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- SAFETY HAZARD ANALYSIS
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ELINT Systems ECM Systems Computer Card-reader System P-3C Aircraft Automatic Flight Control System F-16 Aircraft Automatic Flight Control System A&C Band Jammers Magnetic Tape Transport Single Pole Double Throw (SP2T) IF Switch With Driver Communications Recorder Model No. VR2004A Sea Sparrow Fire Control System Sea Wolf Submarine Power Supply Static Frequency Changer & Direct Current Output Supply (407L) Low Light Level Television Camera Subsystem/Type 18 Periscope AWACS Magnetic Tape Transport AEGIS Shipboard MK84/Mod 1 400 Hz Power Supply System Uninterruptible Power Supply System SEAFIRE Program Space Shuttle Mass Memory System Galileo Space Program Tape Recorder International Solar Polar Mission Magnetic Tape Transport Space Telescope Recorder/Reproducer System FIDS/BISS, Facility Intrusion Detection System RF Data Link Boeing Aircraft 767 Auto-Brake/Anti-Skid Systems TADS, Target Acquisition & Detection System Displays Solar Panel Charger & Controls Infra Red Aiming Light KC-10A Inflight Refueling System Tornado Aircraft Inflight Refueling Commercial Aircraft Audio Entertainment System 400 Hz Frequency Converters Static Inverter Power Supplies Magnetic Card Reader, Mark Sense Video Display Monitors RF Data Link Systems Telephone Switching Systems/Message Centers

Filter Connector for Telephone PBX Equipment High Speed Impact Computer Printer High Performance Aircraft Flap Controls Elint Systems Automated Information Storage & Retrieval Systems Floppy Disk Drives Advanced RF Receivers, Transmitters, and Repeaters Bouy RF Receivers/ASW Instrument Calibration Equipments Aircraft Windshield Defrosters/Deicers Electro-Mechanical Submarine Decoy Systems AN/TPX-42A, Air Traffic Control Systems Dish Radar, Pedestal, and Control System Radio Management System RADOPS RF Scorer Nuclear Power Generating Station Equipment Alphanumeric Graphics Printer Deep Space Network Software Testing C-17A Aircraft Autobrakes/Antiskid System MD-11 Aircraft Autobrakes/Antiskid System Boeing 747-400 Aircraft Autobrakes/Antiskid System USN A-12 Aircraft Autobrakes/Antiskid System RADARSAT Satellite Digital Tape Recorder Catapult Launched Fuel-Air Explosive Land Mine Countermeasures System Space Station Freedom EVA Portable Contamination Detector SPOT, ERS-1 & JERS-1 Satellites Digital Tape Recorders Sounding Rocket Inertial Navigation System

PERFORMANCE: PAST AND PRESENT

The following is a partial list of customers for which PSI has performed:

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DRS Optronics, Inc. EECO Incorporated EEMCO Division of Datron Systems, Inc. Electronics Resources, Inc. **Electronics Specialty Company** Electro Optics Systems, Division of Xerox Corporation Elgar Corporation, Division of Onan, Inc./McGraw Edison Honeywell, Inc., Defense & Electronics Division Honeywell, Inc., Marine Systems Center Hydro-Aire Division of The Crane Company Incosym, Inc., Division of Textron Corporation Industrial Electronic Engineers, Inc. Infodetics, Inc. International Telephone & Telegraph, Cannon Electric Division Kinelogic Corporation Lear Siegler, Inc., Astronics Division Librascope Division of Singer Aerospace & Marine Systems Litton Data Systems Division Lockheed Electronics Company, Division of Lockheed Aircraft Company Magnavox Electronics Systems Company, West Coast Division MagneTek Defense Systems Corporation McDonnell Douglas Corporation Naval Ship Missile Systems Engineering, Systems Effectiveness Division Ocean Technology, Inc. Odetics, Inc., Spaceborne, Kode and Omutec Divisions Odetics, Inc., Advanced Intelligent Machines Division Optivus Technologies, Inc. Perkin-Elmer Corporation, Applied Science Division Pertec Computer Corporation Pressure Systems, inc. Phaostron Instrument and Electronics Company, Division of Sterling Electronics, Inc. Radtec, Inc./Division of Guide Scientific Company Sargent-Fletcher Company Sargent Industries

Science Applications, Inc. Sierracin Corporation/Sylmar Division Signal Design, inc. Static Power, Inc., Division of Gates Rubber Company Tasker Industries/Whittaker Corporation Teledyne Control Electronic Safety Products Teledyne Control Teledyne Electronic Technologies Transco Products, Inc. US Naval Metrology Engineering Center Vari-L Company, Inc. Volt Technical Xerox Electro-Optical System Corporation

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Section 1.0


RELIABILITY PARTS STRESS PREDICTION

Section 1.1

RELIABILITY MATHEMATICAL MODELLING

MIL-STD-785B, Task 201 MIL-STD-756B, Task 102 Reliability Logic Block Diagram Reliability Mission Mathematical Model

Block	Assembly Name Schematic No.	Failure Rate, λ ΡΡΜ
A	Converter/30684941	λ _A = 12.1937
В	Encoder/30684944	λ _B = 6.1375
С	Inverter A/30684942	$\lambda_{\rm C}$ = 15.2983
D	Inverter B/30684943	$\lambda_{\rm D}$ = 16.3430
E	Splitter/30684945	$\lambda_{\rm E}$ = 4.1355
Total	Sam Power Supply	λ _{SPS} = 54.1080



$$R_{SPS} = R_A (2R_B - R_B^2) (3R_C - 3R_C^2 + R_C^3) R_D R_E$$

= $6R_A R_B R_C R_D R_E - 6R_A R_B R_C^2 R_D R_E + 2R_A R_B R_C^3 R_D R_E$
 $- 3R_A R_B^2 R_C R_D R_E + 3R_A R_B^2 R_C^2 R_D R_E - R_A R_B^2 R_C^3 R_D R_E$
 $R_{SPS} (t) = 6e^{-\lambda_{SPS}t} - 6e^{-(\lambda_C + \lambda_{SPS})t} + 2e^{-(2\lambda_C + \lambda_{SPS})t}$
 $- 3e^{-(\lambda_B + \lambda_{SPS})t} + 3e^{-(\lambda_B + \lambda_C + \lambda_{SPS})t} - e^{-(\lambda_B + 2\lambda_C + \lambda_{SPS})t}$

$$MTBF_{SPS} = \int_{0}^{0} R_{SPS}(t) dt = \frac{6}{\lambda_{SPS}} - \frac{6}{\lambda_{C} + \lambda_{SPS}} + \frac{2}{2\lambda_{C} + \lambda_{SPS}}$$
$$- \frac{3}{\lambda_{B} + \lambda_{SPS}} + \frac{3}{\lambda_{B} + \lambda_{C} + \lambda_{SPS}} - \frac{1}{\lambda_{B} + 2\lambda_{C} + \lambda_{SPS}}$$
$$MTBF_{SPS} = 27,020 \text{ Hours}$$

Figure 1, Reliability Logic Block Diagram and Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) Mathematical Model for Redundancy Equation

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Section 1.2

RELIABILITY STRESS AND FAILURE RATE DATA

MIL-STD-785B, Task 203 MIL-HDBK-217F, Section 5.1 MIL-STD-756B, Type III, Method 2005, Task 202

