $+ B_4$ Gender
$(+ B_5$ L-R Ideology$) + B_6$ Individualism or Collectivism $+ r_{ij}$

Level 2: Country

$B_0 = G_{00} + G_{01}$ Individualism Culture $+ G_{02}$ Government Size $+ u_{0j}$
$B_6 = G_{10} + G_{11}$ Individualism Culture $+ u_{1j}$

Mixed Model

Components of Civic Culture/Social Capital or Political Interest/Participation
$= G_{00} + B_1$ Employment Status $+ B_2$ Income $+ B_3$ Education $+ B_4$ Gender
$(+ B_5$ L-R Ideology$) + G_{10}$ Individualism or Collectivism
$+ G_{01}$ Individualism Culture $+ G_{02}$ Government Size
$+ G_{12}$ Individualism or Collectivism*Individualism Culture
$+ u_{1j}$ Individualism or Collectivism $+ r_{ij} + u_{0j}$

A mixed model is a collapsed form of level 1 and level 2 models. B represents the fixed effect at the individual level except for the intercept (B_0) and the slope of cultural values (B_6), both of which are random, that is, vary over countries. G_{st} is the effect of the macro variable *t* (i.e., macro-level intercept, Individualism Culture, and Government Size)

on the regression coefficient of micro variable *s* (i.e., micro-level intercept and Individualism or Culturalism index). It represents the fixed effect at the country level. *r* refers to level 1 error and *u* level 2 error. The subscript *i* indexes respondent and *j* country. Left-Right self-placement is parenthesized because it is included only in the models for national pride and political action scale.

The analysis used STATA software and the restricted maximum likelihood (REML) method to estimate parameters. "Trust" is the only binary variable and the estimation is based on multilevel logistic regression model. Table 3.3 and 3.4 show the estimation results.

Hypotheses

The analysis focuses on (1) the statistical significance of slope and intercept variance estimates and (2) the effects of individualism and collectivism on the component variables of civic culture and social capital while disentangling their individual level effects as cultural values from the cultural level effects as cultural frames.

First, I hypothesize that the variance estimates of intercept and slopes of individualism and collectivism as cultural values are statistically significant across all the models. In other words, I expect that there exit differential effects of individualism and collectivism as cultural values at the individual level across countries. In addition, I expect the mean of each dependent variable when all the independent variables are set to their means – 0 in this analysis because of grand-mean centering – to be different across countries. Substantively, this hypothesis implies that each country is unique in that it has

the different effects of cultural values and a different baseline value for each dependent variable. In other words, this hypothesis is intended to confirm empirically that each context, a country in this analysis, is a valid second-level unit in the multilevel modeling analysis.

Second, the effects of collectivism on trust and tolerance are hypothesized to be negative while the effects of individualism on these civic culture/social capital variables are hypothesized to be positive.

Trust presupposes positive consideration of or sometimes even emotional investment in others. According to Paxton (2007, 48), trust implicates "a conscious or unconscious decision to place trust, arrived at through an assessment of trustworthiness of a potential trustee." Tolerance also involves consideration of others although it does not have to positive. Thus, trust and tolerance presuppose enhanced consideration of other regarding, collectivistic values such as relationship and interdependence.

A considerable cross-cultural psychological literature has shown that especially in collectivistic cultures, these values function only when one considers others in question as members of groups one identifies with, that is, members of one's own in-group. Moreover, it has been suggested that the distinction of in-group versus out-group is amplified and vital to collectivists (Hui and Triandis1986; Hui 1988; Triandis et al. 1988; Triandis 1989; Schwartz 1990; Triandis et al. 1990; Kitayama and Markus1991; Triandis 1995). Hofstede's definition (2001) of collectivism even specifies "strong, cohesive in-group" and "unquestioning loyalty" as its key components, as introduced in Chapter II.

In-groups are characterized by similarities among the members who share a sense of "common fate" with other members. In contrast, out-groups are characterized as

"groups with which one has something to divide, perhaps unequally, or are harmful in some way, groups that disagree on valued attributes, or groups with which one is in conflict" (Triandis 1995, 9). Defined broadly, the specific scopes of in-group and out-group depend on culture. That is, in individualistic cultures the in-group includes "people who are like me in social class, race, beliefs, attitudes, and values" while in collectivistic cultures it typically includes family and friends. Moreover, collectivists are inclined to view ambiguous groups as out-groups while individualists tend to view such groups as quasi-in-groups. Thus, most interpersonal behavior occurs within that huge in-group in individualistic cultures (Triandis et al. 1988; Triandis 1995).

That being the case, I expect the negative effects of collectivism on trust and tolerance especially when the target is deemed as not "one of us" and thus in an adversarial relationship with "us" by default. In contrast, I expect the positive effects of individualism on trust and tolerance for such huge, quasi-in-group members. In fact, Hofstede's validation analysis with the World Values Survey shows that individualism is positively linked with trust and trust at least at the aggregate level (2001, 191). At the individual level, it has been shown that Americans, typical individualists, were more at ease with strangers than others and more willing to trust others (Oyserman et al. 2002a).

Third, individualism is hypothesized to have a positive effect on membership while collectivism is hypothesized to have a negative effect on this behavioral component of civic culture/social capital.

According to Triandis (1995), as discussed in Chapter II, the constructs of individualism and collectivism can be distinguished along the dimension of personal-communal goal alignment. For example, one can identify collectivism when group goals

have priority and individualism when personal goals have priority. Thus, individualists are theorized to maintain multiple memberships to the extent that it helps attain self-relevant goals and that the benefits of participation exceed the costs. They are also hypothesized to leave and join groups as personal goals change. In other words, group memberships for individualists are impermanent and nonintensive.[22] Indeed, empirical literature found that Americans interacted with more groups and felt they could choose their groups more freely (Triandis et al. 1988; Kim 1994; Oyserman 2000a). In contrast, collectivists tend to stick with narrowly defined in-groups and family and close friends in particular, even when personal goals should be adjusted to be aligned with the goals of the group where they belong.[23]

Based on this observation, I expect that individualism is positively linked while in-group oriented collectivism is negatively associated, with the number of groups individuals join. In other words, individualism is hypothesized to encourage individuals to be joiners while collectivism is hypothesized to constrain individuals to stick to a relatively small number of narrowly defined in-groups.

Fourth, the effects of culture on subjective well-being (SWB) are hypothesized to be opposite and depend on the level of cultural factors. That is, at the individual level the effect of individualism (IND) is hypothesized to be negative while the effect of collectivism (COL) on this measure of subjective global evaluation of happiness is

[22] The multiple memberships in individualistic cultures may also explain the hypothesized positive effects of individualism on trust and tolerance. To maintain multiple memberships in diverse groups based on their needs, individualists might learn and internalize "equity" norm that discourages bias and favoritism and facilitates trust and tolerance.

[23] Triandis and his colleagues (1998, 325) observed that individualists make friends easily but by "friends" they mean nonintimate acquaintances (325).

hypothesized to be positive. In other words, I expect that collectivists are more likely to feel satisfied and happy while individualists are less likely to feel the same. At the cultural level, however, the effects are hypothesized to be reversed. Individualistic cultures (IC) are hypothesized to affect one's SWB positively while collectivistic cultures (CI) are hypothesized to affect one's SWB negatively.

Empirical evidence has shown that collectivistic people perceive that they receive a more and better quality of social support than individualists do. It has also suggested that people who have emotional support from others, more specifically from in-group members, are less likely to feel lonely but are more likely to feel happy, to be healthy, and live longer, which implies higher level of SWB. In contrast, individualism has been linked to high levels of alienation and perceived loneliness, which should be the symptoms of lower level of SWB (Triandis 1985 et al. 1985; Triandis et al. 1988; Triandis 1995; Oyserman et al. 2000a). Thus, I expect the opposite influence of individualism and collectivism at the individual level on personal life satisfaction, which is also one of the civic culture components.

At the aggregate level analysis, a body of empirical work has shown that individualistic culture is positively linked with SWB. For example, Diener et al. (1995), based on surveys from fifty five nations, found that the correlation between individualism and SWB was strongly and persistently positive even when other predictors such as income, equality, and human rights, all of which were positively correlated with SWB, were controlled.[24] Their individualism measure primarily drew on Hofstede and Triandis as the empirical analysis of the dissertation did. Veenhoven (1999) also found, based on

[24] The authors' data consist of Veenhoven's probability surveys and a large scale college student samples from 40 nations.

probability surveys of forty three nations from his "World Database of Happiness," that "individualization," a similar measure of individualism showed a clear positive relationship with quality-of-life measured by citizen's subjective appreciation of life. In addition, Hofstede (2001, 191) reported that his IDV measure positively correlated with happiness (r=.66) and life satisfaction (r=.58), based on the data of nineteen wealthy countries from the second wave of the World Values Survey (1990-1993).

Furthermore, Inglehart et al. (2008) showed, based on multilevel analysis, that "sense of free choice" at the country level as well as at the individual level positively affected one's subjective well-being. Although these authors' measure of cultural value and frame are mere one aspect of individualism of this analysis, their finding, along with the other works discussed here, provide a key rationale for why I expect reversed cultural effects at the national level. That is, I theorize that individualistic cultures would enhance individuals' SWB by providing favorable cultural environments where they feel more freedom of choice and control over their lives. Indeed, Inglehart et al. (2008)'s "sense of free choice" is one of dependent variable in Chapter IV and I will be able to provide the supporting evidence for this reasoning.

Fifth, I expect that the effect on national pride is negative while the effect of collectivism on this civic culture component is positive. That is, individualism is hypothesized to lead individuals to feel less pride while collectivism is hypothesized to lead individuals to feel more pride, in their country.

A growing body of cross-cultural psychology literature suggests that people in different culture tend to have different construals of the self or self-concept. In other words, individualism has been shown to facilitate the *independent* while collectivism the

interdependent, construal of the self.[25] Specifically, the former conception of individuality encourages "egocentric, separate, autonomous, idiocentric, and self-constrained" notion of the self while the latter "sociocentric, holistic, collective, allocentric, ensembled, constitutive, contextualist, connected, and relational" self-concept (Markus and Kitayama 1991; Kim 1994; Triandis 1995; Oyserman et al. 2002a). Markus and Kitayama also argued that independent construal of the self did not need others even including in-group members such as family and friends while interdependent self included them in the construal.

Thus, I theorize that collectivistic construal of the self encourages the individual to link pride, which is an attribute of the self, with the nation, which is a collective he or she belongs to while individualistic, egocentric self-concept discourages the conceptual connection.

Sixth, I expect that individualism and collectivism have opposite effects on political interest and participation, the variables in which students of comparative political behavior have had inherent interest. That is, individualists are less likely to be interested in politics and hence less likely to participate in non-electoral, difficult forms of political activity such as signing a petition, joining in boycotts, and attending peaceful demonstration. In contrast, collectivists are more likely to be interested in politics and hence more likely to participate in those difficult forms of political activities.

It has been suggested, as discussed in Chapter II, that the core attributes of individualism include independence, autonomy, and self-reliance. These individualistic

[25] Markus and Kitayama (1991) proposed that this differential construal of the self has significant psychological consequences in the domain of cognition, emotion, and motivation, all of which had been approached as the universal psychological functioning.

values help individuals interact positively in most interpersonal relations with "quasi-in-group" members because "truly reciprocal" interdependence presupposes actor's independence and awareness of shared interests with others. Thus, Waterman (1984, 65-69) hypothesized that individualism would be positively linked with such social attitudes as tolerance, trust, and cooperation, which is consistent with the one suggested above.

However, these individualistic cultural values have also been advanced to have negative effects on individual's social attitude and behavior when the issue and situation facing the individual involve a group as a whole including a broad collectivity such as society or government. In other words, individualistic cultural values function positively only when the situations involve *interpersonal* relationships. Collectivism should replace individualism when the situations involve *intergroup* relationships (Triandis 1995). Thus, individualism has been suggested to affect civic engagement in matters of public interest negatively (e.g. Sampson 1977; Merelman 1991). The decreasing stock of American social capital, extensively shown by Putnam (2000), has been suggested to support the reasoning (McBride 1998).

Specifically relevant to politics, individualistic cultural values that emphasize independence, autonomy, and self-reliance have been theorized to be central to "classical liberalism" and individualists' preference for *laissez-faire* when it comes to politics and the form of government in particular. According to Lukes' "political individualism," independent individuals are "the sole generators of their own wants and preferences and the best judges of their own interests" and therefore the purpose of governments should be "confined to enabling individuals' wants to be satisfied." The government should not "influence or alter their wants, interpret their interests for them or invade or abrogate

their rights" (1973, 79-80).[26] Markus (2001) concurred with this idea in the context of American politics and proposed "limited government" as one of the distinct aspect of individualism along with autonomy and self-reliance.

In a sense, those individualistic values function as ego-centric or self-interested orientations when individuals deal with a collective and the government in particular. Thus, I expect the negative effects of individualism on political interest and participation.

In contrast, collectivism is hypothesized to have a positive effect on these political attitude and behavior variables considering that in collectivist cultures the country as a whole could be relevant in-group.[27] In addition, collectivistic, group-oriented cultural values encourage individuals to align their goals to communal ones and thus they should have inherent interest in those goals (Triandis et al. 1988; Triandis 1995). In a sense, the expectation is consistent with the hypothesis for national pride.

Finally, I expect that the direction and statistical significance of the effects of cultural values at the individual level and cultural frames at the country level are aligned except for subjective well-being. For example, significant positive effect of individualism at the individual level on tolerance would be accompanied with significant positive effect of individualism at the country level. Thus, individualists who live in individualistic culture are expected to be most tolerant. Substantively, this means that in general individual's cultural values are expected to be aligned with the dominant cultural frame.

[26] According to Lukes (1973 Chapter 12), the other two component ideas of political individualism are a view of government as based on the individually given consent of its citizens and a view of political representation as representation not of orders or estates or social functions or social classes, but of individual interests.

[27] In collectivistic cultures, family and friends are typical examples of in-groups but neighbors, work groups, or even the country as a whole could become the relevant in-groups (Triandis et al. 1988).

In addition, I expect significant cross-level effects of the aligned cultural values and frames. That is, there would be synergistic, mutually reinforcing cultural effects from the individual and cultural level. For example, I hypothesize that a collectivist in collectivist culture feels *far* more national pride – more than sum of the net effects from both levels to be exact – because of the additional cross-level effect.

Results

All the variance components are statistically significant, which suggests that there exit contextual effects. As shown from the bottom parts of Table 3.3 – Table 3.18, all the variance estimates for intercept and slope are at least two times larger than their standard error (SE). In other words, it is highly likely that each country has different intercept and slope estimates of the cultural values of individualism and collectivism. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that each country is a legitimate unit of analysis in multilevel modeling analysis as well as in the study of culture. This finding is consistent with Inglehart and Baker's observation (2000) that the differences between the cultural values such as survival/self-expression and traditional/secular-rational values held by members of different religions such as Catholics, Protestants, and Muslims within given societies are much smaller than are cross-national differences. It is also consistent with Schwartz's observation (2004) that the cultural distance between samples from the same country was almost always smaller than the distance between samples from different countries. Thus, he supports the view that "nations are meaningful cultural units" (57).

For the other hypotheses, the cultural effects of individualism and collectivism showed up in general but rather with mixed results. First, the hypotheses about the effects of individualism on trust and tolerance appear to be confirmed in general. Individualism both as cultural value and as cultural frame seems to affect trust positively, whether it is measured without a reference to a specific group (Table 3.3) or with reference to groups of people other than family members (Table 3.5). Both the coefficients of individualism index (IND) at the individual level and individualism-collectivism rating (IC) at the country level are positive and statistically significant regardless of controlling for government size and cross-level interaction term of IND and IC. Moreover, cross-level interactions in Model 3 and Model 4 for Trust (Table 3.3) are positive and marginally significant (*p*-value = 0.07), which suggests that IND and IC interacts to produce additional positive effect – i.e., more than the sum of each net effect of IND and IC – on "generalized trust" or a sense of trust toward generalized others. It is worthy of note that only individualism shows cross-level effects and that "Trust" is one of the three domains that such statistically significant effects exit. The others include "Membership" and "Political Action Scale."

In addition, collectivism at the country level (CI)[28] shows negative effects on "Trust" and "Trust Index" across all the models, with or without cross-level interactions and government size, which confirms the hypothesis in general. All of them are highly statistically significant with considerable sizes ranging from -0.21 to -0.19 for "Trust" and -0.76 to -0.61 for "Trust Index."

[28] The country-level rating is reversed so that the expected effects are aligned across levels. This applies to all the models in the statistical analysis of the dissertation.

Yet the hypothesized negative effects of collectivism are not confirmed at the individual level (COL). In fact, all the models show significantly positive effects of COL on generalized trust although the coefficients are relatively small, all close to 0.05 (Table 3.4). The effects of COL on the more target specific measure of trust are also positive but not statistically significant with p-values ranging from 0.12 to 0.20 (Table 3.6).

The hypotheses for the cultural effects on intolerance are also confirmed. The coefficients of individualism at both levels in all the models for intolerance are negative (Table 3.7) while those of collectivism also at both levels are positive (Table 3.8) and all of them are highly significant with p-values close to zeros. In other words, individualism leads one to be more tolerant while collectivism less tolerant. The size of the government, a proxy variable for collectivism, also seems to contribute to intolerance but the p-values are rather large (p=0.10).

Second, the hypotheses about the effect of culture on membership seem to be partially supported. As Table 3.9 illustrates, individualist tend to belong to more groups and individualistic culture encourages this tendency despite the fact that the individual level effects (IND) are marginally significant with p-values ranging from 0.3 to 0.5. Yet there exist statistically significant cross-level effects as Model 3 and Model 4 show. Table 3.10 suggests that collectivism at the individual level (COL) also encourages more memberships as opposed to the expectation while collectivistic culture (CI) seems to discourage membership as hypothesized. The coefficients for both COL and CI are statistically significant and the absolute sizes are similar (0.11) for Model 1 and 2. In addition, the effects of COL are larger than those of IND. For example, the coefficients of COL are close to 0.11 while those of IND range from 0.03 to 0.04. Moreover, there exist

small but significantly negative cross-level effects in collectivism, that is, -0.02 for both Model 3 and 4. This may imply the total effects of collectivism on membership are indeed smaller than those of individualism, which is consistent with the hypothesis.

Third, the results seem to support the level dependent hypothesis about subjective well-being (SWB) in general. At the individual level, collectivism affects positively on one's SWB as expected (Table 3.11). In addition, the effects are statistically significant through all the models. It is worthy of note that in both cultures, income has relatively large, positive effects (close to 0.20) on one's SWB, which is consistent with findings from existing literature. At the country level, individualism seems to affect one's SWB positively (Table 3.11) while collectivism negatively as hypothesized (Table 3.12). Moreover, the effects are larger than those of income. The absolute sizes of the cultural level effects range from 0.32 to 0.37. Government size also affect one's SWB negatively, which also supports the negative effect of collectivistic culture on SWB.

Nevertheless, the hypothesized negative effect of individualism at the individual level on SWB was not confirmed. It seems to affect negatively one's subjective feeling of happiness and satisfaction as hypothesized but the effects are close to zero (-0.01) and are not even statistically significant.

Fourth, the hypotheses about the cultural effects on national pride are also partially confirmed. As expected, individualism as individual's cultural value (IND) seem to affect negatively on one's pride on nationality (Table 3.13) while collectivism as individual's cultural value (COL) positively on one's national pride (Table 3.14). This is significant because another possible "constraint" in mind, that is, left-right ideological self-placement, is controlled for in every model. The absolute sizes are similar – 0.4 for

IND and COL and 0.5 for ideology – and both are highly statistically significant.[29] As both tables show, however, the corresponding cultural frames (IC and CI) are not statistically significant. In a sense, the cultural level effects seem reversed as government size exerts relatively small but negative effects on national pride (-0.02). They are statistically significant.

Fifth, as in national pride, the effects of individualism and collectivism on the individual's level of political interest seem to exist as hypothesized but only at the individual level. According to Table 3.15 and 3.16, individualists do not seem to care about politics while collectivists do. In addition, the effects of individualism (-0.08) are four times as large as those of collectivism (0.02 or 0.03). Individualism and collectivism as cultural frame do not register statistically significant effects although the directions of the effect are consistent with the relevant hypotheses.

Finally, the hypotheses about the effects of the cultural values and frames on political participation are disconfirmed. Individualism at both levels seems to affect political action scale positively, which implies that individualists are more likely to participate in non-electoral, difficult forms of political activity and the corresponding cultural frame seems to encourage this behavioral tendency. There also exist cross-level effects as shown in Model 3 and 4 (Table 3.17). Collectivism at the country level (CI) also seems to disconfirm the hypothesis (Table 3.18). The collectivistic culture appears to discourage people from involvement with actions in matters of public concerns. The effects are relatively large, close to -0.16, and statistically significant. Collectivism at the

[29] The analysis did not hypothesize the effect of ideology but it seems to confirm conventional notion of the term. That is, the results show that the right are positively linked with national pride. Kim and Fording (1998) suggested "national way of life" as one of the Rightist categories.

individual level (COL) seems to have a positive effect on political action scale but the coefficients are not statistically significant. It is worthy of note that the left seem to be more politically active. The absolute size of the coefficients of the Left-Right ideological self-placement is similar to that of the coefficients of education. For individualism (Table 3.17), the coefficient for education is 0.12 and that for ideology is 0.13 and for collectivism (Table 3.18), both are 0.14.

Discussion

The empirical analysis of the dissertation is based on the premise that culture affects individuals' political psychology via internalized cultural values and as "human-made" environments under which they think and act. This chapter attempted to identify the effects of individualism and collectivism, which have been proposed as the central cultural dimensions in cross-cultural psychology literature, on the individual's political attitude and behavior relevant to the theory of civic culture and social capital, while distinguishing the cultural and individual level effects. The results of multilevel analysis show that in general individualism and collectivism matter both for the elements of civic culture and social capital. The significant cultural effects show up either at one level of analysis or at both.

