



Report¹

Overview of contextual and institutional factors for migration

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¹ This Report has been submitted to the EU Commission as Deliverable D4. 4; The Growth, Equal Opportunities, Migration and Markets (GEMM) project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 649255.

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1 Outline of the overview

This is the second overview of country-specific literature on the theme of migration in the EU covering the six countries taking part in GEMM Workpackage 4 'The lived experiences of migration': UK, Germany, Italy, Spain, Bulgaria and Romania. The first literature review focused on the individual factors for migration such as gender, ethnicity and age, as well as the formal and informal channels for mobility from the countries of departure to the countries of destination. The second overview concentrates on the institutional and contextual factors facilitating or preventing mobility in the European labour market. The objective is to examine previous research findings about the structures of opportunities and constraints for the successful labour market integration of migrants, common in the research literature from the different countries, and to outline the discrepancies, uncertainties and gaps among different studies. It will serve as a background for writing the subsequent country reports which will be based on the analysis of the rich qualitative data collected in the fieldwork of the GEMM Workpackage 4 study.

As in the first overview, we start with presenting some descriptive results from the work done in Workpackage 2 analysing quantitative data on factors for the employment integration of the migrants from Italy, Spain, Bulgaria and Romania in the two institutional contexts of the UK and Germany. We then proceed with reviewing research literature on the contextual and institutional factors in the two countries – UK and Germany - that are traditional host countries for migrants, followed by presenting national studies on emigration from IT, SP, BG and RO. In each of these chapters we begin with a look at whether there are new themes present in the public debate in the last year (since the first literature review) and then we delineate the significant aspects of the demographic, labour market, political and cultural context in the sending countries and in the receiving countries. Migrants often leave their home countries to overcome deficiencies in the local labour markets, economic stagnation, blocked career prospects and corruption. They also choose the destination country based on their perceptions of the regulations in the labour market and opportunities for work, housing, welfare and wider quality of life. Among the contextual factors we pay special attention to the general climate of reception and issues of discrimination. When exploring the institutional factors, we focus on the differences between the skill levels of migrants, in particular in the sectors of IT, finance and health care for the highly skilled, and domestic work and construction for the low skilled as described in the available national literature. Migrants finding jobs in the different sectors face significantly different sets of regulations and perspectives for economic and social integration. We finish with formulating questions and hypotheses to explore in the subsequent analytical reports.

The report has been written authored in the following way:

Introduction and Conclusions – Siyka Kovacheva

Chapter 2. Descriptive analysis of available statistics – Wouter Zwysen

Chapter 3. Overview of contextual and institutional factors for migration. Country report UK - Wouter Zwysen and Neli Demireva, University of Essex

Chapter 4. Overview of contextual and institutional factors for migration. Country report Germany - Thomas Tichelbäcker, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung

Chapter 5. Overview of contextual and institutional factors for migration. Country report Italy - Diego Coletto, Ivana Fellini, Fabio Quassoli, Emilio Reyneri, Giovanni Fullin and Iraklis Dimitriadis, University of Milano-Bicocca

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2 Descriptive statistics on labour market integration of migrants

2.1. Introduction

This section of the report provides an overview of labour market outcomes for migrants in the EU, specifically focusing on the groups that are studied in Work Package 4, namely migrants from Romania, Bulgaria, Italy and Spain to Italy, Spain, Germany and the UK. Three datasets are used for this description: the European Social Survey (ESS) 2002-2014; the Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries (DIOC) 2005/06 – 2011/12; and the EU Labour Force Survey (LFS) 2005-2014. The DIOC is a combination of census and detailed labour force survey data and provides the most complete picture based on a large sample and with detailed country of origin. It is only available for the year 2005/06 and 2010/11 however. To provide as up-to-date as possible information I make use of the latest wave (2010/11) for the descriptive tables. The ESS provides detailed information on country of birth and most indicators I use here, but it is based on small samples per country. Italy is only present in 2002, 2004 and 2012. The EU LFS has a very large sample as well as detailed information on all indicators, but to maintain confidentiality of the sample the country of birth is aggregated. We can therefore only distinguish between migrants from the 3 latest EU member states (Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia) and those from the EU-15 (including Italy and Spain). Finland and Sweden do not report on the three newest member states but instead group all non-EU15 member states together in the New Member States category. All data is weighted to be representative of the population. The do-file to create the tables is `create_tables_WP4_new.do` and the datasets are created using `tables_WP4_data`. The tables are generally weighted to be representative of the population. Some of the tables also provide statistical tests of the difference in an outcome between migrants and natives and its' significance. This is estimated from a simple binary regression.

Migrants are divided by region of origin into large groupings. Where possible, we divide EU migrants in migrants from Romania, Bulgaria (together with Croatia in one group in the LFS), Spain and Italy (part of EU-15 migrants in the LFS); the 15 older member states (EU-15) and the new member states (EU-11; EU-10 or NMS10). Further we include other West which contains North American countries, the EFTA countries and Oceania, which are highly developed origin countries. Third countries are all other migrants meaning those from Africa, Asia or Central and South America.

2.2. Migrants' labour market participation and employment

Table 1a shows the estimated activity and employment rate for the DIOC. The numbers for Germany are unreliable, which is why we use the LFS in table 1b. In general, we see relatively high activity rates for male migrants compared to natives, but generally lower employment rates. Only in the UK is the average employment rate among migrants similar to that of natives (91.5 vs 91.7%). In Spain there is a substantial gap with only 61% of migrants being employed compared to 75.5% of natives. The employment rates in Spain are especially low for migrants from Romania and Bulgaria. The problem is that some of the work done by migrants might be seasonal or even informal. There is a similar pattern among women although the activity rate of migrants is generally more similar to that of natives, with the exception of Italy and Spain where migrant women are more likely to be active on the labour market. The employment rates are generally very low in Spain in 2010/2011 which is likely to be due to the effects of the crisis. Again, in the UK there is no large employment penalty in general, compared to the other countries or the EU-15 and Norway as a whole.

Table 1b also shows the labour market participation rate and the employment rate, but this time estimated using the European Labour Force Survey. It uses the wider period 2005-2014. Migrants are generally more active on the labour market than natives among men while among women this is not the case in the UK and Germany. Especially migrants from the three newest member states (Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia) stand out as being likely to be active on the labour market among both men and women compared to natives and to other migrants. There are clear differences depending on the destination country, as migrants from the newest EU member states have employment rates that are similar to those of third country migrants in Italy and Spain, but are closer to EU-15 migrants in the older destination countries of UK and Germany where they experience less unemployment.

Table 1a: Labour market participation (top) and employment rate (bottom) for men

		Spain	Italy	UK	Germany	EU15+NO
natives	Activity	66.72	59.19	68.49	64.98	64.67
	employment	75.57	90.43	91.74	94.57	89.71
Romania	Activity	85.08	84.05	86.26	68.87	80.62
	employment	59.70	88.77	93.40	100.00	80.42
Bulgaria	Activity	85.50	75.68	84.76	100.00	82.71
	employment	58.29	84.57	93.77	100.00	76.89
Italy	Activity	74.84		70.07	71.13	58.17
	employment	68.87		94.42	92.60	89.76
Spain	activity		64.53	76.26	100.00	56.83
	employment		92.33	92.27	100.00	93.12
EU-15	activity	60.01	70.78	67.31	81.05	67.40
	employment	75.60	89.44	92.92	98.12	89.78
EU-11	activity	82.66	51.05	85.35	74.15	76.54
	employment	64.61	90.82	95.19	96.77	93.17
Other_West	activity	72.01	76.19	80.11	100.00	77.19
	employment	77.75	91.32	95.23	100.00	92.88
Third_countries	activity	80.73	79.22	71.63	79.42	73.16
	employment	57.76	87.99	89.70	93.24	83.07
all migrants	activity	77.61	78.15	73.58	77.93	72.44
	employment	60.87	88.34	91.48	94.69	85.21

Source: DIOC 2010/2011, showing estimated labour market participation and employment rate for men in the four destination countries and the average of the EU15+Norway

Table 1a: labour market participation (top) and employment rate (bottom) for women

		Spain	Italy	UK	Germany	EU15+NO
natives	activity	57.83	40.36	57.49	53.09	52.64
	employment	68.41	86.79	93.84	95.00	88.48
Romania	activity	77.14	67.59	73.76	55.04	67.36
	employment	55.46	84.22	90.40	100.00	77.97
Bulgaria	activity	78.66	68.00	78.30	100.00	72.75
	employment	54.76	84.36	92.40	100.00	78.15
Italy	activity	68.05		52.55	57.40	41.67
	employment	64.48		93.22	100.00	91.22
Spain	activity		44.65	67.72	62.27	44.69
	employment		88.67	92.69	100.00	91.67
EU-15	activity	55.27	46.39	54.63	63.57	55.05
	employment	67.66	85.14	93.89	100.00	88.38
EU-11	activity	76.66	48.40	76.20	62.62	65.40
	employment	59.88	84.51	94.01	95.36	91.58
Other_West	activity	67.44	53.64	69.63	73.14	64.46
	employment	72.64	87.68	95.00	100.00	91.94
Third_countries	activity	72.56	54.79	53.34	53.25	55.40
	employment	58.32	82.93	88.31	93.21	80.73
all migrants	activity	70.29	55.64	58.07	56.58	56.89
	employment	59.30	83.62	90.84	94.99	83.49

Source: DIOC 2010/2011, showing estimated labour market participation and employment rate for women in the four destination countries and the average of the EU15+Norway

Table 1b: labour market participation and employment rate for men using LFS

		Spain	Italy	UK	Germany
natives	activity	79.81	72.75	81.54	82.64
	employment	85.10	92.47	92.99	91.88
NMS3	activity	89.83	86.18	91.28	80.44
	employment	74.74	89.60	96.07	90.21
EU-15	activity	82.20	80.29	83.62	83.86
	employment	85.58	90.97	93.34	91.73
EU-10	activity	90.87	80.41	91.68	87.18
	employment	85.17	90.21	94.90	89.25
Other West	activity	78.75	86.23	86.19	84.60
	employment	89.43	93.74	95.80	92.49
Third country	activity	86.67	84.05	80.10	77.81
	employment	73.25	89.26	91.08	81.91
all migrants	activity	86.44	84.13	82.73	80.41
	employment	75.43	89.77	92.42	85.95

Source: LFS 2005-2014, showing estimated labour market participation and employment rate (weighted) for men in the four destination countries and the average of the EU15+Norway; random 10% sample of natives is used to limit the sample size
German LFS data does not have information on country of birth, so nationality is used

Table 1b: labour market participation and employment rate for women using LFS

		Spain	Italy	UK	Germany
natives	activity	64.10	51.25	70.36	70.71
	employment	82.68	90.01	94.37	92.14
NMS3	activity	76.09	68.25	73.31	68.53
	employment	72.83	85.57	90.52	91.44
EU-15	activity	65.33	52.15	71.30	67.79
	employment	82.50	88.31	94.32	93.18
EU-10	activity	68.05	62.01	77.68	68.54
	employment	78.01	87.47	93.02	86.95
Other West	activity	68.75	58.77	73.47	65.75
	employment	86.17	90.41	95.53	93.95
Third country	activity	72.66	56.17	56.47	47.41
	employment	74.03	84.45	89.17	82.26
all migrants	activity	72.05	58.40	63.20	55.88
	employment	75.08	85.61	91.31	86.63

Source: LFS 2005-2014, showing estimated labour market participation and employment rate (weighted) for women in the four destination countries and the average of the EU15+Norway; random 10% sample of natives is used to limit the sample size
German LFS data does not have information on country of birth, so nationality is used

2.3. Labour market outcomes

Table 2 uses the most recent data from the Database on Immigration to the OECD (DIOC) to show the distribution of migrants in the four receiving countries over years of stay. It demonstrates how recent the migration from Romania and Bulgaria is as 32-38% of migrants from those countries had been in the country of destination for less than 5 years compared to on average 20.6% of migrants having arrived that recently. 61% of all migrants had been in the country of residence for longer than 10 years with especially Italian migrants being very well established, compared to only around 20% of Bulgarian migrants having been in the country that long. This difference in length of stay is likely to be associated with substantial differences in outcomes.

Table 2: Average duration of stay by origin-group in 2010/2011

	Men <=5 years	Men 5-10 years	Men 10< years	total	Women <=5 years	Women 5-10 years	Women 10< years	total
Romania	32.12	30.00	37.88	100.00	34.17	30.62	35.21	100.00
Bulgaria	33.58	44.71	21.71	100.00	37.82	41.85	20.33	100.00
Italy	11.30	5.79	82.91	100.00	12.07	5.66	82.27	100.00
Spain	25.80	8.56	65.63	100.00	20.80	9.65	69.55	100.00
EU-15	17.06	12.14	70.80	100.00	13.38	10.28	76.34	100.00
EU-11	29.57	11.07	59.36	100.00	25.86	12.57	61.57	100.00
Other_West	30.40	11.49	58.11	100.00	29.19	11.05	59.76	100.00
Third_countries	18.46	19.52	62.02	100.00	19.57	20.16	60.27	100.00
all migrants	20.63	18.02	61.36	100.00	20.96	18.46	60.58	100.00

Source: DIOC 2010/2011, showing estimated duration of stay for each origin group in the four destination countries

Table 3 uses the European Labour Force Survey but provides more detail on the type of labour market outcomes migrants experience. It shows the average years of residence (based on 5-year intervals) for migrants; the percentage of people who are currently looking for work that have been looking for work for longer than 6 or 12 months; the proportion of respondents who receive some form of employment-related public assistance or benefits; and then the percentage of respondents who changed labour market status from one year to the next and went from being in work to out of work; or from out of work to in work. These averages are weighted. I also show the estimated difference in the sample and the p-value of a t-test of that difference. This p-value indicates whether it is likely that there is a difference in this outcome between a specific group of migrants and natives. If it is lower than 0.05 the difference in the sample is generally thought to be reflecting an actual difference in the population rather than random chance and is called statistically significant.

In line with earlier findings in table 2 migrants from the new member states have generally been in the country of residence less long while migrants from the EU-15 are much more established. Table 3 showed that migrants are less likely to be employed, but here we find that when out of work and looking for new work natives are on average more likely to search for longer than migrants and this difference is statistically significant for both the 6 and 12 months. For women those from the three newest member states tend to periods of searching for work that are slightly longer than those of natives with a non-significant difference for searching longer than 12 months. Whether migrants receive benefits is generally a sensitive point. With this data we find that migrant men are 1p.p. more likely to receive benefits than natives and this is due to migrants from third countries who are 2p.p. more likely to receive benefits in Germany, Italy, Spain or the UK. This difference is only small given the higher risk of almost all migrant men to be unemployed. The only other significant differences are that migrants from the EU10 and other Western countries are less likely to receive benefits. For women migrants as a whole are actually 0.4p.p. less likely to receive benefits and again only the third country migrants are slightly more likely to receive benefits (0.2p.p.) while migrant women from other groups are less likely to receive benefits.

The final two variables show for men that there is substantially more movement both in and out of work for migrants than for natives. While on average 10% of employed migrant men from the three new member states are out of work the year after; 28% of those who are not working in one year work the next; compared to 5% of natives moving out of work and 18% into work from one year to the next. Female migrants have similarly high mobility out of work, but their differences in terms of going into work are smaller than for men, but still statistically significant. All migrant men are more likely to move from employment to out of work with the exception of those from the EU-10 where the difference is not statically significant, but migrants from Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia have the highest risk, both for men and women.

