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REPORT TO THE CONGRESS

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Need To Improve Project Transition Management By The Department of Defense

B-164088

*BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL,
OF THE UNITED STATES*

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DEC. 8, 1969

C o n t e n t s

	<u>Page</u>
DIGEST	1
CHAPTER	
1 THE TRANSITION PROGRAM	3
2 NEED TO IMPROVE IDENTIFICATION AND CONTACTING OF ELIGIBLES, COUNSELING ACTIVITIES, AND VOCATIONAL AND ACADEMIC TRAINING	6
3 NEED FOR IMPROVEMENTS IN ACCOUNTING FOR COSTS AND PROGRAM RECORDKEEPING AND REPORTING PROCEDURES	12
4 FOLLOW-UP OF PROGRAM PARTICIPANTS	15
5 RECENT TRANSITION DEVELOPMENTS	17
6 EXECUTIVE AGENCY COMMENTS	19
7 SCOPE OF REVIEW	20
APPENDIX	
I Letter dated June 27, 1969, from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) to the General Accounting Office	23
II Project TRANSITION installations as of March 31, 1969	26
III Participation in Project TRANSITION as of March 31, 1969	27
IV Project TRANSITION training courses offered at Fort Knox, Kentucky during fiscal year 1968	28
V Project TRANSITION industry participation as of November 1, 1968	29

APPENDIX

Page

VI	Results of GAO follow-up of TRANSITION training participants	30
VII	Principal officials of the Department of Defense responsible for administration of activities discussed in this report	31

ABBREVIATIONS

DOD	Department of Defense
DOL	Department of Labor
GAO	General Accounting Office
GT	General Technical
OJT	On-the-job training
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
USES	United States Employment Service
VA	Veterans Administration

DIGEST

WHY THE REVIEW WAS MADE

Project TRANSITION was developed by the Department of Defense (DOD) in 1968 to provide educational and vocational training designed to increase the chances for employment of enlisted men in civilian life after separation from the service.

As of March 31, 1969, 250 installations were participating in TRANSITION. (See app. II.)

The General Accounting Office (GAO) reviewed Project TRANSITION at the five military installations with the longest experience in the program to obtain information on administration of the program and to identify areas where corrective action could reduce costs or improve its effectiveness.

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

In view of the relative newness of Project TRANSITION, GAO is not in a position to express an opinion on its overall effectiveness. (See p. 16.)

GAO found, however, that the program needs certain improvements if the objectives as outlined by DOD are to be attained.

Many enlisted personnel eligible to participate in the program were not identified during their last 6 months of service. Many others identified as eligible were not contacted to determine if they wanted to participate. In addition, a large number of Career Plans Questionnaires, which had been given to eligible servicemen, were not returned to the local TRANSITION office. (See p. 6.)

DOD considers counseling to be the keystone to the TRANSITION program. However, at three installations, the counselors did not have available a description of the courses offered by the program nor adequate current information on available jobs. (See p. 8.) Also, in many instances counselors were keeping inadequate records of the assistance given to each serviceman. (See p. 8.)

In some instances, the criteria used for determining needed training courses were inadequate. Program evaluation could not be accurately

performed because of incomplete, inaccurate, or nonexistent training records. Prerequisite admission standards for courses were not always followed either. (See p. 9.)

Other deficiencies were noted in accounting for costs (see p. 12) and in recordkeeping and reporting procedures. (See p. 13.) In addition, inadequacies were found in the follow-up evaluation of the program. (See p. 15.)

GAO mailed 519 questionnaires to recently separated servicemen who had taken TRANSITION training. About 31 percent of the 274 responses indicated employment in skills related to training received under TRANSITION. (See p. 16.)

Comments on recent Project TRANSITION program modifications are included on page 17.

RECOMMENDATIONS OR SUGGESTIONS

GAO proposed that D05 take appropriate action to correct the matters discussed above.

AGENCY ACTIONS AND UNRESOLVED ISSUES

Office of the Secretary of Defense officials were generally aware of the areas which needed improvement and advised that corrective action had been taken in an attempt to strengthen the administration of the program. (See p. 19.)

MATTERS FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE CONGRESS

The Committee on Appropriations of both the Senate and House of Representatives singled out Project TRANSITION for comment in their respective reports (Repts. 1576 and 1735) on the DOD Appropriation Bill, 1969. This report is being submitted for the consideration of these and other committees and Members of the Congress.

CHAPTER 1

THE TRANSITION PROGRAM

TRANSITION was established in response to the President's message on manpower in April 1967, when he stated, "We must make military service a path to productive careers." He requested the Secretary of Defense "to make available, to the maximum extent possible, in-service training and educational opportunities which will increase veterans' chances for employment in civilian life."

