


**RELATIONS OF THE
OTTOMAN EMPIRE WITH
THE INDIAN RULERS
1750-1924**

DISSERTATION SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF
Master of Philosophy
IN
West Asian Studies
(HISTORY)


BY
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Under the Supervision of
Professor Mahmudul Haq




**CENTRE OF WEST ASIAN STUDIES
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C O N T E N T S

	<u>PAGE</u>
Preface	i
Abbreviations	v
Introduction	1
Chapter - I : Ottoman Relations with the Mughal Court.	15
Chapter - II : Ottoman Relations with the States of Mysore and Hyderabad.	46
Chapter - III : Ottoman Relations with the British India.	73
Map	101
Bibliography	102
Appendix	A — K

PREFACE

The present work throws light on the relations between the rulers of the Ottoman Empire and India, especially during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In this dissertation effort has been made to analyse the impact of this relation on both the countries. The Ottoman Empire and India had friendly relations over the last five hundred years. During this period a number of diplomatic missions were exchanged between India and Turkey.

One who intends to work on the relations of the Ottoman Empire with the various states of India is faced with the dearth of source material. I have not been able to trace any proper work on this subject so far. There is still more dearth of source material regarding the period with which my dissertation deals. While there is enough material available on the later part of the Ottoman relations with India, especially during the World War I, the material in eighteenth and nineteenth centuries which is the thrust period of my dissertation is very scarce. Whatever material is available most of it is Archives. Due to nonavailability of any work on the subject, it was very difficult for me to search and collect archival material in Archives. In this connection I visited National Archives of India New Delhi, Andhra Pradesh State Archives

Hyderabad, Khuda Bakhsh Library, Patna. Of course I could not consult some materials available in Archives of Istanbul. However, I have been able to use of these materials available in printed form. I entered into correspondence with some Turkish scholars such as Doc. Doctor Erkan Turkman of Jonya, Seljuk University and Director of Archives Istanbul but unfortunately it did not prove fruitful. If these archival materials were avoidable to me I could have been able to make this study more substantial.

My dissertation consists of three chapters. It is based on the material which I was able to collect from these Archives. The first chapter deals with the relationship the Ottoman Sultans and the Mughal emperors of India. In the second chapter I have tried to emphasize the diplomatic exchanges between the Ottoman Empire and the States Mysore and Hyderabad. The third but the last deals with the attitude of the Ottoman Empire towards British India. The emphasis in these chapters is to examine the various levels of relation between the two countries and to investigate the basic objectives of these relations.

These chapters are mainly based on the studies of the letters of the rulers' of both the countries, diaries of emissaries, summaries of newspapers' articles and the reports of various

government officials. The documents - Foreign Home and Political Department of the Government of India - which I have been able to utilize in my dissertation are in the custody of the National Archives of India, New Delhi and A.P. State Archives Hyderabad. Specific references of these documents have been given in footnotes. Apart from these, I have also utilized some important publications such as Calender of Documents on Indo Persian Relations by Riazul Islam; Manazil-i Rum edited by Mohibbul Hasan; 'The Mughal and the Ottoman's, (P.Q) by Bernard Lewis; Tarikh-e Saltanat-e-Khudadad (Mysore) by Mahmud Banglori; Britain, India and Turkish Empire by R.L. Shukla, The Caliphate by Arnold, All About the Khilafat by M.H. Abbas, The Eastern Question by J.A. Marriot and a number of other secondary sources.

At the end I feel bound to acknowledge the great obligation that I owe to my well wishers and friends. I have first of all to express my deep sense of gratitude to my supervisor Prof. Mahmudul Haq. In spite of his numerous engagements he took keen and active interest at every stage for the preparation of my dissertation. I am also thankful to Professor M.A. Saleem Khan for his kindness and help. I am highly obliged to Professor Irfan Habib for his suggestion to work on the theme of Indo-Turkish relation.

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I am very much indebted to the staff of National Archives of
India New Delhi, AP State Archives of Hyderabad, Library of Centre
of West Asian Studies, A.M.U., Research Library, Department of
History, Library, Institute Islamic Studies, Maulana Azad Library,
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ABBREVIATIONS

APSA	-	Andhra Pradesh State Archives.
CDIPR	-	Calendar of Documents on Indo-Persian Relations.
EHR	-	English Historical Review.
IC	-	Islamic Culture.
IHRC	-	Indian Historical Records Commission.
JAOS	-	Journal of American Oriental Society
JIH	-	Journal of Indian History Congress.
MW	†	Muslim World.
NAI	-	National Archives of India.
P Q	-	Pakistan Quarterly
SFRI	-	Studies in the Foreign Relations of India.
TRAS	-	Transactions of Royal Asiatic Society

INTRODUCTION

The Ottoman Empire during the later medieval period was not only the Centre of power of Muslim countries but it was also the most powerful empire of the east. The Indian sub-continent during this period was although ober-whelmingly non-muslim but it was mostly ruled by the Muslim rulers. The Ottoman emperors ruled whole of the Muslim world, either directly or through allegiances and deputations. The Indian sub-continent somhow or other remained untouched from their direct rule. Most of the Indian Muslim rulers enjoyed independence, particularly Mughal rulers, from their allegiance. Nevertheless, (they seemed to be taken enough, particularly) the ruler of Gujarat and Southern India established diplomatic and trade relations with the Ottoman Empire. One of the causes why the Muslim rules of India were keen to establish relations with the Ottomans was the Islamic religion which they shared in common. It was only natural for them to express their religious ties with the latter, particularly in view of the fact that the Ottomans were garded as the leaders of the Muslim World. Besides, the Muslim rulers sought to affirm legitimacy to rule over the Muslims through the Ottoman sanction. The political and diplomatic relations between India and the Ottoman Empire were also very friendly over the last five hundred years. With the establishment of the Bahmanid Kingdom in southern India in the fourtteenth century, the discovery

of the Cape of Good Hope Route in 1498 and the appearance of the Portuguese in the Eastern seas, the conquest of Egypt by the Ottoman Turks in 1516-17, the founding of Safawid Empire in Persia and the Mughal Empire in India, the isolation in which the India had stood so far was broken and active political, economic and cultural contacts were established.

The Bahmanids were the first Indian rulers to establish diplomatic contacts with the Ottomans. Later on they were followed by the Muslim rulers of Gujarat and after them by the Mughals. The relations were also established by the Nizam of Hyderabad, Tipu Sultan of Mysore and the Nawab of Arcot. Even during the British occupation of India, there were bilateral exchanges of diplomatic missions between India and the Ottoman Empire.

The Ottoman Empire was one of the most important 'key' states of Europe and Asia. The strategical, economical and political importance of this country has been significant in international affairs. The Ottoman Empire achieved a commanding position only because of the possession of narrow straits which unite and separate the Black Sea and the Mediterranean.

For over one thousand years Istanbul, the capital of the Ottoman Empire, remained one of the chief centres of culture and commerce. The Turks encouraged the settlements of foreign colonies to build their trade and commerce and thus it became a

cosmopolitan city and an international port. Its position as the cross-roads of Asia and Europe enabled it to profit enormously by the trade flowing from Russia, Iran, Iraq and India, and also in earlier times by the great over-land trade route to inner Asia and the Far East. Thus the geographical location of the Ottoman Empire has conferred on it the position of a bridge between Asia and Europe. A glance at the map of the world discloses the fact that it separates and at the same time it connects Europe, Asia and Africa. Armenia was the meeting place of all the inner trade routes. Syria was the rich maritime hinterland whose ports provided an outlet to Europe for Asiatic trade.

Although there had been commercial relations between India, the Arab World, Turkey and Europe since the time immemorial, the Arab lands stood at the cross roads of the trade route between India and Europe. The luxurious living style of the Arabs and the Turkish ruling classes had an impact on fashions and style of living of the European ruling classes. In the meantime the town life in Europe which had declined after the fall of the Roman Empire had begun to revive. This resulted in increasing trade with Asia. The transportation of Indian and Chinese goods across Central Asia was frequent. The principal carriers of goods from India by sea route were the Arab merchants. The Indians also used to carry merchandise across the Arabian Sea.

The arrival of Portuguese in the Arabian Sea led to far-reaching consequences with regard to the pattern of trade and commerce. The search for a direct route to India was begun by the rulers of Portugal such as Don Henrique known as Henry towards the beginning of the fifteenth century. The growing trade activities and power of the Portuguese caused serious concern to the Ottoman Turks. It was the time when Ottomans themselves were rising rapidly to become a world power. The Ottoman had not only captured Constantinople in 1453 but they had also completed the conquest of Asia Minor. The expansion of the Turkish power on the coast of the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf made inevitable a conflict between the Turks and the Portuguese for supremacy in the Indian Ocean. The Portuguese were fully aware of this. In view of the growing Portuguese threat to the Gujarat trade and the coastal areas, the ruler of Gujarat (Bahadur Shah) sent an embassy to the Ottoman Sultan, Sulayman the Magnificent, congratulating him on his victories and seeking his support. In return the Ottoman Sultan expressed a desire to combat the 'infidels', i.e. the Portuguese who had "disturbed the shores of Arabia".

The Turks were major beneficiaries of trade between Europe and the East. But the diversion of trade from this area threatened their interests. In 1566, the Portuguese and the Ottomans came to an agreement to share the spice and the Indian trade and not to clash in the Arab seas. The Ottomans shifted their interest once

again to Europe and came to an agreement with the Portuguese for deriving the oriental trade between them.

Towards the middle of the thirteenth century a small tribe of Mangol Turks migrated from Khorasan to West Asia under the leadership of Sulayman Shah. But accidentally their leader was drowned in the river Khanva. This land joining the eastern borders of Byzantine Empire. During the last decade of the thirteenth century when Saljukian Empire was being encroached by the continuous invasions of Mongol. Erthogrul's son Osman settled at Karachi and conquered several provinces particularly of his master. According to the ancient orthography (Osman) Othman is regarded as the founder of the Ottoman Empire.¹ The empire existed more than six centuries (1299-1918). In the course of first three centuries of its existence it became the world's most powerful country by gradually expanding from a small domination in Antatolia to the three known continents - Europe, Asia and Africa. The empire produced ten brilliant and great sultans who ruled in the fourteenth fifteenth and sixteenth centuries over a vast stretch of land.

Sultan Salim came to the throne in 1512.² He was the first Ottoman Sultan who turned his attention towards the east.

2 Creasy, E.S., History of the Ottoman Turks, London, 1854.

3 Ibid., p.205.

At the same time Shah Isma'il Safawi I was ruling over Persia. He conquered Azarbijan. In this way the boundaries of the Ottoman Empire and Persia were adjoined. In 1524 Kurdistan had also been annexed to the Ottoman Empire. This led to a three-year war between the Ottoman and Shah Isma'il of Persia which is crucial in so many respects, especially in respect of its impact upon future Indo-Ottoman relation. Meanwhile, Sultan Salim captured Northern Mesopotamia, Egypt, Syria and Arabia.³ The result of this was that the Caliphate was transferred to the Ottoman Sultans who became henceforth protectors or the servants of the two Holy Places Khadim al-Harmayan al-Sharifayn and the religious and spiritual head of the Muslim world.

However, the political and strategic complications of the whole region makes it difficult to completely comprehend the situation. The proper understanding of the Indo-Ottoman relations requires a study of wider Asiatic environment. The diplomatic background not only of the Indian Mughals and the Ottoman but also of the contemporary neighbouring powers, the Persians, the Uzbeks, the Ilkhanids of Khorasan and the others. The beginning of the 16th century constituted an important landmark in Islamic

³ J.A.R., Marriot , The Eastern Question, London, 1930, p.86.

as well as world history. The Ottomans, the Uzbeks and the Safawids had established themselves in Central Asia. The Uzbeks were the natural enemies of the Mughals, having been responsible for the expulsion of Babur and the other Timurid princes from Samarqand and the adjoining areas including Khorasan. At the same time, the Uzbeks clashed with the rising power of the Safawids who claimed Khorasan. The Khorasanian Plateau linked Persia with Central Asia. The trade routes to China and India passed across it. It was natural for the Safawids and the Mughals to ally against the Uzbek danger, especially as there was no frontier dispute between them with the exception of Qandhar. The Uzbeks tried to exploit the sectarian differences with the Safawid rulers of Iran who had ruthlessly persecuted the Sunnis. Persia made the Ottoman Sultans conscious of the danger to their eastern flank. The Ottoman threat from the west made the Persians keen to befriend the Mughals, particularly when they had to face an aggressive Uzbek power in the east. This led the Ottoman rulers to propose a tripartite alliance including the Uzbeks and the Mughals or its other two members. The Mughals refused to be drawn in the tripartite alliance against the Persians as it would have upset the Asian balance of power and left them alone to face the might of the Uzbeks. The alliance with Iran was also helpful in promoting trade with Central Asia.

These three empires with a common Turko-Mongol heritage were almost co-extensive with the entire dar-ul Islam except some outlying areas down to the end of the 18th century. All of these powers, the Ottomans the Uzbeks and the Mughals, were orthodox Sunnis while the Safawids were the Shi'ites. While politics overbore religious differences at times, the latter came to the surface whenever political necessity passed away. The Uzbeks, hostile to Persia, friendly to the Ottoman and ever watchful of the Mughals, played an important part in shaping the balance of power.

The maintenance of the trade relations with the countries around the Indian Ocean, West Asia and Africa, politically the Ottoman state used to its economic powers of its European allies. During the whole of this formative period the foreign policy of the Ottoman Sultans was motivated mainly by three objectives. First, to extend the Turkish power in the west and thereby finally defeating and destroying the European coalition against them. Secondly, to control all the trade routes from east to the west; and thirdly to become undisputed leaders of their co-religionists by wrestling the Caliphate from the Abbasids.⁴

4 M.H., Rahman, op. cit., p.51.

Sulaiman's reign was not only the climax of the Ottoman glory but it opened a new chapter in the empire's foreign relations. The reign of Sulayman coincides with the beginning of a prolonged contest with the major powers of the world. Two of them were European - the Habsburg Empire, Venice - and the other was 'Asiatic Persia'. The growth of the Habsburg and its rivalry simultaneously with Ottoman on the one hand, and the France on the other hand made it only natural that France and the Ottomans should look towards each other as friends and allies against the threat of the Central European power of Austria.

The deteriorating position of the Ottoman Empire was best illustrated perhaps during the thirty-years war (1618-1648), which also threw the Europeans into unprecented turmoil and considerably weakened the Roman Empire. But the Battle of Vienna and the Treaty of Carlowitz closed a chapter in the history of the Ottoman Empire. On the contrary, their various weaknesses resulted into diminishing the role of the Empire in Europe. Henceforth, it was Europe that threatened the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Among the European powers the most ambitious in this respect was Russia while Austria was never pro-Turkish but she began to play less prominent role. She wanted to enlarge her possession in the Balkans and prevent Russian expansionism. This new diplomatic chapter in the history of the Ottoman Empire lasted over two centuries and came to be termed as the Eastern Question. The

Eastern question may be narrowed down to the maneuvering of various European powers to prevent Russia from encroaching too much upon the integrity of the Ottoman Empire.

The war which broke out in 1768 resulted in Russian victories, both land and sea, in the Rumanian principalities. This was concluded in 1774 by the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji. The treaty was a milestone in Russo-Turkish relations and must be considered as a major political event in the history of Turkey and Europe.⁵ The treaty obviously gave Russia enormous advantages and territorial accretions. It put an end to exclusive Turkish control of the Black Sea. From that time on, Russia exercised relentless pressure on the Ottoman Empire.

The outbreak of the French Revolution gave a somewhat pleasant relief to Turkey, since it diverted the attention of Turkey's enemies - Russia and Austria - toward France. The Treaty of Jassy closed one important chapter in the history of the Eastern Question. The next opens with the advent of Napoleon. By the year 1797 he had begun to arrive not only in military but in a political sense. In 1798, Napoleon organized a military expedition to Egypt. This naturally meant an invasion of Ottoman

⁵ George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, London, 1980, p.35.

territory. And after centuries of friendship, put France at odds with the Sultan of Turkey. In 1801 the French armies surrendered to the British in Egypt. A temporary British occupation of Egypt followed; but in 1802 the country was restored to the Sultan of Turkey. The evacuation of French forces from Ottoman territory made possible a gradual restoration of the traditional friendly feeling between the two countries. French ascendancy in the Ottoman capital was reestablished and in 1806. Napoleon was able to induce the Porte to take arms against Russia, with whom France was then at war. But the Turks were disappointed when Napoleon concluded the Treaty of Tilsit with Tsar Alexander I in 1807.

The British power which emerged in the nineteenth century as Russia's principal competitor in Asia, England found a friendly power in France weakened after the Napoleonic wars. Throughout the nineteenth century the two countries presented a common front against Russian imperialism.

Despite the traditional alliance between the Ottoman Empire and France, the latter was not reluctant to take advantage of the empire's weakness in those areas deemed important to French interests. The British record in relation to the Ottoman Empire, must at its best be described as "ambiguous" and at its worst as "insincere". While the preservation of the Ottoman Empire

was axiom of the nineteenth century British policy,⁶ Britain's interest in Ottoman territory originated, of course, in her desire to protect her imperial line to the East. Between 1833 and 1878 Britain was intensely interested in establishing English controlled land and river route through Mesopotamia to India.

In the nineteenth century, while Turkey's international and internal situation was steadily deteriorating, a few attempts were made at reform. A series of internal reforms including reforms in military and administrative organizations followed. The other alternative remained, that of a radical change by revolution. The task of shaking the empire out of its lethargy was taken up by the Young Turk Movement. The young Turk Party drew its inspiration from the west and wanted to remodel the empire into a liberal constitutional monarchy. The outbreak of world War I found the empire reduced territorially. The Ottoman political strategy in war-time could be summoned up in two terms : Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turanism. It will be remembered that upon Turkey's entry into the war, the Sultan in his capacity as Caliph issued a call to a holy war or jihad addressed to all Muslim of the world.⁷

6 Ibid., p.41.

7 Ibid., p.62

The establishment of the Ottoman rule in Egypt in 1516-17, followed by the extension of their power down both the shores of the Red sea involved the Ottomans more intimately in Asian affairs. It brought them into direct contact with the Indian sub-continent and her problems. Their arrival on the Indian Ocean coincided with the coming of the Portuguese, and they soon found themselves committed to a decisive struggle for powers on eastern waters. Moreover, it was natural to the Ottoman Sultan as the major sovereign of the day, that Muslim rulers of India turn to him for help against their domestic or foreign enemies. One of them was the rule of Mysore Tipu Sultan who sent an embassy to the Ottoman Sultan 'Abdul Hamid⁸ in 1785 to obtain caliphal investiture, and military help against the British. Not only Tipu but the Mughal emperors of the eighteenth century also had cordial relations with the Sultan of Turkey. So many letters of the Mughal emperor Muhammad Shah and Ahmad Shah are found in Turkish Archives.⁹ Apart from these, letters of Nizam-ul Mulk Asaf Jaha and his sons are preserved in the Turkish Archives. The diplomatic exchange between the ineffective Mughal emperors and the rulers of the Ottoman Empire continued until the end of

⁹ Islam, Riazul, Calender of Documents on Indo-Persian Relations, Vol.II, Karachi, 1982; see section 10, Miscellaneous Correspondence.

the eighteenth century. In the nineteenth century the pattern of relationship between Turkey and the Muslims of the sub-continent began to change. Even in the first half of the 20th century we find a correspondence between the exile Sultan of Turkey and the Nizam of Hyderabad.¹⁰

¹⁰ See Records of Political Departments of A.P. State Archives Hyderabad.

