

# Pricing of electricity forwards

## – The risk premium –

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# Introduction

- Problem: what is the connection between spot and forward prices in electricity?
- Electricity is a non-storable commodity
- How to explain the risk premium?
  - Empirical and economical evidence: Sign varies with time to delivery
- Propose two approaches:
  1. Information approach
  2. Equilibrium approach
- Purpose: try to explain the risk premium for electricity

# Outline of talk

1. Example of an electricity market: NordPool
2. The “classical” spot-forward relation
3. The information approach
4. The equilibrium approach
5. Conclusions


# Example of an electricity market: NordPool

- The NordPool market organizes trade in
  - Hourly spot electricity, next-day delivery
  - Financial forward contracts
    - In reality mostly futures, but we make no distinction here
  - European options on forwards
- Difference from “classical” forwards:
  - Delivery over a period rather than at a fixed point in time

## Elspot: the spot market

- A (non-mandatory) hourly market with physical delivery of electricity
- Participants hand in bids before noon *the day ahead*
  - Volume and price for each of the 24 hours next day
  - Maximum of 64 bids within technical volume and price limits
- NordPool creates demand and production curves for the next day before 1.30 pm

- The *system price* is the equilibrium
  - Reference price for the forward market
- Historical system price from the beginning in 1992
  - note the spikes....



# The forward market

- Forward with delivery over a period
- Financial market
- Settlement with respect to system price in the delivery period
- Delivery periods
  - Next day, week or month
  - Quarterly (earlier seasons)
  - Yearly
- Overlapping settlement periods (!)
- Contracts also called *swaps*: Fixed for floating price



# The option market

- European call and put options on electricity forwards
  - Quarterly and yearly electricity forwards
- Low activity on the exchange
- OTC market for electricity derivatives huge
  - Average-type (Asian) options, swing options ....

# The spot-forward relation

## The spot-forward relation: some “classical” theory

- The **no-arbitrage** forward price (based on the buy-and-hold strategy)

$$F(t, T) = S(t)e^{r(T-t)}$$

- A risk-neutral expression of the price as

$$F(t, T) = \mathbb{E}_Q [S(T) | \mathcal{F}_t]$$

- The **risk premium** is defined as

$$R(t, T) = F(t, T) - \mathbb{E}[S(T) | \mathcal{F}_t]$$

- In the case of electricity:
  - Storage of spot is *not* possible (only indirectly in water reservoirs)
  - Buy-and-hold strategy fails
  - No foundation for the “classical” spot-forward relation
  - ...and hence no rule for what  $Q$  should be!
- Thus: What is the link between  $F(t, T)$  and  $S(t)$ ?

# Economical “intuition” for electricity

- Short-term *positive* risk premium
  - Retailers (consumers) hedge “spike risk”
  - Spikes lead to expensive electricity
  - Accept to pay a premium for locking in prices in the short-term
- Long-term *negative* risk premium
  - Producers hedge their future production
  - Long-term contracts (quarters/years)
- The market may have a change in the sign of the risk premium

# Empirical evidence for electricity

- Longstaff & Wang (2004), Geman & Vasicek : PJM market
  - Positive premium in the short-term market
- Diko, Lawford & Limpens (2006)
  - Study of EEX, PWN, APX, based on multi-factor models
  - Changing sign of the risk premium
- Kolos & Ronn (2008)
  - Market price of risk: expected risk-adjusted return
  - Multi-factor models
  - Negative on the short-term, positive on the long term


- Explore two possible approaches to price electricity futures
  1. The information approach based on market forecasts
  2. An equilibrium approach based on market power of the consumers and producers
- For simplicity we first restrict our attention to  $F(t, T)$ 
  - Electricity forwards deliver over a time period
  - Creates technical difficulties for most spot models
  - Ignore this here
  - In the equilibrium approach we consider delivery periods

# The information approach



# The information approach: idea

- Idea is the following:
  - Electricity is non-storable
  - Future predictions about market will not affect current spot
  - However, it will affect forward prices
- Stylized example:
  - Planned outage of a power plant in one month
  - Will affect forwards delivering in one month
  - But *not* spot today
- Market example
  - In 2007 market knew that in 2008 CO<sub>2</sub> emission costs will be introduced
  - No effect on spot prices in the EEX market in 2007
  - However, clear effect on the forward prices around New Year



## The information approach: definition

- Define the forward price as

$$F_{\mathcal{G}}(t, T) = \mathbb{E}[S(T) | \mathcal{G}_t]$$

- $\mathcal{G}_t$  includes spot information up to current time ( $\mathcal{F}_t$ ) and forward-looking information
- The information premium

$$I_{\mathcal{G}}(t, T) = F_{\mathcal{G}}(t, T) - \mathbb{E}[S(T) | \mathcal{F}_t]$$