The primary objective of Project **TRANSITION** is to provide educational and vocational training and job counseling for enlisted personnel prior to their release from active duty to prepare them for postservice life. The Military Establishment each year returns over 800,000 enlisted personnel back to civilian life. Each separatee is a potential participant and beneficiary of Project **TRANSITION**, in varying degrees.

After establishing pilot projects at five installations in 1967, the Secretary of Defense directed that **TRANSITION** be placed into operational effect at major installations (205) beginning January 1968. BOD Directive 1332.22, dated March 16, 1968, gave the Secretaries of the military departments guidelines for developing **TRANSITION** training, education, and vocational counseling programs. At March 31, 1969, there were 250 installations participating in **TRANSITION**. (See app. II.) The five basic phases of Project **TRANSITION**, as envisioned by the Secretary of Defense, are a counseling program, an education program, a skill training program, a placement program, and a follow-up program.

Statistics furnished us by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) indicating participation in the project through March 31, 1969, are shown in appendix 111.

In developing Project **TRANSITION**, DOD established certain guidelines for operating the program, which provided that: All men who have from 1 to 6 months of service time remaining will be considered for the program, which is to be all-volunteer; education courses will be offered to bring the individual to the highest education level possible

prior to separation; training courses will be offered only when they reflect job requirements, actual or projected, and their content will be directly related to job demands; on-base facilities will be utilized where available; personnel will be released for training through local command arrangements; a counseling program will be provided for individual decisionmaking about the future; maximum training support will be sought from both the private and public sectors; job placement will be an integral part of the program,

TRANSITION training opportunities are made available through those formal military school courses which train men in civilian-related skills; on-the-job training (OJT) in those skill areas where there is a direct civilian counterpart; programmed instruction material; training in occupational skills which is sponsored or provided by all levels of Government and for which specific requirements are known to exist, e.g., Post Office Department; and facilities provided by businesses and labor organizations that have training capabilities and requirements for trained personnel. (See app. IV for areas in which military-sponsored skill training is offered at one installation visited and app. V for a listing of major companies participating in TRANSITION training.)

DOD has recognized that each of the military services has problems which affect the uniform handling of Project TRANSITION. One of the problems frequently encountered is the fact that at certain installations there are too few men available for TRANSITION training to justify forming classes. For example, large numbers of the Navy's enlisted personnel are not shore-based, but are aboard ships constituting the fleet. Hence, many types of training will not be available to them.

Similarly, the number of personnel discharged each month by the Air Force at most locations is small, when contrasted with the Army's experience. The greater the number of separatees at a base, the greater is the potential for satisfying training demands in class situations. Also, because the Air Force and Navy have a greater percentage than do the Army and Marines of separatees who have acquired in-service training in skills easily convertible to civilian

jobs, major emphasis has been placed on the counseling and placement efforts.

Our review of the early phases of the program was made primarily to obtain information on its administration and operation and to identify those areas where changes would improve program effectiveness or reduce costs. The scope of our review is described in chapter 7.

At the installations we visited, we found that no recent internal audits, management reviews, or special task force studies had been made relative to Project TRANSITION. However, members of the OSD Project TRANSITION office informed us that they are currently visiting TRANSITION sites throughout the country to lend support, provide information and assistance, and learn about innovative programs developed at the local level.

A list of the principal officials of DOD responsible for the administration of the activities discussed in this report is included as appendix VII.

CHAPTER 2

NEED TO IMPROVE IDENTIFICATION AND

CONTACTING OF ELIGIBLES, COUNSELING ACTIVITIES,

AND VOCATIONAL AND ACADEMIC TRAINING

IDENTIFICATION AND CONTACTING OF ELIGIBLES

At three of the five installations we visited, we found that many of the servicemen eligible for TRANSITION had not been identified. At one of the three installations, we found, on the basis of available records, that, of 1,181 enlisted men separated during September 1968, only 525 or less than one half were identified to the TRANSITION office.

In general, local regulations provide that unit or central personnel offices will submit a report at least monthly to the installation TRANSITION office, listing all enlisted servicemen who are scheduled for separation within 6 to 8 months.

Because of inadequacies in the recordkeeping at these installations, we were unable to definitely determine the reasons for failure to identify all eligibles. However, we believe that the deficiencies resulted mainly from servicemen transferring in after monthly TRANSITION reports were submitted and not being subsequently reported to the TRANSITION office by the gaining unit and because of the apparent failure of some local units to submit any report at all.