CHAPTER - I

OTTOMAN RELATIONS WITH THE MUGHAL COURT

The earlier record of diplomatic relations between the Ottoman Empire and the Muslim rulers of the Indian subcontinent dates back in the year 1481-82, when royal embassies, letters and gifts were exchanged between the Bahmanid Kings Muhammad Shah (1463-82) and Mahmud Shah (1482-1518) and the Ottoman Sultans Muhammad II (1451-81) and Bayezid II (1481-1512).¹

India's isolation from Europe and the West Asian region had broken during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the discovery "Cape of Good Hope Route" in 1498 and the appearance Portuguse in the Eastern seas, the Conquest of Egypt by the Ottoman Turks in 1516-17, the founding of Safawid Empire in Persia and the Mughal Empire in India. Active political, economic and cultural contacts began to be established between Indian and the European peoples. In order to arrive at a more precise understanding of the Mughal relations with the Ottoman Empire, one has to look at the political map of western and central Asia during the medieval period. The regions of central and western Asia

1 Bernard Lewis, "The Mughals and the Ottomans", Pakistan Quarterly, Karachi (1958), p.4.

had undergone important political changes during the fifteenth century. After the disintegration of the Mughal Empire in the fourteenth century, Timur united Iran and Turan under his rule. His empire included modern Turkey, Transoxiana (the land beyond the river Oxus, also known as Mawara-un-Nahr), Iran, Afghanistan and parts of the Punjab. The power of Timurids declined during the second half of the fifteenth century which was largely due to repeated partitioning of the empire. With this political disintegration various Timurid principalities started fighting among themselves. Such a situation provided an opportunity to the two new elements to enter the scene. One were the Uzbeks, a Mongol tribe which started penetrating into Transoxiana from the north and the other were the Safawids, who emerged in the west of it under Shah Isma'il. Further towards the west of Iran, the power of the Ottoman Turks was rising. Apart from the territorial expansion, assumption of Caliphate was another achievement of the Ottoman Empire.² The first Sultan who turned his attention towards the East was Sultan Salim who ascended throne in 1512.³

The Ottoman Sultans wanted to establish their domination in eastern Europe as well as Iraq and Iran. The emergence of

² J.A.R., Marriott, The Eastern Question, Oxford, 1918, p. 36.

³ E.S. Creasy, History of the Ottoman Turks, London, p.295.

these empires synchronized with one another political event which had far reaching consequences for the political history of Northern India as well as the Asian balance of power. This was the establishment of the Mughal Empire by Babur in 1526. Babur was expelled from his principality of Faraghna in Transoxiana by the Uzbeks. He made no secret of his desire of recapturing his homeland from the Uzbeks.⁴ This factor of vengeance remained always a dominant cause in the relations between the Mughals of India and the Uzbeks. This also explains the perpetual hostility of the Mughals towards the Uzbek Khanates. Furthermore, this factor had influenced their relations with Persia and Turkey too.

Another factor of paramount importance with regards to the Turko-Mughal relationship was sectarianism.⁵ The Safawid Empire professed Shi'ism as their state religion and promoted Shi'ite faith. They even resorted to persecution in order to convert people from other sects. The Ottomans, Mughals and Uzbeks were, on the other hand, the Sunnis. The Ottomans had received the title of Sultan-e-Rum from the shadowy caliph

4 Babur, Tuzuk, English Translation, Mrs. Beveridge, London, 1931, Vol. II., pp. 626-7.

5 Aziz Ahmad, Studies in Islamic Culture in the Indian Environment, London, 1964, p.25.

living at Cairo, later they assumed the title of Padshah-e-Islam. They may thus become the temporal and spiritual rulers of the Sunni world.⁷ The rise of the Safawids and their policy of promoting Shi'ism in their territory made the Ottoman Sultans conscious of the danger of the expansion of Shi'ism in the region adjoining the Safawid territory towards the East. In other words, they feared that the Safawid domination in their own territory. This led to the a number of clashes between the Ottomans and the Safawids. In 1512 Sultan Salim (the 'Grim') defeated the Safawid ruler Isma'il I. It may not be out of interest to say that in the battle of Panipat in 1526 Babur adopted the same Rumi pattern of warfare as adopted by the Ottomans in the battle of Chaldiran against the Safawids in 1514.⁶ Babur also availed of the services of the Ottoman master gunners Ustad Ali and Mustafa. With the Ottomans, Babur had no direct contact, and reference to them are indirect. He followed the Ottoman method of arranging his artillery in his battle against Rana Sanga.⁷

The Ottoman threat from the west compelled the Safawids to adopt a friendly attitude towards the Mughals, particularly

⁶ Jagdish Narayan Sarkar, Asian Balance of Power in the Light of Mughal Persian Rivalry in the 16th and 17th centuries, Studies in the Foreign Relations of India, Hyderabad, 1975, p.205.

⁷ Aziz Ahmad, op.cit., p.25.

when they had to face an aggressive Uzbek power in the East. Though Qandhar was always a bone of contention between the Mughals and the Safawids for commercial and strategic reasons, there was no other frontier dispute between them.⁸ In the same way Khorasan was the bone of contention between the Uzbeks and the Safawids.

Thus the political and sectarian considerations put the Uzbeks and the Ottomans together who pitted against their common enemy, i.e. the Safawids of Persia. It was this element of common hostility which compelled the Ottomans and the Uzbeks to form an alliance with the Mughals of India against their adversary. But the Mughals were extremely indifferent to such an alliance for a number of reasons.

According to the Ottoman historian Ferdi, the first reference to the Mughals in the Ottoman sources refers back to the appearance "One Lodi Prince Burhan Bey, the son of Sinkandar Shah, who arrived in Istanbul in 1536. Fleeing before the

8 ibid., p.24.

invasion of the Chaghtayan armies he sought refuge at the Ottoman Court. 'He was granted the privilege of kissing the Imperial hand and allowed a daily pension of 300 aspers. At about the same time, an embassy from King Bahadur Shah of Gujarat arrived in Istanbul, to ask for help against the encroachments both of Humayun and of the Portuguese."⁹ However we had no evidence in Indian accounts of any of the Sikandar's sons by the name of Burhan and who sought assylum at the Ottoman court after "being ruined by the invasion of the Chughatai (sic) armies".¹⁰ None of the Afghan Princes of Delhi bore this name. Moreover, this name was quite unfamiler in northern India at that time. According to Shaikh Abdur Rashid this might refer to Sikandar of Gujarat who ruled for little more than two months and was assassinated in 1526, the year when the Mughals defeated the Afghans at the battle of Panipat. Burhan may have been one of the numerous princes who were driven out of Gujarat by Humayun when he conquered the country in 1535.¹¹ According to Shaikh Abdur Rashid, the appearance of Burhan at the Sublime Porte is mentioned

9 Bernard Lewis, op.cit., p.6.

10 Shaikh Abdul Rashid, "Ottoman Mughal Relations During Seventeenth Century, J.I.H., 1963, Calcutta, p. 127.

11 Sidi Ali Reis, Mirat-al Mamalik, Eng. tr. A. Vambery, p.47.

along with the arrival of an embassy from Bahadur Shah of Gujarat who fleeing before the Mughals had sent his family and treasures to Medina consisting of three hundred iron chests." ¹²

Babur did not recognise the Ottoman Sultan as Caliph and he had no direct contact with him. When Humayun succeeded Babur in 1530 during the period of Suri revolt and civil war, a clash developed between his brother Kamran and the Persians over Qandhar. His initial victories alarmed Sulaiman the Magnificent to order several naval expeditions to Gujarat to check the Portuguese on the Arabian Sea and west Coast of India or possibly to reduce not only Gujarat but the whole of India. That under Admiral Sidi Ali Reis, 'Katib-i-Rumi' was disastrously routed. He escaped to Turkey through Mughal India, Central Asia and Persia.¹³ He was the first unofficial Turkish ambassador who came to Delhi indirectly but tactfully claimed for his master sovereignty and supremacy in Darul-Islam. The Ottomans however continued in their efforts to be friendly with Humayun. Sidi Ali Reis, the Turkish Admiral cum poet, received cordial welcome at the court of Humayun and he was escorted by Bairam Khan to the capital.¹⁴ He had left deep

¹² For a detailed study, see E.S. Creasy, op.cit., pp. 287-88.

¹³ Shaikh Abdur Rashid, op.cit., p.127.

¹⁴ Vambery, op.cit., p.47.

impression on the mind of Humayun particularly of his poetry. In Mughal India the tradition of Turkish poetry goes back to 'Ali Sher Nawai' which was imported in India by Babur.¹⁵ In the verses of both Humayun and Bairam Khan, one finds sensitive poetic allusion to the ghazals of Sidi Ali Reis. Even he paid a rich tribute to Indo-Persian poetry by composing verses in Persian in Mira't-ul-Mamalik. Sidi Ali Reis complimented the Indo-Persian school of poetry by composing Persian ghazals in the style of Khusrau.¹⁶ It is quite probable that his voyage was the first channel through which the works of Indo-Persian poets reached the Ottoman Empire and this may explain the familiarity of Naima and others with Indian literary scene.¹⁷

By the time of Sulaiman the Magnificent the Ottomans had already established their religious supremacy over the whole Islamic world. The Turkish Sultan wanted the Mughals to accept his status. This claim was implicit in the statement of Sidi Ali Reis that the emperor of China had given his Muslim subjects the right to include the names of the Ottoman Sultan in the Khutba.¹⁸

¹⁵ Aziz Ahmed, op.cit., p.27.

¹⁶ Vambery, op.cit., pp. 54-55.

¹⁷ Joseph de Hammer, 'Memoir on the diplomatic relations between the Delhi and constantinople in 16th and 17th century, TRAS, II, 1830, pp. 463-64.

¹⁸ Vambery, op.cit., pp. 53-54.

Humayun, without expressing any resentment, admitted that the Sultan was the only person to be called the Padshah,¹⁹ but did not formally acknowledge his supremacy. At the death of Humayun in 1556, Sidi Ali Reis was still in India and it was on his advice that Humayun's death was kept secret till the enthronement of Akbar.

When Akbar his throne insecured like his father Humayun, he also started by going further in positive friendliness towards the Ottomans. He had written a letter to ²⁰ Sulaiman the Magnificent in 1556 and sent it through Sidi Ali Reis in which he addressed the Ottoman Sultan as 'the Khalifa on the earth', no reply, however, came from the Sultan.²¹

Akbar in his early days was under the influence of the 'Ulama', and hence acknowledged with great willingness the religious superiority of the Ottoman Sultan.²² This attitude of Akbar was totally in contrast with his later anti-Ottoman policies²³

19. Jagdish Narayan Sarkar, op.cit., p.205.

20. De Hammer, op.cit., p. 476.

21. Aziz Ahmad, op.cit., p.28.

22. T.W., Aronold, The Caliphate, Oxford, 1924, pp. 146-47.

23. F.W. Buckler, "A New Interpretation of Akbar's Decree of 1579", TRAS, 1924, pp. 590-608.

which were shaped by a number of factors. One of the greatest achievements of Akbar in the realm of military administration is described to the establishment of what is called 'Scientific Frontier' in the North-West. He rejected the previous boundaries of the river Indus and Sulaiman range etc. Instead of river Indus and Sulaiman range he made Hindukush, the frontier of the Mughal Empire in the North-West. Historians as well as Geographers have revealed the strategic importance of Hindukush and Akbar's success could be understood from the fact that no external invasion took place through Hindukush, even the Britishers came through the Western and Eastern coasts. The occupation of Kabul and Qandhar was important for the defence of Hindukush, which he achieved in 1553. The person who made Akbar's task more and more difficult was Abdullah Khan Uzbek of Turan. Akbar was chary of Abdullah Khan's aggressive design of capturing Kabul and Qandhar. He directed all his efforts to guard Kabul. When Akbar occupied Kabul the two giants came face to face with each other. Abdullah Khan Uzbek wanted to ally with Akbar as against the Safawids. The reason was obviously the same sectarian differences. Akbar on the other hand found that the existence of Persian Empire is essential to check the Uzbeks. The Uzbeks and the Ottomans were hand in glove against the Safawids. To him Akbar rejected the Ottoman proposal of tripartite alliance because, as he thought, Safawid's existence was necessary to check the Uzbek threat.

He sent a counter proposal to Abdullah Khan Uzbek to help the Persians against the Ottomans. An attempt made by Abdullah Khan to form a triple alliance against the Persians with the Ottoman. In one of his letters to the Uzbek chief he expresses his intention of driving away the Portuguese from India and of freeing the Holy places evidently from the Ottomans. The Ottoman Sultan seems at first to have regarded the rise of the Mughals with suspicion. This was reinforced in 1588 when reports were received from Ottoman spies in India that Akbar was conspiring with the Portuguese and planning a naval expedition to strike at the ports of Yemen.

As Akbar's power grew he developed an anti-Ottoman bias.²⁴ Declining now to recognize the Sultan as the Caliph he put forward his own claim to the title.²⁵ He never regarded the Ottoman Sultan as the sole champions of the Islamic world. This was best manifested in his Mahzar of 1579. When he tried to assume the position of Imam-i-Adil Padshah-i-Islam and Amirul Monineen,²⁶ and reserved the right of interpreting the Islamic law and issuing a religious 'decree'. The policy of Sulh-e-Kul or 'grand reconciliation' which he pursued from 1580 to 1605 denied

²⁴Bernad Lewis, op. cit., p.6; Abul Fazal, Maktubat, pp. 14-5, 23, 37-39.

²⁵Badauni, Muntakhab-al-Tawarikh, Calcutta 1868, vol.II, p.254.

²⁶ Syed Mahmood, The Khilafat and England, London, 1920, p.54.

any alliance with any religious authority outside the country. Hence we see that without an apparent reason Akbar developed a policy of antipathy towards the Ottomans.

Akbar's successor Jahangir continued this policy. The early years of his reign were characterised by feelings of friendship with Persia and indifference to the Ottoman Empire. In his memoirs Tuzuk-e-Jahangiri, we find that this impression towards the Ottoman was much influenced by his heritage mainly Timur's victory over Bayzid Yildirim.²⁷ The Mughal relation with the Safawids also improved under Jahangir due to his friendship with Shah Abbas I. Sir Thomes Roe suggests that in 1616 Shah Abbas I sent his embassy to obtain financial help from Jahangir for his war against the Ottomans and Jahangir responded liberally to it. The occupation of Qandhar by Shah Abbas I in 1617 which came as a great shock to Jahangir,²⁸ totally altered his policy towards Persia and Turkey. Meanwhile Shah Abbas recaptured Baghdad from the Ottomans. This led the foundation of a new triangular solidarity of the Ottomans, Mughals and Uzeks, all the three directed against Persia.²⁹ This was the first clear reversal of traditional

27 Jahangir, Tuzuk English Translation, Rogers London, 1909, pp. 144-5, 153-4.

28 Aziz Ahmad, op.cit., p.35.

29 Jahangir, Tuzuk, ed. Sayyid Ahmad, Aligarh, 1864, pp. 325-30.

Mughal Policy. Jahangir received a letter from Sultan Murad IV of Turkey advising him to help the Uzbek king Imam Quli Khan against the Persians, announcing his own intention of matching against Persia. This letter which survives in Faridun Bey's Mansh at-e-Salatin, is the first known from an Ottoman Sultan to a Mughal Emperor. But the scheme of the Sunni Triple Alliance (1625,26) against Persia did not materialise on account of Jahangir's death in 1627, and of raid on the Mughal province of Kabul by the Izbek ruler of Balkh, Nazar Muhammad Khan.³⁰

According to Bernad Lewis 'The next report dates from the year 1632 in this year the Ottoman historian Naima tells us, the Mughal prince Baysunkur Mirza³¹ the grandson of Akbar, came to Istanbul' to rub his brow on the Imperial Gate'. He set up house in the suburb of Uskudar. Naima relates at some length how the Mughal family had been massacred by Shah Jahan, and how Baysunkur escaped to Iran. Finding a cold reception there, he continued his Journey to Istanbul, and sought hospitality and help from the Ottoman Sultan Murad IV (1623-40).³² After the death of Jahangir Baysunkur joined Shahryar who had proclaimed himself Emperor

30 Rogers, op.cit., p. 65, 89.

31 Also known as Baisanghar

32 Bernad Lewis, op.cit., p.6.

against heir designate prince Khurram (Shahjahan). The princes were defeated near Lahore. Baysunkur fled to Badakshan, and according to Lazwini died there; but an unknown person assumed his name and went to Turkey via Balkh, Persia and Baghdad. He ultimately returned to Thatta where the governor Daulat Khan recognised the 'imposter'. He arrested and sent him to the court where he was ordered to be put to death in 1636.³³ According to English Factory records (May 13, 1631) it was rumoured that the prince intended invading India with the help of the Ottomans.³⁴ According to the Ottoman accounts Baysunkur having been coldly received in Persia after his flight from India, appeared at constantinople before Sultan Murad IV in 1632. The Mughal prince seems to have had bad impression at the Turkish court Naima describes him as boastful arrogant and discourteous.³⁵ His lack of manners and general haughtiness displeased the Sultan, when he was given a sum of money for his expenses which he distributed immediately amongst the attendants at court. As a result of these acts of discourtesy to the great annoyance of the Sultan. He was "always

33 Abdul Hamid Lahori, *Badshahnama*, Calcutta, 1867, vol.I, Book II, p.206.

34 English Factories in India (1630-33), p.160.

35 Bernad Lewis, op.cit., p.6.

followed", Naima writes, "by a servant who carried the hide of a hart and spread his master to sit upon. This stupid and uncouth behaviour was the cause that the Sultan had no desire what ever to see any more of him.³⁶ However he went and demanding an army from the Sultan, to win him the throne of India the Sultan was not interested, because his relations with Shah Jahan were good and the Mughal emperor had already sent him two embassies with gifts and protestations of friendship. Eventually Baysunkun gave up hope of wining Turkish support and left the country and some say he became a darvish.