- Rewrite the information premium using double conditioning and  $\mathcal{F}_t \subset \mathcal{G}_t$

$$I_{\mathcal{G}}(t, T) = \mathbb{E}[S(T) | \mathcal{G}_t] - \mathbb{E}[\mathbb{E}[S(T) | \mathcal{G}_t] | \mathcal{F}_t]$$

- The information premium is the residual random variable after projecting  $F_{\mathcal{G}}(t, T)$  onto  $L^2(\mathcal{F}_t, P)$ 
  - $I_{\mathcal{G}}$  measures how much more information is contained in  $\mathcal{G}_t$  compared to  $\mathcal{F}_t$

- Note that

$$\mathbb{E}[l_{\mathcal{G}}(t, T) | \mathcal{F}_t] = 0$$

- $l_{\mathcal{G}}(t, T)$  is orthogonal to  $R(t, T)$ 
  - The risk premium  $R(t, T)$  is  $\mathcal{F}_t$ -adapted
- Thus, impossible to obtain a given  $l_{\mathcal{G}}(t, T)$  from an appropriate choice of  $Q$  in  $R(t, T)$ 
  - Including future information creates new ways of explaining risk premia

## Example: temperature predictions

- Temperature dynamics

$$dY(t) = \gamma(\mu(t) - Y(t)) dt + \eta dB(t)$$

- Spot price dynamics

$$dS(t) = \alpha(\lambda(t) - S(t)) dt + \sigma\rho dB(t) + \sigma\sqrt{1 - \rho^2} dW(t)$$

- $\rho$  is the correlation between temperature and spot price
  - NordPool:  $\rho < 0$ , since high temperature implies low prices, and vice versa

- Suppose we have some temperature forecast at time  $T_1$ 
  - Full, or at least some, knowledge of  $Y(T_1)$

$$\mathcal{F}_t \subset \mathcal{G}_t \subset \mathcal{H}_t \triangleq \mathcal{F}_t \vee \sigma(Y(T_1))$$

- We want to compute (for  $T \leq T_1$ )

$$F_{\mathcal{G}}(t, T) = \mathbb{E}[S(T) | \mathcal{G}_t]$$

- Program:
  1. Find a Brownian motion wrt  $\mathcal{G}_t$
  2. Compute the conditional expectation

- From the theory of “enlargement of filtrations”:
  - There exists a  $\mathcal{G}_t$ -adapted drift  $\theta_1$  such that  $\tilde{B}$  is a  $\mathcal{G}_t$ -Brownian motion,

$$d\tilde{B}(t) = dB(t) - \theta_1(t) dt$$

- The drift is expressed as

$$\theta_1(t) = a_1(t) \left( e^{\gamma T_1} \mathbb{E}[Y(T_1) | \mathcal{G}_t] - e^{\gamma t} Y(t) - \gamma \int_t^{T_1} \mu(u) e^{\gamma u} du \right)$$

$$a_1(t) = \frac{2\gamma e^{\gamma t}}{\eta(e^{2\gamma T_1} - e^{2\gamma t})}$$



- Dynamics of  $S$  in terms of  $\tilde{B}$ :

$$dS(t) = \alpha \left( \rho \frac{\sigma}{\alpha} \theta_1(t) + \lambda(t) - S(t) \right) dt + \sigma \rho d\tilde{B}(t) + \sigma \sqrt{1 - \rho^2} dW(t)$$

- Note that we have a mean-reversion level being *stochastic*
  - Explicitly dependent on the temperature prediction and today's temperature
- $\theta_1(t)$  is the **market price of information**, or **information yield**

- Calculate the forward price

$$\begin{aligned}
 F_G(t, u) &= \mathbb{E}[S(u) | \mathcal{F}_t] + I_G(t, T) \\
 &= S(t)^{\exp(-\alpha(T-t))} + \alpha \int_t^T \lambda(s) e^{-\alpha(T-s)} ds + I_G(t, T)
 \end{aligned}$$

- The information premium is, by applying the definition

$$I_G(t, T) = \rho\sigma \mathbb{E} \left[ \int_t^T e^{-\alpha(T-s)} dB(s) | \mathcal{G}_t \right]$$

- Use that  $\tilde{B}$  is a  $\mathcal{G}_t$ -Brownian motion

- Expression for the information premium

$$I_{\mathcal{G}}(t, T) =$$

$$\rho A(t, T) \left( e^{\gamma T_1} \mathbb{E}[Y(T_1) | \mathcal{G}_t] - e^{\gamma t} Y(t) - \gamma \int_t^{T_1} \mu(s) e^{\gamma s} ds \right)$$

where

$$A(t, T) = \frac{2\gamma\sigma e^{\gamma T} (1 - e^{-(\alpha+\gamma)(T-t)})}{\eta(\alpha + \gamma)(e^{2\gamma T_1} - e^{2\gamma t})}$$