Having said that, I speculate on some of the reasons for the unexpected results and alternative interpretation of some of the findings in the concluding section.

First, a future analysis may need to reconceptualize and re-operationalize the definition of collectivism at the individual level in a way that emphasizes the component of close in-groups and family in particular rather than the abstract notion of

interdependent, group- and relation- centered aspects. This will increase conceptual consistency across the levels.

The confirmation of the hypothesized negative effects of collectivism at the cultural level in the domain of trust, tolerance, and membership in fact strengthens the case of "family and close friends" specific nature of collectivism made by Triandis and his colleagues, among others (Hui and Triandis1986; Hui 1988; Triandis et al. 1988; Triandis et al. 1990). The family and close in-group component of collectivism might also explain the sizable negative effect of collectivism at the cultural level on political participation.[30] Indeed, Triandis and his colleagues claimed that collectivists tend toward actions that benefit the family rather than the broad public good particularly if they are centered on the family as their major collective. Thus, according to these authors, "perhaps the major disadvantage of collectivism is in the political domain" (1988, 328).[31]

In addition, the unexpected positive effects of collectivism at the individual level on generalized trust and membership may be attributable to the fact that collectivism index contains "tolerance and respect for others" as one of the components. It seems that collectivists still interpret "others" in this question as in-group members especially considering the fact that collectivism at both levels affects tolerance negatively (Table 3.8). Nevertheless, people may approach this relational, other-regarding cultural value as a universal norm, not specifically tied to their close in-group members.

[30] In fact, Allik and Realo (2004) showed that individualism, not collectivism, was strongly positively associated with political activity as well as civic engagement. Their aggregate level analysis draws on the state level data of the United States and the second wave (1990-1991) of the World Values Survey.

[31] The authors invoked Banfield (1958), who attributed the lack of trust and cooperation for common good in a small town in southern Italy to the ethos of "amoral familism" that only encouraged the material, short-run advantage of the nuclear family.

Yet the emphasis on the family in the definition of collectivism should not go too far as the evidence is not definitive. As cultural value at the individual level, collectivism seems to enhance national pride and political interest, whose targets are bigger than one's family. In addition, we should note that family is also a critical component in the definition of individualism as suggested by Hofstede: "everyone is expected to look after him/herself and her/his immediate family only" (2001, 225). In fact, the concept of self in individualism and the West in general subsumes one's immediate family according to self-interest literature (Kinder and Kiewiet 1981; Kinder 1998). Then, the question is under what conditions or situations, collectivists identify non-familial groups or collectives as close in-groups and collectivists cultures encourage individuals to do so.

The confirmed result of the level dependent, reversed cultural effects on subjective well-being (SWB) emphasizes the need to incorporate major cultural dimensions into a unifying theoretical framework for cross-cultural analysis, as proposed by Inglehart and Oyserman (2004) and Schwartz (2004). They have found that Hofstede and Triandis' individualism and collectivism, Schwartz's autonomy and embeddedness, and Inglehart's self-expression and survival, the major cultural dimensions at the aggregate level proposed so far, significantly overlap both theoretically and empirically. In a sense, they constitute "cultural syndromes," that is, patterns of shared attitudes, beliefs, and values organized around a theme (Triandis 1996). Thus, self-expression value that emphasizes "freedom and choice," as a societal condition could be introduced to facilitate reasoning for the positive effects of individualism at the cultural level on individual's SWB. In addition, Inglehart's finding (1997) that Postmaterialists seek relatively demanding, non-material standards for the quality of life appears to strengthen

the case for the hypothesized but unconfirmed negative effect of individualism on SWB at the individual level.[32]

In some cases where only individual level cultural effects show up, individuals might internalize cultural values so distinctively as their own that they may not need additional, societal pressure whether or not they are aware of it. National pride and political interest are cases in point. The divergent level effects should weaken the case for the alignment hypothesis that the effect of culture at the individual level is in the same direction of that of culture at the aggregate. To test the hypothesis further, we need to look more closely at political socialization and acculturation process in particular where individuals learn and internalize the dominant cultural norms.

Finally, the divergent results between political interest and action – that is, individualism discourages political interests while encourages difficult forms of political participation – call for a serious theoretical consideration about the discrepancy between attitude and behavior in a non-experimental setting as in this observational study. The discrepancy may be due to a different level of specificity in the attitudinal and behavioral measures, as Inglehart (1997, 51-52) suggested as a reason for low levels of attitude-behavior consistency. In other words, global cultural values and frames may be good at predicting global political interest but not specific political behavior. In addition to the measurement specificity issue, a future research agenda should include what motivates individualists to act against their apparent disinterest in politics and why collectivists do not follow up their revealed interest in public matters with actions.

[32] Inglehart reasoned that economic prosperity throughout the formative years would allow Postmaterialists to take economic security for granted and go on to emphasize those non-material, demanding goals and standards.

Table 3.1. The Number of Observations for Country by Wave

Country\Wave	1981-84	1989-93	1994-99	1999-04	2005-07	Total N
Australia	1,228	0	2,048	0	1,421	4,697
Austria	0	1,460	0	1,522	0	2,982
Belgium	1,145	2,792	0	1,912	0	5,849
Canada	1,254	1,730	0	1,931	2,148	7,063
Czech Republic	0	3,033	1,147	1,908	0	6,088
Denmark	1,182	1,030	0	1,023	0	3,235
Finland	0	588	987	1,038	1,014	3,627
France	1,200	1,002	0	1,615	1,001	4,818
Greece	0	0	0	1,142	0	1,142
Hungary	1,464	999	650	1,000	0	4,113
Iceland	927	702	0	968	0	2,597
Ireland	1,217	1,000	0	1,012	0	3,229
Italy	1,348	2,018	0	2,000	1,012	6,378
Japan	1,204	1,011	1,054	1,362	1,096	5,727
South Korea	970	1,251	1,249	1,200	1,200	5,870
Luxembourg	0	0	0	1,211	0	1,211
Mexico	0	1,531	2,364	1,535	1,560	6,990
Netherlands	1,221	1,017	0	1,003	1,050	4,291
New Zealand	0	0	1,201	0	954	2,155
Norway	1,051	1,239	1,127	0	1,025	4,442
Poland	0	1,920	1,153	1,095	1,000	5,168
Portugal	0	1,185	0	1,000	0	2,185
Slovakia	0	1,602	1,095	1,331	0	4,028
Spain	2,303	4,147	1,211	2,409	1,200	11,270
Sweden	954	1,047	1,009	1,015	1,003	5,028
Switzerland	0	1,400	1,212	0	1,241	3,853
Turkey	0	1,030	1,907	4,607	1,346	8,890
Great Britain	1,167	1,484	1,093	1,000	1,041	5,785
United States	2,325	1,839	1,542	1,200	1,249	8,155
West Germany	1,305	2,101	1,017	1,037	988	6,448
East Germany	0	1,336	1,009	999	1,076	4,420
Total N	23,465	41,494	24,075	39,075	23,625	151,734

Source: World Values Survey. 2009. “1981-2008 Unofficial Aggregate.” World Values Survey Association (www.worldvaluessurvey.org). Aggregate File Producer: ASEP/JDS, Madrid.

Table 3.2. Individualism and Collectivism Index with Country Level Ratings

	Individualism		Collectivism		Country
Country	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	IND-COL*
Australia	1.72	1.11	1.80	0.89	9
Austria	2.14	0.96	1.18	0.74	6.75
Belgium	1.58	1.07	1.50	0.91	7.25
Canada	1.84	0.99	1.76	0.90	8.5
Czech Republic	1.52	0.87	1.27	0.77	7
Denmark	2.00	0.99	1.41	0.77	7.7
Finland	2.29	0.94	1.48	0.76	7.15
France	1.50	1.02	1.62	0.85	7.05
Greece	2.17	0.95	1.28	0.87	5.25
Hungary	1.59	0.95	1.23	0.88	6
Iceland	1.97	1.18	1.69	1.14	7
Ireland	1.20	1.01	1.94	0.97	6
Italy	1.58	0.97	1.58	0.94	6.8
Japan	2.33	0.99	1.16	0.79	4.3
South Korea	2.02	0.94	0.95	0.79	2.4
Luxembourg	1.91	0.99	1.47	0.88	6
Mexico	1.83	0.98	1.99	1.03	4
Netherlands	1.79	1.02	1.42	0.80	8.5
New Zealand	1.89	1.09	1.53	0.94	7.9
Norway	2.28	1.00	1.14	0.73	6.95
Poland	1.43	0.88	1.85	0.80	5
Portugal	1.31	0.89	1.73	0.82	3.85
Slovakia	1.45	0.90	1.38	0.84	5.2
Spain	1.60	0.96	1.42	0.85	5.55
Sweden	2.08	1.02	1.36	0.67	7.55
Switzerland	2.32	1.07	1.56	0.80	7.9
Turkey	1.36	0.93	1.71	0.85	3.7
Great Britain	1.45	1.07	1.89	0.91	8.95
United States	1.65	1.06	1.83	1.02	9.55
West Germany	2.22	1.04	1.08	0.73	7.35
East Germany	2.33	0.94	1.13	0.66	6
Total	1.78	1.04	1.50	0.90	6.49

Individualism Index = independence + feeling of responsibility + imagination + determination and perseverance
Collectivism Index = tolerance and respect for other people + religious faith + unselfishness + obedience

*Source: Suh et al. (1998). "The shifting basis of life satisfaction judgments across cultures: Emotions versus norms." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 74 (2): 482-493. Authors averaged the country level measures by Hofstede (1980) and Triandis (1990) when both were available and used available one if either one is missing.

Figure 3.1. Individualism in OECD Countries over the Five Waves of the World Values Survey



Figure 3.2. Collectivism in OECD Countries over the Five Waves of the World Values Survey



Figure 3.3. Individualism-Collectivism Ratings at the Country Level



Source: Suh, et al. 1998. "The shifting basis of life satisfaction judgments across cultures: Emotions versus norms." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 74 (2):482-93.

Figure 3.4. Trust in General



Figure 3.5. Trust Index



Figure 3.6. Intolerance Index



Figure 3.7. Membership Index



Figure 3.8. Subjective Well-Being



Figure 3.9. How Proud of Nationality



Figure 3.10. Political Interest



Figure 3.11. Political Action Index



Table 3.3.Effect of Individualism on Trust

	Model 1 N_1=99,656 N_2=30			Model 2 N_1=96,909 N_2=29			Model 3 N_1=99,656 N_2=30			Model 4 N_1=96,909 N_2=29		
	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value
Individual Level												
Employed	0.06	0.02	0.00	0.06	0.02	0.00	0.06	0.02	0.00	0.06	0.02	0.00
Income	0.06	0.00	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.00
Education	0.07	0.00	0.00	0.07	0.00	0.00	0.07	0.00	0.00	0.07	0.00	0.00
Male	0.01	0.01	0.56	0.01	0.01	0.69	0.01	0.01	0.55	0.01	0.01	0.67
Individualism (IND)	0.13	0.02	0.00	0.13	0.02	0.00	0.13	0.02	0.00	0.13	0.02	0.00
Constant	-0.66	0.08	0.00	-0.66	0.09	0.00	-0.66	0.08	0.00	-0.66	0.09	0.00
Cross-level Interaction												
IND*IC							0.02	0.01	0.07	0.02	0.01	0.07
Country Level												
Individualism-Collectivism (IC)	0.17	0.05	0.00	0.17	0.05	0.00	0.20	0.05	0.00	0.20	0.05	0.00
Size of the Government				0.00	0.02	0.86				0.00	0.02	0.86
Variance Component												
Variance Slope Individualism	0.01	0.00		0.01	0.00		0.01	0.00		0.01	0.00	
Variance Intercept	0.21	0.06		0.22	0.06		0.21	0.05		0.22	0.06	
Covariance	0.02	0.01		0.02	0.01		0.02	0.01		0.02	0.01	

Note: N_1 is the number of level 1 observations and N_2 is the number of level 2 observations.

Table 3.4. Effect of Collectivism on Trust

	Model 1 N_1=99,656 N_2=30			Model 2 N_1=96,909 N_2=29			Model 3 N_1=99,656 N_2=30			Model 4 N_1=96,909 N_2=29		
	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value
Individual Level												
Employed	0.09	0.02	0.00	0.09	0.02	0.00	0.09	0.02	0.00	0.09	0.02	0.00
Income	0.06	0.00	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.00
Education	0.08	0.00	0.00	0.08	0.00	0.00	0.08	0.00	0.00	0.08	0.00	0.00
Male	0.00	0.01	0.83	0.00	0.01	0.96	0.00	0.01	0.83	0.00	0.01	0.96
Collectivism (COL)	0.05	0.02	0.00	0.05	0.02	0.01	0.05	0.02	0.00	0.05	0.02	0.01
Constant	-0.63	0.09	0.00	-0.63	0.09	0.00	-0.63	0.09	0.00	-0.63	0.09	0.00
Cross-level Interaction												
COL*CI							0.00	0.01	0.87	0.00	0.01	0.84
Country Level												
Collectivism-Individualism (CI)	-0.19	0.05	0.00	-0.20	0.05	0.00	-0.20	0.05	0.00	-0.21	0.05	0.00
Size of the Government				-0.02	0.02	0.29				-0.02	0.02	0.29
Variance Component												
Variance Slope Individualism	0.01	0.00		0.01	0.00		0.01	0.00		0.01	0.00	
Variance Intercept	0.24	0.06		0.25	0.07		0.24	0.06		0.25	0.07	
Covariance	0.01	0.01		0.02	0.01		0.01	0.01		0.02	0.01	

Note: N_1 is the number of level 1 observations and N_2 is the number of level 2 observations.

Table 3.5.Effect of Individualism on Trust Index

	Model 1 N_1=16,967 N_2=18			Model 2 N_1=16,139 N_2=17			Model 3 N_1=16,967 N_2=18			Model 4 N_1=16,139 N_2=17		
	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value
Individual Level												
Employed	-0.33	0.06	0.00	-0.32	0.06	0.00	-0.33	0.06	0.00	-0.32	0.06	0.00
Income	0.12	0.01	0.00	0.12	0.01	0.00	0.12	0.01	0.00	0.12	0.01	0.00
Education	0.24	0.01	0.00	0.23	0.02	0.00	0.24	0.01	0.00	0.23	0.02	0.00
Male	0.00	0.06	0.99	-0.01	0.06	0.91	0.00	0.06	0.99	-0.01	0.06	0.90
Individualism (IND)	0.20	0.06	0.00	0.20	0.06	0.00	0.20	0.06	0.00	0.20	0.07	0.00
Constant	16.43	0.34	0.00	16.68	0.37	0.00	16.43	0.34	0.00	16.68	0.37	0.00
Cross-level Interaction												
IND*IC							-0.01	0.03	0.71	-0.01	0.03	0.71
Country Level												
Individualism-Collectivism (IC)	0.74	0.17	0.00	0.65	0.18	0.00	0.73	0.17	0.00	0.64	0.18	0.00
Size of the Government				0.14	0.09	0.13				0.14	0.09	0.13
Variance Component												
Variance Slope Individualism	0.05	0.02		0.05	0.02		0.05	0.02		0.05	0.03	
Variance Intercept	2.03	0.73		1.95	0.75		2.03	0.73		1.95	0.75	
Covariance	0.02	0.09		0.04	0.09		0.03	0.09		0.04	0.10	
Variance Residual	13.16	0.14		13.13	0.15		13.16	0.14		13.13	0.15	

Note: N_1 is the number of level 1 observations and N_2 is the number of level 2 observations.

Table 3.6.Effect of Collectivism on Trust Index

	Model 1 N_1=16,967 N_2=18			Model 2 N_1=16,139 N_2=17			Model 3 N_1=16,967 N_2=18			Model 4 N_1=16,139 N_2=17		
	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value
Individual Level												
Employed	-0.31	0.06	0.00	-0.30	0.06	0.00	-0.31	0.06	0.00	-0.30	0.06	0.00
Income	0.13	0.01	0.00	0.13	0.01	0.00	0.13	0.01	0.00	0.13	0.01	0.00
Education	0.26	0.01	0.00	0.25	0.02	0.00	0.26	0.01	0.00	0.25	0.02	0.00
Male	0.00	0.06	0.99	0.00	0.06	0.95	0.00	0.06	0.99	0.00	0.06	0.94
Collectivism (COL)	0.11	0.07	0.12	0.10	0.07	0.16	0.10	0.07	0.15	0.09	0.07	0.20
Constant	16.53	0.36	0.00	16.80	0.39	0.00	16.54	0.36	0.00	16.82	0.39	0.00
Cross-level Interaction												
COL*CI							-0.05	0.03	0.11	-0.05	0.03	0.12
Country Level												
Collectivism-Individualism (CI)	-0.76	0.18	0.00	-0.69	0.18	0.00	-0.71	0.18	0.00	-0.61	0.19	0.00
Size of the Government				0.16	0.09	0.09				0.16	0.09	0.09
Variance Component												
Variance Slope Individualism	0.06	0.03		0.07	0.03		0.05	0.03		0.06	0.03	
Variance Intercept	2.21	0.79		2.21	0.85		2.20	0.79		2.19	0.84	
Covariance	-0.08	0.12		-0.13	0.13		-0.08	0.11		-0.12	0.12	
Variance Residual	13.19	0.14		13.17	0.15		13.19	0.14		13.17	0.15	

Note: N_1 is the number of level 1 observations and N_2 is the number of level 2 observations.

Table 3.7.Effect of Individualism on Intolerance

	Model 1 N_1=65,691 N_2=29			Model 2 N_1=63,727 N_2=28			Model 3 N_1=65,691 N_2=29			Model 4 N_1=63,727 N_2=28		
	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value
Individual Level												
Employed	-0.18	0.02	0.00	-0.18	0.02	0.00	-0.18	0.02	0.00	-0.18	0.02	0.00
Income	-0.01	0.00	0.08	-0.01	0.00	0.05	-0.01	0.00	0.08	-0.01	0.00	0.05
Education	-0.08	0.00	0.00	-0.08	0.00	0.00	-0.08	0.00	0.00	-0.08	0.00	0.00
Male	0.10	0.02	0.00	0.10	0.02	0.00	0.10	0.02	0.00	0.10	0.02	0.00
Individualism (IND)	-0.13	0.02	0.00	-0.14	0.03	0.00	-0.14	0.02	0.00	-0.14	0.02	0.00
Constant	2.89	0.14	0.00	2.91	0.14	0.00	2.89	0.14	0.00	2.90	0.15	0.00
Cross-level Interaction												
IND*IC							0.02	0.02	0.23	0.02	0.02	0.23
Country Level												
Individualism-Collectivism (IC)	-0.30	0.09	0.00	-0.32	0.09	0.00	-0.29	0.09	0.00	-0.31	0.09	0.00
Size of the Government				0.04	0.03	0.16				0.04	0.03	0.16
Variance Component												
Variance Slope Individualism	0.01	0.00		0.02	0.00		0.01	0.00		0.01	0.00	
Variance Intercept	0.59	0.16		0.58	0.16		0.59	0.16		0.58	0.16	
Covariance	0.00	0.02		0.00	0.02		0.00	0.02		0.00	0.02	
Variance Residual	3.72	0.02		3.73	0.02		3.72	0.02		3.73	0.02	

Note: N_1 is the number of level 1 observations and N_2 is the number of level 2 observations.

Table 3.8.Effect of Collectivism on Intolerance

	Model 1 N_1=65,691 N_2=29			Model 2 N_1=63,727 N_2=28			Model 3 N_1=65,691 N_2=29			Model 4 N_1=63,727 N_2=28		
	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value
Individual Level												
Employed	-0.20	0.02	0.00	-0.20	0.02	0.00	-0.20	0.02	0.00	-0.20	0.02	0.00
Income	-0.01	0.00	0.00	-0.01	0.00	0.00	-0.01	0.00	0.00	-0.01	0.00	0.00
Education	-0.09	0.00	0.00	-0.09	0.00	0.00	-0.09	0.00	0.00	-0.09	0.00	0.00
Male	0.11	0.02	0.00	0.11	0.02	0.00	0.11	0.02	0.00	0.11	0.02	0.00
Collectivism (COL)	0.05	0.02	0.01	0.06	0.02	0.00	0.05	0.02	0.01	0.06	0.02	0.00
Constant	2.88	0.15	0.00				2.88	0.15	0.00	2.90	0.15	0.00
Cross-level Interaction												
COL*CI							0.00	0.01	0.89	0.00	0.01	0.72
Country Level												
Collectivism-Individualism (CI)	0.31	0.09	0.00	0.33	0.09	0.00	0.31	0.09	0.00	0.33	0.09	0.00
Size of the Government				0.05	0.03	0.10				0.05	0.03	0.10
Variance Component												
Variance Slope Individualism	0.01	0.00		0.01	0.00		0.01	0.00		0.01	0.00	
Variance Intercept	0.63	0.17		0.61	0.17		0.63	0.17		0.61	0.17	
Covariance	0.01	0.02		0.01	0.02		0.01	0.02		0.01	0.02	
Variance Residual	3.75	0.02		3.75	0.02		3.75	0.02		3.75	0.02	

Note: N_1 is the number of level 1 observations and N_2 is the number of level 2 observations.

