Power, Negotiation Type and Negotiation Tactics

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Abstract

We tested the effect of power on negotiators' performance in distributive and integrative negotiation tasks, applying situated focus theory of power on negotiation. With an experiment of 61 respondents participating in a computer negotiation, we found that high instead of low power promoted more first offers, and more problem solving strategy and better joint outcome in integrative negotiations. In distributive negotiations, however, high instead of low power led to more fighting strategy and higher self-gain. Together, these findings suggest that the effect of power on negotiators' first offers, strategy use and outcome is moderated by negotiation type.

Keywords: power, situated focus theory, negotiation types, first offer, strategy, outcome

Negotiation happens all the time. In daily life, people are confronted with negotiation from family to work place. In the world, negotiation plays an important role from small business to international affairs. Arguably, using the proper tactic in a negation brings about a more desirable negotiation outcome than using an improper one. However, many factors influence negotiators' tactic choice, which makes a proper negotiation tactic according to the negation setting more precious. For example, if we were the negotiators during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, it would be a hard choice to choose from one of these options – a more fighting style tactic to give USSR leaders continuous military pressure on the negotiation table, or a more accommodating style tactic to satisfy the USSR's claims somewhat. An improper tactic might have triggered a nuclear war.

Among the many factors affecting negotiation tactics, power is one of the important ones. As one of the basic concepts in social science (Russell, 1938), power is present in almost every context, from parent-child dynamics, to work-related environments to international conflicts (Keltner, Gruenfeld & Anderson, 2003). Especially, power has been considered one of the most important factors in negotiation (De Dreu & Van Kleef, 2004; Magee, Galinsky, & Gruenfeld, 2007; Pinkley, Neale, & Bennett, 1994). The effect of power on negotiation has been studied in a considerable number of studies. However, a newly-developed theory of power (Situated Focus Theory of Power) suggests a new direction of how power could influence the way people negotiate – since the effect of power on people's behavior depends on certain situations (Guinote, 2007a, 2010). In this article, we propose that the effect of power on negotiators' behavior depends on the type of negotiation (in terms of task structure) as well. We conducted this study to specifically test the situated focus effect of power (in two different types of negotiation) on tactics that people use in negotiation.

There are many ways to define power (Keltner et al., 2003) and scholars have argued that power is difficult to define (Lukes, 1986). Two of the most common definitions of power in social psychology are "an individual's capacity to modify other's states by providing or withholding resources or administrating punishments" (Keltner et al., 2003, p. 265), and the ability to control one's own and other's resources and outcomes (Fiske 1993; Magee, Galinsky & Gruenfeld, 2007; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). Despite the popularity of these definitions of power, I define power as the "potential to influence another in psychologically meaningful ways, inducing changes in behavior, opinions, attitudes, goals, needs or values of another person or group" (Guinote, 2007, p. 259; Vescio, Snyder & Butz, 2003). I favor this definition over others as it catches the core nature of power: the ability to influence other individuals. Any base of power - such as the five types of power (coercive, reward, legitimate, expert and referent) discussed by French and Raven (1959), or controlling over resources (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003) – needs to be transformed into a kind of influence on others before they can be identified as power.

Situated Focus Theory of Power

The *Situated Focus Theory of Power* (Guinote, 2007, 2010) provides a comprehensive explanation for the contradictory results regarding the effect of power on social behavior. There is considerable literature and some theories that try to understand power's function in social life. However, the findings are contradictory somehow. For example, there are studies indicating that high-power individuals use power for their own needs (Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003; Kipnis, 1976) or to discriminate against subordinates (Kipnis, 1976; Sachdev & Bourhis, 2006), while others point out that high-power individuals are altruistic (Anderson & Thompson, 2004).