Table 3a: Length of stay and job search factors by origin for men

		years of residence	job search >=6m	job search >=12m	receive benefits	transition employment - no work	transition employment - work
native	mean		60.77	46.00	6.84	4.89	17.87
	difference						
	p-value						
	diff						
NMS3	mean	9.44	56.53	39.58	6.74	10.22	27.92
	difference	0.00	-4.24	-6.42	-0.10	5.34	10.05
	p-value		0.01	0.00	0.79	0.00	0.00
EU-15	mean	20.82	53.77	38.50	6.60	6.07	21.16
	difference	0.00	-7.00	-7.50	-0.24	1.19	3.29
	p-value		0.00	0.00	0.36	0.00	0.00
EU-10	mean	8.55	44.38	27.45	5.15	4.97	34.37
	difference	0.00	-16.38	-18.55	-1.68	0.08	16.50
	p-value		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.81	0.00
Other West	mean	19.54	47.54	30.78	2.28	4.18	25.27
	difference	0.00	-13.22	-15.22	-4.55	-0.71	7.41
	p-value		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.00
Third country	mean	14.12	59.47	42.80	9.07	8.89	21.76
	difference	0.00	-1.29	-3.20	2.23	4.01	3.89
	p-value		0.05	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
all migrants	mean	14.54	57.55	41.01	7.96	8.00	22.82
	difference	0.00	-3.26	-5.05	1.07	3.12	4.98
	p-value		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	diff						

Source: LFS 2005-2014, random 10% sample of natives is used to limit the sample size, showing weighted results for Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK
 German LFS data does not have information on country of birth, so nationality is used
 shows the average of each variable by origin group, and for migrants the weighted difference and the p-value from an F-test of regression
 outcomes are the years of residence in the country, whether the respondent receives benefits or public support
 the percentage of current job seekers who have been looking for work longer than 6/12 months; and the percentage that worked last year and does not now and vice versa

Table 3b: Length of stay and job search factors by origin for women

		years of residence	job search >=6m	job search >=12m	receive benefits	transition employment - no work	transition employment - work
native	Mean		58.10	43.44	5.75	6.03	13.49
	difference						
	p-value						
	diff						
NMS3	Mean	9.52	60.63	45.38	4.46	12.39	19.61
	difference	0.00	2.53	1.94	-1.29	6.36	6.12
	p-value		0.05	0.14	0.00	0.00	0.00
EU-15	Mean	21.09	50.66	37.40	4.07	7.09	15.11
	difference	0.00	-7.44	-6.04	-1.67	1.06	1.62
	p-value		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
EU-10	mean	9.58	47.70	31.41	5.52	8.66	22.82
	difference	0.00	-10.41	-12.02	-0.23	2.63	9.34
	p-value		0.00	0.00	0.47	0.00	0.00
Other West	mean	20.48	43.07	31.54	1.58	7.47	18.37
	difference	0.00	-15.04	-11.90	-4.17	1.44	4.88
	p-value		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Third country	mean	13.40	57.89	41.79	5.99	10.48	12.36
	difference	0.00	-0.22	-1.65	0.24	4.45	-1.12
	p-value		0.76	0.02	0.09	0.00	0.00
all migrants	mean	14.09	56.32	40.75	5.32	9.77	14.22
	difference	0.00	-1.80	-2.73	-0.44	3.74	0.76
	p-value		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	diff						

source: LFS 2005-2014, random 10% sample of natives is used to limit the sample size, showing weighted results for Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK
German LFS data does not have information on country of birth, so nationality is used
shows the average of each variable by origin group, and for migrants the weighted difference and the p-value from an F-test of regression
outcomes are the years of residence in the country, whether the respondent receives benefits or public support
the percentage of current job seekers who have been looking for work longer than 6/12 months; and the percentage that worked last year and does not now and vice versa

Table 4 uses the ESS to show whether respondents have ever been unemployed for longer than 3 or 12 months, whether they work in the public sector (meaning working directly for the government, for a state-owned enterprise or in a public sector such as education: this question is available from 2008 onwards) and finally whether their main household income comes from benefits (any type). The sample is smaller, but it has detailed information on country of origin.

We see that respondents are generally settled for longer in the ESS which means there could be some bias as short-term migrants are not really captured. Migrants from Romania are much more likely than natives to have been unemployed for more than 3 months (49% for men and 40% for women), but there is no significant difference for Bulgarian, Italian or Spanish migrants. While being unemployed for more than 3 months is more common for migrants, the difference is much smaller when it comes to being long-term unemployed. This fits the findings in table 5 that there is a higher risk of being out of work, but also a higher inflow into work for migrants from EU member states, especially the newer member states.

Migrants are substantially less likely than natives to work in the public sector with especially Romanian and Bulgarian migrants very unlikely, presumably as they arrived less long ago than the other groups. Women are about 10p.p. more likely on average than men to work in the public sector and this generally also holds for migrants with the exception of recent groups of migrants where the difference between men and women is quite small. While we find that some groups do not rely on benefits at all, in general 10% of male migrants receive the bulk of their household income through benefits of some sort, compared to 4.9% of natives (8.9 vs 5.2% for women). The difference is statistically significant for migrants from the EU-10; other West and third countries for men while for women only migrants from the EU-10 are significantly more likely to rely on benefits. This, together with the evidence from table 5, suggests that the use of benefits and public assistance is not much larger among migrants than among natives, especially not when taking into account that they are more likely to be unemployed.

Table 5 uses the LFS to show the type of job search used by migrants. Generally migrants are more likely to directly approach employers and to use personal networks, but slightly less likely to use adverts or other methods. Migrants from the new member states stand out as making very extensive use of personal networks and contacts (over 80% of unemployed migrants make use of these methods to find work), although these methods are not a zero-sum game as they are not substantially less likely to make use of a particular sort of method. This supports findings in the literature that migrants tend to use a variety of methods and that some groups, especially the lower educated and less advantaged, make extensive use of their networks². Adverts are thought to be relatively high-hurdle as a good knowledge of the host country norms and language is required.

² E.g. Giulietti, Schluter & Wahba (2013). With a lot of help from my friends: social networks and immigrants in the UK. *Population, Space and Place*, 19, 6: pp.657-670

Table 4a: inclusion/exclusion for men using ESS

		years of residence	ever unemployed >=3m	ever unemployed >=12m	public sector	on benefits
native	mean		28.07	12.33	22.06	4.88
	difference					
	p-value diff					
Romania	mean	14.05	48.72	14.33	9.53	5.78
	difference	0.00	20.65	2.00	-12.53	0.89
	p-value diff		0.00	0.65	0.01	0.73
Bulgaria	mean	14.15	16.43	4.80	0.00	0.00
	difference	0.00	-11.64	-7.53	-22.06	-4.88
	p-value diff		0.33	0.12		
Italy	mean	28.31	32.48	17.59	12.84	7.77
	difference	0.00	4.41	5.27	-9.22	2.89
	p-value diff		0.53	0.36	0.20	0.50
Spain	mean	29.70	18.74	8.45	11.21	0.00
	difference	0.00	-9.33	-3.88	-10.85	-4.88
	p-value diff		0.38	0.63	0.35	
EU-15	mean	24.43	28.57	13.82	12.29	6.69
	difference	0.00	0.50	1.49	-9.77	1.81
	p-value diff		0.93	0.76	0.16	0.57
EU-10	mean	19.49	37.91	16.97	13.00	11.34
	difference	0.00	9.84	4.64	-9.06	6.46
	p-value diff		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
US, Australia, New Zealand, Canada	mean	28.18	27.75	9.54	17.96	8.21
	difference	0.00	-0.32	-2.79	-4.10	3.33
	p-value diff		0.92	0.19	0.29	0.09
Third countries	mean	26.31	32.89	8.98	11.14	8.11
	difference	0.00	4.82	-3.35	-10.92	3.23
	p-value diff		0.13	0.07	0.00	0.09
all migrants	mean	21.55	36.48	14.91	13.42	10.02
	difference		7.89	2.51	-9.17	5.10
	p-value diff		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

source: ESS 2002-2014, showing weighted results for Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK; shows the average of each variable by origin group, and for migrants the weighted difference and p-value from binary regression of the difference with natives; shows the years of residence (in years 2010, approximation based on 5 categories prior); whether respondent was ever unemployed for longer than 6/12 months; whether respondent works for the state sector or government directly (since 2008) and whether the main source of income is public benefits/assistance

Table 4b: Inclusion/exclusion for women using ESS

		years of residence	ever unemployed >=3m	ever unemployed >=12m	public sector	on benefits
native	mean		26.84	13.72	31.49	5.15
	difference					
	p-value diff					
Romania	mean	13.05	39.93	17.01	10.75	4.82
	difference	0.00	13.09	3.28	-20.74	-0.33
	p-value diff		0.01	0.40	0.00	0.86
Bulgaria	mean	11.80	33.15	14.19	7.47	11.87
	difference	0.00	6.32	0.47	-24.03	6.72
	p-value diff		0.59	0.96	0.00	0.37
Italy	mean	27.09	35.45	21.86	28.27	5.34
	difference	0.00	8.62	8.14	-3.22	0.19
	p-value diff		0.27	0.24	0.73	0.95
Spain	mean	27.94	36.53	10.17	24.59	0.00
	difference	0.00	9.69	-3.56	-6.90	-5.15
	p-value diff		0.38	0.61	0.60	
EU-15	mean	25.20	21.45	7.74	33.46	2.79
	difference	0.00	-5.39	-5.98	1.96	-2.35
	p-value diff		0.28	0.07	0.83	0.27
EU-10	mean	17.78	34.23	18.42	23.45	11.00
	difference	0.00	7.40	4.70	-8.05	5.86
	p-value diff		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
US, Australia, New Zealand, Canada	mean	28.95	24.21	14.02	28.29	4.78
	difference	0.00	-2.62	0.29	-3.20	-0.37
	p-value diff		0.35	0.90	0.41	0.76
Third countries	mean	23.87	31.45	16.77	25.03	5.98
	difference	0.00	4.61	3.05	-6.46	0.83
	p-value diff		0.12	0.19	0.07	0.58
all migrants	mean	20.47	32.18	17.03	23.50	8.90
	difference		5.61	3.42	-7.99	3.54
	p-value diff		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

source: ESS 2002-2014, showing weighted results for Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK; shows the average of each variable by origin group, and for migrants the weighted difference and p-value from binary regression of the difference with natives; shows the years of residence (in years 2010, approximation based on 5 categories prior); whether respondent was ever unemployed for longer than 6/12 months whether respondent works for the state sector or government directly (since 2008) and whether the main source of income is public benefits/assistance

Table 5: Methods of job search by origin

		Men				Women			
		direct methods	personal networks and contacts	adverts	other methods	direct methods	personal networks and contacts	adverts	other methods
native	mean	40.92	51.14	68.95	67.36	37.86	49.29	70.17	63.65
	Diff.								
	p-value								
NMS3	mean	63.78	82.28	66.69	47.05	57.97	81.49	66.28	43.24
	Diff.	22.87	31.14	-2.26	-20.31	20.12	32.20	-3.89	-20.41
	p-value	0.00	0.00	0.13	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
EU-15	mean	42.32	50.60	69.29	60.28	45.47	54.93	72.04	54.77
	Diff.	1.41	-0.53	0.34	-7.08	7.62	5.64	1.87	-8.88
	p-value	0.27	0.69	0.78	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.11	0.00
EU-10	mean	28.93	44.36	68.46	63.86	28.37	44.08	71.99	60.77
	Diff.	-11.99	-6.78	-0.49	-3.49	-9.48	-5.21	1.82	-2.88
	p-value	0.00	0.00	0.78	0.05	0.00	0.00	0.20	0.06
Other West	mean	45.11	47.63	70.46	50.91	41.82	48.30	74.23	47.30
	Diff.	4.19	-3.51	1.50	-16.45	3.96	-0.98	4.06	-16.35
	p-value	0.06	0.12	0.46	0.00	0.06	0.65	0.03	0.00
Third country	mean	49.38	64.27	65.14	61.50	48.93	66.11	64.71	54.71
	Diff.	8.46	13.14	-3.81	-5.85	11.07	16.82	-5.46	-8.94
	p-value	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
all migrants	mean	48.52	62.65	65.94	60.04	47.75	64.44	66.37	53.74
	Diff.	7.82	11.77	-2.90	-7.44	10.03	15.31	-3.72	-9.99
	p-value	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

Source: LFS 2005-2014, random 10% sample of natives is used to limit the sample size, showing weighted results for Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK; German LFS data does not have information on country of birth, so nationality is used; shows the average of each variable by origin group, and for migrants the weighted difference and the p-value from a binary regression of the difference with natives; shows the percentage of respondents who use the following method while searching for work: direct application to employer; asking friends, relatives, trade unions etc...; answering or placing advertisements in newspapers/journals; other methods

2.4. Migrants' occupations and status

Tables 6 and 7 show the occupational status estimated from resp. the LFS and the ESS. Occupational status is measured using ISEI, which is a combination of the average educational attainment and wage in an occupation. It ranges between 16 and 90 with a higher score indicating working in a better job. Migrants from the three newest member states stand out as working in very low-status jobs compared to all other migrants, although in the UK and Germany there is no clear difference between migrants from the three newest member states and those that joined in 2004. Women from the three newest member states stand out as having particularly low-level jobs in Italy and Spain. On the other hand, EU-15 migrants tend to work in on average higher-status jobs than natives.

Table 7 shows the results from the ESS. Due to the smaller sample size the destination countries are aggregated into the four destination countries of interest (Italy, Spain, Germany, the UK) and the EU15 including Norway. Migrants have on average higher status jobs in the ESS than in the LFS while the difference between natives is smaller. This again indicates that the ESS sample of migrants is likely to be quite positively selected. The ESS does allow for a comparison of the four main sending countries. Spanish migrants tend to work on similar status jobs to natives or even better jobs, while Italian migrants work on lower level jobs that are quite similar to the status of Romanian and Bulgarian migrants. This shows clearer that Romanian women tend to work on lower status jobs than Romanian men while these gender differences tend to be smaller among other migrant groups.

Finally, table 8 uses the LFS to show the percentage of migrants working in certain occupations that are put forward in the grant agreement as of special interest for work package 4. As high-skilled jobs we show the percentage of people working as a medical doctor; or in nursing or midwifery; as an ICT professional; or an ICT technician; or working as a financial/math associate which includes bankers. Lower skilled jobs are captured by material accountants (stock clerks); those working in building and related trades; domestic or office cleaners/helpers and finally labourers in agriculture, forestry or fisheries.

Migrants from the EU-15, other Western countries and third countries are substantially more likely than natives to work in medical professions or as ICT professionals. EU15 and other Western migrants are also more likely to work as financial/math associates and ICT technicians. On the other hand, migrants from the new member states and especially those from the three newest are very unlikely to work in any of these professions or as a lower-level accountant. These migrants are over-represented in building and related trades (8% of NMS3 and 5.4% of EU-10 compared to 2% of natives); as domestic or office cleaner or helper (10% of NMS3 workers work in this profession compared to 6-7% of EU-10 and third country nationals and only 2% of natives. Migrants from Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia are also quite substantially represented in agriculture with almost 3% of them working in elementary agricultural work compared to only 0.3% of natives. These sectors account for a relatively large part of the work experiences of NMS3 migrants as only 78% work in other occupations, compared to 91-92% of natives and other Western migrants.

Table 6a: Occupational status by origin for men

		Spain	Italy	UK	Germany
native	Mean	41.73	42.32	46.18	42.28
	difference				
	p-value diff				
NMS3	Mean	27.95	28.27	33.78	35.35
	difference	-13.78	-14.05	-12.40	-6.94
	p-value diff	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
EU-15	Mean	46.07	42.66	51.52	43.20
	difference	4.34	0.34	5.34	0.91
	p-value diff	0.00	0.11	0.00	0.01
EU-10	Mean	35.07	32.93	32.56	35.39
	difference	-6.67	-9.38	-13.63	-6.90
	p-value diff	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Other West	Mean	47.87	42.00	57.09	55.14
	difference	6.14	-0.31	10.90	12.85
	p-value diff	0.00	0.16	0.00	0.00
Third country	Mean	32.33	29.77	46.98	34.80
	difference	-9.40	-12.55	0.80	-7.49
	p-value diff	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
all migrants	mean	34.01	31.53	45.98	38.01
	difference	-7.73	-10.78	-0.20	-4.22
	p-value diff	0.00	0.00	0.30	0.00

source: LFS 2005-2014, random 10% sample of natives is used to limit the sample size, showing weighted results for Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK; German LFS data does not have information on country of birth, so nationality is used; shows the average of occupational status by origin group, and for migrants the weighted difference and the p-value from a binary regression of the difference with natives; occupational status is measured by Ganzeboom's ISEI and calculated from 3-digit occupation (isco88 and isco08)

Table 6b: Occupational status by origin for women

		Spain	Italy	UK	Germany
native	mean	43.98	45.45	46.01	42.72
	difference				
	p-value diff				
NMS3	mean	23.45	26.16	37.43	35.69
	difference	-20.52	-19.30	-8.58	-7.03
	p-value diff	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
EU-15	mean	46.08	45.96	50.29	42.21
	difference	2.10	0.51	4.28	-0.52
	p-value diff	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.20
EU-10	mean	33.03	31.53	33.55	36.87
	difference	-10.94	-13.92	-12.46	-5.85
	p-value diff	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Other West	mean	49.20	44.53	55.99	53.08
	difference	5.23	-0.93	9.98	10.36
	p-value diff	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Third country	mean	28.89	26.65	45.49	32.76
	difference	-15.08	-18.81	-0.52	-9.96
	p-value diff	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.00
all migrants	mean	30.74	30.01	45.19	36.76
	difference	-13.24	-15.44	-0.83	-5.93
	p-value diff	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

Source: LFS 2005-2014, random 10% sample of natives is used to limit the sample size, showing weighted results for Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK; German LFS data does not have information on country of birth, so nationality is used shows the average of occupational status by origin group, and for migrants the weighted difference and the p-value from a binary regression of the difference with natives; occupational status is measured by Ganzeboom's ISEI and calculated from 3-digit occupation (isco88 and isco08)

Table 7: Occupational status by origin using ESS

		4 destinations Men	EU15+NO men	4 destinations women	EU15+NO women
Native	mean	43.03	43.57	42.16	42.23
	difference				
	p-value diff				
Romania	mean	38.93	39.45	32.64	32.70
	difference	-4.10	-4.12	-9.52	-9.52
	p-value diff	0.07	0.05	0.00	0.00
Bulgaria	mean	36.66	28.75	39.30	36.56
	difference	-6.37	-14.83	-2.86	-5.67
	p-value diff	0.46	0.00	0.69	0.21
Italy	mean	37.49	39.21	36.73	36.10
	difference	-5.54	-4.37	-5.44	-6.13
	p-value diff	0.01	0.00	0.07	0.00
Spain	mean	45.65	43.95	49.10	41.97
	difference	2.62	0.38	6.94	-0.26
	p-value diff	0.62	0.90	0.09	0.92
EU-15	mean	49.21	48.99	54.32	53.02
	difference	6.19	5.41	12.15	10.79
	p-value diff	0.02	0.02	0.00	0.00
EU-10	mean	39.90	40.56	38.03	38.62
	difference	-3.13	-3.02	-4.13	-3.61
	p-value diff	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
US, Australia, New Zealand, Canada	mean	42.26	43.44	41.61	42.21
	difference	-0.77	-0.14	-0.55	-0.02
	p-value diff	0.60	0.88	0.68	0.99
Third countries	mean	41.59	41.29	41.37	41.73
	difference	-1.44	-2.28	-0.79	-0.50
	p-value diff	0.33	0.06	0.58	0.67
all migrants	mean	40.66	41.23	39.46	39.87
	difference	-2.36	-2.36	-2.71	-2.38
	p-value diff	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

Source: ESS 2002-2014, showing weighted average for Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK shows the average of occupational status by origin group, and for migrants the weighted difference and the p-value from a binary regression of the difference with natives occupational status is measured by Ganzeboom's ISEI and calculated from 3-digit occupation (isco88 and isco08)
Italy is only present 2002 2004 and 2012 and samples are small, therefore only show the average in destination countries and in the EU15

Table 8: Distribution over selected occupations by origin

	Medical doctor	Nursing/midwifery	ICT professionals	financial/ math associate	ICT technician	material accountant	building and related trades	domestic or office cleaner/helper	agricultural labour	Other	total
natives	0.51	0.34	0.92	0.82	0.44	1.51	2.01	1.97	0.32	91.17	100
NMS3	0.18	0.2	0.3	0.1	0.17	0.35	7.96	9.78	2.8	78.17	100
EU-15	0.65	0.68	1.79	0.93	0.58	1.15	2.13	2.56	0.23	89.32	100
EU-10	0.37	0.26	0.64	0.33	0.23	0.91	5.36	6.33	0.87	84.69	100
Other West	0.56	0.66	2.1	1.04	0.86	0.72	1.41	0.79	0.18	91.69	100
Third country	0.73	0.82	1.07	0.29	0.28	0.51	2.57	6.93	1.12	85.68	100
Total	0.56	0.51	1.01	0.61	0.38	1.07	2.64	4.15	0.71	88.34	100

Source: LFS 2011-2014, random 10% sample of natives is used to limit the sample size, showing weighted results for Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK

German LFS data does not have information on country of birth, so nationality is used

This shows the proportion of respondents that work in selected occupations with isco08 codes 25; 35; 221; 222; 331; 92; 911; 432; 71

3. Overview of contextual and institutional factors for migration. Country report UK

3.1. Introduction

While the number of migrants relative to the UK population is quite average for an EU-country, it has become a very contentious issue in the UK, especially since the Brexit debate. Immigration played a large role within the campaign to leave the EU and there were reports of increased discrimination and hate crimes rising in the period after the vote (APPG on Social Integration, 2017; Heath and Richards, 2016).

