Report of Residence Hall Security Program

Security Systems Review
University of Massachusetts, Amherst Campus

Submitted by:

BPS
Business Protection Specialists

December 3, 2013

1. OVERVIEW AND BACKGROUND

The University of Massachusetts, Amherst selected BPS to perform a comprehensive review of its residence hall security program and make recommendations for improvement to ensure a safe campus community. The scope of work for the consultant included:

- Collaborating with a working group selected by the University for support and feedback
- Identification of the strengths of the residence hall security program and a comparison to best practices
- Identification of the areas in need of improvement in the residence hall security program and compare to best practices
- Review and assessment of the current policies, procedures and practices with special attention to the guest registration process
- Review and assessment of the residence hall physical layouts, identifying the security strengths of the buildings, as well as areas in need of physical improvements
- Review and assessment of the electronic access control and key entry systems as they relate to desirable security outcomes
- Review and assessment of the residence hall security program and its organizational interface with the University of Massachusetts Amherst Police Department (UMPD)
- Review and assessment of the residence hall security program and its organizational interface with Residential Life (RL)
- Review the University's educational efforts relating to residence hall safety and security and how information is shared with students, faculty and staff
- Review and assess the communication process between primary departments and divisions responsible for safety, security, student affairs and residence hall operations
- Provide recommendations and an implementation plan for improvements identified and provide cost estimates for proposed recommendations for improvement.

2. A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

During the early to mid-1980's security desk personnel was part of Residential Education as Heads of Residence hired their own staff to perform the resident verification and guest sign-in function during peak periods. In the latter 1980's a new model was developed which placed these Heads of Residence into a position attached to UMPD to enjoy the support of that area. This model existed until 2009 when UMPD was moved from the division of Student Affairs to the division of Administration and Finance. At this time the determination was made that it was too difficult to determine the true cost of residence hall security services with monies from UMPD and Housing contributing together. In 2010, the ties were severed and the Housing funds and budget that had been appropriated were allocated in full to the UMPD.

Today, over 225 Student Security personnel, 25 Police Cadets and 3 full time administrators are employed at a cost of over $1.2 million per year to manage residence hall security. The campus efforts to increase safety and security have paid significant dividends. Collaborative efforts by UMPD, Residence Life and the Dean of Students Office have largely eliminated or

significantly diminished the party atmosphere that existed at one time in the residence halls. In a November 2011 report titled, *Community/Police Advisory Board Survey* over 53% of undergraduates and 55% of graduates reported they felt "very safe" from crime on campus. When asked to list areas of campus in which they felt unsafe at night, only .02% of the students stated Residence Halls.

Security Cameras – Housing Services first piloted one *exterior* security camera in 2001 on the John Q. Adams Residence Hall to provide an overview of the area where the Southwest pyramids were previously located. This area was part of the campus that was often the center of poor behavior. This first camera provided many learning opportunities about data retention, backup power, emergency lighting and criminal forensic investigations. The next phase of the camera program was to place a camera atop Van Meter Residence Hall.

The first installation *inside* the residence halls came in 2003 when the University piloted installations in Baker, Patterson and Van Meter Residence Halls. The University administration worked with the Student Government Association and other student groups to develop a comprehensive policy on camera placement and use in residence halls, this policy remains in effect today. With more lessons learned about previous camera placement, data recovery and remote access UMPD personnel were asked to draft a 10 year plan to place cameras in all residence halls. In 2004, the Red Sox made the playoffs and won the World Series for the first time in 86 years and the New England Patriots were performing to a high level. Students were using these events as an excuse to engage in unruly celebrations. Student and visitor behavior was extremely poor and the Vice Chancellor at the time called for a 10 year installation plan to be accelerated into a 3 year plan. By the fall of 2006, there were nearly 300 security cameras in all

45 residence halls as the North Apartments had been completed by that time. As UMPD dispatchers and police officers became more experienced in the use of the cameras for crime detection, forensic investigations and crime alerts; the cameras became an important tool for UMPD. The University of Massachusetts Amherst campus has far more security cameras than a number of comparable campuses throughout the eastern United States. From 2006 to 2013 residence hall cameras and DVR's have been replaced on a regular schedule or as technology advancements have improved both quality and memory. In 2013 the six residence halls of Commonwealth Honor College were outfitted with cameras **Access control (card access)** – A concurrent initiative to enhance residential security was the installation of an access control system. First piloted in 1991 in four Southwest towers, an expansion project in 1995 would phase in the installation of card readers at the entrance and service doors, with door position switches at all doors of all 41 residence halls. The access control system went online in January 1996 in Coolidge and John Q. Adams Residence Halls. Phased in over the following four years, all 41 residence halls were completed by 1999. Beginning in 1999 the exterior doors of all residence halls were locked 24x7x365 with access only granted by UMass UCard. When the North Apartments were opened in 2006 and the Commonwealth College Residence Hall opened in 2013 they were each equipped with access control that provided this enhanced level of security for all residential buildings.

Police Cadets – The UMass Amherst Police Cadet Program was launched in the summer of 2003. The program was modeled after a similar program in the Town of Amherst that had since been discontinued. With the unruly student behavior around the 2004 baseball playoffs and World Series the Vice Chancellor directed that supplemental contract security be hired. The result was to hire staff from Securitas, Inc. Although the Securitas staff arrived with their own supervisor, they required oversight by other campus officials and UMPD. Additionally, many of these staff were not appropriately trained or prepared for a college environment. After the less-than-satisfactory results with Securitas, it was determined that UMPD could better manage residence hall security by way of an expanded police cadet program. With limited time to conduct a month-long academy these staff would become to be known as Cadet 1's or "Housing Cadets" while those with more training and skill hired since 2003 were Cadet II's or "Police Cadets".   As UMPD employees, the role of the Housing Cadets was to support the residence hall monitors in lobbies and to patrol areas immediately adjacent to the residence halls. The feedback from Residence Life staff was largely positive. Having a uniformed presence supporting the student security desk monitors was very helpful in addressing poor student behavior and compliance with sign in procedures. In part, due to both Massachusetts Accreditation and The Commission on the Accreditation of Law Enforcement (CALEA) the cadets are no longer differentiated by title, they all are "Police Cadets" and perform the same role in supporting Residence Hall Security, and assisting with parking issues around residence halls. They have always supported UMPD with both booking prisoners and prisoner watch. More recently their role has been expanded to include more foot patrols and in and around residence hall clusters. The cadet ranks numbered around 25-30 per year. Cadets are expected to work at least two nights per week throughout the academic year.

Scope and Limitations of Residence Hall Security Staff – In the summer of 2004, a working group comprised of the Director of Housing Services, the Associate Director of Housing Services for Residential Life, the Dean of Students, the Chief of Police and the Residence Hall Security Manager convened for a series of meeting to determine the scope and limitations of the residence hall security staff. The current practices for security staff are the results of those meetings.

The group determined the following:

- Desk monitors will check ID's and record guest data
- Desk monitors will review guests against the judicial restriction and trespass lists
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- Desk monitors will refer judicial and trespass violators to the appropriate enforcement authority, either Residence Life or UMPD.
- Residence Hall Security Supervisors will respond to walking escorts on campus after the discontinuation of the vehicular escort service in 2004.
- The title "security receptionist" was changed to "Security Desk Monitor".

In summary, UMass Amherst has a long track record of monitoring security performance and

making adjustments to correct identified weaknesses. This track record of continuous improvement has been a long standing tradition and continues in 2013.

3. RESIDENCE HALL SECURITY STRENGTHS AND EXISTING CONDITIONS

The residence hall security program has undergone steady improvement during the ten years since a security consultant's report entitled "Student Security Program Review Report" by John Collins was issued. The existing conditions as reported in this document should be considered in the broad context of where the security program started when a security manager was hired. Great strides have been made in that period. There is more work to do to optimize the protection of students and staff.

Everyone associated with the residence hall security program is working hard toward a single goal of providing the safest and most secure possible environment. However, there are a number of challenges which have affected and continue to influence the success of the program. These strengths and challenges are outlined below. The recommended corrective action follows in the remainder of the report.

3.1. Strengths

3.1.1. Security Program

The residence hall security program has undergone significant development and improvement during the ten years since a security consultant's report entitled "Student Security Program Review Report" by John Collins in 2002. Great strides have been made in that period and UMass has made significant investments in both time and personnel to ensure the safest environment possible for students.

By way of comparison, UMass is a leader in terms of the investments the University makes in residence hall security. Figure ES-1 outlines a summary of key security program features as compared to several peer institutions which included several universities which requested to remain unnamed.

Examples of the security improvements that have been made at UMass Amherst include:

- Hiring of a Security Manager to oversee the Residence Hall Security Program and assignment of a sworn UMPD employee to serve as an additional supervisor during the night shift. In comparison to other similar sized public universities surveyed, UMass is the only one that makes this commitment to residence hall security.
- Locking residence halls 24 hours per day, seven days per week. Few similarly sized universities are employing this basic security practice.
- Consistent commitment by Residential Life leadership to fund requested security improvements for the residence halls. If you add up all of the funds the three other Universities spend on student security for residence halls, UMass spends more than the other Universities combined for security staffing in residence halls (many times over);

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which we perceive as an illustration of the UMass commitment to safety.

- Investment of over $1.2 million in electronic access control to move away from mechanical locks and keys for building entry. This investment provides the capability for the University to know if a door has been propped open and University personnel now respond to those conditions to investigate and close the door.

- Establishment of a position where door alarms from the new access control system are monitored in Residential Life Facilities Operations. This allows the identification of problem doors so an investigation may commence in a timely manner. Few similarly sized universities are employing this basic security practice. Instead they rely upon security breaches to be discovered during random and sporadic patrols of residence hall staff.

- Addition of video surveillance in the residence halls. The University now employs over 1000 cameras, with 389 cameras in the 51 residence halls (as of Sept 2013) which deter illegal activity and provide forensic support with thirty days of recorded video. UMass has some of the highest camera counts of all universities surveyed. Of the peer universities examined, one university is now considering cameras for residence halls and another has a construction project just underway to install video in residence halls.

- Provision of over 112,000 hours of security staffing at residence hall desks for access control during duty hours which generally start at 8:00 p.m. and end anywhere between midnight and 3:00 a.m. each night. Some similarly situated universities do not employ such controls and therefore have little control over who may be admitted to the residence halls. In one case there were no visitor limits imposed.

- Reorganization of residence service desks to limit the number of outsiders who may get access into the residence halls.

- Adjustments made in staffing strategies to essentially eliminate vacant security posts at residence halls during security duty hours.

- Initiation of a University Police Residence Liaison program for the residence halls and other buildings on campus. This is a critical program used successfully by other universities.

- Engaging outside university security experts to provide an assessment followed by implementation of reasonable recommendations made in those assessments

- Incorporation of physical changes in the design of more recently constructed residence halls (e.g. North Residence Halls) which segregate common use space and make the residential living space more secure.

- Adjustments made in the 2012-2013 academic year to make resident assistants more visible and available within the residential community.

- Establishing limits on guests per room in residence halls creates a climate where it is more difficult for parties and other inappropriate activities to occur.

3.1.2. Student Survey Results

The following groups were surveyed as part of this study:

- Residence Hall Security "Desk Monitors"
- Residence Hall Security "Supervisors"
- Students not affiliated with the residence hall security program

Noteworthy summary comments from each group are listed below:

3.1.2.1.RHS Student Monitors (Sample Size=105)

- 40% of the security desk monitors reported dealing with aggressive behavior from other students or visitors
- 84% of security desk monitors were comfortable with their ability to reach supervisors or University Police in the event of an incident
- 90% of security desk monitors reported receiving sufficient training to properly perform the security job to which they have been assigned
- 50% of security desk monitors were observant and knowledgeable enough to identify security weaknesses in the security at the residence halls to which they were assigned
- 87% of security desk monitors support the variable schedule based on days of the week
- 7% reported that Residential Life is unwilling to provide the resources necessary for residence hall security
- There does not seem to be a belief among security desk monitors that violence among students is increasing
- About 50% of security desk monitors felt that security is a high priority for Residential Life Staff while about 89% felt that security is a high priority for UMPD.
- 72% of students felt that absenteeism is not a problem, with statistics revealing that absenteeism has been significantly reduced in the last ten years

3.1.2.2.RHS Security Supervisors (Sample Size =8)

- 63% of security supervisors are not concerned about the physical layout of the buildings in which they work
- 75% of the supervisors reported dealing with aggressive behavior from other students or visitors
- 87% of supervisors were comfortable with their ability to reach University Police in the event of an incident
- All supervisors surveyed were content with the rapid police response to a call
- 75% of the supervisors reported they have received sufficient training to perform the job, while 12.5% strongly disagreed that there is sufficient training for supervisors
- Most supervisors identified security weaknesses in residence halls that would enable unauthorized access

- 75% of the supervisors felt that RHS is a deterrent to criminal activity
- 87% of supervisors support the variable schedule based on days of the week
- 87% of supervisors believe residence hall security is effective
- 50% of supervisors felt that student monitors consistently check student ID's. This is consistent with feedback from the general student population, in contrast with the student monitor feedback which consisted of 90% of student monitors who felt ID's are checked consistently
- 75% of the supervisors reported that Residential Life staff is not willing to work with RHS staff
- Supervisors echoed student monitor sentiments that student violence is not increasing
- About 50% of supervisors felt that security is a high priority for Residential Life Staff; while about 75% felt that security is a high priority for UMPD.

3.1.2.3. Students (Sample Size =252)

- 92% of students surveyed reported that they felt that security in the residence halls was appropriate
- Only 8% of students surveyed reported that they felt that security was not consistent throughout the week
- Only 17% of students reported receiving security awareness training in the current academic year in which the study was conducted
- 40% of students knew of security weaknesses in the residence halls which could be exploited
- Only 6% of the students reported the security program for residence halls does not work
- Only 5% of the students surveyed felt that ID's are not consistently checked
- Students agree with other groups surveyed that violence among students is not increasing
- Only 5% of the students surveyed felt that security is not a high priority for Residential Life staff and UMPD

3.1.3. Residence Hall Physical Layouts

- Investment in Technology and Physical Security – Separate electronic access control, video surveillance and key control system have been set up to ensure residence hall security. ▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮ Competent administration of these systems sets UMass apart from many other colleges and universities we have surveyed.
- Residence halls are designed to be locked 24 hours a day 7 days per week.
- The ▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮ have an interior perimeter within the lobby to deter and restrict unauthorized persons from entering living spaces. Further, meeting spaces in the outer lobby can be used without compromising the security of the living spaces.
- The introduction of cameras provides the University with an important enforcement tool (though it will be recommended to integrate this and automate the distribution of video clips of student offenses for judicial or legal enforcement).
- Residential service desks have reduced third-party access throughout the residential

living spaces.

3.1.4. Factors Impacting Existing Conditions

o There are no dedicated security personnel to maintain the access control system. (The Director of Residential Life / Student Affairs IT Services presented a job description for which BPS provided comments.)
o According to some interviewees, RA's are on call and no longer working desk duty and in their opinion, this delays response to incidents.
   o UMass clarified that for 2012-2013 academic year, role of RA on duty changed from staffing the Cluster Office (with implementation of Residential Service Desks), to being visible and available within the residential community. There is no data to indicate whether this delayed or sped response to incidents. RAs are more available to respond since they are no longer staffing an office that provides services to students. RAs are available by phone at all times on duty and are able to respond upon receipt of the call. In the past, they had to close up and lock an office prior to responding. In some locations (where former cluster office was next to the security desk) response is probably delayed in the eyes of the residence hall security monitor.

o Students are going to hold doors open for each other, therefore the risk of tailgating will be ever-present
o The 2009 decriminalization of marijuana makes drug use and possession much less of a deterrent to criminal prosecution and could increase risk associated with drug sales.
o Many exceptions to the "residents only access rule" have been created to enable other non-resident personnel to get into residence halls. Combined with the lack of automation, this significantly increases the risk of unauthorized access.
o The current practice is to allow faculty/staff to prop open doors, despite the fact that this practice breaches the security of the residence halls. According to UMass, there is disagreement that this is the current practice.
o The role of people in the access control aspect of the Residence Hall Security Program has changed:
   o The former institutional security officer model has migrated to the student security approach.
   o Security staff is only on duty part-time.
   o Monitors are required to stay at their desks. Breaches of security can occur in their presence or in close proximity to the desk and they are not allowed to respond. Students know this.
o There is a general lack of automation that is impeding effective security controls at the residence halls.
o Changes in processes and practices have impeded RHS' ability to report security incidents and breaches, creating a climate where there is a lack of student accountability for inappropriate conduct.
o In some cases the volumes of students in the residence hall lobbies makes security significantly challenging (parents weekend, sporting events, special events, after last call).

o There is currently no vehicle to enable rapid deployment of supervisory or cadet resources around a large campus.
o There has been a lot of turnover in key positions in recent past (e.g. Director of RL, Dean of Student Affairs, Chief of Police).

4. POLICIES, PROCEDURES AND PRACTICES

4.1. Incident Reporting

Observation: Residence Hall Security staff, who are Campus Security Authority (CSA) identified personnel under the Clery Act, are sometimes challenged to fulfill their roles or the compliance regulations outlined in Clery: "To report allegations made in good faith to the reporting structure established by the institution." Over the past two years the Department of Education has increased their focus on Clery compliance. Residence Hall Security staff are CSA and as such are on the front lines of reporting. This is an area that needs improvement.

There appears to be no formal incident reporting program. Factors that underlie our observation include reports from multiple sources who stated:

- All RHS reports are handwritten.
- There is a constant issue concerning students and RL staff and delayed reporting from a UMPD perspective (e.g. not much can be done about a stolen electronic after a week has elapsed).
- The Dean of Students office has adopted an online reporting system and does not accept handwritten reports. According to persons interviewed, there was a point where handwritten reports from RHS were not accepted. RHS made an adjustment to have reports entered into the system during normal business hours.
- Some RHS incidents may be reported to dispatch and others may just be documented on a paper form.
- Information is in silos which limits sharing of information. RHS and RA's have their own separate reporting systems (filing, routing and decision-making).
- Information originating from within RHS is reported to RHS dispatch as the gatekeeper.
- There is no centralized logging of incidents across the University.
- Property losses may be captured in RHS Dispatch log but it is possible that there would be no onward reporting.
- There are no major debriefings after major security incidents. (RHS Manager of Security did not learn of an on-campus rape until he was contacted by the media.) There is no formal list of who would be included in a debriefing meeting.
- According to several persons interviewed, security incident reporting by RHS/Cadets must be done on uncompensated time. In some cases reports are being completed weeks after an incident.