Table 3.9. Effect of Individualism on Membership*

	Model 1 N_1=68,365 N_2=27			Model 2 N_1=66,318 N_2=26			Model 3 N_1=68,365 N_2=27			Model 4 N_1=66,318 N_2=26		
	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value
Individual Level												
Employed	0.11	0.01	0.00	0.10	0.01	0.00	0.11	0.01	0.00	0.10	0.01	0.00
Income	0.04	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.00	0.00
Education	0.05	0.00	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.00	0.05	0.00	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.00
Male	0.04	0.01	0.00	0.04	0.01	0.00	0.04	0.01	0.00	0.04	0.01	0.00
Individualism (IND)	0.04	0.02	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.05	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.04
Constant	0.78	0.06	0.00	0.78	0.07	0.00	0.78	0.06	0.00	0.78	0.06	0.00
Cross-level Interaction												
IND*IC							0.03	0.01	0.00	0.03	0.01	0.00
Country Level												
Individualism-Collectivism (IC)	0.07	0.03	0.01	0.08	0.03	0.01	0.15	0.04	0.00	0.16	0.04	0.00
Size of the Government				-0.01	0.01	0.31				-0.01	0.01	0.30
Variance Component												
Variance Slope Individualism	0.01	0.00		0.01	0.00		0.01	0.00		0.01	0.00	
Variance Intercept	0.11	0.03		0.11	0.04		0.10	0.03		0.10	0.03	
Covariance	0.02	0.01		0.02	0.01		0.02	0.01		0.02	0.01	
Variance Residual	0.98	0.01		0.99	0.01		0.98	0.01		0.99	0.01	

Note: N_1 is the number of level 1 observations and N_2 is the number of level 2 observations.

Table 3.10. Effect of Collectivism on Membership

	Model 1 N_1=68,365 N_2=27			Model 2 N_1=66,318 N_2=26			Model 3 N_1=68,365 N_2=27			Model 4 N_1=66,318 N_2=26		
	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value
Individual Level												
Employed	0.12	0.01	0.00	0.11	0.01	0.00	0.12	0.01	0.00	0.11	0.01	0.00
Income	0.04	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.00	0.00
Education	0.06	0.00	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.00
Male	0.04	0.01	0.00	0.04	0.01	0.00	0.04	0.01	0.00	0.04	0.01	0.00
Collectivism (COL)	0.11	0.02	0.00	0.11	0.02	0.00	0.11	0.02	0.00	0.11	0.02	0.00
Constant	0.80	0.06	0.00	0.79	0.07	0.00	0.80	0.06	0.00	0.79	0.07	0.00
Cross-level Interaction												
COL*CI							-0.02	0.01	0.03	-0.02	0.01	0.02
Country Level												
Collectivism-Individualism (CI)	-0.11	0.04	0.00	-0.11	0.04	0.00	-0.15	0.04	0.00	-0.16	0.04	0.00
Size of the Government				-0.01	0.01	0.45				-0.01	0.01	0.44
Variance Component												
Variance Slope Individualism	0.01	0.00		0.01	0.00		0.01	0.00		0.01	0.00	
Variance Intercept	0.11	0.03		0.11	0.03		0.11	0.03		0.11	0.03	
Covariance	0.01	0.01		0.01	0.01		0.01	0.01		0.01	0.01	
Variance Residual	0.98	0.01		0.99	0.01		0.98	0.01		0.99	0.01	

Note: N_1 is the number of level 1 observations and N_2 is the number of level 2 observations.

Table 3.11. Effect of Individualism on Subjective Well-Being

	Model 1 N_1=101,521 N_2=30			Model 2 N_1=98,657 N_2=29			Model 3 N_1=101,521 N_2=30			Model 4 N_1=98,657 N_2=29		
	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value
Individual Level												
Employed	0.03	0.02	0.18	0.01	0.02	0.63	0.03	0.02	0.18	0.01	0.02	0.63
Income	0.19	0.00	0.00	0.19	0.00	0.00	0.19	0.00	0.00	0.19	0.00	0.00
Education	0.03	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.00
Male	-0.20	0.02	0.00	-0.20	0.02	0.00	-0.20	0.02	0.00	-0.20	0.02	0.00
Individualism (IND)	-0.01	0.02	0.70	-0.01	0.03	0.70	-0.01	0.02	0.72	-0.01	0.03	0.72
Constant	2.62	0.16	0.00	2.66	0.14	0.00	2.62	0.16	0.00	2.66	0.14	0.00
Cross-level Interaction												
IND*IC							-0.01	0.01	0.68	-0.01	0.01	0.71
Country Level												
Individualism-Collectivism (IC)	0.32	0.08	0.00	0.35	0.08	0.00	0.34	0.09	0.00	0.36	0.08	0.00
Size of the Government				-0.07	0.03	0.01				-0.07	0.03	0.01
Variance Component												
Variance Slope Individualism	0.01	0.00		0.01	0.00		0.01	0.00		0.02	0.01	
Variance Intercept	0.74	0.20		0.57	0.16		0.74	0.20		0.58	0.16	
Covariance	-0.05	0.02		-0.03	0.02		-0.05	0.02		-0.04	0.02	
Variance Residual	9.43	0.04		9.39	0.04		9.43	0.04		9.39	0.04	

Note: N_1 is the number of level 1 observations and N_2 is the number of level 2 observations.

Table 3.12. Effect of Collectivism on Subjective Well-Being

	Model 1 N_1=101,521 N_2=30			Model 2 N_1=98,657 N_2=29			Model 3 N_1=101,521 N_2=30			Model 4 N_1=98,657 N_2=29		
	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value
Individual Level												
Employed	0.04	0.02	0.08	0.02	0.02	0.36	0.04	0.02	0.08	0.02	0.02	0.36
Income	0.20	0.00	0.00	0.20	0.00	0.00	0.20	0.00	0.00	0.20	0.00	0.00
Education	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.00
Male	-0.17	0.02	0.00	-0.17	0.02	0.00	-0.17	0.02	0.00	-0.17	0.02	0.00
Collectivism (COL)	0.24	0.02	0.00	0.23	0.02	0.00	0.24	0.02	0.00	0.23	0.02	0.00
Constant	2.61	0.16	0.00	2.65	0.14	0.00	2.61	0.15	0.00	2.65	0.14	0.00
Cross-level Interaction												
COL*CI							0.02	0.01	0.21	0.02	0.01	0.23
Country Level												
Collectivism-Individualism (CI)	-0.36	0.09	0.00	-0.37	0.08	0.00	-0.33	0.09	0.00	-0.37	0.08	0.00
Size of the Government				-0.08	0.03	0.00				-0.08	0.03	0.00
Variance Component												
Variance Slope Individualism	0.01	0.00		0.01	0.00		0.01	0.00		0.01	0.00	
Variance Intercept	0.72	0.19		0.55	0.16		0.72	0.19		0.55	0.16	
Covariance	0.02	0.02		0.00	0.02		0.02	0.02		0.00	0.02	
Variance Residual	9.38	0.04		9.35	0.04		9.38	0.04		9.35	0.04	

Note: N_1 is the number of level 1 observations and N_2 is the number of level 2 observations.

Table 3.13. Effect of Individualism on National Pride

	Model 1 N_1=86,113 N_2=30			Model 2 N_1=83,594 N_2=29			Model 3 N_1=86,113 N_2=30			Model 4 N_1=83,594 N_2=29		
	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value
Individual Level												
Employed	-0.05	0.01	0.00	-0.05	0.01	0.00	-0.05	0.01	0.00	-0.05	0.01	0.00
Income	0.00	0.00	0.17	0.00	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.00	0.18	0.00	0.00	0.06
Education	-0.03	0.00	0.00	-0.03	0.00	0.00	-0.03	0.00	0.00	-0.03	0.00	0.00
Male	-0.01	0.00	0.03	-0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.01	0.00	0.03	-0.01	0.01	0.01
Individualism (IND)	-0.04	0.01	0.00	-0.04	0.01	0.00	-0.04	0.01	0.00	-0.04	0.01	0.00
Left-Right	0.05	0.00	0.00	0.05	0.00	0.00	0.05	0.00	0.00	0.05	0.00	0.00
Constant	3.31	0.05	0.00	3.32	0.05	0.00	3.31	0.05	0.00	3.32	0.05	0.00
Cross-level Interaction												
IND*IC							0.00	0.01	0.60	0.00	0.01	0.65
Country Level												
Individualism-Collectivism (IC)	0.01	0.03	0.80	0.01	0.02	0.57	0.01	0.03	0.68	0.02	0.03	0.48
Size of the Government				-0.02	0.01	0.01				-0.02	0.01	0.01
Variance Component												
Variance Slope Individualism	0.00	0.00		0.00	0.00		0.00	0.00		0.00	0.00	
Variance Intercept	0.07	0.02		0.06	0.02		0.07	0.02		0.06	0.02	
Covariance	0.00	0.00		0.00	0.00		0.00	0.00		0.00	0.00	
Variance Residual	0.51	0.00		0.50	0.00		0.51	0.00		0.50	0.00	

Note: N_1 is the number of level 1 observations and N_2 is the number of level 2 observations.

Table 3.14. Effect of Collectivism on National Pride

	Model 1 N_1=86,114 N_2=30			Model 2 N_1=83,595 N_2=29			Model 3 N_1=86,114 N_2=30			Model 4 N_1=83,595 N_2=29		
	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value
Individual Level												
Employed	-0.05	0.01	0.00	-0.05	0.01	0.00	-0.05	0.01	0.00	-0.05	0.01	0.00
Income	0.00	0.00	0.98	0.00	0.00	0.65	0.00	0.00	0.98	0.00	0.00	0.65
Education	-0.03	0.00	0.00	-0.03	0.00	0.00	-0.03	0.00	0.00	-0.03	0.00	0.00
Male	-0.01	0.00	0.22	-0.01	0.01	0.07	-0.01	0.00	0.21	-0.01	0.01	0.07
Collectivism (COL)	0.04	0.01	0.00	0.04	0.01	0.00	0.04	0.01	0.00	0.04	0.01	0.00
Left-Right	0.05	0.00	0.00	0.05	0.00	0.00	0.05	0.00	0.00	0.05	0.00	0.00
Constant	3.31	0.05	0.00	3.32	0.05	0.00	3.31	0.05	0.00	3.32	0.05	0.00
Cross-level Interaction												
COL*CI							0.00	0.00	0.43	0.00	0.00	0.46
Country Level												
Collectivism-Individualism (CI)	-0.01	0.03	0.62	-0.02	0.03	0.45	-0.01	0.03	0.65	-0.02	0.03	0.50
Size of the Government				-0.02	0.01	0.04				-0.02	0.01	0.04
Variance Component												
Variance Slope Individualism	0.00	0.00		0.00	0.00		0.00	0.00		0.00	0.00	
Variance Intercept	0.07	0.02		0.06	0.02		0.07	0.02		0.06	0.02	
Covariance	0.00	0.00		0.00	0.00		0.00	0.00		0.00	0.00	
Variance Residual	0.51	0.00		0.50	0.00		0.51	0.00		0.50	0.00	

Note: N_1 is the number of level 1 observations and N_2 is the number of level 2 observations.

Table 3.15. Effect of Individualism on Political Interest

	Model 1 N_1=83,509 N_2=30			Model 2 N_1=80,537 N_2=29			Model 3 N_1=83,509 N_2=30			Model 4 N_1=80,537 N_2=29		
	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value
Individual Level												
Employed	0.05	0.01	0.00	0.06	0.01	0.00	0.05	0.01	0.00	0.06	0.01	0.00
Income	-0.04	0.00	0.00	-0.04	0.00	0.00	-0.04	0.00	0.00	-0.04	0.00	0.00
Education	-0.05	0.00	0.00	-0.05	0.00	0.00	-0.05	0.00	0.00	-0.05	0.00	0.00
Male	-0.26	0.01	0.00	-0.27	0.01	0.00	-0.26	0.01	0.00	-0.27	0.01	0.00
Individualism (IND)	-0.08	0.01	0.00	-0.08	0.01	0.00	-0.08	0.01	0.00	-0.08	0.01	0.00
Constant	2.57	0.05	0.00	2.59	0.04	0.00	2.57	0.05	0.00	2.59	0.04	0.00
Cross-level Interaction												
IND*IC							-0.01	0.01	0.32	-0.01	0.01	0.31
Country Level												
Individualism-Collectivism (IC)	-0.03	0.03	0.28	-0.03	0.02	0.30	-0.02	0.03	0.37	-0.02	0.02	0.40
Size of the Government				-0.02	0.01	0.05				-0.02	0.01	0.05
Variance Component												
Variance Slope Individualism	0.00	0.00		0.00	0.00		0.00	0.00		0.00	0.00	
Variance Intercept	0.07	0.02		0.05	0.01		0.07	0.02		0.05	0.01	
Covariance	0.00	0.00		0.00	0.00		0.00	0.00		0.00	0.00	
Variance Residual	0.75	0.00		0.75	0.00		0.75	0.00		0.75	0.00	

Note: N_1 is the number of level 1 observations and N_2 is the number of level 2 observations.

Table 3.16. Effect of Collectivism on Political Interest

	Model 1 N_1=83,509 N_2=30			Model 2 N_1=80,537 N_2=29			Model 3 N_1=83,509 N_2=30			Model 4 N_1=80,537 N_2=29		
	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value
Individual Level												
Employed	0.04	0.01	0.00	0.05	0.01	0.00	0.04	0.01	0.00	0.05	0.01	0.00
Income	-0.04	0.00	0.00	-0.04	0.00	0.00	-0.04	0.00	0.00	-0.04	0.00	0.00
Education	-0.05	0.00	0.00	-0.05	0.00	0.00	-0.05	0.00	0.00	-0.05	0.00	0.00
Male	-0.26	0.01	0.00	-0.26	0.01	0.00	-0.26	0.01	0.00	-0.26	0.01	0.00
Collectivism (COL)	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.02
Constant	2.55	0.05	0.00	2.57	0.05	0.00	2.55	0.05	0.00	2.57	0.05	0.00
Cross-level Interaction												
IND*IC							0.00	0.00	0.28	0.00	0.00	0.29
Country Level												
Collectivism-Individualism (CI)	0.02	0.03	0.38	0.02	0.03	0.36	0.03	0.03	0.27	0.03	0.03	0.27
Size of the Government				-0.01	0.01	0.09				-0.01	0.01	0.09
Variance Component												
Variance Slope Individualism	0.00	0.00		0.00	0.00		0.00	0.00		0.00	0.00	
Variance Intercept	0.07	0.02		0.06	0.02		0.07	0.02		0.06	0.02	
Covariance	0.00	0.00		0.00	0.00		0.00	0.00		0.00	0.00	
Variance Residual	0.76	0.00		0.76	0.00		0.76	0.00		0.76	0.00	

Note: N_1 is the number of level 1 observations and N_2 is the number of level 2 observations.

Table 3.17. Effect of Individualism on Political Action Scale

	Model 1 N_1=81,002 N_2=30			Model 2 N_1=78,612 N_2=29			Model 3 N_1=81,002 N_2=30			Model 4 N_1=78,612 N_2=29		
	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value
Individual Level												
Employed	0.31	0.01	0.00	0.30	0.01	0.00	0.31	0.01	0.00	0.30	0.01	0.00
Income	0.04	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.00	0.00
Education	0.12	0.00	0.00	0.12	0.00	0.00	0.12	0.00	0.00	0.12	0.00	0.00
Male	0.20	0.01	0.00	0.20	0.01	0.00	0.20	0.01	0.00	0.20	0.01	0.00
Individualism (IND)	0.25	0.02	0.00	0.25	0.02	0.00	0.25	0.02	0.00	0.25	0.02	0.00
Left-Right	-0.13	0.00	0.00	-0.13	0.00	0.00	-0.13	0.00	0.00	-0.13	0.00	0.00
Constant	2.77	0.07	0.00	2.75	0.07	0.00	2.77	0.07	0.00	2.75	0.07	0.00
Cross-level Interaction												
IND*IC							0.05	0.01	0.00	0.05	0.01	0.00
Country Level												
Individualism-Collectivism (IC)	0.15	0.04	0.00	0.15	0.04	0.00	0.15	0.04	0.00	0.16	0.04	0.00
Size of the Government				-0.01	0.01	0.57				-0.01	0.01	0.57
Variance Component												
Variance Slope Individualism	0.02	0.00		0.02	0.00		0.01	0.00		0.01	0.00	
Variance Intercept	0.14	0.04		0.14	0.04		0.14	0.04		0.14	0.04	
Covariance	0.00	0.01		0.00	0.01		0.00	0.01		0.00	0.01	
Variance Residual	2.31	0.01		2.31	0.01		2.31	0.01		2.31	0.01	

Note: N_1 is the number of level 1 observations and N_2 is the number of level 2 observations.

Table 3.18. Effect of Collectivism on Political Action Scale

	Model 1 N_1=81,003 N_2=30			Model 2 N_1=78,613 N_2=29			Model 3 N_1=81,003 N_2=30			Model 4 N_1=78,613 N_2=29		
	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value
Individual Level												
Employed	0.35	0.01	0.00	0.34	0.01	0.00	0.35	0.01	0.00	0.34	0.01	0.00
Income	0.04	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.00	0.00
Education	0.14	0.00	0.00	0.14	0.00	0.00	0.14	0.00	0.00	0.14	0.00	0.00
Male	0.17	0.01	0.00	0.17	0.01	0.00	0.17	0.01	0.00	0.17	0.01	0.00
Collectivism (COL)	0.01	0.02	0.57	0.01	0.02	0.55	0.01	0.02	0.59	0.01	0.02	0.57
Left-Right	-0.14	0.00	0.00	-0.14	0.00	0.00	-0.14	0.00	0.00	-0.14	0.00	0.00
Constant	2.79	0.07	0.00	2.78	0.07	0.00	2.79	0.07	0.00	2.78	0.07	0.00
Cross-level Interaction												
COL*CI							-0.01	0.01	0.22	-0.01	0.01	0.24
Country Level												
Collectivism-Individualism (CI)	-0.15	0.04	0.00	-0.15	0.04	0.00	-0.15	0.04	0.00	-0.16	0.04	0.00
Size of the Government				-0.01	0.01	0.32				-0.01	0.01	0.32
Variance Component												
Variance Slope Individualism	0.01	0.00		0.01	0.00		0.01	0.00		0.01	0.00	
Variance Intercept	0.14	0.04		0.14	0.04		0.14	0.04		0.14	0.04	
Covariance	0.01	0.01		0.01	0.01		0.01	0.01		0.01	0.01	
Variance Residual	2.38	0.01		2.38	0.01		2.38	0.01		2.38	0.01	

Note: N_1 is the number of level 1 observations and N_2 is the number of level 2 observations.

CHAPTER IV

Multilevel Model of Individualism and Collectivism Attribution of Responsibility

"In collectivistic cultures the collective is responsible for the wrongdoing of one of its members; in individualistic cultures, it is solely the individual who is responsible" (Triandis 1995, 78).

The aim of this chapter is to examine political psychological implications of individualism and collectivism among the citizens of thirty OECD countries in the domain of attribution of responsibility. It is the second part of the empirical analysis of the dissertation that focuses on how those cultural frames and values affect the political attitude, preference, and behavior f citizens of advanced democracies.

First, this chapter will evaluate the effects of individualism and collectivism on the individual's feeling of freedom and control over his or her life in general. It will touch upon the question of *agency*, which should affect one's expectation for the role of the government among others. Second, it will take a close look into the effects of those cultural values and frames on the individual's opinion about government responsibility in general and her role in economy in particular. As in Chapter III, this chapter draws on multilevel modeling in order to disentangle the effects of cultural factors at the individual level from those at the cultural level.

Agency

Psychologists and social psychologists in particular have long been interested in the interplay between the environments, be it physical or social, and human minds and behavior.[1] Political psychologists have been no exception. Greenstein, for example, observed, "politics is a matter of human behavior, and behavior, in the formulation of Kurt Lewin and many others, is a function of both the *environmental situations*, in which actors find themselves and the *psychological predispositions* they bring to those situations" (1969, 7 *italics* in the original).

Drawing on the scholarly achievements in these traditional fields, cultural and cross-cultural psychologists have approached culture as "human-made part of environment" (Herskovits cited in Triandis 1994 and 1996) and studied the effect of the subjective aspect or "the shared perceptions of the social environment" on the individual's psychological functioning. Indeed, a major goal of cross-cultural psychology is to understand the relationships between human behavior and the cultural environment in which it has developed and now occurs (Berry et al. 2002).

Students of political culture have the similar understanding. For example, Street (1994) stated prosaically "political culture forms the context or environment for political action" (98). Elkins and Simeon elaborated political culture as a part of individual's environment "which has the effect of limiting attention to less than the full range of alternative behaviors, problems, and solutions which are logically possible" (1979, 128). These authors' understanding of culture is consistent with Triandis observation that

[1] For a brief review of the studies about environmental or situational factors in psychology, see Choi (1998, 1-4).

culture affects individual's perception and cognition by developing conventions for "sampling information" (Triandis 1989; Triandis and Suh 2002).

One of the core concepts in cross-cultural psychological study of the interplay between the social environment and psychological functioning is *agency* that addresses the question of "what impels actions." By logical extension, it addresses the question of who or what is responsible for an individual's action and the answer has been suggested to lie on the dimension of personal (i.e., individual self) versus collective (i.e., others or group) agency. Menon et al. (1999) elaborated on the dichotomy. They advanced that not only an individual but also a collective can possess "the power of an agent to exert the law set forth by its internal will rather than that of external constraint," which is Kantian notion of autonomy. In other words, the internal will that motivates an individual's action could be originated from individual self or from collective.

The concept of agency is closely tied in with "locus of control," one of the most studied concepts of personality attribute in psychology. According to Rotter who pioneered the study in the 1960s, an individual's "generalized expectancies" of the locus of control vary on the dimension of internal versus external control. A belief in "internal control" refers to "the degree to which persons expect that a reinforcement or an outcome of their behavior is contingent on their own behavior or personal characteristics" while "external control" refers to "the degree to which persons expect that the reinforcement or outcome is a function of chance, luck, or fate, is under the control of powerful others, or is simply unpredictable." The dimension of internal-external locus of control reflects the degree which individuals accept *personal responsibility* for what happens to them (1996;

also cited in Waterman 1984, 44-48, *italics added*) and thus conceptually overlaps significantly with that of personal versus collective agency.

