



# Practical Application of Robot Safety

**Presented By; Roberta Shea Nelson,  
Jim Van Kessel,  
Tom Eastwood**

NOTE: This presentation is intended to be vendor-neutral. No particular product or solution is best and none are specifically recommended.

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Roberta Nelson Shea

## Tom Eastwood Introduction

- \* Chairperson Safeguarding of Machinery Standard CSA Z432
- \* Chairperson Industrial Robot Standard CSA Z434
- \* Vice Chairperson Canadian delegation ISO 10218
- \* Previous Technical Committee Member CSA Z142 Press Safety

## JVK Introduction

- \* Electrical Engineer
- \* Performs Pre-start Health and Safety reviews
- \* Participated in the development of
  - \* CSA Z142 Press Standard
  - \* CSA Z432 Machinery Standard
  - \* CSA Z434 Industrial Robots
  - \* CSA Z460 Energy control and Lockout
  - \* ANSI B11.1, 2 and 3 Press standards
  - \* ISO 10218.1 and 2 Industrial robots

## DISCLAIMER

- \* Any circuits used in this presentation are illustrative only and not intended to be used literally for your application. Each machine is unique and has individual characteristics that must be considered when designing a safety circuit.
- \* Always perform a complete risk assessment of all machine hazards, to acquire an in depth understanding of your machine / application .
- \* Check all relevant standards /regulations applicable to your machine / application. There may be many additional local, state, national, and international standards as well as machine function specific standards pertinent to your machine.

## Objectives of the Workshop

- \* Familiarize participants with
  - \* How to design a robot cell
  - \* Risk Assessment
  - \* Safeguarding application
  - \* Safe distance calculations.
  - \* Determining “stopping time”.
  - \* Hints that safeguards are working as expected or not working
  - \* Safety reviews



Ref: ANSI RIA R15.06, CSA Z434-03, and ISO 10218-1

## What is a Robot? Robot System?

- \* **Industrial robot**
  - \* An automatically controlled, reprogrammable multipurpose manipulator programmable in three or more axis which may be either fixed in place or mobile for use in industrial automation applications
- \* **Industrial robot system**
  - \* Equipment that includes the robot (hardware and software), consisting of the manipulator power supply and control system, the end-effector(s), and any other associated machinery and equipment within the safeguarded space

## Some Other Definitions

- \* **Space** — the three-dimensional volume encompassing the movements of all robot parts through their axis
- \* **Safeguarded space**— the space defined by the perimeter safeguarding devices.
- \* **Restricted space**— that portion of the maximum space to which a robot is restricted by limiting devices. The maximum distance that the robot, end-effector, and work piece can travel after the limiting device is actuated.
- \* **Operating space** — that portion of the restricted space that is actually used by the robot while performing its task program.

## System / Cell Design

- \* Functional Specification
  - \* What will the cell do?
- \* Space restrictions
  - \* Where will the cell be installed?
  - \* Where are the traffic aisles (people & materials)?
  - \* Space for the teacher
- \* Interlocks with adjacent machines
  - \* Will other automation be needed for the productive use of the cell?

## Functional Specification

- \* Define the operation
  - \* Part details
  - \* Auxiliary equipment
  - \* Through put requirements
- \* Define the process
  - \* Are parts manually loaded
  - \* Location of parts to be used in the process
  - \* How will finished parts exit the cell

## System / Cell Design


- \* Operating Personnel
  - \* How many personnel will be required?
  - \* What tasks will they do?
  - \* What skills are needed to perform the tasks?
  - \* What training is needed?
  - \* What procedures are needed?
  - \* How to make “safe use” be as intuitive as possible?

## System / Cell Design


- \* Define the Robot(s) to be used
  - \* Payload requirements
  - \* Speeds
  - \* New or redeployed Robots
  - \* Conventional or Collaborative


# Space Requirements

## Material Handling robot



# Typical Mig Welding Cell





## Typical Mig Welding cell

### Other considerations


- Where do we place the wire spools
- How do we do the tip dressing
- What access do we have for maintenance?