> System: SAM Power Supply Assembly: Converter Schematic No.: 30684941 Part Ambient Temperature, Worst Case: 55 Degrees Celsius Environment: Space, Flight (SF)

RELIABILITY STRESS AND FAILURE RATE DATA

System: SAM Power Supply

Assembly: Converter

Schematic No.: 30684941

Part Ambient Temperature, Worst Case: 55.00 Degrees Celsius Environment: SF Prepared By: J. Smith

Ref.	Description/	Type/	Specification	Sti	ress	Stress	Pi	Pi	Pi	Pi	Pi	Failure Rate Parts Per Mi	
Desig.	Part Number	Value		Rated	Applied	Ratio	E	Q				Base	Total
U1	Intgrtd Ckt. 54LSOO Quadruple 2-In	H FP	Mil-Std-883/ Class B-1 itive-NAND Gates	Tj 175.00 Deg. C	Tj 55.519 Deg. C	14 Pins, Θjc,°C/W = 22.00	0.5 Type=		0.6 1=0.00	1.00 25,C2=0		<=100 Gates 5.00 Suppl 0.024 Watts	0.00671 Voltage Dissipated
U2	Intgrtd Ckt. LM139AJ Linear, Voltag	H DIP	Mil-Std-883/ Class B-1 rators	Tj 150.00 Deg. C	Tj 56.602 Deg. C	14 Pins, Øjc,°C/W = 28.00	0.5 Type=		1.1 1=0.01	1.00 00,C2=0	0.0048	<=100 Trans. 12.00 Suppl 0.057 Watts	
CR1	Diode 1N4148-1 Switching	General Purpose	Mil-S-19500/ 116 JANTX	Tj 175.00 Deg. C	Tj 55.240 Deg. C	Pd, W = 0.002 @jc,°C/W = 120.00	0.5	1.00	2.6		Pi C 1.00	0.00100 40.00 Appl 100.00 Rates	
VR1	Diode 1N4474 Voltage Regula	Zener/ Avalnch ator and	Mil-S-19500/ 406 JANTX Voltage Reference		Tj 58.000 Deg. C /Zener)	Pd, W = 0.024 Øjc,°C/W = 125.00	0.5			Pi S 1.000	Pi C 1.00	0.00200	0.00190
Q1	Transistor 2N2222A NPN and PNP L	NPN/PNP	225 JANTX	Tj 150.00 Deg. C	Tj 55.210 Deg. C	Pd, W = 0.003 0jc,°C/W = 70.00	0.5	1.00 Pi S⊓ Pr=	ub R = 0.501	1.50 0.77 Matts		0.00074 25.00 Appl 50.00 Rate	
Q2	Transistor 2N2907A NPN and PNP Su	NPN/PNP	Mil-S-19500/ 291 JANTX	Tj 150.00 Deg. C	Tj 56.411 Deg. C	Pd, W = 0.014 0jc,°C/W = 98.00	0.5	1.00 Pi S Pr=	PiT 2.0 ubR = 0.40	0.70	Pi S 0.30	0.00074 37.00 Appl 60.00 Rates	
R1	Resistor RCR07G102JS	1.00K Ohms	Mil-R-39008, S Insitd Fxd Comp	0.250 Watts	0.001 Watts	< 0.1	Pi E 0.5	Pi Q 0.03	Pi R 1.00			0.00053	0.00001
R2	Resistor RWR74S1210FP	121.00 Ohms	Mil-R-39007, P Power Fixed WW	5.000 Watts	0.065 Watts	< 0.1	Pi E 0.3	Pi Q 0.30	Pi R 1.00			0.00632	0.00057
R3	Resistor RJR24FW501P	500.00 Ohms	Mil-R-39035, P Trimmer NonWW	0.500 Watts	0.004 Watts	< 0.1	Pi E 0.5		Pi R 1.00		Taps 1.00	0.02548 3 Tap Connec	0.00255 t'ns on Pots
R4	Resistor M83401/01	50.00 Ohms	Mil-R-83401,Mil Netwrk Fxd Film	1.750 Watts	0.800 Watts	0.5	Pi E 0.5	Pi Q 1.00		Pi T 8.37	NR 8	0.00006 8 Film Resi	0.00201 stors in use
C1	Capacitor CKR06BX104KP	100.00 nF	Mil-C-39014, P Ceramc,Gen.Pur.	100.0 Volts	25.00 Volts	0.3	Pi E 0.4		Pi CV 1.45			0.00118	0.00021
C2	Capacitor CMR06F471JPDP	470.00 pF	Mil-C-39001, P Mica, Dipped	500.0 Volts	24.00 Volts	< 0.1	Pi E 0.5	Pi Q 0.30	Pi CV 1.06			0.00046	0.00007
C3	Capacitor CLR73BH330KGP		Mil-C-39006, P Tntlm Elctrlytc	30.0 Volts	12.00 Volts	0.4	Pi E 0.5	Pi Q 0.30	Pi CV 1.03			0.00521 Slug,Hermetic	0.00161 Construct'n
C4	Capacitor CSR13F476KP	47.00 uF	Mîl-C-39003, P Tntim Elctrlytc	35.0 Volts	12.00 Volts	0.3	Pi E 0.4	Pi Q 0.30	Pi CV 1.59			0.00964 Cir. Res. = 1	0.00012 .0 Ohms/Volt
T1	Transformer TF4R03GA203	Power	Mil-T-27 ,Mil Audio,Pwr,HiPwr Power Transforma	Deg. C	Deg. C		Pi E 0.5	Pi Q 8.00				0.00354	0.01416

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RELIABILITY STRESS AND FAILURE RATE DATA

System: SAM Power Supply

Assembly: Converter

Sche

Schematic No.: 30684941

Part Ambient Temperature, Worst Case: 55.00 Degrees Celsius Environment: SF Prepared By: J. Smith

Ref.	Description/	Type/	Specification	Sti	ress	Stress	Pi	Pi	Pi	Pi		Failure Rate Parts Per Mi	
Desig.	Part Number	Value	spectrication	Rated	Applied	Ratio	E	Q	PI	P1	Pi	Base	Total
L1	Coil CL3500GA203	Variabl	Mil-C-15305,Mil Fxd and Var, RF Variable Constru	Deg. C	75.00 Deg. C	1	Pi E 0.5		Pi C 2.00			0.00063	0.00251
к1	Relay, SPST RL 53441	Resistv Load	Mil-R-39016, R General Purpose Balanced Armatur		0.100 Amps.	0.1	Pi E 0.5	0.10		Pi F 5.0 1.02			
J1	Connector GO6 Series		Mil-C-24308,Mil Rack and Panel 22 Actv Cntcts				Pi E 0.5		Pi P 4.31			0.00105 1.00 Mating B Insert Mat	0.00454 Cycls/1K Hrs
J2	PCB Connector TP 32PSTR		Mil-C-55302,Mil PCB Two-Piece 32 Active Pins				Pi E 0.5		Pi P 5.94	Pi K 2.00		0.00053 1.00 Mating	0.00314 Cycls/1K Hrs
13	IC Socket ICS 16PSTR		Mil-S-83734,Mil Plug-in Socket 16 Acty Cntcts				Pi E 0.5		Pi P 3.42			0.00042	0.00072
P1	Intercon Assy 3068491 PWB		,Mil Printed Wiring				Pi E 0.5	Pi Q 1.00	Pi C 1.00		:	0.000041 N1= 40 Wave N2= 6 Hand	0.00254 solder PTHs. solder PTHs.
	Connections	Manual Tools	Standard ,Mil Solderless wrap				Pi E 0.5	Pi Q 1.00				0.0000035 N = 10 Conne	0.00002