- The Dean of Students office uses SYMPLICITY database reporting software to track judicial cases and sanctions. Resident Assistants (RAs) file their own incident reports which are then forwarded to their respective Resident Director (RD). The RD then determines who else should receive a copy of the report. Serious violations are forwarded to the Senior Associate Dean, Student Conduct and Crisis Response in the Dean of Students Office (e.g. assaults) and Clery reportable incidents are logged as such.
- Minimal reports are submitted to the Dean of Students office from the Hall Monitors. Minor fire code violations are much more common than behavioral issues. Dean of Students office noted that oftentimes there is a long delay in receiving reports via this method.
- According to interviews, many staff members have not yet been trained on how to access the Symplicity on-line system and/or do not have the passwords to access the new system. This could result in a significant under-reporting of violations that may be Clery reportable incidents, especially as it relates to alcohol referrals.
- Security Monitors must submit a written report to the Residence Hall Security Manager to document any student misconduct. The Residence Hall Security Manager determines which incidents are forwarded to the UMPD and which cases are forwarded to the Dean of Students. Incidents of a criminal nature are forwarded to UMPD and serious misconduct cases are forwarded to the Dean of Students office and appropriate "Notice of Charges" is given to the offending student(s).
- Security Monitors are identified/defined and trained as "CSA's", therefore reports need to be made in a timely manner

Recommendations		Priority
Rec. 1	Map out and standardize the incident intake processes and guidelines across the entire University and develop consistent messaging about how to report incidents.	Critical
Rec 1a	Establish a centralized incident reporting database or use existing student affairs system and provide access to Student Affairs, RHS, Res Life and UMPD. Review daily for potential criminal or judicial activities. Utilize the weekly information sharing meeting (between RL, RHS and UMPD) to review incident input and coordinate who will take the lead on processing	Critical (Federal Regulatory)
Rec 1b	Ensure that all CSA's have proper training on Clery reporting requirements	Critical (Federal Regulatory)
Rec 1c	All CSA's should be listed in the University's annual report.	Critical (Federal Regulatory)
Rec 1d	Consider conducting a third-party Clery	High

Recommendations		Priority
	compliance assessment.	
Rec 1e	Provide computer access to reporting system from the RHS Monitor desks. In the final outcome, Cadets also need to have access to enter incident reports.	High
Rec 1f	Ensure security personnel are compensated for reporting security incidents and that incidents are filed by the end of each shift.	High

4.2. Alcohol Enforcement Observations

Observation: There are weaknesses in the enforcement of alcohol rules in the residence halls:

- There does not seem to be a great deal of change in the position on alcohol from 2002 to 2013.
- Those who want to bring people or alcohol in just do it prior to the start of the RHS shifts. According to student surveys, offenders are also doing this on Tuesdays and Wednesdays.
- According to interviewees, alcohol rules appear to be enforced very inconsistently. Some RAs/RDs document every violation, whereas others indicate that they only document in an "alcohol PLUS" model, which only requires written documentation if an alcohol violation AND another violation (e.g. disorderly conduct, vandalism) were evident. The underreporting of alcohol violations as reported by the Cadets and Monitors was more a systemic issue of not having an efficient means for these line staff to properly enforce and/or report their observations of policy violation. This would include the contention that most alcohol is brought into the residence halls prior to the scheduled duty time of each area, as well as the inability of the Cadets or monitors being able to address observed violations when suspected violators simply refuse to stop at the desk. It is not believed that the University is trying to deliberately underreport violations, rather the staffing models, lobby designs, and security policies/procedures do not allow for all suspected alcohol violations to be addressed. It should also be noted that some higher administrative representatives interviewed also believed that most minor violations are not always reported, unless they reach the "alcohol plus" threshold
  - According to UMass, this bullet overstates a human error issue. It is the expectation that all alcohol violations are documented by residence hall staff when they are witnessed. The number of violations and referrals to BASICS would indicate that most are addressed and documented. The only component of the alcohol policies that would fall into the "alcohol

PLUS" model is intoxication as the other behavior is what leads a staff member to determine that a student is likely intoxicated.

- Alcohol is permitted in the residence halls to students that are over 21 years of age (this represents approximately 10% of the resident hall population). Alcohol is viewed in the Dean of Students office as "de-stabilizing" the RL environment. The university also sponsors an Amnesty program to encourage reporting of serious alcohol related violations, which is a good practice in our opinion. It was noted that UMass-Amherst attracts a large number of traditionally-aged students from eastern Massachusetts, many of them with well-established drinking habits. Alcohol use studies have also shown that the drinking culture and behaviors of college-age students in the United States is highest in the northeast.

Recommendations		Priority
Rec. 2	Ensure each violation of the campus alcohol and drug policies are consistently documented for judicial review. The review can be done at the area level, but all violations should be reported.	Critical
Rec 2a	UMass should consider banning of alcohol in all residence halls that house freshman students and those who are under the age of twenty-one. With the state drinking age at 21, less than 10% of the resident student population is of legal drinking age. This would allow the Hall Monitors, Police Cadets and UMPD to more aggressively enforce individuals bringing alcohol into the halls.	High

4.3. Guest Registration Management

Observation: There are numerous exceptions to the "residents only" rules for access to the residence halls. These exceptions drive more traffic through the RHS Monitor desk and further drive down efficiency in processing. The access control system is not currently being used to validate "special admittance" personnel who are allowed into a residence hall, in contradiction the "residents only" access rules that were in place a few years ago. Examples include:

- Residence Education Staff (RD's, ARD's and some Graduate Students) - 24 access to all residence halls and do not have to sign in.
- Temporary guests of RD's, ARD's - Do not have to sign in but do have to get an escort from the host.

- Maintenance workers
- Student Door Checkers (students who work for RL and check functionality of exterior doors in the event of an alarm or reported failure)
- Residential Service Desk visitors - Access to buildings in which their RSD is located in their assigned residential area.
- Students attending evening classes, seminars and meetings
- Attendees of approved special events

Physical security weaknesses that may be corrected as a result of this study could force even more traffic through the RHS Monitor's desk, as illegitimate users will not be able to sneak into the residence halls (undetected) without being signed in.

The conversion from hard keys to electronic access has made it easier to provide controlled access, but technology is not effectively applied to the RHS Monitor desks. Visitor registration is still done with pen and paper. The lack of automation increases the risk of unauthorized access into the residence halls as described below:

- Staff has multiple paper lists to go through in order to authenticate all of the non-residents that are permitted without a resident host. A typical security desk may have a list of student leaders Area Government officers and tutors.
- It is challenging to monitor the guest limitations with the current manual system.

The use of color coded stickers to determine hall residency is an administrative strain to the Student Services Desk staff and is not very efficient in assisting the Hall Monitors due to the difficulty to visually differentiating the various halls from each other. Some residence halls are very similar in color to other halls and the reflective stickers are very difficult to visually check. There is also a lack of adequate control in the issuance process. Students that have been separated from the university may still possess their ID, and therefore could gain initial access to a residence hall and "tailgate" into the living spaces. This process is managed by the Residential Service Desks that are required to distribute the stickers to the 360 RAs for individual distribution.

The number of guests allowed per room is of concern to University Police. To date, we haven't conducted any research on the guest policy of other Universities with respect to room occupancy. It was not clear from the RFP that this specific issue was a concern, but we know the current system is not capable of complying with any number of guests whatever that number may be. We agree room occupancy should be a part of any guest limitation determination. According to the Assistant Director of Security at St. John Fisher College, room occupancy is determined by doubling the number of roommates, plus 1. For example, a double residence hall room is only allowed to have 5 occupants at any given time. A quad room can have 9. We are continuing to collect this data from peer schools and will update UMass when we have exhausted this effort.

Recommendations		Priority
Rec. 3	Implement an automated visitor management software package for each residence hall. BPS has identified one such product that is being used in other Universities. The next step would be to bring in the product and do a demo at a busy residence hall on a weekend. We also understand that there is a pilot software solution that is being piloted in the North residence halls.	Critical
Rec 3a	Extend the access control system to the RHS desks to assist in the authentication of non-residents without having to consult ineffective paper records.	Critical

Recommendations		Priority
Rec 3b	Provide personal computers to the RHS Monitor desks to enable a number of IP based software solutions to be introduced to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the guest registration process.	High
Rec 3c	In selected residence halls without an interior control barrier or low traffic volumes, install a validation card reader at the RHS desk.	High
Rec 3d	The sticker program should be discontinued and a system of electronic authentication of the credentials introduced.	Critical

4.4.   Residence Hall Security Monitor Observations

Observation: The reliance on students may be beneficial from a cost perspective, but the trade-off is that other issues arise with this staffing model:[1]

- Attendance and availability (Absenteeism has been reduced – down from 18% to less than one percent, but only because additional students are being scheduled for each shift to compensate for students who do not show up.)
- Students consistently demonstrate a lack of respect toward other students.
- Students can be reluctant to enforce rules against peers
- Training is not currently adequate to enable consistent performance.

RHS Monitors are on duty for a limited period of time. During all other times, visitors and contraband can be brought into the residence halls without detection.

Observation: Hall Monitors wear a name tag and Area Supervisors are provided a jacket and polo shirt. There is no standard uniform or clothing for RHS. The lack of a uniform undermines an appearance of authority and respect.

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[1] Refer to Appendix 10 for a comparative analysis of residence hall security for peer institutions

Recommendations		Priority
Rec. 4	For selected buildings with the highest incidence of "gateway behaviors to crime" or high risk residence halls (e.g. first year students, substantial code of conduct or law violations) consider increasing RHS coverage to include patrols on a 24 hour basis per day or in some cases a fixed post for 24 hours .	Medium
Rec 4a	On a pilot basis, consider an alternative staffing model such as non-students (e.g. adults from the local community, recent college retirees, active employees who need or want supplemental income) to provide access control duties to residence halls.	Low[2]
Rec 4b	If there is an order of protection, consider increasing security on a temporary basis.	High
Rec 4c	Consider purchasing individual golf shirts and windbreaker jackets embroidered with a RHS logo and provided to each Hall Monitor.	Medium

5. RESIDENCE HALL PHYSICAL LAYOUTS

5.1. Physical Layout Observations

Observation: There are some factors in the RHS program which are not controllable at this point in time:

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[2] Defer consideration for one year to determine the relative effectiveness of other recommended measures.

o There are mixed messages being sent to students with issues such as trash and bike racks adjacent to doors RL/RHS does not permit students to use. One example can be found at Van Meter. This may indicate a lack of coordination, communication or cooperation in balancing RL operational matters with security.

Observation: There are classrooms in the towers that present a significant risk of unauthorized "non-resident access" to the residents of these buildings. The students who need to access the classrooms have to utilize the same elevators as the residents and there is no logical way to secure this pathway.

Recommendations		Priority
Rec. 5	Identify alternatives for classrooms embedded in high rise buildings or accept the risk of unauthorized and unaccounted visitors in residential living space.	High
Rec 5a	Enhance access control barriers to prevent unauthorized access into the residence halls (access control enhancements include classroom management, introduction of turnstiles where high volumes of students enter buildings, elimination of stickers, expansion of the use of access control to the lobby desks, utilization of channeling devices such as rope/stanchions, addition of access readers on stairwells.	High
Rec 5b	In terms of new design standards, if classrooms (or other types of public meeting rooms) will exist within residence hall buildings, ensure that isolation is designed in from the start to avoid expensive retrofits.	Critical

Observation: Several area-based Residential Service Desks (8, with plans for a 9th) have been created to eliminate the need for un-monitored access in the residence halls for parcel/package delivery. These desks also maintain and manage back-up keys for students to check-out for 24-hour periods. Non-resident students to the selected Residential Service Desks (RSD) can access living space up until 11 p.m., which in some cases provides unrestricted access to resident living spaces and enables students to bypass sign-in procedures.

Recommendations		Priority
Rec. 6	Establish access control around designated resident service desks ████████████████ ██████ to prevent unauthorized access into resident living space.	High

Observation: There are residence halls that have stairwells leading up and down inside the main entrance which creates challenges for RHS Monitors to control entry.

Recommendations		Priority
Rec. 7	Establish life safety compliant physical security barriers to prevent unauthorized access to the residence halls via the stairwells from the main entrances of ▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮	Critical

Observation: There are retail food service establishments in some of the residence halls which create exception conditions for non-residents to enter the residence halls.

Recommendations		Priority
Rec. 8	Establish access control around designated student run eateries in the residence halls.	Critical

Observation: Public restroom access provides a means for abuse and unauthorized access into the resident living space in some residence halls:

Recommendations		Priority
Rec. 9	Eliminate access to public restrooms or consider a procedure to collect the Student ID or driver's license as a form of collateral at the RHS desk in the event a non-resident wishes to use the public restrooms as means to track that person in the building and as a deterrent to sneaking into the residence hall without signing in. Alternatively, additional access control barriers can be implemented but at an increased cost.	Critical

Observation: In some cases the volumes of students in the residence hall lobbies makes security significantly challenging (in part due to unsecured openings from the lobby that can be exploited).

The physical lay-out of several of the residence hall lobby areas makes it very difficult for Hall Monitors to effectively manage and monitor access. █████████████████████ ██

Several of the back doors are easily compromised and other areas require double coverage in order to properly monitor additional stairwells and access points. Unfortunately, oftentimes these double monitors are not properly monitoring their areas and unauthorized access still results. The Southwest towers are the most difficult areas to monitor due to the heavy traffic and inability to properly funnel the students/visitors to the desk locations, especially on week-ends. Several HMs also shared frustration over several door alarms that are never working properly.

Recommendations		Priority
Rec. 10	Enhance the security in lobbies with poor security layouts (e.g. addition of access control on stairwells or the introduction of turnstiles).	High

5.2. Access Control System Observations[3]

Observation: A new mechanical key control system has been implemented in the residence halls. The system is a good one and the record keeping at the RL Facilities Operations level is effective. There are, however, a number of opportunities for improvement for the system and measures that will increase the long-term integrity of the system:

- ███

- ███

- An interim report was issued shortly after BPS left campus on the initial survey to address these issues. Refer to report Appendix 1.

Recommendations	Priority
Rec. 11 ████████████████████████████ ████████████	Critical
Rec 11a Begin to utilize the Knox boxes on residence halls to reduce the need for wide distribution of keys to emergency responders.	Critical
Rec 11b Where electronic door access is installed, require all community members to use UCards for building access (minimize mechanical key cylinders on access controlled spaces).	Critical
Rec 11c Revisit mechanical key cylinder use and control issues within SIC.	High
Rec 11d Establish a process, procedure and audit program to ensure that once keys change hands from RL Facilities Operations to a department, accountability for those keys transfers to the department. Conduct periodic audits on the departments that have been issued keys to ensure no keys have been lost and rekey as necessary.	Critical

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[3] The Association of College and University Housing Officers (ACUHO) Self-Assessment Item #20 states that "The access control system provides for frequent monitoring of all hardware and identifies potential security hazards/risks related to key/card inventory by stringently controlling the use of master keys/access cards." BPS does not feel the existing conditions entirely meet the intent of this expectation for reasons described in this section.

Recommendations	Priority
Rec 11e Consider expanding the key control study to a campus-wide scope to identify gaps and apply lessons learned from the RHS study to improve security across the enterprise.	High

Observation:

██

The Residence Hall Security (RHS) program is funded by the RL Department. It was previously under the direct supervision of the RL, but has been placed under control of UMPD, which is appropriate. ██

An interim report was issued shortly after BPS left campus on the initial survey to address these issues. Refer to report Appendix 1.

Recommendations	Priority
Rec. 12 Establish a service level agreement with the access control system and ensure full awareness of the capabilities of the system, roles and responsibilities and the appropriate departments have access to critical data. For example, UMPD and the judicial office should have full access to READ the card access historical data.	Critical
Rec 12a Ownership of all security systems should reside with UMPD as effective security is a form of crime prevention. Operating best practices must be clearly identified and documented to maintain the quality of system maintenance and operations as is currently evident with RL.	Critical

Recommendations	Priority
Rec 12b Provide two levels of access for the police department in the access control systems (administrator and user access).	Critical

Observation: There are a number of mechanical hardware door deficiencies identified during the physical inspection of the residence halls. There is a contract in place with a contracted preventative maintenance company to conduct services on the UMass access control system. As it worked out, BPS was on site conducting our door inspections at the same time as the contracted preventative maintenance company, so we were able to observe the preventative maintenance company testing execution. We offer the following comments on the contract and the execution of the stated contract activities:

- o   On the contract:
  - ▪   Under field testing activities, there is an expectation for the contracted preventative maintenance company technician to check the labeling if the reader and validate that the read out in the system matches the label on the reader.

- o   On the execution:
  - ▪   Load testing of the batteries was not performed based on our observations. The contracted preventative maintenance company reports indicate the dates on the batteries were checked and as a result of that check, the batteries were deemed "adequate." Checking the dates on the batteries is not sufficient and the load testing should be performed as required by contract.
  - ▪   Testing of all voltages to and from the panel is called out in the contract. This work was not observed. Once the tamper switch on the panel was tested, the panel box was closed and the technician left.

In the contract with the contracted preventative maintenance company, there is an expectation to "Check all devices for condition, fit, alignment, LED's". BPS observation was that not all closer function and locking hardware was checked by the technician at the door. BPS identified fifteen pages of deficiencies in the door inspection and reported these findings in an interim report. Refer to report Appendix #2.

Recommendations	Priority
Rec. 13 Correct identified door hardware deficiencies.	Critical
Rec 13a Communicate the expectation to the contracted preventative maintenance company that all door hardware should be tested, not just the electronic equipment	High

Recommendations	Priority
Rec 13b Communicate the expectation to the contracted preventative maintenance company that any unlabeled reader should be labeled	Medium
Rec 13c Request that the battery load testing and panel voltage (in/out) be executed as per the contract	High

Observation: There are several conditions that result in delayed response or inaction when actual or potential unauthorized personnel access the residence halls, all of which will be addressed in this section.

There are thousands of nuisance alarms registered each month. This is consuming the better part of a full-time (around the clock) ███████████ resource, ███████████
███

    Door hardware deficiencies that increase the risk of unauthorized access
██ ███
    Inconsistent actions taken for trespass list violation or judicial barring violations (if they are even discovered)
- o   Failure to properly detect physical breaches of security
- o   Ignoring of audible alarms. (At least one student reported, "The alarmed door by my room is not monitored, it simply goes off at all hours of the day. There is no sense in having it if it won't be monitored.")
- o   Failure to properly drive down the access control alarms to a manageable number (sampled one month of data at 31,000)

BPS issued an interim report on the resolution of the door alarm issued identified. Refer to report Appendix #3 for a summary.

Recommendations	Priority
Rec. 14 Implement corrective actions to reduce nuisance alarms (refer to report Appendix #3).	Critical
Rec 14a Develop procedures for the management and investigation of door alarms when they occur	Critical
Rec 14b Add a passive infrared request-to-exit device to the inside of card reader controlled doors on the residence halls to alleviate the nuisance forced door alarms generated when students exit the buildings without activating the panic alarm hardware embedded request-to-exit device.	Critical
Rec 14c To address the nuisance alarms from persons	Critical

Recommendations	Priority
entering the buildings by grabbing the exterior door trim as a door is about to close, a software remediation is recommended. Application of this software feature will enable a delay of the door contact signal from registering into the panel logic allowing the door time to latch: ████ ███████████████████████████████ ███████████████████████ Enabling this software feature allows for variable time adjustments in the system (up to several minutes) and allows timing for door contacts and other features, to be modified on a per-door basis.	