# Typical Mig Welding cell

## Guarding considerations

Inconvenience of an automatic door



Space for safe distance with light curtains



## Typical Multi-robot Weld cell

### Other considerations

- Overlapping robots therefore we can only teach one at a time
- Multiple zones for each robot

## Some other applications...

- \* Paint
- \* Assembly
- \* Inspection
- \* Welding (various types)
- \* Palletizing or Packaging
- \* Applying sealant, adhesives, ...
- \* Material transport
- \* small assembly collaborative
- \* Combinations of the above and more...



## Robots New Vs Redeployed

- \* What is the cost of rebuilding a robot that has already worked through the life of a project?
- \* What is the cost of the base limits to define the restricted space and safety zones?
- \* Will the redeployed robot meet the safety requirements of Category 3 PI "d"?
- \* The redeployed robot will not be usable as a collaborative robot. What will the fixtures and other automation cost?

## Collaborative vs conventional

Fixture table and slide mechanism was required to hand off the part from one cell to the next material handling robot





# Risk Assessment

- \* List all Tasks to be performed by workers
- \* Assess the hazards associated with the tasks
- \* Determine the severity/ frequency of exposure / and probability of avoidance
- \* Document the facts.

## Perform the Risk Assessment

RISK ASSESSMENT Title												
Remember - This evaluation is performed as though there is no guarding on m/c				Performed by		Jim Van Kessel						
				Revision A				January				
Item	Who	Task	Hazard - Risk		Evaluation		Countermeasure		Safety Device		Check	
			Type, sketch & description		Severity	Serious	Sketch or description of safety protection and reason why level of safety device was chosen		Individual	Protective	Exposure	Frequent
Operator					Exposure	Frequent					Avoidance	Likely
					Avoidance	Not Likely					Severity	Slight
					Risk Level						Risk Level	
					R1						R3A	
<b>And document the results!</b>												

# Break

15 minutes

## Guarding Development

Lets look at the choices

- Barrier guards
- Interlocked barrier guards
- Light curtains
- Two hand controls
- Laser scanners
- Floor mats

## Safety Distance & Barriers\*

- \* The barrier (and any barrier openings) needs to be sized be such that a person **cannot reach A.U.T.O.**
  - \* Around
  - \* Under
  - \* Through
  - \* Over
- \* **And access a hazard.**

*\*This is a fundamental and is the same in the USA, Canada, and Europe.*

## Fixed Barriers / Guards

- \* SECURELY INSTALLED
  - \* Requires TOOLS to install/ remove
  - \* Not easily removed

### NOTE:

Expect new requirements such that fastening hardware must remain attached to the machine or the guard!

However this is not required for guards that will rarely be needed to be removed (for major overhaul, re-deployment of a system, ...).



## Solid Barriers



## Fixed Barriers / Guards

- \* The number of fasteners is NOT specified, however one or two most likely are NOT sufficient.
- \* The guard should not be able to be propped in place (and **appear** secured when it is not secured).
- \* Means of affixing the removable guard shall remain attached to the machine or guard, if it will be removed for expected tasks.
- \* Flat black painted barriers are the easiest to “see through” (recommendation, not a requirement).



## Barriers as Safety Fencing



## Devices that signal a stop

- \* **Protective Devices**  
(Engineering Controls)
  - \* Interlocked guards
  - \* Light curtains
  - \* Laser scanners
  - \* Safety mats
  - \* Two-hand control
  - \* Safe vision systems

## Interlocked Barrier Guards

Roll up  
Curtain



## Interlocked Barrier Guards

Interlocked  
Lift gate




# Interlocked Barriers

- \* How is this done?
  - \* Electromechanical safety switches
    - \* Safety limit switches
    - \* Safety hinge switches
    - \* Other safety switches
  - \* Safety sensors (non-contact safety sensors)
  - \* These devices are used to sense movement of the barrier / door (lateral or rotation).
- \* Doors shall swing away from the hazard

## Monitoring Door Position Lineal Movement




Safety-type Limit Switches




Mechanical Latch

# Monitoring Door Position Rotation Movement




Electro-mechanical solutions



Non-contact solution

*All available from multiple manufacturers*


# Safety Locking EM (Electro-Mechanical) Switch



Guard Locked (Held in Place)