The situated focus theory gives an explanation for the behavioral variance among high-power people - it proposes that high-power individuals behave according to the situation they are involved in by means of selective attention and process flexibility (Guinote, 2007a, 2007b, 2010). High-power individuals can distinguish situation relevant information easily from situation irrelevant information and process the relevant information selectively (Guinote, 2007a, 2010). This would induce that high-power individuals focus more on the primary demand of the current situation than the low-power individuals. For instance, a high-power negotiator will notice compatible interests more easily than a low-power negotiator. As such, they may try to use a win-win negotiation tactic during a negotiation which contains compatible issues and allows for an integrative agreement between two sides. However, the same high-power negotiator might focus on self-interest and try to win by all means in a negotiation which contains no space for compatible interests and no chance for an integrative agreement.

Types of Negotiation

As mentioned before, a negotiation can contain compatible and/or incompatible interests between the negotiators. In daily life, there may be both compatible interests as well as incompatible interests for the negotiators in a single negotiation - in other words, negotiation contains a mixed-motive of distributive and integrative elements. However, theoretically, it is needed to distinguish the difference of integrative and distributive negation by definition.

Integrative negotiation means that interests are neither completely oppositional nor completely compatible (Pruitt & Lewis, 1977). This integrative potential allows a mutual agreement which is reached when both of the parties achieve a result higher than the simple 50-50 compromise (Neale & Bazerman, 1992). Distributive negotiation, in contrast, is that the

negotiator has to investigate the question how to divide a fixed amount of resources in a negotiation. Distributive negotiation is a zero-sum game from the perspective of game theory, where the value along a single dimension shifts in either direction - one side is better off and the other is worse off (Rosenschein & Zlotkin, 1994).

Behaviors during Negotiation Process

Adair and Brett (2005) proposed a four-stage negotiation model to depict the process of negotiation. The four stages are: relational positioning, identifying problems, generating solutions and reaching agreement. In the first stage of relational positioning, negotiators focus mainly on influence with respect and power. In the second stage of identifying problems the attention is focused towards exchanging information about issues, options and interests. In the third stage of generation solutions, negotiators form and apply strategies to achieve their goals in negotiation. And finally, in the fourth stage of reaching agreements, an agreement is in sight (Adair & Brett, 2005). Each stage is marked by some typical behavioral indicators accordingly: 1) first offer giving, 2) information searching, 3) strategy formation and acting, and 4) the final outcome of negotiation.

We assume that most of the indicators of the negotiation process are influenced by negotiators' power and the negotiation type which jointly forge the power's situated focus effect in negotiation.

Hypotheses

First offer. The first offer is an important anchor for the negotiation process and could predict the negotiation outcome (Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001; Magee et al., 2007). Several empirical studies have found that power promotes first offer given behavior during a negotiation or a bargaining situation (Galinsky, Magee, Gruenfeld, Whitson, & Liljenquist, 2008; Magee et al., 2007) The high-power negotiator not only tends to open with a first offer to their counter party, but also tends to use a higher level of first offer than the low-power negotiator. Arguments that explain those findings are based on the approach theory of power (Keltner et al., 2003) which proposes that power stimulates human approach systems and leads people to behave more proactively.

On the basis of the situated focus theory of power, we assume that the effect of power on giving the first-offer would depend on negotiation type. The demand of distributive negotiations is to maximize self – interest with the price of other – interest. So giving a higher first offer to set the anchor for a better deal seems to be the proper path to serve the goal in distributive negotiation. Since the high-power negotiator would give more attention to how to maximize self-interest in distributive negotiation than the low-power negotiator, the high-power negotiators should be willing to propose the first offer more than the low-power negotiators in distributive negotiation.

Integrative negotiation's nature requires negotiators to find the interests compatibility between each other (Pruitt & From, 2001; Pruitt & Lewis, 1977). Therefore, giving a first offer eagerly is detrimental to acquire information about the other party's interest and preference. If the high-power negotiators can realize the demand of integrative negotiation, then their willingness of giving the first offer will drop compared to a distributive negotiation. This

tendency could also be predicted by the flexibility of the high-power negotiator. Because low-power negotiators have the general tendency to acquire more information, their willingness to give the first offer would be low as well.