As many issues in mainstream psychology that presuppose universality, however, the question of agency has preferred one particular answer, that is, personal agency. Psychologists have argued that "internal states, motives, and dispositions inside disjoint individuals" impel and hence, are responsible for, their actions. Indeed, there had not existed the notion of the dichotomy of personal versus collective agency in Western psychology. Yet as psychologists began to incorporate the concept of culture in the field of study, they realized that there exist other forms of agency, where actions are impelled by external forces that include "others, in relationship and interaction with others" (Markus and Kitayama 1991 and 2003). Thus, psychologists now conceptualize human agency in terms of personal versus collective or group agency, personal referring to the former, Western conception while collective or group to the latter, Eastern conception. In other words, they now consider others or collective as another unit of agency (Lehman et al. 2004; Bandura 2006).

The origin of the different approaches to agency in the context of different cultural environments can be explained by Nisbett and his colleagues' sociocognitive system theory (Nisbett et al. 2001; Nisbett 2003). According to the theory, social differences among different social environments or cultures affect not only individuals' beliefs about specific aspects of the world but also "system of thought" that consists of metaphysics (i.e., beliefs of the nature of the world and causality), epistemology (i.e., beliefs about what is important to know and how knowledge can be obtained), and cognitive and perceptual habits. Historically, the social differences can be traced and

classified into two major social organizations or cultures, one that emphasizes a sense of personal agency and the other a sense of collective agency or one with less and the other with more social relations and role constraints.[2] Thus, people tend to regard themselves as free agents or as constrained by and as less agentic than, social collective, depending on the type of cultures in which they were raised and live.

Theoretically, the concepts closely related to personal agency have frequently been suggested as one of the core attributes of individualism. For example, according to Lukes (1973, Chapter 8), autonomy or self-direction, one of the "basic ideas" of individualism, is the notion that an individual's thought and action is his own, and not determined by causes outside his control.[3] He elaborated on the term by contrasting it with what seems to constitute the notion of collective agency.

> an individual is autonomous (at the social level) to the degree to which he subjects the pressures and norms with which he is confronted to conscious and critical evaluation, and form intentions and reaches practical decisions as the result of independent and rational reflection (Lukes 1973, 52).

Hofstede (1980) explained that emphasis on personal autonomy and initiative characterized "high individualism." Waterman (1984) suggested Rotter's internal locus of control as one of the four personality qualities that individualism embodies.[4] One can also find the conceptual affinity of personal agency with Schwartz' self-direction at the individual level (1990) and autonomy at the aggregate level (2004). In addition, Markus

[2] They trace these differences to as far as ancient Greek and Chinese society, the former typifying personal agency and the latter collective agency. For further discussion of sociocognitive system, see Nisbett (2003).

[3] The other basic ideas include the dignity of man, privacy, self-development, the abstract individual, political, economic, religious, ethical, epistemological, and methodological individualism (Lukes 1973).

[4] The other personality qualities include Eriksonian sense of personal identity, Maslow's self-actualization, and Kohlberg's principled (post-conventional) moral reasoning (Waterman 1984, Chapter 3).

(2001) defined individual autonomy as one of the three individualistic values in his analysis of American individualism and Anu et al. (2002) included it as one of the core components of individualism in their analysis of Estonian individualism.[5]

As opposed to the concept of personal agency, collective agency, as a relative newcomer to Western psychology, has not been extensively discussed as related to the attributes of collectivism except for contrasting purposes (e.g., Lukes 1973; Menon et al. 1999; Schwartz 1994 and 2004). However, one can relate, without much difficulty, the notion of collective agency with relationship and group-centered elements of collectivism. In fact, cultural psychologists have attempted to demonstrate empirically that individualistic culture encourages personal agency while collectivistic culture collective agency (Menon et al. 1999; Choi et al. 1999; Choi et al. 2003).

In sum, the question of agency deals with an individual's global, enduring beliefs or "generalized expectancies" to use Rotter's term, about who or what motivates and thus is responsible for, his or her actions in general. Individualism and collectivism have been suggested to influence an individual's beliefs in individual and collective agency, respectively, both theoretically and empirically.

That being the case, it is reasonable to assume that those cultural, cross-situational beliefs about "who or what have control over life affairs" would influence attribution of responsibility, which is specific behavior. In politics, the relevant actors for the question of agency are the individual and the government, the pair of which is the focus in the analysis of attribution of responsibility.

[5] Markus's other individualistic values are self-reliance and limited government while Anu et al.'s other individualistic values include mature self-responsibility and uniqueness.

Attribution of Responsibility

Attribution Theory in Cross-Cultural Psychology

In psychology, how individuals assign responsibility for behaviors and events has often been studied in the context of attribution theory especially since Heider led the way in the late 1950s. According to social and political psychologists, attribution theory aspires to provide a systematic account of how ordinary people make sense of and explain social events. In other words, it attempts to explain how lay people understand causally or more specifically assign causes and effects to the world around them including themselves (Fincham and Jaspars 1980; Kinder and Fiske 1986; McGraw 2001). This attribution process implicates responsibility attribution as the latter process also involves causality assignment or "imputation" as one of the "two facets" of responsibility. "Answerability," which has been regarded as a synonym of responsibility, is the second facet and they have been theoretically distinguished in contemporary philosophy as well as in psychology. It focuses on "the liability for appropriate sanctions" (Schlenker 1994) or accountability (Fincham and Jaspars 1980).

Attribution theorists have sustained that Heider's claim that the most important distinction made by observers in their explanations of social acts is between *internal* cause – the traits, abilities, intentions, and so on, of the actor – and *external* causes – the incentives, pressures, demands, and so on, of the situation (Kinder and Fiske 1986). Thus, they have examined the degree to which and the conditions under which people rely on internal, dispositional or external, situational attribution.

The dichotomy of internal versus external casual attribution is also relevant to the dichotomy of agency, internal versus collective agency. Culture oriented psychologists

have suggested that individualism and collectivism would encourage a particular form of agency would favor one way of causal attribution over the other. Indeed, they have advanced that individualism that encourages personal agency facilitates internal or dispositional attribution while collectivism that encourages collective agency facilitates external or contextual attribution. For example, Miller (1984), who first demonstrated the importance of culture in casual attribution, claimed that different "cultural meaning systems" would affect an individual's development of everyday social explanation in the direction of dispositional or contextual emphasis, independent of his or her cognitive capacities and objective experiential conditions, both of which have been previously suggested as factors explaining cross-cultural attributional diversity. The author's evidence suggests that contrasting cultural conceptions of the person, i.e., individualistic or holistic, entail these cross-cultural and developmental differences in social attribution. Morris and Peng (1994) showed that dispositional attribution for behavior was more widespread in individualistic culture of the United States than in collectivistic culture of China. According to these authors, the person-centered theory that social behavior reveals stable, global, internal dispositions is more prevalent in Judeo-Christian individualistic cultures while the situation-centered theory" that social behavior is shaped by relationships, roles, and situational pressures is dominant in Confucian collectivistic cultures. Triandis (1995) also observed that individualists attribute events to internal individual causes more frequently than collectivists, who tend to attribute them to external causes probably because their perceptions and cognition are influenced by different cultural syndromes. Furthermore, as discussed above, Menon and her colleagues (1999) explicitly framed the issue of cultural differences in attribution as the question of

agency. The authors proposed that cross-cultural, attributional divergences would arise from contrasting "implicit theories" or conceptions of which actors in society have agency, i.e., individual or collective, which they also traced to individualistic, Judeo-Christian tradition in the West and collectivistic, Confucian tradition in the East.

Recent studies have shown more nuanced cultural differences in attribution. According to extensive ethnographic and psychological data analysis by Choi et al. (1999), for example, internal attribution is a cross-culturally widespread mode of thinking. Yet they showed that East Asians, who represent collectivism, made more external attribution than their counterpart, Americans, who represent individualism. Choi and his colleagues (2003) confirmed the finding.

Attribution of Responsibility in Political Science

Political scientists in general as well as political psychologists have studied the attribution of responsibility extensively as the subject is particularly relevant to democracy, where citizens can hold their representatives accountable for their performances usually by electoral choices and not infrequently by public opinions. The significance of citizens' responsibility attribution for political issues is well supported by the empirical studies of voting and public opinion (McGraw 2001). Rudolph (2003, 700) even claimed that the concept of responsibility lied "at the heart of theories of democratic accountability."

The majority of the political science literature on the subject has analyzed citizens' attributions of responsibility for broadly defined political and social problems, such as economic conditions, crime, terrorism, and racial inequality. In fact, we have learned a

great deal about the political consequences of responsibility attributions – i.e., "throw the rascals out" – most likely based on citizens' retrospective, sociotropic voting behavior (Kinder and Kiewiet 1979 and 1981; Feldman 1984; Anderson 1995; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000). Yet, we have only limited knowledge about the factors that influence the formation of responsibility attribution in politics (Gibson and Gouws 1999; McGraw 2001; Rudolph 2003). In a sense, political scientists have focused on the second facet of responsibility, accountability, rather than the first one, causal imputation, which is logically antecedent to accountability.

The dissertation proposes individualism and collectivism as cultural frames at the aggregate level and cultural values at the individual level should be considered as one of the important determinants of the individual's attribution of responsibility. In this chapter, I will first examine the effects of individualism and collectivism on the question of agency in general, that is, without reference to the government. This will be the groundwork for the subsequent analyses of what factors influence who should be in charge of various policy issues. In addition, I will investigate the effects of individualism and collections on individual's political attitudes that would be formed via responsibility attributions.

Dependent Variables

Agency

All the five waves of the World Values Survey have the same question that asks "how much freedom of choice and control you feel you have over the way your life turns

out" on a scale of 1 ("no choice at all") to 10 ("a great deal of choice"). This item is used to construct "Freedom of Choice and Control," the first dependent variable for the agency question. As discussed above, personal versus collective agency has been conceptualized as binary opposite as internal versus external locus of control. Thus, the higher the score for this variable is, the more personal agency a respondent feels to have.

The newest fifth wave (2005–2007) also has a similar question of agency. It asks to what degree a respondent's view come closer to either "everything in life is determined by fate" or "people shape their fate themselves" on a 10-point scale. It is used to make "Fate versus Control," the second dependent variable for the agency question.[6] Similarly as in "Freedom of Choice and Control," the higher the score for this variable is, the more personal agency a respondent believes to have.

These two agency variables are used to verify the results from each other. Figure 4.1 shows the distribution of freedom of choice and control and Figure 4.2 the distribution of fate versus control across countries.

Government versus Individual Responsibility

Since the second wave (1989 – 1993), the World Values Survey has had a battery of items that tap citizens' attitudes in economic self-reliance issues. In the first part of attribution of responsibility analysis, three items that measure an individual's preference for government responsibility in the domain of basic personal welfare, ownership, and income redistribution are selected.

The first dependent variable for responsibility attribution is "Government versus Individual Responsibility." It is constructed based on the question that asks whether

[6] According to Rotter (1996), fate is one of the external controls along with chance, luck, and others.

citizens agree with the statement “the government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for” or “people should take more responsibility to provide for themselves” on a 10-point scale. The higher the score is, the more a respondent agrees with individual responsibility for the basic personal welfare. In contrast with the agency questions, the item directly invokes who or what is responsible for sustenance – i.e., the government or the individual. Figure 4.3 shows the distribution of “Government versus Individual Responsibility.”

Government versus Private Ownership of Business and Industry

The second dependent variable for attribution of responsibility is more specific in terms of the area the government is responsible for, ownership of business and industry. “Government versus Private Ownership of Business and Industry” is constructed based on the item that asks respondents whether their views are close to “private ownership of business and industry should be increased” or “government ownership of business and industry should be increased” on a 10-point scale. The more a respondent prefers private ownership, the higher score he or she will mark. Figure 4.4 illustrates the distribution of the variable.

Income Redistribution

The third dependent variable for attribution of responsibility is also about specific economic policy. Respondents are asked to reveal their preference on the issue of income redistribution – “we need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort” or “incomes should be made more equal” – again on a 10-point scale. The question is used to make the variable “Income Redistribution.” The higher score means a respondent’s view prefers income equality rather than more incentives for individual effort. Although

this variable is not as explicit as the ownership variable in terms of who is in charge of this policy, it is included in the analysis of government responsibility because one can reasonably infer that the government is most responsible for the policy through a progressive tax system. The distribution of "Income Redistribution" across countries is shown in Figure 4.5.

Claiming Government Benefits Justifiable

The second part of attribution of responsibility analysis consists of two dependent variables that *indirectly* measure citizens' attitude toward government responsibility. The first item, for example, asks respondents whether it is justifiable to claim "government benefits to which you are not entitled" and it is reasonable to assume that respondents should have preference for attribution of responsibility, i.e., whether the government is in fact responsible for benefits regardless of your entitlement, before they come up with an answer to the actual question. "Claiming Government Benefits Justifiable" is constructed based on this 10-point scale item.

"Tax Cheating Justifiable," the second dependent variable for an indirect measure of responsibility of attribution is constructed based on a 10-point scale question whether it is justifiable to cheat "on taxes if you have a chance." As with the entitlement dependent variable, one can reasonable assume that respondents should have their own conclusion as to who should be in charge of managing their money before answering this question.

Figure 4.6 shows the distribution of "Claiming Government Benefits Justifiable" and Figure 4.7 the distribution of "Tax Cheating Justifiable."

Independent Variables

All the independent variables in the analysis of attribution of responsibility are introduced in Chapter III.[7]

Level 1: Individual Level

Individualism

This is an additive measure that consists of four individualistic cultural values: independence, feeling of responsibility, imagination, and determination and perseverance. It ranges from 0 (least individualistic) to 4 (most individualistic).

Collectivism

This is an additive measure that consists of four collectivistic cultural values: tolerance and respect for other people, religious faith, unselfishness, and obedience. It ranges from 0 (least collectivistic) to 4 (most collectivistic).

Left-Right

This is a 10-category measure for ideological self-identification, 1 being left and 10 being right. This variable is included in all the models in this chapter except for "Fate versus Control," for which ideology does not seem to be relevant.[8]

Employed

This is a dichotomous variable that collapse full time (thirty hours a week or more), part time (less than thirty hours a week), and self-employed into "employed"

[7] More detailed descriptions can be found in Chapter III.

[8] In fact, the ideology variable was not statistically significant when included in "Fate versus Control."

category while retired/pensioned, housewife not otherwise employed, student, and unemployed into "unemployed."

Income

Income is measured on a 10-point scale, where 1 indicates the lowest income decile and 10 the highest income decile. It measures household income that includes all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes that come in.

Education

Education is a 10 category variable that classifies the groups a respondent belongs to based on the age when he or she completed education.[9]

Gender

This is a binary variable that classifies the gender of a respondent.

Level 2: Country Level

Individualism-Collectivism Ratings at the Country Level (IND-COL)

This analysis utilizes an independent measure of individualism and collectivism at the country level instead of using the country means of those cultural values at the individual level in order to avoid the problem of serious multicollinearity. It relies primarily on the measure by Suh and his colleagues (1998). They averaged the country level measures by the two leading experts on the cultural frames, Hofstede (1980) and Triandis (1990). As opposed to the corresponding individual level values, this country level variable is considered unidimensional. In other words, the higher the rating of IND-COL, the higher individualistic culture a country has.

[9] The variable is missing for New Zealand, making the maximum number of level 2 observations thirty in the multilevel models.

Government size

Government size is measured by government share of real gross domestic product per capita in % in 2000 Laspeyres constant prices (Penn World Table 6.2).[10] This is an institutional proxy variable that is assumed to represent the degree of collectivism at the macro-level. East Germany is the only country that does not have the measure and is not included in the multilevel analysis.

Cross-level Interaction

There is one cross-level interaction variable in the analysis: individualism or collectivism at the individual level (level 1) multiplied by individualism-collectivism at the country level (level 2). The cross-level interaction variable is included in the models to determine whether cultural effects interact to amplify or dampen corresponding cultural values at the individual level beyond the sum of the effects from both levels.

Multilevel Models

As in Chapter III, I run four multilevel models that estimate the effects of individualism and collectivism at the individual level and at the country level, with or without cross-level interaction and with or without the second macro-level variable, government size. Thus, there are four multilevel models to be estimated for each dependent variable.

[10] East Germany is the only country that does not have the measure and is excluded in Model 2 and Model 4 in the multilevel analysis.

The other parameter estimates of interest are variance components, the statistical significance of which is used to test the assumption that there exists differential contextual effect. The estimation of the multilevel models is based on the independently pooled cross-sectional data of 30 OECD member countries over the five waves of the World Values Survey.

All the independent variables including the dichotomous ones are grand mean centered to facilitate substantively meaningful interpretation and to avoid multicollinearity in cross-level interactions.

Model 1

Level 1, Individual
Attributional Variables
$= B_0 + B_1$ Employment Status $+ B_2$ Income $+ B_3$ Education $+ B_4$ Gender
$+ B_5$ L-R Ideology $+ B_6$ Individualism or Collectivism $+ r_{ij}$

Level 2: Country
$B_0 = G_{00} + G_{01}$ Individualism Culture $+ u_{0j}$
$B_6 = G_{10} + u_{1j}$

Mixed Model
Attributional Variables
$= G_{00} + B_1$ Employment Status $+ B_2$ Income $+ B_3$ Education $+ B_4$ Gender
$+ B_5$ L-R Ideology $+ G_{10}$ Individualism or Collectivism
$+ G_{01}$ Individualism Culture $+ u_{1j}$ Individualism or Collectivism $+ r_{ij} + u_{0j}$

Model 2

Level 1, Individual
Attributional Variables
$= B_0 + B_1$ Employment Status $+ B_2$ Income $+ B_3$ Education $+ B_4$ Gender
$+ B_5$ L-R Ideology $+ B_6$ Individualism or Collectivism $+ r_{ij}$

Level 2: Country
$B_0 = G_{00} + G_{01}$ Individualism Culture $+ G_{02}$ Government Size $+ u_{0j}$
$B_6 = G_{10} + u_{1j}$

Mixed Model
Attributional Variables
$= G_{00} + B_1$ Employment Status $+ B_2$ Income $+ B_3$ Education $+ B_4$ Gender
$+ B_5$ L-R Ideology $+ G_{10}$ Individualism or Collectivism $+ G_{02}$ Government Size
$+ G_{01}$ Individualism Culture $+ u_{1j}$ Individualism or Collectivism $+ r_{ij} + u_{0j}$

Model 3

Level 1, Individual
Attributional Variables
Components of Civic Culture/Social Capital or Political Interest/Participation
$= B_0 + B_1$ Employment Status $+ B_2$ Income $+ B_3$ Education $+ B_4$ Gender
$+ B_5$ L-R Ideology $+ B_6$ Individualism or Collectivism $+ r_{ij}$

Level 2: Country
$B_0 = G_{00} + G_{01}$ Individualism Culture $+ u_{0j}$
$B_6 = G_{10} + G_{11}$ Individualism Culture $+ u_{1j}$

Mixed Model
Attributional Variables
$= G_{00} + B_1$ Employment Status $+ B_2$ Income $+ B_3$ Education $+ B_4$ Gender
$+ B_5$ L-R Ideology $+ G_{10}$ Individualism or Collectivism
$+ G_{01}$ Individualism Culture
$+ G_{12}$ Individualism or Collectivism*Individualism Culture
$+ u_{1j}$ Individualism or Collectivism $+ r_{ij} + u_{0j}$

Model 4

Level 1, Individual
Attributional Variables
$= B_0 + B_1$ Employment Status $+ B_2$ Income $+ B_3$ Education $+ B_4$ Gender
$+ B_5$ L-R Ideology $+ B_6$ Individualism or Collectivism $+ r_{ij}$
Level 2: Country
$B_0 = G_{00} + G_{01}$ Individualism Culture $+ G_{02}$ Government Size $+ u_{0j}$
$B_6 = G_{10} + G_{11}$ Individualism Culture $+ u_{1j}$

Mixed Model
Attributional Variables
$= G_{00} + B_1$ Employment Status $+ B_2$ Income $+ B_3$ Education $+ B_4$ Gender
$+ B_5$ L-R Ideology $+ G_{10}$ Individualism or Collectivism
$+ G_{01}$ Individualism Culture $+ G_{02}$ Government Size
$+ G_{12}$ Individualism or Collectivism*Individualism Culture
$+ u_{1j}$ Individualism or Collectivism $+ r_{ij} + u_{0j}$

A mixed model is a collapsed form of level 1 and level 2 models. B represents the fixed effect at the individual level except for the intercept (B_0) and the slope of cultural

values (B_6), both of which are random, that is, vary over countries. G_{st} is the effect of the macro variable *t* (i.e., macro-level intercept, Individualism Culture, and Government Size) on the regression coefficient of micro variable *s* (i.e., micro-level intercept and Individualism or Culturalism index). It represents the fixed effect at the country level. *r* refers to level 1 error and *u* level 2 error. The subscript *i* indexes respondent and *j* country.

The analysis used STATA software and the restricted maximum likelihood (REML) method to estimate parameters

Hypotheses

The analysis focuses on (1) the statistical significance of slope and intercept variance estimates and (2) the effects of individualism and collectivism on agency and responsibility attribution variables while distinguishing their individual level effects as cultural values from the cultural level effects as cultural frames.

First, I hypothesize that slope and intercept variance estimates are statistically significant for all the models. In other words, I expect that across countries there exit differential effects of individualism and collectivism as the individual level cultural values. In addition, I expect that the mean of each dependent variable when all the independent variables are set to their means – 0 in this case because of grand mean centering – is different across countries. That is, I hypothesize that the variance estimates for the intercepts are statistically significant. Substantively, this hypothesis is about whether each country is a legitimate unit for cultural analysis as well as for multilevel

modeling analysis in a sense that it has the different effects of cultural values and a different baseline value for each dependent variable

Second, the effects of individualism both at the cultural level and at the individual level on “Freedom of Choice and Control” and “Fate vs. Control,” are hypothesized to positive while the effects of collectivism on those agency variables negative. In other words, individualism and collectivism exert opposite influences along these dimensions of the agency variables.

