Screen After Previous Screens: Spatial-Temporal Recreation of Android App Displays from Memory Images

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A Crime To Investigate...

Before the investigation began, the suspect was interacting with their apps...





Without access to the suspect's password or breaking Telegram's fully encrypted storage!

UNIVERSITY




Memory Forensics ... or Mission Impossible?







State of the Art: GUITAR - GUI Tree ARchaeology [CCS '15, Best Paper]






The "Screen O" Limitation of GUITAR





Are The Old Screens Really Gone?




App screen changes are **highly dynamic**

How can every screen be **fully rebuilt** so fast?

Some data must remain to bring the screens back




Are The Old Screens Really Gone? ... Yes and No





Android Asks The App To Draw A Screen




Android sends a Redraw Command

- 1) A Canvas is sent for the app to fill
 - Apps register *draw* routines with Android
- 2) The app **builds GUI structures** which "package" the internal data
 - Destroying the previous screen!
- 3) The filled canvas is **rendered** on the device's screen



Idea: Ask The Memory Image To Draw A Screen

- Challenges:
- 1) How to inject the Redraw Command?
 - Screen-specific draw routines



2) Need to understand the app internal data?

Previous Approaches:

- -Data structure signature scanning
- App-specific reverse engineering

Our Goal: "Plug And Play" **App-Agnostic Recovery**



RetroScope: Spatial-Temporal Display Recreation

Screen 0

Ashley


Jessica Harris

John Smith


Margaret Wilso

Mark Johnson

Steve Thomas



Symbiont App: Two Apps In One



Step 1) Start the Symbiont App to host the memory image

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
3K 00 21

Step 2) Move the memory image state into the Symbiont App

- Map memory segments -
- Merge Java runtimes
- Register *draw* functions -



Interleaved Re-Execution Engine




Step 3) Initialize the Interleaved Re-Execution Engine (IRE)

Formally modeled the interleaving of states as a finite automata


The Overly Simple Explanation: Live Code outputs to Live Environment & Old Code reads from Old Environment Transition rules guided by executing instruction semantics




Interleaved Re-Execution Engine












Memory image app's *draw* routines naturally accesses its internal data









Memory image app's *draw* routines naturally accesses its internal data








IRE ensures that function calls to the new canvas are directed to the live GUI system







The newly filled Canvas is rendered by the live GUI system and saved

obj'.* | Pass

obj.fld

obj.fld | Pass


obj'.func | Pass

δ


obj'.fld

Code Context

Barr



Breaking The Case Wide Open!






Evaluation

15 Apps on 3 "Suspect" Devices: HTC One, LG G3, Samsung Galaxy S4

	Арр		Screens Recovered	Ground Truth (lower bound)		Byte Code Inst. Re-Executed	New Java Objects	New C/C++ Structures
HTC One (More In Paper)	Calendar		6	6		197316	732	102642
	Chas	Avei	rage of:			584587	2091	266965
	Cont	41,078 Byte-C	Code Instructions, va Objects, and			190847	723	71578
	Face					382522	1451	95516
	Gilla		C/C++ Structures			235973	929	129804
	Instagram		Screen	5		86829	433	42037
	Messaging		4	4		93971	287	45085
	TextSecure		7	8		231891	924	98571
	WhatsApp		6	6		321229	1571	104216




Case 1: WeChat (And Others) Deleted Messages



From LG G3 Device



Case 2: WhatsApp Background Update



From Samsung Galaxy S₄ Device



Related Works

B. Saltaformaggio, Z. Gu, X. Zhang, and D. Xu. DSCRETE: Automatic Rendering of Forensic Information from Memory Images via Application Logic Reuse. In Proc. USENIX Security, 2014. Best Student Paper.

M. Carbone, W. Cui, L. Lu, W. Lee, M. Peinado, and X. Jiang. Mapping kernel objects to enable systematic integrity checking. In Proc. CCS, 2009.

B. Dolan-Gavitt, A. Srivastava, P. Traynor, and J. Giffin. Robust signatures for kernel data structures. In Proc. CCS, 2009.

J. Lee, T. Avgerinos, and D. Brumley. TIE: Principled reverse engineering of types in binary programs. In Proc. NDSS, 2011.

A. Slowinska, T. Stancescu, and H. Bos. Howard: A dynamic excavator for reverse engineering data structures. In Proc. NDSS, 2011.

R. Walls, B. N. Levine, and E. G. Learned-Miller. Forensic triage for mobile phones with DECoDE. In Proc. USENIX Security, 2011.





RetroScope represents a new paradigm of **spatial-temporal** memory forensics for app GUI screens

RetroScope's novel IRE selectively reanimates an app's screen redrawing functionality **without** any app-specific knowledge

Recovers visually accurate, temporally ordered screens (ranging from 3 to 11 screens) for a wide variety of **privacy-sensitive apps**



Thank you! Questions?

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Privacy Implications of RetroScope?

The privacy-sensitive apps are not broken, per se

- Unlike disk or network, memory is assumed private
- Little incentive to "protect" memory
- E.g., Malware in your app's memory = all bets are off

RetroScope is just emulating the standard behavior of Android

- To disrupt RetroScope would also hinder an app's ability to draw screens
- Encrypting memory doesn't work because RetroScope would reanimate the decryption logic
- Privacy vs. Usability
 - E.g., Zeroing data would require getting it back in order to redraw (slowing down the UI)

Citizens' privacy is protected by strict legal protocols and regulations (see [9,21])

- Search warrants & strict chain of custody documentation prior to performing "invasive" forensics