The military objective of Shah Jahan which included the recapture of Qandhar and subjugation of Shi'ite state in Dacan made a clash with the Safawids inevitable. On the other hand the persians were at war with the Ottomans. So Shah Jahan started thinking in terms of entering into same kind of alliance to which his father had switched towards the end of his reign. But the sinister movements of the ruler of Transoxiana Nazar Muhammad towards Kabul the victory of Shah Safi at Erivan in 1637 by Persian governer Ali Mardan Khan who was later on given the governship

36 Hammer, op.cit., p.463.

of Kashmir³⁷ by Shah Jahan, amended Shah Jahan's calculations. But before the surrender of Qandhar Shah Jahan received the intelligence of a large scale military preparations by the Safawids he got alarmed. In 1638 he sent his first embassy to the Ottoman Empire under Mir Zarif³⁸ Isphani an expert dealer in horses 'had been sent to Persia for the purpose of horses. The horses that he brought for the royal stables were not liked by the Emperor and he felt out of favour. He was anxious to be restored to favour and requested permission to go to Arabia and Turkey to purchase horses. Afzal Khan was instructed to draft a letter to the Sultan and another to the Grand vizir of Sultan Murad IV and despatched it through Mir Zarif. The purpose of this embassy was proclaimed to purchase horses presumably to relate the suspicious of Shah Safi and the Persian noble in the Mughal Court.³⁹ According to Bernad Lewis the ambassador brought sumptuous gifts, including a girdle worth 15,000 piasters, and shield of elephant ear and rhinoceros' hide, the letter he brought was less gartifying, Shah Jahan urged on Murad the need for a close alliance

37 Abdul Hamid Lahori, Badshahnama, Calcutta, 1867, vol. II, pp. 21-24, 126.

38 Shah Nawaz Khan, Mathir-ul-Umara' III, p.92.b.

39 Aziz Ahmad, op.cit., p.37.

between the two Sunni emperors against the Shia heretics in Iran but in such terms as to reproach the Ottoman Sultan for dilatoriness and lack of zeal.⁴⁰ But the letter which Mir Zarif carried to Murad IV contained the same old story of an alliance against Persia. The proposal suggested a coordinated invasion of Persia by the Ottomans, Mughals and the Uzbeks. The title which Shah Jahan used for Murad IV⁴¹ in the letter liked "Khaqan of the Muslim Kings" etc. were politically motivated because Murad's answers to Shah Jahan offended him. Unfortunately, the text of this letter has so far not been traced. It is also said that Murad IV had objected to Shah Jahan's title while he was in fact only the ruler of India, which brought displeasure to Shah Jahan. This Ottoman reply was taken to India by an ambassador called Arsalan Aqa. In 1642 he returned to Constantinople bringing unmistakable indication of Shah Jahan's displeasure. No letter was sent by Shah Jahan to Sultan Ibrahim (1640-48) who had meanwhile succeeded Murad IV on the Ottoman throne. However, one finds that the attitude of the Ottoman Sultan Ibrahim towards Shah Jahan remained cold and indifferent, especially after Shah Jahan's campaign of Balkh and Badakhsan. Shah Jahan lost

40 Bernad Lewis, op.cit., p.7

41 Faridun Bey, Munshaat-e-Salatin, vol.II, pp. 57-69.

Qandhar in 1649 and find the Safawid Shah Abbas II, King Abdul Aziz coming together when the later sought the formers help in his quarrel with Uzbek rivals in Khawarizm.⁴² In lieu of this the Uzbek Khan refused an alliance with the Mughals against Persia, though in later diplomatic correspondence Shah Jahan continued to show his regard for the Ottoman Sultans. Some scholars have attributed this to the religious zeal of Shah Jahan.

The next Turkish envoy named Sayyid Mohi-uddin was sent in 1649 to the court of Shah Jahan. He was sent with a letter to the Mughal emperor on 16th May 1649 to notify the accession of Muhammad IV and to seek support for Nazar Mohammad and bring out a reconciliation between him and his son Abdul Aziz Sayyid. Mohiuddin's arrival in 1650 at Surat was reported to the Mughal emperor, and elaborate arrangements were made to recieve him and conduct him to the capital. He was allowed to return in November 1651.

It was not until 1652 that a new Mughal ambassador, called Sayyid Ahmad⁴³ (Mir-i-Adl) arrived in Constantinople. He was sent to Constantinople with the Ottoman ambassador Sayyid Mohiuddin

42 Aziz Ahmad, op.cit., p.40.

43 Padshanama Manuscript in Allahabad University Library, p.201 b.

The letter which he had carried was in reply to the letter sent, by the sutlan to Shah Jahan and the latter informed him that the matter relating to Nazar Muhammad had been taken care of him. The Mughal ambassador Sayyid Ahmad Nalima describes about as man of "learning charm and wit", and remarks that no ambassador had ever been received with such attention and honour.⁴⁴ The ambassador was feted and entertained and given rich presents to take home with him.⁴⁵ The another Turkish ambassador Zulfiqar Agha came as head of the return embassy to the court of the Mughal emperor. He reached Surat in December 1653. He was received in audience in March 1654. Orders were issued to local officers to accompany the ambassador to the capital. He was received by Prince Sulaiman Shukoh and Jahan Ara Begum. The Turkish Sultan referred to the complaints he had received from Nazar Mohammad Khan but expressed satisfaction with Shah Jahan's subsequent conduct. Shah Jahan felt offended at the patronising tone of Sultan Muhammad's letter.⁴⁶ He gave an indication of this in the letter which he sent through Qaim Beg⁴⁷ in August 1654.⁴⁸

44 Abdur Rashid, op.cit., p.132.

45 Bernad Lewis, op. cit., p.8.

46 Banarsi Parasad "Shah Jahan" Allahabad, 1932, p.301

47 Muhammad Waris, Badshahnama, p.276.

48 Ibid., pp. 485-6.

He was the last envoy to be sent to Constantinople by Shah Jahan. The value of presents sent is calculated by Waris at ten lakhs of rupees while the present and entertainment money given to Zulfiqar Agha cost the Mughals another 2,75,000.⁴⁹ Zulfiqar Agha died on the way back home near Jiddah.

According to the Ottoman sources prince Dara Shukoh had sent a letter to the Turkish Grand vizir through one Mulla Shakir. There is no reference to any such letter in the numerous histories written in India during this period.

In the words of Bernad Lewis on the return of Qaim Beg a person was appointed with him named Manzade Husain. He was one of the chief Chamberlains of the Ottoman court and it seem a man of some distinction. He returned to Turkey in 1659. Unfortunately his report on India, was not available though some allusions to it appear in the Naima's history. He was received in India by Murad Baksh who accepted his letter and gifts and replied to them as sovereign.⁵⁰

After the death of Shah Jahan diplomatic contacts between the Ottoman sultan and the Mughal emperors became less frequent

49 ibid., p.277.

50 Bernad Lewis, op.cit., p.8.

and more casual and formal. Both the empires were faced with serious domestic problems.

The relation of Aurangzeb with other Muslim rulers outside India were correct and friendly. In 1665 there came ambassadors from the Sherif of Mecca, Turkish governor of Yemen and Basrah.⁵¹ In 1661 Husain Pasha the Turkish governor of Basrah had sent a letter congratulations on his accession and a gift of horses. Latters in disgrace at the Ottoman court he took refuge in India and joined Aurangzeb's service, as did also his successor designate to the governorship of Basrah, Yahya Pasha.⁵² Diplomatic relations were none existent between the Mughal Empire and the Ottoman Empire for 32 years during Aurangzeb's reign. In 1690 after the defeat of Qara Pasha at Vienna, when the Ottoman Empire was in distress the Ottoman Sultan Sulaiman II (1687-91) had sent a letter by Ahmad Aqa to the Mughal Empire to seek Aurangzeb's aid.⁵³ The summary of the letter has been given by Riazul Islam which deserves to be quoted at length:

51 Saqi Mustaid Khan, Maathir-i-Alamgiri, Eng. tra. J. Sarkar, Calcutta, 1947.

52 Ibid., pp. 20-22.

53 Ibid., p.203.

"Lengthy opening, bearing on the nature and purpose of monarchy. Says it is ordained by Quranic injunction and affirmed by the traditions of the Holy Prophet that every realm in every period of history should have a ruler. The Prophet himself was a ruler. He was followed by the four pious Caliphs. Expresses cordial friendship for "Shah Aurangzeb 'Alamgir" (name preceded by seven lines of compliments) and enquires after his welfare.

The exalted duty of looking after the two holy cities (Haramain-i Sharifain = Mecca and Medina) has been assigned to the Ottoman Sultan. The various Christian powers have combined to desolate the lands of Islam and to oppress the Muslim who have turned to God for help. Alludes to and briefly cites the Quranic verse meaning that God exalts those who undertake Jihad, over those who abstain from it.

In keeping with the well-known royal practice of strengthening relations through correspondence, the writer is sending this letter by the hand of (two-word space left blank for name) from the capital Qustantiniyya (Constantinople). Expects that the Padshah, with the blessing of the 'Ulama' and the Masha'ikh and out of regard for the claims of Din-i-Ahmadi and its Shari'at, will (exert to) attain the rewards of Jihad (text: na'il-i ajr-i jihad). The identity of religion and community between them requires uninterrupted correspondence. Requests early conge for the bearer of the letter. (written in) the year 100 (i.e. A.H. 1100)".⁵⁴

But the Ottoman ambassador Ahmad Aga was received coldly because the Ottoman negligence in not sending an embassy to

⁵⁴ Riazul Islam, Calendar of Documents on Indo-Persian Relation, V.II, Karachi, 1982, pp. 339-340.

Aurangzeb until 32 years of his reign. Again, as Persia was weak there was no necessity of renewing Turko-Mughal alliance.⁵⁵

The Ottoman historical records of the eighteenth century contain a few allusions to diplomatic exchanges between the courts of Delhi and Constantinople. Conditions in the sub-continent were chaotic and the Ottoman Empire was in retreat in Europe when a Mughal embassy arrived in Constantinople in 1717. Apart from the usual details about the gifts, no information is given by the Imperial historiographer Rashid.⁵⁶ The Imperial historiographer Izzi tells us that the Mughal emperor and the Ottoman Sultan had long been friends. In 1744 Muhammad Shah (1719-48) the powerless Mughal emperor of Delhi had sent an ambassador called Sayyid Ataullah Bukhari to the Ottoman Sultan Mahmud warning him against the tactics of Nadir Shah, and proposing a common alliance against him. Though he might for the moment seek Turkish friendship, his intention against Turkey were no less hostile than against Mughal India. The letter says:

"Says he had earlier received through Sayyid' Ataullah b. Atai Husaini a letter from Sultan Ahmad Khan (III, d.1730), congratulating him (Muhammad Shah) on his

55 J.N. Sarkar, op.cit., p.135. Bernad Lewis, op.cit., p.8, Aziz Ahmad, op.cit., p.44.

56 Bernad Lewis, op.cit., p.8, Aziz Ahmad, op.cit., p.44.

his accession. Expresses pleasure on the accession of the Sultan (Mahmud Khan I). The envoy Sayyid' Ataullah is therefore being sent again. Requests maintenance of cordial relations and the keeping up of correspondence".⁵⁷

The letter of Muhammad Shah contained nothing apart from the subject of renovation of the old ties of accord. But the letter of India minister (Wukula-i Hindiya) and the Muluk-i-Majusya spoke of the need of revenge on Nadir Shah and of Liberating the provinces grabbed by him. The taqrir of Syiid Ataullah also contained a plea to Sultan not to make peace with Nadir Shah. The Summary of the Sayyid Ataullah's taqrir is given below:

"In the month of Safar of the Hijri year 1154/April 1741, Tahm's Quli Nadir Shah Afshar sent an envoy to India with the object of purchasing as many ships as possible, one hundred, two hundred or even more. The cost of these ships was to be paid from the treasury of the province of Sind which though part of the Indian empire, is at present under Persian occupation. Accordingly eight large ship were purchased and despatched to Bandar' Abbas. Soon, however, it transpired that Tahmas Quli was planning an invasion of the Ottoman empire and that these ships were being acquired for that purpose. When we

57 Raizul Islam, C.D.I.P.R., op.cit., p.346.

came to know of this we stopped all further supply of ships to Tahmas Quli we wrote that no further ships were available and we thus put him off.

When, in the course of crossing the Persian Gulf, we reached the Port Bushahr and men from Bushahr Boarded our ship, they told us that 500 skilled carpenters were working day and night to build large ships.

In the year 1155 when Tahmas Quli was fighting against the Lequis and besieging them, a trustworthy spy brought to the Mughal government the following report of Tahmas Quli's plans : Tahmas Quli says he would invade the Ottoman empire in 1154 (or 1159, doubtful reading). If he succeeded, he would stay there and keep himself informed of the affairs of the seven realms. If he fails to conquer the Ottomans, he would make a feigned peace with them. Then, after making effective arrangements for the security and defence of the frontiers of Iran, he would swiftly march into India, and collect the ships from all the ports from Bengal to Lahari Bandar which marks the limit of the province of Sind. After collecting artillery, soldiers and all military equipment and supplies and putting them on board the ships, he would sail across the Persian Gulf to the Suezport. Then he would capture the cities of Mecca and Medina and the countries of Egypt, Syria etc. some of the ships laden with military equipment he will send by the way of Persian Gulf for the seizure of the port of Basra.

Sayyid' Ataulлах concluded his speech thus: What I had been appointed to say, I have said. And it all comes to this: the Islamic Ottoman empire will be well-advised to refrain from making peace with Tahmas Quli. For one cannot depend on the treaties made by him. He made peace with the people of Hindustan but went back on his pledge." 58

In a report presented by the ambassador himself to the Ottoman authorities, he gives specific evidence of Nadir Shah's hostility and of India's goodwill. Thus for instance, Nadir Shah had sent a mission to India by ships, but when it was learnt that they were for use against Turkey their sale was prohibited.⁵⁹ Now Nadir Shah was trying to make peace with the Ottomans. If they agreed to this, he would turn against India. The Ottomans should not therefore be taken in by Nadir Shah's deceitful peace proposal, but should continue the war.

The Sultan's return embassy was led by Salim Muhammad Efendi an official of the department of finance. The contents of the letter indicate that the attachment of Sultan Mahmud for considerable importance to this correspondence. It further expressed that general agreement and promises to take all possible precautions. The summary of this letter is as follows:

Summary (based on the Persian text): "Respectfully submits that he was greatly honoured to receive the Sultan's message (irshadat) vouchsafed to Muhammad Sali Efendi who died on the way, and which (message) was orally communicated to the writer (mu'taqid-i rasikh ul-i tiqad = orthodox adherent) by Yusuf Agha. The news of Ottoman victories (over the Persians?) was received with great jubilation. May the Sultan's sanguinary sword (saif-i khun ashām) be ever upon the throats of the enemies. What the Sultan has, in consultation with the 'Ulama', averred regarding the opponents of

59 Bernade Lewis, op.cit., p.9.

faith and state, is (true like) divine inspiration and indubitable revelation (ilham-i ghaibi wa wahi-i la-raibi). The Sultan's utterances on certain matters have been received. Asseveraters that he has been in every way loyal and faithful to the Emperor Muhammad Shah. Now that he has received the Sultan's command (amr-i wahi mithal= order as binding as the divine revelation), he (Nizam ul-mulk) will strive all the more assiduously in the loyal service of the Emperor.

Certain special message have been entrusted only to Haji Yusuf and Sayyid 'Ataullah. They will deliver these to the Sultan after reaching his honoured threshold."⁶⁰

The bearer of this letter travelled by way of Jiddah and he reached India but died before arriving at Delhi. Al-Hajj Yusuf Agha assumed charge of the embassy and of royal letter and other official papers. The royal letter had been directly presented to Muhammad Shah by Turkish new ambassador Haji Yusuf Agha and also communicated him the oral message in accordance with the last instruction of the deceased (Salim Efendi). He was entrusted with a title and a present for the Sultan of Turkey from Mughal Emperor and a letter also from Nizam-ul-Mulk (Asaf Jah) of Mughal India. After performing his diplomatic duties he returned back and arrived at Constantinople in March 1749 or 1750.⁶¹ At the same time the Turks suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of Nadir Shah in 1747. In fact, the war continued until 1747.

60 Riazul Islam, op.cit., No. Ott. 409, pp. 356-357.

61 Riyazul Islam, op.cit., p. 355.

In this period the Persians looked at the Indian Muslims with same contempt and their view point is reflected in the memoirs of the poet Shaiykh Ali Hazin.⁶²

According to Nam-e deftri Haji Yusuf Agha brought four letters to Sultan Mahmud : one from Muhammad Shah, two from Nizam-ul-Mulk Asaf Jah and One from Nizam-ul-Mulk's son Nizam ul-Daula Nasir Jang. The letter of Niza-ul Mulk expressed that he was greatly honoured to receive the Sultan's message which was orally communicated by Haji Yusuf Agha.⁶³ Apart from these letters some letters also came from Turkey which had been written by Haji Yusuf Muhammad Efendi to Mughal Emperor Ahmad Shah and Nizam ul Daula Nasir Jang Bahadur. A letter was addressed to Indian Emperor Ahmad Shah which was condolatory letter.⁶⁴ A Arzdasht was sent by Haji Muhammad Yusuf Efendi to Nawab Asaf Jah in 1748. In this letter he describes about the problem of Zar-i Mutaqallaba (converted money). The summary of the letter is as follows :

"This humble writer's men who travelled to the capital (Delhi) with Nawwab Asaf Jah's letter, for the purpose of settling the matter of zar-i-mutaqallaba (converted money?) of 'Abdullah Armani, found on arrival that the Wazir ul-Mamalik (Qamar ud-din Khan) had proceeded to Lahore along with the Padshahzada (Prince Ahmad). Hashmatullah Khan then

62 Aziz Ahmad, op.cit, p.5 Cf. Shaiykh Ali Hzim, Tarikh-i Ahwal ba Tadhkira-i Hal, ed. F.C. Balfour, London, 1831, p.257.

63 See Appendix C .

64 See Appendix B .

despatched the Nawwab's letter by (fast) camel-riders to the Wazir ul-mamalik. The letter, as desired in the Nawwab's letter, issued raqams to 'Imad ul-mulk and to his (i.e. Qamar uddin Khan's) own eldest to investigate the correct position. The mutaqallib (money changer), seeing the Wazir ul-mamalik's interest in the matter, had the case put up to the Emperor through the influence of Rozafzun Khan. The Emperor ordered 'Abd-ul--Majid Khan to have the matter decided according to the Shari'at (that is, by Qadi), and if the envoy's entitlement was proved, to pay his dues from the imperial treasury. The case was handed over to the Qadi who investigated it, and on the evidence of good witnesses, gave a verdict in the writer's favour and decreed that either the mutaqallib should account for the mutaqallaba money or should seek the Haji's pleasure. In the meanwhile news arrived of the Wazir ul-mamalik's sad demise, and the enforcement of the decree was deferred. Of the writer's men who had gone to Shah Jahanabad (Delhi), two proceeded to Burhanpur to give a report of the matter to the Nawwab (the addressee). Requests that in accordance with the instructions of the late Wazir ul-mamalik, the amount in question be held as an amanat (a trust) till the mahdar is received. Further requests the Nawwab to letters to 'Imad ul-Mulk and Sayyid Hashmatullah Khan affirming that the last named has been lawfully appointed as the writer's attorney. When the money in question has been received through legal processes, it should be sent to the writer at Surat through a hundwi (i.e. hundi, a bill of exchange). Urges the Nawwab not to lend ears to the lies of the mutaqallib⁶⁵ and his supporter Rozafzun Khan.⁶⁶

65 Mutaqqalib means one who is dexterous in business. In the above letter and in subsequent letters, mutaqallib could signify a swindler and zar-i mutaqallaba swindled money. However, the repeated use of the two words indicates these were terms with a special connotation. The context of the correspondence suggests that mutaqallib was a money-changer and zar-i mutaqallaba converted money. For the ubiquitous money-changer in the Mughal empire, see A.K.M. Farooque, Roads and Communications in Mughal India, Delhi, 1977, p. 156, et seq.