- Observe that  $A(t, T)$  is positive
- The sign of the information premium is determined by
  - The correlation  $\rho$
  - The temperature prediction

## Example with complete information

- Suppose we know the temperature at  $T_1$ 
  - The information set is  $\mathcal{H}_t$
  - Unlikely situation of perfect future knowledge....
- Assume we we expect a temperature drop

$$Y(T_1) < e^{-\gamma(T_1-t)} Y(t) + \gamma \int_t^{T_1} \mu(s) e^{-\gamma(T_1-s)} ds$$

- At NordPool, where  $\rho < 0$ :
  - The information premium is positive
- Drop in temperature will lead to increasing demand, and thus higher prices

# The equilibrium approach

## The equilibrium approach: idea

- Producers and consumers can trade in both spot and forward markets
  - No speculators in our set-up
- We suppose that the forwards deliver electricity over an agreed period
  - No fixed delivery time as in other commodity markets
  - Natural for electricity due to its nature
- Choice of an electricity producer
  - Sell production on spot market, *or* on the forward market

- Producer is indifferent when ( $U_{pr}$  is the utility function)

$$\mathbb{E} \left[ U_{pr} \left( \int_{\tau_1}^{\tau_2} S(u) du \right) \right] = \mathbb{E} [ U_{pr} ( (\tau_2 - \tau_1) F_{pr}(t, \tau_1, \tau_2) ) ]$$

- The certainty equivalence principle
- $F_{pr}$  is the **lowest** acceptable price for the producer can accept to be interested in entering a forward
  - Similarly,  $F_c$  is the highest acceptable price for the consumer, for a given utility function  $U_c$
- We assume exponential utility  $U(x) = 1 - \exp(-\gamma x)$ , with respective risk aversion for producer and consumer  $\gamma_{pr}$  and  $\gamma_c$

- By Jensen's inequality, the predicted average spot price is within the price bounds

$$F_{\text{pr}}(t, \tau_1, \tau_2) \leq \mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{1}{\tau_2 - \tau_1} \int_{\tau_1}^{\tau_2} S(u) du \mid \mathcal{F}_t \right] \leq F_c(t, \tau_1, \tau_2)$$

- Hypothesis: The settlement price of the forward will depend on the market power  $p \in [0, 1]$  of the producer

$$F^P(t, \tau_1, \tau_2) = pF_c(t, \tau_1, \tau_2) + (1 - p)F_{\text{pr}}(t, \tau_1, \tau_2)$$



- Assume a simple two-factor spot model with jump component

$$S(t) = \Lambda(t) + X(t) + Y(t)$$


- $\Lambda(t)$  seasonal function

$$dY(t) = -\lambda Y(t) dt + Z dN(t)$$

- Jumps (accounting for spikes)
  - $Z$  jump size
  - $N$  Poisson process
- Slowly varying base component

$$dX(t) = -\alpha X(t) dt + \sigma dB(t)$$


- Calculate prices for weekly contracts and compute the risk premium
  - The market power set to  $p = 0.25$
  - Constant positive jumps at rate 2/year




- Note the **positive** risk premium in the short end
  - Caused by the jump risk

## Empirical example: EEX (Metka, Ulm)

- Fit two-factor model to daily EEX spot prices (Jan 02 – Dec 05)



- Using observed prices for 18 monthly forward contracts and fitted spot model
  - Calculate the risk premium,
  - Difference between forward price and predicted spot
  - Observe a positive premium in the short end, and negative in the long end




- Based on all available forward prices in the study, risk aversion parameters were determined
  - $\gamma_{pr} \geq 0.421$  and  $\gamma_c \geq 0.701$  are such that

$$F_{pr}(t, \tau_1, \tau_2) \leq F(t, \tau_1, \tau_2) \leq F_c(t, \tau_1, \tau)$$

- Calculate the empirical market power

$$p(t, \tau_1, \tau_2) = \frac{F(t, \tau_1, \tau_2) - F_{pr}(t, \tau_1, \tau_2)}{F_c(t, \tau_1, \tau_2) - F_{pr}(t, \tau_1, \tau_2)}$$

- Observe that producer's power is strong in the short end, while decreasing to be rather weak in the long end



# Conclusions

- Discussed two potential ways to understand the link between spot and forward prices in electricity markets
- Information approach:
  - Include future information in pricing
- Equilibrium approach:
  - Certainty equivalence principle for upper and lower bounds of prices
  - Use market power as an explanatory variable for price formation

# Coordinates

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- [folk.uio.no/fredb](http://folk.uio.no/fredb)
- [www.cma.uio.no](http://www.cma.uio.no)



# References

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Benth, Cartea and Kiesel (2008). Pricing forward contracts in power markets by the certainty equivalence principle: explaining the sign of the market risk premium. *J Banking Finance*, 32