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0.03082

Section 2.0

MAINTAINABILITY PREDICTION

Mean Time To Repair (MTTR) MIL-HDBK-472, Procedure IIA MIL-STD-470A, Task 203

Table 1, Maintainability Analysis Worksheet

Γ

Environment: SF

		Avera	ge Corre	ctive Ma	intenanc	e Task T	imesM	inutes		
Assembly Name Schematic No.	Failure Rate: LambdaPPM	Locali- zation	Isola- tion	Dissas- sembly	Inter- change	Reas- sembly	Align- ment	Check- out	Repair Time:Rp Mins.	Lambda x Rp
Converter 30684941	0.1937	4.00	4.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	4.00	4.00	25.00	4.842
Inverter A 30684942	0.2983	4.00	4.00	2.50	2.00	2.50	4.00	4.00	23.00	6.860
Inverter B 30684943	0.3430	4.00	4.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	4.00	4.00	22.00	7.54
Encoder 30684944	0.1375	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	28.00	3.850
Splitter 30684945	0.1355	4.00	4.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	4.00	4.00	25.00	3.387
age Totals: rand Totals:	1.1080	L,	I	L		I	<u> </u>	<u>l</u>	123.00 123.00	26.48

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Total Failure Rate, $\lambda = 1.1080 \, / \, 10^6 \, \, Hours$

For normal distribution of R:

$$MTTR = \begin{bmatrix} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \lambda_i R_i \\ \sum_{i=1}^{n} \lambda_i \end{bmatrix} = \frac{26.4869}{1.1080}$$

$$= 23.9051$$
 Minutes $= 0.3984$ Hours

For $R=M_{ct}\,,\ M_{maxct}\,$ at 95% Confidence Level is

 $M_{maxct} = \mu + 1.645\sigma = 28.3871$ Minutes = 0.4731 Hours

Where,

$$\sigma = \left[\frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n} (\mu - R_i)^2}{n-1}\right]^{0.5} = 2.3022 \text{ Minutes}$$
$$\mu = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n} R_i}{n} = 24.6000 \text{ Minutes}$$

n = Quantity of repairables, 5 LRUs

Figure 1, MTTR and M_{maxct} Calculation for Normal Distribution

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Table 1, Maintainability Analysis Worksheet

Γ

Environment: SF

		Avera	ge Corre	ctive Ma	intenanc	e Task T	imesM	inutes		
Assembly Name Schematic No.	Failure Rate: LambdaPPM	Locali- zation	Isola- tion	Dissas- sembly	Inter- change	Reas- sembly	Align- ment	Check- out	Repair Time:Rp Mins.	Lambda x Log Rp
Converter 30684941	0.1937	4.00	4.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	4.00	4.00	25.00	0.623
Inverter A 30684942	0.2983	4.00	4.00	2.50	2.00	2.50	4.00	4.00	23.00	0.935
Inverter B 30684943	0.3430	4.00	4.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	4.00	4.00	22.00	1.060
Encoder 30684944	0.1375	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	28.00	0.458
Splitter 30684945	0.1355	4.00	4.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	4.00	4.00	25.00	0.436

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Total Failure Rate, $\lambda = 1.1080 / 10^6$ Hours

For log-normal distribution of R:

MTTR = Antilog
$$\begin{bmatrix} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \lambda_i \log R_i \\ \sum_{i=1}^{n} \lambda_i \end{bmatrix}$$
 = Antilog $\begin{bmatrix} 3.5134 \\ 1.1080 \end{bmatrix}$

= 23.8294 Minutes = 0.3972 Hours

For $R = M_{ct}$, M_{maxct} at 95% Confidence Level is

 $M_{maxet} = Antilog \left[\mu + 1.645\sigma\right] = 28.5441 Minutes = 0.4757 Hours$

Where,

$$\sigma = \left[\frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n} (\mu - \log M_{ct_i})^2}{n-1}\right]^{2} = \text{Log } 0.0925 \text{ Minutes}$$
$$\mu = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n} \log M_{ct_i}}{n} = \text{Log } 3.1993 \text{ Minutes}$$

n = Quantity of repairables, 5 LRUs

Figure 2, MTTR and M_{maxct} Calculation for Log-Normal Distribution

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Section 3.0

DERATING ELECTRICAL STRESS ANALYSIS

MIL-STD-785B, Task 207 MIL-STD-975G System: SAM Power Supply

Assembly: Converter

Schematic No.: 30684941

Part Ambient Temperature, Worst Case: 55.00 Degrees Celsius Γ

Environment: SF

Prepared By: J. Smith

Ref.	Description/	Type/	Specification		rical and	Thermal S	Stress	Stress Ratio	Demosice
Desig.		Value	spectrication	Maximum Rated	Derating Factor	Derated	Actual	Actual Derated	Remarks
U1	Intgrtd Ckt. 54LSOO	LSTTL H FP	Mil-Std-883/ Class B-1						Quadruple 2-Input Positive-NAND Gates.
	Parameter: Supply Volt Power Dissi Input Volta Junction Tee Output Curr Pin 1 Pin 2 Pin 3 Pin 4	pation () ge mperature	Watts) e (°C.) eres):	5.50 0.031 5.50 175.00 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004	1.00 1.00 0.57 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80	5.50 0.031 5.50 100.00 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003	5.00 0.024 5.00 55.52 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001	0.9 0.8 0.9 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3	Тс = 55 °С.; Өјс = 22 °С./Watt.
U2	Intgrtd Ckt. LM139AJ	LIN BIP H DIP	Mil-Std-883/ Class B-1						Linear, Voltage Comparators.
	Parameter: Supply Volta Power Dissi Input Volta Junction Ter Output Curro Pin 1 Pin 2 Pin 3 Pin 4	pation () ge mperature ent (Ampe	e (°C.)	30.00 0.800 36.00 150.00 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010	0.90 0.75 1.00 0.67 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80	27.00 0.600 36.00 100.00 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008	12.00 0.057 12.00 56.60 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.001	0.4 < 0.1 0.3 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.1	Tc = 55 °C.; Øjc = 28 °C./Watt.
CR1	Diode 1N4148-1		Mil-S-19500/ 116 JANTX						
	Parameter: Junction Ter PIV Surge Currer Forward Curr	nt (Amper		175.000 100.000 0.399 0.160	0.71 0.70 0.50 0.50	125.000 70.000 0.200 0.080	55.240 40.000 0.150 0.002	0.4 0.6 0.8 < 0.1	Tc = 55 °C.; 0jc = 120 °C./Watt. Power Dissipation = .002 Watts.
VR1	Diode 1N4461	Zener/ Avalnch	Mil-S-19500/ 406 JANTX						Iz Derated (Amps.) = Iz Nom. + 0.5(Iz Max Iz Nom.)
	Parameter: Junction Ter Power (Watts Zener Currer	5)		175.000 1.192 0.524	0.71 0.50 0.66	125.000 0.596 0.346		0.4 < 0.1 < 0.1	Iz Nom. = 0.1668, Iz Max. = 0.5243 Tc = 55 °C.; ⊖jc = 125 °C./Watt.
Q1	Transistor 2N2222A	NPN/PNP	Mil-S-19500/ 225 JANTX				4		
	Parameter: Junction Ter Power (Watts Voltage Current (Amp	s)	e (°C.)	150.000 0.379 50.000 0.607	0.83 0.50 0.75 0.75	125.000 0.190 37.500 0.455	0.003	0.4 < 0.1 0.7 < 0.1	Тс = 55 °С.; Өјс = 70 °С./Watt.
Q2	Transistor 2N2907A	NPN/PNP	Mil-S-19500/ 291 JANTX						
	Parameter: Junction Ter Power (Watte	s)	e (°C.)	150.000 0.299	0.83 0.50	125.000 0.150	56.411 0.014	0.5 < 0.1	Tc = 55 °C.; Θjc = 98 °C./Watt.