## Safety Locking EM Switch guard closed & unlocked

(actuator released, able to be removed from the switch)



## Safety Distance

- \*  $D_s = [K * (T_s + T_c + T_r)] + D_{pf}$
- \* K = Hand speed constant 63"/sec
- \*  $T_s$  = Stop time of the machine
- \*  $T_c$  = Reaction time of the controls
- \*  $T_r$  = Reaction time of safety device
- \*  $D_{pf}$  = Depth of penetration

# Stop time measurement

\* By Roberta Shea Nelson

# Light Curtain Muting

**Disable the light curtain function during a part of the cycle**

- \* Large opening for product to exit
- \* Light Curtain has muting to allow the product to pass through without stopping the process
- \* Other solutions would be a dual light curtain zone. The outer zone mutes the inner zone.





# Muting

- \* Photo eye detects the allowed object to pass through the light beam without stopping the machine
- \* If one of the photo eyes is broken before the other then the machine will stop
- \* All Muting circuits must be of the same quality as the safety circuit being muted.
- \* An indication showing the status of the muting circuit should be supplied.



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


## Dual zone Control

Inner light curtain

Outer light curtain

Too High




## Discussion






## Safety Laser Scanners




## Safety Scanners

- \* Safety scanners use the same safety distance formula.
  - \* There are additional factors that may need to be included in the safe distance calculations (measurement error, for example).
  - \* The MOS / resolution increases as the distance increases from the unit.
  - \* There may be a maximum safety distance zone (to ensure maintaining a specific MOS / resolution).

## Safety Vision System




Conventional PSSD solution



PSSD that is  
Vision-based monitoring

## Safety vision system


- \* Sensor unit (camera assembly) is installed above the area to be monitored.
- \* Zones define the system's responses to intrusions (response may vary depending on the location of the intrusion and the robot's location at the time and place of the intrusion).
- \* An object or person entering the safeguarded area will be detected by the safe vision system.



# 3D Zone Monitoring

## Action and reaction

- ... Flexible recognition and response



### Warning Zone

- the process slows, but can continue.
- the process continues but AWAY from the warning zone(s).

### Protection Zone

- protective stop or emergency stop issued (or alarm)

# Issues

- \* Obstructions / shadows may restrict "view"
  - \* Cranes, supports, gantries, etc.
- \* Some airborne obstructions may be an issue
  - \* Dust, mist, smoke, steam
- \* Vibration must be minimized by installation
- \* Lighting
  - \* Background lighting needed (not for "lights-out")
- \* Guarding may still be required (as with any PSSD)
  - \* To "contain" ejected materials, sparks, parts, etc.
  - \* Due to traffic / movement considerations

## What will Safe Vision Systems mean in the future?

- \* If the robot has safe speed control and safe motion control AND the safe vision system has similar specifications as a safety scanner (response time and resolution), then we will see tighter, smaller floor space because the combination could allow much smaller workspaces by situational logic (reduced speed(s) and/or the robot positioning itself further and further away from the approaching person).

Lunch


60 minutes

# Safety beyond the Electrics


## Control reliability

- \* Control reliability is a buzz word that has been floating around the safety world for some years now.
- \* All presentations in the past talked about the control system from an electrical point of view
- \* We will take this to the next step to show you how to bring the pneumatics and hydraulics to that same level

# Typical safety relay circuit




Which integrates fine with a motor




- \* This works fine to control a motor but how does this relate to Pneumatics or Hydraulics
- \* Very serious hazards can exist when using fluid power to control a machine
  - \* Presses
  - \* Clamps
  - \* Fixture controls

# Final Switching device



# Final Switching device



## Hidden hazards

- \* With fluid power we can have hazards that are not real obvious
  - \* Gravity fall due to component failures
  - \* Trapped energy
  - \* Valves switch when power is removed
  - \* Components move as the pressure within the system gets vent
  - \* Cylinders can leak causing machines to drift