Hypothesis 1: High-power negotiators will make a first offer more often than those with low power in a distributive negotiation task.

Negotiation strategy. There are several negotiation-strategies which can be enacted by negotiation partners. The most common distinction among the negotiation strategies are: fighting, problem-solving, yielding, avoiding and compromising (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986; Rahim, 1983, 2002; Van de Vliert, 1997).

In linking power with negotiators' strategies, we specifically highlight the strategy of fighting and problem-solving because previous studies have shown that these two strategies are closely related to power (De Dreu, Giebels, & Van de Vliert, 1998; Dunbar & Abra, 2010; Lawler, 2005). There is considerable literature demonstrating the effect of power on strategies. For example, power induces negotiators' aspiration (Pinkley, 1995) and demands (De Dreu & Van Kleef, 2004). As a consequence, the high-power negotiator uses more threats and punishments (De Dreu, 1995; Lawler, 2005; Van de Vliert, 1998) as a strategy than the low-power negotiator in negotiation.

Applying this theory to negotiation research, we argue that the effect of power on individuals' behavior may depend on the main task of the negotiation. As pointed out previously, in integrative negotiations, the main tasks are to identify the underlying interest compatibility of both negotiators and to get a high joint outcome. To achieve these goals, individuals seem to be better off by being more cooperative or problem-solving oriented. Based on the situated-focus

effect of power, we assume that the high-power negotiator may figure out the nature of negotiation more easily than the low-power negotiator. The high-power negotiator then uses more problem-solving strategies than the low-power negotiator in integrative negotiation.

By contrast, in distributive negotiations, the main tasks are to keep self-interest as high as possible regardless the consideration for the other party. If the high-power negotiator can figure the nature of distributive negotiation out more easily than the low-power negotiator, then they should employ the more fighting strategy to achieve their goals than the low-power negotiator.

Hypothesis 2: The high-power negotiator uses more fighting strategies than the low-power negotiators in distributive negotiation, but more problem solving in integrative negotiation.

Outcomes. Higher outcome is related with high power negotiator (Giebels, De Dreu, & Van de Vliert, 2000). However, we assume this link states when the negotiation is distributive and the outcome is self-oriented; when in integrative negotiation, high power negotiators result in more joint outcome. According to the SFT of power, the high-power negotiator detects the core requirement of a task more accurate than the low-power negotiator and employs more suitable ways to fulfill the task than the low-power negotiator. By nature, the requirement of a distributive negotiation is to achieve a better outcome for oneself without consideration of the other party. Therefore, high-power individuals should detect this self-interest oriented requirement in distributive negotiation better than low-power individuals. However, integrative negotiation requires a high joint outcome in potential, then high-power individuals should catch this joint-interest oriented requirement of integrative negotiation more accurately than low-power individuals. As a consequence, the high-power negotiator will achieve higher self-outcome in

distributive negotiation and a higher joint outcome in integrative negotiation than low-power negotiators.

Hypothesis 3: High-power negotiators will achieve higher self-outcome in distributive negotiation and a higher joint outcome in integrative negotiation than low-power negotiators.

Method

Respondents

We recruited 63 participants from two Dutch universities for this study. Ultimately, 61 participants remained for the data analysis (respondent rate = 96.8%). Among these 61 participants, 36 were female (59%), 25 were male (41%), and the mean age of the sample was about 22 years (M=21.77, SD=2.42). For the education background, 18 participants (30%) had a bachelor degree and above; 39 participants (64%) finished high school education and are doing their bachelor study with different majors; 4 completed secondary school and are working.

Procedure

The participants were approached by an experiment advertisement at both the Radboud University of Nijmegen and the University of Twente. An informed consent procedure was followed; participants attended the experiment voluntarily and they are anonymous in the study. The participants were told they are going to play an online negotiation game with another real person via the computer in the lab. They got a chance of lottery for a reward of four movie tickets. Participants first registered by email and then were randomly assigned to one of the four experimental groups.