Space Intentionally Left Blank

Sample Impact Analysis - ▮▮▮

Door Name and Alarm Type	Existing	*Projected* after PIR RTE and ADM Module Implemented	Percentage Reduction
▮▮▮01 ELLB-N INDR RDR TAMPER activated	2	2	
▮▮-01 ELLB-N INDR-FORCE activated	701	0	
▮▮01 ELLB-N INDR-HELD activated	270	54[4]	
▮▮-01 ELLB-S INDR-FORCE activated	1024	0	
▮▮-01 ELLB-S INDR-HELD activated	17	3	
▮▮-23 ROOF-N EXDR-FORCE activated	16	0	
▮▮-BUILDING COMM-FAIL activated	2	2	
▮▮F1 SERV LBM activated	53	53	
▮▮-F1 SERV-FORCE activated	39	0	
▮▮-F1 SERV-HELD activated	2	1	
▮▮F3 MAIN LBM activated	7	7	
▮▮-F3 MAIN-FORCE activated	214	0	
▮▮-F3 MAIN-HELD activated	263	53	
▮▮-F5 EXDR CHEXIT ACTIVATION!! activated	3	3	
▮▮-F5 EXDR-FORCE activated	3	0	
▮▮-F6 EXDR CHEXIT ACTIVATION!! activated	1	1	
▮▮F6 EXDR-FORCE activated	1	0	
Grand Total	**2620**	**118**	**95%**

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[4] BPS is conservatively predicting that 20% of the alarms are actual hold open conditions versus students streaming into or out of buildings which would not generate a hold upon alarm with the PIR RTE resetting the shunt time on the door.

Observation: The ███████████████████████ experience similar volumes of door alarms and, quite likely, the design issue identified above is a major contributor there as well. Dependent upon when the University plans to migrate from the current access control system to █████ would inform whether to invest in the two phase corrective action suggested for the other forty-one residence halls. If it looks like it will be at least a year before the access control system is standardized, we would recommend corrective action as suggested for the remainder of the RL █████ system.

Another unique problem was identified in the trash collection areas of the ████ ███████████ The trash room doors are entered from student space via a set of double doors which are equipped with card readers to enable student reentry. For the two doors, one is an active door (reader, electric lock) and the other is a passive leaf (supposed to be secured in place). Students are able to unsecure the passive leaf enabling free entry into the residence halls from the trash room and resulting in nuisance forced and held open door alarms. Currently this condition is accounting for 37% of all alarms recorded in the ███████████████ A simple corrective action of dead bolting the passive leaf was discussed with RHS when BPS was on site. This will reduce the alarms on the ████ ████████ immediately.

Recommendations		Priority
Rec 14d	Confirm the timing of implementing the remediation measures for nuisance door alarms for the ███████████████ based upon the timing of the migration of the Jeffrey system █████.	High
Rec 14e	Secure the passive leaf on the double doors to the trash room to prevent students from being able to unsecure them.	Critical

Observation: There are 825 cameras and 80 DVR's in use on campus. ███████████ ██

There is currently a global inability to efficiently/effectively utilize video for judicial, security and legal enforcement of perimeter security breaches. This is a result of a lack of integration, cameras located inappropriately and ineffective camera technology where cameras are subject to widely variable lighting conditions from outside the residence halls. Analog video cameras are utilized throughout the residence halls and are only capable of VGA resolution (640x480). In some cases, these do not provide sufficient forensic quality video to identify individuals who may not be students and are on campus illegitimately. (Forensic video requires 40 pixels per foot which, with an analog camera, limits the horizontal field of view to 16'-18'.) Additionally, analog cameras are not capable of providing wide dynamic range functionality and therefore cannot resolve video images in views where there are lights (windows) in the doors, or when those doors open in bright lighting conditions.

The University has started to implement hybrid DVR's which would allow migration to IP video camera use where needed. Many of the interior cameras were viewed in at close range and found to have dirty lower domes. All cameras are visible and controllable by ████████ with the exception of the ████████████ camera. This should be corrected.

Establishing the targeted enforcement of door violations will involve the combined use of the █████ alarm reporting function integrated with the existing video. Elimination of the nuisance alarms will clear the way for identifying the doors that are truly being used to smuggle unauthorized visitors and contraband into the residence halls (among other improper activities). Continued monitoring of alarm activity will allow for the next phase of improvements to occur.

Currently the ██████ access control system and the decentralized video systems are not integrated. RHS, in cooperation with RL and UMPD, can reverse the trend where it is easy and routine for perimeter doors to be breached. Using wired output from the █████ access control system, door alarms can trigger an alarm input in the existing DVR's. By introducing a piece of software, ██████████████, RHS will have the ability to control multiple sources of video subsystems (disparate DVR's across campus) to collect, manage and present video in a clear and concise manner. Specifically, when an alarm is generated through the improper use of a door (opening a fire emergency exit, holding open a door for an excessive period of time, improperly opening a door with a key, exiting a staff door without presenting a credential) the █████████████ will create a video clip of that event which can then be used for judicial or criminal investigation purposes.

The field of view of the cameras is currently intended to capture the images of persons entering the perimeter doors of the residence halls. The problem is the threat is currently originating from insiders who are using the doors improperly, not persons breaching the doors from the outside. Therefore one could argue that the cameras are aimed in the wrong direction. Ideally, each door would be fitted with two cameras; one for capturing the images of persons entering and one capturing the images of persons exiting. This may be an ideal that is pursued over time. If the RL is not willing to fund this expense today, we would suggest selecting the buildings that are experiencing the highest incidence of alarms after the completion of "phase one" and simply rotating the cameras 180 degrees to capture the images of persons approaching the door from the inside. This will ensure that when the ██████████ software generates the incident video clip, the University can have a reasonable expectation of forensic quality video of the event. ██████████ will provide the University with the ability to investigate events and alarms by simultaneously viewing alarm video at various stages. For every door input alarm, users can view the video captured during pre-alarm, on-alarm, post-alarm, and for low volume, high risk periods (e.g. early morning hours) the system will provide the capability to view live video from the camera (in dispatch) which triggered the alarm.

Recommendations	Priority
Rec. 15 Integrate access control and video systems. Refer to report Appendix #4 for a summary of the actions required to establish this video enforcement capability (addition of wiring and software to achieve integration). Video clips of offenses should be emailed to the residence directors associated with the offending building.	Critical
Rec 15a Refer to report Appendix #5 for a summary of the actions required to make the cameras useable under this enforcement program (relocation of selected cameras and replacement of selected cameras).	Critical
Rec 15b Implement a program to ensure cameras are cleaned twice a year. Consider establishing a contract with a third party if internal electrician resources are unable to absorb this additional work.	Medium
████████████████████████████████	High
Rec 15d Establish standards for video cameras, recording appliances and integration for all future construction projects.	High

Observation: Service entry doors are used by service personnel to gain entry for servicing such things as mechanical and electrical systems, trash removal or vending machine replenishment. These doors are equipped with entry and egress card readers, and door contact(s) for monitoring the door position. A local audible in a two-gang device-mounted configuration exists that will alarm immediately if the door is opened without the use of a valid card on the egress reader.

Selected residence hall fire emergency exit doors are equipped with a door contact for monitoring the door position. A local audible alarm is installed within panic hardware which alarms immediately upon depressing panic hardware paddle. The audible alarm after activation by door use will automatically reset after a minute or more of elapsed time. ███

██ Alarm arming should be automated through the access control system. UMass feels that the local alarm statement above is inaccurate. Local alarms were re-cored with the installation of the new access control system, starting in 2010. RHS Supervisors visit each door to ensure that it's actually closed and latched at the commencement of shift, but there is no need for them to be arming door alarms unless they see that the visual indicators are off or the wrong color. This practice will continue.

Local audible alarms are under a constant threat of vandalism and do not elicit a reliable response to serve as deterrence to inappropriate use by students as a result of a number of factors:

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- The use of a service entrance or fire exit to admit unauthorized visitors is a breach of security and cannot easily be detected due to hardware configuration and a lack of video integration.
- Once audible alarms are vandalized and disabled, the doors can be freely used without detection as long as they are closed within thirty seconds
- The University needs to decide whether or not students are going to be allowed to exit via fire doors. Allowing this action significantly increases the risk of unauthorized access to the residence halls and will drastically increase the cost of detecting students sneaking in the residence halls.

Recommendations	Priority
Rec. 16 Correct deficiencies associated with residence hall perimeter doors which can be opened without an alarm to ███████████████████████████ or a local response to the audible alarm to admit unauthorized visitors without signing in or	Critical

	contraband.	
Rec 16a	Discontinue the use of the local and audible alarms if there is no viable response mechanism to breaches of security.	Medium
Rec 16b	If students are going to be allowed to exit via fire exits (not recommended), eliminate the request-to exit-device and replace with a card reader. Consider the use of detection devices that will alarm in the event a student enters through a fire exit (versus traveling in the egress direction.) Also consider the use of delayed egress devices on these doors.	Critical
Rec. 17	Discontinue the use of personnel to manually arm alarms on doors and automate.	Medium

6. RESIDENCE HALL SECURITY INTERFACE WITH UMPD

6.1. UMPD Routine Interface with RHS

Observation: The Police Department appears to be detached from regular or significant communication and collaboration with the Residence Hall Security program. Long-term staff members from both sides point out that the relationship began to wane when the Police Department, officers and supervisors alike, stopped attending daily shift briefings. This issue was exacerbated by the lack of substantive daily interactions between the departments, and the requirement for all security post communications to be routed to a student dispatcher and then to the Police Department. By all accounts the final break came with the move of the University Police from its cohabitation with RHS in Dickinson Hall to their new station on East Pleasant Street.

Another example of this disconnect can be found when the RHS Security Manager learned of rape incident last year from the media, not UMPD.

Effective security is another form of crime prevention.

During staff interviews, we consistently heard concerns regarding communication and collaboration between RHS, RL and UMPD. Staff members from various offices expressed disappointment regarding the lack of collaboration and communication during and after critical incidents that occur in and around student residential facilities.

While it should be noted that these problems are not unique to larger universities, communication and collaboration issues appear to be having a serious and significantly

negative impact on the experiences and morale of staff in RHS, including those charged with direct oversight and support of the program.

Recommendations	Priority
Rec. 18 RHS should continue to report to UMPD and security should be treated as a crime prevention effort focusing on maximizing preparedness for the scenarios outlined in the security design basis document. RHS requires a relationship with UMPD operations for day-to-day activities and support from UMPD Administration for non-operational matters. Proper support for security is essential and a joint reporting relationship to UMPD operations Lieutenant with a dotted line reporting relationship to the Deputy Chief of Operations should be considered.	Critical
Rec 18a Reinstate UMPD attendance at RHS daily briefings.	High

6.2.   Dispatching and Alarm Monitoring Operations

Observation: There are separate and somewhat redundant monitoring and dispatching functions occurring at UMass Amherst. Each is described below.

6.2.1. ███████████ Facilities Operations Center

6.2.2. ████████ RHS Dispatch

Every evening, one of the security supervisors is assigned to take the role of dispatcher. The dispatcher is assigned to the security office and coordinates telephone and two-way radio communication while maintaining a log of the evening's activities.
There is an access control alarm client workstation that is monitored ████████
████████████████████████

6.2.3. UMPD Dispatch

There is a standard police dispatch function in the new police station.

Recommendations		Priority
Rec. 19	Consolidate security aspects of dispatching functions to the new police station on Pleasant Street. ████████████████ ████████████████████ ████████████████	Critical
Rec 19a	A study is required to determine the manpower required to staff a consolidated dispatching function, but at a minimum, 4.5 full time equivalents (FTE's) should be planned as that is what is being applied today.	High

6.3. Cadet Observations

Observation: Police Cadets are instructed to "observe and report" in their role as a Police Cadet. They are used primarily in the high traffic residence halls in the Southwest area as additional presence. Many of them will find future employment in law enforcement careers, but they are very frustrated about their inability to provide any additional level of service to the UMass community. BPS acknowledges that there are likely many other evolutionary factors with the Cadets of which we are not aware that explain the existing conditions.

Nonetheless, Cadets stand in the lobby with no significant role in RHS enforcement, other than a potential deterrent value. A video was captured of Cadet inaction in an altercation which was posted on You Tube. The Cadet acted within his expected performance expectations yet the public relations impact was not positive. The ineffectiveness of the Cadet in this video underscores the underutilization of this resource.

Recommendations		Priority
Rec. 20	Consider an alternate staffing model for the Cadets and redefine the role to add more value (e.g. provision of service to entire campus, patrols, escorts, alarm response, building locking/unlocking, support in a centralized dispatch).	High
Rec 20a	Consider expanding the Cadet role to cover patrols of common areas. These areas are not patrolled on a regular basis, and thereby create opportunities for unauthorized alcohol being brought into the halls, smoking marijuana outside of the halls, and other violations of law or student code of conduct. Areas of role clarification to consider are: ○ Can Police Cadets search closed bags (e.g. book bags, grocery bags) to look for evidence of alcohol? ○ Can Police Cadets stop and identify individuals violating the college alcohol and/or drug policies? ○ Can Police Cadets be used to respond to door alarms? ○ Can Police Cadets be first responders to other incidents in the residence halls?	Medium
Rec 20b	Alternatively, UMass may consider looking at a different model for carrying out essential security tasks not being done today (e.g. security officer to close identified gaps)	Medium

7. RHS INTERFACE WITH RESIDENTIAL LIFE

7.1. Security Program Design Basis

Observation: There is no documented design basis to define the performance requirements of the RHS program. With RL as the primary customer of RHS, obtaining the concurrence on the design basis of the program will ensure alignment and assist in the justification of needed funding.

There is no documented security master plan governing future planning or the finances required to enhance and sustain the security program.

Recommendations	Priority
Rec. 21 UMPD/RHS/RL /Student Affairs should work collectively to validate the security design basis and draft hazard vulnerability assessment, determine initial reporting protocols, which incident types require joint response, documentation requirements for Clery compliance, follow-up and close-out activities.	Critical
Rec. 22 Develop a "security operations and master plan" to educate stakeholders, plan for future expenditures, manage change and ensure consistent performance.	High

Observation: The RA job description makes no mention of coordinating with RHS, nor is there any mention of RHS in any of the RL student staff manual.

Recommendations	Priority
Rec. 23 Clarify the RA's role with respect to RHS and adjust security protocols to ensure adequate response to incidents.	Critical

Observation: There is no mention of coordinating or involving RHS in the Residential Life crisis management manual. There is no provision to execute a lock down of a residence hall or cluster of residence halls in the event there is a serious threat on campus.

Recommendations	Priority
Rec. 24 Incorporate reference to communicating with RHS in the Residential Life Crisis Management manual for the appropriate incidents necessitating access and lobby control.	High

Recommendations	Priority
Rec 24a Incorporate a provision to execute a residence hall lockdown[5] via the electronic access control system in the event of a serious threat on campus.	Medium

Observation: With respect to internal operations and repairs, some interviewees reported extended delays in getting security deficiencies corrected (e.g. malfunctioning cameras).

Recommendations	Priority
Rec. 25 Establish a process to prioritize life safety and security repairs (e.g. similar to the one hour emergency re-coring that can be done when a key is lost).	Critical

Observation: There is a perception in RHS that security input is insufficiently sought for decisions in Residential Life which impact security.

Adherence to the residence hall event registration is sometimes dismissed (reportedly approximately 3 to 4 times a semester). The event registration process is in place to ensure that activities are appropriate and that RHS can "staff up" to properly support an event.

Recommendations	Priority
Rec. 26 Communicate between RHS and Residential Life to determine how best to incorporate security recommendations into Residential Life planning (Residential Life remains the decision-maker) and security provides advice and consultation to the customer.	Critical

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[5] A "residence hall lockdown" would be determined by the Police department command staff when an external threat is identified and all students are being directed to remain in their current location until an "all clear" is given. This is used when an unknown threat such as an active shooter or armed robbery suspect is in the area of the campus/residence halls.

Recommendations	Priority
Rec 26a When events occur outside of the approved registration process, ensure RL and RHS meet to determine root cause and modify processes to avoid recurrence.	High

8.   EDUCATIONAL EFFORTS

Observation: There is no central training plan to cover all aspects of residence hall security. The stakeholders are diverse and the messaging needs to be as well.

According to "The Association of College and University Housing Officers" (ACUHO), "Educational programming, advising, and supervisory activities of the staff will vary with locally assessed needs, but will include multiple functions. Staff members will:"

Provide information on safety, security, and emergency procedures.

- Provide information about appropriate civil and other law as well as policies consistent with legislation.
- Assess the feasibility and desirability of having and enforcing policies restricting access of non-residents in residence halls (execution needs improvement).
- Ensure that the safety and security of residents and their property is taken into consideration as policies are developed.
- Ensure that data regarding security incidents are reviewed to determine the need for corrective action (needs improvement).
- Encourage residents to confront inappropriate and/or disruptive behavior, participate in mediating conflict within the community, and participate in evaluating the department.
- Encourage residents to learn and exercise their rights as students, tenants, residents and consumers.
- Periodic inspections and audits are made to identify safety/security hazards (security design basis matrix will enhance the agreement on security hazards)
- Measures are taken to promote a safe and secure environment in and around the residences and dining halls.

Many of the ACUHO expectations above are written into guidelines on the UMass website.

UMPD community outreach is on the rise, but not yet sufficient. The new Residential Liaison Officer (RLO) program initiated by UMPD is an excellent beginning to hopefully improve the crime prevention efforts in the residence halls. The RLOs should provide crime prevention strategies based on experienced incident and crime trends in the residence halls, on the campus and in the local community.

Recommendations	Priority
Rec. 27 Develop a centralized training plan to cover all aspects of the Residential Life security program. All materials should be jointly developed between Resident Education, UMPD and RHS. Refer to report Appendix #8 for a master training plan model.	Critical

Observation: Initial training for RHS Monitors is a one to two hour presentation followed by a quiz where the highest scoring students are offered jobs pending a background check[6]. Training needs to include access control, Clery (CSA training), de-escalation, crisis management bias-related crime, potential Title IX incidents, and a variety of other incidents that could result in institutional liability. Further, if any electronics are introduced at the posts, this will have to be included as well.

Recommendations	Priority
Rec. 28 Training for RHS monitors should be recreated to include all critical elements (access control, Clery (CSA training), de-escalation and management of aggressive personalities, crisis management bias-related crime, potential Title IX incidents, and a variety of other incidents that could result in institutional liability, as well as operation of any updated electronic systems that may be deployed to the RHS Monitor workspace.)	Critical
Rec 28a Consider adding one-on-one interviews to the hiring process and role-play scenarios as part of the evaluation.	Medium

Observation: There is insufficient joint training between RHS and Residential Life. The basis of a joint training program can be the security program design basis document prepared with this report and should include a role clarification of RA's based on the CBA.

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[6] The Association of College and University Housing Officers (ACUHO) Self-Assessment Item #36 and #37 calls for Staff members employed by RL with safety and security responsibilities are carefully selected and are provided with adequate training and supervision. BPS does not consider the current practices to meet these expectations.