Within this context of a problematized migration it is particularly important to study the experiences of migrants, both from within the EU and outside, in the UK. In this document we provide a short overview of UK-focused research on the labour market outcomes of migrants, particularly those from EU sending countries, such as Italy, Spain, Romania and Bulgaria. We further highlight the contextual factors and institutional barriers faced by migrants.

A recent report by the All Party Parliamentary Group on Social Inclusion wrote the following: *“Very few of the individuals we have met during visits were hostile to Immigration. Indeed, most shared the view that it has been fantastic for our economy and for the cultural life of our country. It is clear, however, that demographic and cultural change has threatened people’s sense of security, identity, and belonging within their communities and ... put pressure on local public services”* (APPG on Social Integration, 2017, p.3). They recommend that regions should play more of a role in determining their immigration needs and tailoring a region-specific immigration policy. They also plead for integration to start at the moment of arrival, through routes to citizenship and stricter English requirements as well as offered courses (APPG on Social Integration, 2017). The Casey review on integration (Casey, 2016) at the end of 2016 focused on segregation in communities in the UK which were seen as problematic.

Immigration also took a dominant place in the manifestoes of both parties at the recent 2017 General Election. The conservative manifesto mentioned the intention to double the Immigration Skills Charge levied on companies employing migrant workers to £2,000 a year, with the proceedings to support skills training in the UK (p.20-21), while one of the main points to ensure the UK is the world’s great meritocracy was *“Controlled, sustainable migration, with net migration down to the tens of thousands”*, from their current level of 273,000 (p.48). They aimed to focus particularly on non-EU migrants by increasing the earnings thresholds for family reunion migrant sponsors and toughening the visa requirements for students. Once they left the EU they aimed to further reduce EU migrants. Labour’s manifesto was slightly more positive about the benefits of migration. They proposed scrapping income thresholds in favour of a prohibition on recourse to public funds (p.28). They also vouched to stop overseas-only recruitment practices.

A few studies have looked at the labour market outcomes of other European migrants. Demireva & Kesler (2011) show some good outcomes for migrants from the EU8 and Romania and Bulgaria, as they differ from other migrants in not being more likely to enter unemployment or remain in unemployment compared to white British. They hypothesize that the higher probability of being and staying in work could have to do with more stringent conditions on receiving benefits at the time of the study. Luthra, Platt & Salamonska (2016) use data on recent Polish immigrants to Germany, the

Netherlands, London and Dublin. They find substantial variation in the motivations of migrants. The largest groups they identify are temporary migrants who aim to return to Poland (32% of their sample) and settled migrants (28%) who primarily move for work and are committed to an international life. The temporary, as well as circular migrants, are originally generally lower educated, more male and were more likely to be unemployed as well as more rural; while the settled workers are generally less tied, have better language skills and are more urban. The temporary migrants generally do quite well on the labour market in terms of employment, but work on lower quality jobs and report lower life satisfaction.

3.2. Climate and context of reception

In a study using 2010 ESS data Duemmler (2013) classifies countries by their combination of symbolic boundaries, which measure respondents' migrant attitudes, and social boundaries based on the MIPEX scores which capture integration effectors. They also include a measure on whether respondents feel like their group is discriminated against based on skin colour, race, nationality, religion, language or ethnic group. The UK is clustered together with France and Ireland in that high social boundaries and negative views (high symbolic boundaries) resulted in high feelings of discrimination. A recent study based on data from the European Social Survey (ESS) 2014-2015, which included data on attitudes towards migration, found a somewhat more positive result in that the UK lies only somewhat below the EU average in pro-immigration attitudes. This had increased slightly from 2002 to 2014. The crucial aspects put forward as a determinant of attitudes towards migration are migrants being committed to the way of life; speaking the language and having work skills. They find a clear preference for professional rather than unskilled migrants, and while origin is less important for professionals, among unskilled migrants there is a preference for EU migrants over overseas migrants (Heath and Richards, 2016).

The regime under which migrants enter the UK has been shown to affect their labour market outcomes, as shown by Altorjai (2013) in her study of overqualification of UK migrants. Based on the country of origin and the year of arrival she distinguishes between several groups. She finds that migrants from the old EU member states (EU15) and those from English-speaking countries are similar to natives; while migrants from the newer EU countries (EU12 at the time of writing) are substantially more likely to be overqualified. She further finds that migrants who arrived under a more skill-biased system are more likely to be overqualified. This is consistent with the findings of Aydemir (2011) in Canada who find that migrants arriving under the point system are indeed very highly qualified, but they do not tend to find corresponding jobs. Algan et al. (2010) study the outcomes of migrants in Germany, the UK and France and point out that, while immigration policies are historically very diverse in these countries, there is a clear convergence in policies over time. They find the largest earning gaps as well as large gaps in employment for UK migrants, while they are on average most highly educated in the UK.

3.3. Barriers to migrants' integration

In work on ethnic minorities, Battu et al. (2011) show that minorities that are less well integrated in the UK are more less likely to benefit from their high reliance on social networks to find jobs. This could be very relevant for migrants as they are very likely to make use of social networks to find work in the UK (Frijters et al., 2005; Giuliatti et al., 2013). Giuliatti and co-authors (2013) study the job search of migrants in the UK. They find that Polish migrants are least likely to use social networks in their job search while other Eastern Europeans were among those making most use of it. They also find that the use of social networks increases for Eastern European migrants with years of residence.

Besides social networks a good knowledge of the language is one of the most often mentioned barriers to good labour market outcomes. Dustmann & Fabbri (2003) use 1994 data to show that migrants who are fluent in English are 22 %-points more likely to be employed and have 18-20% higher earnings. They also show that the more highly educated, as well as those living in an area with fewer migrants, are more likely to be fluent in English. A further barrier that partly explains the lower earnings of migrants in the UK is that qualifications obtained abroad are not recognised as equivalent in the UK (Dustmann and Theodoropoulos, 2010).

Migrant and ethnic disadvantage in the UK is mainly evident in the access to work, but generally smaller in earnings once employed (Blackaby et al., 2002, 2005; Dustmann and Theodoropoulos, 2010). This could point to the importance of discrimination as a substantial barrier.

There have been some studies using correspondence tests that tend to find minorities and migrants are less likely to be hired than their native counterparts, also in the UK (Zschirnt and Ruedin, 2016). In a very interesting study Ford (2015) also found that white majority respondents were much more positive towards co-ethnic welfare claimants than to ethnic minority and foreign-born claimants. Both ethnicity and migrant status had an additive negative effect which means ethnic minority migrants experience are doubly disliked when claiming welfare. This is important as it shows the limited support for welfare between communities and exemplifies negative attitudes to migrants and minorities.

Previous studies showed that migrants and minorities in the UK are more likely to search for jobs using their social network (Battu et al., 2011; Giulietti et al., 2013). Through a high rate of finding jobs through referrals and ethnic networks there is a clustering within occupations (Dustmann et al., 2016; Patacchini and Zenou, 2012). Preferences and efficiency, such as a common language or business culture, may also contribute to the segregation of migrants and minorities in certain occupations (Aslund and Skans, 2010). Besides that, constraints such as discrimination may also limit the chances of migrants to access certain occupations, strengthening the concentration within certain, lower valued, occupations (Brynin and Guveli, 2012; Elliott and Lindley, 2008). Brynin & Gueveli (2012) show that accounting for occupational segregation goes a long way to accounting for ethnic and migrant pay gaps. Occupations with a higher percentage of ethnic minorities also pay substantially lower on average. In an interesting study Elliott & Lindley (2008) found that occupational segregation actually had positive effects for white migrants to the UK who cluster in high-paying occupations, while non-white immigrants are clustered in lower-paying occupations. It would be very important to study differences between sectors further.

3.4. Conclusion

Migration is an increasingly important topic within the UK public debate. The main barriers identified in the literature are possible discrimination, language barriers and the fact that foreign qualifications are not readily recognised. The barriers to migrants in the UK mainly focus on the probability of employment, but once employed there are fewer disadvantages in terms of wage. Previous studies found that occupational segregation further explains important parts of these migrant gaps. It is important to study the pathways migrants use, depending on their background, to find work within the UK and how these patterns and experiences differ between sectors.

3.5. References

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
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4. Overview of contextual and institutional factors for migration. Country report Germany

4.1. Introduction: the public debate on migration and integration

The topic of incoming migration has received more and more attention in the German public debate, especially since the numbers of asylum requests reached a new peak in 2015. In general, there was a shift around the year 2000 from a discourse centring on cultural distance and belonging to the economic necessity of skilled immigration. In consequence, German politicians and citizens supported the idea of Germany as an immigration country and policies like the green card which was supposed to attract high-skilled specialists, e.g. in the information technology sector, were adopted. However, the idea of immigration as a threat to national identity was not completely abandoned (Bauder 2007).

Figure 1: Frequency of articles on migration on the website of German “Die Zeit”³



The lack of skilled and trained workers (“Fachkräftemangel”) for the German industry due to the demographic development of the country was already predicted in 2005 to become a serious

³ Articles with migration topics were counted for each year on www.zeit.de. Frequency is the total sum of articles with key words: “Zuwanderung”, “Einwanderung” and “Migration” per year. Source: Own calculation.

problem as soon as in 2010. Attracting skilled workers was not only seen as fundamental for future economic growth, but in 2009 it was also regarded as necessary for finding a way out of the crisis (Haller 2017: 59). Migration from Southern Europe was seen therefore as a win-win situation (see Schröder 2012) since Southern European countries experienced high unemployment rates. While earlier accounts were rather pessimistic on the magnitude of necessary migration to compensate for the lack of skilled workers and put the problem in rather general terms, it has recently been emphasized that shortages will most likely only appear in certain sectors, such as the health care sector (Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales 2015). Migration is, however, still regarded as a requirement to deal with the ongoing demographic development (ibid.).

While public attention to migration from Southern European countries is often focused on skilled migration, migration from Eastern European countries often became associated with the term poverty migration (“Armutsmigration”). The peak of a debate on the consequences of migration from Bulgaria and Romania to Germany was reached in December 2013 and January 2014 when Bulgaria and Romania were completely integrated in the European labour market. This was also associated with the possibility of claiming social benefits which alarmed conservative politicians fearing that Romanian and Bulgarian migrants would only come to claim social benefits. Even moderate conservatives opposed this view and took a nuanced stance. For example, Armin Laschet, opposition leader in the North-Rhine-Westphalian state parliament stressed problems, but argued that these problems would not be connected to the opening of the labour market (Die Zeit, 3.1.2014). This was empirically supported by Brücker et al. (2013) who emphasize problems, e.g. that 46 percent of the Romanians and Bulgarians in Germany in 2013 have not completed vocational training. On the other hand, the unemployment rate of Romanians and Bulgarians in 2013 (7.4 percent) is rather low compared to unemployment among the population (7.7 percent) and foreigners (14.7 percent). However, there is a remarkable difference between Romanians (5.3 percent) and Bulgarians (13.6 percent). The immigration of highly qualified workers, such as medical professionals, from Bulgaria and Romania to Germany is less often a topic for German media even though there are notable exceptions (e.g. Die Zeit, 21.05.2015).

At the beginning of the “refugee crisis”, positive estimates emphasized, once again, the importance of new immigrants, including refugees, for the German labour market (see Fratzscher and Junker 2015). Daimler CEO Zetsche even said that, in the best-case scenario refugees could build the base for a new German “economic miracle” (cited in: FAZ, 15.09.2015). However, this was contrasted, e.g. by Liebau and Sallkutluk (2016) who underline that most refugees cannot meet the requirements, such as formal vocational training which is seen as a requirement for integration in the labor market without further obstacles. Based on an analysis of newspaper content, Haller (2017) argues that the public discourse on migration turned in 2015 from economic necessity to a moral imperative, while there was little journalistic effort to distinguish between right-wing slogans and anxious citizens.

As can be seen in Figure 1, the public debate on migration has steadily received more attention and space in German newspapers. The major share of this increased attention can be attributed to the “refugee crisis” in 2015. Nevertheless, an upward sloped trend was already visible before 2015. Furthermore, the “refugee crisis” also provoked debates not only on asylum policy but also on immigration control. In December 2016, the Social Democratic Party (SPD), proposed a new immigration law similar to the regulation in Canada. In this context, the Chairman of the SPD’s parliamentary group, Thomas Oppermann, called for “controlled migration” and mentioned that it would be necessary to “regain control on migration processes”. The initiative, however, remained without consequences even though the conservative parties signalled their agreement.

4.2. Obstacles for migrants on the German labour market

Between 2010 and 2014, the number of migrants in Germany increased by 1.42 million of which 69 percent were employed in the German labour market. In 2014 alone, more than 400,000 migrants entered Germany and 83 percent also started to work in Germany. These high quotas generally show a high degree of integration of migrants in the labour market in recent years. Comparing data from the micro census 2005 and 2013 reveals that especially the proportion of migrants who hold a university degree has increased. At the same time, the share of low-qualified migrants has decreased with the notable exception of first generation migrants from Eastern European countries (Höhne 2016). However, for the total migrant population, employment quotas among migrants are still lower and unemployment rates are still higher compared to the German population (Brücker 2015).

German language skills remain one key obstacle on the labour market for migrants. Migrants with better German skills are less often unemployed and work less often in a job they are overqualified for (Brücker 2015). By using German panel data (SOEP), Dustmann and van Soest (2002) show that previous estimates of the return of language proficiency have been downward biased due to measurement errors. They calculate returns of language proficiency ranging from 5 percent to 14 percent. However, their sample is restricted to individuals not born in Germany who joined an already surveyed household. Aldashev et al. (2009) argue that the effects of language proficiency on earnings run through higher participation rates, employment chances and a higher probability of working in white-collar occupations.

A second obstacle is the recognition of foreign diplomas. Aldashev et al. (2012) analyze SOEP data and find that education obtained from abroad is valued less on the German labour market in comparison to educational attainment in Germany. In line with this result, Brücker et al. (2014) find based on SOEP data that the full official recognition of the equivalency of a foreign degree has a positive effect on wages and decreases the risk of being overqualified for the current job. The law for the recognition of foreign qualifications (“Anerkennungsgesetz”) which the German federal government and the state governments passed between 2012 and 2014 aimed at facilitating the recognition process and opened the process for a broader group. Both goals were accomplished according to Ekert et al. (2017). It is now also possible to submit an application for recognition from foreign soil. Approximately 10 percent of all processes are started when the respective applicants do not live yet in Germany. It is noteworthy that especially migrants working in regulated occupations profited from the new law (ibid.). However, an empirical assessment of the effects of the law is still missing.

Different groups of migrants also face different barriers. One difference between low and high-skilled migrants e.g. consists of how they find employment in Germany. Brücker et al. (2014) report based on SOEP data that migrants without any degree are more depending on informal networks. About 66 percent of low-skilled migrants indicate to have found a job through personal networks such as family, friends or acquaintances vis-à-vis only 43 percent of high-skilled migrants. Migrants with a vocational or university degree rely more on public or private agencies and public announcement in newspapers or on the internet (Brücker et al. 2014). However, research taking a comparative perspective on which barriers high and low-skilled workers face when entering the German labour market is not well established.