At three of the five installations, we found that Career Plans Questionnaires had not been administered to all servicemen identified as eligible for TRANSITION, and in some cases questionnaires that had been completed were not returned.

For example, at one installation, Project TRANSITION officials stated that they were aware that in none of the three major organizations at that installation were all eligible individuals being contacted to have them complete questionnaires. Also, these officials stated that a large

percentage of those individuals being contacted were not timely contacted. One of the organizations estimated that only about 25 percent of eligible personnel were contacted during the sixth or seventh month prior to completion of their active duty and that about 50 percent of the eligible individuals were not contacted at all. The project coordinator at this installation assured us that he would establish procedures to evaluate the Project TRANSITION staff's effectiveness in having eligible individuals complete questionnaires.

During our review, we found that many servicemen whose records show relatively low educational achievements and who appear to need TRANSITION training the most are not responding to the opportunities available under the program.

For example, at one Army installation we examined the records of the levels of educational achievement of those servicemen who separated during July and September 1968 and compared the results with the extent of their participation in TRANSITION, using the General Technical (GT) score as the measure of educational achievement. We found that about 45 percent of the separating servicemen with low GT scores did not take training.

Although TRANSITION is designed to be an all-volunteer program, we believe that a special emphasis should be given by TRANSITION counselors to identify those servicemen who have relatively low educational achievements and to interest them in the importance of obtaining additional training through TRANSITION. DOD has similarly recognized the necessity for special effort in identifying and stimulating interest among those whose background indicates a need for additional training and has brought this to the attention of local TRANSITION officials.

COUNSELING ACTIVITIES

At Treasure Island, where separations represent approximately one third of the total separations at all naval installations where Project TRANSITION sites have been established, the counseling given is primarily a 1-day effort directed toward job placement. This 1-day effort normally

occurs about 3 days before the serviceman is separated. It consists primarily of attending group lectures, movies, and meetings on veterans' rights, reserve obligations, and the civilian employment outlook as presented by representatives of the local TRANSITION staff, the Veterans Administration (VA), other Federal and State agencies, and private industry,

Approximately 90 percent of the servicemen separated from the installation are from the fleet and are usually transferred to the site from 10 to 90 days prior to their scheduled separation. Thus, fleet separatees as a group generally have not had available to them the full range of TRANSITION opportunities. Less understandable was the fact that the TRANSITION site officer had also extended the 1-day TRANSITION processing to shore-based personnel at Treasure Island, who were available for identification and counseling 6 months prior to their scheduled separation.

At three of the five installations we visited, we found that counselors did not have available a description of numerous courses offered under TRANSITION nor adequate current information on available jobs in various regions of the country, together with salary potentials. DOD publications stress the importance of helping the serviceman to determine what TRANSITION education or training will be most useful in terms of his particular needs. These publications also express the desirability for counselors to have available the latest information about job availability. In our opinion, a counseling program cannot be expected to achieve maximum effectiveness when it lacks sufficient information with which to properly advise the serviceman seeking assistance.

Counselors at two installations were not maintaining adequate records of each counseling session, were not preparing training plans for each enrollee, and were not maintaining adequate progress reports on TRANSITION training. As a result, records at these installations did not evidence that the counselors were performing their duties in the manner intended under the program. Without a record of the substantive content of each counseling session, a plan for training for each enrollee, or training progress reports, the counselor has little basis upon which to measure

the effectiveness of the program as it relates to individual participants.

At one Army installation, servicemen were generally not being counseled in the techniques of applying for jobs, writing resumes, and in the conduct of job interviews. Also, some servicemen at this installation stated that they were not receiving information on the benefits available under the G.I. Bill from VA and the opportunities available for taking courses after separation, even though pamphlets containing this information were available in the **TRANSITION** office. The Director, General Education Development, who is also the Project TRANSITION Officer, stated that he would take the action necessary to ensure that servicemen are counseled in job-seeking techniques and advised of benefits available from VA, when we discussed these matters with him.

Inasmuch as counseling is considered by DOD to be the keystone of the program, we believe more attention should be directed to correcting deficiencies in the areas of the availability of adequate information for use in counseling; the maintenance of counseling records; job-seeking assistance; and information on educational benefits available from Government sources after separation from the service.

VOCATIONAL AND ACADEMIC TRAINING

We found some instances where inadequate criteria were used for determining what **TRANSITION** training should be established and what type of training could most benefit the individual trainee. For example, at one installation, no determination was being made of the areas in which training was needed or desired, even though service regulations implementing DOD directives required such a determination. At other installations, we found that prerequisite admission standards for a number of the courses were not maintained and that in some instances servicemen were being enrolled in courses for which they did not have the recommended GT scores.