Recommendations	Priority
Rec. 29 An annual fall in-service training program should be conducted between the RL RA and RD staff, the RHS program and the UMPD Residential Liaison Program. Included in this training should be ice-breaking exercises, role clarification, role plays, open Q & A period and social time. The message of early and consistent enforcement of all campus rules and regulations should be emphasized. Joint training on specific procedures and loss event scenarios is recommended.	High

Observation: Security training for students (provided by RHS) was discontinued. Key messaging was lost. The training process in combining residence hall security with the general student orientation is not effective as too much information is being passed on at once to expect proper retention. The overload of information presented during traditional orientation programming may likely limit long term effects on human behavior. Rather, more consistent safety messaging and on-going training efforts will be more effective in 1) changing student behavior and 2) reducing campus crime incidents.

Recommendations	Priority
Rec. 30 Each Resident Assistant should be required to have a two security-related floor programs on their floor/area each year; one in the fall semester and one in the spring semester. These programs could be facilitated by the new Residential Liaison Officer Program and also include representation from the RHS Program.	Critical

Observation: There is insufficient coverage of security in Residential Life Community Standards (http://www.housing.umass.edu/living/standards.html). These standards could be enhanced by specifically addressing some of the "gateway" behaviors that are listed in the security program design basis (Refer to report Appendix #7). There is insufficient discussion and materials presented regarding the access control system and acceptable use of doors in the residence halls. The RL web site contains the following limited text for security. There is no reference to the residence hall security program.

Crime prevention information is presented to the residence hall students (and parents) during a one-hour Orientation program, as well as through various floor programs and community forums conducted throughout the year by UMPD. Popular programs include the "Like It, Lock It and Keep It" program, Community Outreach program, walking escorts, and the new Residential Liaison Officer Program initiated by the UMPD. UMPD also maintains a very comprehensive webpage with many excellent crime prevention

resource and information links.

Recommendations		Priority
Rec. 31	Enhance the standardization and consistency of security related communications on the RL Community Standards page and throughout the web site by incorporating specific security prohibitions where appropriate.	Medium
Rec 31a	The new Residential Liaison Officer (RLO) program initiated by UMPD is an excellent beginning in hopefully improving the crime prevention efforts in the residence halls. The RLOs should provide crime prevention strategies based on experienced incident and crime trends in the residence halls, on the campus and in the local community	Critical

Observation: There is no process in place to educate live-in staff (e.g. family, partners) in the residence halls.

Recommendations		Priority
Rec. 32	Incorporate all parties into the training plan including live in staff (e.g. family, partners) in the residence halls.	High

9.   COMMUNICATION PROCESSES

Observation: There is a significant lack of effective inter-departmental training activities or opportunities between RL, UMPD, RHS and Dean of Students office. One administrator stated that "the lack of connections is epidemic". There is insufficient contact, communication and coordination between UMPD, RHS and Residential Life apart from coordinating on incidents. There appears to be no debriefings after significant security incidents. Interviewees (and UMPD) reported that UMPD just responds to a call in the residence halls with the information the police dispatcher provides. All parties agree there needs to be better, more timely and complete communication – upfront when UMPD arrives and as they leave the scene, informing those that work closely with UMPD. As another example, the desk monitors, Police Cadets and resident assistants would all benefit greatly from a series of controlled brain-storming sessions designed to improve communications and operations. Obtaining the input from the frontline staff that provides these services would result in invaluable information and suggestions for improvement. The process would also improve morale and teamwork between these areas. The RHS Monitor survey process was very informative in validating physical security weaknesses in the residence halls, so this type of communication and

information exchange should be ongoing.

Recommendations		Priority
Rec. 33	Using the RHS program design basis as a reference for discussion, coordinate regular ongoing meetings between all stakeholders of the residential life program (e.g. security, education, UMPD, operations, judicial) as accepted recommendations from this report are implemented until such a time that stakeholders at all levels agree that the recommendations are fully implemented and functioning well (critical). Thereafter, consider having a representative from the supervisory groups from RHS, UMPD, RA's/RD's meet once per month to exchange information and areas of ongoing concerns.	Critical

Observation: Demands on the RHS program are going to increase in order to close gaps identified in this report. The coordination and communication between RHS leadership and the day and night shift needs to improve. Regular staff meetings are required as changes roll out.

Recommendations		Priority
Rec. 34	Ensure RHS leadership (both the RHS Manager and the RHS Assistant Manager) convey changes associated with the implementation of recommendations in the monthly meeting held with supervisors. Consider having a weekly report completed by the RHS Manager and the RHS Assistant Manager highlighting current and future events, policies, procedures placed in each RHS monitor binder.	High

10. OTHER BEST PRACTICE OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Observation: The perception of some leadership in RHS is that there is currently no vehicle to enable efficient deployment or movement of supervisory or cadet resources around a large campus. UMass informs BPS that they own a 12 passenger van and although our staff aren't emergency responders, if the need arose, that van is available to evening staff.

Recommendations	Priority
Rec. 35 Advise the night shift of RHS of the availability of this resource and how to use it when necessary.	Medium

Observation: The Job Duties and Responsibilities of the Resident Directors do not require RD on-duty to respond to <u>all</u> emergency or serious situations in the residence halls. This potential lack of response leaves the RAs in the position of dealing with many levels of situations that may be more appropriate for a senior level position to handle. It also takes away the mentoring and role-modeling opportunities of developing the RA staff into more effective first responders.

Recommendations	Priority
Rec. 36 The Job Duties and Responsibilities of the RAs and RDs should be evaluated to provide a greater consistency in emergency response in the residence halls. RDs should respond to emergency situations and the RAs should be required to respond to lesser level situations to assist the Hall Monitors, Police Cadets or Supervisors.	Medium

Observation: There are currently three access control systems in use on the UMass Amherst campus. Maintaining multiple access control systems across campus results in a risk of unauthorized access. Duplicate administration and databases must be maintained for each system in use. When cardholders separate from the University, administrators must remember to review and potentially remove card holders from all three databases.

Many of the nuisance alarms are a result of the design choices (e.g. request-to-exit devices). To avoid these and other correctable physical deficiencies in residence halls, design and construction standards for security in the residence halls is required.

Recommendations	Priority
Rec. 37 Develop a plan to unify the electronic access control systems on campus with ownership by UMPD.	High

Recommendations	Priority
Rec 37a If the decision is taken to unify across the enterprise (recommended), add a technical security consultant to the SIC to assist in guiding the committee through this complex process.	High
Rec. 38 Develop university-wide security design standards for residence halls. This should include video design and tools to assist in specifying cameras for residence hall deployment.	High

Observation: In some lobbies lighting is not sufficient for RHS to perform the ID card inspection. While this process should eventually be automated, that will take some time and in the interim, it is still a problem to properly inspect badges. RHS knows which residence halls are impacted by this condition.

Recommendations	Priority
Rec. 39 Enhance lighting in residence hall lobbies to allow for proper inspection of ID cards.	Medium

Observation: ███ The typical philosophy in establishing alarms is to ensure that responding personnel can be brought to an accurately located area where a security breach is occurring. The objective of effective response can be achieved at a much lower cost. If UMass chooses to spend the extra money to determine which enclosure in the same room has been opened, it is a choice UMass is entitled to make. Input boards are listed at approximately $700 each for 8 input points

Recommendations	Priority
Rec. 40 BPS does not endorse this methodology but rather one that groups ALL tamper switches at one panel mounting location to a single input point. This will save the cost of one to two input boards per panel location as future panels are deployed.	Medium

Observation: Several instances of persons who have been separated from UMass gaining access to buildings were reported to BPS during interviews. Examples include:

- A number of people have been caught in building with cards and keys after being separated from the University
- Recently, a terminated CONTRACTOR who had an old key/ID card was caught stealing.
- There is no formal arrangement with HR to recover keys prior to leaving.

Recommendations	Priority
Rec. 41 Evaluate change management procedures with respect to persons separating from the University to ensure that potential security risks (possession of ID cards, keys, safe combinations, PIN codes for intrusion alarm panels) are properly managed.	High

11. APPENDICES
11.1. Appendix 1 – Interim Report #1 (Master Keys and Access Control System Software Access)

April 5, 2013

John Horvath
Chief of Police
University of Massachusetts
585 East Pleasant Street
Amherst, MA 01003

RE: Interim Assessment

Chief Horvath,

Thank you once again for your continued confidence in Business Protection Specialists. I want to extend our gratitude for your hospitality and assistance during our site visit this week. Without exception, everyone with whom we interacted was welcoming, courteous, and extremely helpful as we navigated the campus community. The University of Massachusetts was a wonderful host to our team.

As promised, I'm following up with an interim report on two issues we discussed during last Thursday's debrief. We believe the University may wish to look more closely and potentially address these issues while we continue to finalize the first draft of our report. The first issue on keys has a greater potential to result in significant cost to the University and both the first and the second issue impacts the ability of UMPD to respond effectively to significant emergencies in the residence halls.

If you have any questions on these matters, please contact me on my cell phone at (585) 202-7004.

Sincerely,

Frank Pisciotta, CSC

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Figure 1 – Knox Box on ████████████

Irrespective of the option (or options) selected above, please note the following:

a) ███
███
███████████████████████████████████

b) ███
███

c) ███
████████████

d) In the long run, UMass should initiate a campus-wide keyway study. The analysis should verify the adequacy of the key control system; how brass keyways are implemented in conjunction with electronic access control (to minimize nuisance alarms) and reduce the risk of unauthorized access to restricted areas. The Residential Life Facilities Operations group provides a model for administering a key control program (e.g. use of controlled keyway, utilizing a proper relational database program to track cores and keys) The results of this long-term study that can then inform UMPD ensuring the "full-access" key ring actually provide access to all campus buildings, doors and locations for exigent circumstances.

Issue #2 – Residence Hall Access Control System Administration and Access to the Applications

2. Access Control System Access. █████████████████████████████████████
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███
█████████████████████████████████████ As the security, protection and primary security emergency response unit for the University it is imperative that UMPD have direct access and control within their dispatch center of campus access control systems, ████████
███████████████████████████████████

An extension to this concept relates to system transactions and records associated with the electronic access control systems. This process is currently owned and controlled solely by

Residential Life and requires a formal written request for records. There are a number of situations that dictate UMPD not be required to request records, foremost being the sensitive and confidential nature of criminal investigations of which they become involved on a regular basis. To enable control of door access in a crisis and; two levels of access should be considered for these systems in keeping with good security practices:

a) Administrator Access. Administrator access should be provided to two or three individuals directly responsible for supervision of UMPD IT and the dispatch center along with a backup person within the UMPD command staff, such as an overnight supervisor. Training should be provided to ensure proper usage, management of access and oversight of subordinate personnel.

b) User Level Access. User level access should be provided to all communications/dispatch personnel and line police supervisors. Training should be provided to ensure proper understanding and usage of the systems.

On the matter of criminal investigations; two levels of access should be considered for these systems in keeping with good security practices:

c) Administrator Access. Administrator access should be provided to two or three individuals directly responsible for UMPD investigations along with command staff, such as an overnight supervisor. Training should be provided to ensure proper usage, management of access and oversight of subordinate personnel.

d) User Level Access. User level access should be provided to all communications/dispatch personnel and line police supervisors. Training should be provided to ensure proper understanding and usage of the systems.

11.2. Appendix 2 – Interim Report #2 – Mechanical Door Deficiencies

Specific Residence Hall Door and System Inspection

<u>**Definitions:**</u>

Key Cylinder Loose – Typically each door has three or four key cylinders associated with its functionality. Where this term is noted, one or more of those key cylinders are loose.

Panic Hardware Loose – Each door has panic hardware that latches to keep the door secure. Where this term is noted, the panic hardware is loose and is danger of potentially falling off of the door and needs to be tightened so that the security of the residence upheld.

Strike Plate Loose – Each panic device has a strike plate that is mounted to the jamb. This strike plate is engaged by the latchbolt of the panic device to secure the door. Where this term is noted the strike plate is loose and is, in some cases, in danger of falling off of the jamb and needs to be tightened so that the latchbolt will engage properly and the security of the residence is upheld.

Audible not functioning properly – Door types 2-4 have audibles. Where this term is noted it means that either the audible did not make any sound, the sound was diminished to the point that it could barely be heard, or the audible briefly made a sound, then stopped even though the alarm condition still existed.

Adjust Closer – Every door tested, and a very important integral part of the proper functionality of the doors, has a door closer. When not adjusted properly, a door may close too slowly and create a vulnerability. If the closer doesn't have enough power to close the door properly or overcome wind gusts or positive building pressures, the door may not latch. If a door closes too fast, the door hardware can be damaged or prematurely wear out. Where this term is noted, the swing speed, latch speed and/or the closer strength may need to be adjusted so that the closer is properly closing the door and allowing the hardware to latch, thereby securing the door.

1.1.1. ██████████

Door #	Description	Finding	Remedial Action

Door #	Description	Finding	Remedial Action
F2	Emergency Exit	Closer screws loose	Tighten closer screws

1.1.2. ▬▬▬▬▬

Door #	Description	Finding	Remedial Action
B1	Emergency Exit	Door not closing properly; Key cylinder loose	Adjust closer; Tighten key cylinder(s)
B2	Service Entrance	Key cylinder loose	Tighten key cylinder(s)
B1	Emergency Exit	Door not closing properly; Key cylinder loose	Adjust closer; Tighten key cylinder(s)
F3	Emergency Exit	Door not closing properly; Strike plate loose	Adjust closer; Tighten strike plate screws or replace with longer screws

1.1.3. ▬▬▬▬▬

Door #	Description	Finding	Remedial Action
B1	Main Entrance	Door not closing properly	Adjust closer
B2	Emergency Exit	Door not closing properly	Adjust closer
B3	Emergency Exit	Door not closing properly	Adjust closer

1.1.4. ▬▬▬▬▬

Door #	Description	Finding	Remedial Action
B1	Service Entrance	Key cylinder loose	Tighten key cylinder(s)
F2	Emergency Exit	Door not closing properly	Adjust closer

1.1.5. ██████████

Door #	Description	Finding	Remedial Action
B3	Service Entrance	Audible not functioning; Audible key cylinder missing	Repair/replace audible, validate programming; Install key cylinder and core appropriately keyed to the building
F1	Main Entrance	Door not closing properly	Adjust closer
F3	Emergency Exit	Door not closing properly	Adjust closer
F4	Emergency Exit	Door not closing properly	Adjust closer
F7	Emergency Exit	Door not closing properly	Adjust closer

1.1.6. ████████

Door #	Description	Finding	Remedial Action
B1	Service Entrance	Door not closing properly	Adjust closer
F1	Emergency Exit	Door not closing properly	Adjust closer
S2	Emergency Exit	Key cylinder loose	Tighten key cylinder(s)

1.1.7. ███████

Door #	Description	Finding	Remedial Action
B3	Emergency Exit	Key cylinder loose	Tighten key cylinder(s)
F2	Emergency Exit	Strike plate loose	Tighten strike plate screws or replace with longer screws

1.1.8. ████████

Door #	Description	Finding	Remedial Action
B1	Service Entrance	Strike plate loose	Tighten strike plate screws or replace with longer screws
F1	Emergency Exit	Audible not functioning	Repair/replace audible, validate programming
F3	Emergency Exit	Audible not functioning	Repair/replace audible, validate programming

1.1.9. ███████

Door #	Description	Finding	Remedial Action
B1	Service Entrance	Door not closing properly	Adjust closer
F3	Main Entrance	Door not closing properly	Adjust closer
F5	Emergency Exit	Strike plate loose; Door not closing properly	Tighten strike plate screws or replace with longer screws Adjust closer

1.1.10. █████████

Door #	Description	Finding	Remedial Action
B4	Emergency Exit	Jamb behind strike plate broken	Repair/replace as necessary to provide a sufficient mounting surface for the strike plate
F2	Emergency Exit	Door not closing properly	Adjust closer

1.1.11. ███████████

Door #	Description	Finding	Remedial Action
F3	Main Entry	Strike plate is loose	Tighten strike plate screws or replace with longer screws

1.1.12. █████████

Door #	Description	Finding	Remedial Action
F1	Main Entrance	Strike plate loose	Tighten strike plate screws or replace with longer screws

1.1.13. ██████████

Door #	Description	Finding	Remedial Action
F4	Main Entrance	Door not closing properly	Adjust closer

1.1.14. ████████

Door #	Description	Finding	Remedial Action
F2	Emergency Exit	Door not closing properly	Adjust closer
F4	Emergency Exit	Door not closing properly	Adjust closer

1.1.15. ████████████

Door #	Description	Finding	Remedial Action
F2	Service Entrance	Strike plate loose Door not closing properly Audible box falling off wall	Tighten strike plate screws or replace with longer screws Adjust closer Remount audible box

1.1.16. ████████████████

Door #	Description	Finding	Remedial Action
00 COSE	Door to Recreation Room	Screws missing from closer bracket	Add appropriately sized and type screws to secure bracket
B2	Emergency Exit	There is not audible associated with this door	An audible should be added to this location

1.1.17. ████████████

Door #	Description	Finding	Remedial Action

Door #	Description	Finding	Remedial Action
B1	Emergency Exit	Key cylinder loose	Tighten key cylinder(s)
B2	Emergency Exit	No audible Closer not functioning	An audible should be added to this location Door closer should be replaced
B4	Emergency Exit	Door not closing properly Key cylinder loose	Adjust closer Tighten key cylinder(s)
B5	Emergency Exit- Mechanical Room	No Audible Doors not closing properly	An audible should be added to this location Door are in need of adjustment/repair or replacement
F1	Main Entrance	Door not closing properly Strike plate loose Lock cylinder loose	Adjust closer Tighten strike plate screws or replace with longer screws Tighten lock cylinder
F2	Emergency Exit	Audible no functioning properly Key cylinder loose	Repair or replace audible, validate programming Tighten key cylinder(s)

1.1.18. ████████

Door #	Description	Finding	Remedial Action
B1	Emergency Exit	Door not closing properly	Adjust closer
B2	Service Entrance	Door not closing properly	Adjust closer
F1	Main Entrance	Door warped Panic hardware loose	Replace door Tighten or remount panic hardware

Door #	Description	Finding	Remedial Action
F2	Resident Exit Door	This door leads into unit 102 and is not monitored. The student in this unit has a key but with no monitoring, this door could be left unlocked or propped open	Replace lockset with storeroom function lockset Install door contact to monitor door position Install request to exit device to allow egress without alarm

1.1.19. ████████

Door #	Description	Finding	Remedial Action
F3	Emergency Exit	Audible not functioning properly	Repair/replace audible, validate programming
F4	Emergency Exit	Audible not functioning properly Door not closing properly Strike plate loose	Repair/replace audible, validate programming Adjust closer Tighten strike plate screws or replace with longer screws
01	Stairwell Entry	Strike plate loose	Tighten strike plate screws or replace with longer screws
F6	Service Entrance	Sounder will not reset	Check wiring, reset mechanism

1.1.20. ██████████

Door #	Description	Finding	Remedial Action
F1	Service Entrance	Panic hardware loose	Tighten panic hardware screws or refasten with new hardware
F5	Emergency Exit	Key cylinder loose	Tighten key cylinder(s)

Door #	Description	Finding	Remedial Action
F6	Emergency Exit	Key cylinder loose	Tighten key cylinder(s)

1.1.21. ███████

Door #	Description	Finding	Remedial Action
F1	Emergency Exit	Door not closing properly	Adjust closer