4.3. Climate of reception of migrants

During the peak of the Euro crisis, the majority of the German population welcomed immigration from Southern European countries. In a representative survey for the Bertelsmann Foundation in 2012, 55 percent of the participants agreed that Germany would need foreign skilled workers to close future gaps on the labour market. At the same time, 61 percent of the respondents assumed that migrants would leave Germany as soon as the crisis would be over (TNS Emnid 2013). In a follow-up survey three years later, the picture of a migration-friendly society became even more pronounced. A vast majority, 97 percent, said that migrants would generally try to live well together with Germans (2012: 88 percent). Furthermore, 54 percent stated that disadvantaging migrants on the labor market should be fought by law (2012: 47 percent) (see Haller 2017: 53).

A more nuanced picture is drawn by Zick and Küpper (2012: 171) who find that the acceptance of sociocultural diversity increases, while simultaneously half of the respondents mention to be anxious about “Überfremdung”. This picture is also reflected by a representative survey for the federal antidiscrimination authority. 23.2 percent of the respondents with migration background report to have had a discrimination experience while only 3.2 percent of the participants without a migration background report such an experience (Antidiskriminierungsstelle des Bundes 2016). Based on SOEP data, Tucci et al. (2014) report that more than half of the respondents with migration background state to have discrimination experiences. Discrimination experience is strongly depending on the origin of the respondent. European migrants report less discrimination than migrants from Turkey, Arabic states or the former Yugoslavian states. Respondents experience discrimination especially while working or while contacting authorities.

Therefore, it is not surprising that discrimination on the labor market is still widely spread. In a field experiment, Kaas and Manger (2012) find that applying with German sounding name increases the probability to be called back by 14 percent towards an applicant with a Turkish sounding name. They report that the effect is particularly strong among smaller firms and disappears when information on the applicant’s personality is added which hints to statistical discrimination.

Based on qualitative data, Ofner (2010) reports that migrants with university degree often feel pushed to “ethno-business”, e.g. a lawyer with Turkish migration background was only successful when she moved to a neighbourhood with a high migrant density. In a Berlin neighbourhood with relatively high renting costs, she had not been able to build up a profitable business in contrast to five other German lawyers in the same building. In another example, Ofner (ibid.) describes a young medical doctor with Turkish migration background who spent her time as an assistant doctor mostly as a communication intermediary between medical staff and patients. When she looked for a dissertation topic, her professor suggested an inquiry in gynaecological problems of “Turkish/Muslim origin” (ibid.: 46).

4.4. Conclusion

In the aftermath of the euro and “refugee crisis” and the opening of the labor market for Eastern European migrants, migration issues have constantly received more attention in Germany. However, a comprehensive account on the evolving public discourse, such as Haller’s (2017) analysis on media coverage during the “refugee crisis”, is missing. Such an analysis would help e.g. to understand varying narratives for different groups of migrants.

There is also a notable gap in the literature when looking at the recognition of qualifications in Germany. Even though formal qualifications play a major role on the German labor market, it remains unclear which obstacles migrants face if they want their qualification to be recognized. Furthermore, research on integration and experiences of low and high-skilled migrants across different sectors is not well established even though sectors differ in many regards. For example, the IT sector demands for highly skilled workers which cannot only be found in Germany, but German language skills and formal training are less important here. In contrast, the health care sector is also in need for foreign skilled workers, but at the same time the sector is highly regulated, formal recognition of foreign diplomas is mostly mandatory and German language skills are necessary.

The few empirical studies show that migrants in Germany face obstacles which depend not only on the origin of the respective migrant but also on certain skills, such as German language skills, or acquired education. The GEMM project may contribute by further analysing these obstacles for different groups of migrants, especially from European countries.

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5. Overview of contextual and institutional factors for migration. Country report Spain

5.1. Introduction: The public debate on new migration outflows

During the period of major economic growth between 2001 and 2007, Spain became the EU's top immigration destination, as it attracted mainly Latin American, Moroccan and Romanian workers to its booming construction sector, among others (Domínguez Mujica and Pérez García 2017, Rodríguez-Planas and Nollenberger 2014). However, amidst the financial and economic crisis and particularly following the austerity measures that led to a deepening of the economic crisis, this period of high immigration came to a halt. Net migration flows began to reverse and for the first time in decades, 2012 saw considerably more people exiting the country than entering it (INE 2012). Foreign nationals accounted for the majority of outflows, as 5% of the total foreign population left Spain in 2012, compared with the less than 1 per thousand of Spaniards born in Spain who left the country that same year (Izquierdo et al. 2016). As of 2016, with considerable improvement in the economic climate, net migration flows in Spain are positive for the first time since 2009, although the number of new arrivals is still less than half of it was in 2007 on the eve of the crisis (BDE 2014, INE 2017).

Media and political reactions to the recent wave of Spanish emigration have been steeped in an intense public debate on the management of the economic crisis. To be sure, virtually all news headlines and articles on the topic of emigration have been framed in starkly negative terms with explicit reference to the economic crisis as the main cause of the phenomenon. The tone of public and political discourse has ranged from indifference and down-playing of the gravity of the emigration phenomenon (mainly on the part of pro-government voices) to outrage on the part of media and pressure groups over 'brain drain' and 'youth mass exodus' caused by the conservative government's poor management of the crisis. Accurately portraying the nature and long-term consequences of this controversial phenomenon is further complicated by the official figures on emigration (see for example Gonzalez-Ferrer 2013, Jendrissek 2016, Vallejo-Martin and Moreno Jiménez 2016), since national statistics offices, in Spain as in other countries, generally have more difficulty in capturing the number of departures from their territory compared to the number of arrivals.

Estimates by the Spanish National Statistics Institute claiming that 225,000 Spanish nationals left between 2008-2012 are generally recognized as incomplete as they are based directly on changes in Spanish municipality registers or indirectly on new registrations in Spanish consulates abroad, measures which cannot account for the significant number of Spanish citizens abroad who are still registered in their local Spanish municipality or who have not registered with the Spanish consulate in their country of destination (González-Ferrer 2013, Izquierdo et al. 2016). In terms of more recent years, statistics based on residential variations and alternative migration surveys as well consulate registrations indicate that exits from Spain are continuing and that the number of Spanish-born Spaniards leaving the country was on the rise toward the end of the crisis: 51,267 in 2014 and preliminary data from 2015 pointing to a further increase in exits of 32,980 people. Izquierdo et al. (2016) have determined based on these data that most foreigners in Spain migrated mainly to Europe and South America, while the crisis years have witnessed an increase in the number of Spaniards born in Spain immigrating within Europe (mainly the UK and Germany) and to the United States.

Other figures on the scale of Spanish emigration have been provided by using combinations of Spanish and destination country data (González Ferrer 2013, INJUVE 2014, Jendrissek 2016). The Spanish Youth Institute, which is associated with the Ministry of Health, Social Services and Equality, has calculated that between 2009 and 2013, around 105,000 Spaniards aged 15-29 went to the United Kingdom, while 22,000 left for Germany (INJUVE 2014, Jendrissek 2016). These two countries combined have captured 85% of departures from Spain for the period. In yet another study, González Ferrer (2013) has calculated even higher figures. According to her calculations based on applications for British National Insurance numbers and German municipal statistics, among other sources, an estimated 700,000 Spanish nationals in total have left Spain between 2008 and 2012, which is equivalent to 1.5% of the Spanish population. She stresses that in parallel to the increased migration flows from Spain to North and Western Europe, levels of return migration to Spain have dropped in relation to the years prior to the crisis.

Although the non-Spanish-born population left Spain in higher numbers relative to the Spanish-born population in the years since 2008, only the latter group has been the subject of a great deal of controversial political and public discourse, Godenau (2017) cautions against the tendency in both the public debate and academic analyses to focus either explicitly or implicitly on the emigration of young and high-qualified individuals and emphasises the challenges in obtaining information on other segments of migrants. To be sure, surprisingly little attention has been paid to the migration of less skilled Spaniards, especially given the fact that they were significantly more hard-hit by the economic crisis than their high skilled counterparts.

As of 2016, Spain has experienced a reversal back to positive net migration. However, the rapid increase in flows of Spanish nationals abroad during the crisis years, especially to the United Kingdom and Germany, contributed to reactivating the South-North European migration route (both in real terms and in the national imaginary). Other indications of the new-found salience of the South-North migration channel was the rapid increase in English and German language class enrolments in Spain compared to the years prior to the crisis (Glorius 2017, Connolly 2013) as well as the recent opening of a branch of the German Employment Agency within the Madrid offices of the Spanish State Employment Public Services, which, according to a representative, is the only one of its kind in the EU.

5.2. Climate and context of departure: emigration from Spain in times of crisis

The economic recession in Spain had unequal impacts across different cohorts of workers, industries and occupations, the most affected groups being youth, non-EU immigrants and low-educated workers (Jansen et al. 2016). Men were hit harder than women, as male employment fell by 15 %, compared to a 3 % drop for women. In addition, womens' labour force participation (the ratio of the number of employed plus the unemployed to the total population) actually increased during the crisis, while it decreased for males, mainly as a result of a steep decline in young male labour force participation (Jansen et al. 2016). As of 2015, the group least affected by unemployment are university graduates above the age of 45, with an unemployment rate of 10%, while the rate of unemployment for youth with no more than primary education is the highest, standing at 69%. In the early years of the crisis, one in four young workers was laid-off in the services sector, while every second worker aged 20-29 lost her job in industry (Buck 2014). Although the unemployment rate of university graduates overall remained virtually stable throughout the crisis years, in 2015, young

university graduates, with an unemployment rate of 35%, are at a great disadvantage compared to their older counterparts.

The economic crisis, however, was not the sole cause of high unemployment and the lack of job stability for Spanish youth. Spain's notorious two-tier labour market that has guaranteed high job security for workers with permanent contracts (overwhelmingly older cohorts) while maintaining new job market entrants (predominantly youth) on the margins with temporary contracts was already a prominent feature of Spanish society by 1997 (Polavieja 2003) and during the economic 'bonanza'. Nevertheless, the historical context of three decades of economic betterment followed by the economic boom has led several authors to depict Spanish youth prior to the crisis as holding positive expectations for the future (Bygnes and Flipo 2017, Buck 2014) and as sharing a "generational grand narrative" of strong belief in progress (Jendrissek 2016). The optimism of pre-crisis Spanish youth in spite of their poor labour market position can perhaps be understood in terms of their awareness of the relatively high standards of living that they enjoyed compared to previous generations, compounded by a housing boom "that was turning bricklayers into sports car owners" (Buck 2014). In this context, the severity of the recession as well as its political and social dimensions can be seen as the ultimate disillusionment for this optimistic generation and their parents, a feeling which has no doubt infused the public discourse on Spanish emigration with a great deal of negativity.

5.3. Climate and context of reception: the integration of Spanish nationals in Northern European societies

The new wave of Spanish emigration to Northern Europe, though often evoked in public debates, remains under-researched compared to the more established theme of East-West European migration. Still, there is a growing literature on the effects of the crisis and individuals' decisions to migrate from Spain⁴ as well as profiles of migrants from Southern Europe and their labour market and psychosocial adjustment in the receiving society.⁵ Three very recently published edited volumes in particular have contributed to the field from a comparative perspective: *European Mobility in Times of Crisis: The New Context of European South-North Migration* (Glorius and Domínguez-Mujica, eds. 2017), *South-North Migration of EU Citizens in Times of Crisis* (Lafleur and Stanek, eds. 2017) and *High skilled Migration and Recession: Gendered Perspectives* (Triandafyllidou and Isaakyan 2016). Given the limits of this overview, I discuss some of the contextual and institutional aspects of Spanish emigration only for the German and British cases, the two main destination countries of Spanish emigres during the crisis.

The German context

The institutional framework of Spanish labour mobility in Germany

Several researchers show evidence that a variety of informal and formal networks facilitated by both private and public actors have emerged to help match the labour demand in Germany with the labour supply in Spain. Godenau (2017) draws our attention to the intensification of travel and networks between Spain and Germany, thanks to increased academic exchanges, tourism and communication technologies. He suggests that Spanish regions such as the Balearic and Canary Islands have facilitated the development of networks between the two countries thanks to the well-

⁴ See, for example, Bygnes 2015, Bygnes and Erdal 2016, Bygnes and Flipo 2017, Jendrissek 2016, Nijhoff and Gordano 2016, Triandafyllidou and Gropas 2014a.

⁵ See, for example, Bartolini et al. 2016, Triandafyllidou and Gropas 2014b, Vallejo-Martín and Moreno Jiménez 2016, Wassermann 2017.

known tourism and migration of German nationals to these places. Such networks have been confirmed by other researchers who identify cases of German employers speaking to local chambers of commerce while vacationing in Mallorca, leading to increasing work-placements of young Spaniards in German construction (von Koppenfels and Höhn 2017). Apart from informal networks based on tourism and family ties, German state and non-state actors have been coordinating labour mobility at the municipal and regional levels and through involvement of chambers of commerce, professional associations and the Federal Employment Agency, all of which have attended job fairs in Southern Europe (von Koppenfels and Höhn 2017).

Indeed, even in an era of open borders in the EU, the significance of ‘middlemen’ has not altogether disappeared. Despite the reduced state involvement in processes of labour mobility in the EU compared to the 1960s *Gastarbeiter* period of Spanish labour migration to Germany, for instance, public intervention is now focused on providing access to job matching processes and the social services granted to all national citizens. Godenau (2017) claims that Germany has invested in forging alliances with other states to promote labour mobility between them. Thus, Chancellor Merkel’s visits to Spain in recent years were often opportunities to voice the needs of the German labour market for high skilled labour (Godenau 2017). Indeed the so-called ‘Merkel Plan’ to hire over 100,000 high-qualified workers from Southern Europe did not fall on deaf ears in Spain, as a survey of 800 Spanish architects demonstrated that 44% of them claimed to be willing to try and benefit from the opportunities being offered by the German government (Sindicato de arquitectos 2011). However, to date it is unclear to what extent the German government ever had a concrete strategy in mind to attract high-qualified Southern European workers and facilitate their labour market integration in Germany, especially where German language training is concerned. Spanish media have since criticized the ‘empty promises’ behind the targeted recruitment discourse of the German government after reports of disillusioned high-qualified Spaniards seeking jobs in Germany emerged, highlighting that English language skills were rarely sufficient tools for finding work in their field in Germany (Público 2011).

Nevertheless, the German government has perceived migration from Southern Europe in overwhelmingly positive terms and that it has encouraged further recruitment of these “model migrants” (Klekowski von Koppenfels and Höhn 2017). In addition, the administration has recognized some of the socio-cultural challenges that Southern Europeans face in settling in Germany due to the language barrier as well as a general cultural attitude to foreigners lacking in warmth and openness (Connolly 2013). This has prompted specific new mechanisms to improve access to language training and government incitement that the German population display a more ‘welcoming culture’ toward foreigners (von Koppenfels and Höhn 2017).

Labour market integration of Spanish nationals in Germany

Data from a 2012 German microcensus of the working-age population in Germany shows that Southern European migrants (and Spaniards in particular) are relatively well positioned in the German labour market, specifically compared to other immigrants but also to the German-born population (except in terms unemployment levels). 76.4% of working-age Spaniards are active on the labour market (compared to 78.5% of the native German population), while 7.7% of them are unemployed (compared to 4.7% of native Germans and 3.8 North/Western European migrants). In terms of the type of employment, roughly 39% of Spaniards are in atypical employment (the same level for native Germans), which is a lower proportion than other migrants, and fewer Spaniards work in temporary jobs (10%) than both the native German population (13%) and the general migrant population. Roughly 28% of Spanish migrants work part-time, compared to 25% of native Germans and which is slightly higher than the Southern European average. Finally, Spanish workers

have one of the highest shares of managers and professionals among their ranks at 44%, just under the 47% of native Germans, and below the 61% of North and West EU migrant workers in Germany.

In this regard, Klekowski von Koppenfels and Höhne (2017) stress the high of occupational attainment of the Spanish population in Germany and of Southern Europeans more generally, but warn of a potential polarization within recent migrant groups (including Southern Europeans) in which high skilled individuals achieve greater success on the labour market than the average working population, while their lower-skilled counterparts fare worse than the average. They also draw our attention to the de-skilling of migrant labour in Germany, which, although most relevant for non-EU migrants, nonetheless affects EU-10 and Southern Europeans in Germany but does not appear in the descriptive census data.

To be sure, in an online study of the psychological, socio-cultural and economic adjustment of 506 Southern European workers in Germany, Wassermann (2017) shows that while 64% of employed participants felt between 'somewhat satisfied' and 'highly satisfied' with their jobs, a significant proportion (48%) perceived having 'rather more skills, abilities and/or qualifications than required' by their jobs. It is notable that on a Likert scale from 1 (no perception of over-qualification) to 7 (strong perception of over-qualification), Italian participants perceived lower levels of over-qualification than Spanish and Greek participants, with respective average scores of 3.7, 4.39 and 4.37 (Wassermann 2017). The fact that well over half of both Spanish and Greek workers in the study reported feeling overqualified for their jobs raises the question of whether the human capital of Spanish nationals and Southern Europeans more generally is adequately being employed in Germany, despite their relative success to date in the labour market.