Records to indicate the current status of trainees regarding type and progress of training and other information

were either incomplete, inaccurate, or nonexistent at all of the five installations we visited. Each of the military services has issued instructions regarding records to be maintained in connection with Project TRANSITION, to enable Project Officers to maintain control over enrollees in different phases of the program and to prepare reports for submission to higher headquarters.

At one Army installation our examination of the "Student Record for Project **TRANSITION**" (USCONARC Form 996-R) for a number of students disclosed that regardless of whether the student finished the course in which he was enrolled, the record indicated that he had done so. In numerous instances, notwithstanding the fact that the student never started class work, his record shows completion. We also found that class cards for many enrollees who never attended a class had not been removed from files maintained at the Education Center. These cards are the data source used to prepare the Project **TRANSITION** Monthly Status Report (USCONARC Form 997-R) .

At another installation, records concerning individual trainees were nonexistent for fiscal year 1968. The TRANSITION site personnel could not identify the servicemen enrolled in training, their training status, the extent of counseling received, or other data on individual trainees.

In testimony before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, for fiscal year 1969, Army representatives stated that

"*** instead of giving the man training in Project TRANSITION during the period of time he is serving the Army, we try to keep it off duty as much as possible, sending him to school at night, over weekends."

DOD policy is to leave the determination of availability for off-duty versus on-duty training to the local commander, since he has regular missions which he must accomplish with his assigned personnel.

At four of the five installations, we observed that the majority of training given was being conducted during duty hours. We believe that the program could be strengthened by added emphasis on off-duty training whenever possible. The availability of more off-duty courses would enable those servicemen to participate who were not being permitted to do so during duty hours, because of the press of their regular duties.

We have been informed that, beginning April 1, 1969, the Army is aiming a larger share of its **TRANSITION** effort during duty hours at servicemen with poor education and those with few or no civilian skills. Project training for all other enlisted personnel is to be limited to off-duty hours, thus reducing the loss of the services of skilled personnel during duty hours.

We noted a general absence of evaluation of the training being given under the **TRANSITION** program. The limited duration and relatively narrow skill objectives provided by OJT courses at two installations did not appear to prepare the servicemen for employment as qualified carpenters, plumbers, or electricians. At these installations, no formal training plans had been developed for the OJT courses offered, although we were advised at one base that each supervisor had an informal, unwritten plan for training.

Various aspects of training need improving at the installations visited, including the establishment of controls over the courses offered, the assignment of trainees to these courses, the maintenance of complete and accurate training records, and the initiation of training evaluation procedures.

CHAPTER 3

NEED FOR IMPROVEMENTS IN ACCOUNTING FOR

COSTS AND PROGRAM RECORDKEEPING AND

REPORTING PROCEDURES

ACCOUNTING FOR COSTS

At four of the five installations, we attempted to obtain formal budget data and costs incurred for TRANSITION in fiscal year 1968 and the applicable portion of fiscal year 1969. Budget data and actual costs were not available, however, because separate TRANSITION figures were not identifiable. For example, costs incurred in connection with TRANSITION at installation Education Centers were not separated from the costs of other Education Center activities. As a result, we believe that it will not be possible to determine the total cost of the program unless more definitive cost records are prescribed and maintained at each installation.

It was indicated by DOD in hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, that costs of the program would approximate \$16 million for fiscal year 1969 and \$19 million for fiscal year 1970. DOD indicated that this would include salaries of civilian personnel and pay and allowances of military personnel who assist in counseling and administering the program, travel, transportation of students, supplies, materials, contractual services, and equipment. These estimates do not include the pay and allowance of those military personnel who are receiving academic and vocational training or other services under Project TRANSITION.

Further, the Senate Committee on Appropriations in its report (Rept. 1576) on the DOD Appropriation Bill, 1969, stated that the Committee had carefully considered the objectives of Project TRANSITION and had concluded that the program was of no great value to DOD. Therefore, the Committee directed that, although no funds for the project had been disallowed, under no circumstances was the program to be expanded beyond that carried in the budget for fiscal year

1969. The Committee also directed DOD to consider the recently instituted "civic programs" to be a matter of special interest to the Committee and any expansion of the program should be treated accordingly.

We believe that policies and implementing instructions concerning what costs to include under TRANSITION and how those costs are to be determined and reported should be disseminated in order to ascertain within reasonable levels of accuracy what the program is actually costing. This would appear to be of paramount importance in view of the Senate Committee's direction that the program not be expanded beyond that for fiscal year 1969.

RECORDKEEPING AND REPORTING PROCEDURES

Inadequacies in maintaining accurate and complete records have resulted in erroneous reports being prepared and submitted to higher headquarters responsible for evaluating the program.