1.1.22. ███████

Door #	Description	Finding	Remedial Action
F1	Service Entrance	Door not closing properly	Adjust closer
01	Elevator Lobby Entrance	Strike plate loose	Tighten strike plate screws or replace with longer screws
F3	Main Entrance	Door contact magnet loose	Glue magnet into door with appropriate adhesive
F5	Emergency Exit	Door not closing properly	Adjust closer

1.1.23. ███████

Door #	Description	Finding	Remedial Action
F2	Emergency Exit	Door not closing properly	Adjust closer

1.1.24. ████████

Door #	Description	Finding	Remedial Action
F2	Emergency Exit	Door not closing properly	Adjust closer
F4	Emergency Exit	Door binding on bottom	Adjust or sand/grind door to prevent binding

1.1.25. ████████

Door #	Description	Finding	Remedial Action
B1	Service Entrance	Strike plate loose	Tighten strike plate screws or replace with longer screws

1.1.26. ████████

Door #	Description	Finding	Remedial Action
B2	Main Entrance	Key cylinder loose / Door not closing properly	Tighten key cylinder(s) / Adjust closer
B3	Emergency Exit	Strike plate loose / Key cylinder loose	Tighten strike plate screws or replace with longer screws / Tighten key cylinder(s)

1.1.27. ████████

Door #	Description	Finding	Remedial Action
B1	Emergency Exit	Audible not functioning / Loose key cylinder	Repair/replace audible, validate programming / Tighten key cylinder(s)

1.1.28. ███████████

Door #	Description	Finding	Remedial Action
F3	Emergency Exit	Door not closing properly	Adjust closer
F4	Service Entrance	Door not closing properly	Adjust closer

1.1.29. █████████

Door #	Description	Finding	Remedial Action
01	Stairwell Entrance	Door not closing properly	Adjust closer
F2	Emergency Exit	Door not closing properly Key cylinder loose	Adjust closer Tighten key cylinder(s)
F3	Emergency Exit	Door not closing properly Key cylinder loose	Adjust closer Tighten key cylinder(s)

1.1.30. ███████████

Door #	Description	Finding	Remedial Action
B1	Service Entrance	Panic hardware loose	Tighten screws or remount panic hardware
00	Stairwell Entrance	Door contact broken	Replace door contact
B4	Emergency Exit	Door not closing properly	Adjust closer

1.1.31. ███████████

Door #	Description	Finding	Remedial Action
B1	Main Entrance	Door not closing properly	Adjust closer
B3	Emergency Exit	Door not closing properly	Adjust closer
F3	Service Entrance	Students letting people in through this door	Install delayed egress function in panic hardware

1.1.32. ███████████

Door #	Description	Finding	Remedial Action
B1	Service Entrance	Audible not functioning	Repair/replace audible, validate programming
F1	Emergency Exit	Audible not functioning	Repair/replace audible, validate programming
F2	Emergency Exit	Door not closing properly	Adjust closer
S1-1	Emergency	Key cylinder loose	Tighten key cylinder(s)

Door #	Description	Finding	Remedial Action
	Exit		
S1-2	Emergency Exit	Door not closing properly Key cylinder loose	Adjust closer Tighten key cylinder(s)

1.1.33. ███████

Door #	Description	Finding	Remedial Action
F1	Emergency Exit	Audible does not remain active when alarm condition exists Alarm signage missing	Repair/replace audible, validate programming Apply appropriate signage to the door for the alarm conditions
F2	Emergency Eixt	Audible defective Door not closing properly	Repair/replace audible, validate programming Adjust closer
F4	Service Entrance	Door not latching consistently	Adjust strike plate
F5	Emergency Exit	Audible defective Door not closing properly	Repair/replace audible, validate programming Adjust closer
F6	Service Entrance	Door sweep rubbing on threshold plate preventing door from closing properly Strike plate loose	Adjust door sweep or replace. Once complete, check closer for proper operation, it may need to be adjusted as well Tighten strike plate screws or replace with longer screws

1.1.34. ███████

Door #	Description	Finding	Remedial Action
F1	Emergency Exit	Door not closing properly	Adjust closer
F2	Emergency Exit	Door not closing properly Audible not working	Adjust closer Repair/replace audible, validate programming
F3	Main Entrance	Strike plate loose	Tighten strike plate screws or replace with longer screws
F5	Emergency Exit	Strike plate loose	Tighten strike plate screws or replace with longer screws

1.1.35. ████████████

Door #	Description	Finding	Remedial Action
B1	Service Entrance	Door not closing properly	Adjust closer
B2	Emergency Exit	Door rubbing on threshold preventing latching without assistance	Adjust threshold or cut/grind/sand bottom of door to prevent rubbing Adjust closer
B3	Main Entrance	No Audible All students are given access to this door from 8am to 8pm according to signage, to access 1st floor classrooms. This access allows students who do not live in this residence, access to the entire building during these hours	An audible should be installed on this door and it should not be used by any student to enter this residence
B4	Emergency Exit	Door rubbing on threshold	Adjust threshold or cut/grind/sand bottom of door

Door #	Description	Finding	Remedial Action
		preventing latching without assistance	to prevent rubbing

Adjust closer |
B5	Service Entrance	Door not closing properly	Adjust closer
B6	Emergency Exit	Door not closing properly	Adjust closer
F1	Main Entrance	Door not closing properly	Adjust closer
F2	Emergency Exit	Door not closing properly

Key cylinder loose | Adjust closer

Tighten key cylinder(s) |
| | Residence 125D | This residence has a door that leads to the exterior and is not monitored

The lock is a classroom function which would allow for someone to leave the door unlocked at any time | Replace lockset with storeroom function lockset

Install door contact to monitor door position

Install request to exit device to allow egress without alarm |

1.1.36. ███████████

Door #	Description	Finding	Remedial Action
01	Elevator Lobby Entrance	Door not closing properly	Adjust closer
F5	Emergency Exit	Door not closing properly	Adjust closer
F6	Emergency Exit	Door not closing properly

Key cylinder loose | Adjust closer

Tighten key cylinder(s) |

1.1.37. ████████

Door #	Description	Finding	Remedial Action
F1	Service Entrance	Door not closing properly Strike plate loose Door does not latch without assistance	Adjust closer Tighten strike plate screws or replace with longer screws
F2	Service Entrance	Door not closing properly	Adjust closer

1.1.38. ████████

Door #	Description	Finding	Remedial Action
B1	Emergency Exit	Door not closing properly Key cylinder loose	Adjust closer Tighten key cylinder(s)
B2	Service Entrance	Door not closing properly	Adjust closer
B3	Emergency Exit	Door not closing properly	Adjust closer
F1	Emergency Exit	Door not latching	Adjust closer
F3	Emergency Exit	Door not closing properly Key cylinder loose	Adjust closer Tighten key cylinder(s)

11.3. Appendix 3 – Interim Report #3 – Nuisance Alarm Remediation

May 3, 2013

John Horvath, Chief of Police
Jim Meade, Residence Hall Security Manager
University of Massachusetts
585 East Pleasant Street
Amherst, MA 01003

RE: Nuisance Door Alarm Reduction Plan

Chief Horvath, Jim,

This interim report submittal is intended to provide a plan to substantially reduce the nuisance alarms associated with the ▮▮▮▮ access control system for the ▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮. The rate of nuisance alarms is complicating the field and making it impossible to enforce published residence hall Community Standards in particular; the University alcohol and drug policy, guest policy and general building safety and security expectations. Adequately controlling the perimeter is an essential part of the Residence Hall Security program and we are confident the implementation of these recommendations will be an important first step in getting control of the perimeter.

If you have any questions on these matters, please contact me on my ▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮ ▮▮▮

Sincerely,

Frank Pisciotta, CSC

Cc: E. Hull

Observation: An analysis was conducted on the alarm activity for one month based upon an electronic file output provided by Director of Residential Life / Student Affairs Info & Tech Services. When considering input signals only, there were over 31,000 events occurring (generally but not exclusively alarms) and another 31,000 events occurring (restorals), each requiring intervention by the ███ – either a full time staff member or a student) to acknowledge, classify cause and clear these alarms. Alarms under the focus of this particular part of the study include doors held open beyond the programmed permissible time and forced doors (which under normal circumstances is indicative of a burglary or forced entry into a residence hall). There are a number of conditions that can lead to nuisance forced door alarms (actual breaking and entering event, use of a key to open an electronically monitored door, hardware problems, sabotaged door, improper, defective or missing "request to exit" device).

Currently when door alarms are received at ██████████████, acknowledgement of the alarm is done without any verification as to the cause or culprit. If a door held open alarm clears by the door closing, it is cleared and a notation made that the door has closed. Similarly, when a forced door alarm is received and clears when the door is closed, a notation is simply made in the system that the door has closed. ██ The major risk in continuing to tolerate the number of nuisance alarms and handle them as they are today is that if an actual breach of security occurs and a major crime ensues, it will be a significant embarrassment to the University.

Clearly some percentage of the alarms is generated by student abuse of the doors, but the preponderance is not. Our field tests suggest the following equipment configurations are responsible for a significant percentage of alarms (in some buildings perhaps upwards of 90%). The good news is corrective action is within reach by following a phased approach.

Cause of False Alarms

Our opinion is the primary cause of the majority of false alarms is a result of the use of request to exit devices in the panic hardware of electrified devices on high traffic doors. On many of the high traffic doors (e.g. main entry of residence halls), when the door is almost closed (but not latched) security advisors observed students exiting the building who pushed open the door (not the panic hardware which would have activated the request to exit and shunted the alarm). By opening the door in this manner, the ██████ panel is spoofed into thinking the door is closed and when the door is reopened, the panel generates a forced door alarm ██████████████████.

Alternatively, this alarm can be generated in the same scenario (almost fully closed by not latched) when someone grabs the door handle, from the outside at the last minute, and opens the door before it latches. Similarly in this instance, because the door is almost closed, the door contact transfers and indicates to the ██████ access control panel that the door is closed and treats the door re-opening as a forced door. This was observed and the condition replicated under a test situation.

The highest offending doors from an alarm activation perspective include the following (note that the threshold for listing below was an average of more than two alarm activations daily). Note that each time these events occur, the ██████████████ has to acknowledge, log a cause and monitor for the clearing of the event. This is currently someone's full time job. The largest offender doors

(generally >400 alarms) are listed in bold type. Service portals (ones with read in/out) were included in some cases due to the potential for staff abuse (which would be concerning to us). Corrective action to remediate these conditions follow the list of doors.

- o ████ **F3 Main (forced 879 and held 61)**
- o ███ F2 Serv (forced 78)
- o ███ **B2 Serve (forced 812)**
- o ███ **F2 Main (forced 69, held open 348)**
- o ███ F1 Main (forced 181, held open 93)
- o ███ **B1 Serv (forced 445)**
- o ███ F2 Main (forced 134 held open 48)
- o ████ F1 Main (held open 100)
- o ████ F2 Main (forced 160 held open 78)
- o ████ **-F1 Main (forced 572 held open 47)**
- o ████ -F1 Main (forced 67)
- o ████ 01 STCE INDR (held open 80)
- o ████ -F1 Main (forced 38 held open 106)
- o ████ -F2 Main (forced 17 held open 65)
- o ████ F3 Main (forced 19 held open 66)
- o ████ -F1 Main (forced 104 held open 69)
- o ████ -F3 Main (forced 214 held open 66)
- o ████ -ELLB INDR (forced 10 held open 125)
- o ████ -F3 Main (held open 65)
- o ████ -F1 Main (forced 693 held open 94)
- o ████ -F6 SERV (forced 89 held open 14)
- o ████ -F3 Main (forced 152 held open 51)
- o ████ -F3 Main (forced 105 held open 143)
- o ████ -01 STCE INDR (forced 16 held open 58)
- o ████ -F3 Main (forced 139 held open 90)
- o ████ -01 STCE INDR (forced 51 held open 114)

- o ▮▮▮ -01 ELLB-N INDR (forced 243 held open 145)
- o ▮▮▮ -01 ELLB-S INDR (forced 4 held open 80)
- o ▮▮▮ **-F1 SERV (forced 517 held open 59)**
- o ▮▮▮ -F3 MAIN (held open 298)
- o ▮▮▮ **-01 COWE INDR (forced 818 held open 24)**
- o ▮▮▮ -B1 SERV (forced 114)
- o ▮▮▮ -F2 MAIN (forced 367)
- o ▮▮▮ -01 STSO INDR (forced 35 held open 133)
- o ▮▮▮ -F3 EXDR (forced 7 held open 61)
- o ▮▮▮ -F4 MAIN (forced 63 held open 39)
- o ▮▮▮ -01ELLB-N INDR (forced 27 held open 108)
- o ▮▮▮ -01ELLB-S INDR (forced 1 held open 84)
- o ▮▮▮ -F1 SERV (forced 87 held open 43)
- o ▮▮▮ -F3 Main (forced 80 held open 78)
- o ▮▮▮ -01 STWE INDR (forced 24 held open 179)
- o ▮▮▮ F1 Main (forced 46 held open 50)
- o ▮▮▮ -F2 EXDR (forced 20 held open 43)
- o ▮▮▮ -01 ELLB-E INDR (forced 5 held open 131)
- o ▮▮▮ **-01 ELLB-W INDR (forced 524 held open 171)**
- o ▮▮▮ **-F1 (forced 126 held open 461)**
- o ▮▮▮ -F3 SERV (forced 213 held open 49)
- o ▮▮▮ **-01 ELLB-S INDR (forced 1024 held open 17)**
- o ▮▮▮ **-01 ELLB-N INDR (forced 701 held open 270)**
- o ▮▮▮ **-F3 Main (forced 214 held open 263)**
- o ▮▮▮ **-00 COSO INDR (forced 449 held open 129)**
- o ▮▮▮ -00 STCE INDR- (forced 152 held open 52)
- o ▮▮▮ -02 STCE INDR- (forced 87 held open 131)
- o ▮▮▮ -B2 Main- (forced 118 held open 91)
- o ▮▮▮ -S1 Main (forced 15 held open 56)
- o ▮▮▮ -01 STNO INDR (forced 3 held open 160)

- o ███████ -F1 EXDR (forced 26 held open 56)
- o ███████ -F2 Main (forced 19 held open 44)
- o ███████ -F6 SERV (forced 43)
- o ███████ -01 STCE INDR (forced 25 held open 121)
- o ███████ -B1 SERV (forced 107 held open 32)
- o ███████ -00 CONO INDR (forced 10 held open 65)
- o ███████ -00 STNO INDR (forced 6 held open 60)
- o ███████ -02 CONO INDR (forced 53 held open 17)
- o ███████ -02 CONO INDR (forced 13 held open 102)
- o ███████ -B2 SERV (forced 307 held open 13)
- o ███████ -B3 Main (forced 60 held open 38)
- o ███████ -S1 Main (forced 25 held open 58)
- o ███████ -01 STCE INDR (forced 61 held open 122)
- o ███████ -B1 SERV (forced 36 held open 46)
- o ███████ -F3 Main (forced 51 held open 62)
- o ███████ **-B2 SERV (forced 467 held open 49)**
- o ███████ -F1 Main (forced 49 held open 95)
- o ███████ **-F3 SERV (forced 803 held open 36)**
- o ███████ -01 STSO INDR (forced 68 held open 112)
- o ███████ -F3 Main (forced 43 held open 33)
- o ███████ F4 EXDR (forced 30 held open 127)
- o ███████ -F6 SERV (forced 92 held open 35)
- o ███████ -01 ELLB-N INDR (forced 60 held open 132)
- o ███████ -01 ELLB-S INDR (forced 4 held open 125)
- o ███████ -01 ELLB-S INDR (forced 4 held open 125)
- o ███████ -F1 SERV (forced 341 held open 58)
- o ███████ -F3 Main (forced 149)
- o ███████ -F1 Main (forced 291 held open 67)
- o ███████ -B2 SERV (forced 92 held open 5)
- o ███████ -F1 Main (forced 46 held open 74)

- o ███████-B1 EXDR (forced 57 held open 8)
- o ███████-B2 SERV (forced 69 held open 1)
- o **███████-F1 Main (forced 660 held open 80)**

Phased Mitigation for Nuisance Alarms

Phase One

"Phase one" involves a two-step process is suggested to reduce the nuisance held and forced door alarm activity in the ██████ system. One step addresses nuisance alarms generated when students leave, and the other step address nuisance alarms when students are entering the residence halls.

Step 1 – To address the nuisance alarms from persons exiting the buildings, add a passive infrared request (PIR) to exit device to existing installation to the card reader doors (with the exception of the service entrances which have read in/out) which will shunt the contact by virtue of persons simply passing through the portal irrespective of whether they use the panic alarms or not. The installation of this device will also reduce the hold open alarms that are occurring as students are streaming in or out of the building during high traffic periods in that as long as the PIR request to exit sees motion in the field of view, it will reset the shunt time and not register a hold open alarm[1].

Option 1 – Run a new 22 gauge 4 conductor wire to each door location; power from local ACS power supply. At the door, a 22 gauge 2 conductor wire will need to be run from the PIR location into the panic hardware via the power transfer. Inside the panic hardware, the PIR contact and the panic hardware REX switch need to be connected so that either one will provide a REX signal to the panel. The record documentation (sometimes referred to as "as built") from 2010 does not show panel elevations and layouts, so it is unclear if there is a power source at the panel location to power a PIR request to exit device. The new PIR request to exit devices will need power. This power can either be derived from the power source for the iStar controller or an additional power supply would be required.

Option 2 – According to the record documentation from 2010 there is an existing 22/4 AWG running to each panic device that is used to monitor the request to exit switch as well as the latch bolt. In lieu of option one above, this wire could be removed from the panic hardware and reused to power the PIR REX and provide a signal to the panel.

Step 2 – To address the nuisance alarms from persons entering the buildings by grabbing the exterior door trim as a door is about to close, a software remediation is recommended. Application of this software feature will enable a delay of the door contact signal from registering into the panel logic allowing the door time to latch: This is accomplished using a

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[1] BPS concludes that tailgating is not a condition that is practical to correct in a higher education residence hall.

feature in ███████████████████████████████████. Enabling this software feature allows for variable time adjustments in the system (up to several minutes) and allows timing for door contacts and other features, to be modified on a per-door basis.

Sample Impact Analysis - ████████

Door Name and Alarm Type	Existing	*Projected* after PIR RTE and ADM Module Implemented	Percentage Reduction
████████ 01 ELLB-N INDR RDR TAMPER activated	2	2	
████ 01 ELLB-N INDR-FORCE activated	701	0	
████ 01 ELLB-N INDR-HELD activated	270	54[2]	
████ 01 ELLB-S INDR-FORCE activated	1024	0	
████ 01 ELLB-S INDR-HELD activated	17	3	
████ 23 ROOF-N EXDR-FORCE activated	16	0	
████ BUILDING COMM-FAIL activated	2	2	
████ -F1 SERV LBM activated	53	53	
████ F1 SERV-FORCE activated	39	0	
████ -F1 SERV-HELD activated	2	1	
████ -F3 MAIN LBM activated	7	7	
████ -F3 MAIN-FORCE activated	214	0	
████ -F3 MAIN-HELD activated	263	53	
████ -F5 EXDR CHEXIT ACTIVATION!! activated	3	3	
████ -F5 EXDR-FORCE activated	3	0	
████ -F6 EXDR CHEXIT ACTIVATION!! activated	1	1	
████ -F6 EXDR-FORCE activated	1	0	
Grand Total	**2620**	**118**	**95%**

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[2] BPS is conservatively predicting that 20% of the alarms are actual hold open conditions versus students streaming into or out of buildings which would not generate a hold upon alarm with the PIR RTE resetting the shunt time on the door.