66 Riazul Islam, Op.cit., pp. 370-371.

Bernade Lewis quoting the biography of Muhammad Emin Pasha, who became grand Wazir in 1769, was a son of a former ambassador (Yusuf Agha) who came to India in the reign of Muhammad Shah. Muhammad Emin Pasha himself had accompanied his father on this mission. The Ottoman sources contain a number of passing allusions to some other missions which are not included in the imperial records of history.

On the basis of whatever material is available in India on this topic, we reach the conclusion that from sixteenth to eighteenth century both the Ottoman and Mughal empires were the greatest powers of the Muslim world. The rulers of these empires were the sunni Muslims. However, they were too remote to interact one another very much, either as allies or as rivals. It was necessary for the Ottomans to had their eyes fixed on **Europe** due to some reasons. First, it was an area of expansion; secondly, it was also an area of danger for the Ottomans. So in this prevailing conditions the principle concern of the Ottoman sultans was to protect themselves against Europe.

On the other hand, the Mughals were preoccupied with Indian affairs with so many problems of their vast empire. There was only one thing which brought them together, that is the

common threat offered to the Ottoman Empire as well as to the Mughal Empire by the Shi'ite Safawid Empire of Persia. It was the time when the Ottomans were fighting near Baghdad and the Mughals were fighting near Qandhar. The rulers of both the empires had turned their attention towards the four sides of their enemies' territory and started to exchange their embassies by sea routes.

CHAPTER - II

OTTOMAN RELATIONS WITH THE STATES OF
MYSORE AND HYDERABAD

Towards the close of the seventeenth century disintegration of the Mughal Empire set in. Consequently a number of independent states emerged during this time; Kabul was occupied by Nadir Shah in 1739, Punjab came under the possession of Ahmad Shah Abdali in 1754. The provinces of Bengal and Orissa too became independent under Aliwerdi Khan in 1758, while Gujarat and Sindh cut themselves off from the Mughal Empire in 1750, Sa'adat Khan an immigrant from Khorasan established himself in Awadh. His successors ruled over Awadh (modern Uttar Pradesh) until 1848. In the South, Mysore also emerged as an autonomous independent state in the wake of declining Mughal Empire. It situated in the south India at the junction of Eastern and Western Ghats. Haider Ali and his son Tipu Sultan made Mysore a powerful centre in the second half of the eighteenth century, whereas Asaf Jah had established independent Nizamat. However, it was Mysore which looked for legitimizing its rule. The political conditions in South India in eighteenth century as follows:

Haider Ali Khan was a soldier of fortune, born in 1721. Within a short period he made himself the most powerful man in

Mysore. After sometimes he had become the most formidable power of south India only due to his foresightedness, ability as well as Judicious use of his great military capacity. The British who were not so unwilling to the possibilities of establishing their power in India as is generally made out of by some historians saw Haider Ali to be the greatest obstacle in the achievement of their ambition.¹ At the time of Hayder Ali's death his enemies conveniently believed that his new built empire would cease to be a dominant factor in south Indian politics. The natural anxiety at the death of a military commander and ruler like Hayder Ali was exaggerated by the British informants. For example Murad Ali, an amaldar wrote to Major Genetal Stuart:

The companions of the Naik are gone off to Tipu to say, collect your scattered forces and colar and despatch a person with a letter of peace to the Heads of English army and if the Nawab Walajah desires any thing as a recompense for the destruction of his Kingdom, settle matters by agreement and live contented in your Kingdom'? It is possible that some weak hearts advised Tipu to seek terms, but the army seems to have unbounded confidence in hir. Fath Muhammad, a British sepoy, who had been able to visit the Mysore camp, reported that "he could perceive that the army in general had the highest opinion of Tippoo's humanity and abilities to command them and were highly confident that they would succeed while he remained at their head".²

1 Sir Alfrad Layall, The Rise and Expansion of the British Domination in India, 1919, p.19.

2 Intelligence Received 18th December, 1782; I.H. Qureshi 'The Purpose of Tipu Sultan's Embassv to Constantinople' J.I.H., XXIV, 1945, pp. 78-79.

This confidence reposed by the army in the capacity of Tipu was justified by later events, which very soon showed that he was a worthy successor of his father and could fulfil the role of an ambitious ruler. It was the open ambition of Haider Ali as well as Tipu to be the over-lord of all the area south of the river Kistna. This brought them into conflict with Nawab Walajah; the ruler of Arcot. There was nothing in the conditions of eighteenth century India to damp these ambitions. The anarchy brought about by the rise of the Marathas and the weakening of the Mughal Empire had made it possible for new dynasties to establish and extend their power. Hayder Ali and Tipu were both men of deep acumen and possessed a sound political instinct. Apart from this they soon came to foresee that if the Indian powers did not unite against the British, the whole of South India would pass into British hands. Nizam Ali Khan of Hyderabad was also enjoined with British and he wanted to invade Hayder Ali's dominion and to partition his territories. The Nizam felt justified in planning the destruction of Hayder Ali because he considered Hayder Ali to be a mere usurper with no right to his territories. But Tipu ended this fiction of his dependence on the Hindu Raja of Mysore which made his legal title even weaker. According to the legal ideas of the day every Indian ruler had acknowledged the supremacy of the House of Timur. This in itself would be quite acceptable to Tipu, but as matters stood, he could get recognition

only as a subirdinate either of the Walajah or the Nizam. Both the Nizam and the Walajah were dependent on the English who were by no means friendly to Tipu.

In the given political condition when Tipu failed to get recognition from the Nawab of Arcot and the Mughals he turned his attention towards Sultan Caliph of Turkey. The usual practice of obtaining legitimacy was to seek recognition from the Ottoman Caliph, who were regarded as the Centre of religious and political authority in the entire Muslim world. Since he was not able to secure recognition in India he tried to secure it abroad. He corresponded with Zaman Shah, the ruler of Afghanistan and Karim Khan Zhand of Iran. Both of these rulers addressed him as a brother monarch.³ He was also in correspondence with the French rulers to strengthen the bonds of friendship with France.⁴ The french were his natural allies against the English and whose friendship would have given him an international status. Similarly, he corresponded with the Sultan of Turkey with a similar end in view. He gained this object because we find the Sultan of Turkey addressing him as an independent ruler.⁵

3 Zaman Shah's letter to Tipu Sultan and Tipu Sultan's letter to Karim Khan Zhand included in Tarikh-i-Sultanat-i-Khudadad, (Mysore), pp. 554-558.

4 I.H. Lureshi, op.cit., p.83.

5 Mahmud Banglari, Tarikh-e-Sultanat-i-Khudadad, (Mysore), Lahore 1945, pp. 549-552.

Syed (Sayyid) Mahmud the author of Khilafat and England writes that "the Islamic civilization is a theocracy and the Khalifa is its earthly head, whether, he be an Arab or non-Arab. Whether his seat of power is at Madina, Baghdad or Constantinople".⁶ A Muslim ruler's position was considered legitimate and lawful only after his title of Kingship was confirmed by the Sultan Caliph of Turkey. Keeping with this factor in his mind first of all Tipu sent Osman Khan to Constantinople to find out whether an embassy to the Ottoman Government would be fruitful.⁷ Tipu had started a correspondence with the Sultan of Turkey and was trying to annex Bijapur to his territories. He had struck coins, both rupees and gold mohurs, with the figure of an elephant on one side of them, and his name on the other. He wrote to Nawab Nizam Ali Khan that he was the master of the whole country on 'this' side of the Kistna and that the territories on the other side belonged to the Nawab.⁸

After receiving a positive response, he had decided to depute Ghulam Ali Khan, Nurullah Khan, Lutf Ali Khan and Jafar Khan

6 Syed Mahmud, The Khilafat and England, Fatna, 1921, p.6.

7 Mohibul Hasan, History of Tipu Sultan, Calcutta, 1971, p.128.

8 Calender of Persian Correspondence, May 29, 1784, 1118:- News from Ellore, p.355, Delhi, 1938.

with Sayyid Jafar and Khawaja Abdul Qadir as secretaries, to proceed to Constantinople.⁹ Tipu asked them to proceed to Paris from Constantinople and then to London to advise the kings of France and England to keep them separate from the Maratha Mysore War.¹⁰ After sometime they were called back from the Constantinople and they could not fulfil this part of their mission.

Therefore, with the objective of securing a diploma from the Caliph Tipu sent an embassy to Constantinople in 1786. However, this was not the sole objective. He had several other objectives. Earlier Tipu had made attempts to secure political recognition from the Mughal Emperor Shah Alam. But this attempt was unsuccessful. He had tried to secure recognition as a ruler of Mysore from the neighbouring state as well. Commenting on the historical background of such a recognition Mohibbul Hasan writes that:

"The idea of securing an investiture from the Caliph was no innovation on the part of Tipu. With the exception of Mughal Emperors who regarded themselves as Caliphs in their kingdom in their own right, a number of Muslim rulers of India had secured

⁹ Mark Wilk, South Indian History, vol. IV, Delhi, 1980, p.361. Cf. M. Sharma Rao, Modern Mysore, Banglor, 1936, p.139.

¹⁰ National Archives, Secret Proceedings, Jan.5, 1787, No.3.

confirmation of their title to the throne from the then ruling Caliphs. Thus Iltutmush and Mahmud of Ghazni had obtained their investiture from the Abbasid Caliphs of Baghdad while Muhammad bin Tughlaq, Firoz Shah Tughlaq and Mahmud of Malwa had secured it from the Abbasid Caliphs of Egypt. Now that the Caliphate had become vested in the Ottoman dynasty, Tipu wanted to obtain his investiture from the Ottoman ruler in order to legalise his status which appeared to anomalous".¹¹

In the prevailing political conditions of the eighteenth century Tipu sought to obtain an investiture from the Ottoman ruler in order to legalise his rule in Mysore. In view of the fact the Nizam, the Nawab of Carnatic and the Maratha possessed legal titles to their territories, Hayder Ali, Tipu's father, had enjoyed legal position as a dalavayi of the Raja of Mysore and had procured through the good offices of Basalat Jung, the Government or Suba of Sira from the Mughal Emperor,¹² whereas Tipu had dethroned the ruler of Mysore. Therefore, without a proper recognition his position would have been that of an usurper. For this reason Tipu sought to legitimise his position in Mysore. Thereupon he decided to send envoy to the Caliph and secure confirmation of his position as an independent ruler.

11 Mohibbul Hasan, op.cit., p.128.

12 Ibid., p.128.

In the given political condition when Tipu failed to get recognition from the Nawab of Arcot and the Mughals he turned his attention towards the Caliph. Seeking of recognition from the Caliph had precedence when in the early sixteenth century the ruler of Gujarat had acknowledged the Caliph.¹³ Shah Waliullah of the eighteenth century however claimed that the Muslims of India had all along recognized the Sultan of Turkey as their Caliph.¹⁴ This was however disputed by a number of scholars.¹⁵ According to I.H. Qureshi it is true that Tipu Sultan had the intention of establishing trade relations with the Ottoman Empire, but this objective could not only secondary as he did not persist in this attempt. Besides a man of his acumen could not be ignorant of the fact that it was useless to establish factories in Turkey without merchantships and effective naval power to guard them. Nor could he have ignored the certainty of an impending conflict with the British who enjoyed supremacy in Indian and Turkish water.¹⁶

On the basis of following points we can observe the real objective of Tipu's Triumph to establish relations with Turkey:

13 Syed Mahmud: op.cit., p.50.

14 Ibid., p.50.

15 As far example Sayyid Ahmed Khan, 1886.

16 I.H. Qureshi, op. cit., p.77.

- (1) If Turkey and Iran are provided ports in India, in lieu of this they will also provide ports for Mysore on the shores of their countries. Then the navigational routes of the Muslim ships and the ports will not have the chance to be occupied by the western nations.
- (2) Since ancient times India's trade was carried out through land route and by this trade the Islamic countries and the Muslims prospered themselves. After the discovery of the Cape of Good Hope route, the Europeans had taken over this trade. Therefore, Tipu Sultan in order to recapture this trade proposed a short sea route direct from India to Turkey via Basrah which was shorter and easier than the Cape of Good Hope route.¹⁷ Apart from this trade, there was also another motive which was the security of the trade of the Muslim countries and will strengthen their naval power which did not exist at all till that age.
- (3) The Muslims were not much interested in trade and commerce which had made them superior in all over the world. Therefore Tipu wanted to provide factories not only in his dominion but all over the Muslim countries to divert the attention of Muslims towards trade and commerce.

17 See Map. p. 101

- (4) To expel the Britishers from India Tipu sought for military help from Turkey.

The embassy sent by Tipu was composed of 900 personnel and was led by Ghulam Ali Khan an important trusted officer of Tipu Sultan. Also included in it were some of eminent courtiers and secretaries of the Sultan like Nurullah Khan, Lutf Ali Khan, Sayyid Jafar, Jafar Khan and Khawaja Abdul Qadir. Besides these, there were a number of traders and a large encourage of staff. This delegation carried considerable quantities of cloth, sandal wood products, spices, gold and silver coins, local garments and jewellery to offer them as gifts to high officials and nobles etc. as well as to meet the expenses of the embassy. It also carried four elephants of which one each was to be presented to the Ottoman Sultan, King of France and King of England respectively and the remaining one was to be sold to realise the expenses of the journey. Some of these articles were taken for the publicity of the products of Mysore Kingdom were to be sold at the various ports of call. Thus the twin objective of this embassy was apart from seeking the recognition from the Caliph. Tipu utilized the opportunity to establish commercial and trade relations with other Muslim countries.

The embassy left Srirangapatam for Constantinople on 17th November, 1785. It sailed from Tadri, a small port on Malabar coast, on Wednesday, 9th March 1786. The embassy consisted of four ships namely Churab-e-Surati, Fakhrul Marakib, Futh-e-Shahi Muazi and Nabi Baksh.¹⁷

The editor of Waqai' Manazel-i-Rum describes the objectives of Tipu's embassy in the first place to establish commercial relations with the Ottoman Empire "Manesty", the English agent at Basrah reported

"is to obtain firmans to establish factories in Turkish dominions for selling the produce of his Kingdom."

He further wrote to the Court of Directors on 5th September, 1786:

"The Wakil want to obtain firmans to establish factories in Turkish dominions for selling the produce of his kingdom. We think this is a circumstances very material for the Honourable Court of Directors to be acquainted with, as we apprehend it precludes all hopes of your servants at Tellicherry being able to provide pepper for your homeward ships".¹⁸

17 Khawaja Abdul Qadir, Waqai-i-Manazel-i-Rum; ed., Mohibbul Hasan, Delhi, 1968, p.25.

18 Waqai-i-Manazil-i-Rum - see introduction

In the second place his objective was to secure confirmation of his title to the throne of Mysore from the Caliph. This was necessary because Tipu had failed to secure an investiture from the Mughal Emperor and was generally regarded an usurper. The third main objective of the embassy was to obtain military assistance from the Ottoman Sultan against the English who were Tipu's most formidable enemies. In addition to achieving these objects the ambassadors had been instructed to land at Masqat in order to strengthen the trade and friendly relations which already existed with Oman and in their way up the Persian Gulf, to touch Bushire and obtain commercial concessions from the Shah of Persia.¹⁹

According to Professor Mohibbul Hasan, Ghulam Ali Khan, the leader of the embassy was instructed to enter into a treaty with the Ottoman Government on the following conditions: First, the Mysore and Ottoman Governments should always remain on friendly terms with each other. Secondly, the Ottoman Government should send troops to Mysore and its expenses would be borne by Tipu and would be sent back to Constantinople at his expense, whenever, they would be required by the Caliph. Thirdly, the Caliph should send Tipu technicians who should be able to make muskets, guns, glass, chinaware and other things. In return Tipu would send such

19 Ibid., p.1.

workmen as were available in his dominions and required by the Caliph. And lastly, Tipu should be given trade facilities in the Ottoman empire. In return he would give similar facilities and privileges to the Ottoman Government in Mysore Kingdom. Tipu, in addition, proposed that he should be given facilities at the port of Basrah and in return he would present to the same facilities at the port of Mangalore.²⁰

The envoys left Indian shore for Constantinople enroute Masqat and Basrah. The sea was however not favourable for them. Soon after, they left Tadri port on the Malabar coast on the night of 9th March 1786, their ships were caught by a big storm. The caravan suffered heavy losses of life and property. One of the ships was badly damaged and hundreds of people died. Although the precise number of casualties is not known but it could be guessed that when the embassy reached Basrah the number of personnels on board was reduced to 400. An account of this is given in Waqai-i-Manazel-i-Rum in the following words:

"On leaving Tadri, the ships headed straight for the Arabian coast. On 15th March the sea became very stormy, and the Fakhrul-Marakib, which had Ghulam Ali Khan and Nurullah Khan on board, was seriously damaged. The

20 Mohibbul Hasan, History of Tipu Sultan, p.130.

passengers fell into a panic, and raised an uproar. Ghulam Ali Khan tried to quieten them, but in vain. Luckily the vessel was repaired. After a few days there was again a storm and as a result three of the elephants fell ill. One of them later died, but other two recovered. Early in the morning of the 6th April the flotilla sighted the island of Masira. On the 18th it passed the Rasul-Had, and on the 11th anchored in the port of Masqat."²¹

From Basrah they sailed through Tigris to Baghdad. They left Basrah on 10th February 1887, and reached Baghdad on 15th April, 1887. Baghdad was then an important province of the Ottoman Empire. Sulaiman Pasha was the Governor of Baghdad. On receiving the news of the reaching of the embassy, he sent an escort of 500 horsemen to receive it. At Samawah they were received by Sulayman Pasha himself with great honour.

While staying at Baghdad they paid visit to the holy Shrines of Najaf and Karbala. Meanwhile, the Sultan sent his own representatives headed by Qapji Bashj to Baghdad to escort the embassy. They travelled by land through Mosul and Diyar Bakar. They entered Constantinople on 25th September of the same year. They put in one of the palaces of the city.