We found that persons responsible for reporting TRANSITION statistics to higher commands stated that they had little guidance from such commands or that they did not understand the reporting requirements set out in existing guidance.

For example, when we compared Post Office course enrollment data at one installation, as reported by the Education Center, with comparable data obtained from the Post Office, we found significant overstatements in the installation's Education Center reports. While applicable instructions called for information on the number of personnel taking training, the Education Center had no means of determining how many individuals scheduled to take training never began or dropped out. Comparisons of attendance records maintained on training provided TRANSITION trainees through facilities of the Manpower Development and Training Act, Department of Labor (DOL), also revealed overstatements on Education Center reports. On the basis of these comparisons, we found that the statistics reported by the Education Center were unreliable.

At another installation, we arbitrarily selected the names of 183 personnel from a total of approximately 1,770 individuals who should have been reported during August and September 1968, as being eligible for consideration for Project TRANSITION training, to determine whether they had been reported to higher command. Of these 183, we found that certain individual reports required by higher command had been submitted for only 38.

We believe that, in order to submit complete and accurate TRANSITION reports to higher commands, personnel responsible for these reports at the installations need a better understanding of the reporting requirements and an appreciation of the importance of maintaining reliable supporting records.

OSD TRANSITION officials indicated to us that they were generally aware of the weaknesses in the reporting system as shown by our review. They acknowledged that there was considerable confusion at the installations, both as to the reporting requirements and as to how the reports were to be **prepared**, and that field personnel do not retain adequate records to support the information included in the reports. An active program has been initiated for teams to visit TRANSITION sites throughout the country and assist in improving the overall operation of the program, by determining whether reporting requirements are understood and directing efforts to disclosing causes of and means for correcting reporting system deficiencies.

CHAPTER 4

FOLLOW-UP OF PROGRAM PARTICIPANTS

FOLLOW-UP PROCEDURES BY DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOD, in cooperation with the Bureau of Employment Security of DOL, has developed a system for following up on Project TRANSITION trainees in civilian life. Separating servicemen are required to complete a DOL form at the installation separation center. This form becomes the basis for alerting Employment Service (USES) personnel of DOL to contact the veteran 30 to 90 days after separation to obtain information on his employment status.

At two installations visited, we reviewed installation procedures associated with DOL follow-up and found that inadequate information was provided with which to evaluate the effectiveness of the TRANSITION program. At one installation, many veterans were failing to correctly complete DOL forms (VES-1) at the time of discharge. We found that the separation/transfer point at the installation does not verify the accuracy of the original forms and our tests of veterans residing in nearby areas showed that many veterans failed to indicate participation in TRANSITION to USES personnel.

At the other installation, instructions for completing DOL separation forms were not being properly followed, apparently because copies of current regulations or current forms were not available at that site nor were Project TRANSITION personnel aware of this lack of essential data. To ensure that DOL follow-up procedures are effective, TRANSITION officials at the several installations will have to coordinate closely with separation center personnel to see that servicemen properly complete the appropriate forms at the time of their separation,

GAO FOLLOW-UP EVALUATION

A reasonable measure of the effectiveness of Project TRANSITION is the degree to which the program has assisted

servicemen in preparing themselves for more useful jobs, following their separation from military service. To ascertain this and to evaluate the validity of this type of information being reported to higher echelons, we forwarded questionnaires to all of the servicemen separated during selected months of 1968 who had taken education or job skill courses through Project TRANSITION at the bases we visited. The questionnaire was sent to each man about 30 days after his separation.

From a total of 519 questionnaires mailed, we received 274 responses (52.8 percent) of which 86 (31.4 percent of total responses) indicated that the veteran had received employment in a skill he related to TRANSITION training. (See app. VI.) Of these 274 responses, 192 (70.1 percent) indicated that training had been received in Post Office courses, but only 62 were employed in postal work. There were 32 individuals (11.7 percent) who indicated that they had taken data processing courses, of whom seven reported they were employed in that field. The remaining 50 individuals who responded (18.2 percent) indicated they had taken other types of training, and 17 were employed in related fields.

During our review we noted that Project TRANSITION gave major emphasis to raising educational levels of participating individuals to the high school graduate level. Although we could not definitely determine to what extent high school equivalency courses benefited veterans in obtaining employment, it is believed that some positions were more readily available to the separating serviceman as a result of his taking advantage of such general education courses through Project TRANSITION.

In view of the early stages of the program at the time of our review, we have no opinion regarding its overall effectiveness.