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System: SAM Power Supply

Assembly: Converter

Schematic No.: 30684941

Part Ambient Temperature, Worst Case: 55.00 Degrees Celsius · · · · · ·

Environment: SF

Prepared By: J. Smith

Ref.	Description/	Type/	Specification	Elect	rical and	Thermal S	Stress	Stress Ratio	
Desig.	Part Number	Value	spectrication	Maximum Rated	Derating Factor	Derated	Actual	Actual Derated	Remarks
	Voltage Current (Am	peres)		60.000 0.449	0.75 0.75	45.000 0.337	37.000 0.009	0.8 < 0.1	
R1	Resistor RCR07G102JS	1.00K Ohms	Mil-R-39008, S Insltd Fxd Comp						
	Parameter: Maximum Open Power (Watte Voltage	rating To s)	emp. (°C.)	130.000 0.250 15.811	1.00 0.60 0.80	130.000 0.150 12.649		0.4 < 0.1 < 0.1	
R2	Resistor RWR74S1210FP	121.00 Ohms	Mil-R-39007, P Power Fixed WW						
	Parameter: Maximum Oper Power (Watts Voltage	rating To s)	emp. (°C.)	275.000 5.000 23.074	1.00 0.50 0.80	275.000 2.486 18.459	55.000 0.065 2.804	0.2 < 0.1 0.2	
R3	Resistor RJR24FW501P	500.00 Ohms	Mil-R-39035, P Trimmer NonWW						
	Parameter: Maximum Oper Power (Watts Voltage	rating Te s)	emp. (°C.)	150.000 0.500 2.230	1.00 0.60 0.80	150.000 0.300 1.784	55.000 0.004 1.414	0.4 < 0.1 0.8	
R4	Resistor M83401/01	50.00 Ohms	Mil-R-83401,Mil Netwrk Fxd Film						
	Parameter: Maximum Oper Power (Watts Voltage		emp. (°C.)	125.000 1.750 9.354	1.00 0.60 0.80	125.000 1.050 7.483	55.000 0.800 6.325	0.4 0.8 0.8	
C1	Capacitor CKR06BX104KP		Mil-C-39014, P Ceramc,Gen.Pur.						
	Parameter: Maximum Oper Voltage	rating Te	emp. (°C.)	85.000 100.00	1.00 0.60	85.000 60.00	55.000 25.00	0.6 0.4	
C2	Capacitor CMR06F471JPDP		Mil-C-39001, P Mica, Dipped						
	Parameter: Maximum Oper Voltage	rating Te	emp. (°C.)	125.000 500.00	1.00 0.50	125.000 250.00	55.000 24.00	0.4 < 0.1	
C3	Capacitor CLR73BH330KGP		Mil-C- 39006, P Tntlm Elctrlytc						Slug,Hermetic Construction.
	Parameter: Maximum Oper Voltage	ating Te	emp. (°C.)	125.000 30.00	0.88 0.60	110.000 18.00	55.000 12.00	0.5 0.7	
С4	Capacitor CSR13F476KP	47.00 uF	Mil-C-39003, P Tntlm Elctrlytc						
	Parameter:	·	-						

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Section 4.0

FAILURE MODE, EFFECTS AND CRITICALITY ANALYSIS - MAINTAINABILITY INFORMATION (FMECA-MI)

MIL-STD-785B, Task 204 MIL-STD-1629A, Tasks 101, 102 and 103 MIL-STD-470A, Task 205 Section 4.1

FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS

Task 101 of MIL-STD-1629A

FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS

System: SAM Power Supply Indenture Level: 3 Reference Drawing: Converter, 30684941

Date: Sheet: 1 Compiled By: J. Smith Approved By: S. L. Fri

Referen Mission:	Reference Drawing: Converter, 30684941 Mission: Space, Flight (SF)	ter, 30684941 :)						Compiled By: J. Smith Approved By: S. L. Fr	J. Smíth S. L. Friedman		
1 dent	[ton/Eunctional	Euroction	Esilura Modec	Miccian Dhaca/		Failure Effects		Eailina	Common ti no	Contractor	Domonto
No.			and Causes		Local Effects	Next Higher Level	End Effects	Petection Method	Provisions	Class	Vering
a1-1	Transistor 2N2907A Low Frequency Bipolar (NPN/PNP)	Switch Transistor Driver	Open	Power On	5V Regulator Inoperative	Loss of 5 Volts	Converter Inoperative	No 1553 Response	Redundant Circuits	111	
a1-2			Short	Power On	5V Regulator Full On	26 V on 5V Line. Parts Damaged	Open Primary Circuit Breaker	No 1553 Response	Redundant Circuits	71	
CR1-1	Diode 1N4148-1 General Purpose	Overvol tage Protection	Open	Power On	Loss of Overvoltage Protection	Possible Possible Damage to U19 Converter Malfuncti	Ę	Periodic Test	Redundant Circuits	٨I	
CR1-2			Short	Power On	5V Applied to U19 Analog U19 Analog Channel 7 Channel 7 Inoperativ	U19 Analog Channel 7 Inoperative	Converter Inoperative	Periodic Test	Redundant Circuits	111	
R1-1	Resistor RCR07G102JS Insulated Fixed Composition, ER	Current Limit	Open	Power On	a1,a2,a3,u2 Inoperative	Current Test Inoperative	Converter Malfunctions	Periodic Test	Redundant Circuits	111	
R1-2			Short	Power On	Possible damage to Q2	Current Test Inoperative	Converter Malfunctions	Periodic Test	Redundant Circuits	111	
c1-1	Capacitor CKR06BX104KP General Purpose Ceramic, ER	Feedback Capacitor	Open	Power On	Malfunction of Active Low Power Filter	Malfunction Degraded Possible of Active Low Filtering for Converter Power Filter U19, Analog Malfuncti Channel 7	Ę	Periodic Test	Redundant Circuits	5-4 5-4 5-4	
c1-2			Short	Power On	Active Low Power Filter Inoperative	Loss of Signal to U19, Analog Channel 7	Converter Inoperative	Periodic Test	Redundant Circuits	2	
		<pre>/// 2003 bit bit bit bit i to bit</pre>									