The British context

The institutional framework of Spanish labour mobility in the United Kingdom

In spite of the relative rise in unemployment in the UK following the 2008 recession (beginning at 5% and peaking at 8.1% in 2011) and a reduction in the number of jobs available, the demand for both high and low skilled migrant workers has remained strong across a range of sectors (D'Angelo and Kofman 2017). This can be explained by several institutional and policy features: relatively low labour market regulation in some sectors, cuts in public investment in education and training, low wages and poor working conditions in several sectors, and low-waged agency work, among others. D'Angelo and Koffman (2017) provide specific examples of sectors which have relied heavily on migrant labour: the construction sector, where labour shortages may be explained by inadequate vocational training in the UK, the care sector, which involves low wages, and famously, in the healthcare sector. With regards to the latter, budget cuts to the National Health Service and the accompanying reduction in training places for healthcare professionals have led to a shortage of nurses, among others, which has prompted the recruitment of nurses from Portugal and Spain as well as non-EU countries (D'Angelo and Kofman 2017).

Despite this strong demand for both high and low skilled migrant workers, including Spanish nationals who have had high occupational attainment in the British labour market (detailed in the following section), British politicians of all political stripes (including Labour) have increasingly supported restrictions on the rights of EU citizens living in the UK in recent years. At the core of the political discourse and policy measures is a popular consensus in the UK that it has become a 'welfare magnet' in the eyes of low skilled Eastern European migrants (D'Angelo and Kofman 2017). Examples such as former Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron's decision to refuse family welfare benefits to unemployed EU migrants who had spent less than four years in the UK, (Travis 2016),

former Labour Prime Minister Gordon Brown's slogan of 'British jobs for British workers' and his pledge "to make EU migrants learn English" (D'Angelo and Kofman 2017) as well as proposals to clamp down on tax credits claimed by working EU migrants are all initiatives that pre-date the Brexit referendum.

According to D'Angelo and Kofman, the increased hostility toward EU migrants in the UK is mainly fueled by resentment toward Polish workers who have been filling the less skilled sectors and are perceived as competing with less educated local populations in provincial England. The researchers have found that relative to Polish workers, few Spanish and Italian emigrants are concentrated in low skill jobs, as will be discussed in the following section. The statistical representation of Spanish and Italian workers that emerge from the UK Labour Force Survey in 2014 is a contrast to recurring reports in the British media portraying Southern Europeans mainly in low skilled hospitality, retail and construction work (D'Angelo and Kofman 2017). In the context of the ongoing Brexit negotiations, it is unclear what the future status of EU migrants will be in Britain and whether they can expect different treatment based on their qualifications and British labour-market experience compared to other groups of migrants.

Labour market integration of Spanish nationals the United Kingdom

Data from the UK Annual Population Survey shows that most Spanish workers in the UK between 2013 and 2015 were relatively evenly distributed across three major economic sectors. 19,400 were concentrated in public administration, education and health (more than half of which in the education sector); 17,000 were in banking and finance; and 16,700 were working in distribution, hotels and restaurants. Spanish citizens are over-represented in both the financial and banking sector (25% compared to 17% of the total workforce) as well as in the distribution, hotels and restaurants sector (25% compared to 19% of the total workforce). According to a recent study by the British Office for National Statistics, Spanish workers in the UK are less concentrated in the communications and transport sectors (roughly 6,000 of them) and the number working in agriculture, forestry and fishing, energy and water, construction, manufacturing and 'other services' combined is roughly 9,000 (ONS 2017).

Regarding occupational levels, the Labour Force Survey data presented by D'Angelo and Kofman (2017) show that roughly 62% of the Spanish-born UK population can be found in managerial, professional, or associate professional technical occupations (ISCED categories 1-3), 42% of which are concentrated specifically in the professional occupations, which is more than double that of the UK-born rate. 12% of Spanish workers in the UK are employed in elementary occupations, which is a slightly higher concentration compared to the British-born (10% in elementary occupations).

5.4. Conclusions

The negative framing of the issue of emigration in the media and political discourse suggests that Spanish society perceives this recent phenomenon more in terms international migration than intra-EU mobility. The consensus among anti-government voices is that there are clear political and economic factors that are 'pushing' high-skilled Spaniards out of the country, rather than that Spanish workers are gaining access to the European labour market by exercising their right to circulate freely in the EU. However, the fact that among the Spanish-born population, the tendency to migrate among low-skilled youth (the hardest hit by the economic crisis) appears to be lower than among university educated youth indicates that 'the crisis narrative' cannot adequately explain the new wave of Spanish emigration. The emerging literature on South-North European labour mobility

suggests that there are political, social and cultural factors behind these processes that may be equally or even more important than the economic dimension.

In this sense, it would be very useful for the comparative literature on the subject to grow against the backdrop of continued long-term unemployment in Southern Europe and the challenges to European integration that most strikingly took shape around the Brexit referendum. In particular, more research is needed on how groups who were differently-impacted by the economic recession in Spain (e.g. foreigners/natives, youth/over 40s, men/women, unemployed/employed) and individuals in specific occupations (e.g. construction workers and architects vs. IT specialists vs. healthcare workers) may have employed different 'survival strategies', involving migration or not. Since so much attention has been paid to the role of the economic and social crisis, it would also be worthwhile to compare the motivations and experiences of Spaniards who migrated before the crisis with those who left after. In addition, despite the growing sense in Spain that many Spanish emigres are considering returning (Gil 2017) in the midst of the relative improvement in the Spanish economy, the reasons for and experiences of return to Spain remain relatively unstudied (exceptions include González Martín and Pumares 2016).

Finally, there are several major issues currently at stake in Europe that will no doubt shape the context of EU labour mobility in the long-run. The ongoing Brexit negotiations, on the one hand, will likely have an effect on the Spanish population (and other foreigners) in Great Britain, as well as on any future flows of migration to the UK. As the negotiations develop, the series of statistical studies being published by the UK Office for National Statistics on the UK's EU population will be extremely useful in order to follow the evolution of the Spanish population in Great Britain.

Another dynamic which will likely influence EU migration trends in the long-term is the arrival of the 1.1 million asylum-seekers in Germany since 2015. Successfully incorporating them into the German labour market and society represents a significant challenge, which may shift the German administration's attention away from encouraging Southern European mobility to Germany. As a result, we might expect fewer Spaniards leaving for Germany in coming years, unless it becomes clear that there are insufficient numbers of high-qualified workers among the recently arrived asylum-seekers.

A final long-term trend that is of interest to researchers of Southern European mobility has to do with the evolution of Southern European societies and economies in the aftermath of the economic crisis. Despite the improvement in the economy, the rise in employment levels, the recent reversal back to positive net migration in Spain as well as the fewer numbers of exits from the territory relative to the recession years, it is unclear how many Spanish emigres perceive these changes as a cue to return. Whether the recent waves of emigration prove to be a case of 'brain drain' with negative long-term effects on South European economies or whether countries like Spain are able to attract 'talent' back – both higher skilled and lower skilled workers – remains to be seen but will most likely depend on Spanish policy-makers' degree of commitment to creating the conditions of a long-term and inclusive economic recovery.

5.5. References

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6. Overview of contextual and institutional factors for migration. Country report Italy

6.1. Introduction: the public debate on new migration outflows

Over the last few years, the issue regarding the new migration waves of young educated Italian people toward EU and Extra-EU countries has been gaining momentum within the national public debate. Those debates started quite soon after the 2008 financial crisis and have become increasingly relevant in the Italian media-scape. Since the very beginning, the theme has been framed in a contrasting way by high level cabinet members. On the one hand, we can find some ritual and reiterative statements underlining how crucial and worrisome is the problem: “We have to create opportunities for our young people that went abroad to allow them to come back bringing back with them the competences and skills they gained” said, for instance, Sergio Mattarella (President of the Republic) commenting a research report by Fondazione Migrantes in 2016. On the other hand, we have opposite declarations aimed at minimizing both the problem and government’s responsibilities. On 4 October 2007, just before the eruption of the global financial crisis, a former member of the ECB board, Tommaso Padoa Schioppa, then Minister of Economy and Finance, referred to the Italian youth as “bamboccioni” (mummy's boys) to evoke an image of clumsy, overgrown babies still living with their parents and implicitly saying that they should better considering migrate abroad. Five years after, Elsa Fornero, then Minister of Welfare, added that Italian young people were having trouble finding a job because they were “too choosy”. Recently, only some months ago, Giuliano Poletti, the current Minister of Labour and Social Policies, tweeted “do young Italian people go abroad to look for more opportunities? It is better to get some of them out of the way”.

Such official statements have always triggered strong reactions by both the opposition and the public opinion at large that have focused on the cabinet not doing anything to address the problem of the increasing number of highly educated young people escaping abroad to improve their life and career chances. A recent example of this kind of backlash took place in late June when two young Italian people perished in the fire of the Grenfell Tower in London. Shortly after the fact, the legal representative of one of the family said in an interview with a national broadcasting network that one of the Italian dead persons - a 27 years old girl from Treviso - was in London working for an architecture firm for 1,800 pounds per month because in Italy, after her graduation with honors, she was offered 300 hundred euros per month for the same job.

In spite the growing relevance the question has got in public debates, up to now just two pieces of research (Caneva 2016, Lai 2014) have been done to analyse how the issue is framed and dealt with by newspapers, television and web-sites. Elena Caneva’s analysis - covering January-November 2015 – highlighted that most used words to talk about this issue encompass ‘escape’, ‘lack of opportunities and of hope’, ‘crisis’ and ‘unemployment’. Overall, they convey a negative and even tragic understanding of the problem. Emigration is usually described as the only way to escape job insecurity and find the career opportunities that could match the investment that young people and their families did in university studies. Other frequently used definitions such as “brain drain”, “talented young people on the run” “graduated young people trying their lucky” highlights even more clearly the failure to promote young generations’ educational degrees and competences.

Lack of meritocracy and dynamism are two other relevant leitmotifs that evoke a framework where Italian society is portrayed as a “No country for young people”. Here an intergeneration conflict is

put forward: on one side, we have elder, less educated who have permanent occupations with several benefits (or are retired with high pensions) and, on the other side, we have people who are younger, highly educated, skilled and motivated, who either are seeking a job or have a non-permanent occupation with few or no benefits. A frame that is often used in order to call for an increasing flexibilization and de-regulation of labour contracts that would make the labor market more flexible and, above all, more open to the younger generations. Caneva analyzed also some blogs put up by Italian young people living abroad. Here, the prevailing narratives are fairly more nuanced and complex: references to spirit of adventure, emphasis on individual agency and positive stories are much more frequent (see also Lai 2015). However, they do not seem able to reverse the standard/dominant discourse.

More broadly, media coverage is usually one-sided and offers a stereotyped picture. Firstly, it addresses the issue on a strictly national basis, instead of putting it into a broader framework: there is no mention of a better allocation of talents within, for instance, the EU labour market; furthermore, what is lost by one country (Italy in our case) is gained by another one. Secondly, most of the time media discourses recall just the push factors obliterating the pull-ones: migrants are not seduced by the opportunities provided by new contexts (Berlin, Paris, London, etc.) so much as they are unfairly rejected by their motherland. As a consequence, Italian migration is described as both an economic and a moral loss for the country. Thirdly, they contribute to reproducing and restating a strong class prejudice. In fact, media discourses focus on young and highly educated mobile people only, forgetting the older and low educated ones that still are an important share of the Italian emigration: the former are classified as brain drain while the latter as (invisible) migrants that do not deserve either targeted policies or moral support.

A final aspect concerns an alleged linkage - that has been increasingly asserted by center-right and right-wing politicians and has become a new important way of framing the debate - between “young Italian people going abroad” and immigration to Italy. It regards, on the one hand, what the government is not doing to prevent brain drain and, on the other, the waste of public financial resources that are used to host economic migrants from Africa and the Middle-East and disguised as asylum-seekers. Moreover, it states that we are losing our best talents in exchange for the worst ones coming from the Global South. Here Italy is depicted as a no country for young and white men: a narrative in which class and “race” join forces promoting discriminatory and exclusionary representations and practices concerning foreign migrants.

6.2. Climate and context of departure: the new emigration of educated youth

With the lengthening of the crisis, Italy has “returned” to be a country of emigration. As recalled in the first country report (Deliverable D4.2) and differently from the past, the “new” Italian emigrants are highly educated young people, often coming from the Northern regions of the country. A recent report of the National Institute of Statistics (Istat, 2016) stresses the increase of the number of people that were deleted from the public registers (in 2015 doubled the 2010 data). The main destinations for Italian emigrants are the UK (17,1%), Germany (16,9%), Switzerland (11,2%) and France (10,6%) (Istat, 2016; Triandafyllidou and Gropas, 2014).

Besides the data on migration outflows - that only partially capture the number of people moving abroad as they count only those who have asked to be deleted from the public registers - some surveys investigated also the intention to migrate among young people still in Italy. According to the

data of a survey carried out by Istituto Toniolo (Migliavacca et al. 2015), more than 40% of young Italian people 18-29 years old would be willing to move abroad, in order to get a better job (about 32% would be willing to move to another city in Italy and less than 30% would not be willing to move). Among respondents who declared they would migrate there were people with different employment conditions: unemployed, non-permanent employees and also permanent employees with a job that they do not like. Regression models show that men are more likely than women to be willing to move, 18-26 years old more likely than 27-29 year old. As expected, highly educated young people are more likely to be willing to move than less educated and students, unemployed and non-permanent workers more likely than permanent ones and self-employed (Migliavacca et al. 2015).

A comparative research carried out by ISTUD (2014) stressed also that Italian youth are more likely than young people from Germany, UK, United States, China, India and Brasil to see no real opportunities of self-fulfilment and prospect of growth in their country. Asked about what they expect from a working experience abroad, the most usual answer from Italian students was, "Career opportunities I cannot find in my country" (21.4%), while both BRIC (26.7%) and great western industrial countries (25.9%) students typical answer was, "To build my personal and professional future". A similar comparative project carried out by Istituto Toniolo in 2015 (Balduzzi and Rosina, 2016) with a survey involving 5000 young people in UK, France, Germany, Italy and Spain, showed interesting cross countries differences concerning two questions. The first asked people how much they agreed with the idea that going abroad was an important way to experience other cultures: 75% of Italians strongly agreed, while only 41% of Germans and 49% of British did the same. The second question concerned the idea of moving abroad as a necessity of finding better life and job opportunities: the percentage of Italians that strongly agreed was the highest (45%) in comparison with all the other countries (Spain 21%, France 15%, UK 8%, Germany 6%). According to this survey, Italians were also the most skeptical about the opportunities that their country could offer in comparison with other high developed countries (Balduzzi and Rosina, 2016). Skepticism about job opportunities may couple with non-economic factors that push Italians to find employment abroad. In particular, young Italians criticize the fact that older people usually occupy key positions in business and politics (gerontocracy), and favour their acquaintances to enter the labour market (nepotism), leaving little space to people who deserve a better position (King et al., 2016). The same finding is also highlighted by Bartolini and colleagues (2016) who state that highly skilled workers may migrate due to the lack of meritocratic conditions that impede their careers. Given these attitudes, emigration is seen by a large percentage of young Italians as the only way to realize themselves (43% vs 35% in Spain, 19% in France, 11% in Germany and UK). Very similar results were highlighted also by another survey carried out the following year by the same research institute (Bichi, 2017).

Structural characteristics and main trends of the Italian labour market

Taking into consideration both the structural characteristics and the main trends of the Italian labour market is crucial to understand the reasons that push Italian (young) people to migrate abroad, in particular with the lengthening of the crisis.

Overall, the Italian labour market is characterized by:

- a *low employment rate*, indicating relatively limited job opportunities. In 2016, the employment rate in Italy was 57% while the EU15 average was nearly 67% and some countries like Germany, UK, and Denmark were around 73-75%. In spite of the less severe job losses due to the crisis than those registered in other Southern European countries, Italy is still at the bottom of the ranking among Western European countries (Fellini and Fullin, 2017);

- a strong *territorial segmentation* along the North-South divide as regards employment, unemployment and participation rates. The huge difference between unemployment rates in 2016 – around 7% in the North vs 19% in the South – provides an example of the dramatic Italian labor market “balkanization” which has worsened since the onset of the crisis (ISTAT, 2017). The South-North internal migrations – that decreased for some decades – have been recovering in the last years (Panichella, 2014 Impicciatore and Strozza, 2016)
- a *low qualification* of the employment structure due the weak demand for highly-skilled occupations which have furtherly shrunk since the crisis, differently from the trends that took place in the other Western European countries (Fellini, 2015). This turns out into structural weak returns of education for highly educated whose advantage in terms of unemployment risk, length of job search and precocity of first jobs is low in comparison to what occurs in the other Western European countries.

This set of structural characteristics has traditionally promoted the (male) adult labour force insertion in the labour market and *penalized younger workers*, whose labour market outcomes have further deteriorated since the outburst of the crisis (Migliavacca 2013; De Luigi et al. 2012), thus strengthening the (economic) push factors that, in the Italian context, are likely to affect the decision to go abroad for working reasons. Indeed, since then, the difficulties that young (educated) people face in finding a job have significantly increased and the quality of jobs they find has significantly worsened.