CHAPTER 5

RECENT TRANSITION DEVELOPMENTS

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) has recently modified the program in an effort to make Project TRANSITION benefits available to as many eligible servicemen as possible and, at the same time, to minimize the loss of critical skills during duty hours by units having TRANSITION enrollees.

The Assistant Secretaries of the military departments were directed to commence a pilot program in each service, effective January 1969, to provide TRANSITION training to early release personnel., particularly those combat veterans with little or no civilian-related skills. Participants are those who are willing to volunteer to remain on active duty until they complete their training. On the basis of the experience gained in the pilot program, the services may expand the program for this category of separating servicemen during 1969.

The House Committee on Appropriations, in its report (Rept. 1735) on the DOD Appropriation Bill, 1969, stated that there was considerable sentiment in the Committee in opposition to activities such as Project TRANSITION. It stated further that, in the light of other Government programs providing training for useful employment in the general economy, it would seem that devoting military time of both trainer and trainee to this program was wasteful. as to military utility and duplicative as to Government programs.

A special program was placed into operation, effective September 1968, to register Vietnam Era veterans and servicemen, about to be released from military service, in an automated referral program. This facilitates their consideration for civilian employment in DOD and other Federal agencies. Counselors in Project TRANSITION centers counsel servicemen about to be released regarding the details of this facet of the program and refer those who are interested and who appear to meet the eligibility requirements to the nearest BOD Civilian Personnel Office for registration.

Analyses by the services of the early results of Project **TRANSITION** reveal that they have received additional benefits in their reenlistment efforts as a result of the counseling phases of the program. A continued career in the Armed Forces is always cited as an option under **TRANSITION** counseling, and program officials have indicated that this aspect of the project has definitely increased reenlistment in all the services.

There are also indications that many separated servicemen have **used** their **TRANSITION** training to obtain full or part-time employment to finance further education. **In** some instances, servicemen have declined full-time job offers related to their training under the program in order to attend school full time.

CHAPTER 6

EXECUTIVE AGENCY COMMENTS

On April 30, 1969, we submitted our draft report to the Secretary of Defense for review and comment. We proposed that DOD consider the matters discussed in the report and take appropriate corrective action.

In responding to the draft report, DOD expressed awareness of the problems indicated and emphasized its desire to raise the quality of the TRANSITION effort. The response indicated that, by inviting participation of a variety of agencies, the scope of the management of the program at the local level increased and that this, together with personnel shortages in staff, led to the administrative difficulties identified in the report.

DOD also stated that the ability to provide training to all individuals who need it is limited by training on either a "released time" or "after hours" basis. It was indicated that this policy was adopted primarily to limit the need for increased manpower authorizations and other costs in support of the program.

The response to the draft report identified several measures being taken to raise the level of program accomplishment and to make TRANSITION services more widely available. These measures include visits to local levels by OSD (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) teams to review and stimulate the program; publication of monthly TRANSITION bulletins and program letters; and establishment of a working group composed of members of each of the military services to identify, discuss, and act upon critical problems. We believe that the actions taken and being considered should improve the management of Project TRANSITION.

CHAPTER 7

SCOPE OF REVIEW

In performing our review, we examined appropriate department and command regulations and informational bulletins and pamphlets. In addition, we examined selected counseling and training records and related reports, when available, for parts of fiscal years 1968 and 1969, and we interviewed selected trainees, TRANSITION officials at installation and OSD level, and others connected with various facets of the program.

We discussed our findings with appropriate installation officials responsible for the administration and operation of Project TRANSITION.

Reviews were performed at the following installation's:

Air Force: Randolph Air Force Base, Texas

Army: Fort Knox, Kentucky
Fort Lewis, Washington

Marine Corps: Camp Lejeune, North Carolina

Navy: Naval Station, Treasure Island, California

With the exception of Fort Lewis, Washington, the locations included in our reviews were the pilot sites where the services had operated their programs for the longest period of time.

APPENDIXES



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

MANPOWER AND
RESERVE AFFAIRS

27 JUN 1969

Mr. C. M. Bailey, Director
Defense Division
General Accounting Office
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Bailey:

This responds to your letter to the Secretary of Defense, dated April 30, 1969, enclosing GAO Draft Report, "Management of early phases of Project TRANSITION by Department of Defense" (OSD Case #2936).

We have reviewed the subject report and believe that it depicts objectively the problems inherent in the development of the TRANSITION Program. The data upon which the report is based were developed during the very formative stages of the program. The report recognizes this fact. There are now 250 installations in the TRANSITION effort. Five installations were sampled for the report.

We would like to underline our awareness of the problems indicated and to emphasize our desire to raise the quality of our effort.