It is clear from the chart above that once the nuisance alarms are taken out of the mix, there becomes a very manageable number of alarms that handle which then enable RHS, Res Life, Student Affairs and UMPD to begin a joint campaign of enforcement of the Residential Life Community Standards with respect to alcohol and drug policy, guest policy and general building safety and security expectations. After implementation of phase one, the University will be ready to move to "phase two". There is no question, the monitoring of alarms is going to have to be an ongoing process for a while until all of the adjustments are made and RHS is reasonable sure that alarms are a function of abuse and not a design problem.

Phase Two

Phase two involves targeted enforcement of the door violations through the combined use of the ██ ██████ reporting function integrated with the existing video. Elimination of the nuisance alarms will clear the way to identifying the doors that are truly being used to smuggle unauthorized visitors and contraband into the residence halls (among other improper activities). Continued monitoring of the alarm activity will allow for the next phase of improvements to occur.

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RHS in cooperation with HRL and UMPD can reverse the trend where it is easy and routine for perimeter doors to be breached. Using wired output from the █████ access control system, door alarms can trigger an alarm input in the existing DVR's. By introducing a piece of software ████████████████ RHS will have the ability to control multiple sources of video subsystems (disparate DVR's across campus) to collect, manage and present video in a clear and concise manner. Specifically, when an alarm is generated through the improper use of a door (opening a fire emergency exit, holding open a door for an excessive period of time, improperly opening a door with a key, exiting a staff door without presenting a credential) the ████████████ will create a video clip of that event which can then be used for judicial or criminal investigation purposes.

██ The problem is the threat is currently originating from ████████ who are using the doors improperly, not persons breaching the doors from the ██████ Therefore one could argue that the cameras are aimed in the wrong direction. Ideally, each door would be fitted with two cameras; one for capturing the images of persons entering and one capturing the images of persons exiting. This may be an ideal that is pursued over time. If the HRL is not willing to fund this expense today, we would suggest selecting the buildings that are experiencing the highest incidence of alarms after the completion of "phase one" and simply rotating the cameras 180 degrees to capture the images of persons approaching the door from the █████. This will ensure that when the █████████ software generates the incident video clip, the University can have a reasonable expectation of forensic quality video of the event. ██████████ will provide the University with the ability to investigate events and alarms by simultaneously viewing alarm video at various stages. For every door input alarm, users can view the video captured during pre-alarm, on-alarm, post-alarm, and for low volume, high risk periods (e.g. early morning hours) the system will provide the capability to view live video from the camera ████████████ which triggered the alarm.

The ███████████████████ experience similar volumes of door alarms and quite likely, the design issue identified above is a major contributor there as well. Dependent upon when the University plans to migrate from the current access control system to ██████ would inform whether to invest on the two phase corrective action suggested for the other forty-one residence halls. If it looks like it will be at least a year before the access control system is standardized, we would recommend corrective action suggested above.

Another unique problem was identified in the trash collection areas of the ███████████████. The trash room doors are entered from student space via a set of double doors which are equipped with card readers to enable student reentry. For the two doors, one is an active door (reader, electric lock) and the other is a passive leaf (supposed to be secured in place). Students are able to unsecure the passive leaf enabling free entry into the residence halls from the trash room and resulting in nuisance forced and held open door alarms. Currently this condition is accounting for 37% of all alarms recorded in the ████████████. A simple corrective action of dead bolting the passive leaf was discussed with RHS when BPS was on site. This will reduce the alarms on the ████ █████████ immediately.

Cost for Remediation

Phase/Option	Cost	Notes
Phase One – Address Nuisance Alarms from Resident Egress		
Option 1 – 41 ████████ ██	$60,173	
Option 1 – ████ ██████████	$8,113	Option 1 Total - $68,286
Option 2 – 41 ██████ ██	$46,725	
Option 2 – ████ ██████████	$6,300	Option 2 Total - $53,025
Phase 2 – Address Nuisance Alarms from Resident Entry		
████████████	$6,380	Assumes programming done internally

11.4. Appendix 4 – Video Integration Requirements

Observation: There are currently significant challenges in the enforcement of door abuses in the residence halls. The lack of integration of the video and access control system contributes to the challenge.

Execution: █████ output panels would be enclosure-mounted ██████████████████████ ████████████ and connected to the iStar panels to provide a capability to transmit door alarm output signals to the ████████ DVR's in the residence halls. Output connections would be established between each protected door (via the output panel) to input points on the DVR. Refer to the block diagram below for a typical integration. When a door alarm occurs, the output signal will be transmitted to the digital video recorder, which through software programming would generate the video clip of pre-, current and post-alarm activity for judicial or legal enforcement support.

11.5. Appendix 5 – Specific Residence Hall Camera Observations and Recommendations

Observation: There are some deficiencies observed with respect to the placement and type of video cameras used. The following table outlines the specific weaknesses observed during the tours of each residence hall.

Bldg.	Location	Finding	Remedial Action
▬	Security Camera	Camera not in optimal position to capture facial images of individuals standing at the security desk Video quality fair	Reposition camera for better field of view to capture images of individuals standing at security desk Replace camera with Wide Dynamic Range low light cameras
▬	Security Camera	Camera is positioned so that it only views the backs of the heads of individuals standing at the security desk Video quality fair	Relocate the camera so that it is behind the desk in a position that allows for facial views of individuals standing at the security desk Replace camera with Wide Dynamic Range low light cameras
▬	Security Camera	Camera position to view individuals standing at the security desk is good but could be lowered so that it does not view ceiling lights Video quality fair	Reposition camera down Replace camera with Wide Dynamic Range low light cameras
▬	Security Camera	Camera is positioned so that it only views the backs of the heads of individuals standing at the security desk Video quality fair	Relocate the camera so that it is behind the desk in a position that allows for facial views of individuals standing at the security desk Replace camera with Wide Dynamic Range low light cameras
▬	Security Camera	Camera field of view is too narrow and can barely see desk and sign in area Video quality fair	Adjust camera field of view to capture desk properly Replace camera with Wide Dynamic Range low light cameras

Bldg.	Location	Finding	Remedial Action
■■■	Security Camera	Camera is positioned so that it only views the backs of the heads of individuals standing at the security desk Video quality fair	Relocate the camera so that it is behind the desk in a position that allows for facial views of individuals standing at the security desk Replace camera with Wide Dynamic Range low light cameras
■■■	Security Camera	Camera is positioned so that it only views the backs of the heads of individuals standing at the security desk Video quality fair	Relocate the camera so that it is behind the desk in a position that allows for facial views of individuals standing at the security desk Replace camera with Wide Dynamic Range low light cameras
■■■■	Security Camera	Camera is positioned so that it only views a profile of the individuals standing at the security desk Video quality fair	Relocate the camera so that it is behind the desk in a position that allows for facial views of individuals standing at the security desk Replace camera with Wide Dynamic Range low light cameras
■■■	Security Camera	Camera is positioned so that it views individuals at desk but is too far away for recognition Video quality fair	Relocate or re-lens the camera to provide a tighter image of the individuals standing at the security desk. Replace camera with Wide Dynamic Range low light cameras
■■■	Lobby Camera	Camera is positioned so that it views individuals at desk but view is not optimal for recognition Video quality fair	Reposition camera down and to the right for a better field of view
■■■	Main Entrance Camera	Camera field of view not optimal for intended image	Reposition to provide an optimal field of view
■■■	Security Camera	Camera is positioned correctly Video quality fair	Replace camera with Wide Dynamic Range low light cameras
■■■	Main Entrance Camera	Position does not provide a useful field of view Video quality fair	Reposition to provide an optimal field of view Replace camera with Wide Dynamic Range low light cameras

Bldg.	Location	Finding	Remedial Action
■■■■	Security Camera	Camera is positioned so that it only views the backs of the heads of individuals standing at the security desk Video quality fair	Relocate the camera so that it is behind the desk in a position that allows for facial views of individuals standing at the security desk Replace camera with Wide Dynamic Range low light cameras
■■■■	Main Entrance Camera	General view good but gets blocked by a door each time it is opened Video quality fair	Reposition camera so that door does not interfere with the field of view Replace camera with Wide Dynamic Range low light cameras
■■■	CCTV System	DVR was inaccessible over the network at the time of the visit due to network maintenance or repair	Need to apply any lessons learned from other residence halls.
■■■	Security Camera	Camera is positioned so that it only views a profile of the individuals standing at the security desk Video quality fair	Relocate the camera so that it is behind the desk in a position that allows for facial views of individuals standing at the security desk Replace camera with Wide Dynamic Range low light cameras
■■	Security Camera	Camera is positioned properly Video quality fair	Replace camera with Wide Dynamic Range low light cameras
■■■	Security Camera	Camera is positioned so that it only views the backs of the heads of individuals standing at the security desk Video quality fair	Relocate the camera so that it is behind the desk in a position that allows for facial views of individuals standing at the security desk Replace camera with Wide Dynamic Range low light cameras
■■■	Security Camera	Lighting is poor for proper camera function Camera is positioned so that it only views a profile of the individuals standing at the security desk Video quality fair	Upgrade lighting and/or replace camera with Wide Dynamic Range low light cameras Relocate the camera so that it is behind the desk in a position that allows for facial views of individuals standing at the security desk

Bldg.	Location	Finding	Remedial Action
▮	Entrance Camera	Positioning poor Video quality fair	Reposition to the right Replace camera with Wide Dynamic Range low light cameras
▮	Security Camera	Camera is positioned so that it only views the backs of the heads of individuals standing at the security desk Video quality fair	Relocate the camera so that it is behind the desk in a position that allows for facial views of individuals standing at the security desk Replace camera with Wide Dynamic Range low light cameras
▮	Security Camera	Camera position not optimal Lighting is poor for proper camera function Video quality fair	Upgrade lighting and/or replace camera with Wide Dynamic Range low light cameras
▮	Security Camera	Camera is positioned so that it only views a profile of the individuals standing at the security desk Video quality fair	Relocate the camera so that it is behind the desk in a position that allows for facial views of individuals standing at the security desk Replace camera with Wide Dynamic Range low light cameras
▮	Security Camera	Camera is positioned so that it views individuals at desk but is too far away for recognition Video quality fair	Relocate or re-lens the camera to provide a tighter image of the individuals standing at the security desk. Replace camera with Wide Dynamic Range low light cameras
▮	Security Cameras	Security Desk cameras and West Entrance camera do not provide any image of individuals standing at the security desk. Video quality fair	Relocate the cameras to provide a tighter image of the individuals standing at the security desk.
▮	Security Camera	Camera is positioned properly Video quality fair	Replace camera with Wide Dynamic Range low light cameras

Bldg.	Location	Finding	Remedial Action
███	Main Entrance Camera	Position not optimal Video quality fair	Reposition camera down for better field of view Replace camera with Wide Dynamic Range low light cameras
███	Security Camera	Camera is positioned too low to properly view individuals standing at security desk Video quality fair	Reposition camera up for better field of view Replace camera with Wide Dynamic Range low light cameras
███	Main Entrance Camera	Camera is positioned properly Video quality fair	Replace camera with Wide Dynamic Range low light cameras
███	Security Camera	Camera is positioned so that it only views a profile of the individuals standing at the security desk Video quality fair	Relocate the camera so that it is behind the desk in a position that allows for facial views of individuals standing at the security desk Replace camera with Wide Dynamic Range low light cameras
███	Security Camera	Camera position good Lighting is poor for proper camera function Video quality fair	Upgrade lighting and/or replace cameras with Wide Dynamic Range low light cameras
███	Main Entrance Camera	Position not optimal Video quality fair	Reposition camera down for optimal field of view Replace camera with Wide Dynamic Range low light cameras
███	Security Camera	Field of view too wide to properly capture images of individuals standing at security desk Video quality fair	Tighten field of view for optimal image. Replace camera with Wide Dynamic Range low light cameras

Bldg.	Location	Finding	Remedial Action
▮	Security Camera	Camera is positioned so that it only views a profile of the individuals standing at the security desk Video quality fair	Relocate the camera so that it is behind the desk in a position that allows for facial views of individuals standing at the security desk Replace camera with Wide Dynamic Range low light cameras
▮	CCTV System	DVR was inaccessible over the network at the time of the visit due to network maintenance or repair	Need to apply any lessons learned from other residence halls.
▮	Security Camera	Camera is positioned so that it only views the backs of the heads of individuals standing at the security desk Video quality fair	Relocate the camera so that it is behind the desk in a position that allows for facial views of individuals standing at the security desk Replace camera with Wide Dynamic Range low light cameras
▮	Main Entrance Camera	Lighting is poor for proper camera operation Video quality fair	Upgrade lighting and/or replace camera with Wide Dynamic Range low light cameras Replace camera with Wide Dynamic Range low light cameras
▮	Security Camera	Camera is positioned so that it only views a profile of the individuals standing at the security desk Video quality fair	Relocate the camera so that it is behind the desk in a position that allows for facial views of individuals standing at the security desk Replace camera with Wide Dynamic Range low light cameras
▮	Main Entrance Camera	Good camera view Video quality poor	Replace camera with Wide Dynamic Range low light cameras
▮	Security Camera	Camera is positioned so that it only views individuals who are standing at the security desk at a 45 degree angle Lighting is poor for proper camera function Video quality fair	Relocate the camera so that it is behind the desk in a position that allows for facial views of individuals standing at the security desk Upgrade lighting and/or replace camera with Wide Dynamic Range low light cameras

Bldg.	Location	Finding	Remedial Action
▮	Main Entrance Camera	Lighting is poor for proper camera operation Video quality fair	Upgrade lighting and/or replace camera with Wide Dynamic Range low light cameras
▮	Security Camera	Camera is positioned so that it only views a profile of the individuals standing at the security desk Video quality fair	Relocate the camera so that it is behind the desk in a position that allows for facial views of individuals standing at the security desk
▮	East & West Cameras	Good camera view, lighting conditions poor for proper camera function Video quality fair	Upgrade lighting and/or replace camera with Wide Dynamic Range low light cameras
▮	Security Camera	Camera is positioned so that it only views a profile of the individuals standing at the security desk Video quality fair	Relocate the camera so that it is behind the desk in a position that allows for facial views of individuals standing at the security desk
▮	East & West Cameras	Good camera view, lighting conditions poor for proper camera function Video quality fair	Upgrade lighting and/or replace camera with Wide Dynamic Range low light cameras
▮	Security Camera	Camera is positioned so that it only views a profile of the individuals standing at the security desk Video quality fair	Relocate the camera so that it is behind the desk in a position that allows for facial views of individuals standing at the security desk
▮	East & West Cameras	Good camera view, lighting conditions poor for proper camera function Video quality fair	Upgrade lighting and/or replace camera with Wide Dynamic Range low light cameras

Bldg.	Location	Finding	Remedial Action
▮	Security Camera	Camera is positioned so that it only views a profile of the individuals standing at the security desk Video quality fair	Relocate the camera so that it is behind the desk in a position that allows for facial views of individuals standing at the security desk
▮	East & West Cameras	Good camera view, lighting conditions poor for proper camera function Video quality fair	Upgrade lighting and/or replace camera with Wide Dynamic Range low light cameras
▮	Security Camera	Good camera view, lighting conditions poor for proper camera function Video quality fair	Upgrade lighting and/or replace camera with Wide Dynamic Range low light cameras
▮	East & West Entrance Cameras	Good camera view, lighting conditions poor for proper camera function Video quality fair	Upgrade lighting and/or replace camera with Wide Dynamic Range low light cameras
▮	Security Camera	Cannot see security desk Video quality fair	Relocate the camera so that it is behind the desk in a position that allows for facial views of individuals standing at the security desk Replace camera with Wide Dynamic Range low light cameras
▮	East Entrance Camera	Good camera view, lighting conditions poor for proper camera function Video quality poor	Upgrade lighting and/or replace camera with Wide Dynamic Range low light cameras
▮	West Entrance Camera	Camera needs to be positioned down, lighting conditions poor for proper camera function	Reposition camera for optimal view Upgrade lighting and/or replace camera with Wide Dynamic Range low light cameras

Bldg.	Location	Finding	Remedial Action
██████	CCTV System	DVR was inaccessible over the network at the time of the visit due to network maintenance or repair	Need to apply any lessons learned from other residence halls.
██████	Security Camera	Good camera view Video quality poor	Replace camera with Wide Dynamic Range low light cameras
██████	Security Camera	Camera is positioned so that it only views the backs of the heads of individuals standing at the security desk Lighting is poor for proper camera function Video quality fair	Relocate the camera so that it is behind the desk in a position that allows for facial views of individuals standing at the security desk Upgrade lighting and/or replace camera with Wide Dynamic Range low light cameras
██████	Security Camera	Good camera view Video quality poor	Replace camera with Wide Dynamic Range low light cameras
██████	West Entrance Camera	Position not optimal Video quality fair	Reposition camera down for optimal view Replace camera with Wide Dynamic Range low light cameras
██████	Security Camera	Camera is positioned so that it views individuals at desk but is too far away for recognition Lighting is poor for proper camera function Video quality fair	Relocate or re-lens the camera to provide a tighter image of the individuals standing at the security desk. Upgrade lighting and/or replace camera with Wide Dynamic Range low light Video quality fair
██████	Main Entrance Camera	Position not optimal Lighting is poor for proper camera function Video quality fair	Reposition camera down for optimal view Replace camera with Wide Dynamic Range low light cameras
██████	Security Camera	Camera is positioned so that it views individuals at desk but is too far away for recognition Video quality fair	Relocate or re-lens the camera to provide a tighter image of the individuals standing at the security desk. Replace camera with Wide Dynamic Range low light cameras

Bldg.	Location	Finding	Remedial Action
■■■■■	Security Camera	Camera not positioned properly to provide adequate facial images Lighting is inadequate Video quality fair	Reposition or relocate camera for optimal view Upgrade lighting and/or replace camera with Wide Dynamic Range low light cameras