The reception of embassy at Constantinople was somehow Lukewarm. The Grand Wazir received them "without any

²¹ Mohibbul Hasan, Waqai' Manazil-i-Rum, p.25.

extraordinary ceremony".²² They were however given the robes of honour. They presented to the Wazir rich dresses, jewellery and 70,000 Venetian.²³

Sultan Abdul Hamid I (1774-89) met the embassy in a fete organized especially for them at the village of Kelhana. The Sultan "invested them with sable furs and the two secretaries with ermine furs."²⁴ The Sultan conferred upon Tipu the title of an independent ruler. Tipu was granted the right to strike coins and have his name included in the Friday prayer Khutbah owing allegiance to the Caliph and not to the Mughal emperor. The ambassadors also received a sword and a shield besides a number of friendly letters and Khetab for Tipu. The embassy left Constantinople to return to India on 4th March, 1788. They returned this time through Alexandria, Suez and Jiddah. They reached Calicut in January 1790.²⁵

Tipu Sultan spent a lot of money on this embassy. However in return he did not gain much in proportion to what had been invested. As mentioned above, the embassy resulted in heavy losses of life and property. On account of the British influence at Constantinople and the rapid progress of French arms in Egypt

22 Prof. Mohibbul Hasan, op.cit., p.61.

23 Window Screen made of many horizontal strips (Slats of Wood).

24 Ibid., p.61

25 See map for the Route of Embassy. p. 101

the Turkish sultans were not very eager to encourage Tipu in his attempt to fight the British. Indeed, the British succeeded in persuading the Turkish Court to write to Tipu to forsake the friendship of the French and to ally himself with the English,²⁶ a request which Tipu could not accept. But Tipu did succeed in gaining recognition for his independence in spite of British machinations at Constantinople. The British news reporter writes,

"Golam Alley Beg died in that country and another man returned having accomplished his means (sic) and he also procured from the Sultan the title of King and permission to hold (sic) a mint and to have the Khutba read in his name."²⁷

This caused a great stir in the political circle of India and efforts were made to prove that Tipu's claim was baseless. The British recognised that the recognition of Tipu's independence was a source of great danger. It was felt that people will begin to consider his usurped title of king as derived from an authority held respectable among Mohamedans.²⁸

26 Mahmud Banglari, op.cit., p.552.

27 Mir Muhammad Husain letter received 21 June 1787, No.42. See I.H. Qureshi, op.cit., p.94.

28 I.H. Qureshi, op.cit., p.94; Cf. Secret Consultation, 12th Nov., 1787, No. 9.

Besides endeavouring to legalise his position, Tipu wanted to obtain the Caliph's military assistance against the English who were his most formidable enemies and were bent upon his destruction. Hayder Ali had already obtained in 1775 a body of 1000 men from Shiraz in Persia.²⁹ Tipu, it must be remembered, was also eager to promote the trade, commerce and industry of his Kingdom, for he held the view that the political decline of the Muslims was the result of their indifference to trade and industry and that it was because the Europeans were seriously applying themselves to these that they were bringing Muslim countries under their domination. The ambassadors were, therefore, required to obtain commercial privileges in the Ottoman Empire and technicians from Constantinople who would introduce various industries into Mysore.³⁰

Similarly the idea of Tipu's desire for an alliance with the French and English against the Marathas is farfetched because he was more desirous of winning over the Marathas against the English. Tipu was well aware that the English were his natural enemies.³¹ Therefore he consistently desired an alliance

29 Rice, Mysore and Coorg, p. 268.

30 Mohibbul Hasan, op.cit., 130 Fn.

31 ibid., Cf. p.77.

with France whom he considered to be his willing allies against the English. When it came to be known that Tipu had sent an embassy to France,³² the English prevailed upon Sultan Salim of Turkey to make an appeal as head of Islam and forbade him for his anti-British activities and establish friendship with them against the French. This fact could be more clear from the letter of Sultan Salim to Tipu.³³ It was addressed to the Indian sovereign Tipu Sultan dated 20th September, 1798 from Constantinople which was forwarded in January 1799 by Lord Wellesely, the Governor General of India with a covering letter³⁴ of his own in which he referred to French intrigues and expected that the admonition of the head of his faith would dispose Tipu's mind favourably towards the British. The Sultan advised Tipu to refrain from hostile action against the British who were his friends, and offered his good offices in bringing about a reconciliation between him and the English. He made pointed reference to French designs on Muslim lands and the Muslim religion and to the "reciprocity of interests" existing between England and Turkey, and asked Tipu to assist the Porte in this "general cause of religion".

32 Mahmud Banglari, op.cit., p.409.

33 ibid., pp. 549-552

34 For detailed study, see Appendix.K

Tipu was shrewd enough to grasp the real purpose behind this Caliphal mission. In his reply he professed devotion to the Caliph and agreed that since the French were his enemy all Muslims should renounce friendship with them. At the same time he drew the Sultan's attention to the treachery and deceitfulness practised in India by the Christians, especially the English, and referred to the latter's "determined resolution to subdue the whole of Hindustan and subvert the Musalman religion" Tipu was willing to "exterminate the infidel:" with the help of the Sultan, but remained non-committal with regard to the friendship with the British which the Sultan had asked him to cultivate.³⁵ The embassy naturally kept its real purpose secret and did not disclose it until it was necessary.

Here a question arises, why the embassy failed to obtain either any commercial concessions or military help? It must be remembered that Turkey at that time was in the grip of crises. All the Pashas and Governors of Turkey were fighting among themselves and they always revolted against the Sultan. Generally, the Governors were appointed for only one year but on the basis of bribery they worked more than three and four years. In this

³⁵ M.H. Abbas, All About the Khilafat, Calcutta, 1923, pp. 47-59, Mohibbul Hasan, op.cit., pp. 302-3; C.f., R.L. Shukla, Britain India and Turkish Empire (1853-1882), p.21. For detailed study, see Appendix H. I.K.

way only corrupt persons found opportunities to enter into the administration. All the judges or magistrates were appointed on the basis of bribery. Not only the Government Officials but Zamindars were also very corrupt. Taxes were not properly paid by the people. Even the power of Shaikh-ul-Islam was growing day by day. We see that every departments of empire was on the decline.³⁶ At this period the every existence of the country was threatened by Catherine II, Empress of Russia, and Joseph II, Emperor of Austria, who had entered into an agreement in 1787 to partition the European provinces of the Ottoman Empire, and to set on the throne of Constantinople, Cathrine's grandson Cathrine. In these circumstances Turkey was provoked to declare war against Russia on August 15, 1837. The whole year Turkey had to fight Austria and Russia. She could not expect any help from France, but could count upon the support of England which was party to the treaty with Prussia and Holland in 1788 to restore the balance of power in south-eastern Europe in favour of Turkey. Under these circumstances the Ottoman Sultan could not afford to antagonise Britain by entering into an alliance with Tipu. The contemporary sources do not say much more about the British attitude towards Tipu's embassy, but enquiring from their relations with him, it could not has anything but hostile. The Britishers thought

³⁶ Muhamad Inshaallah, Tarikh-e Khandan-e' Uthmaniyya, Vol. II, pp. 240-48, Amritsar, 1899

that Tipu Sultan was a new nucleus of Muslim resistance - conscious of the fact that the English were stealing sceptre from the hands of the exhausted Mughal. This was the plea which Tipu had advanced for his attitude towards the English as well as the Emperor. If Tipu succeeded in arousing the Muslims, the British would have to face much greater difficulties in subjugating India. Actually Tipu had a scheme of cooperation in political and economic sphere which would create a new hindrance for the British because it was Tipu's suggestion that Muslim countries should have trade relations, factory establishment, new arms and naval power. The Britishers were well aware of its outcome and they never liked to unite the Muslim countries of the world on a platform because it could not suit for their interests in India.

Tipu Sultan never gave up his hope. Again, he sent two embassies to Turkey one in 1798; at that time the British ambassador had great influence in Turkey. Unfortunately, that letter is not available, but the reply of that letter was given by Mahmud Banglari in his Tarikh Sultanat-i-Khudad (Mysore). In this letter Sultan Salim addressed Tipu and suggested him that he should establish friendship with the British and further, he emphasised that the French were treachrous people, their friendship is not beneficial for the Muslims. Again Sultan Salim advised

Tipu Sultan that if he has any complaint against the English, he should inform me I am able to come to the conclusion. After this letter Tipu had understood the feelings of Sultan Salim about India and the English. Therefore, he wrote a formal letter.³⁷ Tipu Sultan respectively informs him "English people want to make war on me and have collected arms and munitions for that purpose I am therefore compelled to declare jehad against them."³⁸ Governor General of India had sent a news about another embassy which was sent by Tipu to Sultan of Turkey. It was received by Mr. Manesty in 1799.* The embassy contains gifts and a letter for the Sultan. According to Governor General of India that letter represented that the British Government was oppressing the Muslims of India and their attitude was tyrannical and cruel towards them and further added that Sultans solicit the assistance of the Sultan against British. But unfortunately Tipu Sultan had died while the embassy was in the way.

The state of Hyderabad was founded by Chin Qulej Khan or Nizam-ul Mulk Asfjah in 1724. He was one of the leading nobles of the post-Aurangzeb era and in fact was a deputy of the Mughal

37 For detailed study, see Mahmiid Banglari, Tarikh Sultanat Khodadad (Mysore), pp. 549-552.

38 Karname-i Haidgi, Calcutta, 1848, p. 98's; For the text of letter see Appendix.G

* See Appendix - J

Emperor at Hyderabad where he ruled with a strong hand. He never openly declared his independence from the Central Government (Mughal Government) but in practice he acted like an independent ruler. He concluded peace treaties, waged wars and also started exchanging emissaries with the foreign countries. He started correspondence with the Ottoman government as if an independent ruler. He sent a letter to Sultan Mahmud of Turkey in 1747. The bearer of that letter was Al-Hajj Yusuf Agha, or Sayyid Alaullah.³⁹ Apart from this letter several diplomatic exchanges took place between the Ottoman Empire and the Hyderabad state. This tradition was followed by his son Nizam-ud-daula Nasir Jang. A famous Turkish envoy named Haji Muhammad Yusuf Effendi came to Hyderabad during his reign. In return Nasir Jang had sent many emissaries to Constantinople.⁴⁰

39 For a detailed study, see Riazul Islam, Calander of Documents on Indo-Persian Relations; Karachi, 1982, pp. 356-363.

40 Many of these letters of the Ottoman Empire and the Hyderabad State are preserved in the Turkish Archives, (also see in Riazul Islam, section 10, Miscelenious chapter). Even in the Andhra Pradesh State Archives Hyderabad, a number of letters and firmans are available in both the countries. The reports of Governments officials and summaries of newspaper articles are found in the National Archives of India also which throw light on the Indo-Ottoman relations.

When the Turko-Serbian War broke-out in 1876 the Indian Muslims actively supported for Turkey. The sympathy and public support for Turkey among the Indian Muslims was wide spread and touched almost the whole Indian sub-continent. Public meetings and demonstrations were held at many places such as Bombay, Calcutta and Hyderabad. Large sums of money were remitted by the Nawab of Rampur and the Nizam of Hyderabad.⁴¹

The British resident at Hyderabad felt that in the beginning, the local Muslims had little real sympathy for the Turks. But the appeals by influential co-religionists to their religious feelings led to the growth of a pro-Turkish movement among them. Their interest on the fate of Turkey increased so much that they formed a society to get regular telegrams from the seat of war.⁴² The resident in a report has referred to the view, held by Salar Jang, the Prime Minister of the Nizam of Hyderabad and many nobles at Hyderabad, that a number of Muslims should proceed from India to join the Turks in the war.⁴³ One

41 Home Department, Public B. Proceedings No.220, "Punjab Government to Government of India", 4th June 1877.

42 Ibid., No.222, "Resident Hyderabad to Government of India", 4th June 1877.

43 Ibid.,

Muhammad Badi-uz zaman, a former employee of Nizam Government, visited Bangalore for raising funds and recruiting volunteers for the Russo-Turkish War. He circulated an address in the principal towns of south India asking the Muslims to join the War.⁴⁴

At the instance of Salar Jang the resident at Hyderabad made enquiries about Badiuzzaman's movement who was likely to visit Hyderabad for preaching jjihad and gathering public support for Turkey. Badi-uz zaman however himself put off the proposed Hyderabad visit and proceeded to Madras. The resident at Hyderabad sent a message to Madras requesting the authorities there not allow Badi-uz zaman to entering Hyderabad, as was afraid of disturbance in Hyderabad. The message at once communicated to the Madras Government which did not allow Badi'uzzaman to go to Hyderabad.⁴⁵ A newspaper named Varita Dhara, in its issue of 18th June 1877, stated that all the Indian Muslims keenly watched the progress of the war. It has also been reported that many of his officials in the Nizam's state used to receive telegraphic news of the war. They used to circulate these news among the public.⁴⁶

44 Ibid., No.244, "Chief Commissioner of Mysore Government to Government of India, 11th August, 1877; "The resident was observed that altogether this movement was closely watched by the public but not sign of disloyalty to the Government was detected.

45 Ibid., No.105.

46 R.L. Shukla, Britain, India and Turkish Empire 1853-1882, Delhi, 1973, pp. 166-67.

An anti-British newspaper al-Akhtar from Constantinople in Persian which was considered in the mouthpiece of an Islamic league was financed by the Nizam of Hyderabad when it was suspended due to lack of funds. These relationships continued in the first half of the 20th century. When the Sultan Abdul Majid was exiled in Europe and his financial condition was miserable. In 1924, the Nizam of Hyderabad issued a firman regarding financial help for the sultan of Turkey. He fixed a sum of £ 300 yearly to Sultan of Turkey till his death.⁴⁷ The Nizam had expressed his feeling for the Caliph in further and later on it was enhanced to £ 500.⁴⁸ On receiving this news of the Nizam's firman regarding the stipend Sultan Abdul Majid the exiled Sultan of Turkey wrote a letter back to the Nizam acknowledging his gratitude for Nizam's generosity.⁴⁹ The state of Hyderabad was keenly interested in the victory of Turkey. After the conclusion of the treaty of Lausanne, the Nizam of Hyderabad, issued a firman

47 Andhra Pradesh State Archives, Political Department Instalment No.81, List No.3, S.No.411 July 1924 For the text of this Firman see Appendix.

48 Ibid., Firman of 25 Jamad II 1352 A.H.

49 Ibid., For the full text of the letter, see Appendix E

on 19th Zilbijja 1341 A.H. and declared holiday for oneday in the entire state of Hyderabad.⁵⁰ He also ordered distribution of sweets among the people in order to celebrate the victory of Turkey.

Apart from these the Nizam of Hyderabad had granted so many individual grants for Turkish people. A person named Dr. Hasan Kairi was granted a stipend of £ 15 per month for two years for completing his medical education.⁵¹ He had also sanctioned a sum of Rs.1,000/- to Sayyid Mahmud and Sayyid Muhammad of Constanlinople for the travelling expenditure when they were going back to their homeland.⁵² This sort of financial help shows that Nizam had deep sympathy with the Turkish people and his attitude was friendly towards Turkey.

The Nizam had issued a firman on 5th Rabi I 1341 A.H. regarding the contributions for the oppressed people of Turkey. He had given permission to Muhammad Akbar Ali, editor of a newspaper Saheefah to perform this task. But he also instructed that the amount should be used only for the real purpose not for the political motives.⁵³

⁵⁰ NPSA, Inst. No. 31, List No.2, S.No.464, 19 and 25 Zilhijja, 1341 A.H.

⁵¹ ibid., Inst. No.81, List No.2, S.No.699, 19th Ramzan 1342 A.H.

⁵² Ibid., Inst. No.31, List No.2, S.No.702, 27th Zilqada 1342 A.H.

⁵³ Ibid., Inst. No.17, List No.2, S.No.107, ^{N5}_{C17} 5th Rabi I 1342 A.H.

CHAPTER - III

OTTOMAN RELATIONS WITH THE BRITISH INDIA

In the early eighteenth century European political influence in the Middle East and India was still slight. The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries of the Indian history are rather full of various isolated sporadic attempts and struggles against the English. The wars of Tipu Sultan and the Marathas against the English, the Wahabi movement of mid-nineteenth century and the struggle of 1857-59 are some of the more important and well known instances. A lot of factors which may not be characterised as purely nationalist, acted as the motivating force behind these movements; but the one common anti-British feeling ran through all these movements. This chapter is based on the study of Indo-Turkish collaboration against the British. The origin of the movement for alliance with Turkey goes back to the time of Tipu Sultan. In his trial of strength with British, Tipu Sultan had very early realised the fact that in order to present a really strong front against the British, it was necessary for him to have a system of alliance with some foreign powers. The French would have been his obvious choice, against the British. Under the political circumstances prevailing at that time Tipu turned his attention towards Turkey for seeking help against the British. Thus the main objective of Tipu Sultan in sending the embassy

was to secure the military alliance against the British.¹ However, he failed in his struggle against the British, but the idea of alliance with Turkey did not die down with him. Almost a century later, we find the British Government faced with a very organised movement for creating an Indo-Turkish alliance against them.

According to Mustafa Kemal Pasha: "In the eighteenth century the policy of British towards the Ottoman Empire was dual. One side Russia had been fully supported by the Britain in the war and on the other hand Britain claimed her friendship with the Ottoman Empire.² Behind this dual policy there were a number of factors. Before few years Britain had occupied India by defeating France. Because of this, France was the greatest enemy of Britain. At that time France and the Ottoman Empire had friendly relations. Therefore it was natural for Britain to turn her attention towards Russia. Britain had not been feared by Russia yet her attention was not diverted towards India. Apart from these both the empires had trade and commerce relations among themselves. So it is clear that if Britain helped Russia against Turkey for protection of trade and commerce.

1. Mahmud Langlari, Tarikh-e Saltanat-e Khudadad (Mysore) Lahore, 1945), p.542.

2. Muhammad Uzair, Daulat-e-Uthmaniyya, Vol III, Azamgarh, 1958, p.80.

However, the Ottoman Empire and Britain had friendly relations but after some time a misunderstanding arose among them. The British merchants who were residing in India, their trading vessels were using the ports of Suez without prior permission from the Turkish Government. The Ottoman government resented the unauthorised use of their port and strongly complained to Sir Rober Ainslie on 5th May, 1777, who was British Ambassador at Constantinople. This development alarmed the British which might prove harmful for their commercial interests. In this way the British nation got involved in hostility with Turkey. The Court of Directors issued instructions to the Presidency Government in India on 4th July, 1777 to prohibit all British subjects and mercantile vessels from trading with Red Sea Port other than Jiddah and Mocha to confiscat cargoes for violation of their order.³

At the same time they requested Ainslie to secure protection to the trading vessels which had been ready at Suez or on way to it and obtain privileges of passing dispatches to and from the East Indies by the Suez route without molestation. To this effect Ainslie addressed a memorial to the port on August 26th, 1777 and contemplated to approach his Grand Wazir for


3 Fort William - India House Record, p.7

securing the required concession by offering presents to the leading members of his court.⁴

The concession asked for was an innovation. The Port considered it as contrary to custom and prejudicial to interests of Turkey. However, in view of his friendly relations with England, he consented with utmost reluctance to allow the use of Suez territory for passing dispatches only in emergencies and to suspend the operation of this prohibitory order temporarily to enable the British ships, which had already sailed from India to unload their goods at Suez unmolested. However, the Suez route for trade was not altogether abandoned.

After some times the Anglo-French rivalries was in Egypt. On the initiative of Ali Beg for a few years the independent ruler of Egypt and Warren Hastings, Governor of Bengal, the East India Company sent more than one expedition in 1770 from India to Suez. By opening up of this route which foreshadowed the speeding up of communication in following country. Calcutta was brought within two months of London, as compared with five months by the Cape Route. But the Ottoman Government jealous for its custom-revenues, and did not allow European tradingships to sail north of Jiddah. The Turkish Empire, as Napoleon saw, was the key to India and English interest and intervention in Turkey increased in proportion to commitments further east.