The negotiation concerns buying a second hand computer. The scenario was made up by the researcher. Although they were informed that it was randomly decided that who would be a seller or a buyer, in fact the default of the program was set that every participant was playing the role of buyer and the performance of the negotiators was showed in the final points.

Before the negotiation game started, the participants were first presented with a scenario in which their role in the negotiation game was described. We manipulated the variable of power through this procedure. Seven questions followed in order to check whether the manipulation met its purpose. Then the negotiation program started. The participants were given information about the negotiation task and pay-off schedule (see Appendix A) and were asked to prepare themselves for five minutes. Five minutes later the negotiation game started automatically. Through computers, the participants bid for the first offer, and made the final agreement. The experiment finished with debriefing.

Independent Variables

Power. Power was manipulated by assigning different roles to participants in negotiation game. For the high-power group (n = 31), the participants' role was introduced as a "chairperson" of a student association, a senior student majoring in computer science and having an expertise in computer hardware. These three pieces of information aim at reinforcing participants' legitimate power and expert power (French & Raven, 1959). For the low-power group (n = 30), the participants' role was described as a junior member of a student association who needs to follow the decisions made by the board, a freshmen majoring in philosophy, and a newbie for computer hardware. Participants were randomly assigned to a high-power or low-power group. We further checked participants' understanding of their role with 7 questions (e.g., "to what extend did you feel in charge?"; Cronbach's alpha = .92; see Appendix B).

Negotiation tasks. Negotiation tasks were manipulated via the number of issues to be negotiated and the interest compatibility between negotiators. In the distributive tasks, only one issue was concerned in the negotiation. Participants read the instruction as: "the only issue that you need to concern is the PRICE". Interest compatibility between the two negotiators was introduced as conflicting with each other ("some details"). In the integrative tasks, participants were presented with two issues which have a potential to reach a win-win solution. Participants read the instruction as "two issues need to be concerned during the negotiation: price and transaction date. The most important for you is PRICE. In the program, the default of the primary interest for the seller was set on transaction date (participants in the role of the buyer however needed to explore and confirm it via information searching and the pay-off schedule). Differences in the priorities between buyer and seller created a potential for interest compatibility.

The first task described is more distributive oriented and the second task is more integrative orientated. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two types of tasks. To check whether participants understood the nature of the negotiation task as they were intended, we formulated a manipulation check with four questions (e.g., "I thought there was very HIGH potential to reach an agreement which could satisfy both yours and the sellers' goal when I was in the negotiation"; Cronbach's alpha = .74; see Appendix B).

Dependent Variables

Negotiation process and outcomes are indicated by three variables: first offer, strategy and negotiation outcomes (joint outcomes for the integrative tasks and self-outcomes for the distributive tasks).

First offer. Two variables – a. the real act of giving a first offer (give or not give) and b. the willingness of giving the first offer (7-point scale) are used to indicate the behavior and intention of giving a first offer. After the information searching process, we first asked the participants to chose whether to give a first offer or not (1= Give or 0 = Not give). Then they were asked to indicate the extent to which they were willing to give the first offer on a 7-points Likert-scale (1 = Not willing to give at all, 7 = Very much willing to give).

Negotiation strategy. After the negotiation game, participants were asked to retrospect the tactics they used during the negotiation. The tactics were measure by using an adjusted version of the DUTCH scale (De Dreu et al., 2001). There were 2 strategies included: fighting (e.g, "I insist on my offer.") and problem-solving (,e.g., I will work out an offer that really satisfies both the seller and me.). Each strategy includes 4 items (fighting's Cronbach's alpha = .72, problem-solving's Cronbach's alpha = .76)

Negotiation outcome. For the integrative tasks, the negotiation outcomes were indicated by the joint outcomes of buyer and seller (e.g. if the final offer: price=2, & transaction day = 4, then the buyer's final score = 125 + 20 =145; the seller's points=0 + 75= 75; joint outcome = 145+ 75 = 220). Each offer reflects a fixed score. The seller's reaction is pre-programmed. The seller will agree with the offer given by participants only if the minimal standards are met. The seller will not accept the extremely good offer for the buyer---too cheap price and too short transaction day. However, the seller will lower down the standard during the negotiation process.). For the distributive negotiation, the self-outcome was the buyer's score. If there was no agreement made between the buyer and the seller, the outcome was recorded as a zero point. The program automatically generated the separated value points for each participant and the joint points for the negotiation dyads.