The difficult condition of young people in the Italian labour market

The unemployment rate of young people is higher than the adults’ unemployment rate in most of the European countries (but Germany) but Italy is characterized by the highest youth penalization (Migliavacca, 2012; Reyneri, 2017). In 2017 the average unemployment rate (>15 years) was 11,7% and the youth unemployment rate (15-24 years old) was 37% (Istat datawarehouse). Just before the crisis, in the same month of 2007, the total unemployment rate was 6% and the youth one was 19%. The North/South divide already highlighted for the total unemployment rate is stronger for the youth: the difference between unemployment rate in the two macro-regions was 30 percentage points in the ‘90s and 20 points in the following decade. As stressed by De Luigi et al. (2012) and Reyneri (2017), the recent decrease does not mean the divide is really shrinking as discouraged people in the South, facing increasing difficulties in the labour market because of the crisis stopped looking for a job and so became inactive (De Luigi et al. 2012; Reyneri 2017).

Italian young people are not only much more unemployed than adults but also much more precarious. As stressed by literature, the percentage of youth with a non-permanent occupation is higher than the percentage registered among adults in all the European countries. But in Italy - and more generally in Southern Europe – precarious jobs are less likely to be a stepping stone to a permanent occupation and more likely to become a trap (Barbieri and Scherer, 2005, 2007 and 2009; Fellini, Migliavacca, 2010; Blossfeld et al. 2011 and 2012, Migliavacca 2013; Scherer 2004; Cutuli and Guetto, 2012). The process of labour market deregulation took place in Italy in the late ‘90s and has been hitting much more the youth than the adult labour force. The first are now much more likely to enter the labour market with a non-permanent jobs than the previous generations, who found their first job in the ‘60s ‘70s and ‘80s (Schizzerotto, 2002; Fullin and Reyneri 2015).

In this context, very difficult for youth, investment in education does not give as much return as in other European countries. Even though the number of young Italians holding a tertiary degree has

considerably increased in the most recent decades, spanning from 74,471 to 304,608 between 1987 and 2014, the share of graduates is still comparatively low in Italy. Only 24% of the 25-34 years-old holds a tertiary degree in comparison to the much higher OECD average of 41% in 2014 (Recchi, Barone, Assirelli, 2016; OECD, 2015). Paradoxically, the “scarcity” of young Italian graduates does not imply higher returns of education for them, neither in terms of employment opportunities, nor in terms of earnings. Indeed, their unemployment rate in 2014 was 17,7 % among the 25-34 years-old, a value even higher than that for upper secondary graduates (15,8%) (Recchi, Barone, Assirelli, 2016). High education does not seem to protect from job instability either. Differently from the past, highly educated youth is not less likely to get a non-permanent job than low educated. A high level of education, nevertheless, is still associated with higher probabilities of getting a permanent job after the first precarious experiences (Scherer, 2004). Besides, the earnings premium of tertiary degrees is in Italy among the smallest in OECD countries (Recchi, Barone, Assirelli, 2016; OECD, 2015). The main reason for such low returns of university degrees in Italy is the structural unbalance between the supply and the demand for skilled occupations. If young people holding a tertiary degree are quite few from a *demographic* point of view, they are too many from an *economic* point of view, due to the low demand for graduates in the labor market that highlights the scarcely dynamic and innovative character of the Italian productive fabric (Reyneri, 2010).

The Italian labour market highlights an increasing mismatch between job opportunities, on the one hand, and younger labour forces educational attainment (and expectations) on the other. Returns of education have significantly lowered in the last fifty years: according to recent estimates, at present a young graduate is much less likely than a young graduate in the 60s and the 70s to insert into the highest occupational classes for his first job. Differently from a recent past, this means that the highest educational credentials do not guarantee the access to jobs with the highest socio-economic status (Ballarino, Scherer, 2013; Argentin, Ballarino, 2014). This increasing mismatch between labour demand and younger labour forces explains also the increase of over-qualification in the Italian labour market in recent years (as well as in other European countries), in spite of the difficult task to carry out analysis on the topic both at the national and at a comparative level.

6.3. Climate and context of reception. Italian migrants' integration into the new society

A recent study based on a survey of Italian graduates carried out in 2015 estimated that around 5% of Italian young graduates were living abroad 4 years after getting their degree and the figure had doubled from the previous survey in 2011 (Recchi, Barone and Assirelli, 2016). Moreover and more interestingly, the study shows that the occupational outcomes of those who move abroad are better than those of graduates who stay in Italy as the former have higher chances to find a highly-skilled occupation (+ 6,8%), earn more even when controlling for different standard of living (+ 27%) and also are more confident about their future career prospects (+21%). Even if such differences could be accounted for by the positive self-selection of young Italian graduates who choose to move abroad, it is quite likely that their better outcomes do depend on the more widespread qualified job opportunities in other European countries, especially Germany and United Kingdom.

Besides these general findings about the return to migration abroad, some researches focused specifically on integration of Italian migrants in UK and Germany, which are the preferred destinations of Italians who look for better job and life opportunities (Triandafyllidou and Gropas, 2014). By virtue of the EU institutional framework that enabled free movement of EU citizens within

its borders, intra-European labour migration of Italians to the UK and Germany has considerably increased during 1990s and 2000s (Haug, 2015; McKay, 2015).

Starting from the British case, a big number of Italians have been moved to the UK during the years of the crisis. With regard to highly-skilled sectors, Italians have found employment in engineering, business and economics, and ICT sector (Triandafyllidou and Gropas, 2014), although assumptions should not be made that all highly-skilled migrants achieve to find a job reflecting their skills. Based on journalistic sources, McKay (2015) points out that highly-skilled Italian workers, especially immediately after their arrival to UK, in some cases are employed in low skilled jobs that do not require language proficiency in fast food outlets, characterized by bad working conditions. Furthermore, coming either as students or job-seekers, Italians have also to face the high cost of housing rentals in big cities, and, particularly, in London. Those employed under precarious working conditions in low paid sectors may struggle to make ends meet, and may spend more than half of their monthly wage for dwelling (McKay, 2015). In this sense, migrant workers in the UK may work with temporary contracts through employment agencies; undeclared or even unpaid for overtime working hours; without the right to complain for unfair dismissals for the first two years of job contract. McKay thus states that the arrival in the UK is by no means an easy and straightforward task, and young Italians might be disappointed from the first steps in the British labour market.

Another popular destination for Italian emigrants during the last decade has been Germany; especially the city-state of Berlin (Pichler, 2017). Contrary to Italian patterns of mobility in past decades (1950s – 1960s) that largely regarded labour mobility of males in low-skilled sectors such as manufacturing, agriculture and construction (Haug, 2015; Pichler, 2017), contemporary migration flows to Germany have a different nature. In a qualitative research on Italian migrants in Berlin, del Prà (2011) states that more and more Italian migrants access high skilled sectors in the German labour market, highlighting the opportunities for these workers to advance their career and improve their quality of life in the German capital. This phenomenon concerns also Italian women who have traditionally showed lower employment rates in comparison with women from other sending countries (Pichler, 2017). New highly skilled migrants find usually employment in Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics professions and health sector. With special reference to the latter, a proficient knowledge of German language is often required and represent a barrier to access good jobs in the sector. Moreover, nurses are likely to get jobs not corresponding to their skills (Pichler, 2017).

With regard to low skilled jobs, the majority of Italians are concentrated in food trades and gastronomy (Del Prà, 2011; Haug, 2015; Pichler, 2017). Concentration of Italians in such professions may be due to the problematic recognition of university certificates or requirements of language proficiency in German (Haug, 2015). In this sense, Recchi and colleagues (2016) related that this constraint might be of great relevance for Italians who perform worse in acquiring language proficiency than other European citizens. Nevertheless, these jobs are usually low-paid and precarious (MiniJobs contracts), and, as such, may constrain Italians' access to welfare benefits and rent subsidies (Del Prà, 2011).

Further barriers concerning Italians' arrival and integration in the new society may derive from housing problems, irrespective of workers' skill levels (Haug, 2015; Recchi et al., 2016). In particular, organization of relocation, dissatisfaction with the quality of housing and high cost of rents have been referred as problematic issues by new Italian emigrants. At the same time, the same author

points out that new migrants' children in schooling age may face difficulties in getting a diploma from a German secondary school. Italian migrants may also have problems when dealing with German public services, because they may find German bureaucracy too complex (Del Prà, 2011). Finally, with regard to discrimination against new Italian migrants and their strategies to cope with such a phenomenon, there are few references in the literature. There is only a little reference to migrants who have not received medical treatment notwithstanding they possessed the European health card that provides health care (Del Prà, 2011).

6.4. Conclusions

Recently it is common to find an increasing number of news that confirms the difficult situation of the Italian labour market and vulnerability of young workers we outlined above, as well as news concerning the negative effects of the economic crisis, which are more visible than few years ago (Istat, 2017). Alarming data concerning poverty showed an increase of the incidence of absolute poverty in a single year: between 2015 and 2016 the percentage increased from 6.1 to 6.3 among households and from 7.6 to 7.9 among individuals. Negative news concerning social and welfare dimensions of the Italian society gets along with other recent news concerning the increasing brain drain of Italian (young) people and, as said, the weak performances of the Italian labour market. They are fragments of different dimensions, but all of the same colour, which go to make up a picture that triggers a cry of alarm: Rome, we have some problems!

One of the main problems seems to be the fact that current features of the Italian labour market and negative socio-economic effects of the economic crisis have pushed an increasing number of Italian workers to move abroad, mainly to Germany, Britain and France.

As highlighted in the previous pages, in the recent years Italian workers who decided to move abroad for working reason have been not only an important topic in the national public debate, but also the object of an increasing number of studies seeking to explore this quite new phenomenon. Given the long history of Italian emigration towards American and North European countries, the resurgence of migration outflows in the recent years, after half a century of scarce mobility to abroad, is perceived as a very alarming fact.

This new wave of Italian migrant workers seems to involve more categories of workers in terms of high/low skills than in the past. According to Impicciatore and Strozza (2016), South-North internal migrations, which recently showed an increase, and international mobility are connected and their interlinkages need to be investigated. Germany and United Kingdom (and, more specifically, Berlin and London) are the main European countries/urban areas of destination for both high and low-skilled Italian workers. The few empirical studies available highlighted some barriers that Italian workers met in these labour markets and societies, but usually the attention is focused on a specific category of workers (recently more on high-skilled workers than low-skilled) or on a specific economic sector. Further research is needed in order to improve the knowledge of this new wave of Italian migrant workers; specifically it is necessary to collect and analyse more information on their migration experience, on their expectations concerning the countries of destination and the problems they are facing, especially during the first months after their arrival. Also our knowledge of migrants' perceptions and of their social representations of the destination labour markets and societies is still scant and fragmented. Moreover, last but not least, the new wave of Italian migrant workers and its specificities do challenge the interpretative models that in the past have been particularly effective in explaining actions and choices of migrant workers coming to EU15 countries

from abroad. The GEMM study may give a valuable contribution, improving and enriching these different dimensions of knowledge, developing a more systematic cross-country comparison.

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7. Overview of contextual and institutional factors for migration. Country report Bulgaria

7.1. Introduction. Migration in the public debate

Mobility within Europe continues to be present as a major theme in public debates in Bulgaria in the spring and summer of 2017. The two directions of mobility – crossing the country's borders from the outside and from the inside are widely discussed, this time having a more equal weight. Defending the country borders from outsiders has gained momentum with the so called patriotic parties entering the new government and the scandals linked to the construction of the border wall to the South-East, separating Bulgaria from Turkey with the more than 3 million refugees residing there. The arguments against accepting refugees are closely linked to the theme of national security and is now set in a stronger European discourse with the claim to defend the borders of the EU against illegal immigration. It is also in line with the government objective the country to join the Schengen agreement. A new theme giving support to considering mobility via security issues is the upcoming Bulgarian Presidency of the Council of the EU in 2018 and the need to provide safety for the expected hosting of EU officials.

The theme of emigration of Bulgarians to other European countries is less discussed in the media at present. It is still viewed in a mostly negative light linked to the population decline and the brain drain discourse (Ivanova, 2017; Novini, 2017). Since June 2016 the results of the Brexit referendum have given some fresh impetus to the discussions about the situation of Bulgarians studying and working in the UK (Dnevnik, 2017; Vesti, 2017, PIK, 2017). Media publications deliberate not only Bulgarian emigrants' fears about the future of their status in the UK but also wage reductions and rise in discriminatory attitudes already experienced. Bulgarians living in other countries such as Germany, Spain and Italy rarely attract media attention. However, Germany, Spain and the UK are cited as the most preferred destinations for Bulgarians leaving the country (Novini, 2017). The media continue providing information about significant amounts of the remittances sent by emigrants back to Bulgaria (Petrova, 2017).

Some new books on migration research (Maeva, 2017; Richter et al, 2017) were published in the studied period which however did not attract high media attention. Few are the studies that have considered gathering empirical data about the institutional factors and context of departure for migrants. Some publications discuss the changes in policy regulations over time by the respective Bulgarian and European governments. More information is available about the perceptions, explanations and motivations of prospective and actual migrants which have been presented in the first overview (D4.2). Research has been done on how return migrants view and experience the local labour market, housing conditions and political developments (Malev, 2010; Mintchev & Boshnakov, 2010).

In what follows we first discuss the findings from academic publications examining institutional and contextual factors for emigration from Bulgaria followed by a presentation of the research done on the context in the receiving countries and the factors for the labour market and community integration of Bulgarian emigrants into the UK, Germany, Spain and Italy. We conclude with an outline of the commonalities and differences between the reviewed studies, the gaps in research and hypotheses that we could explore on the basis of our own interview data.

7.2 Bulgaria as a context of departure

Bulgaria is commonly defined as a country of emigration and this has been true for almost a century since the Balkan wars in the second decade of the 20th century when the country received large waves of refugees as a result of the changing state borders in the region. Since the fall of the communist regime, the country context has been characterized with a consistent emigration flow, strong transit migration trend, a relatively low immigration inflow and a moderate refugee inflow (Mancheva and Troeva, 2011: 16). However, the situation has been far from unilineal in the post-communist period. The institutional system in the country, its economic, demographic, political and cultural characteristics have been changing and so have the specific features of the outgoing migration. In the first decade of the regime change the context was one of sharp reduction of economic output, closure of enterprises, mass unemployment, galloping prices and recurrent deficits of goods and services. The prevalent trend in the general climate was a rise of anxiety and insecurity (Maeva and Zahova, 2015: 48). With the opening of the country borders the first emigrants were economic migrants led by the desire to earn some money for a short period and then come back when the situation improves. Their knowledge of the foreign countries was very limited. The mushrooming new tourist companies were often the first channels allowing those wishing to migrate to exit the country and only later there came the firms offering secure jobs and work permits. The two authors also cite political deficiencies of the country context as arguments for migration – the lack of perspectives for a real political reform and replacement of political elite.

The banking crisis of 1997 and the fall of the reformed socialists' government were accompanied by hyperinflation and a further reduction of industrial output (Minchev and Boshnakov, 2006). This resulted in a more massive outflow of both highly and low skilled migrants, still sharing expectations for a short stay abroad – till 'things in Bulgaria are sorted out' (Karamihova, 2003: 84). Subsequently, in the first decade of the 21st century, the institutional context slowly changed towards economic growth and political stabilization. The improvement however was not as fast and significant as the mass expectations for the 'end of the transition' were and the emigration continued to be the prevalent trend. Leaving the country was eased by its placement on the so-called Schengen White List (April 2001) removing visa restrictions for traveling in the EU, and the EU accession (January 2007). According to official statistical data (NSI, 2017) the highest emigration rate was in 2009-2010, at the time when the economic crisis started to be felt in Bulgaria, it then declined till 2014 and started to rise again from 2015 on. Evaluating the context of departure based on survey data, Richter et al (2017: 187) consider that the main reasons for leaving the country are still the economic situation and the general perception of a missing developmental perspective in the home country. Ethnographic studies confirm this observation. According to Maeva and Zahova (2015: 31), the home country is viewed as a social place in which migrants come on short visits only to reconfirm the rightness of their choice while the rest of the population has turned into potential migrants or e-migrants, part of the virtual diasporas. A major characteristic of the country context, described by migrants as 'traumatic experiences' (Zahova, 2015: 114) is the situation with services in Bulgaria: legal, health, educational, house repairs and others and this is valid for both state and private providers according to the interviewed migrants. Other aspects that act as pushing factors at present are the low trust in institutions, rising social inequalities, corrupt elites (Krastev, 2015). Ethnic discrimination is pointed at one of the main reasons for emigration of people from the Roma minority (Tarnovchi, 2012; Richter et al, 2017).

The state policy to regulate internal and external mobility is another significant feature of the institutional context for migration. It is based on the Law on Bulgarians Living outside the Republic of

Bulgaria, adopted in 2000, the revised National Strategy on Migration, Asylum and Integration (2015–2020), implemented by the State Agency for Bulgarians Abroad as well as the activities of other ministries. One of its main goals is to attract Bulgarian nationals and foreigners of Bulgarian origin to return and permanently settle in Bulgaria. Researchers evaluate this policy as ineffective, based on legal imperfections and flawed implementation (Krasteva, 2010; Richter, 2017). The state is also engaged in implementing the EU directives encouraging the free mobility of workers in the European labour market through the country's network of EURES services. In Bulgaria these are rather recent structures and a significant share of their activities is occupied by their own institutional development including employing new experts while the job offers and applicants are still very few (Employment Agency, 2017).