In the design of the TRANSITION Program every effort was made to keep costs at a minimum by the full utilization of the resources made available in both the public and private sectors. By inviting participation of a variety of agencies, the scope of the management of the program at the local level quite naturally increased. This fact and the personnel shortages in staff led to the administrative difficulties identified in the report.

There are also certain policy determinations which shape and delimit the nature of the TRANSITION Program. An awareness of these determinations is helpful in understanding the reason for some of the problem areas noted in the report. Program decentralization and the "released time" concept are the most important of these policies and are noted further below.

Of necessity, the TRANSITION Program has been developed on a highly decentralized basis not only to the four Military Services but to the local sites within these Services. The limitations imposed by military missions, readiness capabilities, the availability of counselors and administrative personnel under stringent manpower ceilings, the availability of industry-sponsored training and the capability of the public sector to supply other educational and training resources vary from installation to installation. To permit adjustment to local circumstances, each site military commander has been given wide latitude in the nature and rate of program implementation.

Another major policy division underlying the TRANSITION Program has been the provision of training on either a "released time" or "after hours" basis. This policy was adopted primarily to limit the need for increased manpower authorizations and other costs in support of the program. The constraints imposed by the policy limits the ability to provide training to all individuals who need it.

As the program is developing, the office of the Secretary of Defense, in cooperation with the headquarters staffs of the Military Departments are taking steps progressively to raise the level of program accomplishment and to make TRANSITION services more widely available. Several techniques have been employed by the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) in furthering improvements in the TRANSITION effort. OASD(M&RA) teams were organized to review and stimulate the program through visits to local levels. Particular attention has been given to the supervision and management activities specifically cited in the report. Other efforts have included the publication of monthly TRANSITION Bulletins which have consistently highlighted areas identified by the report; publication of Program Letters which address major operational areas, and the establishment of a working group composed of members of each of the Military Services to identify, discuss and act upon critical problems. Each of these measures is contributing to a continuing systematic improvement of the program.

It is pointed out that the TRANSITION Program is a unique effort, not heretofore undertaken by the Military Services. There are problem areas and these have been clearly identified by the report. Our efforts are now directed to a systematic attack on each of them. The Evaluation Checklist contained in the Jan-Feb 1969 Information Bulletin (p. 14) See GAO note is concerned with each item cited in the report as a problem area.

In addition to the **above** Evaluation Checklist, we are appending a variety of materials and information relating to our efforts to remedy criticisms of the program contained within the report. Included also with this letter are copies of the comments submitted by the Military Departments [See GAO note.]

Sincerely,



[See GAO note.]

W. P. Mack
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy
Deputy

GAO note: Attachments Tab A through F not included in report because of **volume** of detail.

APPENDIX II

PROJECT TRANSITION INSTALLATIONS

AS OF MARCH 31, 1969

Air Force	174
Army	55
Marine Corps	7
Navy	<u>14</u>
Total	<u>250</u>

PARTICIPATION IN PROJECT TRANSITION

AS OF MARCH 31, 1969

Questionnaires administered	444,542
Number counseled	371,581
Number completed training	53,202

APPENDIX IV

PROJECT TRANSITION TRAINING COURSES

OFFERED AT FORT KNOX, KENTUCKY

DURING FISCAL YEAR 1968

Educational:

Pre-high school

On-duty high school

Formal training courses--These are conducted in cooperation with Post Engineer and other installation activities, the U.S. Post Office, State and private institutions, and private industry.

Appliance repair	Loan manager
Auto maintenance	Postal service
Auto mechanics	Public health inspector
Basic data processing	Service station manager
Computer programming	Track (vehicle) maintenance
Drafting	United Parcel Service
Electro-mechanical concepts	Welding
Fish and wildlife	Woodcraft
Industrial electricity	


OX--These jobs have been established with the Data Processing Office and the Post Engineer. OJT is performed under the close supervision of experienced journeymen, often in conjunction with correspondence or self-study programs.

Automatic data processing	Heavy equipment operator
Boiler plant operator	Masonry
Carpentry	Plumber
Electrician, general	Refrigeration and air conditioning
Entomology	Sheet metal
Fireman	Steam fitter
Heating equipment repair	Supply
Heavy equipment mechanic	

PROJECT TRANSITION
INDUSTRY PARTICIPATION
AS OF NOVEMBER 1, 1968

OSD records indicate that the following major companies provide a variety of skill training under Project TRANSITION on bases throughout the country:

American Oil	Service station manager
Equitable Life Insurance	Insurance salesman
Financial Programs Inc.	Personnel manager
	Retail sales
	Sales
	Management finance
	Security sales
Ford Motors	Auto mechanic
	Sales
	Assembly line foreman
General Electric	Sales manager
General Motors	Diesel mechanic
	Frigidaire appliance
	Appliance repair
	Truck and coach
	Collision Repair and Refinishing
	Delco fleet service
	Auto mechanics
General Telephone	Telephone repair
	Warehouse
Gulf Oil	Station manager
Honeywell	Computer program
	Computer maintenance
Howard Johnson	Restaurant manager
Humble Oil	Station manager
IBM	Computer systems fundamentals
	Sales and repair
	Office machine repair
	Technical representative
	Electrician mechanic
John Hancock	Salesmanship
	Insurance sales
Lockheed Shipbuilding	Pipefitter
Metropolitan Life	Insurance sales
Mobil Oil	Station manager
Montgomery Ward	Auto air-conditioning mechanic
	Radio-TV repair
	Security clerk
	Sales management
National Cash Register	Electro-mechanical concepts
Nationwide Finance	Manager trainee
	Financial management
	Field representative
New York Life	Insurance sales and underwriting
J. C. Penney	Auto mechanic
	Parts control
	Maintenance
	Stock clerk
Philco Ford	Electrician technician
RCA	TV repair
	Data processing
Ryan Aircraft	Plastic parts fabrication
Raytheon	Electric assembler
	Drafting
Robertshaw Control	Salesman
	Clerk
Royal Typewriter	Office machine repair
	Salesman
Seaboard Finance, Inc.	Consumer finance
	Management trainee
Sears Roebuck	Sales management
	Shipping receiving
	Credit trainee
	Basic electronics
Standard Oil of California	Station manager
	Service station operator
United Parcel Service	United Parcel Service
Yolkswagen	Auto mechanic
Xerox	Technical representative
	Machine maintenance
	Clerical
	Service technician



PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
RESPONSIBLE FOR ADMINISTRATION OF ACTIVITIES
DISCUSSED IN THIS REPORT

<u>Tenure of office</u>	
<u>From</u>	<u>To</u>

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:

Melvin R. Laird	Jan. 1969	Present
Clark M. Clifford	Mar. 1968	Jan. 1969
Robert S. McNamara	Jan. 1961	Feb. 1968

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

(MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS):

Roger T. Kelley	Mar. 1969	Present
Vice Admiral W. P. Mack (acting)	Feb. 1969	Mar. 1969
Alfred B. Fitt	Oct. 1967	Jan. 1969
Thomas D. Morris	Oct. 1965	Sept. 1967

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE:

Dr. Robert C. Seamans, Jr.	Jan. 1969	Present
Dr. Harold Brown	Oct. 1965	Jan. 1969

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR
FORCE (MANPOWER AND RESERVE
AFFAIRS) :

Dr. Curtis W. Tarr	June 1969	Present
James P. Goode (acting)	Apr. 1969	My 1969
J. William Doolittle	Apr. 1968	Mar. 1969
Dr. Eugene T. Ferraro (acting)	Jan. 1968	Mar. 1968

DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF **THE AIR**
FORCE (abolished) :

Dr. Eugene T. Ferraro	June 1966	Dec. 1967
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PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
RESPONSIBLE FOR ADMINISTRATION OF ACTIVITIES
DISCUSSED IN THIS REPORT (continued)

	Tenure of office	
	From	To
<u>DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY</u>		
SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:		
Stanley R. Resor	July 1965	Present
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY (MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS) :		
William K. Brehm	Apr. 1968	Present
Arthur W. Allen, Jr. (acting)	Jan. 1968	Mar. 1968
DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF THE ARMY (MANPOWER) (abolished) :		
Arthur W. Allen, Jr.	Oct. 1963	Dec. 1967
<u>DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY</u>		
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY:		
John H. Chafee	Jan. 1969	Present
Paul R. Ignatius	Aug. 1967	Jan. 1969
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY (MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS) :		
James D. Hittle	Feb. 1969	Present
Randolph S. Driver	Apr. 1968	Jan. 1969
DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF THE NAVY (MANPOWER) (abolished) :		
Randolph S. Driver	Aug. 1967	Mar. 1968



COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20548

B- 164088

To the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives

This is our report on the need to improve Project
TRANSITION management by the Department of Defense.
This review was made pursuant to the Budget and Accounting
Act, 1921 (31 U.S.C. 53) and the Accounting and Auditing
Act of 1950 (31 U.S.C. 67).

Copies of this report are being sent to the Director,
Bureau of the Budget; the Secretary of Defense; the Secre-
taries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; and the Commandant
of the Marine Corps.

Comptroller General
of the United States