Results

Manipulation Checks

The participants in the high-power group reported a more high-power feeling (M = 4.33, SD = 0.39) than the low-power group (M = 2.07, SD = 0.40), t (59) = 22.43, p < .001. The t-test showed that the participants in the integrative negotiation group reported more potential to reach an agreement (we use this item as the manipulation check for the participants in the integrative group, to see whether they understand the scenario; M = 3.86, SD = 0.45) than the participants in the distributive negotiation group (M = 1.29, SD = 0.82), t (59) = 15.08, p = .014. These results suggest that our manipulations on power and negotiation task were effective.

Descriptive Analyses

Table 1 shows means, standard deviations and correlations for all the relevant variables used in this study. Willingness of giving a first offer correlated highly with the real act of giving first offer, indicating that the two indicators measured the same variable of first offer giving.

Hypotheses Testing

First offer. Hypothesis 1 predicted that the high-power would be more likely to give the first offer than the low-power in distributive negotiation than in integrative negotiation. Two variables, a. willingness of giving first offer (intention) and b. act of giving first offer (behavior) are used as indicators for the first offer.

Willingness of giving first offer. ANOVA showed that there is a significant difference between the high-power and the low-power participants on the willingness of first offer giving. In general, the high-power participants' willingness (M=4.84, SD=1.66) of giving first offer is higher than the low-power participants'(M=3.7, SD=1.49). The main effect of power was qualified by an interaction effect between power and negotiation type (see Figure 1). For participants in the integrative negotiation, the high-power tended to give more first offer than the low-power, $F(1, 29) = 11$, $p = .002$; for participants in the distributive negotiation, the difference of first offer giving willingness between the high-power and the low-power did not reach significance, $F(1, 30) = .52$, $p = .473$.(see Table 1 for mean between the high-power and the low-power group under the distributive condition). This interaction effect is not in line with hypothesis 1.

Act of giving first offer. The result of logistic regression showed that there is an interaction effect of power and negotiation type on the act of giving a first offer. For the integrative negotiation, the high-power participants gave more (Chi-square = 6,533; p=.011) first offer (14 gave, 1 didn't give) than the low-power participants (8 gave, 7 didn't give). For the distributive negotiation, there is no significant difference (Chi-square = 1.58; p=.209) for act of giving first offer between high-power participants (10 gave, 6 didn't give) and the low-power participants (9 gave, 6 didn't give).

Negotiation strategies. Hypothesis 2 assumed that the high-power negotiators uses more fighting strategies than the low-power negotiators in distributive negotiation, but more problem-solving in integrative negotiation.

Fighting. The ANOVA results in Table 2 showed that there is a main effect of power on fighting. This main effect was further qualified by a significant interaction between power and negotiation types (see Figure 2). The following simple effect test shows that in distributive negotiation the high-power participants reported employing more fighting strategy than the low-power, $F(1, 30) = 9.93$, $p = .003$. Yet, in the integrative negotiation, the high-power and the low-power did not show significance difference on fighting, $F(1, 29) = .05$, $p = .823$. These results confirm our hypothesis 2.

Problem-Solving. The ANOVA analysis showed a main effect of power on problem solving (see Table 2). Further, the interaction effect of power and negotiation types was also significant (see Figure 3). The contrast analysis showed that in integrative negotiation the high-power participants used problem-solving strategy more than the low-power, $F(1, 29) = 8.64$, $p = .005$, but not in distributive negotiation, $F(1, 30) < .001$, $p = .952$, which conforms Hypothesis 2.