⁴ Ibid.,



According to R.L. Shukla the real beginnings of British India's involvement in the Turkish question dates back to the Levant crisis of the 1830s.⁵ By that time India had become a major imperial base from which British political and commercial activities could be extended westward into Turkish dominions, through which passed their shorter routes to India. But their interests seemed threatened by activities of their imperial rivals France and Russia in the Near and Middle East. The former had conquered Algeria in 1830, and the latter had penetrated far into Persia and Turkey, approaching the natural lines of communications to India and even her physical frontiers.⁶

The British therefore reexamined the position of Turkey as a buffer between the East and the West, and also from side by side it approaches to India. The British thought that Russia could challenge the whole British position in the Mediterranean. She could establish her supremacy in Central Asia and Persia and also she could threaten the British routes to India. All the geopolitical ramifications of Turkish Question were, however, not fully grasped by the British until after the treaty of Unkjar-Skelessi. In the words of V.J. Puryear "it (treaty) marked a

⁵ R.L. Shukla, Britain India and Turkish Empire (Delhi, 1973), p.1.

⁶ H.L. Hoskins, British Routes to India, p. 146., New York, 1928
F.E. Baily, British Policy and Turkish Reform Movement, p.58., Cambridge, 1982.

significant advance of Russian policy in the Near East.⁷ This awakened Palmerston to a full comprehension of British stakes in the area, and led him to formulate the policy the British were required to follow to meet the situation. The broad outline of this policy emerged in a speech which Palmerston delivered in the House of Commons on 11 July 1833:

"It is of the utmost importance for the interest of England, and for the maintenance of the peace of Europe, that the territories and provinces forming the Ottoman empire should be an independent state If Russian conquest should lead to the Christianising and civilising of the inhabitants of the country, these advantages would be counterbalanced by the consequences that would result to Europe from the dismemberment of the Turkish empire. I say, then, that undoubted by Government would feel it to be their duty to resist to the utmost any attempt on the part of Russia to partition the Turkish empire; and, if it had been necessary, we should equally have felt it our duty to interfere and prevent the Pasha of Egypt from dismembering any portion of the dominions of the Sultan. The integrity and independence of the Ottoman empire are necessary to the maintenance of the tranquillity, the liberty and the balance of power in the rest of Europe".⁸

The Near East crisis of the 1830 promoted Britain to attempt to reopen and develop the alternative route to India via

7 Shukla, op.cit., p.5, V.J. Puryear, International Economics and Diplomacy in the Near East - 1834, 1853, p.9, California, 1935.

8 Shukla, op.cit., p.5.

Mesopotamia and Syria. The British were less familiar with this route than the Egyptian and the Red Sea Route, but it was much more important ... than the later.⁹ Palmerston wanted to develop this route as the chief means of arresting the dissolution of the Turkish Empire and as an additional safeguard for India against hostile Russian designs. Palmerston considered this route highly advantageous to British imperial interests. Both British Government and the Indian authorities were aware of the Mesopotamian route. It would substantially check the eastward progress of any European rivals of Britain.¹⁰ The foregoing position shows that the British policy in the Near and Middle East were laid on 1830, when India entered into European diplomacy as a major issue.

In May 1838, Muhamad Ali announced his intention to become independent of the Sultan. It was clear that a war between the Pasha and the Sultan would bring Russian forces into Constantinople in accordance with the treaty of Unklar-skelessi. The Turks with the help of Russia might push the Pasha back from Syria but then Russia would probably remain entrenched at the straits and control the route to India via Mesopotamia. Thus the British could not

9 H.L. Haskin, op.cit., p.147.

10 Foreign Department, Poli Cons. 24th Feb., 1835, No.16.

afford to ignore France. On the other hand, England was inclined to protect Muhamad Ali if the French succeeded in confining the hold of Pasha on Syria. In this way, they would then dominate both the shorter routes of India. Russian and French designs led to Palmerston to visualise a "division of Turkish Empire into two separate and independent states, where- of one will be the dependency of France and the other a Satellite of Russia, and in both of which our political influence will be annulled and our commercial interests will be sacrificed....".¹¹ Therefore, he decided to intervene actively in order to keep up Turkey as the occupier of the road to India.¹²

British involvement in the Crimean War was throughout influenced by her imperial interest in India.¹³ Outside England the war was generally regarded as an Asian quarrel in which British interest alone were at stake. The course of events that ultimately led to the Crimean War engaged the close attention of the Indian authorities. Even before the British actually entered the war its probable repercussions on India were examined by Lord Dalhousie. He was of the view that the war would have a direct bearing on the interests of India and might possibility

11 R.L. Shukla, op.cit., p.11

12 H.L. Haskins, op.cit., p.268.

13 R.L. Shukla, op.cit., p.14., cf. The Nineteenth Century, vol.I, p.43, 1877.

effect the security of the British possessions in India. He analysed at some length Russian designs on India as well as the possibility of Russian invasion of India. The Government of India was not directly involved in this war. To sum up although British policy in this war was influenced to a great extent, by the consideration of the security of India and of the routes to it.

During the nineteenth century the British bolstered up Turkish Empire against Russia under the conviction that it was in their imperial interest. They posed themselves as defenders of the Sultan and frequently impressed upon the Indian Muslims that a close community of interest existed between them and the Sultan. There was great deal of talk about the British empire as being the greatest Muslim power in the world.¹⁴ The British empire is the greatest Muslim power in world, the Queen of England as the Empress of India, rules over Muslims than any sovereign excepting His Imperial Majesty, the Sultan of Turkey. The number of the Muslims in British India is estimated at 4,50,00,000 while there are only 1,61,68,000 Muslims of the Sultan in Europe, Asia and Africa.¹⁵

14 Arnold J. Toynbee, ed. Survey of International Affairs, 1925, Vol. I, p.40.

15 Maulvi Chiragh Ali, The Proposed Political, Legal, and Social Reforms in the Ottoman Empire and other Mohammadan States, Bombay, 1883, p.1, "The Indian Muhammadans, who are chiefly sunnis, with an influential Shiah minority, are concentrated chief in Bengal, the North-West Provinces and the Punjab, and number of altogether nearly 45,000,000, so that the Empress of India rules over far more Mussalman subjects than any other sovereign in the East." A.H. Keene, Asia, ed. Sir R. Temple, London, 1882, p.305.

The Turkish question was intimately connected with Indian problems, because most of the Muslims of India considered Turkish Sultan as their religious head (Caliph). In fact that he was accepted as such only by the Sunni Muslims of India. But practically the whole movement was more political than religious for the Caliph. He was not only the religious and spiritual leader but also the ruler of the only existing Muslim empire.¹⁶ Naturally the European plans for the dismemberment of his territories were a cause of anxiety to the Muslims of India.

From the Crimean War onwards the British had occasionally emphasized the Caliphal position of the Sultan beyond the Indian Muslims. During the Crimean war Dalhousie observed that the British support for Turkey had evoked great pleasure among the Indian Muslims. He was fully aware that the British aim was not to defend the Muslim religion, but to thwart the ambition of Russia in the East.¹⁷ Still he bluffed that the British were fighting for the Muslim interest in the East and apparently lamented that even then the Indian Muslims were hostile to the British. Charles Wood's suggestion that the Indian contingents with the greatest number of Muslim soldiers should be sent to the

16 Aziz K.K. Britain and Muslim India, London, 1963, pp. 26-27.

17 R.L. Shukla, op.cit., p.122.

Crimea "to aid the brethren of the faith",¹⁸ seems to have been a ruse to please the Indians. In this way during the Crimean War the British magnified Turkey in the eyes of the Indian Muslims. After some time at the outbreak of the Indian revolt of 1857 the British tried to win over the Muslims to their side by obtaining the Sultan's condemnation of the atrocities committed by the mutineers. His note warned the Indian Muslims that they would incur his displeasure and fall in his estimation, if they did not entertain friendly sentiments towards the British. It described the British as defenders of Islam and as a proof mentioned their help to the Sultan in the Crimean War.¹⁹ The Turkish Sultan's connection with Indian Muslims was again sought to be brought into prominence in July 1867 when the Sultan paid a visit to England. He was honoured by the India Office with a sumptuous fete and a grand ball the expenses of which were charged to the Indian revenues. The British Government justified this step on the ground that the attention shown to the Sultan as Head of Muslim religion would tend to propitiate the Indian Muslims, and soften their feelings of hostility towards their infidel masters.²⁰

18 Aziz Ahmad, Studies in Islamic Culture in the Indian Environment, London, 1964, p.63.

19 Pol. Deptt., Secret Consultation, 26th Feb., 1858, No.298, Aziz Ahmad, op.cit., p.63.

20 R.L. Shukla, op.cit., p.123.

The Turko-Serbian war was waged in 1876. This war was the starting point for the active support to Turkey by the Indian Muslims. On 19th August 1876, the Friend of India referred to a significant movement among the Muslims for supporting the Sultan of Turkey.²¹ From that time on it frequently mentioned the numerous meetings were held in the support for Turkey. It also spoke of several memorials and addresses sent to the English Queen or the Secretary of State for India requesting them to take up the cause of Turkey against Russia. Muslim demonstration in favour of Turkey was more active and successful in North-Western India and at places where Muslim population was predominant.

Many appeals from Mecca and elsewhere called upon the Indian Muslims to sympathise with Turkey. Sayyid Sulayman Effendi head of the Islamic community at Baghdad sent his brother Haji Mastan Saheb to India to encourage the Indians to contribute liberally to the Turkish fund.²² Abdul Latif of Calcutta, in his speech gave a brief history of Eastern Question and its relation to India and the Caliph. He expressed the gratitude of the Muslim community to England for helping the Caliph from time to time and said

21 The Friend of India, 19th August, 1876, p.754.

22 R.L. Shukla, op.cit., p.94.

that the Indian Muslims were pleased at friendly relations existing between the English and Turkish Empire.²³ The meetings also decided to request the English Queen on behalf of Indian Muslims to support the Sultan of Turkey. The addresses signed by 9,000 Muslims was sent to the Bengal Government on 15th December, 1876 for being forwarded to the Queen.²⁴

Similar memorials were sent to the Secretary of State from the Muslims of Monghyr and Ghazipur as also from the Muslims of Burdwan. A number of meetings were held, money collected for Turkey. Apart from this many lists of addresses were sent to the British Government. It clearly indicated that the Muslims of India were taking keen interest in the fate of Turkey.

Lord Lytton was under the impression that the position of the sultan as head of the Muslim world was not universally recognised by the Indian Muslims. His view on the Muslim interest in Turkish question underwent a complete change when he was confronted with unmistakable signs of Muslim sympathy with Turkey. He disputed with Northbrook's assessment that there was no connection between the Indian Muslims and the Sultan of Turkey. He

²³ Foreign Department, Political A, March 1877, No. 520, N.A.I.,

²⁴ R.L. Shukla, op.cit., p.95.

found that the Sultan commanded so much respect among the Muslims of India that they would start a jihad (holywar) against the British if he asked them to do so.²⁵

Although the possibilities of Muslim rebellion in India was doubtful, clearly the current troubles of Sultan were powerfully affecting the Indian Muslims. On the basis of the observations of the Friend of India, there were two extreme views on the Indian Muslim reaction to the Turkish question. Some held that if England deserted the Porte, Muslim feelings would be hurt to the detriment of the British rule, but others believed that the British policy towards Turkey would not affect India at all.²⁶ Thus even before the outbreak of Russo-Turkish War Muslim support of Turkey had become sufficiently widespread and had manifested in the form of a constitutional agitation combining public meetings, collection of funds for Turkish victims of the War with Serbia and sending memorials to the British Government for continued support of Turkey. During the Russo-Turkish war the agitation not only continued but went on increasing and was also joined in measure by the Hindus.²⁷

In May 1877 the Government of India initiated a secret and informal inquiry into the Muslim movement in India in support of

25 R.L. Shukla, op.cit., p.97.

26 ibid., p.98

27 The Friend of India and the Statesman, 9th Feb., 4th and 11th May, 1977

Turkey. The various local authorities were asked to report confidentially and keep a careful watch over Muslim feeling and over their communications with the Muslims outside India. The report made by the various local authorities and connected correspondence throw a good deal of light on the Muslim movement in India on the Turkish question. In May 1877 within a month of Russian declaration of war on Turkey, Lytton wrote to Lord Salisbury, the Secretary of State for India.

"So far I can judge the feeling of our Mohammadan subjects at the present moment is eminently satisfactory, more loyal than it has been at any former period perhaps. But all the Government Officers whose special business it is to study and watch Mahommadan feeling in India are strongly of opinion that, were we suspected by our Mahommadan subjects of active connivance with Russia in the spoliation of Turkey, and yet more, did they see us openly sharing the plunder, we should probably be at once confronted by an internal embarrassment sufficient serious to paralyse all external action on our part; we should not only have to reckon on a real jehad all round our frontier, but in every Anglo-Indian home there would be a traitor, a foe and possibly an assassin. Such a danger might possibly be more difficult to deal with than mutiny which cost us such an effort to suppress".²⁸

28 P. Hardy, The Muslims of British India, C.U.P., 1972, pp. 118-119., Cf. Lytton papers, letters dispatched 1877, vol. II, pp. 405, 519-20.

Probably Sultan Abdal Hamid was the first Ottoman Sultan in whose name the Khutba was read by the Indian Muslims. It is ironic that British foreign policy Directors in London were beginning to move away from diplomatic and military support for the Ottoman Empire in favour of physical control of the Muslim lands along the route to India just at the time when British administrations in India were trying to give Indian Muslims a stake in British rule.

A confidential police report said that two shoe merchants of Delhi, Habibur Rahman and Khalifa Ahmad, were likely to leave for the seat of war to join the Turks. It is also said that Safdar Jang, a relative of Nawab of Rampur, was preparing to leave for Constantinople to join the war. It is further noted that the Muslims of Faridabad were showing great enthusiasm in contributing to the Turkish funds and that large sums of money had been remitted by the Nawab of Rampur, the Nizam of Hyderabad, the presidency of the Delhi Anjuman-e-Islam and the Muslims of Deccan, Calcutta, Bombay and Lahore.²⁹

The Muslims of Madras also intended to send the English Queen a memorial in which they professed sincere loyalty to her deep concern over the misfortunes of the Sultan. They expressed

29 R.L. Shukla, op.cit., pp. 102-103,

their gratitude to the British for helping the Sultan. So far and felt confident that they would oblige the Indian Muslims by continued support of Turkey.³⁰ The Muslims of Mysore had also deep sympathy with Turkey expressed by one Muhammad Badiuz-Zaman, a former employee of Nizam Government. The confidential government inquiry into the pro-Turkish movement among the Muslims gives us an idea of its scope, intensity and nature, which is also furnished by one E.R.C. Brandford. He found no place in India howsoever small, where meetings were not held in moral and financial support of Turkey. On the contrary, he found so much enthusiasm that even poor women gave away the jewels on their persons.³¹

The movement Pan Islamism was propagated by the Sultan of Turkey and it was supported by the British ambassador at Constantinople, Beaconsfield Layard. What were the reasons behind this support are clearly stated in two private letters that he wrote to Lytton on 14th June and 12 July in 1877. In the first letter he said that the Turkish Government was trying to "get up" a kind of Muslim league for defending Islam against Russia and anxious to send envoys for this purpose to central Asia. Further Layard added Sultan desired to help. England in establishing

30 Home Department, Public B, Proceedings of Feb. 1878, No.227 (Madras Govt. to Government of India).

31 R.L. Shukla, op.cit., p.105.

cordial relations with Afghanistan. He thought that in the interest of both England and Turkey that Afghan Amir should be kept out of Russian hands, because if Russia would take Afghanistan Islam in Central Asia would become hopeless.³²

In the second letter of 12th July 1877 he reiterated that the Sultan of Turkey still enjoy a very great hold over the Muslim World and suggested that it would be in the interest of British rule if the Indian Muslims were on good terms with the Sultan. He believed that the British would have in him a very useful and valuable ally, and was of confident that they would have no difficulty in making him understand that England and Turkey had common interest in Central Asia.³³

On the basis of these two letters, we can say that the real object of Layard behind supporting Turkey was secret. He was organising a crescentade against Russia in Central Asia.

In September 1880, a Committee of Indian residents in Constantinople was found which had constant correspondence with the various Committees formed in India, which were collecting funds for Turkey. Some of the Chief Indian working at Constantinople for this object were the following.