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Section 4.2

CRITICALITY ANALYSIS

Task 102 of MIL-STD-1629A

CRITICALITY ANALYSIS

System: Indentu Referen Mission	System: SAM Power Supply Indenture Level: 3 Reference Drawing: Converter, 30684941 Mission: Space, Flight (SF)	ter, 30684941 F)							Date: Sheet: 1 Compiled Approved	Date: Sheet: 1 Compiled By: J. Smith Approved By: S. L. Fr ⁱ	Smith L. Friedman		
I dent.	Item/functional Identification	Function	Failure Modes and Caneee	Mission Phase/ Operational	Severity Class	Failure Probability	Failure 54204	Failure	Failure	Operating	Failure	I tem	Remarks
			2000		C1055	Failure Rate Data Source	Errect Probability (8)	Ratio (a)	кате (др) РРМН	time (t) Hours	mode Crit # Cm=8αλpt	Crit# Cr=Z(Cm)	
Q1-1	Transistor 2N2907A Low Frequency Bipolar (NPN/PNP)	Switch Transistor Driver	Open	Power On	111	MIL-HDBK- 217f, N1	0.50	0.40	1.106-10	1.00E-01	2.20E-12	2.20E-12	
a1-2			Short	Power On	2	MIL-HDBK- 217F, N1	0.10	0.60	1.10E-10	1.00E-01	6.60E-13	6.60E-13	
CR1-1	Diode 114148-1 General Purpose	Overvol tage Protection	Open	Power On	1	MIL-HDBK- 217F, N1	0.10	0.40	1.40E-10	1.00E-01 5.60E-13	5.60E-13	1.22E-12	
CR1-2			Short	Power On	11	MIL-HDBK- 217F, N1	0.50	0.60	1.40E-10	1.00E-01	4.20E-12	6.40E-12	
R1-1	Resistor RCR07G102JS Insulated Fixed Composition, ER	Current Limit	Open	Power On	II	MIL-HDBK- 217F, N1	0.50	0.85	1.00E-11	1.00E-01	4.25E-13	6.83E-12	
R1-2			Short	Power On	I	MIL-HDBK- 217F, N1	0.50	0.15	1.00E-11	1.00E-01	7.50E-14	6.90E-12	
c1-1	Capacitor CKR06BX104KP General Purpose Ceramic, ER	Feedback Capacitor	Open	Power On	II	MIL-HDBK- 217F, N1	0.50	0.85	2.10E-10	1.00E-01	8.93E-12	1.58E-11	
c1-2			Short	Power On	N	MIL-HDBK- 217F, N1	0.10	0.15	2.10E-10	1.006-01	3.15E-13	1.53E-12	
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Section 4.3

MAINTAINABILITY INFORMATION

Task 103 of MIL-STD-1629A

FAILURE MODE EFFECTS AND CRITICALITY ANALYSIS - MAINTAINABILITY INFORMATION

System/Subsystem Nomenclature: SAM Power Supply

Indenture Level: 3 Reference Drawing: Converter, 30684941

System Identification No.: 100-113 Mission: Space, Flight (SF)

Date: Sheet: 1 Prepared By: J. Smith Approved By: S. L. Friedm

System/:	System/Subsystem Description: Converter	ion: Converter				Compensating	Compensating Provisions: Redundant Convert	edundant Convei	÷		Approved	Approved By: S. L. Friedman	Friedman
Ident -	[tem/Functional	Function	Functional		Engineering Failure Mode	Mission		Failure Effects		E cilino	Course i tru		
No.		No.	Ltr		No.	Phase	Local Effects	Next Hīgher Level	End Effects	ç	Class	¥	Mode MTBF and Remarks
a1-1	Transistor 2N2907A Low Frequency Bipolar (NPN/PNP)	Switch Transistor Driver	Open	0	Open	Power On	5V Regulator Inoperative	Loss of 5 Volts	Converter Inoperative	No 1553 Response	H	Ŷ	MTBF~Hrs.: 9.091E+15
a1-2			Short	0	Short	Power On	5V Regulator Full On	26 V on 5V Line. Parts Damaged	Open Primary Circuit Breaker	No 1553 Response	N	0 Z	MTBF~Hrs.: 9.091E+15
CR1-1	Diode 1N4148-1 General Purpose	Overvoltage Protection	Open	Ö	Open	Power On	Loss of Overvoltage Protection	Possible Damage to U19	Possible Converter Malfunction	Periodic Test	N	Ŷ	MTBF"Hrs.: 7.143E+15
CR1-2			Short	<u></u>	Short	Power On	5V Applied to U19 Analog Channel 7	to U19 Analog Channel 7 Inoperative	Converter Inoperative	Periodic Test	111	N.	MTBF~Hrs.: 7.143E+15
R1-1	Resistor RCR07G102JS Insulated Fixed Composition, ER	Current Limit	Open	ō	Open	Power On	a1,a2,a3,u2 Inoperative	Current Test Inoperative	Converter Malfunctions	Periodic Test	111	Ŷ	MTBF~Hrs.: 1.000E+17
R1-2			Short	<u></u>	Short	Power On	Possible damage to Q2	Current Test Inoperative	Converter Malfunctions	Periodic Test	111	° Z	MTBF~Hrs.: 1.000E+17
c1-1	Capacitor CKRO6bX104kP General Purpose Ceramic, ER	Feedback Capacitor	Open	ō	Open	Power On	Malfunction of Active Low Power Filter	Degraded Filtering for U19, Analog Channel 7	Possible Converter Malfunction	Periodic Test	111	°.	MTBF~Hrs.: 4.762E+15
C1-2			Short	<u>ō</u>	Short	Power On	Active Low Power Filter Inoperative	Loss of Signal to U19, Analog Channel 7	Converter Inoperative	Per iodic Test	N	Ŷ	MTBF ⁻ Hrs.: 4.762E+15
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Section 5.0

SAFETY HAZARD ANALYSIS

MIL-STD-882B, Tasks 203 and 204

SUBSYSTEM HAZARD ANALYSIS

System: SAM Power Supply Indenture Level: 3 Reference Drawing: Converter, 30684941