Outcomes. Hypothesis 3 assumed that high-power negotiators would achieve higher self-outcome in distributive negotiation and a higher joint outcome in integrative negotiation than low-power negotiators.

Self-outcomes. The ANOVA revealed that power increased the self-outcome in distributive negotiation (see Table 2). An independent t-test revealed that the high-power earned more score

for themselves (M = 129.69, SD = 26.61) than the low-power (M =104.00, SD = 33.98) in the distributive negotiation, t (29) = 2.35, p = .026. This partly confirmed our hypothesis.

Joint-outcomes. The ANOVA analysis showed that power had a main effect on joint outcome in integrative negotiation (Table 2). The result of a t-test showed that the high-power gained more joint-score (M = 226.00, SD = 15.83) than the low-power (M =189.67, SD = 28.94) in the integrative negotiation, t (28) = 4.27, p = .000.

Discussion

The clearest result from our studies is that power's effect on individual's performance (both behaviors and outcomes) on negotiation depends on negotiation type. The result of first offer giving showed that high power negotiators are more inclined to give a first offer than low power negotiators. We also found that high power negotiators use more fighting in distributive negotiation and more problem-solving in integrative negotiation. We also found evidence that power promotes self-outcome in distributive negotiation and joint-outcome in integrative negotiation.

Together, these *results* provide evidence consistent with our hypothesis that negotiation type moderates the relationship between elevated power and individuals' performance in negotiation.

More First Offer in Integrative Negotiation? The Inconsistent Phenomenon and Explanation

One interesting finding is that the result of first offer giving is not entirely as we assumed. However, it confirmed our assumption that the effect of power on negotiation performance depends on negotiation types. The inconsistent evidence is about the direction of the interaction effect, where the high-power gave more first offer than the low-power in integrative negotiation.

My explanation for this inconsistency is based on both of the theory of fixed-pie assumption in negotiation and the experimental design. For most negotiators, there is a fixed-pie assumption about a negotiation in their mind (Bazerman, 1983; De Dreu, Koole, & Steinel, 2000). This mind set makes people tend to think of any type of negotiation as distributive. In a mixed-motive negotiation, individuals need to put effort to uncover the integrative part, such as analyzing the key information about other party on hand, communicating with the other party and

trying to understand the other party's underlying needs. It means that the negotiators who can realize the integrative elements in a negotiation should put more effort than those negotiators who keep the fixed-pie assumptions (Pruitt, 1990; Pruitt & Lewis, 1977). As the situated focus theory of power suggested, the low-power individual should recognize the integrative nature harder than the high-power. As a consequence, the low-power negotiators would keep the fixed-pie assumption during an integrative more than the high-power negotiators. This explains why across the two types of negotiation, the low-power participants gave first offer at same level.

From the descriptive result, there is a high positive correlation between first offer giving and problem-solving strategy (Table 1). This correlation might indicate that giving first offer in this study is related to the suitable behavior in integrative negotiation. This might be explained by the theory of integrative negotiation and our design as well. Theoretically, the integrative negotiation requires information exchanging between negotiators to uncover its nature (De Dreu et al., 1998; De Dreu, Weingart, & Kwon, 2000; Pruitt & Lewis, 1977). However, our negotiation game was based on a fixed computer program, which was lack this information exchanging process. Therefore, if participants wanted to get any information from others, they needed to use other methods. As a consequence, giving first offer was not merely a way to set high anchor to influence the other party, it could also be used as feedback from the other party. In this sense, the high-power participants would be more like to give a first offer than the low-power participants to acquire the feedback and test their assumptions in the integrative negotiation. Another character of our experimental design might partly explain this result: our distributive negotiation only contains one issue to negotiate for the participants. The merit of this design was that the cue for the distributive negotiation is clear. But one potential problem is that combining the effect of fixed-pie assumption, a simplified distributive negotiation could lead both high-power and low-power participants to recognize its nature easily. This assumption could be partly confirmed by

the mean score of the willingness of first offer giving among the four experimental groups: it shows that the willingness of giving first offer for the low-power in both integrative and distributive as well as the high-power in distributive have no significant difference, except for the high-power integrative group with the significantly highest value.