32 Ibid., op.cit., p.142.

33 Layard Papers, Add. MS 39/30, Layard to Lytton, 12 July, 1877, p.66.

Maulvi Azmat Ali of Bihar who was an advocate in Calcutta High Court and was a resident of Aliganj (modern Siwan). He was the first delegate to go to Turkey ostensibly with the purpose of enquiring into allocation and expenditure of funds collected for Turkey in India. But actually he had gone there for establishing contacts between India Turkey.³⁴ In December 1879 one Nusrat Ali Khan, and Indian resident at Constantinople proposed the establishment of an Urdu newspaper styled Paik i-Islam. The first issue of the paper appeared in May 1880. The objects of the paper were described in a report by its editor to the Sultan of Turkey. First, to be tighten the relations between Turkey and India, and secondly to afford means of addressing the Indians on religious and political matters. A large number of copies of the paper were sent to the Indian princes. The editor claimed that a large number of Indian princes were interested in the movement and also ready to extend financial help to the Sultan of Turkey. The aims and objects of the paper being so decidedly hostile to the British rule in India, a representation was made by the British ambassador with the result that the paper was suppressed.³⁵

The Turkish press consisted of five principal daily news papers, one of them was Ma'lumat, appearing in Arabic as well as

34 Levantuddin Ahmed: "A Study of the Attempts for Indo-Turkish Collaboration against the British" I.H.C., p.346.

35 Ibid., p.348.

in Turkish. These are the following :

<u>Papers</u>	-	<u>Editor</u>
1. <u>Malumat</u>	-	Tahir Beg
2. <u>Ikhdam</u>	-	Ahmad Djevdet
3. <u>Sabah</u>	-	Mikran Effendi
4. <u>Tarik</u>	-	Philippe Effendi
5. <u>Tarjuman-i Hakikat</u>	-	Mehmet Djevdet

Among these papers two of them (Malumat and Sabah) were leading newspapers of Turkey and their importation into India was prohibited. A telegram from Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India received on 17th August 1897; "Informs the Government of India of certain mischievous articles on India, which appeared in Constantinople newspapers "Sabah", 6th August, and "Malumat", 7th August, in view to stopping their introduction into India, if necessary".³⁶

A telegram from the Secretary of State, London to the Viceroy of Simla on 16th August 1897, "The newspapers published in Constantinople, viz., the Sabah of the 6th August and the Malumat of the 7th, contain mischievous articles on India. The tone of Turkish being generally virulent, I think it advisable to warn you in case you wish to watch or stop of introduction of the papers into India."³⁷

36 Foreign Department, Secret, E. Oct. 1897, Fros. No.262, K.W.No.1, N.A.I.,

37 Foreign Department, Secret. E. No.262 and K.W.No.1, N.A.I.

Another telegram was also sent by the Secretary of State, London to the Viceroy, Simla, on 18th August 1897. "Foreign Secret. Your telegram of 17th August. Turkish journals. Currie will be asked to send copies direct of any papers forming subject of his report. See my telegram of 16th August Sabah, 6th, referred to mutiny and increased misery of India, diversion of Famine Fund, and violation of women at Poona. Malumat, 6th August, referred to number and power of Mussulmans, signs of their union with Hindus, violation of mosque, and brutal Government. Several other papers, despite censorship, adopt same violent tone. Malumat, 25th July, referred to Afghan arsenal, Amir's protection of the rebel tribes, and his issue of gold coin. Currie reports numerous addresses received by Sultan from Mussulman community in India, including Moulmein, besides considerable contributions to the Turkish patriotic Fund."³⁸

These telegram and summary of the article published in Sabah give an account of how the Turkish press perceived the British role in India:

"The latest news received from India shows that the disturbances there are spreading. The British Government is universally blamed by the press as being the primary cause of these: indeed, if one looks closely into the matter, it is seen

38 Ibid., No.264.

that the method of Government has been such as to bring the unfortunate Indians to the verge of annihilation. The present movement is most important, and recalls the time of the mutiny. It began with the famine: the sufferers were innumerable, yet the Government, instead of assisting them, remained impassive, and did not abstain from oppressing the inhabitants. This conduct, contrary not only to governmental prestige, but also to civilisation and humanity, will doubtless be productive of grave results to British rule, as the natives whom the English accuse of barbarity and ignorance must have been affected by the impassive attitude of the Government towards their sufferings. The natives, who are forced to live under a foreign yoke, and who under the British code in India have lost their personal rights, only bear the burden of the ordinary phenomena of civilisation; they expected in return that the Government would at least keep the country preserved against famine and their disappointment is proportionately severe being heightened by the evident carelessness and incapacity of the officials. The Indians are displeased at being considered subjects of the second class by the English, they are indifferent to the advantages of civilization, such as canals, railways, etc. of which they have to bear a cost greater than any benefit in return, and the only result of which to them is to transform their country. All they ask is to be able to live peacefully and happily Thus the famine and its successor, the plague, have made the sufferings of the natives unbearable. Yet the English have only spent one-fourth of the famine funds on relief and devoted the rest to other objects.... Just as the civil officials have worked this administrative intrigue, so the troops by acts never witnessed in civilized countries have outraged national and religious feeling, women have been violated, and the natives have now quite lost

patience. The whole press blames the deeds committed at Poona by the English troops, but England remains quite careless and continues to act in the old way, which may have results in the future, as the question has now changed its complexion and become serious.

The ulterior attitude of English will, adopt being anxiously watched by politicians."³⁹

Another newspaper Malumat expressed concerned over the plight of Indian at the hands of the Britishers in the following words:

"Events in India are gradually becoming more serious. Foreign rule has for more than a century used every oppression to keep the natives in subjection and compelled 300,000,000 of Indians to live in terror; it continues at the present day in a manner incompatible with European civilisation and has finally given rise to the present disturbances. These have not broken out suddenly but have for years been planned with a view to obtaining relief from the burden laid on the country by foreign rule. It would, therefore, seem unlikely that they will be completely and finally put down..... Will the Powers of Europe, which so loudly boast of acting in the name of humanity and civilisation, be able to protect the natives of India? The writer thinks that their eyes are not yet turned towards South-East Asia."⁴⁰

The British had long been aware that the Turkish newspapers generally, and those published in Persian particularly were anti-English. It appears that Al-jawaib, a pro-English Arabic

39 Foreign Department, Secret. E., Oct., 1897, No. 278.

40 Ibid., No. 280.

newspaper of Constantinople on which the Indian Office had been spending £ 105 a year and copies of which used to be circulated in India, was not able to counteract the anti-English propaganda of the Turkish Press. The Government of India therefore tried to bribe the Turkish Press.

In contrast to the Anglo-Indian Press, the newspapers in Indian languages were the true vehicle of Indian public opinion. They discussed almost all aspects of the Russo-Turkish War which gives us an idea of direction in which the Indian mind was moving. The comments of the language press on different aspects of the Eastern Question and on the British policy towards Turkey can be regarded as a measure of Indian awakening and consciousness of the time. The Indian language press was almost invariably on the side of Turkey. The outbreak of the war led to the birth of daily newspapers in many cities of north India. The Indian language press also analysed the reasons for Indian sympathy with Turkey. Some language newspapers attributed Indian sympathy with Turkey to inter alia, an inchoate pan-Asian feeling among the Indians. Dayan Prakash wrote a long letter entitled "The Hindu Feeling About the War" on 20th September, 1877, and stated that the Turks were an Asian power their glorious exploits in the past were a common heritage for all Asians including the Hindus.⁴¹ The paper

41 Home Department Public B. Proceedings 1878, No. 222.)

felt it that to the Hindus, Russia was a natural enemy of England, and hence their enemy also. The Sadharani of 30 September 1877 also held that the Turks were Asians commanding the natural sympathy of all the Asians, and hence India desired that the prestige of Asia should remain as great as ever in the world.⁴² The Indian language press pleaded strongly for British support of Turkey.

In January 1881 G.J. Goschen, the British ambassador at Constantinople reported that since the Russo-Turkish War and more especially since the accession of the Liberal ministry to power in England, the Sultan, his courtiers and the majority of his ministers had been constantly fomenting troubles in India. Therefore the English ministry might not take an active part in Eastern affairs. Goschen learnt that the Sultan had sent emissaries to Mecca, Medina, the Red Sea and Persian Gulf areas, Yeman and Najd to propagate that the English Government was bent on destroying Islam.⁴³

Goschen wished the British Government to scotch the Sultan's anti-English plots by setting the Arab against the Turks which would leave the sultan isolated. He suggested that the British

42 ibid., no. 227.

43 R.K. Shukla; op.cit., 170.

should cultivate the friendship of the grand Sherif, so that his great hold over the Muslims of India, Central Asia and Afghanistan might serve their interests. He also thought that the Caliphate was a weak point of the Sultan because the Arabs were preparing for an Arab as opposed to a Turkish Caliphate. He wanted England to take advantage of it and help build an Arab Caliphate to neutralise the growing influence of the Sultan among the Muslims.⁴⁴

The status and future of the Ottoman Empire have played a prominent role in British foreign and Imperial policy. In the earlier period what came to known as the 'Eastern Question', British sympathy and support were generously given to Turkey. Behind this support there were two reasons : first the presence of Russia in Asia and the possibility of Russian initiative in the East became a British Phobia.⁴⁵ There was also the problem of retaining India. This was a second element in Palmerston's anti-Russian and Pro-Turkish policy. The Indian Empire was a British interest and in order to maintain this interest Palmerston had twice risked war and had once actually waged it in Crimea. Basically Palmerston and Disraeli both agreed on the

44 Ibid., pp. 70-71.

45 Aziz K.K., op.cit., p.25.

destiny of the Ottoman Empire. In their opinion for the British Imperial interest the Ottoman Empire should survive.⁴⁶


Now we see that the establishment of British rule in India closed nearly all avenues of normal relations with the Turks. India and Turkey were virtually under imperialism. Pan-Islamism and Young-Turk movement had influenced India's freedom. The Khilafat movement of India was a direct product of India's affection for the Turkish people.

In 1911 war broke out between the Ottoman Empire and Italy and during 1912 and 1913 Turkey had to fight the Balkan powers. The Turkish ruler claimed at this time to be also the Caliph or religious head of all Muslims. Moreover, nearly all the Muslim holy places were situated within the Turkish Empire. A wave of sympathy swept throughout India. A medical mission, headed by Dr. M.A. Ansari, was sent to help Turkey. Since Britain's policy during the Balkan War and after was not sympathetic to Turkey, the pro-Turkey and pro-Caliph sentiments tended to become anti-imperialist. In fact, for several years from 1912 to 1924 the loyalists among the Muslim leaguers were completely overshadowed by the nationalist young men.

46 Ibid., p.26

Unfortunately, with the exception of a few persons like Maulana Azad who were rationalists in their thinking, most of the militant nationalists among Muslim young men also did not fully accept the modern secular approach to politics. The result was that the most important issue they took up was not political independence but protection of the holy places and of the Turkish Empire. They fought imperialism on the ground that it threatened the Caliph and the holy places. Even their sympathy for Turkey was on religious grounds. Their political appeal was based on religious sentiments.

THE ROUTE FOLLOWED BY TIPU'S ENVOYS TO CONSTANTINOPLE



Based on Manazil-i Rum, ed. Muhibbul Hasan, Bombay, 1968.

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بنوایام مملکت نظام الدوله نقشه
تولید نظریات و اعمال حضرت نواب میرزا محمد تقی خان قزوینی

عقد و امر
عقد و امر

فرد و جمع
بعد از آنکه در اول روز قیام نمود و در وقت نماز صبح در حضور فقیر کجور جمعیت و مرور میرسد
غایت نامه نامه بنام میرزا محمد تقی خان قزوینی در این اوقات و حسن عادت شرف صدور یافته مرافق گردانیده
بر آن بجهت در این اوقات در این مقام ضرورت فتنه ضروریات نیازمند خرج روزانه بود از روز
داخل بندر نورث استقره می کرد آن مسکنه بخاری استحقاق خود را هر چه بود از آن غایت نامه بنام
خرج روزانه طلب نمود و در غایت نامه بنام آن علم عطا روزانه بود و در چهار روز نامه بنام
از محصول آن خبر و اعانت خواهد شد که در سلامت سید زین العابدین باد و آن نامه فرستاد
ه اگر از حضور بر روز حکم عطا روزانه صادر شود بموجب حکم عالی استحقاق همان بنام است و تا او در
بر عین است و غرض است یافت همه از بنام آن است عینیت ضرورت و از دست گرم بیشتر عطا فرستاد بنام
استوار است و در حضور مردم سواد آن وقت رفتن چهار نول چهار سوله و سوره مکرر فرستاد
بست بود نظام العزیز الشریف نام دولت عازم گشته در میرزا محمد تقی خان قزوینی در آن اوقات در آن
باز از دیگر عرو و دولت و اقبال لایزال بنام آن که و آنچه بنام آن در این بنام آن را از بنام آن
اصفا و مضاف است بر العزیز و آن است العزیز بقدرت قدر بر تقیر و نظیر حسن تصویر بر بنام
زیب نظیر غنچه دولت دام دولت و ارباب دولت و ارکان سلطنت برسانند و ظاهر می نماید و ذکر آن است
تا قیام قیامت زانست خورشید و عوام می مانند و هر چه بر اعانت بر حق خواهد شد بنام آن است
دام دولت بنام آن که از بنام آن در این بنام آن خدوند و در سبک بنام آن است
شکسته با تقوی ظاهر نمود در بنام آن حکم بنام آن صادر نمود غیر عینیات و غرض است سید زین العابدین

22. Hājī Muḥammad Yūsuf to Nizām ud-daula Nāṣir Jang. Topkapi MS (ibid), f. 27a. Calendar, II, No. Ott. 421, p. 380. Mark the letterhead formula: *Khwankār* etc.

بر در روز سید کریم استرم مدام دستدام

بود درین احوال جریب شاد و بعضی از دوستان صادق و محبوب
 فرموده جمعی از همشینان موافق در سنگ جمع و ترتیب
 شد امید که مرغوب طبایع ارباب عقول سلیمه مستحسن خاطر اصحاب
 اودان مستقیم گردیده بجهت وجوده از طرف ابواب صاحب
 نظام الملک بسط ازین محله و باوشاه زوم نوشته عرض داشت
 معتقد راسخ الاکتفا و نظام بعد از ابرامی انجمنی عبودیت
 فایده و انجمن اصناف تسلیات نایقه و تعبیل شفا و تلمیم حبیب
 بر تراب ساحت بارگاه آسمان چاه خلایق سیده گاه
 بعرض اقدس اعلیٰ میرساند که ارشادات تعطف سمات

19. Opening folio of Nizām ul-mulk Āṣaf Jāh's letter to the Ottoman Sultan Mahmūd I. *Munsha'at-i Radī b. Nūr ud-din*, National Museum, Karachi, MS N. M. 1958-202/24, f. 2a. *Calendar*, II, No. Ott. 409, p. 356.

که هر بر عمو اطفش نامانه و نوازشات با دشانانه از من بجاو
عقبه کیوان استباه غر صد و رو غرت و مکرمت ایام مجتبیان از من
بسفارت و تبلیغ آن مامور شده بود بعد از انتقال او از عالم غایبی
در انامی راه بقصد میرزای شرافت و نجابت به راه حاجی محمد یوسف
زبانی تقریر نمود و تارک مباحث معتقد عقیدت گزین از حصول
سعادت و جنین فرقدان آسا آسمان ساگر و بد فرو نهوض
توفیق آبات که درین آوا ان سعادت تو امان بمصدق
صدق سیاق و تقدیر کم اله فی موطن کثیره صورت
و قوح یا نتمه جهان جهان اعزاز و سر و بخشید الحمد لله



فرمان

چونکہ آجکل معزول خلیفہ عبدالمجید خان کی مالی حالت بہت ناگفتہ بہ ہے اور وہ اندرون
 (انگل) یورپ میں قیام کئے ہوئے ہیں۔ جہاں کے مصارف بے انتہا
 بڑے ہوئے ہیں لہذا اس آیتہ کے بموجب "المومن اخوة المومن" اورنگی
 سقیم حالت کے منظر میں اپنے استطاعت کے موافق اورنگی تائید کرنا اپنا
 مذہبی فریضہ خیال کرتا ہوں۔ چنانچہ انہیں وجوہات کی بنا پر ماہ جولائی ۱۹۲۴ء سے
 تاحیات تین سو پانچ سو روپے کا ماہانہ وظیفہ مقرر کرتا ہوں اور قریب میں اورنگی اورنگی
 معلوم ہونے پر رقم کے ایصال کا انتظام عمل میں آئیگا۔

پبلک کی اطلاع کی غرض سے میرا یہ حکم جریدہ غیر معمولی میں طبع کرادیا جائے
 ۱۵۔ ذیقعدہ ۱۳۴۲ھ ہجری یوم پینتھینہ (شرعی خط مبارک علی حضرت بندگاہ کا نام لکھنا)

نقل مطابقتاً

(Handwritten signature)

دکارمعد



6

۱۰

نہرمان

سلطان عبد المجید خان معزول خلیفہ نے حال میں اپنے قلم سے لکھنؤ زبان

ترکی میں جو خط میرے نام پہنچا ہے اسکا اردو ترجمہ منک ہے۔

بغرض اطلاع مسلمانان عالم جریدہ غیر معمولی میں طبع کرا دیا جائے فقط ترجمہ مبارک بند مانتا (تحت خط کی نظر سے لے کر لکھا گیا)

۲۲ - صفر ۱۳۳۳ھ بمطابق ۱۹۱۵ء

نقل مطابقت اصل

محمد رفیع الدین

مستند

بِسْمِ اللّٰهِ الرَّحْمٰنِ الرَّحِیْمِ
فِیْ حُدُودِہٖ وَنُصَلِّیْ عَلٰی رَسُوْلِہِ الْکَرِیْمِ

صاحبِ جلال و نجابت آصف جاہ نظام الملک - حیدرآباد

السلام علیکم ورحمۃ اللہ وبرکاتہ۔

برادر عزیز

خدمتِ عالیٰ میں اس امر کی اطلاع عرض کرتا ہوں کہ آپ کا مرحمت آمیز فرمان شاہی جو میرے مستقر

اپریل تک آن لیا گیا ہے اور ہوا ہے تو سب سے پہلے حیدرآباد کے حکام کو مطلع کیا گیا ہے اور

میں تہ دل سے آپ کی حقیقتِ اسلامی کی قدر کرتا ہوں جو بفضلِ خدا مخلصین و انبیاء و رسولین پر
حقیقی اخوتِ اسلام کو ظاہر کرتی ہے آپ جیسے عالیشان فرمانرواے اسلام کا وجود اس وقت تک

باعثِ فخر ہے کہ آپ کے فیاضانہ سلوک سے اعلیٰ ہند کے برادرانِ اسلام کے جذباتِ قلبی
ظاہر ہوتے ہیں۔ جو کہ اس پر آشوب زمانہ میں اسلامی تعلقات کے استحکام کی بین دلیل ہے۔

آپ کا احسان اُس ہمدردی اور محبت کا ہی ثبوت دیتا ہے جو کہ اسلامی دنیا کو عثمانیہ ترکوں کی

قوم اور میرے معزز آبا و اجداد کے ساتھ رہی ہے۔ جنہوں نے صد ہا سال تک جان و دل

خلافتِ اسلام کی حمایت و حفاظت کی۔

اللہ تعالیٰ سے میری دعا یہ ہے کہ وہ اپنے فضل و کرم سے آپ کے شاہی خاندان کو عزت و سعادت


کے ساتھ سلامت رکھے۔ اور آپ کے ملک و قوم پر ہمیشہ اپنی رحمت نازل کرے۔ بہرحق سید المسلمین و المرسلین

مجموعہ ۷ - محرم الحرام ۱۳۴۱ھ
عبدالمجید خان خلیفہ رسول اللہ

محمد شاہی

مستقر

(از نظام لڑویہ تارینہ - تاریہ)



قطعہ

حمدگوئی و دستار اوراقِ دیوانِ نصیب
تاج بسم اللہ زین فرقِ عنوانِ نصیب
مستے شد کین تمنا در دل و جانِ نصیب
یا خداجِ وزیرت کن تو عثمانِ نصیب

فرمان

چونکہ حال میں جو مسلح ہو رہا ہے اس سے اسلامی دنیا میں از سر نو امن و امان قائم ہو گیا ہے
لہذا اسکی سرت و یادگار میں ایک روز کی عام تعطیل عطا کی جاوے گی۔ (۲۹ ۱۰۱۱ء حال
یومِ درشنہ کو) اور اس روز شب میں شہر کے بڑے مساجد پر شلاکہ مسجد - چوک کی مسجد -
افضل گنج کی مسجد - جامع مسجد اور اسکے سوا چار مینار پر روشنی کی جائے تو کافی ہے کیونکہ
اہل اسلام کے لئے یہ اتہاج و انساط کا موقع ہے - (شرعہ تخطیب کا راجعہ حضرت نذکانانی فرماتا ہے)
- جریۃ غیر معمولی میں یہ حکم عوام کی اطلاع کی غرض سے طبع کر دیا جائے -

۱۹ - ذی الحجہ ۱۳۱۱ھ

جواب مكتوب خوندكا وروم از شهر يار دكهن
• طيپو سلطان

الحمد لله الذي زين الاسلام بضبط الرؤساء العظام وشيد اساس
الدين بتنسيق السلاطين الكرام والصلوة والسلام على رسوله محمد
 وآله وصحبه مويدي طريفة خير الانام اما بعد فلا يخفى على جناب
 وارث المرتبة السليمانية جامع رموز الحكمة اللقمانية مظهر القدرة
 آلايه مورد الكرامة الغير المتناهيه مجمع العلوم والحكم معدن معالي
 الهمم متدمة جنود الفتح والظفر منتخب كتاب القضاء والقدر سلطان
 البر والبحر خليفة الله في الارضين سلطان الروم خاد الله ملكه
 وخلافته ان كتابكم العالي المتعالي منضمنا على ذمايم القوم الفرنجويان
 ومعادتهم لاهل الاسلام وارادة استيصالهم جميع الملل والنحل من
 العالم وحمايد القوم الانكترلويان وعزيمة جنا بكم العالي على التثقل
 بالتصفيه فيما بيننا وبينهم واهر جنا بكم المتعالي لنا ببيان سبب
 المعاندة الواقعة بيننا وبينهم وصل البناء في احسن الاوقات وعلما كل
 مطوياته ليس مخفيا على جنا بكم ان هممتنا الجهاد في سبيل الله
 وتنظيم امور دين الله والحق ما قلتم ان القوم الفرنجويان قوم ليس
 لهم وفاء ونحن نعلم ذمايمهم وانكن في هذه الاوقات قدم القوم
 انكترلويان على حربنا وهيا واسباب الحرب والضرب فلهذا وجب

عليها الجهاد بل على جميع اهل الاسلام فالمرجو من جنابكم ان
يدخلوا في خاصة الاوقات ويعاونوا بدعائكم واهتمامكم وهو المسئول
مكم والله يكتفي لنا ولكم وكنا ارسلنا المكتوب قبل هذا الزمان
بصحابة سيد علي محمد ومدار الدين وفصلنا فيه امورنا باحسن التنصیل
وايضاً ارسلنا المكتوب الثاني بواسطة يوسف وزير من طريق المدينة
الممورة سيظهر على جنابكم تمام المركوزات مشروحا ومبسوطا
وصلى الله على النبي محمد وآله واصحابه الأبرار؛

APPENDIX - H

Letter from Governor General of India to Tippoo

Sultan Written 16th January 1799

Your highness has already been furnished by Lord Clive with a translation of the declaration of war, issued by sublime Porte against the French, in consequence of their having violated the sacred obligations of Treaty with the Grand seignior, and of their having invaded Egypt, in contempt of every principle of good faith, and of the Law of Nations. You have also received from me a translation of the manifesto, published by the Porte on the same occasion, exposing, in just colours, the over bearing and arrogant spirit as well as the treachery and falsehood, which the French have disclosed in their conduct towards all mankind, and especially towards the Sublime Porte.