Date: Sheet: 1 Compiled By: J. Smith Approved By: S. L. Fri

Mission	Mission: Space, Flight (SF)	(Approved By:		J. Smith S. L. Friedman		
Ident	Item/Functional	Function	Dart failure	Part Mode	Svetem Event	Primar	Primary Part Failure Mode	e Mode	Pactor	Recomment	Recommended Action	
No.	Identification (Nomenclature)		Modes and Causes	failure Rate (Ap)	Phase	Local Effects	Next Higher Level	End Effects	nazard Risk Index (HRI)	Failure Detection Method	Compensating Provisions	·
e1-1	Transistor 2N2907A Low Frequency Bioclar (NDW/DND)	Switch Transistor Driver	Open	1.10E-10	All Operational 5V Regulator Modes Inoperative	5V Regulator Inoperative	Loss of 5 Volts	Converter Inoperative	III E	No 1553 Response	Redundant Circuits	,
01-2			Short	1.10E-10	All Operational 5V Regulator Modes Full On	5V Regulator Full On	26V on 5V Line. Parts Damaged	Open Primary Circuit Breaker	IV E	No 1553 Response	Redundant Circuits	
CR1-1	Diode 1N4148-1 General Purpose	Overvol tage Protection	Open	1.40E-10	All Operational Loss of Modes Protect U19 Anal Channel	tage ion to log 7	Possible Possible Damage to U19 Converter Analog Malfuncti Channel 7	Possible Converter Malfunction	111 E	Periodic Test	Redundant Circuits	
CR1-2			Short	1.40E-10	1.40E-10 All Operational 5V Applied Modes Channel 7	5V Applied U19 Analog Channel 7	U19 Analog Channel 7 Inoperative	Converter Inoperative	111 E	Periodic Test	Redundant Circuits	
R1-1	Resistor RLR07C1501FR Insulated Fixed	Current Limit	0pen	3.97E-09	All Operational 01,02,03,U2 Modes	01,02,03,U2 Inoperative	Current Test Inoperative	Converter Malfunction	111 E	Periodic Test	Redundant Circuits	
			Short	3.97E-09	All Operational Damage to	0 02	Current Test Inoperative	Converter Malfunction	111 E	Periodic Test	Redundant Circuíts	
c1-1	Capacitor CKR06BX104KP General Purpose Ceramic, ER	Feedback Capacitor	Open	6.89E-09	All Operational Malfunction Modes of Active Low Power Filter	· · · · ·	Degraded Possible Filtering for Converter U19, Analog Malfuncti Channel 7	Possible Converter Malfunction	III E	Periodic Test	Redundant Circuits	
c1-2			Open	6.89E-09	All Operational Active Low Modes Inoperative	6.0	Loss of Converter Signal to U19 Inoperative Analog Ch. 7	Converter Inoperative	IVE	Periodic Test	Redundant Circuits	
L1-1	Filter Mil-T-27/356-39 Inductor	Input Filter Inductor	Open	2.51E-09	All Operational Loss of Modes Power	26V	Regulator Inoperative	Converter Inoperative	111 E	No 1553 Response	Redundant Circuits	
۲۱-2			Short	2.51E-09	All Operational Degraded 2V Modes		Possible EMI on 26V Line	Possible Converter Malfunction	111 E	Periodic Test	Redundant Circuits	
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Section 6.0

WORST CASE ELECTRONIC PARTS/CIRCUITS TOLERANCE ANALYSIS

MIL-STD-785B, Task 206




Figure 1, Voltage Divider Circuit

Note: This simple circuit is used to illustrate the procedure.

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WORST CASE CIRCUIT TOLERANCE ANALYSIS

System: SAM Power Supply

Assembly: Converter

Schematic No.: 30684941

Prepared By: J. Smith

Circuit: Voltage Divider

Part Ambient Temperature, Worst Case: 55.00 Degrees Celsius

Ref. Desig.	Description/ Part Number	Type/ Value	Specification	Part Nominal Value, X	Nominal Circuit Function Value, f	Initial Tolerance, ^{ΔT} Ι (%)	Temp. Tolerance, ^{ΔT} T (%)	End of Life Tolerance, ^{ΔT} EOL (%)	Part Variance, ^Ø X	Partial Derivative Squared, (δf/δX) ²	(δf/δX)² •(σ _X 2)
Ei	Input Voltage	DC Volts	Mil-Std-704	10.00000 Volts	9.090909 Volts	2.000000	0.200000	2.000000	0.019600	0.826532	0.016200
R1	Resistor RLR07C1000FR	100.00 Ohms	Mil-R-39017, R Insltd Fxd Film	100.0000 Ohms	9.090909 Volts	2.000000	0.550000	2.000000	2.300278	0.000068	0.000157
R2	Resistor RLR07C1001FR	1.00K Ohms	Mil-R-39017, R Insltd Fxd Film	1000.000 Ohms	9.090909 Volts	2.000000	0.550000	2.000000	230.0278	6.8E-07	0.000157

0.01651

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WORST CASE CIRCUIT TOLERANCE ANALYSIS SUMMARY

System: SAM Power Supply Assembly: Converter Schematic No.: 30684941 Circuit: Voltage Divider Part Ambient Temperature, Worst Case: 55.00 Degrees Celsius Prepared By: J. Smith

 $V_{O} = f(E_{i}, R_{1}, R_{2})$

 $V_0 = E_i \cdot R_2 / (R_1 + R_2)$

 $V_{O} = 9.090909$ Volts

$$\sigma_{V_O}^2 = \left(\delta V_O / \delta E_i\right)^2 \cdot \sigma_{E_i}^2 + \left(\delta V_O / \delta R_1\right)^2 \cdot \sigma_{R_1}^2 + \left(\delta V_O / \delta R_2\right)^2 \cdot \sigma_{R_2}^2$$

$$\sigma_{V_O}^2 = 0.016200 + 0.00015 + 0.000157$$

$$\sigma_{V_O}^2 = 0.0165143$$

 $\sigma_{V_O} = 3\sqrt{0.016514} = \pm 0.385522$

 $\mu \pm 3\sigma_{V_{O}} = 9.090909 \ Volts \pm 0.385522 \ Volts$

 $\mu \pm 3\sigma_{V_{O}} = 8.705386$ Volts to 9.476432 Volts

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Section 7.0

THERMAL ANALYSIS

MIL-HDBK-251 MIL-D-18300 MIL-T-23103

THERMAL ANALYSIS DATA TABLES

System: SAM Power Supply

Assembly: Converter

Schematic No.: 30684941 Prepared By: J. Smith

Part Ambient Temperature, Worst Case: 55.000 Degrees Celsius Environment: SF

							Temperature	(°C.): T Max	к. / Тј Мах.	
Ref. Desig.	Description/ Part Number	Type/ Value	Specification	Power Dissipation (Watts,RMS)	Thermal Resistance Øjh (°C/W)	Mfr. Max. Rating	Maximum Derating	Rise	Actual	Thermal Safety Margin
U1	Intgrtd Ckt. 54LS00 Quadruple 2-II	LSTTL H FP nput Pos	Mil-Std-883/ Class B-1 itive-NAND Gates	0.0167	22.600	175.000	100.000	0.377	55.377	44.623
U2	Intgrtd Ckt. LM139AJ Linear, Volta	LINEAR H DIP ge Compa	Mil-Std-883/ Class B-1 rators	0.0404	28.600	150.000	100.000	1.157	56.157	43.843
CR1	Diode 1N4148-1	General Purpose	Mil-S-19500/ 116 JANTX	0.0014	120.600	175.000	125.000	0.171	55.171	69.829
VR1	Diode 1N4461	Zener/ Avalnch	Mil-S-19500/ 406 JANTX	0.0048	125.600	175.000	125.000	0.604	55.604	69.396
Q1	Transistor 2N2222A	NPN/PNP	Mil-S-19500/ 225 JANTX	0.0021	70.600	150.000	125.000	0.150	55.150	69.850
Q2	Transistor 2N2907A	NPN/PNP	Mil-S-19500/ 291 JANTX	0.0102	98.600	150.000	125.000	1.004	56.004	68.996
R1	Resistor RCR07G102JS	1.00K Ohms	Mil-R-39008, S Insltd Fxd Comp	0.0007	240.600	130.000	130.000	0.170	55.170	74.830
R2	Resistor RWR74S1210FP	121.00 Ohms	Mil-R-39007, P Power Fixed WW	0.0460	50.600	275.000	275.000	2.325	57.325	217.675
R3	Resistor RJR24FW501P	500.00 Ohms	Mil-R-39035, P Trimmer NonWW	0.0028	130.600	150.000	150.000	0.369	55.369	94.631
R4	Resistor M83401/01	50.00 Ohms	Mil-R-83401,Mil Netwrk Fxd Film	0.5656	32.029	125.000	125.000	18.115	73.115	51.885
C1	Capacitor CKR06BX104KP	100.00 nF	Mil-C-39014, P Ceramc,Gen.Pur.			85.000	110.000		55.000	55.000
C2	Capacitor CMR06F471JPDP		Mil-C-39001, P Mica, Dipped			125.000	110.000		55.000	55.000
с3	Capacitor CLR73BH330KGP	33.00 uF	Mil-C-39006, P Tntlm Elctrlytc			125.000	110.000		55.000	55.000
C4	Capacitor CSR13F476KP	47.00 uF	Mil-C-39003, P Tntlm Elctrlytc			125.000	110.000		55.000	55.000
т1	Transformer TF4R03GA203	Power	Mil-T-27 ,Mil Audio,Pwr,HiPwr			130.000	105.000	20.000	75.000	30.000