This result suggests that even after reading all the indications from our manipulation, the low-power still treat both types of negotiation as the distributive. Only the high-power treated integrative information in the priming manipulation seriously and tried to use first offer as a path to get feedback from the other party. Together this findings and indications suggest that power's effect at the first stage of negotiation is qualified by negotiation type as well and the high-power negotiators would use any method to achieve a goal under certain negotiation settings. This is also in line with the assumption of the situated focus theory of power.

Power, Competitive and Cooperative Behaviors

Previous research regarding power's effect in negotiation mainly emphasized the competitive side (Bacharach & Lawler, 1981; Magee et al., 2007; Tost, Gino, & Larrick, 2012). These researches mainly focused on questions such as, "Who does more competitive behavior?" or "Who initiates competitive?" Power was considered as one of the most important factors that cause individuals use more competitive tactics and initiate an aggregative step in negotiations. For example, the high-power individuals were more likely to initiate competitive interaction in negotiations, gave more first offer (Magee et al., 2007) and perceive more competitiveness in negotiations (Tost et al., 2012). The low-power were believed as the cooperative negotiators (Tjosvold & Morris, 1979).

However, our study found that the high-power negotiators were not always competitive in negotiations. They can be initiative for using cooperative strategy to solve problem and pursue

joint interests, when they realize the integrative nature of the negotiation. The cooperation from the low-power individuals are in a way a concession, which sacrifices part of self-interest to achieve better coordination with the other party. However, the cooperation from the high-power negotiators departs from insisting on both self-interest and other-interest. The problem-solving is a win-win style negotiation strategy, which tries to satisfy both negotiators' needs. In this sense, if a high-power negotiator can realize the integrative elements in a negotiation, then he would choose better strategies to achieve their goal while keeping the others' goal to achieve than the low-power negotiators.

Limitations and Implications

The first limitation of our study is that we used a computer-based negotiation task. The merit of a program is the standardized negotiation process. However, this made the negotiation lack of information exchanging between the negotiators like in the negotiation between real persons. The participants' strategy was not able to influence the computers' feedback results as well. This limits the relation between our strategy measures and the final outcome for the negotiation and reduces the generalizing ability of this study. The second limitation of this study is that we didn't include negotiators' emotion into our study. Emotions can be evoked by both negotiators' power state and the reaction offer from the computers. The effect of emotions on negotiation also could be moderated by the power of negotiators (Van Kleef et al, 2004). This probable interference from emotions would reduce the internal validity of this study.

One of the most important implications is that how to use power correctly in negotiation in order to achieve better outcomes. As the result suggested, the high-power negotiators could perform better in negotiations with integrative potentials. In the real life, most negotiations are mixed-motive, which contains the integrative potentials. It could be wise to entitle negotiators

more power to make them feel more high-power. As a consequence, the negotiators would be more easily to recognize the compatibility of different interest party and pursue a win-win solution for both sides.

Future research may test the effect of power on information searching and exchanging process in negotiations. The influence of emotions within the situated focus effect of power in negotiation could also be tested.

Conclusion

Relying on the SFT of power, we found that across different stages of negotiation process, the power' effect on negotiators' performance (both behavior and outcomes) depends on the type of negotiation. High power promotes individuals' first offer giving, using problem-solving strategy and joint-outcome in integrative negotiation, while also promotes them to employ fighting strategy and self-outcome in distributive negotiations.

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7. Appendixes

Pay-off schedule of negotiation games

Integrative

Issue	NM	Option	Points
Price	1	€75	125
	2	€100	100
	3	€125	75
	4	€150	50
	5	€175	25
	6	€200	0
Transaction Day	1	Within 18 days	50
	2	Within 15 days	40
	3	Within 12days	30
	4	Within 9 days	20
	5	Within 6 days	10
	6	Within 3 days	0

Distributive

Issue	NM	Option	Points
Price	1	€100	200
	2	€125	180
	3	€150	160
	4	€175	140
	5	€200	120
	6	€225	100
	7	€250	80
	8	€275	60
	9	€300	40

Appendix B

Manipulation check items for power

In your role as a chairperson, to what extend do you agree with the statement?

(strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 strongly agree)

1. I can make decisions in the association.

2. I am in a high position of the association.

3. I am a computer expert.

4. I have got enough knowledge about the computer market

5. In your role as a chairperson, to what extend did you feel high-power?

(NOT AT ALL 1 2 3 4 5 VERY MUCH)

6. In your role as a chairperson, to what extend did you feel in control?

7. In your role as a chairperson, to what extend did you feel in charge?

Manipulation check items for negotiation tasks

To what extend do you agree with the statement?

(strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 strongly agree)

1. There is potential for you and the seller to reach a win-win solution._

2. The goals of yours and the seller's are opposed to each other._

3. I thought there was very HIGH potential to reach an agreement which could satisfy both yours and the seller's goals when I was in the negotiation.

4. I thought there was very LOW potential to reach an agreement which could satisfy both yours and the seller's goals when I was in the negotiation.

Table 1

Descriptive Result

	High-power				Low-power												
	Integrative		Distributive		Integrative		Distributive										
	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Control Variables																	
1 Gender	.47	.516	.38	.500	.47	.516	.33	.488									
2 Age	21.33	2.992	21.87	2.306	22.67	1.59	21.20	2.541	.399**								
3 Education	2.40	.507	2.19	.655	2.33	.488	2.00	.535	.076	.446**							
First Offer																	
4 Willingness	5.40	4.502	4.31	1.662	3.53	1.552	3.87	1.457	.001	.190	.181						
5 Act	.93	.258	.63	.500	.53	.516	.60	.507	-.057	.050	.037	.731**					
Strategy																	
6 Fighting	3.65	.645	3.92	.735	3.58	.730	3.07	.914	.019	-.018	.116	-.075	.042				
7 Problem Solving	3.83	.724	3.05	.776	3.00	.845	3.02	.704	.101	.105	.105	.255*	.136	-.106			
Outcome																	
8 Self-outcome	113	15.213	129	26.613	94	23.084	104	33.975	-.026	-.041	.066	.011	-.069	.227	.130		
9 Joint-outcome	226	15.834	200	0	189.67	28.937	200	0	-.184	-.100	-.032	.214	.262	.230	.230	.128	

** p<.01; *p< .05.

Table 2

Power, Negotiation Type on Dependent Variables

	First offer						Strategy						Outcome					
	Willingness			Act			Fighting			Problem Solving			Self(within distributive)			Joint(within integrative)		
	F	p	η^2	B	SE	P	F	p	η^2	F	p	η^2	F	p	η^2	F	p	η^2
Gender	1.28	.26	.02	.77	.69	.26	.10	.75	.00	.00	.96	.00	,02	,90	,00	6,45	**,01**	,21
Age	3.20	.08	.06	.16	.19	.38	.83	.37	.02	1.29	.26	.02	,04	,84	,00	3,47	,07	,12
Education level	1.13	.33	.04	-.50	.82	.55	.43	.66	.02	.06	.94	.00	,65	,53	,05	2,63	,12	,10
Power	9.04	**.00**	.15	-.02	.82	.98	4.05	**.05**	.07	5.08	**.03**	.09	4,56	**,04**	,15	25,74	**,00**	,51
Negotiation types	1.10	.30	.02	2.60	1.21	.03	.25	.62	.01	3.16	.08	.06	-	-	-	-	-	-
Power*negotiation types	5.34	**.03**	.09	- 2.79	1.48	**.06**	4.35	**.04**	.08	5.01	**.03**	.09	-	-	-	-	-	-



Figure 1. Willingness of giving first offer by power and negotiation task



Figure 2. Fighting by power and negotiation task



Figure 3. Problem solving by power and negotiation task