As discussed above as well as in Chapter II, individualism values personal agency and responsibility. It encourages people who live in individualistic culture or who are individualists to exercise control over their own action. Personal agency has been also associated with such values as autonomy and self-direction that emphasize independent thought and action, not swayed by external causes outside of one’s control. On the contrary, collectivism values belongingness, relationship, context, duty, group, hierarchy, and harmony, among others, (Oyserman et al. 2002a) that promote external control and group or collective agency. Thus, it encourages people who live in collectivistic culture or who are collectivists to allow others or context to influence on themselves or their actions.

In addition, the agency hypothesis, combined with the hypothesis about cultural effect on subjective well-being (SWB) suggested in Chapter II, will test whether “Freedom of Choice and Control” function as a mediating variable between culture and SWB. In Chapter II, I theorize that individualistic cultures would enhance individuals’ SWB by providing favorable cultural environments where they feel more freedom of choice and control over their lives. Evidence suggests that the agency variable, “sense of

freedom" to use Inglehart's term, affects an individual's SWB both as the individual level and as the country level variable (Inglehart et al. 2008). Moreover, Inglehart and Oyserman (2004) and Schwartz (2004) have shown that individualism, autonomy, and self-expression form a coherent cultural syndrome at the aggregate level. Thus, the hypothesis in this chapter will test the first part of the linkage of "Culture-Agency-SWB."

Third, I hypothesize that the effects of individualism and collectivism on attribution of responsibility variables are also bipolar opposite. In other words, I expect individualism exerts positive effect on personal responsibility while collectivism on government responsibility when it comes to the basic personal welfare question. In addition, individualism is hypothesized to facilitate support for private ownership of business and industry and income difference as incentives for individual effort while collectivism support for government ownership and income redistribution.

The expectation is consistent with the hypothesis proposed on the agency questions. Individualism that values personal agency or internal control should encourage the value of self-reliance when it comes to the basic personal welfare. By logical extension, individualism is expected to encourage the idea of "limited government" while collectivism to advocate or at least acknowledge the expanded role of modern government in macro-economic management. In fact, self-reliance, defined as "the idea that individuals should take care of their own well-being, particularly (but not only) their *economic condition*," and limited government, defined as the belief that "the purpose of government is strictly to protect life, liberty, and property, and thereby provide a framework within which individuals may pursue their private interests" have been proposed as distinct aspects of American individualism, along with autonomy discussed

above (Markus 2001, 407 *italics added*).[11] It is reasonable to assume that these aspects are relevant to individualism in general since the United States has been suggested to represent a prototypical individualist culture. For example, Hofstede (2001) rated her individualism (IDV) as 91 out of 100 and the most individualistic country out of fifty three nations and regions he evaluated. The country level measure of individualism by Suh et al. (1998) that this analysis draws on also rated her 9.55 out of 10 and the most individualistic country out of sixty nations they evaluated.

In addition, drawing on the empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis of "clarity of responsibility" that people tend to do better in attributional tasks when the cue of who is responsible is clear (Powell and Whitten 1993; Anderson 1995 and 2000), I expect still opposite but smaller effect of those cultural frames and values on responsibility attribution when the question of who is in charge is not explicitly invoked but implied.[12] Thus, I hypothesize that collectivism would exert positive effect while individualism negative effect, on income redistribution but their effects are weaker than in cases above where the government is explicitly invoked in the questions.

Fourth, as for the indirect measures of responsibility attributions, I expect that individualism would lead citizens *less* likely to think that it is justifiable to claim government benefits to which they are not entitled while collectivism would lead them *more* likely. In addition, I hypothesize that individualism would direct citizens *more*

[11] I discussed the relationship between individualism and the idea of limited government in the context of political interest and participation in Chapter III.

[12] Feldman (1984) made an even stronger case for the cultural effect on attribution of responsibility while denying the influence or clarity of government responsibility suggested by Kramer (1971 and 1983). According to the author, personal attribution is strongly related to people's belief in economic individualism that consists of the work ethic and equality of opportunity, not a matter of their failing to see government responsibility. Attribution of changing personal well-being to the wider societal context is only common among those who do not subscribe to both of these cultural beliefs.

likely to think that it is justifiable to cheat on taxes if they have a chance while collectivism would direct them *less* likely.

As discussed above, individualism should lead people to think that individuals are responsible for their basic personal welfare. In other words, individualism should encourage self-reliance and limited government. This would lead them to think that the government should not hand out any benefits or at the very least that any government benefits should be kept at minimum. Hence, individualists will be more likely to oppose claiming government benefits. On the contrary, collectivism that facilitates the view that the government is responsible for her citizens' basic welfare would lead people to think that it is justifiable to claim government benefits or to an extreme degree, regardless of their entitlement. In a similar reasoning, individualism that advocates the idea that individuals, not the government, should manage their own money would lead people to think that it is justifiable to cheat on taxes while collectivism that allow the government's say in the management of citizens' money more than individualism would lead people to think that it is not justifiable to do so.

Lastly, I theorize the direction and statistical significance of cultural values at the individual level and cultural frames at the country level are aligned as in Chapter III. In other words, the positive effect of individualism as a cultural value at the individual level (IND) on personal agency will be accompanied with positive effect of individualism as a cultural frame at the country level (IC). In other words, individualistic people who live in individualistic culture are expected to value personal agency most. In addition, I expect significant cross-level effects of the aligned cultural values and dominant cultural frames. That is, there would be synergistic, mutually reinforcing cultural effects from the

individual and cultural level. For example, I hypothesize that a collectivist in collectivist culture would support government ownership of business and industry more than the sum of the coefficients of each cultural variable because of the additional cross-level effect.

Results

As in Chapter III, the results seem to support that culture matters. In general, the cultural effects of individualism and collectivism showed up at least at one level – either the individual or the cultural level – except for income redistribution. First, as illustrated from the variance component estimation parts of Table 4.1 – Table 4.14, all the variance with the sole exception of the slop variance of individualism for "Fate versus Control" are statistically significant, which suggests that there exits contextual effect in general. All the estimates except for the slope variances of that dependent variable are at least two times larger than their standard error.[13] Thus, it is highly likely that each country has different slopes or different effects of individualism and collectivism at the individual level in the domain of agency and government responsibility. In addition, considering that variance of intercept estimates are statistically significant, it is also highly likely that each country has a different mean for each dependent variable when other independent and control variables are set to zero, that is, their respective grand means. Combined with the similar results in Chapter III, this should strengthen the case that each country is a legitimate unit of analysis in the study of culture as well as in multilevel modeling analysis.

[13] All the four slope variances of individualism at the cultural level for "Fate vs. Control" are about the same as their respective standard errors. See Table 4.3.

For the agency questions, individualism both at the individual level (IND) and at the cultural level (IC) confirms the hypothesized positive effects on the "Freedom of Choice and Control." In other words, individualists are more likely to "feel they have completely free choice and control over their lives" and individualistic culture adds a positive effect. In addition, the positive effects of IND and IC on the first agency variable strengthen the case that it is an intervening variable between culture and subjective well-being.

As Table 4.1 shows, cultural effects seem stronger at the national level considering 5-point scale of IND as opposed to 10-point scale of IC. The size of coefficients range from 0.11 to 0.13 for IC and are close to 0.12 for IND. It is also interesting to note that Left-Right self-placement is also positive (0.3 to 0.4) and statistically significant.

According to Table 4.3, individualistic cultural value also leads people more likely to believe "people shape their fate themselves" although the cultural level effects on the same "Fate versus Control" variable are not statistically significant regardless of controlling for government size and cross-level effect (Table 4.3). The individual level effects of IND in fact seem to be larger, ranging from 0.16 to 0.18, than those in "Freedom of Choice and Control."

By contrast, collectivism does not show consistent effects across levels on the agency variables. For example, Table 4.2 shows that collectivistic culture (CI) discourages the feeling of free choice and control over life as expected but collectivistic value at the individual level (COL) does not. The individual level effects of COL are all statistically insignificant. In addition, collectivists are more likely to believe "everything

in life is determined by fate" although collectivistic cultural frame does not appear to lead to the same belief. As shown in Table 4.4, all the coefficients for collectivism as a cultural frame are negative – meaning CI affects negatively the belief that ""people shape their fate themselves" – as hypothesized but they all are highly statistically insignificant. The *p*-values are at least greater than .5

For the attribution of responsibility variables, individualism and collectivism both at the individual level and at the cultural level demonstrate statistically significant effects as hypothesized when it comes to "Government versus Individual Responsibility." That is, individualism tends to encourage the belief that "people should take more responsibility to provide for themselves" while collectivism the belief that "the government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for." Table 4.5 shows that the sizes of the effect of IND and COL are similar in absolute values, the former being close to 0.06 and the latter to 0.09. As shown in Table 4.5 and 4.6, the cultural level effects are the same in absolute values (0.33) and far greater than individual level effects. In addition, it is worthy of note that Left-Right self-placement is highly statistically significant and positive, 0.18 in both IND and COL models. Both cultural values and ideology have independent effects on citizens' attitude toward government responsibility in the domain of basic personal welfare.

Collectivism at both levels also leads to the belief that "government ownership of business and industry should be increased" especially when the size of the government is controlled. Table 4.8 shows that the coefficients for COL are -0.04 (*p*-value=0.03) for Model 2 and -0.05 (*p*-value=0.02) for Model 4, meaning that collectivists are more likely to *oppose* private ownership. The coefficients for CI are all highly significant and

negative, ranging from -0.17 to -0.20, smaller than those of "Government versus Individual Responsibility" but are still considered large.

In contrast to the collectivism effects, the effect of individualism on the same dependent variable is mixed. It seems that individualism leads to the belief that "private ownership of business and industry should be increased" only at the cultural level. As shown in Table 4.7, the size of the coefficients, ranging from 0.19 to 0.21 is comparable to those of collectivism as cultural frames, which implies that it has equally powerful effect on the ownership preference. However, the effects of IND are not statistically significant.

As in "Government versus Individual Responsibility," Left-Right also seems to exert considerable effects in all the models for the ownership preference. The effects are highly statistically significant and close to 0.17 both for individualism and collectivism, almost equivalent in size to those of cultural frames. They are all measured on a 10-point scale.

For "Income Redistribution," the last responsibility attribution variable, none of the hypotheses about the effects of individualism and collectivism were confirmed. Although the effects of both individualism and collectivism at the individual level are in the expected direction, that is, the former being against and the latter for income redistribution, their p-values are rather large as Table 4.9 and 4.10 illustrate. The *p*-value is 0.14 for individualism in Model 4 and the *p*-value is 0.13 for collectivism in Model 1 and 3.

As with the case of the ownership question for individualism, this may have to do with the fact that the effects of ideology, all of which are highly statistically significant

and large, eclipse the cultural effect. The right are clearly against income redistribution and favor larger income differences as individual incentives. The sizes of the ideology effect are close to -0.24, larger than any other coefficients. Moreover, the absence of clear information about who or what is responsible for this policy may weaken the effects of individualism and collectivism, which exist in the other two responsibility attribution questions that involve "government." In a sense, the results seem consistent with the clarity of responsibility hypothesis.

The results for the effects of individualism and collectivism on the indirect measures of responsibility attributions are mixed. Individualism and collectivism at the cultural level exert statistically significant effects on "Claiming Government Benefits Justifiable" in expected directions but they do not at the individual level. As shown in Table 4.11 and 4.12, individualistic culture leads people to think that it is *not* justifiable to claim government benefits to which they are not entitled while collectivistic culture leads people to think that it is. The coefficients of these cultural effects are similar in absolute values, the coefficients of individualism ranging from 0.15 to 0.17 and those of collectivism ranging from 0.16 to 01.9. At the individual level, however, these cultural values do not seem to be linked with this dependent variable. The coefficients of IND and COL are not statistically significant. It seems, however, that Left-Right ideology functions as the individualistic value. The coefficients in all the models are small, close to -0.04 but all of them are statistically significant. It appears that people on the right are more likely to think that it is *not* justifiable to claim government benefits to which they are not entitled.

In contrast, individualism and collectivism as cultural values influence "Tax Cheating Justifiable" as hypothesized while they do not as cultural frames. As Table 4.13 and 4.14 demonstrate, individualists are more likely to think that it is justifiable to cheat on taxes when they have a chance while collectivists that it is not, the coefficients of IND being close to 0.06 and those of COL close to - 0.17. At the aggregate level, however, those cultural frames do not appear to be related with the tax cheating variable. None of the coefficients of those cultural frames are statistically significant. It is interesting to note that the right are more likely to think that it is *not* justifiable to cheat on taxes although the effects are almost close to zero (-0.01) in all the models. They are still statistically significant.

Lastly, despite of grand mean centering, none of the cross-level interactions are statistically significant, which suggests that the current data do not support the hypothesis that cultural frame and values have synergistic effects. This may have to with the fact that the inferential properties of cross-level interaction terms are still dubious (Bickel 2007).

Discussion

The empirical analysis of this chapter attempts to show that individualism and collectivism as cultural frames as well as cultural values matter when it comes to individuals' attitude toward agency in general and political preference toward the issue related to individual versus government responsibility. A series of multilevel modeling that the analysis draws on to distinguish individual and aggregate level of the cultural effects seems to confirm that this is the case in general. The statistically significant

independent effects of individualism and collectivism show up as hypothesized either at one level of analysis or at both.

In addition, the analysis of this chapter shows that individualism and collectivism register independent effects as cultural values or as cultural frames, in the areas – i.e., government responsibility in basic personal welfare, ownership of business and industry, and income redistribution – where the left-right ideology has been suggested especially powerful.[14] For "Government versus Individual Responsibility" in particular, individualism and collectivism at both levels as well as the ideological self-placement have significant effects on the individual's attribution preference as hypothesized. An individualist in individualistic cultures who identifies with the ideology of the right is most likely to believe that "people should take more responsibility to provide for themselves." In addition, for the ownership variable, collectivism at both levels as well as the ideology has independent effects on the individual's preference as theorized. For example, a collectivist in collectivistic cultures who identifies with the left ideology is most likely to prefer government ownership of business and industry.

This alignment of the effects of culture and political ideology – i.e., individualism with the right and collectivism with the left – suggests a new area in cross-cultural psychological study where both theoretical and empirical relationship between these two constructs should be examined. As the results of this analysis in this chapter show, the alignment is noticeable when it comes to economic policy preference. Yet there seem to

[14] Elaborating on Inglehart's definition of left-right ideology, Knutsen (1995) observed that the political values underlying left-right polarization are conflicts related to "economic inequalities, differences in ownership to the means of production, and conflict over the desirability of a market economy." The comprehensive analysis of voter ideology in Western democracies confirms this observation (Kim and Fording 1998 and 2001).

exist other political attitudinal objects where the effects of culture and ideology overlap but are underexplored. For example, personal agency has been positively associated with autonomy and self-reliance aspects of individualism, both of which are also consistent with the ideology of the right.[15] According to the Kim and Fording (1998), negative attitude against "social services expansion" belong to the Rightist categories. In fact, the analysis shows that the effects of individualism at both levels and the ideology of the right on the "Freedom of Choice and Control," an abstract agency variable, are in the same, positive direction while the effects of collectivism at the cultural level and the ideology of the left on the same variable are in the same, negative direction.

There also exist some results that need further elaboration. First, the fact that individualism and collectivism as cultural frames do not affect "Fate versus Control" as theorized appears to have to do with the question wordings loaded with religious connotation as opposed to the other agency variable, "Freedom of Choice and Control." For example, the leading sentence of the item read as "some people believe that individuals can decide their own *destiny*, while others think that it is impossible to escape a *predetermined fate*" (*italics* added). Thus, at the individual level it could sufficiently invoke the question of agency but at the cultural level the relationship might vanish because individualism and collectivism at the national level is not dominated by religious component. Furthermore, when the similar concept is framed in a way that emphasizes individual level values, it might depress the corresponding cultural level effects if there is

[15] According to Markus (2001), American liberals defy the simple characterization. Liberals are individualists when individualism is framed as autonomy and conservatives are individualists when it is conceptualized as self-reliance. This has to do with the fact that he emphasizes economic aspect of self-reliance.

any. Indeed, the coefficients of individualism and collectivism at the individual level for "Fate versus Control" are larger than those for "Freedom of Choice and Control."

Second, the mixed results for government benefit and tax questions may have to do with the fact that the questions themselves invoke morality dimension by using such words as "not entitled" and "justifiable" as well as with the fact that they are indirect measures for responsibility attributions as laid out above. In other words, the issue of "what is right or wrong" might have dominated the question of "who is responsible"[16] and the former might have overshadowed the attributional task. Thus, individualism and collectivism matter as individual values for the tax cheating question or as the aggregate level frames for the government benefit variable but the routes its influences take are open to questions, especially when it comes to these indirect, morality confounded, measures for responsibility attribution.

[16] To use Schlenker and his colleagues' terminology, "answerability" might have dominated "imputation" component of responsibility in these questions.

Figure 4.1. Freedom of Choice and Control



Figure 4. 2. Fate vs. Control



Figure 4.3. Government vs. Individual Responsibility



Figure 4.4. Government vs. Private Ownership of Business and Industry



Figure 4.5. Income Redistribution



Figure 4.6. Claiming Government Benefits Justifiable



Figure 4.7. Tax Cheating Justifiable



Table 4.1. Effect of Individualism on Free Choice

	Model 1 N_1=88,272 N_2=30			Model 2 N_1=85,623 N_2=29			Model 3 N_1=88,272 N_2=30			Model 4 N_1=85,623 N_2=29		
	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value
Individual Level												
Employed	0.09	0.02	0.00	0.09	0.02	0.00	0.09	0.02	0.00	0.09	0.02	0.00
Income	0.04	0.00	0.00	0.05	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.00	0.00	0.05	0.00	0.00
Education	0.05	0.00	0.00	0.05	0.00	0.00	0.05	0.00	0.00	0.05	0.00	0.00
Male	0.03	0.01	0.07	0.03	0.01	0.05	0.03	0.01	0.07	0.03	0.01	0.05
Individualism (IND)	0.12	0.03	0.00	0.12	0.03	0.00	0.12	0.03	0.00	0.12	0.03	0.00
Left-Right	0.04	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.00
Constant	6.89	0.08	0.00	6.89	0.08	0.00	6.89	0.08	0.00	6.89	0.08	0.00
Cross-level Interaction												
IND*IC							-0.01	0.02	0.43	-0.01	0.02	0.41
Country Level												
Individualism-Collectivism (IC)	0.11	0.04	0.02	0.11	0.04	0.01	0.12	0.05	0.01	0.13	0.05	0.01
Size of the Government				-0.03	0.01	0.09				-0.03	0.01	0.09
Variance Component												
Variance Slope Individualism	0.03	0.01		0.03	0.01		0.03	0.01		0.03	0.01	
Variance Intercept	0.20	0.05		0.19	0.05		0.20	0.05		0.19	0.05	
Covariance	-0.03	0.01		-0.03	0.01		-0.03	0.02		-0.03	0.02	
Variance Residual	4.32	0.02		4.32	0.02		4.32	0.02		4.32	0.02	

Note: N_1 is the number of level 1 observations and N_2 is the number of level 2 observations.

Table 4.2. Effect of Collectivism on Free Choice

	Model 1 N_1=88,273 N_2=30			Model 2 N_1=85,624 N_2=29			Model 3 N_1=88,273 N_2=30			Model 4 N_1=85,624 N_2=29		
	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value
Individual Level												
Employed	0.11	0.02	0.00	0.11	0.02	0.00	0.11	0.02	0.00	0.11	0.02	0.00
Income	0.05	0.00	0.00	0.05	0.00	0.00	0.05	0.00	0.00	0.05	0.00	0.00
Education	0.06	0.00	0.00	0.07	0.00	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.00	0.07	0.00	0.00
Male	0.03	0.01	0.08	0.03	0.01	0.06	0.03	0.01	0.08	0.03	0.01	0.06
Collectivism (COL)	0.03	0.02	0.12	0.03	0.02	0.15	0.03	0.02	0.13	0.03	0.02	0.16
Left-Right	0.03	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.00
Constant	6.89	0.08	0.00	6.90	0.08	0.00	6.89	0.08	0.00	6.90	0.08	0.00
Cross-level Interaction												
COL*CI							-0.02	0.01	0.14	-0.02	0.01	0.14
Country Level												
Collectivism-Individualism (CI)	-0.10	0.05	0.03	-0.11	0.05	0.02	-0.12	0.05	0.02	-0.13	0.05	0.01
Size of the Government				-0.03	0.02	0.12				-0.03	0.02	0.12
Variance Component												
Variance Slope Individualism	0.01	0.00		0.01	0.00		0.01	0.00		0.01	0.00	
Variance Intercept	0.21	0.06		0.20	0.06		0.20	0.06		0.20	0.06	
Covariance	0.01	0.01		0.01	0.01		0.01	0.01		0.01	0.01	
Variance Residual	4.36	0.02		4.35	0.02		4.36	0.02		4.35	0.02	

Note: N_1 is the number of level 1 observations and N_2 is the number of level 2 observations.