Note: Blank entries indicate parameters which are not applicable.

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Section 8.0

FAULT TREE ANALYSIS

MIL-HKBK-338

Mathematical Model

Since all the events in the fault tree of Figure 1 are independent, the event probabilities are as follows:

$$P(C) = P(D) + P(E) - [P(D) \times P(E)]$$
$$P(Top) = P(A) \times P(B) \times P(C)$$

Where

P(A) = Probability of Event A, Servo Valve Driver Failure, $1 - e^{\lambda_A t}$, $4.29576 / 10^{12}$

- λ_A = Failure rate of Servo Valve Driver, U1, Hybrid Current Driver, 0.61368 / 10⁶ Hours.
 - t = Risk Exposure Time, 0.025 seconds or 7 / 10⁶ hours, for all events.
- P(B) = Probability of Event B, Shutoff Valve Watchdog Failure, $1 - e^{-\lambda_B t}$, $1.13323 / 10^{12}$
 - λ_B = Failure rate of Shutoff Valve Watchdog Circuit, U2, Errasable Programmable Logic Device (EPLD), 0.16189 / 10⁶ hours.
 - $t = 7 / 10^6$ hours.
- P(C) = Probability of Event C, Display Electronics Unit (DEU) fails to display ABS fault status,

$$P(D) + P(E) - [P(D) \times P(E)], \ (1 - e^{-\lambda_D t}) + (1 - e^{-\lambda_E t}) - [(1 - e^{-\lambda_D t}) \times (1 - e^{-\lambda_E t})], \ 2.26646 / 10^{12}.$$

P(D) = Probability of Event D, ABS Arm Watchdog Failure, $1 - e^{-\lambda_D t}$, $1.13323 / 10^{12}$




Figure 1, Automatic Brake Systems (ABS) Fault Tree Diagram

 $\lambda_{\it D} = \mbox{ Failure rate of the ABS Arm Watchdog Circuit, U3, EPLD, } \\ 0.16189 \, / \, 10^6 \mbox{ hours.}$

 $t = 7/10^6$ hours.

P(E) = Probability of Event E, Servo and Shutoff Valve Monitor Failure, $1 - e^{-\lambda_E t}$, $1.13323 / 10^{12}$

- λ_E = Failure rate of the Servo and Shutoff Valve Monitor Circuit, U4, EPLD, $0.16189 / 10^6$ hours.
 - $t = 7/10^6$ hours.

Therefore,

$$P(Top) = P(A) \times P(B) \times P(C)$$

 $= (4.29576/10^{12}) (1.13323/10^{12}) (2.26646/10^{12})$

 $= 11.033317 / 10^{36}$ or zero.


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Section 9.0

MECHANICAL RELIABILITY

(RADC-TR-85-194) October 1985

Stress/Strength Interference Method



Normalized Density Function of Excess Strength Over Load

Establish a new random variable D, where the difference of strength minus stress (load) is

D = Strength (S) - Stress (L) = S - L,
$$\mu_D = \mu_S - \mu_L$$
, $\sigma_D = \sqrt{\sigma_S^2 + \sigma_L^2}$ and where

 μ_D , μ_S , μ_L = Mean of the difference, strength and stress, respectively, and

 $\sigma_D, \sigma_S, \sigma_L$ = Standard Deviation of the difference, strength and stress, respectively.

Then the probability of failure, P(f), is

$$P(f) = P(S - L < 0) = P(D < 0) = P\left\{\frac{D - \mu_D}{\sigma_D} < \frac{-\mu_D}{\sigma_D}\right\} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}} \int_{-\infty}^{-\mu_D/\sigma_D} exp(-t^2/2) dt$$

for the P(f) = $\frac{1}{\sigma\sqrt{2\pi}} \int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} e^{-\frac{1}{2}\left(\frac{x-\mu}{\sigma}\right)^2} dx$ where the standard normal random variable at t = $\frac{x-\mu}{\omega} & -\frac{\mu}{D} / \sigma D = -9.0766753347$ at t = $\frac{\mu}{D} = -\frac{\mu}{D}$, the difference probability defined by the difference probabilit

$$t = \frac{x - \mu}{\sigma} & -\mu_D / \sigma_D = -9.0766753347 \text{ at } t = \frac{\mu_S - \mu_L}{\sqrt{\sigma_S^2 + \sigma_L^2}}, \text{ the difference probability density}$$

function is normalized to a zero mean and a standard deviation of one.

The reliability prediction, 1-P(f), for the MTA Propellant Tank, which has a ultimate strength normal distribution mean of $\mu_S = 160,000$ psi and a standard deviation of $\sigma_S = 17,660$ psi and an in - orbit stress load (MEOP) normal distribution mean of $\mu_L = 250$ psi and a standard deviation of $\sigma_L = 50$ psi, is 0.9999999999.

Monopropellant Tank Reliability Mathematical Model and Prediction

Section 10.0

EXAMPLE FAILURE RATE ANALYSIS FOR POPPET VALVE ASSEMBLY

Carderock Div, NSWC-92/L01, "Handbook of Reliability Prediction Procedures for Mechanical Equipment", May 1992 Poppet Valve Assembly

$$\lambda_{PO} = \lambda_{PO,B} \frac{Q_a}{Q_f}$$

Where:

$$\lambda_{PO}$$
 = Failure rate of the poppet assembly, failures/million operations

 $\lambda_{PO,B} =$ Base failure rate for poppet assembly, failures/million operations

$$Q_a$$
 = Leakage rate, in³/min

 Q_f = Leakage rate considered to be valve failure, in³/min

$$Q_a = \frac{2x10^4 D_{MS} f^3 (P_1^2 - P_2^2)}{V_a L_W (S_S)^{3/2}}$$

Where:

 $Q_a =$ Actual fluid leakage, in³/min

 D_{MS} = Mean seat diameter, in

f = Mean surface finish of opposing surfaces, min

$$P_1 =$$
 Upstream pressure, lb/in²

 $P_2 = Downstream pressure, Ib/in_2$

$$V_a$$
 = Absolute fluid viscosity, lb-min/in²

 L_W = Radial seat land width, in.