The climate of departure is characterized by a 'negatively loaded' image of the phenomenon, perceiving it as a leading to depopulation of the country, destroying its cultural traditions, and a national betrayal (Maeva and Zahova, 2015: 28). Describing the public attitudes, the authors claim that migration is still considered as a social deviation, 'a morally unacceptable but economically justifiable existence' (ibid: 31). Characteristic for the climate in Bulgaria as a country with massive outflows of people is the figure of the 'gurbetchia' – a low-skilled man working abroad for a short time following the traditional model of 'minimum spending and maximum saving' (Zahova, 2015: 110). Other negative evaluations of present day mobility build upon arguments that it prevents the development of the Bulgarian economy depriving businesses from highly skilled labour, hospitals – from qualified nurses, and Bulgarian universities – from bright and active students (Krastev, 2015). The author also speaks about the Hirschman (1970) effect on the political system – when people exit, there is no voice to reform the system.

A more nuanced picture of the social context emerges when we examine more specific local contexts and particular institutional factors. Authors (Richter et al, 2017) have pointed at high regional disparities in Bulgaria as a sending country. Based on a representative survey of young people in Bulgaria, Mitev and Kovacheva (2014) found out that the highest emigration aspirations were expressed in the richest region in Bulgaria, that of the South-West, while people from the poorest North-West region tended to be mobile inside the country. These results were confirmed by another study exploring the transitions to the labour market of recent school and university graduates (Stoilova and Dimitrova, 2015). The public-private divide in the economy also affects the readiness for migration. Thus Mintchev et al (2017: 57) argue that occupations in the public sector hold people back from migration as such jobs are relatively stable and secure. Employment in agriculture on the contrary is linked to low earnings and low security which stimulate people to emigrate.

Looking at the sectors on which the GEMM project focuses, we can see significant differences not only between the highly skilled and the low skilled occupations but also within them. The IT sector in Bulgaria is among the few which merit positive presentations in the specialized media. Thus TechNews.bg (2013) claims that software developers are the specialists that are in greatest demand in the Bulgarian labour market and calculates that the employment in the IT market grows with 5% per year. Similar are the conclusions of Farrell (2014). According to him, Bulgarian IT specialists no longer take their expertise abroad (as they did 10 years ago) due to the improved prospects at home: the 10% income tax, cheap office and other property rents and food, the more leisurely Bulgarian lifestyle. In addition, the market is developing and many new IT companies bring their offices in Sofia. While the author agrees that the public health sector and school system are in a bad condition, the income of the IT elite makes private services easily accessible. However, a study of the employees in the sector (Pejcheva, 2017) highlights a growing discontent in the group of IT employees citing high

intensity of work, long working hours, irregular workload and frequent overwork, poor office infrastructure.

In contrast to the more positive conditions in the developing IT sector, the situation in the country's health care in Bulgaria is presented in catastrophic terms (Malasheva, 2017; PIK, 2014). The list of structural problems in the sector encompasses low wages of the personnel, low investment in technology, diminishing support for the specialization of doctors. When this review was being written in the beginning of July the doctors from a hospital in Sofia were staging an organized protest after a client's assault against one of their colleagues. Their representative stated that violence against medical personnel is a more significant reason for emigration abroad than the low salaries (Yordanova, 2017). It is not only the Bulgarian media that portray the shortages of medical personnel due to emigration as damaging the whole sector. Pitu and Popova (2016) cite Herbert Bruckner from the Institute of Employment Research in Nuremberg, who considers that, in view of the numerous medical personnel educated in Bulgaria and working in Germany, the health care in Bulgaria is negatively affected. A study of the quality of work in four sectors in Bulgaria (Kovacheva and Kabaivanov, 2008) found that the employed in the public hospitals were more satisfied than those in the communication technologies valuing the following aspects of their work: its autonomy, flexible working schedules, opportunities to combine this with a second job in a private hospital and moral satisfaction of helping people. In the same study bank employees scored the lowest on the scale measuring satisfaction with the quality of work and life, despite having the highest income. They commonly expressed disapproval of the lack of autonomy and high intensification of their work, regular practices of working overtime with little or no warning.

Finances is the sector which underwent radical restructuring after the fall of the communist regime in 1989 and since then it has been experienced several crises with banks going bankrupt, numerous mergers and high employment insecurity. At present the efforts to stabilize the sector are showing results but the chronic problems still undermine its prospects: high share of risky credits, including 'linked personalities credits' (Capital, 2017). The Ministry of Finances (2017) published a report showing positive evaluation of the financial situation in the country and satisfactory expectations of financial experts.

In the low-skilled end of the labour market, construction in Bulgaria is the sector under highly fluctuating circumstances. In the first years of the post-communist transformation it experienced a substantial expansion with numerous small private companies replacing the large state enterprises in a booming housing market and then saw the companies grow capitalizing upon building of highways, treatment plants, railways on public tenders, particularly with European funds. The sector reached the highest growth in 2008 and since then is in decline with companies cutting workers who immediately 'become potential labour migrants in the EU countries' (Capital, 2016). Besides experiencing a steep contraction of the output, the sector is evaluated as being one of the riskiest for the employed workers because of high work traumatism (News, 2016). A rather continuous trend in the whole post-communist period is that the labour inspections often find violations of the working time and the health and safety regulations. A large share of employment is in the grey economy with little or no social security benefits for the construction workers.

7.3. Institutional and contextual factors in the receiving countries

The recruitment channels for mobility which were analysed in the first overview (D4.2) are very often found to be the initial factors for adaptation of migrants in the country of destination as well.

Prospective migrants who have employment contracts before departure often rely on employers not only for their jobs but also for help with housing and administrative services. The state institutions such as the specialized State Agency for Bulgarians Abroad and the Bulgarian Embassies and Consulates in foreign countries are another possible source of support for the new migrants which they offer in varying degrees. A third type of institutions and often more important than the previous two are the migrants' associations in the receiving countries. The research literature overwhelmingly reveals that it is the informal networks that channel migrants' activities in settling, adapting and integrating in the new context. Let us now look more closely on the role of the institutional factors as explored and highlighted in the national literature.

Many studies have described the migrants' search for the first jobs and the opportunities and constraints that they meet in the destination country. Richter et al (2017: 186) distinguish three patterns of labour market integration: informal groups for access to the low skill sector of the labour market; employment agencies and the Internet for access to the highly skilled sector; employers act as a third pattern, again for the highly qualified jobs. Employers are more inclined to support migrants with valuable skills than those with low qualifications (Richter et al 2017; Donchev, 2017). However, this is not a common practice in all countries. Maeva (2017, 123) argues that the most used channel is to mobilize the informal networks of country nationals and relatives who provide information about employers and job openings. Employers who are Bulgarians themselves are preferred than local company owners. When describing the jobs however it becomes clear that these factors are used by those searching for jobs in the low qualified sectors such as construction or home care independently of the qualification level of the migrants themselves. Maeva (ibid) tells some comic stories of migrants without any skills claiming to be 'construction workers'. For the personal and home care, a common practice is to 'buy' the houses from other Bulgarians with longer experience of working in the foreign country (Zahova, 110-111). Low skill jobs are usually part-time and insecure which pressures migrants to take on several jobs or work long hours in one of them (Zahova, 2013). Decheva (2013) argues that Bulgarian migrants in Spain are concentrated in the sectors of catering, construction, transport and domestic care. Similar observations of the concentration of Bulgarian immigrants in temporary, low paid dangerous sectors of the highly segmented labour market in Spain are reported by Markova (2006). However, in all publications the employment of Bulgarian migrants in the different economic sectors is not studied separately and the main dividing line is between highly qualified and low qualified jobs.

In the UK and Germany the institutional context of health care and IT is favourable for migrants while the market in Spain and Italy attracts and absorbs migrant employees in construction, restaurants and personal care. In most countries migrants experience initial downward mobility towards low skilled jobs and low-skilled sectors (Richter et al, 2017: 71). In the UK autonomous self-employment is a widely spread practice particularly for the low qualified, while in Italy the cooperatives mediate between employers looking for workers and workers registered as self-employed, thus easing the employment integration of Bulgarian immigrants (Zahova, 2015:109). In Northern Italy the well paid and stable employment in industry had attracted many workers when their jobs in the state enterprises in Bulgaria disappeared. After 2008 they suffered again from the employment reduction. Similar were the experiences of those working in construction in Spain.

In each country, whether traditionally or newly receiving migrants, the context is strongly influenced by policies regulating migration and their integration. While these policies are not always effective in reducing the numbers of incoming migrants, they do have a strong impact on their work and social inclusion. Everywhere migrants try to comply with existing regulations which allows them to rent a

flat, search for jobs and travel to Bulgaria (Zahova, 2015: 104; Maeva, 2017: 127). In Italy several acts of amnesty for the illegal immigrants over the years since 1990 have helped their inclusion in society.

Independently of their legal status migrants tend to create their own networks and these have been studied extensively in the past ten years. Their role has been significant not only for getting the first job but also for further career development, housing and leisure. Maeva (2017) describes the suburbs in London with concentration of Bulgarian immigrants as well as the practice for those successful in their professional realization to move out and buy houses in more prestigious neighbourhoods. Yoveva-Dimitrova (2015: 69) observed that the creation of ethnic suburbs in large cities often brings to encapsulation and prevents the full integration of migrants. This kind of special closure of Bulgarians was common in UK and Spanish cities while in Austria structures such as the Migration Regional Fund and the Consultative Center for Integration and Adaptation helped Bulgarians to settle in more integrated parts of the city of Vienna. Other institutions that serve the integration function are the municipal authorities and the non-governmental sector. Researchers (Voskresenski, 2015; Slavkova, 2012; Maeva, 2017) have examined the Bulgarian associations abroad. They mostly do cultural and educational activities such as language courses, organization of celebrations, participating in the integration projects of state and non-governmental institutions. The ethnic organizations also play a role for helping with the job search, legalization of documents, access to housing, legal advice. Such services are more often provided by informal leaders some of whom become leaders of new associations (Voskresenski, 2015: 10). Besides associations, Bulgarian food shops and restaurants also serve for the consolidation of the Bulgarian community. Research has identified the role of Bulgarian Orthodox church (Maeva, 2017) which however is evaluated as less active than that of the Catholic Church and in London in particular many migrants visit local Anglican churches. In 2015 Yanev (2015: 14) calculates the number of Bulgarian institutions (cultural, religious, educational) in the world as more than 870. He also considers that significant support for migrants comes from the media of Bulgarian migrants: internet sites, information portals, radio and TV programmes, as well as newspapers, journals and leaflets. Maeva and Zahova (2015) also found that the Bulgarian newspapers published legal advice as well as information on health insurance and labour law which migrants in Spain found very helpful.

The climate of reception is more elusive to capture but nonetheless significant in migrants' experiences. In academic literature it has been described as varying both in time and social place. After the first wave of migrants from Eastern European countries that became members of the EU in 2004 the attitudes towards new migrants were rather negative. The fears and distrust towards Bulgarians and Romanians rose in Spain and Italy after the economic crisis in 2008 and in the UK with the Brexit campaign. In the 1990s prospective migrants themselves did not know much about the climate in the respective countries. Maeva and Zahova (2015) argue that since communist Bulgaria was a closed society, migrants' 'knowledge' was based on novels and textbook descriptions; for example, Bulgarians in Spain mentioned a Bulgarian movie and their textbook lessons about the Civil War in Spain in 1936-39 as their pre-migration 'familiarity' with the destination country. Later the access to information became much easier due to the spreading of the new ICT in Bulgaria, and the developing migration networks, including easier travel home of more established migrants. Researchers also point at the growing dislike towards new migrants in the receiving countries not only among the local population but also among older migrants from Bulgaria towards their co-patriots. Specific features of the context in Italy, as argued by Zahova (2015:104) are the tolerance towards illegal immigration and the spread of grey economy. In addition, Bulgarian migrants

commonly stated that Spain and Italy were very close in their mentality to that of Bulgaria with 'cultural shocks' reduced to just some everyday habits and rituals.

Few studies have examined experiences of discrimination among Bulgarian migrants. Discriminatory attitudes were found in the British media rather than in the recruiting practices of employers (Maeva, 2017). In Spain, Italy and other Mediterranean countries interviewees have reported employers' preferences towards local workers (Decheva, 2013: 57; Dimitrova, 2013: 92). Zahova (2015: 120) has extricated the following indicators for full integration in Italy: perfect knowledge of Italian, having Italian friends, following Italian media, and mixed marriages.

7.4. Conclusions

In the Bulgarian academic literature on migration the context of departure is rarely analyzed. Surveys present data on the push factors based mostly on survey data for potential migrants (Richter 2017, Mitev and Kovacheva, 2014) while ethnographic studies briefly describe actual migrants' evaluations of the country situation upon their departure. There has been a debate on the concepts of migrants' adaptation, integration, and inclusion in the receiving country (Maeva and Zahova, 2015; Roth, 2015; Richter et al, 2017) which represent different stages and degrees of migrants' inclusion in the receiving society. In empirical studies, however, they are mostly used as interchangeable. Other scholars speak about different domains of inclusion. The research of the Center for the Study of Democracy (2015) on vulnerable groups of migrants uses the Zaragoza (quantitative) indicators for migrant integration in four policy areas (employment, education, social inclusion and active citizenship). Yoveva-Dimitrova (2015: 66) differentiates between functional (employment and housing), educational (mastering the local language), emotional (belonging and social contacts) and equality (equal rights) integration of migrants building upon qualitative interviews. The outcomes for the different areas are presented separately and the linkages between them are not explored in depth.

Another observation that we can make is that institutional factors when studied are usually described only for single country contexts. Even when the books represent case studies of migrants' experiences abroad, these are discussed separately for each society and comparisons are rarely made. Another gap that we found is the focused study on particular sectors of work, for example involvement of migrants in health care or construction in several countries. A more systematic cross-country comparison of institutional factors for mobility in Europe (taking into consideration of their varying impact in different country context) might be a valuable contribution of GEMM study.

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8. Overview of contextual and institutional factors for migration. Country report Romania

8.1. Introduction – the presence of the topic in the public debate, the importance attached to it

In spite of the huge dimension of the emigration phenomenon (estimated 3.5 million at circa 10 million active population), policy makers in Romania have not paid much attention to its impact on the national labour market, focusing instead on the situation of children left behind and on the extent to which the rights of Romanian immigrants have been observed in their destination countries. As a consequence, the media discourse used to focus on the situation of children left behind in Romania and on legal aspects of working abroad (including risks and abuses, such as slavery, trafficking in human beings, black labour market etc.), as well as on behaviours of Romanian citizens abroad that negatively affect the image of Romania/Romanians.

Since the last electoral campaigns in 2014 and 2016, in the conditions of increased interest of politicians for voters from abroad, but also as a result of some political parties putting forward the theme of an emerging lack of labour force on the Romanian labour market, both political and media discourses have changed. More emphasis has been put on positive stories about Romanian emigrants (e.g. Romanian immigrants having rescued Italian people from Amatrice during the earthquake from 2016; Romanian baker fighting with terrorists in London and hiding people at risk in the bakery), while continuing expressing concern for the rights of Romanian workers in the EU.

In response to the change of political discourse in the sense of encouraging Romanian emigrants to return to their home country (along with targeted policy measures), the media has been paying much more attention to difficulties faced by Romanian emigrants in their destination countries (including the foreseen consequences of the Brexit) as well as to the proposed policy measures aiming at encouraging them to return. Examples of good practice in business start-up in Romania by former emigrants are also being presented by the Romanian media, especially TV channels.

Nevertheless, the right to free movement within the EU has remained on the top of the agenda in both political and media discourses; the main focus of public debates on the Brexit is actually on its impact on the situation of Romanians living and working in the UK. However, one may notice more concern and understanding for the consequences that East-West labour force migration has for the receiving countries (e.g. the recent discussions between the President of Romania and the President of France, during which the theme of “social dumping” was raised by the French president and acknowledged by the Romanian president as relevant and requiring further attention from both parties, have been largely presented by all main TV channels).

8.2. Climate and context of departure

While trying to explain why so many Romanians left their country (and often their families) for working abroad, most of the research based literature puts the emphasis on the economic context of departure. The predominance of economic reasons in the decision to migrate was confirmed by Center for Urban and Regional Sociology - CURS own researches on migration (Abraham et al, 2014), which used both quantitative and qualitative methods. In spite of what some economic indicators reveal, for many Romanians the transition from the socialist economy to the market economy did not bring more and better opportunities but rather the opposite. As Alexandru (2012) noted, “International migration has been closely linked with the transition process in Romania. Some of the first migrants have been commuters, laid off industrial workers or former internal migrants whose

lifestyle, social and economic status has been significantly changed by migration. Many workers lost their jobs when large enterprises were restructured and construction sites closed. The drop in the number of employees by almost 50% in the last 20 years is one of the clearest figures evidencing the impact of transition. After 1989, most of the large state companies had to be restructured and the number of job opportunities dropped considerably. Neamț county and others in the North-Eastern part of Romania had an unemployment rate above the national average, the highest peaks being registered in the 90s.” (Alexandru, 2012: 142)

The resulting economic structure in Romania could not provide jobs for the available labour force, so that large categories of both qualified and (especially) unqualified workers have become redundant. Besides, the facilities for domestic mobility of the labour force have also diminished, which made it more difficult finding a job.

As CURS researches show, as a particularity, Romanian migrants to Italy work mainly in the trade and home care fields but the migrants to Spain work mainly in construction and agriculture. About a third of this labour force do not have formal/official work contracts and often work on short times intervals.