Table 4.3. Effect of Individualism on Fate vs. Control

	Model 1 N_1=16,772 N_2=16			Model 2 N_1=15,851 N_2=15			Model 3 N_1=16,772 N_2=16			Model 4 N_1=15,851 N_2=15		
	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value
Individual Level												
Employed	0.12	0.04	0.00	0.13	0.04	0.00	0.12	0.04	0.00	0.13	0.04	0.00
Income	0.07	0.01	0.00	0.07	0.01	0.00	0.07	0.01	0.00	0.07	0.01	0.00
Education	0.12	0.01	0.00	0.12	0.01	0.00	0.12	0.01	0.00	0.12	0.01	0.00
Male	0.28	0.04	0.00	0.29	0.04	0.00	0.28	0.04	0.00	0.28	0.04	0.00
Individualism (IND)	0.18	0.03	0.00	0.16	0.03	0.00	0.17	0.03	0.00	0.16	0.03	0.00
Constant	6.70	0.12	0.00	6.74	0.15	0.00	6.70	0.12	0.00	6.75	0.15	0.00
Cross-level Interaction												
IND*IC							-0.02	0.01	0.15	-0.02	0.01	0.11
Country Level												
Individualism-Collectivism (IC)	0.01	0.06	0.82	0.02	0.06	0.81	0.03	0.06	0.56	0.03	0.06	0.61
Size of the Government				0.01	0.04	0.75				0.01	0.04	0.75
Variance Component												
Variance Slope Individualism	0.01	0.01		0.01	0.00		0.01	0.01		0.00	0.00	
Variance Intercept	0.21	0.08		0.24	0.10		0.21	0.08		0.24	0.10	
Covariance	-0.01	0.02		-0.01	0.02		-0.01	0.02		-0.01	0.01	
Variance Residual	5.38	0.06		5.36	0.06		5.38	0.06		5.36	0.06	

Note: N_1 is the number of level 1 observations and N_2 is the number of level 2 observations.

Table 4.4. Effect of Collectivism on Fate vs. Control

	Model 1 N_1=16,772 N_2=16			Model 2 N_1=15,851 N_2=15			Model 3 N_1=16,772 N_2=16			Model 4 N_1=15,851 N_2=15		
	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value
Individual Level												
Employed	0.14	0.04	0.00	0.14	0.04	0.00	0.14	0.04	0.00	0.14	0.04	0.00
Income	0.07	0.01	0.00	0.07	0.01	0.00	0.07	0.01	0.00	0.07	0.01	0.00
Education	0.13	0.01	0.00	0.13	0.01	0.00	0.13	0.01	0.00	0.13	0.01	0.00
Male	0.26	0.04	0.00	0.27	0.04	0.00	0.27	0.04	0.00	0.27	0.04	0.00
Collectivism (COL)	-0.09	0.04	0.02	-0.09	0.04	0.03	-0.09	0.04	0.02	-0.09	0.04	0.04
Constant	6.79	0.11	0.00	6.83	0.14	0.00	6.79	0.11	0.00	6.83	0.14	0.00
Cross-level Interaction												
COL*CI							0.01	0.02	0.78	0.01	0.02	0.77
Country Level												
Collectivism-Individualism (CI)	-0.03	0.05	0.56	-0.03	0.06	0.64	-0.03	0.06	0.64	-0.02	0.06	0.72
Size of the Government				0.01	0.03	0.67				0.01	0.03	0.67
Variance Component												
Variance Slope Individualism	0.02	0.01		0.02	0.01		0.02	0.01		0.02	0.01	
Variance Intercept	0.19	0.07		0.22	0.09		0.19	0.08		0.22	0.09	
Covariance	0.02	0.02		0.02	0.02		0.02	0.02		0.02	0.02	
Variance Residual	5.40	0.06		5.37	0.06		5.40	0.06		5.37	0.06	

Note: N_1 is the number of level 1 observations and N_2 is the number of level 2 observations.

Table 4.5.Effect of Individualism on Government Responsibility vs. Individual Responsibility

	Model 1 N_1=74,494 N_2=30			Model 2 N_1=71,855 N_2=29			Model 3 N_1=74,494 N_2=30			Model 4 N_1=71,855 N_2=29		
	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value
Individual Level												
Employed	0.09	0.02	0.00	0.04	0.02	0.06	0.09	0.02	0.00	0.04	0.02	0.06
Income	0.09	0.00	0.00	0.09	0.00	0.00	0.09	0.00	0.00	0.09	0.00	0.00
Education	0.00	0.00	0.20	0.01	0.00	0.14	0.00	0.00	0.20	0.01	0.00	0.15
Male	0.18	0.02	0.00	0.19	0.02	0.00	0.18	0.02	0.00	0.19	0.02	0.00
Individualism (IND)	0.06	0.03	0.05	0.06	0.03	0.04	0.06	0.03	0.03	0.06	0.03	0.03
Left-Right	0.18	0.00	0.00	0.18	0.00	0.00	0.18	0.00	0.00	0.18	0.00	0.00
Constant	5.88	0.11	0.00	5.87	0.12	0.00	5.88	0.11	0.00	5.87	0.12	0.00
Cross-level Interaction							-0.03	0.02	0.03	-0.03	0.02	0.03
COL*IC												
Country Level												
Individualism-Collectivism (IC)	0.33	0.06	0.00	0.33	0.07	0.00	0.34	0.07	0.00	0.34	0.07	0.00
Size of the Government				0.00	0.02	0.94				0.00	0.02	0.96
Variance Component												
Variance Slope Individualism	0.02	0.01		0.02	0.01		0.02	0.01		0.02	0.01	
Variance Intercept	0.36	0.10		0.39	0.11		0.37	0.10		0.39	0.11	
Covariance	-0.01	0.02		-0.01	0.02		-0.01	0.02		-0.01	0.02	
Variance Residual	6.89	0.04		6.83	0.04		6.89	0.04		6.83	0.04	

Note: N_1 is the number of level 1 observations and N_2 is the number of level 2 observations.

Table 4.6. Effect of Collectivism on Government Responsibility vs. Individual Responsibility

	Model 1 N_1=74,495 N_2=30			Model 2 N_1=71,856 N_2=29			Model 3 N_1=74,495 N_2=30			Model 4 N_1=71,856 N_2=29		
	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value
Individual Level												
Employed	0.09	0.02	0.00	0.04	0.02	0.07	0.09	0.02	0.00	0.04	0.02	0.07
Income	0.09	0.00	0.00	0.09	0.00	0.00	0.09	0.00	0.00	0.09	0.00	0.00
Education	0.01	0.00	0.04	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.04	0.01	0.00	0.03
Male	0.18	0.02	0.00	0.19	0.02	0.00	0.18	0.02	0.00	0.19	0.02	0.00
Collectivism (COL)	-0.08	0.02	0.00	-0.09	0.02	0.00	-0.08	0.02	0.00	-0.09	0.02	0.00
Left-Right	0.18	0.00	0.00	0.18	0.00	0.00	0.18	0.00	0.00	0.18	0.00	0.00
Constant	5.87	0.11	0.00	5.87	0.12	0.00	5.87	0.11	0.00	5.87	0.12	0.00
Cross-level Interaction												
COL*CI							-0.01	0.01	0.42	-0.01	0.01	0.25
Country Level												
Collectivism-Individualism (CI)	-0.33	0.07	0.00	-0.35	0.07	0.00	-0.33	0.07	0.00	-0.34	0.07	0.00
Size of the Government				-0.01	0.02	0.60				-0.01	0.02	0.60
Variance Component												
Variance Slope Individualism	0.01	0.00		0.01	0.00		0.01	0.00		0.01	0.00	
Variance Intercept	0.37	0.10		0.39	0.11		0.37	0.10		0.40	0.11	
Covariance	0.00	0.01		-0.01	0.01		0.00	0.01		-0.01	0.01	
Variance Residual	6.90	0.04		6.84	0.04		6.90	0.04		6.84	0.04	

Note: N_1 is the number of level 1 observations and N_2 is the number of level 2 observations.

Table 4.7. Effect of Individualism on Government Ownership vs. Private Ownership of Business and Industry

	Model 1 N_1=64,236 N_2=28			Model 2 N_1=61,691 N_2=27			Model 3 N_1=64,236 N_2=28			Model 4 N_1=61,691 N_2=27		
	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value
Individual Level												
Employed	0.10	0.02	0.00	0.06	0.02	0.01	0.10	0.02	0.00	0.06	0.02	0.00
Income	0.07	0.00	0.00	0.07	0.00	0.00	0.07	0.00	0.00	0.07	0.00	0.00
Education	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.00
Male	0.30	0.02	0.00	0.31	0.02	0.00	0.29	0.02	0.00	0.31	0.02	0.00
Individualism (IND)	0.00	0.03	0.98	0.00	0.03	0.91	0.00	0.02	0.87	0.01	0.02	0.69
Left-Right	0.17	0.00	0.00	0.17	0.00	0.00	0.17	0.00	0.00	0.17	0.00	0.00
Constant	6.59	0.09	0.00	6.56	0.09	0.00	6.59	0.09	0.00	6.56	0.09	0.00
Cross-level Interaction												
IND*IC							-0.05	0.01	0.00	-0.05	0.01	0.00
Country Level												
Individualism-Collectivism (IC)	0.19	0.05	0.00	0.19	0.05	0.00	0.21	0.05	0.00	0.21	0.05	0.00
Size of the Government				0.01	0.02	0.64				0.01	0.02	0.68
Variance Component												
Variance Slope Individualism	0.02	0.01		0.02	0.01		0.01	0.00		0.01	0.00	
Variance Intercept	0.21	0.06		0.22	0.06		0.21	0.06		0.22	0.06	
Covariance	-0.01	0.02		0.00	0.02		0.00	0.01		0.00	0.01	
Variance Residual	5.57	0.03		5.55	0.03		5.57	0.03		5.55	0.03	

Note: N_1 is the number of level 1 observations and N_2 is the number of level 2 observations.

Table 4.8. Effect of Collectivism on Government Ownership vs. Private Ownership of Business and Industry

	Model 1 N_1=64,237 N_2=28			Model 2 N_1=61,692 N_2=27			Model 3 N_1=64,237 N_2=28			Model 4 N_1=61,692 N_2=27		
	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value
Individual Level												
Employed	0.09	0.02	0.00	0.05	0.02	0.01	0.09	0.02	0.00	0.05	0.02	0.01
Income	0.07	0.00	0.00	0.07	0.00	0.00	0.07	0.00	0.00	0.07	0.00	0.00
Education	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.00
Male	0.30	0.02	0.00	0.32	0.02	0.00	0.30	0.02	0.00	0.32	0.02	0.00
Collectivism (COL)	-0.03	0.02	0.13	-0.04	0.02	0.03	-0.03	0.02	0.12	-0.05	0.02	0.02
Left-Right	0.17	0.00	0.00	0.17	0.00	0.00	0.17	0.00	0.00	0.17	0.00	0.00
Constant	6.58	0.09	0.00	6.55	0.09	0.00	6.58	0.09	0.00	6.55	0.09	0.00
Cross-level Interaction												
COL*CI							-0.01	0.01	0.39	-0.01	0.01	0.18
Country Level												
Collectivism-Individualism (CI)	-0.18	0.04	0.00	-0.17	0.05	0.00	-0.20	0.05	0.00	-0.20	0.05	0.00
Size of the Government				0.01	0.02	0.40				0.01	0.02	0.39
Variance Component												
Variance Slope Individualism	0.01	0.00		0.01	0.00		0.01	0.00		0.01	0.00	
Variance Intercept	0.21	0.06		0.21	0.06		0.21	0.06		0.21	0.06	
Covariance	0.02	0.01		0.02	0.01		0.02	0.01		0.02	0.01	
Variance Residual	5.58	0.03		5.56	0.03		5.58	0.03		5.56	0.03	

Note: N_1 is the number of level 1 observations and N_2 is the number of level 2 observations.

Table 4.9. Effect of Individualism on Income Redistribution

	Model 1 N_1=67,954 N_2=29			Model 2 N_1=65,944 N_2=28			Model 3 N_1=67,954 N_2=29			Model 4 N_1=65,944 N_2=28		
	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value
Individual Level												
Employed	-0.13	0.02	0.00	-0.08	0.02	0.00	-0.13	0.02	0.00	-0.08	0.02	0.00
Income	-0.14	0.00	0.00	-0.14	0.00	0.00	-0.14	0.00	0.00	-0.14	0.00	0.00
Education	-0.05	0.00	0.00	-0.05	0.00	0.00	-0.05	0.00	0.00	-0.05	0.00	0.00
Male	-0.19	0.02	0.00	-0.19	0.02	0.00	-0.19	0.02	0.00	-0.19	0.02	0.00
Individualism (IND)	-0.03	0.03	0.30	-0.04	0.03	0.25	-0.04	0.03	0.20	-0.04	0.03	0.14
Left-Right	-0.24	0.00	0.00	-0.23	0.01	0.00	-0.24	0.00	0.00	-0.23	0.01	0.00
Constant	5.23	0.12	0.00	5.27	0.12	0.00	5.23	0.12	0.00	5.27	0.12	0.00
Cross-level Interaction												
IND*IC							0.05	0.02	0.00	0.05	0.02	0.00
Country Level												
Individualism-Collectivism (IC)	0.01	0.07	0.87	0.07	0.07	0.29	0.01	0.07	0.90	0.03	0.07	0.71
Size of the Government				-0.06	0.02	0.01				-0.06	0.02	0.01
Variance Component												
Variance Slope Individualism	0.03	0.01		0.03	0.01		0.02	0.01		0.02	0.01	
Variance Intercept	0.44	0.12		0.39	0.12		0.44	0.12		0.39	0.11	
Covariance	0.00	0.03		-0.03	0.03		0.00	0.02		-0.02	0.02	
Variance Residual	7.00	0.04		6.94	0.04		7.00	0.04		6.94	0.04	

Note: N_1 is the number of level 1 observations and N_2 is the number of level 2 observations.

Table 4.10. Effect of Collectivism on Income Redistribution

	Model 1 N_1=67,955 N_2=29			Model 2 N_1=65,945 N_2=28			Model 3 N_1=67,955 N_2=29			Model 4 N_1=65,945 N_2=28		
	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value
Individual Level												
Employed	-0.13	0.02	0.00	-0.08	0.02	0.00	-0.13	0.02	0.00	-0.08	0.02	0.00
Income	-0.14	0.00	0.00	-0.14	0.00	0.00	-0.14	0.00	0.00	-0.14	0.00	0.00
Education	-0.05	0.00	0.00	-0.05	0.00	0.00	-0.05	0.00	0.00	-0.05	0.00	0.00
Male	-0.19	0.02	0.00	-0.20	0.02	0.00	-0.19	0.02	0.00	-0.20	0.02	0.00
Collectivism (COL)	0.03	0.02	0.13	0.03	0.02	0.16	0.03	0.02	0.13	0.03	0.02	0.16
Left-Right	-0.24	0.00	0.00	-0.23	0.01	0.00	-0.24	0.00	0.00	-0.23	0.01	0.00
Constant	5.24	0.13	0.00	5.27	0.12	0.00	5.24	0.13	0.00	5.27	0.12	0.00
Cross-level Interaction												
COL*CI							0.00	0.01	1.00	0.00	0.01	0.97
Country Level												
Collectivism-Individualism (CI)	-0.02	0.07	0.77	-0.03	0.07	0.62	-0.02	0.07	0.78	-0.03	0.07	0.63
Size of the Government				-0.05	0.02	0.05				-0.05	0.02	0.05
Variance Component												
Variance Slope Individualism	0.01	0.00		0.01	0.00		0.01	0.00		0.01	0.00	
Variance Intercept	0.45	0.12		0.40	0.12		0.45	0.12		0.40	0.12	
Covariance	-0.02	0.02		-0.01	0.02		-0.02	0.02		-0.01	0.02	
Variance Residual	7.01	0.04		6.95	0.04		7.01	0.04		6.95	0.04	

Note: N_1 is the number of level 1 observations and N_2 is the number of level 2 observations.

Table 4.11. Effect of Individualism on Claiming Government Benefits Justifiable

	Model 1 N_1=84,547 N_2=30			Model 2 N_1=81,890 N_2=29			Model 3 N_1=84,547 N_2=30			Model 4 N_1=81,890 N_2=29		
	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value
Individual Level												
Employed	0.16	0.02	0.00	0.16	0.02	0.00	0.16	0.02	0.00	0.16	0.02	0.00
Income	-0.03	0.00	0.00	-0.03	0.00	0.00	-0.03	0.00	0.00	-0.03	0.00	0.00
Education	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00
Male	0.07	0.01	0.00	0.07	0.01	0.00	0.07	0.01	0.00	0.07	0.01	0.00
Individualism (IND)	-0.01	0.03	0.71	-0.01	0.03	0.77	-0.01	0.03	0.70	-0.01	0.03	0.76
Left-Right	-0.04	0.00	0.00	-0.04	0.00	0.00	-0.04	0.00	0.00	-0.04	0.00	0.00
Constant	2.27	0.12	0.00	2.29	0.12	0.00	2.27	0.12	0.00	2.29	0.12	0.00
Cross-level Interaction												
IND*IC							0.01	0.02	0.58	0.01	0.02	0.61
Country Level												
Individualism-Collectivism (IC)	-0.15	0.07	0.02	-0.16	0.07	0.02	-0.16	0.07	0.02	-0.17	0.07	0.02
Size of the Government				0.01	0.02	0.77				0.01	0.02	0.77
Variance Component												
Variance Slope Individualism	0.02	0.01		0.02	0.01		0.02	0.01		0.02	0.01	
Variance Intercept	0.40	0.11		0.41	0.12		0.40	0.11		0.41	0.12	
Covariance	-0.02	0.02		-0.02	0.02		-0.02	0.02		-0.02	0.02	
Variance Residual	4.18	0.02		4.21	0.02		4.18	0.02		4.21	0.02	

Note: N_1 is the number of level 1 observations and N_2 is the number of level 2 observations.

Table 4.12. Effect of Collectivism on Claiming Government Benefits Justifiable

	Model 1 N_1=84,548 N_2=30			Model 2 N_1=81,891 N_2=29			Model 3 N_1=84,548 N_2=30			Model 4 N_1=81,891 N_2=29		
	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value
Individual Level												
Employed	0.16	0.02	0.00	0.16	0.02	0.00	0.16	0.02	0.00	0.16	0.02	0.00
Income	-0.03	0.00	0.00	-0.03	0.00	0.00	-0.03	0.00	0.00	-0.03	0.00	0.00
Education	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00
Male	0.06	0.01	0.00	0.06	0.01	0.00	0.06	0.01	0.00	0.06	0.01	0.00
Collectivism (COL)	-0.04	0.02	0.10	-0.03	0.02	0.17	-0.04	0.02	0.10	-0.03	0.02	0.18
Left-Right	-0.04	0.00	0.00	-0.04	0.00	0.00	-0.04	0.00	0.00	-0.04	0.00	0.00
Constant	2.27	0.12	0.00	2.29	0.12	0.00	2.27	0.12	0.00	2.29	0.12	0.00
Cross-level Interaction												
COL*CI							0.01	0.01	0.40	0.01	0.01	0.33
Country Level												
Collectivism-Individualism (CI)	0.16	0.07	0.02	0.19	0.07	0.01	0.16	0.07	0.02	0.18	0.07	0.01
Size of the Government				0.03	0.02	0.19				0.03	0.02	0.19
Variance Component												
Variance Slope Individualism	0.01	0.00		0.01	0.00		0.02	0.00		0.01	0.00	
Variance Intercept	0.41	0.11		0.42	0.12		0.41	0.11		0.42	0.12	
Covariance	0.00	0.02		-0.01	0.02		0.00	0.02		-0.01	0.02	
Variance Residual	4.19	0.02		4.22	0.02		4.19	0.02		4.22	0.02	

Note: N_1 is the number of level 1 observations and N_2 is the number of level 2 observations.

Table 4.13. Effect of Individualism on Tax Cheating Justifiable

	Model 1 N_1=83,656 N_2=30			Model 2 N_1=81,001 N_2=29			Model 3 N_1=83,656 N_2=30			Model 4 N_1=81,001 N_2=29		
	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value
Individual Level												
Employed	0.24	0.02	0.00	0.24	0.02	0.00	0.24	0.02	0.00	0.24	0.02	0.00
Income	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00
Education	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00
Male	0.33	0.02	0.00	0.32	0.02	0.00	0.33	0.02	0.00	0.32	0.02	0.00
Individualism (IND)	0.06	0.02	0.00	0.06	0.02	0.00	0.06	0.02	0.00	0.06	0.02	0.00
Left-Right	-0.01	0.00	0.02	-0.01	0.00	0.00	-0.01	0.00	0.02	-0.01	0.00	0.00
Constant	2.46	0.10	0.00	2.48	0.11	0.00	2.46	0.10	0.00	2.48	0.11	0.00
Cross-level Interaction												
IND*IC							0.00	0.01	0.91	0.00	0.01	0.97
Country Level												
Individualism-Collectivism (IC)	0.04	0.06	0.53	0.04	0.06	0.47	0.04	0.06	0.52	0.04	0.06	0.48
Size of the Government				-0.02	0.02	0.36				-0.02	0.02	0.36
Variance Component												
Variance Slope Individualism	0.01	0.00		0.01	0.00		0.01	0.00		0.01	0.00	
Variance Intercept	0.32	0.09		0.34	0.10		0.32	0.09		0.34	0.10	
Covariance	0.01	0.01		0.02	0.01		0.01	0.01		0.02	0.01	
Variance Residual	4.79	0.02		4.82	0.02		4.79	0.02		4.82	0.02	

Note: N_1 is the number of level 1 observations and N_2 is the number of level 2 observations.