The Porte, justly outraged by an aggression so atrocious and unprecedented as the invasion of Egypt, has now united in a common cause with the British Nation, for the purpose of curbing the intemperance of the French, and the Grand Seignior, learned unfortunaate alliance which your Highness has contracted with his enemies the French, against his friends and allies the British Nation, his Highness resolved, from motives of friendship towards

you, as well as towards the British Nation to warn you, in an amicable letter, of the dangers of this fatal connexion; and to exhort you to manifest your zeal for the Musalman faith, by renouncing all intercourse with the common enemy of every religion and the aggressor of the head of the Mahamedan church.

Accordingly this letter (the testimony of friendship, and the fruit of wisdom, piety, and faithful zeal) was delivered by the Ministers of the Porte under the Grand Siegnior's orders, to Mr. Spencer Smith, the British Minister resident at constantinople, by whom it was transmitted to the Honourable Mr. Duncan, Governor of Bombay, who has forwarded it to Lord Clive. The day before yesterday this letter reached Madras, and a translation accompanied it, by which I learnt the valuable lessons of prudence and truth which it contains. I now forward it to your Highness. You will read and consider it with the respectful attention which it demands. There you will find the same friendly admissions respecting the dangerous views of the French Nation, which I have already submitted to your consideration.

When your discerning mind shall have duly examined this respected letter, your will, no doubt, draw the following conclusions from it :

First: That all the maxims of public law, honour, and religion, are despised and profaned by the French Nation, who consider all the thrones of the world, and every system of civil order and religions faith, as the sport and prey of their boundless ambition, insatiable rapine, and indiscriminate sacrilege.

Secondly: The French have insulted and assualted the acknowledged Head of the Mohamedan Church, and that they have want only raised an unprovoked and cruel war in the heart of that country, which is revered by every Musalman as the repository of the most sacred Monuments of the Mahamedan faith.

Thirdly : That a firm, honourable and intimate alliance and friendship now subsists between the Grand Seignior and the British Nation for the express purpose of opposing a barrier to the excesses of the French.

Fourthly : That the Grand Seignior is fully apprized of the intercourse and connexion unhappily established between your Highness and the French, for purposes hostile to the British Nation, that of offers to you Highness the Salutary fruit of that experience which he has already acquired, of the ruinous effects of French intrigue, treachery and deceit, and that he admonishes you not to flatter yourself with the vain hope of friendly aid from those who (even if they had escaped from the valour and skill

of the British forces) could never have reached you until they had profaned the tomb of your prophet, and overthrown the foundations of your religion.

May the admonition of the had of your own faith dispose your mind to the pacific propositions which I have repeatedly, but in vain, submitted to your wisdom. And may you at length receive the Ambassador, who will be empowered to conclude the definite arrangement of all difference between you and the allies and to secure the tranquility of India against the disturbers of the world.

(Sd-) Mornington

APPENDIX - I

Letter from Tippoo Sultan to the Right Governor
General dated 10th Ramzan or 16th Feb. 1799,
received at fort St. George,
3rd April.

In the name of the Most Merciful God !

Praise to the supreme king of kings, who hath made just and high minded princes the instruments for exalting the standard of the established religion of Mohummed and committed the Governace and prosperity of the people and dominions of Islam to their able management and guidance ! Be abundance of praises also the offering at the throne of that Leader, by the aid of whose Prophetic mission the beingnant channels of faith retain their course and salutations unnumbered to that consecrated Person whose divine Mission is the pride of the followers of Islam and to his illustrious offspring and companions; every one of whom was the extrpator of heretics, and of those who know not the way of the Lord ! After this, it is humbly represented to the exalted presence the seat of Justice, expanded as the Heavens resplendent as the sun; to the luminous star of the Firmament of Dominion; the bright planet of the Empyreum of Glory and good

Fortune; the Bloom of the Tower of Greatness, the Refresher of the spring of supremacy; the ornament of the Throne of pomp and splendour; the support of the Seat of Happiness and prosperity with troops numerous as the stars; with Angels his guards; whose throne is exalted as the skies; whose dignity is as solomon's the Ray of the Benignity of God, the Sultan of the sea and land, may the vessels of his state continue to reaverse the Seas of success and prosperity, unperishable. And may the Effects of his justice continue to pervade every corner of the Faith. The August and Gracious letter written the 11th of the Rebbeeh-oo-sauny 1213 Hijri (answering to 23 September 1798) which was issued through British Envoy, conveyed upon me boundless Honour and Distinction, the Foundations of concord and Attachment acquired new strength from its contents, and the Fabric of Friendship obtained renovated Firmness by the Gracious Expressions it contains.

The venerated pen did me honour to write of the irruption of the French Nation, those objects of the Divine Anger, by the utmost treachey and deciet, into the venerated region of Egypt, not with standing the strict observance of long subsisting amity and friendship on the part of the Sublime Port. Of the views of that irreligious, turbulent people of their denial of God and His Prophets of the determination of the Sublime Port to adopt the most vigorous measured for the over-throw of that Nation of Rebels

and desiring me for the sake of the whole body of the Faith and religious Brotherhood, to afford assistance to our Brethren Mussulmans; support our Holy Theology, and not withhold my power and endeavours in defending the region of Hindustan from the machinations and evil of these enemies - that I will explain to the Sublime Port, whatever ground of uneasiness and complaint the English may have given me, when by the Divine Aid and the intervention of your good offices all differences will be compromised and opposition and estrangement be converted into cordiality and union. This Gracious communication I have understood.

Through the Divine Favour and Prophetic Grace all the votaries of Islam are united in brotherhood by the ties of religion. Especially the Sublime Port and this state, the Good gift God, forth foundations of friendship and attachment are firmly cemented between them, and repeated token of mutual regard have been manifested. Both in word and deed are they aiding and assisting to each other. This Labourer in the way of the Lord (I) am obedient to Your Highness is world subjecting will. There is absolutely no difference between us. Let me be informed of and employed to promote, that which your exalted mind proposes for the prosperity and ordinance of the Faith and its followers, and the said of God will alone ensures success. As the French Nation are estranged from, and are become the opponents of the sublime Port, they may

be said to have rendered themselves the enemy of all the Followers of the Faith, all Mussullman should ranounce friendship with them. (Quotation from the Koran) I confidently hope that the gates of friendly correspondence between the two states may be always open, and the sentiments of our friendly minds be disclosed to each other. May the sun of Dominion and prosperity be resplendent in the East of Greatness.

Dated 10th Ramzan the blessed, 1213 Hedgiree
(answering to 16th February 1799).

True copy Translator :

(Sd.) N.B. Edmonstone
P.T. to the Government.

APPENDIX - J

Message sent by the Governor General of India,
Mr. Earl of Morington to Mr. Manesty, on the
15th of October, 1779*

On the 15th October, 1799 Mr. Manesty received an intimation from the Right Hon'ble the Earl of Morington, Governor General of India that Tippoo Sahib had sent an embassy to the Sblime Porte via Bussora with present for the Sultan and letters representing "that the British Government tyrannically and cruelly oppressed Mohamedans in India" and soliciting the assistance of the Sultan against the British. Mr. Manesty was at the same time informed of the death of Tipppo Sahib and the conquest of his dominions by the British; at the time Mr. Manesty received their intelligence, Tipppo Sahib's ambassadors had arrived at Bussora and were on the point of proceeding to Constantinople via Baghdad. Mr. Manesty accordingly informed the ambassadors that in consequence of the change of affairs since their departure from

* Foreign Miscellaneous Record, vol. V, para 188, page 295.
(National Archives of India, New Delhi).

from Srīngapatam, it would be useless for them to proceed on their embassy, and he therefore advised them to return to India. This, however, they refused to do, observing that if "Tippoo Sultan had positively been killed in battle and Srīngapatam taken by the English still the children of their master might be alive, and that one of them might have succeeded to his throne and power, and been enabled by ability and good fortune to resist or overthrow the armies of the English" and that his faithful servants to their late master, they felt it to be their duty to proceed on to Constantinople and represent to the Ottoman Porte, the miseries and misfortune to which the Mohamedans in India were subjected. On Mr. Manesty applying to the Musleems (of Bussora) to present the ambassadors from proceeding to Constantinople, he informed him that he had received order from the Pacha of Baghdad to allow the Embassy to proceed on and to furnish them with the requisited means of prosecuting their journey to Baghdad. The Musleems stated that he dared not disobey this order, but that he had no objection to Mr. Manesty again endeavouring to dissuade the ambassadors from further persecuting their mission and to induce them to return to India. Mr. Manesty therefore at another interview with the ambassadors pointed out to them the real situation of the Dominions of their late master, their consequent position as British subjects, eligibility of acknowledging the authority of the British Government and necessity of their yielding obedience to it, at the same time

explained to them the probable consequences to themselves of an obstinate resistance, and state misery to which, in a foreign country, they might be exposed subsequent to their arrival at Constantinople where the Sultan could not possibly, on account of his political situation and connection with Great Britain show them any favour or countenance. Finally Mr. Manesty informed the ambassadors that it was his positive determination not to allow them to proceed to Constantinople, but to send them to Bombay. Mr. Manesty, however, intimated to them that he rather wished such an arrangement to result from their own inclination than from compulsion and assured them that in the event of their consenting to his wishes with cheerfulness they might depend on the liberality of the Right Hon'ble the Governor General of India and on his (Mr. Manesty) recommending them to the favour and patronage of his Lordship, after some delay the ambassadors informed Mr. Manesty they were willing to acknowledge themselves British subjects and that they therefore had resolved to abandon their intention of proceeding to Constantinople and were willing to return to India by the first opportunity.

APPENDIX - K

N.B. EDMONSTONE
P.T. to the Government,
Translation.

ATRUJECOI Y

Letter from Sultan Selim to the Indian sovereign, Tipu Sultan, dated constantinople, 20th September, 1798, delivered to Mr. Spencer Smith, His Britannic Majesty's Minister Plenipotentiary, etc.

We take this opportunity to acquaint your Majesty when the French Republic was engaged in a war with most of the powers of Europe within this latter period, our sublime prote not only took no part against them, but, regardful of the ancient amity existing with that nation, adopted a system of the strictest neutrality, and showed them even such acts of caution, as have given rise to complaints on the part of other courts.

This friendly disposed towards them and repasing a confidence in those sentiments of friendship which they appeared to profess for us, we gave no ear to many propositions and advantageous offers, which had been made to us to side with the Belligerent powers, but persuant to our maxims of moderation and justice we abstained from breaking with them without a direct motive, and firmly observed the line of neutrality all which is notorious to the world.

In this posture of things, when the French having witnessed the greatest marks of attention from our Sublime Porte, a perfect reciprocity was naturally expected on their side, when no cause existed to interrupt the continuance of the peace betwixt the two nations they all of a sudden, have exhibited the unprovoked and treacherous proceedings of which the following is a sketch:

They began to prepare a fleet in one of their harbours, called Toulory with most extraordinary mystery, and when completely fitted out and ready for sea, embarked a large body of troops, and they put also on board several people versed in the Arabic language, and who had been in Egypt before: They gave the command of that armament to one of their generals, named Bounaparte, who first went to Island of Malia of which he took possession and thence proceeded direct for Alexandria, where being arrived the 17th Muharem, all of a sudden landed his troops and entered the town by open force, publishing soon after manifestoes in Arabic among the different tribes, stating in substance that the object of their enterprise was not to declare war against the Ottoman Porte but to attack the Beys of Egypt, for insults and injuries they had committed against the French Merchants in time past, that peace with the Ottoman Empire was permanent, that those of the Arabs who should join would meet the best treatment, but such as shewed opposition would suffer death, with this further insinuation,

made in different quarters, but more particularly to certain courts at amity with us, that the expedition against the Beys was with the privity and consent of the sublime Porte, which is horrible falsity. After this they also took possession of Roseeta, not hesitating to engage in a pitched battle with this Ottoman troops, who had been detached from Cairo to assist the invaded.

It is a standing law among all nations, not to encroach upon each others territories wilst they are supposed to be at peace. When any such even to take place as lead to a rupture, the motives so tending are previously made known between the parties, nor one any open aggression attempted against their respective dominions, until a formal declaration of war take place.

Whilst therefore no interruption of the poace nor the smallest symptom of misunderstanding, appeared between our sublime Porte and the French republic, a conduct so audocious so unprovoked and so decietfully laden on their part, is an undeniable trait of the most extreme insult and treachery.

The province of Egypt is considered as a reign of general veneratin, from immediate proximity of the noble city of Mecca the Kebleh of the Mussulmans (the point of the compass to which all Turks turn their face in performing their prayers) and the sacred town of Medina, where the tomb of our Blessed Prophet us fixed,

the inhabitants of both these sacred cities deriving from thence their subsistence.

Independent of this it has been actually discovered from several letters which have been intercepted that the further project of the French is to divide Arabia into various republics, to attack the whole Mahomedan Sect in its religion and country, and by a gradual progression to extirpate all Mussulmans from face of the earth.

It is for these cogent motives and considerations that we have determined to repel this enemy, and to adopt every vigorous measure against these persecutors of the faith, we placing all confidence in the Omnipotent God, the source of all succour and in the intercession of him who is the Glory of Prophets.

Now it being certain that in addition to the general ties of religion the bonds of amity and good understanding have ever been firm and permanent with your Majesty, so justly famed for your zeal and attachment to our faith, and that more than once such public acts of friendly attention have been practised between us, as to have cemented the connection subsisting between the two countries, we therefore sincerely hope, from your Majesty's dignified disposition, that your will not refuse entering into concert with us and giving our sublime Porte every possible assistance by such an exertion of zeal as your firmness and natural attachment to such a cause cannot fail to excite.

We understand that in consequence of certain secret intrigues carried on by the French in India (after their accustomed system) in order to destroy in settlements and to sow dissensions in the provinces of the English there, a strict connection is expected to take effect between them and your Majesty, for whose services they are to send over a corps of troops by the way of Egypt.

We are persuaded that the tendency of the French plans cannot in the present days escape you Majesty's Penetration and notice, and that no manner of regard will be given to their deceitful insinuations on your side, and where as the court of Great Britain is actually at war with them and our Sublime Porte engaged on the other hand in repeling their aggressions consequently the French are enemies to both: and such a reciprocity of interests must exist between those courts as sought to make both parties eager to afford every mutual succour which a common cause requires.

It is notorious that the French, bent upon the overthrow of all sects and religions, have invented a new doctrine, under the name of liberty, they themselves professing no other belief but of Dehees (Epicureans or Pythagoreans), that they have not even spared the territories of the pope of Rome, a country, since time immemorial, held in great reverence by all European nations, that

they have wrested and shared with others the whole venetian state not with standing that fellow Republic had not only abstained from taking part against them, but had rendered them service during the course of the war, thus effacing the name of the Republic of venice from the annals of history.

There is no doubt that their present attempt against the Ottomans, as well as their ulterior designs (dictated by their avaricious view, towards oriental riches), tend to make a general conquest of that country (which may God never suffer to take effect) and to expel every Mussalman from it, under pretence of annoying the English. Their end is to be once admitted in India, and then to develop what really lies in their hearts, just as they have done in every places where they have been able to acquire a footing.

In award, they are a nation whose decieful intrigues and perfidious pursuits know no bounds, they are intent an nothing but an depriving people of their lives and properties and on persecuting religion wherever their arms can reach.

Upon all this, therefore, coming to your Majesty's knowledge, it is sincerely hoped that you will not refuse every needful exertion towards assisting your brethren Mussalmans, according to the obligations of religion, and towards defending

Hindustan itself against the effect of French machinations should it be true, as we hear that an intimate connection has taken place between your, court and that nation, we hope that, by weighing present circumstances as well as every future inconvenience which would result from such a measure, Your Majesty will beware against it, and in the event of your having harboured any idea of joining with them, or of moving against Great Britain, you will such resolution aside. We make it our special request that your Majesty will please to refrain from entering into any measures against the English or lending any complaint ear to the French. Should there exist any subject of complaint with the former, please to communicate it, certain as you may be of the employment of every good office on our side to compromise the same. We wish to see the connection above alluded to be exchanged in favour of Great Britain.

We confidently expect that upon consideration of all that is stated in this communication, and of the necessity of assisting your brethren Mussulmans in this general cause of religion, as well as of co-operating towards the above precious province being delivered from the hands of the enemy, your Majesty will employ every means which your natural zeal will point out to assist the common cause and to corroborate by that means, the ancient good

understanding so happily existed between our Empires.

A true copy :

Certified Translation and copy

(Sd.) Spencer Smith

(Sd.) J.A. Grant, Sub. Secretary