The motivation to work abroad is in accordance with push-pulls pattern. The push factors are mainly related to sending countries and they lead to a negative pressure. The pull factors are provided mainly by receiving countries and they conduct to a positive selection and pressure. They are associated with higher standards of life.

The economic factor is the main reason of migration. This means the difference between the incomes in the sending countries and receiving countries and the lack of employing opportunities, mainly in rural areas and small towns in Romania.

As a general trend one can say that a vulnerable and active population of Romania, with low education and with low incomes left Romania. Most emigrants are married and have children (half of them succeeded in years to bring the children with them in the destination countries (Abraham et al, 2014).

In this economic context migration is often seen as a life strategy, or even as a survival strategy (Comaneci, 2011), and this is not only an individual perception but tends to become a collective perception at the level of communities severely affected by economic downturn. Girigen (2011) thinks that one may speak about a social pleasure that functions as a push factor at least in the case of young people, who see the emigrant as a success model, with better perspectives to find a life partner (wife). (Girigen, 2012: 187).

Not only group mentalities and behaviours among men have changed. The migration experience of women, shared with their mates during holidays or at definitive return in their communities of origin, have induced changes in the traditional perception of family roles, thus generating some barriers in women’ migration. In time, also as a result of changes in the legal framework and of the changes in the structure of labour force demand in the destination countries, the share of female migrants has increased significantly during the last ten years.

Although the feminization of migration flows had already become a significant phenomenon in Europe by the end of the 1980s, it is only in recent years that women from Romania have begun to leave for the West in increasing numbers. According to estimates by CURS (the Centre for Urban and Regional Sociology) based on a sample survey of 1,199 family units, female migration flows appear to

have doubled in just 3 years (between 2001 and 2004), going from 16.7 per cent to 31 per cent of total out-migration from Romania. (Piperna, 2011: 189)

In consideration of the prevalent role in this regard of the changes in the climate of reception, we will come back with this issue within the next section.

At institutional level the legislative framework regarding international mobility has played an important role. As Lazaroiu and Alexandru (2005) noted, the fall of the communist regime in Romania has brought an end to Ceausescu's restrictive migration policy. Once the Romanian nationals regained the right to free movement, the changing of the obsolete migration legislation became a must. Projects to accede to the EU required a constant adaptation of the legal framework to the European standards. Thus, first initiatives to create adequate provisions were carried out in the early 1990 and enforced during the last three years due to the high political ambitions of the government to conclude negotiations by 2005 and join EU in 2007. The visa free regime introduced in Romania in January 2002 by Schengen member states indicated again the necessity to step up efforts to align the regulations and migration procedures with Chapter 2 "Free movement of people" and Chapter 24 "Co-operation in the field of Justice and Home Affairs" of the *acquis communautaire* (Lazaroiu & Alexandru, 2005: 5). A range of institutions have been set up or have been given responsibilities in overseeing the observance of legal norms ruling the migration. We refer below to the most relevant from the perspective of active engagement and effectiveness.

As already envisaged in the previous overview report, Romanian migrants to work abroad use also institutional channels (public and private). This is an institutional factor (determinant) which covers about 10% of the Romanian migrants and its role has been increasing in importance during the last 10 years.

The main Romanian institution involved in this activity is ANOFM (National Agency for Employment of the Labour Force), which is member of EURES, a European network that publicly offers employment services, coordinated by European Commission. Through its EURES department the Agency provides information and advice for prospective migrants and helps potential employers in recruiting the labour force they need.

The data provided by ANOFM Romanian (2017) show that, in 2016, almost 19,000 people looking for a job in European countries contacted experts from EURES Romania in order to obtain information about finding a job. More than 4,800 vacancies were received from European employers and promoted by EURES Romania in 2016 (on its website www.eures.anofm.ro). This number of jobs was higher by 18% than in 2015 (4,105 vacancies received from European employers).

As a matter of fact, in 2016, about 1,800 people found a job by accessing EURES Romania (about 70% of the persons participated in the selection process). Besides, the other jobs were found by other activities organized by ANOFM based on specific agreements between countries such as the Project with Sweden "Your first EURES job" (YFEJ) addressed to 18-35 years people.

As a trend, the number of work contracts signed by migrants increased in the last 10 years from 65 in 2007 to about 1,800 in 2016, accounting over 10,000 contracts in this period.

The main receiving countries in 2016 for employees assisted by EURES Romania were Spain, Portugal, Denmark, Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom. This is a very different situation compared to people who found a job by using social networks. Italy and Spain are on the first two places in this hierarchy, while the social structure of this group of migrants could be defined by their occupations

(most of them work in agriculture, about 60% of them are young 18-35 years old, about 75% of them are women, and almost half of them are low educated (under high school). Over time, the weight of people with a high level of education among those who use EURES decreased. Regarding the sending regions of Romania, most of these people come from the East and South of the country, regions that are less urbanized than other parts of Romania.

However, although not quite visible in the reviewed literature, there are also private agencies that provide international labour mediation, often complementing the offer of the public agencies (e.g. while EURES Romania, in accordance with the governmental strategy, does not encourage/support migration of highly qualified people, the private agencies deal mainly with qualified and highly qualified people).

According to Lazaroiu and Alexandru (2005) labour unions have also got involved in international labour mediation.

8.3. Climate and context of reception

The integration of Romanian migrants in the receiving countries is a multidimensional process including job finding and adaptation, housing, social, ethnical, cultural, religious and political, dimensions. The context of departure explains to a certain extent why people decide to migrate but does not tell us very much about choosing the destination countries and the sector in which jobs can be found. These depend mainly upon the economic context, the institutional settings and the legislative framework in the destination countries. Nonetheless, the experience of working and living abroad may become itself a pull factor and influences the migration patterns. "The new tendency towards migration is strongly linked to the so named circular migration „the strongest impetus to want to migrate again is the previous working experience abroad; - not only the individual experience but also the entire family's experience matters in encouraging emigration for working purpose" (Avramescu, 2009)

The general economic context may also influence the social climate of reception: "The economic crisis influences the phenomenon of migration conducting to deepening the xenophobic and racism attitudes." (Stanculescu and Stoiciu, 2012)

However, the features of the labour market in the destination country play the most important role in determining the sector(s) in which immigrants try to find jobs, the dimensions of the immigrants groups and even the structure by gender of those groups. As we have previously referred to, the economic evolution in Western countries, along with changes in education and behaviours on the labour market, have led to a need for exactly that kind of labour force that had become redundant in its home country. This is also the case of migrant women: "Various factors are contributing to the growth of female emigration from Romania. Firstly, there is a growing demand in Western labour markets, particularly in Southern Europe, for workers in the domestic help and personal care sector. The latest immigrant legalization drives that took place in Italy (in 2002) and Spain (in 2005) clearly show this trend. Romanian citizens ranked first and second in those countries respectively in terms of the most numerous national groups of immigrants legalized; in both cases, the majority of stay permits granted were for work in the domestic help and personal care sector). (Abraham et al, 2014, Piperna, 2011: 189-290) This is a significant feature of Romanian migrants, mainly in the last years, which is called "feminized migration".

In the Romanian researches on integration of the migrants in the receiving countries one may find discussions about models of integration policies in different countries. For instance, Anghel R. (2012) talks about the German policy integration model focused on German's ethnic migration as privileged one or about Italian laissez faire model. They had advantages and disadvantages. "Many Romanian Germans came to construct an idiom of separateness from local Germans. First they complained about feelings of exclusion that they were not able to set up close ties to local Germans; some had a tendency to re-evaluate their "Romanian-ness." Back when they were living in Romania, these ethnic German migrants had a clear sense of being German, and enjoyed a high symbolic status even when they came from ethnically mixed families. In Germany however, they complained they were considered Romanians, a label that was perceived initially as a degradation of the prestige they once held. Subsequently, they emphasized the commonalities they shared among themselves because of their previous life in Romania, and from their migration experience". On the other hand, "laissez – faire model is seen as a set of institutional practices and a system by which migrants eventually acquires rights over the years." (Anghel, 2012: 327 - 328)

The political incorporation of ethnic Romanians working abroad is an important institutional factor. It is a characteristic of the migrant group, referring to the degree in which the groups have representatives and policy influence in the decision-making processes.

As first migrants waves settle down in destination countries, new comers may find it easier to move up the educational and occupational levels, especially if they have residential and economic support abroad.

In Spain, since 2004, FEDROM performs various activities related to the cultural and linguistic identity of the Romanians living there, it offers legal consultancy for immigrants and has several local integration initiatives in collaboration with city halls of Madrid Community localities. It lobbies for issues related to Romanians' rights in Spain, as for example the equivalence of driving licence and recognition of working rights after Romania's accession to the EU. Related to the political integration, the federation organizes information campaigns for Romanians to inscribe themselves in the electoral census in order to be able to vote in the local elections in Spain and at the European elections (Ciornei, 2012: 51-57, 59)

"Official paths of inclusion are paralleled by informal ties and ad-hoc processes. Religious organizations play a central role not only in immigrant adaptation, but also in their political representation at local and regional levels. Transnational religious solidarity between the Catholic and the Neo-Protestant churches, and the new immigrant religious organizations respectively, contribute to their centrality in the context of immigration.

The articles show the continued relevance of ethnicity when confronted with the situation of migration and its consequences. In the receiving society, ethnic identity is transformed by the local regimes of belonging and hierarchies of ethnicity, race, and class. In the origin society, it undergoes readjustments by the import of immigrants' experience and acquired resources, or by the new social relations ensuing their departure. In all these situations, ethnicity, as consciousness of difference and subjective commonality of feeling, is fundamental for the emotional, practical, and material redefinition of the people involved" (Culic, and Anghel, 2012: 5-6).

8.4. Conclusion – emerging issues and gaps in the literature

Push-pull factors about the migration pattern are strongly linked to the specific features of the migrant work force – mainly female and from rural areas. The underemployed population in the rural areas became one of main source for migration from Romania. There are villages where every family "sent" at least one person to work outside the country. Additionally, the slow job creation in the other sectors and the difficulties faced by many young graduates or medium skilled persons in finding income sources might lead to a quite convincing explanation for general "push" migration conditions. The "pull" factors such as: mismatches between labour force demand and supply on the labour market in several EU countries (shortage of low skilled labour in agriculture, building, seasonal work in tourism; shortage of highly skilled labour like IT, doctors, engineers etc.), and demographic changes (ageing population, which asks for new jobs for health care at home) also exist. (Barsan, 2008)

The literature overview has focused mainly on scientific studies and researches, but included also some important aspects identified in the public discourse about migration and migrants, especially in the recent context of Romania facing labour force shortages in more and more sectors. This suggests an increased awareness among policy makers with regard to the contextual and institutional factors that determine or influence the migration process, which may also lead to more attention paid to social research in the matter.

An important methodological issue could be the limited representativeness of the studies used in the literature analysis. So, in the overview we used both quantitative representative researches, as CURS' Surveys or some surveys conducted at the level of few cities and some qualitative researches conducted at the level of different categories of population, such as women, doctors, students etc. That means that comparing of the data should be done with scientific caution.

A specific problem can be faced when the data collected in GEMM qualitative research will be analysed. The statistical significance can be achieved when the GEMM data will be in accordance with the data obtained from representative surveys. The new qualitative data could be less significant when they don't correlate with other qualitative data, but GEMM data can be relevant providing new insights about the problems evaluated.

8.5. References

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9. Conclusions

Mass media today draw a picture of a rise in European mobility in the aftermath of the global economic crisis and both statistical data and research literature confirm this trend. The dominant view in the public debates in both sending and receiving countries is negative, presenting the process as 'brain drain' rather than 'brain gain' and 'welfare strain' rather than 'relief of labour shortages'. The images of the *Gastarbeiter* (Spanish overview) and the *Gurbetchia* (Bulgarian overview) are much more alive than the one projected in EU policy documents - the mobile European worker profiting personally as well as bringing prosperity to society when exercising the right to freedom of movement in the united European labour market. There are many contextual and institutional factors that lie at the bottom of these unenthusiastic imaginaries.

The four countries in the GEMM study represent different contexts of departure but they all experience demographic and economic difficulties that act as pushing factors for migration. The debates in Spain and Italy in particular link emigration to a crisis discourse, a severe economic and moral loss for their societies. The persistently high unemployment rates, the turn to more precarious temporary and low skill employment, and strong territorial segmentation penalize younger workers. While both low and high skilled youth have started leaving their home countries in search for jobs in the more developed economies in Germany and the UK, the studies focus on university graduates who suffer from the falling return of investments in education. The overviews of research literature from Italy and Spain suggest that in addition to the economic dimension, there are political, cultural and social factors for the new wave of South-North emigration. The two new member states Romania and Bulgaria did not suffer from such high unemployment rates as the two older EU members at the time of the global crisis, yet they still have living standards lagging significantly behind the EU average. Studies of emigration from those countries focus on economic reasons and present migration as a survival strategy for those low and highly skilled workers made redundant by the closure of state owned companies in the course of the transition to a market economy. Mismatches between skills demand and supply, limited opportunities for training, blocked or distorted routes to career growth and rising social inequalities are listed as characteristics of the country contexts. A specific feature is the mass perception that the post-communist transition to democracy did not bring the expected outcomes. Inefficient administration, heavy bureaucracy and political disillusionment, are noneconomic factors that also impact outward mobility. Previous research suggests that there are differences in the working and living conditions at home for the different sectors, for example being better for IT specialists and worse for health professionals or between rural and urban regions. The climate of departure is negatively loaded with emigration seen as a social deviation, morally unacceptable in particular when children are 'left behind'.

Many migration studies address the climate and context of reception focusing on the occupational outcomes of mobility. Research has estimated that university graduates from Italy have better chances to find highly skilled jobs abroad, to earn more and have a higher confidence in their career prospects than those choosing to stay at home. Similarly, Spanish migrants tend to achieve greater success in the German and the UK labour market although there are substantial differences between the prospects of low skilled and highly skilled migrants. Bulgarians and Romanians who have left their home countries looking for work abroad more often experience downward shifts in their occupational careers, face more incidences of discrimination and only recently have had the last legal barriers for access to the European labour market lifted in full. Sectors with labour shortages in the UK and Germany such as health care, engineering and finance attract migrants from the four countries. Spain and Italy receive migrants from Romania and Bulgaria mainly in construction,

domestic help and personal care and tourism. Research in all countries has found that in the countries traditionally receiving migrants such as Germany and the UK and the two countries both receiving and sending migrants Italy and Spain new comers meet significant common barriers: high language requirements, lengthy administrative procedures for the recognition of diplomas, high costs of housing, and cultural differences. The climate of reception often varies from tolerance to hostility and is often independent of economic rationale and policy strategies. At the same time, there are substantial differences in the conditions for the economic, political and social adaptation of foreign workers. Few studies have explored the factors for the varying degrees of integration of the different groups of migrants.

The statistical overview in this report brings additional evidence to the research findings. In general migrants have relatively high activity rates compared to local workers but lower employment rates. The British labour market is the most favourable for migrants' employment while the gap between the employment rate of migrants and locals is widest in Spain. Gender differences in employment are also statistically significant. Thus, women migrants in Italy and Spain are more often employed than men. Quite the contrary is the situation in the UK and Germany where women are less employed than men. Migrants experience significantly more moves in and out of work, the highest risk being for Bulgarian and Romanian men and women. Unemployment is more common for migrants when up to 3 months but not the long-term unemployment. Substantial differences are reported for the sectors that migrants find employment. Migrant men and those from the two new member states have much lower chances to work in the public sector of the receiving countries. Migrants from the two new member states concentrate in low level jobs, particularly in Italy and Spain. On their part migrants from Italy and Spain are substantially more likely to work in medical professions, finance and ICT in the UK and Germany than the locals while it is very unlikely for Romanians and Bulgarians to work in these sectors and they are overrepresented in construction and cleaning.

In the next analytical reports GEMM team will endeavour to find explanations for these differences in the narratives the recruiters working in public and private agencies, and the potential and actual migrants about their work and wider life experiences. The short overviews of the literature in the six studied countries provide tentative answers to some of the questions while others are left without relevant elucidations. The authors of the chapters have found gaps in the study of institutional and contextual factors for migrant integration which can be formulated as the following questions:

- which contextual factors in their home countries have a stronger impact on which groups of migrants according to their skills level and employment sector;
- what institutional factors attract which groups of migrants and how do they consider the differences in the climate of reception when making the choice of the destination country;
- what institutional and contextual factors account for the differences in the experiences of different waves of migrants, e.g. before and after the global crisis, before and after the abolishing of the visa requirements for the citizens of the two new member states;
- what are migrants' experiences from and strategies for overcoming the challenges in the country regulations for the recognition of qualifications;
- how do migrants and recruiters deal with the requirements for occupational and language skills in the different receiving countries and with the sectoral specific regulations;
- what supports and constraints different groups of migrants meet in their integration strategies and how do they deal with discriminatory attitudes and practices;
- how do migrants view the developments in their home countries and what factors might be significant in their decisions to 'stay' or 'return'?

It is clear that more research is needed on the changing contexts in Germany after the 'refugee crisis' and in the UK after the 'Brexit' decision which are major issues at stake in Europe that will influence the context of labour mobility. The heuristic potential in the GEMM project lies the systematic cross-country comparison of the experiences and aspirations of different groups of migrants according to ethnicity, gender, skills level and sector of employment. The findings on the factors that influence the European mobility from the perspectives of migrants themselves will have significant policy implications for the development of the economies and societies in different parts of a united Europe.