Table 4.14. Effect of Collectivism on Tax Cheating Justifiable

	Model 1 N_1=83,657 N_2=30			Model 2 N_1=81,002 N_2=29			Model 3 N_1=83,657 N_2=30			Model 4 N_1=81,002 N_2=29		
	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Coefficient	SE	p-value
Individual Level												
Employed	0.24	0.02	0.00	0.24	0.02	0.00	0.24	0.02	0.00	0.24	0.02	0.00
Income	0.01	0.00	0.03	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.03	0.01	0.00	0.03
Education	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.00
Male	0.31	0.02	0.00	0.31	0.02	0.00	0.31	0.02	0.00	0.31	0.02	0.00
Collectivism (COL)	-0.17	0.03	0.00	-0.17	0.03	0.00	-0.17	0.02	0.00	-0.17	0.03	0.00
Left-Right	-0.01	0.00	0.03	-0.01	0.00	0.00	-0.01	0.00	0.03	-0.01	0.00	0.00
Constant	2.46	0.11	0.00	2.47	0.11	0.00	2.46	0.10	0.00	2.47	0.11	0.00
Cross-level Interaction												
COL*CI							0.04	0.01	0.01	0.04	0.01	0.01
Country Level												
Collectivism-Individualism (CI)	0.02	0.06	0.78	0.02	0.06	0.71	-0.04	0.06	0.50	-0.04	0.06	0.53
Size of the Government				0.00	0.02	0.91				0.00	0.02	0.90
Variance Component												
Variance Slope Individualism	0.02	0.01		0.02	0.01		0.01	0.00		0.02	0.01	
Variance Intercept	0.34	0.09		0.35	0.10		0.33	0.09		0.34	0.10	
Covariance	-0.03	0.02		-0.04	0.02		-0.03	0.02		-0.03	0.02	
Variance Residual	4.77	0.02		4.79	0.02		4.77	0.02		4.79	0.02	

Note: N_1 is the number of level 1 observations and N_2 is the number of level 2 observations.

CHAPTER V

Conclusion

Summary

This dissertation is based on the two premises: First, the original rationale for the study of political culture is still valid. In other words, in comparative politics we need a unifying theoretical framework that will help bridge the gap between the individual and aggregate level analysis. As Almond and Verba (1963, 32) stated, "the connecting link between micropolitics and macropolitics is political culture." Second, culture, specified as individualism and collectivism, affects an individual's political attitude and behavior as internalized values at the individual level and as "human-made" environments under which people think and act.

In the first chapter, I critically reviewed select political and cross-cultural literature to make a case why we need to study political culture and how we can enrich the field by introducing the constructs of individualism and collectivism, which have been suggested as the central organizing dimensions of culture by culture-oriented psychologists. In addition, I elaborated on the issues of both current political culture research and cross-cultural psychology that inspired this dissertation. They are: the overemphasis on the aggregate level approach in the political culture research, the lack of studies of cultural effects on political attitude and behavior in psychology, and the external validity issues due to unrepresentative samples from a small number of countries.

Therefore, in the empirical chapters, I aspired to show the cultural effects of individualism and collectivism on citizens' political attitude and behavior disentangling individual level effects of cultural values from the aggregate level effects of cultural frames. Moreover, I attempted to maximize the external validity of the findings, which is difficult to claim based on 2-3 country comparison experimental studies, by drawing on representative samples from the five waves of World Values Survey data for thirty OECD countries.

For the empirical analysis, I used multilevel modeling which has been suggested as most appropriate in the data analysis of comparative political behavior as well as cross-cultural psychology. It takes into account the fact that the observations are relatively homogeneous within the same cultural context and at the same time incorporates contextual information in the same model.

In Chapter III, I measured the cultural effects of individualism and collectivism on such civic culture/social capital variables as trust, tolerance, membership, subjective well-being, national pride, and political interest and participation. In Chapter IV, I again measured the cultural effects on citizens' attitude toward the agency and government responsibility attribution

The Empirical Findings and Their Substantive Implications

First, I found that culture matters. Specifically, individualism and collectivism mattered in the sense that they affected citizens' political attitude and behavior. The independent effects of individualism and collectivism on individual's attitude and behavior showed up at least at one level of analysis, i.e., either as cultural value at the

individual level or as cultural frame at the cultural level, or at both. For example, evidence suggests that individualism at both levels affects trust, tolerance, membership, and political action positively while collectivistic culture affects these civic culture/social capital variables negatively. In contrast, individualism at the individual level affects national pride and political interest negatively while collectivism at the same level affects them positively. Individualistic culture and collectivistic cultural value affect subjective well-being positively while collectivism at the cultural level affects this measure of one's feeling of happiness negatively. Furthermore, my analysis shows that individualism enhances consideration of personal agency while collectivism either at the individual level or at the cultural level raises consideration of collective agency.

Rather surprisingly, individualism and collectivism also have independent effects in some areas where political ideology has been suggested to have dominant influences such as in government responsibility for basic personal well-being. Evidence suggests that individualistic culture and collectivism at both levels also matter even in citizens' policy preference for ownership – whether they prefer private ownership of business and industry or government ownership.

Second, my analysis suggests that we need to reexamine the individual-level implications of some of the findings of social capital literature both theoretically and empirically. Many social scientists have attributed a decreasing stock of social capital to rising individualism, largely based on the aggregate level analysis. Evidence suggests, however, that individualists put more trust on outgroups and are more tolerant with even stigmatized groups than collectivists. The individualistic culture also seems to encourage trust and tolerance while collectivistic culture seems to discourage these important social

capital values. Moreover, individualism is positively linked with rather difficult forms of political engagement such as signing a petition, joining a boycott and attending peaceful demonstrations, in addition to membership.

Third, it turns out that a country is a legitimate unit of analysis in cultural studies. My analysis shows that there exist different cultural effects at the individual level. In addition, the baseline value of the mean of each dependent variable across countries is different. This may mean that either a higher aggregate level analysis, based on language or religion for example, or a within-country cultural variation analysis has its own merits but would not invalidate the country level approach in the study of culture.

Future Avenues of Inquiry

I will conclude this dissertation with discussion of potential future avenues of inquiry. First, there may exist components of the individual level measures of individualism and collectivism that should be excluded in operational definition in order to enhance the internal validity of each measure. Evidence suggests that the focus on family and close acquaintances characterizes collectivism and that rather abstract relational, group oriented values such as “tolerance and respect for other people” may not be relevant to the construct. Moreover, the inclusion of “religious faith” in the index might have inflated the degree of collectivism while “determination and perseverance” might have done the same to individualism. Thus, a theoretical discussion to distinguish the “defining attributes” and secondary attributes or consequents of individualism and collectivism at both levels is needed for a more appropriate re-operationalization.

Second, this dissertation could not test "causality" as the hypotheses in the analysis implied, in the absence of time-series analysis. In addition, for the same reason, it could not test the influence of fluctuation of such macro-level factors as economy and government ideology. It is likely that they might have affected or affected by, the variables in the both sides of the equations in the analysis of this dissertation. Now that we have the World Values Survey data available, which have measured individuals' attitude and behavior for about thirty years, we are in a better position to implement a time-series analysis and to make a case for causality of cultural influences.

Bibliography

Allik, Juri, and Anu Realo. 2004. “Individualism-Collectivism and Social Capital.” *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology* 35 (1):29-49.

Almond, Gabriel A. 1980. “The Intellectual History of the Civic Culture Concept.” In *The Civic Culture Revisited: An Analytic Study*, ed. G. A. Almond and S. Verba. Boston: Little, Brown.

———. 1990. *A Discipline Divided: Schools and Sects in Political Science*. Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage Publications.

———. 2002. *Ventures in Political Science: Narratives and Reflections*. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner.

Almond, Gabriel A., and G. Bingham Powell. 1966. *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach*. Boston: Little, Brown.

———. 1978. *Comparative Politics: System, Process, and Policy*. Boston: Little, Brown.

Almond, Gabriel A., and Sidney Verba. 1963. *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

———. eds. 1980. *The Civic Culture Revisited: An Analytic Study*. Boston: Little, Brown.

Anderson, Christopher. 1995. *Blaming the Government: Citizens and the Economy in Five European Democracies*. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe.

———. 2000. “Economic Voting and Political Context: A Comparative Perspective.” *Electoral Studies* 19 (2-3):151-70.

Anu, Realo, Koido Kati, Ceulemans Eva, and J. i Allik. 2002. “Three Components of Individualism.” *European Journal of Personality* 16 (3):163-84.

Arts, Wilhelmus Antonius, and Loek Halman. 2004. *European Values at the Turn of the Millen[n]ium*. Boston: Brill.

Bandura, Albert. 2006. “Toward a Psychology of Human Agency.” *Perspectives on Psychological Science* 1 (2):164-80.

Banfield, Edward C. 1958. *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society*. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press; Research Center in Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago.

Barry, Brian. 1978. *Sociologists, Economists, and Democracy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Bellah, Robert Neelly. 1986. *Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life*. 1st Perennial Library ed. New York: Harper & Row.

Berg-Schlosser, Dirk. 2003. “Comment on Welzel, Inglehart & Klingemann’s ‘The Theory of Human Development: A Cross-Cultural Analysis’.” *European Journal of Political Research* 42 (3):381-6.

Berry, John W., Ype H. Poortinga, Marshall H. Segall, and Pierre R. Dasen. 2002. *Cross-Cultural Psychology: Research and Applications*. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.

Bickel, Robert. 2007. *Multilevel Analysis for Applied research: It’s Just Regression*. New York: Guilford Press.

Bond, Michael Harris. 2002. “Reclaiming the Individual from Hofstede’s Ecological Analysis – A 20-year Odyssey: Comment on Oyserman et al. (2002).” *Psychological Bulletin* 128 (1):73-7.

Boninger, David S., Jon A. Krosnick, and Matthew K. Berent. 1995. “Origins of Attitude Importance: Self-interest, Social Identification, and Value Relevance.” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 68 (1):61-80.

Boyd, Robert, and Peter J. Richerson. 1985. *Culture and the Evolutionary Process*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Ceaser, James. 1985. “Alexis de Tocqueville on Political Science, Political Culture, and the Role of the Intellectual.” *The American Political Science Review* 79 (3):656-72.

Choi, Incheol. 1998. The Cultural Psychology of Surprise: Causal Theories, Contradiction, and Epistemic Curiosity, Psychology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.

Choi, Incheol, Reeshad Dalal, Chu Kim-Prieto, and Hyekyung Park. 2003. “Culture and Judgement of Causal Relevance.” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 84 (1):46-59.

Choi, Incheol, Richard E. Nisbett, and Ara Norenzayan. 1999. “Causal Attribution Across Cultures: Variation and Universality.” *Psychological Bulletin* 125 (1):47-63.

Choi, Incheol, Richard E. Nisbett, and Edward E. Smith. 1997. “Culture, Category Salience, and Inductive Reasoning.” *Cognition* 65 (1):15-32.

Conway, M. Margaret. 1989. “The Political Context of Political Behavior.” *The Journal of Politics* 51 (1):3-10.

Curtice, John. 2007. “Comparative Opinion Surveys.” In *Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior*, ed. R. J. Dalton and H.-D. Klingemann. New York: Oxford University Press.

Dalton, Russell J. 1996. *Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies*. 2nd ed. Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House.

———. 2000. “Citizen Attitudes and Political Behavior.” *Comparative Political Studies* 33 (6-7):912-40.

———. 2004. *Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices: The Erosion of Political*

Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.

Dalton, Russell J., and Doh Chull Shin. 2006. *Citizens, Democracy, and Markets Around the Pacific Rim: Congruence Theory and Political Culture*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Diamond, Larry Jay. 1993. *Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries*. Boulder, Colo.: L. Rienner Publishers.

Diener, Ed, and Marissa Diener. 1995. "Cross-Cultural Correlates of Life Satisfaction and Self-Esteem." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 68 (4):653-63.

Diener, Ed, Marissa Diener, and Carol Diener. 1995. "Factors Predicting the Subjective Well-Being of Nations." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 69 (5):851-64.

Diener, Ed, and Eunkook M. Suh. 2000. *Culture and Subjective Well-Being*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Downs, Anthony. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York: Harper & Row.

Duch, Raymond M., and Randy Stevenson. 2005. "Context and the Economic Vote: A Multilevel Analysis." *Political Analysis* 13 (4):387-409.

Durkheim, Émile, and Steven Lukes. 1895/1982. *The Rules of Sociological Method and Selected Texts on Sociology and Its Method*. London: Macmillan Press.

Earley, P. Christopher, and Cristina B. Gibson. 1998. "Taking Stock in Our Progress on Individualism-Collectivism: 100 Years of Solidarity and Community." *Journal of Management* v24 (n3):p265(40).

Eckstein, Harry. 1969. "Authority Relations and Governmental Performance: A Theoretical Framework." *Comparative Political Studies* 2 (3):269-325.

———. 1988. "A Culturalist Theory of Political Change." *The American Political Science Review* 82 (3):789-804.

———. 2009. *Congruence Theory Explained*. School of Social Sciences, University of California, Irvine. 1997 [cited June 25 2009]. Available from http://www.democ.uci.edu/publications/papersseriespre2001/harry2.htm.

Elkins, David J., and Richard E. B. Simeon. 1979. "A Cause in Search of Its Effect, or What Does Political Culture Explain?" *Comparative Politics* 11 (2):127-45.

Eulau, Heinz. 1963. *The Behavioral Persuasion in Politics*. New York: Random House.

———. 1986. *Politics, Self, and Society: A Theme and Variations*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Eulau, Heinz, and Michael S. Lewis-Beck. eds.1985. *Economic Conditions and Electoral Outcomes: The United States and Western Europe*. New York: Agathon Press.

Feldman, Stanley. 1984. "Economic Self-Interest and the Vote: Evidence and Meaning." *Political Behavior* 6 (3):229-51.

———. 1988. "Structure and Consistency in Public Opinion: The Role of Core Beliefs

and Values." *American Journal of Political Science* 32 (2):416-40.

———. 2003. "Values, Ideology, and the Structure of Political Attitudes." In *Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*, ed. D. O. Sears, L. Huddy and R. Jervis.

Fincham, Frank D., and Joseph M. Jaspars. 1980. "Attribution of Responsibility: From Man the Scientist to Man as Lawyer." In *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, ed. L. Berkowitz and ScienceDirect. New York: Academic Press.

Fiske, Alan Page. 2002. "Using Individualism and Collectivism to Compare Cultures – a Critique of the Validity and Measurement of the Constructs: Comment on Oyserman et al. (2002)." *Psychological Bulletin* 128 (1):78-88.

Fiske, Susan T., and Shelley E. Taylor. 1991. *Social Cognition*. 2nd ed. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Franzese, Robert J., Jr. 2005. "Empirical Strategies for Various Manifestations of Multilevel Data." *Political Analysis* 13 (4):430-46.

Fuchs, Dieter 2007. "The Political Culture Paradigm." In *Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior*, ed. R. J. Dalton and H.-D. Klingemann.

Funk, Carolyn L. 2000. "The Dual Influence of Self-Interest and Societal Interest in Public Opinion." *Political Research Quarterly* 53 (1):37-62.

Geer, John Gray. 2004. *Public Opinion and Polling Around the World: A Historical Encyclopedia*. Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC-CLIO.

Geertz, Clifford. 1973. *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays*. New York: Basic Books.

Gelman, Andrew, and Jennifer Hill. 2007. *Data Analysis Using Regression and Multilevel/Hierarchical Models*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Georgas, James, Fons J. R. van de Vijver, and John W. Berry. 2004. "The Ecocultural Framework, Ecosocial Indices, and Psychological Variables in Cross-Cultural Research." *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology* 35 (1):74-96.

Gibson, James L., and Amanda Gouws. 1999. "Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: Attributions of Blame and the Struggle over Apartheid." *The American Political Science Review* 93 (3):501-17.

Green, Eva G. T., Jean-Claude Deschamps, and Dario Paez. 2005. "Variation of Individualism and Collectivism Within and Between 20 Countries: A Typological Analysis." *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology* 36 (3):321-39.

Greenfield, Patricia, M. 2000. "Three Approaches to the Psychology of Culture: Where Do They Come From? Where Can They Go?" *Asian Journal of Social Psychology* 3 (3):223-40.

Hall, Peter A. 1986. *Governing the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Harrison, Lawrence E. 2000. "Introduction - Why Culture Matters." In *Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress*, ed. L. E. Harrison and S. P. Huntington. New York: Basic Books.

Heath, Anthony, Stephen Fisher, and Shawna Smith. 2005. “The Globalization of Public Opinion Research.” *Annual Review of Political Science* 8 (1):297-333.

Heston, Alan, Robert Summers, and Bettina Aten. 2006. “Penn World Table Version 6.2.” Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania.

Hibbing, John R., and John R. Alford. 1981. “The Electoral Impact of Economic Conditions: Who is Held Responsible?” *American Journal of Political Science* 25 (3):423-39.

Hock, Roger R. 2002. *Forty Studies That Changed Psychology: Explorations into the History of Psychological Research*. Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall.

Hofstede, Geert H. 1980. *Culture’s Consequences: International Differences in Work-Related Values*. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications.

———. 2001. *Culture’s Consequences: Comparing Values, Behaviors, Institutions, and Organizations Across Nations*. 2nd ed. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications.

———. 2006. “What Did GLOBE Really Measure? Researchers’ Minds Versus Respondents’ Minds.” *Journal of International Business Studies* 37 (6):882-96.

House, Robert J., and Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness Research Program. 2004. *Culture, Leadership, and Organizations: The GLOBE Study of 62 Societies*. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications.

Hui, C. Harry. 1988. “Measurement of Individualism-Collectivism.” *Journal of Research in Personality* 22 (1):17-36.

Hui, C. Harry, and Harry C. Triandis. 1986. “Individualism-Collectivism: A Study of Cross-Cultural Researchers.” *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology* 17 (2):225-48.

Huntington, Samuel P. 1991. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.

———. 1996. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

———. 2000. “Foreword - Cultures Count.” In *Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress*, ed. L. E. Harrison and S. P. Huntington. New York: Basic Books.

Ikeda, Ken’ichi, and Kobayashi Tetsuro. 2006. “Risk Avoidance and Economic Value Orientation: Functioning of Post-materialist Values in the Pacific Rim Countries.” In *Citizens, Democracy, and Markets Around the Pacific Rim: Congruence Theory and Political Culture*, ed. R. J. Dalton. New York: Oxford University Press.

Inglehart, Ronald. 1985. “Aggregate Stability and Individual-Level Flux in Mass Belief Systems: The Level of Analysis Paradox.” *The American Political Science Review* 79 (1):97-116.

———. 1988. “The Renaissance of Political Culture.” *The American Political Science Review* 82 (4):1203-30.

———. 1990. *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

———. 1997. *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Inglehart, Ronald, and Wayne E. Baker. 2000. "Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values." *American Sociological Review* 65 (1):19-51.

Inglehart, Ronald, Roberto Foa, Christopher Peterson, and Christian Welzel. 2008. "Development, Freedom, and Rising Happiness: A Global Perspective (1981-2007)." *Perspectives on Psychological Science* 3 (4):264-85.

Inglehart, Ronald, and Hans-Dieter Kligemann. 1976. "Party Identification, Ideological Preference and the Left-Right Dimension Among Western Mass Publics." In *Party Identification and Beyond: Representations of Voting and Party Competition*, ed. I. Budge, I. Crewe, D. Farlie, V. Workshop on Participation and C. Party. London: Wiley.

Inglehart, Ronald, and Daphna Oyserman. 2004. "Individualism, Autonomy, Self-expression: The Human Development Syndrome." In *Comparing Culture: Dimensions of Culture in a Comparative Perspective*, ed. H. Vinken, J. Soeters and P. Ester. Leiden; Boston: Brill.

Inglehart, Ronald, and Christian Welzel. 2003. "Political Culture and Democracy: Analyzing Cross-Level Linkages." *Comparative Politics* 36 (1):61-79.

———. 2005. *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Inkeles, Alex 1983. "The American Character." *The Center magazine*, 25-39.

Jackman, Robert W. 1987. "Political Institutions and Voter Turnout in the Industrial Democracies." *The American Political Science Review* 81 (2):405-23.

Jackman, Robert W., and Ross A. Miller. 1998. "Social Capital and Politics." *Annual Review of Political Science* 1 (1):47-73.

Jennings, Kent. 2007. "Political Socialization." In *Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior*, ed. R. J. Dalton and H.-D. Klingemann. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Jervis, Robert. 1989. "Political Psychology: Some Challenges and Opportunities." *Political Psychology* 10 (3):481-93.

Jones, K., R. J. Johnston, and C. J. Pattie. 1992. "People, Places and Regions: Exploring the Use of Multi-Level Modelling in the Analysis of Electoral Data." *British Journal of Political Science* 22 (03):343-80.

Jusko, Karen Long, and W. Phillips Shively. 2005. "Applying a Two-Step Strategy to the Analysis of Cross-National Public Opinion Data." *Political Analysis* 13 (4):327-44.

Kağitçibaşi, Çiğdem. 1997. "Individualism and Collectivism." In *Handbook of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, ed. J. W. Berry, Y. H. Poortinga and J. Pandey. Boston:

Allyn and Bacon.

Kim, Heemin, and Richard C. Fording. 1998. “Voter Ideology in Western Democracies, 1946-1989.” *European Journal of Political Research* 33 (1):73-97.

———. 2001. “Voter Ideology, the Economy, and the International Environment in Western Democracies, 1952-1989.” *Political Behavior* 23 (1):53-73.

———. 2003. “Voter ideology in Western Democracies: An Update.” *European Journal of Political Research* 42 (1):95-105.

Kim, Uichol. 1994. “Individualism and Collectivism: Conceptual Clarification and Elaboration.” In *Individualism and Collectivism: Theory, Method, and Applications*, ed. U. Kim, H. C. Triandis, Ç. Kâgitçibasi, S.-C. Choi and G. Yoon. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications.

———. 1995. *Individualism and Collectivism: A Psychological, Cultural and Ecological Analysis*. Copenhagen S, Denmark: NIAS Books.

Kim, Uichol, Harry C. Triandis, Çiğdem Kâgitçibasi, Sang-Chin Choi, and Gene Yoon, eds. 1994. *Individualism and Collectivism: Theory, Method, and Applications*. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications.

Kinder, Donald R. 1983. “Diversity and Complexity in American Public Opinion.” In *Political Science: The State of the Discipline*, ed. A. W. Finifter and A. American Political Science. Washington, D.C.: American Political Science Association.

———. 1998. “Opinion and Action in the Realm of Politics.” In *The Handbook of Social Psychology*, ed. D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske and G. Lindzey. Boston: McGraw-Hill; Distributed exclusively by Oxford University Press.