11.6. Appendix 6 – Cost Estimates Security Technology

UMass Amherst Cost Estimates - Residence Hall Security Improvements

Project Focal Area	Priority	Cost	Notes
Guest Registration Improvements			
Personal Computers for RHS Monitor Desks	Critical	$ 76,250.00	
Automation of visitor management, enforcement of judical ban, trespass, sexual predator screening	Critical	$ 274,061.25	Based on HID Easy Lobby
Panic Alarms at RHS Monitor Desks	Medium	$ 23,584.85	
Residence Hall Layout			
Classroom management	High	$ 256,438.31	
Stairwells at Main Entrance	High	$ 23,738.71	
Food Service Access Control	High	$ 12,206.50	
Public Restrooms	High		
General Lobby Weaknesses	High	$ 538,530.15	
Securing Res Halls from Resident Service Desks	High	$ 141,877.56	
Access, Key Control and Alarm Monitoring			
Rectify door hardware deficiencies	Critical	$ -	Assumption is this is done with internal maintenance resources, refer to Interim report #2
Nuisance Alarm Remediation-Step 1	Critical	$ 138,029.98	Refer to interim report #3
Nuisance Alarm Remediation-Step 2	Critical	$ 8,912.50	Refer to interim report #3
Door Abuse Enforcement (integrate access and video)	Critical	$ 177,720.47	
Replacement of Video Cameras	Critical	$ 188,831.52	
ID Card Validation (Sticker weakness and over crowding mitigation)	Critical	$ 45,325.56	
Correction of weaknesses with fire exits whch are equipped as permitted egress fire doors	High	$ 6,450.00	
Administrative Costs, Design, Bidding and Construction Administration		$ 228,720.88	
		$ 1,911,957.35	
Grand Total		$ 2,140,678.24	

11.6.1.Cost Estimates for Alternative Staffing Models (RHS Personnel)

Comprative Costs
Alternative RHS Personnel Models

Existing Conditions (Students)

		Desk Hours (Sun-Wed)	Desk Hours (Thurs)	Desk Hours (Fri-Sat)
$	925,000.00			
Staffing Level Per Day		4	6	7
Staffing Level Per Week		16	6	14
Shift Supervisors	1	16	6	14
Area Supervisors	6	96	36	84
Desk Monitors	50	800	300	700
Security Dispatcher	1	16	6	14
Security Schedule Coordinators	2	24	8	8
Security Clerk Helpers	2	24	8	8
		976	364	828

Total Hours/Week	2168
Total Hours/Year	112736
Loaded Rate Per Hour	$ 8.21

24x 7 Coverage (Students)

		Desk Hours (Sun-Wed)	Desk Hours (Thurs)	Desk Hours (Fri-Sat)
$	5,447,601.48			
Staffing Level Per Day		24	24	24
Staffing Level Per Week		96	24	96
Shift Supervisors	1	96	24	96
Area Supervisors	6	576	144	576
Desk Monitors	50	4800	1200	4800
Security Dispatcher	1	96	24	96
Security Schedule Coordinators	6	72	24	24
Security Clerk Helpers	6	72	24	24
		5712	1440	5616

24x 7 Coverage (Contract Security)

		Desk Hours (Sun-Wed)	Desk Hours (Thurs)	Desk Hours (Fri-Sat)
$	9,959,040.00			
Staffing Level Per Day		24	24	24
Staffing Level Per Week		96	24	96
Shift Supervisors	1	96	24	96
Area Supervisors	6	576	144	576
Desk Monitors	50	4800	1200	4800
Security Dispatcher	1	96	24	96
Security Schedule Coordinators	6	72	24	24
Security Clerk Helpers	6	72	24	24
		5712	1440	5616

24x 7 Coverage (Proprietary Security)

		Desk Hours (Sun-Wed)	Desk Hours (Thurs)	Desk Hours (Fri-Sat)
$	13,942,656.00			
Staffing Level Per Day		24	24	24
Staffing Level Per Week		96	24	96
Shift Supervisors	1	96	24	96
Area Supervisors	6	576	144	576
Desk Monitors	50	4800	1200	4800
Security Dispatcher	1	96	24	96
Security Schedule Coordinators	6	72	24	24
Security Clerk Helpers	6	72	24	24
		5712	1440	5616

Comprative Costs
Alternative RHS Personnel Models

Existing Conditions (Students)

$	925,000.00	Desk Hours (Sun-Wed)	Desk Hours (Thurs)	Desk Hours (Fri-Sat)
Staffing Level Per Day		4	6	7
Staffing Level Per Week		16	6	14
Shift Supervisors	1	16	6	14
Area Supervisors	6	96	36	84
Desk Monitors	50	800	300	700
Security Dispatcher	1	16	6	14
Security Schedule Coordinators	2	24	8	8
Security Clerk Helpers	2	24	8	8
		976	364	828

Total Hours/Week	2168
Total Hours/Year	112736
Loaded Rate Per Hour	$ 8.21

Existing Coverage (Contract Security)

$	1,691,040.00	Desk Hours (Sun-Wed)	Desk Hours (Thurs)	Desk Hours (Fri-Sat)
Staffing Level Per Day		4	6	7
Staffing Level Per Week		16	6	14
Shift Supervisors	1	16	6	14
Area Supervisors	6	96	36	84
Desk Monitors	50	800	300	700
Security Dispatcher	1	16	6	14
Security Schedule Coordinators	2	24	8	8
Security Clerk Helpers	2	24	8	8
		976	364	828

Total Hours/Week	2168
Total Hours/Year	112736
Loaded Rate Per Hour	$ 15.00

Existing Coverage (Proprietary Security)

$	2,367,456.00	Desk Hours (Sun-Wed)	Desk Hours (Thurs)	Desk Hours (Fri-Sat)
Staffing Level Per Day		4	6	7
Staffing Level Per Week		16	6	14
Shift Supervisors	1	16	6	14
Area Supervisors	6	96	36	84
Desk Monitors	50	800	300	700
Security Dispatcher	1	16	6	14
Security Schedule Coordinators	2	24	8	8
Security Clerk Helpers	2	24	8	8
		976	364	828

Total Hours/Week	2168
Total Hours/Year	112736
Loaded Rate Per Hour	$ 21.00

Assumptions:
- Rates on page one of Attachment 9.6.1 represent delta from current hours to 24x7 coverage
- Rates on page two of Attachment 9.6.1 represent cost delta of alternative staffing sources using current staffing levels
- Schedule coordinator resources will triple
- Clerk Helper resources will triple
- Private Security (contract rate estimated $15/hour billing rate)
- Proprietary Security (estimated at $21/hour)

11.7. Appendix 7 – Security Program Design Basis

UMass Amherst Gateway Behaviors to Quality of Life Impact or Criminal Activity

EVENT (PARTIAL)		PROBABILITY				CONSEQUENCE					PREPAREDNESS			TOTAL
TO BE USED TO DETERMINE THE DESIGN BASIS OF THE RESIDENCE HALL SECURITY PROGRAM (FROM A HUMAN HAZARD PERSPECTIVE)	Threat Source	HIGH	MED	LOW	NONE	LIFE THREAT	HEALTH/ SAFETY	QUALITY OF LIFE - HIGH DISRUPTION	QUALITY OF LIFE - MOD DISRUPTION	QUALITY OF LIFE - LOW DISRUPTION	MINIMAL DEFENSE AGAINST THIS TACTIC	FAIR	GOOD	
SCORE	3	3	2	1	0	5	4	3	2	1	3	2	1	
Lobby or Perimeter Gateway Behaviors (which can lead to incidents or criminal activity) when RHS Monitor is not present														
Alcohol (possession or introduction into a residence hall in excess of or in contradiction to University policy)	Insider	3					4				3			10
Trespassing - Knowingly entering residence hall in violation of an "order of protection"	Insider/ Outsider		2			5					3			10
Unauthorized Access - Knowingly entering residence hall when on judicial ban or UMPD trespass list	Insider/ Outsider	3							3		3			9
Breaching perimeter security to admit guests in contradiction to Residence Life guest policy (by insider)	Insider	3						3			3			9
Vandalism of a security protection device (e.g. audible alarm)	Insider	3						3			3			9
Hazard, Security (insider induced - e.g. propped door)	Insider	3						3			3			9
Tailgating	Insider/ Outsider	3							2		3			8
Utilization of a door known to be prohibited for use thus generating a nuisance alarm	Insider	3								1	3			7
Use of a mechnical key to circumvent the access control system	Insider	2								1		2		5

EVENT (PARTIAL)		PROBABILITY				CONSEQUENCE					PREPAREDNESS			TOTAL
TO BE USED TO DETERMINE THE DESIGN BASIS OF THE RESIDENCE HALL SECURITY PROGRAM (FROM A HUMAN HAZARD PERSPECTIVE)	HIGH	HIGH	MED	LOW	NONE	LIFE THREAT	HEALTH/ SAFETY	QUALITY OF LIFE - HIGH DISRUPTION	QUALITY OF LIFE - MOD DISRUPTION	QUALITY OF LIFE - LOW DISRUPTION	NEEDS IMPROVEMENT	FAIR	GOOD	
SCORE	3	3	2	1	0	5	4	3	2	1	3	2	1	
RHS Monitor Desk Gateway Behaviors (which can lead to incidents or criminal activity) when Monitor is present														
Alcohol (possession or introduction into a residence hall in excess of or in contradiction to University policy)	Insider	3					4				3			10
Harassment (of RHS staff)	Insider/ Outsider	3					4				3			10
Trespassing - Knowingly entering residence hall in violation of an "order of protection"	Insider/ Outsider		2			5					3			10
Unauthorized Access - Knowingly entering residence hall when on judicial ban or UMPD trespass list	System Induced	3							3		3			9
Hazard, Security (insider induced - e.g. propped door)	Insider	3						3			3			9
Circumventing RHS Sign In Process by breaching perimeter security to admit unauthorized guests or bring in contraband	Insider	3						3			3			9

UMass Amherst Gateway Behaviors to Quality of Life Impact or Criminal Activity

Behavior	Type								Total
Circumventing RHS Sign In Process by breaching lobby security to admit unauthorized guests	Insider/ Outsider	3			3		3		9
Vandalism of a security protection device (e.g. audible alarm)	Insider	3			3		3		9
██████████████████████████	Insider/ Outsider		2		3		3		8
Exploiting "non-resident" justification (e.g. resident service desk, public restroom, eatery, classrooms) for entering building to circumvent sign in procedures	System Induced	3			2		3		8
Disruptive, destructive behavior in lobby or outside residence hall	Insider/ Outsider	3			3			2	8
Altercation in lobby or outside residence hall	Insider/ Outsider		2		2		3		7
Individual performance failure (RHS Monitor, RA), leading to unauthorized access	System Induced		2		3			2	7
Students signing in "strangers" they do not intend to host	Insider	2			3			2	7
██████████████████████	Insider/ Outsider	3			2			2	7
██████████████████████	Insider/ Outsider	3			2			2	7
██████████████████████	Insider/ Outsider	3			2			2	7
Intimidation (of RHS staff)	Insider/ Outsider	3		4					7
Alcohol or drug consumptiono in lobby or outside residence hall	Insider/ Outsider		2		2		3		7
Sexual Harassment (of RHS Staff)	Insider/ Outsider	2		4					6
Assaultive behavior toward student, monitor or cadet	Insider/ Outsider	2		4					6
Use of a mechnical key to circumvent the access control system	Insider	2				1		2	5

11.8.   Appendix 8 – Master Training Plan Model

UMass Amherst Residence Hall Security Training Master Plan

Target Group	Training Program Title	Duration	Initial Use/Frequency	Conducted By	Tracking Responsibility	Competency Assessment	Source Material
Parents	Parent Orientation			Assistant Directors of Residence Education			
Freshman	Safety and Security Poster Series						
	Security Sticker Distribution Talking Points						
	Community Meetings						
Returning Students							
	Community Meetings						
RA's							
RD's							
RHS Security Monitors							
RHS Security Supervisors							
RHS Area Managers							
RHS Assistant Manager							
RHS Manager							
Cadets							
RL Facilities Monitoring							

Other Messaging
Web Site
Posters
Community Meetings

11.9. Appendix 9 – Assessment and Field Work Photos (Not Used)

11.10. Appendix 10 – Survey Results

11.10.1. Student Monitors

Q1 The layout of the building(s) in which I work is supportive of performing my job and controlling access into the residence hall.

Answered: 105   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	N/A	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	**11.43%** 12	**40.95%** 43	**18.10%** 19	**22.86%** 24	**6.67%** 7	**0%** 0	105	2.72

If you disagree, please comment: **(** 35 **)**

Q2 I have experienced aggressive behavior from residents or visitors while working with Residence Hall Security.

Answered: 105   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	N/A	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	**7.62%** 8	**32.38%** 34	**28.57%** 30	**19.05%** 20	**11.43%** 12	**0.95%** 1	105	2.94

If you agree, please describe **(36)**

Q3 The communications systems (e.g. cell phone, radios, panic alarm) available to me in the event of an emergency are effective.

Answered: 105   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	N/A	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	26.67% 28	57.14% 60	8.57% 9	2.86% 3	0.95% 1	3.81% 4	105	1.90

Q4 If have had to summon outside assistance (e.g. supervisor, University Police) for an incident or disturbance, the response has been rapid.

Answered: 105   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	**Agree**	**Neither agree or disagree**	**Disagree**	**Strongly disagree**	**N/A**	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	**23.81%** 25	**30.48%** 32	**16.19%** 17	**1.90%** 2	**0%** 0	**27.62%** 29	105	1.95

Q5 I have received sufficient training to be able to perform my job effectively.

Answered: 105   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	N/A	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	35.24% 37	52.38% 55	9.52% 10	1.90% 2	0.95% 1	0% 0	105	1.81

Q6 I have identified security weaknesses which would allow unauthorized access to the residence hall(s) to which I am assigned.

Answered: 105   Skipped: 0

Answer Choices	Responses	
Yes	**50.48%**	53
No	**49.52%**	52
Total		105
Please describe: (50)		

Q7 The Residence Hall Security program does not work.

Answered: 105   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	N/A	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	1.90% 2	0.95% 1	14.29% 15	52.38% 55	30.48% 32	0% 0	105	4.09

Q8 The Residence Hall Security staff does not understand the need for security.

Answered: 105 Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	N/A	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	0% 0	4.76% 5	1.90% 2	54.29% 57	39.05% 41	0% 0	105	4.28

Q9 The Residence Hall Security force is a deterrent to crime.

Answered: 105   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	N/A	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	10.48% 11	50.48% 53	25.71% 27	4.76% 5	3.81% 4	4.76% 5	105	2.38

Q10 There is a need to control who enters the residence halls.

Answered: 105   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	N/A	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	47.62% 50	39.05% 41	6.67% 7	2.86% 3	3.81% 4	0% 0	105	1.76

Q11 When present, Residence Hall Security supervisors make a difference.

Answered: 105 Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	N/A	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	35.24% 37	51.43% 54	11.43% 12	0% 0	0.95% 1	0.95% 1	105	1.79

Q12 Security levels should vary based on the day of the week.

Answered: 105   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	N/A	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	**37.14%** 39	**50.48%** 53	**7.62%** 8	**4.76%** 5	**0%** 0	**0%** 0	105	1.80

Q13 Residence halls are student sanctuaries.

Answered: 105   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	N/A	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	**19.05%** 20	**45.71%** 48	**26.67%** 28	**6.67%** 7	**0%** 0	**1.90%** 2	105	2.21

Q14 The Residence Hall Security program is effective.

Answered: 105   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	N/A	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	20% 21	62.86% 66	15.24% 16	1.90% 2	0% 0	0% 0	105	1.99

Q15 Students take Residence Hall Security jobs so they can study.

Answered: 105   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	0.95% 1	27.62% 29	41.90% 44	24.76% 26	4.76% 5	105	3.05

Q16 Security monitors consistently check student IDs.

Answered: 105   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	N/A	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	38.10% 40	53.33% 56	4.76% 5	2.86% 3	0% 0	0.95% 1	105	1.72

Q17 Problems with residence hall security are due to lack of support by Residential Life.

Answered: 105   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	N/A	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	3.81% 4	19.05% 20	41.90% 44	28.57% 30	5.71% 6	0.95% 1	105	3.13

Q18 Residential Life staff is not willing to work with Residence Hall Security staff.

Answered: 105   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	**2.86%** 3	**6.67%** 7	**38.10%** 40	**38.10%** 40	**14.29%** 15	105	3.54

Q19 The level of violence among students is increasing.

Answered: 105   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	1.90% 2	1.90% 2	37.14% 39	46.67% 49	12.38% 13	105	3.66

Q20 Residential Life staff is unwilling to provide the resources necessary for security.

Answered: 105   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	N/A	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	**1.90%** 2	**6.67%** 7	**39.05%** 41	**39.05%** 41	**9.52%** 10	**3.81%** 4	105	3.50

Q21 Security is a high priority for Residential Life staff.

Answered: 105   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	N/A	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	**9.52%** 10	**40%** 42	**32.38%** 34	**14.29%** 15	**0.95%** 1	**2.86%** 3	105	2.56

Q22 Security is a high priority for UMPD.

Answered: 105   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	N/A	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	32.38% 34	57.14% 60	6.67% 7	2.86% 3	0.95% 1	0% 0	105	1.83

Q23 Communication is a problem.

Answered: 105   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	N/A	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	**4.76%** 5	**12.38%** 13	**25.71%** 27	**44.76%** 47	**12.38%** 13	**0%** 0	105	3.48

Q24 Absenteeism is a problem.

Answered: 105   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	N/A	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	**4.76%** 5	**23.81%** 25	**27.62%** 29	**31.43%** 33	**6.67%** 7	**5.71%** 6	105	3.12

11.10.2.Cadets

Q1 The layout of the building(s) in which I work is supportive of performing my job and controlling access into the residence hall.

Answered: 8   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	N/A	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	25% 2	37.50% 3	0% 0	12.50% 1	25% 2	0% 0	8	2.75

If you disagree, please comment: **(4)**

Q2 I have experienced aggressive behavior from residents or visitors while working with Residence Hall Security.

Answered: 8   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	N/A	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	**37.50%** 3	**37.50%** 3	**25%** 2	**0%** 0	**0%** 0	**0%** 0	8	1.88

If you agree, please describe **(4)**

Q3 The communications systems (e.g. cell phone, radios, panic alarm) available to me in the event of an emergency are effective.

Answered: 8 Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	N/A	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	62.50% 5	25% 2	12.50% 1	0% 0	0% 0	0% 0	8	1.50

Q4 If have had to summon outside assistance (e.g. supervisor, University Police) for an incident or disturbance, the response has been rapid.

Answered: 8   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	N/A	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	**50%** 4	**50%** 4	**0%** 0	**0%** 0	**0%** 0	**0%** 0	8	1.50

Q5 I have received sufficient training to be able to perform my job effectively.

Answered: 8   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	N/A	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	12.50% 1	62.50% 5	12.50% 1	0% 0	12.50% 1	0% 0	8	2.38

Q6 I have identified security weaknesses which would allow unauthorized access to the residence hall(s) to which I am assigned.

Answered: 8   Skipped: 0

Answer Choices	Responses	
Yes	**87.50%**	7
No	**12.50%**	1
Total		8
Please describe: (7)		

Q7 The Residence Hall Security program does not work.

Answered: 8   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	N/A	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	0% 0	0% 0	25% 2	50% 4	25% 2	0% 0	8	4.00

Q8 The Residence Hall Security staff does not understand the need for security.

Answered: 8   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	N/A	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	0% 0	0% 0	12.50% 1	50% 4	37.50% 3	0% 0	8	4.25

Q9 The Residence Hall Security force is a deterrent to crime.

Answered: 8   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	N/A	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	0% 0	75% 6	12.50% 1	12.50% 1	0% 0	0% 0	8	2.38

Q10 There is a need to control who enters the residence halls.