 $S_S = Apparent seat stress, Ib/in_2$

$$\lambda_{PO} = \lambda_{PO,B} \cdot C_P \cdot C_Q \cdot C_F \cdot C_V \cdot C_N \cdot C_S \cdot C_{DT} \cdot C_{SW} \cdot C_W$$

Where:

 λ_{PO} = Failure rate of poppet assembly in failures/million operations; 1.26

 $\lambda_{PO,B}$ = Base failure rate of poppet assembly, 1.40 failures/million operations

- C_P = Multiplying factor which considers the effect of fluid pressure on the base failure rate, 1.0
- C_Q = Multiplying factor which considers the effect of allowable leakage on the base failure rate, 1.0
- C_F = Multiplying factor which considers the effect of surface finish on the base failure rate, 1.0
- C_V = Multiplying factor which considers the effect of fluid fiscosity/temperature on the base failure rate, 1.0
- C_N = Multiplying factor which considers the effect of contaminants on the base

failure rate, 1.0625

- C_{S} = Multiplying factor which considers the effect of the apparent seat stress on the base failure rate, 0.621119
- C_{DT} = Multiplying factor which considers the effect of the seat diameter on the base failure rate, 1.09
- C_{SW} = Multiplying factor which considers the effect of the seat land width on the base failure rate, 1.001182
- C_W = Multiplying factor which considers the effect of flow rate on the base failure rate, 1.25

Where:

$$C_{P} = \left(\frac{P_{1} - P_{2}}{3000}\right)^{2}$$

$$C_{Q} = 0.055 / Q_{f} \text{ For leakage (Per GPM_{R})} > 0.03,$$

$$C_{Q} = 4.1 - (79Q_{f}) \text{ For leakage (Per GPM_{R})} < 0.03,$$

$$C_{F} = \left(\frac{V_{O}}{V}\right)$$

Where: $V_o = 2 \ x \ 10^{-8} \ \text{lb min} \ / \ \text{in}^2$

$$C_N \left(\frac{C_0}{C_{10}}\right)^3 N_{10} \ GPM_R$$

Where:

 GPM_R = Rated Flow in gallons/min, 5.0

$$C_{10} =$$
 Standard System Filter Size = 10 micron

$$C_0 =$$
 System Filter Size in microns = 5 micron

 $N_{10} = 1.7$ Particles under 10 microns/Hour/GPM

$$C_S = \frac{1}{S_R^{3/2}} = 0.621119$$

Where:

$$S_R = \frac{12\pi D_M L_W}{D_S^2} = 0.758$$

$$S_S = \frac{P_S D_S^2}{4D_M L_W} = 1.2$$

$$S_S = \frac{\text{Force on Seat}}{\text{Seat Land Area}} = \frac{F_S}{A_{SL}}$$

$$F_S = \frac{\pi P_S D_S^2}{4}$$

Stress Ratio = $S_C / S_S = S_R$

Therefore, leakage varies with the seat stress as:

$$\left(\frac{1}{S}\right)^{3/2}$$

Minimum Contact Pressure = $S_C = 3P_S$ approximately three times the fluid pressure.

$$A_{SL} = \pi D_M \cdot L_W$$

Where:

 A_{SL} = Seat land area, in² L_W = Land area width, in D_M = Mean land width diameter, in

$$A_{ST} = \frac{\pi (D_s)^2}{4}$$

Where:

$$A_{ST}$$
 = Seat Area, in₂
 D_{S} = Diameter of seat exposed to fluid pressure, P_S, 0.70 in

$$C_{DT} = 1.1 D_{S} + 0.32$$

$$C_{SW} = 3.55 - 24.52 L_{W} + 72.99 L_{W}^{2} - 85.75 L_{W}^{3} \text{ for } L_{W} < 6$$

$$C_{W} = 1 + \left[\frac{F_{L}}{100}\right]^{2}$$

Where:

$$F_L$$
 = Ratio of actual flow rate to manufacturer's rating

Section 11.0

TESTABILITY / BIT ANALYSIS

MIL-STD-2165

TESTABILITY ANALYSIS

System: SAM Power Supply Indenture Level: 3


Date: Sheet: 1

Referen	Reference Drawing: Converter, 30684941 Mission: Space, Flight (SF)	ter, 30684941 F)						Approve	Approved By: J. Smith Approved By: S. L. Friedman	
ldent. No.	Item/Functional Identification (Nomenclature)	Function	Failure Mode Fault	Mission Phase/ Operational Mode	Severity Class (Probability Of Occurence, 1-Exp(-Cm)	Failure Rate (kp) PPMH	Undetectable Failure Rate (kp) PPMH	Undetectable Failure Acceptance Basis	Fault Isolation Functional Group
u 2-1	Transistor 2N2907A Low Frequency Bipolar (NPN/PNP)	Switch Transistor Driver	Open	Power On	111	2.20E-12	1.10E-10			Continuity Pin Drivers
Q2-2			Short	Power On	1	6.60E-13	1.10E-10			Continuity Pin Drivers
cr1-1	Diode 1N4148-1 General Purpose	Overvol tage Protection	Open	Power On	2	5.60E-13	1.40E-10	1.40E-10	No functional loss	Continuity Pin Drivers
CR1-2			Short	Power On	111	4.206-12	1.40E-10			Continuity Pin Drivers
R1-1	Resistor RCR076102JS Insulated Fixed Composition, ER	Current Limit	open	Power On	111	4.25E-13	1.00E-11			Continuity Pin Drivers
R1-2			Short	Power On	111	7.50E-14	1.00E-11 1.00E-11	1.00E-11	No functional loss, increased susceptability to subsequent fault	Continuity Pin Drivers
c1-1	Capacitor CKR06BX104KP General Purpose Ceramic, ER	Feedback Capacitor	Open	Power On	11	8.93E-12	2.10E-10	2.10E-10	No funtional loss, increased susceptability to subsequent fault	Power Supply
c1-2			Short	Power On	2	3.15E-13	2.10E-10			
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Section 12.0

CONFIDENCE LEVEL



Example: A customer wishes to purchase a system from a vendor, specifying that it be tested to demonstrate a mean-timebetween-failure of at least 200 hours with a confidence level of 95 percent.

In this case, CL=95, $X_1 = 0$, and MTBF = 200 for the minimum total test time. Enter chart at 95 percent on the CL axis. Move to the right to intersect curve $X_1 = 0$. Drop down to TTT/MTBF and read 3.0. Solving MTBF = 200, TTT = 3.0 x 200, or, the system must be operated at least 600 hours without any failure to meet specifications. Now, should a failure occur during the 600 hour test and we wish to try again, we would read over on the $X_1 = 1$ curve, then drop down to TTT/MTBF = 4.8, TTT=960 hours. With just one failure at any time during the test, specifications will have been met. Of course, this chart is not one-way. Simple establish any three values and crank out the fourth. A parting shot – note that for systems which are more cycle dependent than time-dependent, feel perfectly free to substitute mean-cycles-between-failure for mean-time-between-failure.

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