Kinder, Donald R., and Susan T. Fiske. 1986. “Presidents in the Public Mind.” In *Political Psychology*, ed. M. G. Hermann. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers.

Kinder, Donald R., and D. Roderick Kiewiet. 1979. “Economic Discontent and Political Behavior: The Role of Personal Grievances and Collective Economic Judgments in Congressional Voting.” *American Journal of Political Science* 23 (3):495-527.

———. 1981. “Sociotropic Politics: The American Case.” *British Journal of Political Science* 11 (2):129-61.

King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba. 1994. *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Kirkman, Bradley L., Kevin B. Lowe, and Cristina B. Gibson. 2006. “A Quarter Century of Culture’s Consequences: A Review of Empirical Research Incorporating Hofstede’s Cultural Values Framework.” *Journal of International Business Studies* 37 (3):285-320.

Kitayama, Shinobu. 2002. “Culture and Basic Psychological Processes – Toward a System View of Culture: Comment on Oyserman et al. (2002).” *Psychological Bulletin* 128 (1):89-96.

Kitayama, Shinobu, and Dov Cohen. 2007. *Handbook of Cultural Psychology*. New York:

Guilford Press.

Kittilson, Miki C. 2007. “Research Resources in Comparative Political Behavior.” In *Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior*, ed. R. J. Dalton and H.-D. Klingemann. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Knutsen, Oddbjorn. 1995. “Value Orientations, Political Conflicts and Left-Right Identification: A Comparative Study.” *European Journal of Political Research* 28 (1):63-93.

———. 1997. “The Partisan and the Value-Based Component of Left-Right Self-Placement: A Comparative Study.” *International Political Science Review / Revue internationale de science politique* 18 (2):191-225.

Kramer, Gerald H. 1971. “Short-Term Fluctuations in U.S. Voting Behavior, 1896-1964.” *The American Political Science Review* 65 (1):131-43.

———. 1983. “The Ecological Fallacy Revisited: Aggregate- versus Individual-level Findings on Economics and Elections, and Sociotropic Voting.” *The American Political Science Review* 77 (1):92-111.

Kreft, Ita, and Jan de Leeuw. 1998. *Introducing Multilevel Modeling*. London; Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage.

Kuklinski, James H., ed. 2001. *Citizens and Politics: Perspectives from Political Psychology*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Laitin, David D., and Wildavsky Aaron. 1988. “Political Culture and Political Preferences.” *The American Political Science Review* 82 (2):589-97.

Lane, Ruth. 1992. “Political Culture: Residual Category or General Theory?” *Comparative Political Studies* 25 (3):362-87.

Lehman, Darrin R., Chi-yue Chiu, and Mark Schaller. 2004. “Psychology and Culture.” *Annual Review of Psychology* 55 (1):689-714.

Leung, Kwok, and Michael Harris Bond. 1989. “On the Empirical Identification of Dimensions for Cross-Cultural Comparisons.” *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology* 20 (2):133-51.

Lewis-Beck, Michael S. 1988. *Economics and Elections: The Major Western Democracies*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Lewis-Beck, Michael S., and Mary Stegmaier. 2000. “Economic Determinants of Electoral Outcomes.” *Annual Review of Political Science* 3 (1):183-219.

Lichbach, Mark Irving, and Alan S. Zuckerman, eds. 1997. *Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure*. Cambridge, U.K.; New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.

Lijphart, Arend. 1980. “The Structure of Inference.” In *The Civic Culture Revisited: An Analytic Study*, ed. G. A. Almond and S. Verba. Boston: Little, Brown.

Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1960. *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics*. Garden City, N.Y.,: Doubleday.

Little, Daniel. 1991. *Varieties of Social Explanation: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Social Science*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Lukes, Steven. 1973. *Individualism*. Oxford,: Blackwell.

Markus, Gregory B. 2001. "American Individualism Reconsidered." In *Citizens and Politics: Perspectives from Political Psychology*, ed. J. H. Kuklinski. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Markus, Hazel, and Shinobu Kitayama. 1991. "Culture and the Self: Implications for Cognition, Emotion, and Motivation." *Psychological Review* 98 (2):224-53.

———. 1994. *Emotion and Culture: Empirical Studies of Mutual Influence*. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

———. 2003. "Models of Agency: Sociocultural Diversity in the Construction of Action." In *Cross-Cultural Differences in Perspectives on the Self*, ed. V. Murphy-Berman and J. J. Berman. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.

McAuliffe, Brendan, J., Jolanda Jetten, Matthew Hornsey, J., and Michael Hogg, A. 2003. "Individualist and Collectivist Norms: When It's Ok to Go Your Own Way." *European Journal of Social Psychology* 33 (1):57-70.

McBride, Allan. 1998. "Television, Individualism, and Social Capital." *PS: Political Science and Politics* 31 (3):542-52.

McClosky, Herbert, and John Zaller. 1984. *The American Ethos: Public Attitudes Toward Capitalism and Democracy*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

McGraw, Kathleen M. 1991. "Managing Blame: An Experimental Test of the Effects of Political Accounts." *The American Political Science Review* 85 (4):1133-57.

———. 2001. "Political Accounts and Attribution Processes." In *Citizens and Politics: Perspectives from Political Psychology*, ed. J. H. Kuklinski. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Menon, Tanya, Michael W. Morris, Chi-yue Chiu, and Ying-yi Hong. 1999. "Culture and the Construal of Agency: Attribution to Individual Versus Group Dispositions." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 76 (5):701-17.

Merelman, Richard M. 1991. *Partial Visions: Culture and Politics in Britain, Canada, and The United States*. Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press.

Michele J, Gelfand, Triandis Harry C, and Chan Darius K-S. 1996. "Individualism Versus Collectivism or Versus Authoritarianism?" *European Journal of Social Psychology* 26 (3):397-410.

Mill, John Stuart, and F. E. L. Priestley. 1843/1963. *Collected works*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Miller, Joan G. 1984. "Culture and the Development of Everyday Social Explanation." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 46 (5):961-78.

———. 2002. "Bringing Culture to Basic Psychological Theory – Beyond Individualism and Collectivism: Comment on Oyserman et al. (2002)." *Psychological Bulletin* 128 (1):97-109.

Morris, Michael W., and Kaiping Peng. 1994. “Culture and Cause: American and Chinese Attributions for Social and Physical Events.” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 67 (6):949-71.

Mutz, Diana C. 2007. “Political Psychology and Choice.” In *Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior*, ed. R. J. Dalton and H.-D. Klingemann. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Newman, Leonard S. 1993. “How Individualists Interpret Behavior: Idiocentrism and Spontaneous Trait Inference.” *Social Cognition* 11 (2):243-69.

Nisbett, Richard E. 2003. *The Geography of Thought: How Asians and Westerners Think Differently – And Why*. New York: Free Press.

Nisbett, Richard E., Kaiping Peng, Incheol Choi, and Ara Norenzayan. 2001. “Culture and Systems of Thought: Holistic Versus Analytic Cognition.” *Psychological Review* 108 (2):291-310.

Norenzayan, Ara, and Richard E. Nisbett. 2000. “Culture and Causal Cognition.” *Current Directions in Psychological Science* 9 (4):132-5.

North, Douglass Cecil. 1990. *Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Oyserman, Daphna. 1993. “The Lens of Personhood: Viewing the Self and Others in a Multicultural Society.” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 65 (5):993-1009.

Oyserman, Daphna, Heather M. Coon, and Markus Kemmelmeier. 2002a. “Rethinking Individualism and Collectivism: Evaluation of Theoretical Assumptions and Meta-Analyses.” *Psychological Bulletin* 128 (1):3-72.

———. 2002b. “Cultural Psychology, a New Look: Reply to Bond (2002), Fiske (2002), Kitayama (2002), and Miller (2002).” *Psychological Bulletin* 128 (1):110-7.

Oyserman, Daphna, and Ayse K. Uskul. 2008. “Individualism and Collectivism: Societal-Level Processes with Implications for Individual-Level and Society-Level Outcomes.” In *Multilevel Analysis of Individuals and Cultures*, ed. F. J. R. v. d. Vijver, D. A. v. Hemert and Y. H. Poortinga. New York: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Pateman, Carol. 1980. “The Civic Culture: A Philosophic Critique.” In *The Civic Culture Revisited: An Analytic Study*, ed. G. A. Almond and S. Verba. Boston: Little, Brown.

Patrick, Glenda M. 1984. “Political Culture.” In *Social Science Concepts: A Systematic Analysis*, ed. G. Sartori. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications.

Paxton, Pamela. 2002. “Social Capital and Democracy: An Interdependent Relationship.” *American Sociological Review* 67 (2):254-77.

———. 2007. “Association Memberships and Generalized Trust: A Multilevel Model Across 31 Countries.” *Social Forces* 86 (1):47-76.

Peters, B. Guy. 1998. *Comparative Politics: Theory and Methods*. New York: New York

University Press.

Powell, G. Bingham, Jr., and Guy D. Whitten. 1993. “A Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting: Taking Account of the Political Context.” *American Journal of Political Science* 37 (2):391-414.

Putnam, Robert D. 2000. *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Putnam, Robert D., Robert Leonardi, and Raffaella Nanetti. 1993. *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Pye, Lucian W. 1965. “Introduction: Political Culture and Political Development.” In *Political Culture and Political Development*, ed. L. W. Pye, S. Verba and C. Social Science Research. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

———. 1997. “Introduction: The Elusive Concept of Culture and the Vivid Reality of Personality.” *Political Psychology* 18 (2):241-54.

Pye, Lucian W., Sidney Verba, and Council Social Science Research, eds. 1965. *Political Culture and Political Development*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Raudenbush, Stephen W., and Anthony S. Bryk. 2002. *Hierarchical Linear Models: Applications and Data Analysis Methods*. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.

Reisinger, William M. 1995. “The Renaissance of a Rubric: Political Culture as Concept and Theory.” *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* 7 (4):328-52.

Renshon, Stanley, and John Duckitt. 1997. “Issue Editors’ Introduction: Cultural and Cross-Cultural Political Psychology: Toward the Development of a New Subfield.” *Political Psychology* 18 (2):233-40.

———. 2000. *Political Psychology: Cultural and Crosscultural Foundations*. New York: New York University Press.

Rhee, Eun, James S. Uleman, and Hoon Koo Lee. 1996. “Variations in Collectivism and Individualism by Ingroup and Culture: Confirmatory Factor Analysis.” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 71 (5):1037-54.

Ross, Lee. 1977. “The Intuitive Psychologist and His Shortcomings: Distortions in the Attribution Process.” In *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, ed. L. Berkowitz and Science Direct. New York: Academic Press.

Ross, Marc Howard. 1988. “Studying Politics Cross-Culturally: Key Concepts and Issues.” *Cross-Cultural Research* 22 (1-4):105-29.

———. 1997. “Culture and Identity in Comparative Political Analysis.” In *Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure*, ed. M. I. Lichbach and A. S. Zuckerman. Cambridge, U.K.; New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.

Rotter, Julian B. 1990. “Internal Versus External Control of Reinforcement: A Case History of a Variable.” *American Psychologist* 45 (4):489-93.

Royed, Terry J., Kevin M. Leyden, and Stephen A. Borrelli. 2000. “Is ‘Clarity of Responsibility’ Important for Economic Voting? Revisiting Powell and Whitten’s

Hypothesis." *British Journal of Political Science* 30 (4):669-85.

Rudolph, Thomas J. 2003. "Who's Responsible for the Economy? The Formation and Consequences of Responsibility Attributions." *American Journal of Political Science* 47 (4):698-713.

Sabetti, Filippo. 2007. "Democracy and Civic Culture." In *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*, ed. C. Boix and S. C. Stokes. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Sachs, Jeffrey. 2000. "Notes on a New Sociology of Economic Development." In *Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress*, ed. L. E. Harrison and S. P. Huntington. New York: Basic Books.

Sampson, Edward E. 1977. "Psychology and the American ideal." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 35 (11):767-82.

Sapiro, Virginia. 2004. "Not Your Parents' Political Socialization: Introduction for a New Generation." *Annual Review of Political Science* 7 (1):1-23.

Sartori, Giovanni, ed. 1984. *Social Science Concepts: A Systematic Analysis*. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications.

Schimmack, Ulrich, Shigehiro Oishi, and Ed Diener. 2005. "Individualism: A Valid and Important Dimension of Cultural Differences Between Nations." *Personality and Social Psychology Review* 9 (1):17-31.

Schlenker, Barry R., Thomas W. Britt, John Pennington, Rodolfo Murphy, and Kevin Doherty. 1994. "The Triangle Model of Responsibility." *Psychological Review* 101 (4):632-52.

Schwartz, Shalom H. 1990. "Individualism-Collectivism: Critique and Proposed Refinements." *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology* 21 (2):139-57.

———. 1994. "Beyond Individualism/Collectivism: New Cultural Dimensions of Values." In *Individualism and Collectivism: Theory, Method, and Applications*, ed. U. Kim, H. C. Triandis, Ç. Kâgitçibasi, S.-C. Choi and G. Yoon. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications.

———. 2004. "Mapping and Interpreting Cultural Differences Around the World." In *Comparing Cultures: Dimensions of Culture in A Comparative Perspective*, ed. H. Vinken, J. Soeters and P. Ester. Leiden; Boston: Brill.

———. 2006. "A Theory of Cultural Value Orientations: Explication and Applications." *Comparative Sociology* 5:137-82.

Schwartz, Shalom H., and Anat Bardi. 2001. "Value Hierarchies Across Cultures: Taking a Similarities Perspective." *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology* 32 (3):268-90.

Schwartz, Shalom H., and Wolfgang Bilsky. 1987. "Toward a Universal Psychological Structure of Human Values." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 53 (3):550-62.

Schwartz, Shalom H., and Klaus Boehnke. 2004. "Evaluating the Structure of Human Values with Confirmatory Factor Analysis." *Journal of Research in Personality*

38 (3):230-55.

Schwartz, Shalom H., and P. Zanna Mark. 1992. “Universals in the Content and Structure of Values: Theoretical Advances and Empirical Tests in 20 Countries.” In *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*: Academic Press.

Sears, David O., and FUNK Carolyn L. 1991. “The Role of Self-Interest in Social and Political Attitudes.” In *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*: Academic Press.

Seligson, Mitchell A. 2002. “The Renaissance of Political Culture or the Renaissance of the Ecological Fallacy?” *Comparative Politics* 34 (3):273-92.

Singelis, Theodore M., Harry C. Triandis, Dharm P. S. Bhawuk, and Michele J. Gelfand. 1995. “Horizontal and Vertical Dimensions of Individualism and Collectivism: A Theoretical and Measurement Refinement.” *Cross-Cultural Research* 29 (3):240-75.

Smith, Peter B. 2002. “Levels of Analysis in Cross-Cultural Psychology.” In *Online Readings in Psychology and Culture*, ed. D. L. D. W. J. Lonner, S. A. Hayes, & D. N. Sattler: Center for Cross-Cultural Research, Western Washington University, Bellingham, Washington USA.

———. 2004. “Nations, Cultures, and Individuals: New Perspectives and Old Dilemmas.” *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology* 35 (1):6-12.

Smith, Peter B., Michael Harris Bond, and Çiğdem Kağitçibaşi. 2006. *Understanding Social Psychology Across Cultures: Living and Working in a Changing World*. London: SAGE.

Smith, Peter B., Mark F. Peterson, Shalom H. 2002. “Cultural Values, Source of Guidance, and Their Relevance to Managerial Behavior: A 47-Nation Study.” *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 33, no. 2*.

Sniderman, Paul M., and Richard A. Brody. 1977. “Coping: The Ethic of Self-Reliance.” *American Journal of Political Science* 21 (3):501-21.

Steenbergen, Marco R., and Bradford S. Jones. 2002. “Modeling Multilevel Data Structures.” *American Journal of Political Science* 46 (1):218-37.

Stoker, Laura. 2001. “Political Value Judgment.” In *Citizens and Politics: Perspectives from Political Psychology*, ed. J. H. Kuklinski. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Street, John. 1994. “Political Culture - From Civic Culture to Mass Culture.” *British Journal of Political Science* 24 (1):95-113.

Suh, Eunkook, Ed Diener, Shigehiro Oishi, and Harry C. Triandis. 1998. “The Shifting Basis of Life Satisfaction Judgments Across Cultures: Emotions Versus Norms.” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 74 (2):482-93.

Szalay, Lorand B., Rita M. Kelly, and Won T. Moon. 1972. “Ideology: Its Meaning and Measurement.” *Comparative Political Studies* 5 (2):151-73.

Tavits, Margit. 2007. “Clarity of Responsibility and Corruption.” *American Journal of*

Political Science 51 (1):218-29.

Thompson, Michael, Richard Ellis, and Aaron B. Wildavsky. 1990. *Cultural theory*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.

Thomson, Irene Taviss. 1989. “The Transformation of the Social Bond: Images of Individualism in the 1920s versus the 1970s.” *Social Forces* 67 (4):851-70.

Tocqueville, Alexis de, Gerald E. Bevan, and Isaac Kramnick. 1835 and 1840/2003. *Democracy in America: And Two essays on America*. London: Penguin.

Tönnies, Ferdinand. 1887/1955. *Community and Association (Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft)*. London: Routledge & Paul.

Triandis, Harry C. 1989. “The Self and Social Behavior in Differing Cultural Contexts.” *Psychological Review* 96 (3):506-20.

———. 1994. “Theoretical and Methodological Approaches to the Study of Collectivism and Individualism.” In *Individualism and Collectivism: Theory, Method, and Applications*, ed. U. Kim, H. C. Triandis, Ç. Kâgitçibasi, S.-C. Choi and G. Yoon. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications.

———. 1995. *Individualism and Collectivism*. Boulder: Westview Press.

———. 1996. “The Psychological Measurement of Cultural Syndromes.” *American Psychologist* 51 (4):407-15.

———. 2001. “Individualism-Collectivism and Personality.” *Journal of Personality* 69 (6):907-24.

———. 2004. “Dimensions of Culture Beyond Hofstede.” In *Comparing Cultures: Dimensions of Culture in a Comparative Perspective*, ed. H. Vinken, J. Soeters and P. Ester. Leiden ; Boston: Brill.

Triandis, Harry C., Robert Bontempo, Marcelo J. Villareal, Masaaki Asai, and Nydia Lucca. 1988. “Individualism and Collectivism: Cross-Cultural Perspectives on Self-Ingroup Relationships.” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 54 (2):323-38.

Triandis, Harry C., and Michele J. Gelfand. 1998. “Converging Measurement of Horizontal and Vertical Individualism and Collectivism." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 74 (1):118-28.

Triandis, Harry C., Kwok Leung, Marcelo J. Villareal, and Felicia I. Clack. 1985. “Allocentric Versus Idiocentric Tendencies: Convergent and Discriminant Validation.” *Journal of Research in Personality* 19 (4):395-415.

Triandis, Harry C., Christopher McCusker, and C. Harry Hui. 1990. “Multimethod Probes of Individualism and Collectivism.” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 59 (5):1006-20.

Triandis, Harry C., and Eunkook M. Suh. 2002. “Cultural Influences on Personality.” *Annual Review of Psychology* 53 (1):133-60.

van de Vijver, Fons J. R., and Kwok Leung. 2000. “Methodological Issues in Psychological Research on Culture.” *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology* 31

(1):33-51.

Vandello, Joseph A., and Dov Cohen. 1999. “Patterns of Individualism and Collectivism Across the United States.” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 77 (2):279-92.

Veenhoven, Ruut. 1999. “Quality-of-Life in Individualistic Society.” *Social Indicators Research* 48 (2):159-88.

Verba, Sidney. 1965. “Conclusion: Comparative Political Culture.” In *Political Culture and Political Development*, ed. L. W. Pye, S. Verba and C. Social Science Research. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Verplanken, Bas, and Rob W. Holland. 2002. “Motivated Decision Making: Effects of Activation and Self-Centrality of Values on Choices and Behavior.” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 82 (3):434-47.

Vijver, Fons J. R. van de, Dianne A. van Hemert, and Ype H. Poortinga, eds. 2008. *Multilevel Analysis of Individuals and Cultures*. New York: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Vinken, Henk, J. Soeters, and P. Ester, eds. 2004. *Comparing Cultures: Dimensions of Culture in a Comparative Perspective*. Leiden; Boston: Brill.

Voronov, Maxim, and Jefferson A. Singer. 2002. “The Myth of Individualism-Collectivism: A Critical Review.” *The Journal of Social Psychology* 142 (4):461(20).

Waterman, Alan S. 1984. *The Psychology of Individualism*. New York, NY: Praeger.

Weber, Max.1904/2002. *The Protestant Ethic and the “Spirit” of Capitalism and Other Writings*. New York: Penguin Books.

Welzel, Christian, and Ronald Inglehart. 2003. “Exemplary Versus Statistical Evidence? Response to Berg-Schlosser.” *European Journal of Political Research* 42 (3):387-9.

———. 2007. “Mass Beliefs and Democratic Institutions.” In *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*, ed. C. Boix and S. C. Stokes. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Welzel, Christian, Ronald Inglehart, and Hans-Dieter Klingemann. 2003. “The Theory of Human Development: A Cross-Cultural Analysis.” *European Journal of Political Research* 42 (3):341-79.

Wildavsky, Aaron. 1987. “Choosing Preferences by Constructing Institutions: A Cultural Theory of Preference Formation.” *The American Political Science Review* 81 (1):4-21.

Wilson, Richard W. 2000. “Review: The Many Voices of Political Culture: Assessing Different Approaches.” *World Politics* 52 (2):246-73.

World Values Survey. 2009. “1981-2008 Unofficial Aggregate.” World Values Survey Association (www.worldvaluessurvey.org). Aggregate File Producer: ASEP/JDS, Madrid.