## Different types of valves

- \* 2 position
  - \* returns to home position when power is removed
- \* 2 position detented
  - \* stays in the last position when power is removed.
- \* 3 position center blocked
  - \* Returns to center position when power is removed and traps the energy between the valve and actuator
- \* 3 position center open
  - \* Returns to center position when power is removed and vents the pressure in the actuator




# Valve basics

When power is applied the actuator moves out/up  
When power is removed the actuator returns home

2 position valve

Actuator




# Typical pneumatic circuit


(Category 1)

3 position center blocked valve

Actuator



## Safety Control circuit (category 1)



## Issues


- \* Failure of the directional control valve and we lose the safety function
- \* No monitoring means we can not detect a fault when it occurs
- \* Additional measure are required to deal with trapped energy

# Adding a dump valve (Category 2)

2 position valve

3 position center blocked valve

Actuator




# Center Open Valve (Category 2)


2 position valve

3 position center open valve


Actuator




## Adding a dump valve (Category 2)



## Add monitoring (Category 3)




## Safety circuit with monitored dump valve



## Category 4

Pressure switch  
to monitor valve

Dual safety valve




Hazardous  
motion

# Performance levels


- \* Pneumatic circuits like the electrical can have different levels of integrity
- \* Adding additional hardware can increase the level of safety
  - \* Pilot operated check valves
  - \* Rod lock system
  - \* Position monitoring to detect motion

# Ross Category 2 valve

## Solenoid Pilot Controlled



## Pressure Controlled



Schematics shown for 3/4 and 1 1/4 bodies.\*



3/2 Sensing Valve  
(solenoid model shown)

EN 954-1, ISO 13849-1,  
& AS4024-1  
(3/4 bodies only,  
other sizes approval pending)



# DM2 Series E Size 2 3/2 Double Valve with dynamic monitoring



## DM2® Series E Size 2 3/2 Double Valve with Dynamic Monitoring and Memory



ISO 13849-1:2006 Category 4  
PL e applications  
(approval pending)

Air Dump /  
Release

- Rapid response time to minimize stopping time
- Dynamic memory of abnormal function retains lockout condition and this prevents unintentional reset with removal of air or electricity
- Self-contained dynamic monitoring system requires no additional valve monitoring controls
- Electrical reset valve
- Status Indicator switch for valve condition (ready to run) feedback
- Highly contaminant tolerant poppet construction
- Line mounted

**Do not use in power press clutch/brake applications.**

Model Number*	Port Size		C <sub>v</sub>	
	In	Out	In-Out	Out-Exh.
DM2ENA20**21	1/4	1/2	1.34	2.43
DM2ENA21**21	3/8	1/2	1.92	2.43


\* NPT port threads. For BSPP threads, replace "N" in the model number with a "D".  
\*\* Insert voltage code: "A" = 24 volts DC, "B" = 110 volts AC, "C" = 220 volts AC, "D" = 12 volts DC; M12 connectors available, consult ROSS.

Wiring kits and accessories available, see pages 19 thru 23.  
Circuit diagrams are available (see page 24).

# Hydraulic System


- \* Hydraulic circuits are very similar but we need to provide a path for the oil to flow through the system or we end up with a spill.
- \* With a pneumatic system we can vent the components to the atmosphere
- \* Oil requires a path because it cannot be compressed like the air can.

## Category 1 Hydraulic Circuit



Hazardous  
motion


Add some monitoring and it  
increases to Category 2



Hazardous  
motion





## Add a blocking valve (Category 3)



Hazardous  
motion


## Safety Control






## Gravity fall

- \* A cylinder could have a seal failure
- \* the rod or its connection could break
- \* A hose or fitting ruptures
- \* and the platen or attached hardware will fall




# Single Cylinder C/W Counter Balance System




# Single Cylinder C/W Mechanical Restraint

# Multiple Cylinders



Example of multiple cylinder system.

## 4 way circuit



The Double Valve controls the incoming oil and the release of pressure in the hazardous direction.

## Example of self-monitoring hydraulic double valve



## Common Mistakes

By Roberta Shea Nelson

## The Team

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# Questions?

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