Answered: 8   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	N/A	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	75% 6	0% 0	12.50% 1	0% 0	12.50% 1	0% 0	8	1.75

Q11 When present, Residence Hall Security supervisors make a difference.

Answered: 8   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	**Agree**	**Neither agree or disagree**	**Disagree**	**Strongly disagree**	**N/A**	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	0% 0	75% 6	0% 0	25% 2	0% 0	0% 0	8	2.50

Q12 Security levels should vary based on the day of the week.

Answered: 8   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	N/A	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	25% 2	62.50% 5	0% 0	0% 0	12.50% 1	0% 0	8	2.13

Q13 Residence halls are student sanctuaries.

Answered: 8   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	N/A	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	12.50% 1	50% 4	25% 2	12.50% 1	0% 0	0% 0	8	2.38

Q14 The Residence Hall Security program is effective.

Answered: 8 Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	N/A	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	25% 2	62.50% 5	0% 0	12.50% 1	0% 0	0% 0	8	2.00

Q15 Students take Residence Hall Security jobs so they can study.

Answered: 8   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	0% 0	0% 0	75% 6	25% 2	0% 0	8	3.25

Q16 Security monitors consistently check student IDs.

Answered: 8   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	N/A	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	25% 2	25% 2	37.50% 3	12.50% 1	0% 0	0% 0	8	2.38

Q17 Problems with residence hall security are due to lack of support by Residential Life.

Answered: 8   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	N/A	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	25% 2	25% 2	25% 2	0% 0	25% 2	0% 0	8	2.75

Q18 Residential Life staff is not willing to work with Residence Hall Security staff.

Answered: 8   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	**Agree**	**Neither agree or disagree**	**Disagree**	**Strongly disagree**	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	**25%** 2	**50%** 4	**25%** 2	**0%** 0	**0%** 0	8	2.00

Q19 The level of violence among students is increasing.

Answered: 8   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	0% 0	0% 0	25% 2	50% 4	25% 2	8	4.00

Q20 Residential Life staff is unwilling to provide the resources necessary for security.

Answered: 8   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	**Agree**	**Neither agree or disagree**	**Disagree**	**Strongly disagree**	**N/A**	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	**25%** 2	**0%** 0	**50%** 4	**12.50%** 1	**12.50%** 1	**0%** 0	8	2.88

Q21 Security is a high priority for Residential Life staff.

Answered: 8   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	N/A	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	0% 0	50% 4	0% 0	25% 2	25% 2	0% 0	8	3.25

Q22 Security is a high priority for UMPD.

Answered: 8   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	N/A	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	**37.50%** 3	**37.50%** 3	**25%** 2	**0%** 0	**0%** 0	**0%** 0	8	1.88

Q23 Communication is a problem.

Answered: 8   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	N/A	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	0% 0	37.50% 3	12.50% 1	50% 4	0% 0	0% 0	8	3.13

Q24 Absenteeism is a problem.

Answered: 8   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	N/A	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	0% 0	0% 0	62.50% 5	37.50% 3	0% 0	0% 0	8	3.38

11.10.3.Residence Hall Security Supervisor

Q1 The layout of the building(s) for which I have supervisory responsibility is effective in controlling access into the residence hall.

Answered: 14   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	N/A	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	21.43% 3	28.57% 4	7.14% 1	35.71% 5	7.14% 1	0% 0	14	2.79

If you disagree, please comment: **(7)**

Q2 I have experienced aggressive behavior from residents or visitors while working with Residence Hall Security.

Answered: 14   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	N/A	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	**28.57%** 4	**35.71%** 5	**7.14%** 1	**14.29%** 2	**7.14%** 1	**7.14%** 1	14	2.31

If you agree, please describe **(7)**

Q3 The communications systems (e.g. cell phone, radios, panic alarm) available to me in the event of an emergency are effective.

Answered: 14 Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	N/A	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	57.14% 8	35.71% 5	7.14% 1	0% 0	0% 0	0% 0	14	1.50

Q4 If have had to summon outside assistance (e.g. University Police) for an incident or disturbance, the response has been rapid.

Answered: 14 Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	N/A	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	28.57% 4	42.86% 6	0% 0	0% 0	0% 0	28.57% 4	14	1.60

Q5 I have received sufficient training to be able to perform my job effectively.

Answered: 14   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	N/A	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	**35.71%** 5	**57.14%** 8	**7.14%** 1	**0%** 0	**0%** 0	**0%** 0	14	1.71

Q6 I have identified security weaknesses which would allow unauthorized access to the residence hall(s) to which I am assigned.

Answered: 14   Skipped: 0

Answer Choices	Responses	
Yes	**64.29%**	9
No	**35.71%**	5
Total		14
Please describe: (10)		

Q7 The Residence Hall Security program does not work.

Answered: 14   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	N/A	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	0% 0	0% 0	14.29% 2	14.29% 2	71.43% 10	0% 0	14	4.57

Q8 The Residence Hall Security staff does not understand the need for security.

Answered: 14   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	N/A	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	0% 0	0% 0	7.14% 1	7.14% 1	85.71% 12	0% 0	14	4.79

Q9 The Residence Hall Security force is a deterrent to crime.

Answered: 14   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	N/A	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	21.43% 3	50% 7	28.57% 4	0% 0	0% 0	0% 0	14	2.07

Q10 There is a need to control who enters the residence halls.

Answered: 14   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	N/A	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	71.43% 10	28.57% 4	0% 0	0% 0	0% 0	0% 0	14	1.29

Q11 When present, Residence Hall Security supervisors make a difference.

Answered: 14   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	N/A	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	**50%** 7	**50%** 7	**0%** 0	**0%** 0	**0%** 0	**0%** 0	14	1.50

Q12 Security levels should vary based on the day of the week.

Answered: 14   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	N/A	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	**28.57%** 4	**50%** 7	**0%** 0	**7.14%** 1	**14.29%** 2	**0%** 0	14	2.29

Q13 Residence halls are student sanctuaries.

Answered: 14   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	N/A	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	**14.29%** 2	**50%** 7	**28.57%** 4	**7.14%** 1	**0%** 0	**0%** 0	14	2.29

Q14 The Residence Hall Security program is effective.

Answered: 14   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	N/A	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	14.29% 2	85.71% 12	0% 0	0% 0	0% 0	0% 0	14	1.86

Q15 Students take Residence Hall Security jobs so they can study.

Answered: 14   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	0% 0	35.71% 5	35.71% 5	28.57% 4	0% 0	14	2.93

Q16 Security monitors consistently check student IDs.

Answered: 14   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	N/A	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	42.86% 6	35.71% 5	14.29% 2	7.14% 1	0% 0	0% 0	14	1.86

Q17 Problems with residence hall security are due to lack of support by Residential Life.

Answered: 14   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	N/A	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	42.86% 6	28.57% 4	14.29% 2	14.29% 2	0% 0	0% 0	14	2.00

Q18 Residential Life staff is not willing to work with Residence Hall Security staff.

Answered: 14   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	**Agree**	**Neither agree or disagree**	**Disagree**	**Strongly disagree**	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	**14.29%** 2	**28.57%** 4	**35.71%** 5	**21.43%** 3	**0%** 0	14	2.64

Q19 The level of violence among students is increasing.

Answered: 14   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	0% 0	14.29% 2	64.29% 9	14.29% 2	7.14% 1	14	3.14

Q20 Residential Life staff is unwilling to provide the resources necessary for security.

Answered: 14   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	N/A	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	14.29% 2	28.57% 4	28.57% 4	21.43% 3	0% 0	7.14% 1	14	2.62

Q21 Security is a high priority for Residential Life staff.

Answered: 14   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	N/A	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	0% 0	21.43% 3	7.14% 1	50% 7	21.43% 3	0% 0	14	3.71

Q22 Security is a high priority for UMPD.

Answered: 14   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	N/A	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	42.86% 6	28.57% 4	21.43% 3	7.14% 1	0% 0	0% 0	14	1.93

Q23 Communication is a problem.

Answered: 14   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	N/A	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	**7.14%** 1	**21.43%** 3	**21.43%** 3	**28.57%** 4	**21.43%** 3	**0%** 0	14	3.36

Q24 Absenteeism is a problem.

Answered: 14   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	N/A	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	0% 0	14.29% 2	35.71% 5	35.71% 5	7.14% 1	7.14% 1	14	3.38

11.10.4.Students

Q1 Security is excellent in my residence hall.

Answered: 252   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	N/A	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	**15.48%** 39	**52.78%** 133	**23.02%** 58	**6.35%** 16	**2.38%** 6	**0%** 0	252	2.27

Comments: **(** 32 **)**

Q2 The Residence Hall Security progam for the residence halls is effective.

Answered: 252   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	N/A	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	**13.89%** 35	**54.37%** 137	**20.63%** 52	**7.94%** 20	**3.17%** 8	**0%** 0	252	2.32

Please state why you so answered: **(** 46 **)**

Q3 Security at the residence halls is consistent throughout the week.

Answered: 252   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	N/A	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	**25%** 63	**53.97%** 136	**12.30%** 31	**6.75%** 17	**1.59%** 4	**0.40%** 1	252	2.06

Comments: **(** 15 **)**

Q4 I have received security awareness training this year.

Answered: 252   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	N/A	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	**6.35%** 16	**11.51%** 29	**26.19%** 66	**29.76%** 75	**16.67%** 42	**9.52%** 24	252	3.43

Comments: **(20)**

Q5 I have identified security weaknesses which would allow unauthorized access to the residence hall(s) to which I am assigned.

Answered: 252   Skipped: 0

Answer Choices	Responses	
Yes	**39.68%**	100
No	**60.32%**	152
Total		252
Please describe: (68)		

Q6 The Residence Hall Security program does not work.

Answered: 252   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	N/A	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	**2.78%** 7	**3.97%** 10	**24.60%** 62	**52.78%** 133	**15.48%** 39	**0.40%** 1	252	3.75

Comments: **(** 17 **)**

Q7 The Residence Hall Security staff does not understand the need for security.

Answered: 252   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	**Agree**	**Neither agree or disagree**	**Disagree**	**Strongly disagree**	**N/A**	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	**1.19%** 3	**3.57%** 9	**19.44%** 49	**44.84%** 113	**29.37%** 74	**1.59%** 4	252	3.99

Comments: **(0)**

Q8 The Residence Hall Security force is a deterrent to crime.

Answered: 252   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	N/A	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	**7.54%** 19	**36.90%** 93	**32.94%** 83	**13.89%** 35	**5.16%** 13	**3.57%** 9	252	2.71

Comments: **(22)**

Q9 There is a need to control who enters the residence halls.

Answered: 252   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	N/A	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	**26.59%** 67	**43.65%** 110	**15.87%** 40	**9.13%** 23	**4.76%** 12	**0%** 0	252	2.22

Comments: **(** 10 **)**

Q10 When present, Residence Hall Security supervisors make a difference.

Answered: 252   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	N/A	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	**12.70%** 32	**45.63%** 115	**30.16%** 76	**7.54%** 19	**1.59%** 4	**2.38%** 6	252	2.38

Comments: **(14)**

Q11 Security levels should vary based on the day of the week.

Answered: 252   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	N/A	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	13.49% 34	46.83% 118	20.63% 52	15.08% 38	3.97% 10	0% 0	252	2.49

Comments: **(22)**

Q12 Residence halls are student sanctuaries.

Answered: 252   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	N/A	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	**17.86%** 45	**49.21%** 124	**23.41%** 59	**6.35%** 16	**1.98%** 5	**1.19%** 3	252	2.24

Comments: **(** 13 **)**

Q13 The Residence Hall Security program is effective.

Answered: 252   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	N/A	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	**7.14%** 18	**59.92%** 151	**23.41%** 59	**7.54%** 19	**1.98%** 5	**0%** 0	252	2.37

Comments: **(7)**

Q14 Students take Residence Hall Security jobs so they can study.

Answered: 252   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	**5.56%** 14	**25.79%** 65	**44.84%** 113	**21.83%** 55	**1.98%** 5	252	2.89

Comments: **(24)**

Q15 Security monitors consistently check student IDs.

Answered: 252   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	N/A	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	35.71% 90	51.98% 131	6.75% 17	5.16% 13	0.40% 1	0% 0	252	1.83

Comments: **(** 17 **)**

Q16 Problems with residence hall security are due to lack of support by Residential Life.

Answered: 252   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	N/A	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	**1.59%** 4	**7.94%** 20	**49.21%** 124	**31.35%** 79	**4.76%** 12	**5.16%** 13	252	3.31

Comments: **(17)**

Q17 Residential Life staff is not willing to work with Residence Hall Security staff.

Answered: 252   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	**0.40%** 1	**1.59%** 4	**61.11%** 154	**30.95%** 78	**5.95%** 15	252	3.40

Comments: **(** 13 **)**

Q18 The level of violence among students is increasing.

Answered: 252   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	**1.19%** 3	**7.94%** 20	**42.46%** 107	**40.48%** 102	**7.94%** 20	252	3.46

Comments: **(15)**

Q19 Residential Life staff is unwilling to provide the resources necessary for security.

Answered: 252   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	N/A	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	**0.79%** 2	**4.76%** 12	**38.10%** 96	**34.52%** 87	**11.90%** 30	**9.92%** 25	252	3.58

Comments: **(9)**

Q20 Security is a high priority for Residential Life staff.

Answered: 252   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	N/A	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	**13.49%** 34	**45.24%** 114	**30.56%** 77	**4.76%** 12	**1.19%** 3	**4.76%** 12	252	2.32

Comments: **(** 11 **)**

Q21 Security is a high priority for UMPD.

Answered: 252   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	N/A	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	30.16% 76	48.02% 121	13.10% 33	4.37% 11	1.19% 3	3.17% 8	252	1.95

Comments: **(** 15 **)**

Q22 Communication is a problem.

Answered: 252   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	**Agree**	**Neither agree or disagree**	**Disagree**	**Strongly disagree**	**N/A**	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	**5.16%** 13	**12.70%** 32	**44.05%** 111	**27.78%** 70	**5.56%** 14	**4.76%** 12	252	3.17

Comments: **(** 13 **)**

Q23 Absenteeism is a problem.

Answered: 252   Skipped: 0

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	N/A	Total	Average Rating
(no label)	**1.59%** 4	**9.13%** 23	**40.87%** 103	**30.16%** 76	**8.73%** 22	**9.52%** 24	252	3.39

Q25 Are there alternative ways in which you feel relevant safety and security information could be communicated to improve student safety?

Answered: 252   Skipped: 0

Answer Choices	Responses	
Yes	**17.86%**	45
No	**82.14%**	207
Total		252
If so, please describe: (44)		

11.11. Appendix 11 – Benchmarking Data on Residence Hall Security

Peers/Metrics	UMass Amherst	Other Large Public Institution	Other Large Public Institution	Other Large Public Institution
# of Res Halls	45	82	27	55
Make up of Campus Security Force	230 student staff, several that serve in multiple roles.	No student security	200 (student security – Zero student security in res halls	170 student officers, sometimes on a needed basis contracted security
Headcount for Res Hall Security Staffing	230	0	Last year one receptionist for each building, has been cut back	About 30 student officers are deployed in the residence halls over the course of a week. On a shift we have about 3-6 on at a given time.
Training	1 hour training, optional recurring training each semester	N/A	REHS has training that stresses safety and security. The Police do programming when requested and assist as needed.	A general orientation class and then specific roving training which is one shift on duty with a trainer.
Hours for Residence Hall Security Staffing	Sunday – Wednesday, from 8:00 PM to 12:00 midnight Thursday from 8:00 PM to 2:00 AM Friday & Saturday from 8:00 PM to 3:00 AM	N/A	None	Rovers on are on duty from 1500-0700 on Sat and Sun, and from 1700-0700 hours on weekdays
Security Manager dedicated to residence hall security	Yes	No	No	No
Community Policing	Yes	Yes	Yes	Did not report

Peers/Metrics	UMass Amherst	Other Large Public Institution	Other Large Public Institution	Other Large Public Institution
Direct Personnel Cost for RHS Security personnel	$800,000	N/A	$0 – Security $ - Night receptionists	$325,000 for all security, not residence hall security
Security measures for Residence Halls	Access control, video, detection, audible alarms, delayed egress devices, student monitors, supervisors, management, mechanical locking, education and training, emergency response procedures	RHS staff, electronic access control, RA rounds, police foot patrols, education, training, evacuation drills	RHS staff, electronic access control, video, RA rounds, police foot patrols, education, training, messaging, evacuation drills, night receptionists in some residence halls	There is a card access system on at least one door per hall and most have more than one depending on the size. We are moving to having some cameras on some of the hall entry doors. There is computer software system that monitors who is going into the building and we can access that information as needed. We typically have about 3-6 employees(student uniformed employees with a radio) on duty during roving hours who patrol in the residence hall areas, reporting any criminal activity, reporting any safety or security issues, and check for faulty doors/lights. We do not employ any type of building monitors to monitor students entering buildings. Keys are used only to enter individual rooms.

Peers/Metrics	UMass Amherst	Other Large Public Institution	Other Large Public Institution	Other Large Public Institution
Police role in residence hall security	No fixed posts, liaison officers assigned. Patrol / Investigative response when called. Community Outreach programming to include several different crime prevention programs. New student and parent orientation	No fixed posts. Liaison officers assigned. Responds when called	Office in residence halls Officers assigned to three "neighborhood areas" Close liaison with residence hall staff Crime prevention training for students Parent orientation	Police are generally assigned to patrol and are encouraged to patrol in the residence hall areas. We have numerous bike officers who ride through the residence hall areas routinely. We typically don't do any stationary monitoring short of special situations/incidents.
Residence Hall Access Procedures	Locked 24/7 RHS Monitors Guests are signed in	Access control system only	Not locked 24/7 Some night receptionists Other buildings by access control only Guests are signed in	We do not have building monitors but only those with access are permitted to enter. If a security officer sees someone "piggyback" they are to tell the "piggybacker" to leave the building.
Guest limits per room	Limit of 4 per room, 10 per suite	Two before 12:00 a.m. Two overnight guests after 12:00 a.m. 15 in suites	Unsure	None applied

Peers/Metrics	UMass Amherst	Other Large Public Institution	Other Large Public Institution	Other Large Public Institution
Role of RA's/RD in residence hall security	Patrols, enforcement of housing rules and regs	Patrols, enforcement of housing rules and regs	Not specifically stated	RAs do general rounds and report activity as necessary. There is not much connection between the "rovers" and the RAs. RAs will report police activity directly t the police dispatcher.
Security Staff Communications with Supervision	Radio, phone	N/A	Not specifically stated	Radio
Cameras in Residence Halls	389	0	600	A project is currently under way at our campus to install cameras in all of our residence halls. Each hall will have cameras on the inside and outside of any card reader door and one camera, either inside or outside all exit-only doors. There will also be at least one camera inside each entrance lobby and in all elevators.
Monitored	No, recorded	N/A	No, recorded	All of the cameras will be capable of being remotely monitored but there are no plans to constantly monitor them. Some cameras will be monitored on an "as needed" basis by our student security unit.

Peers/Metrics	UMass Amherst	Other Large Public Institution	Other Large Public Institution	Other Large Public Institution
Response capability for propped doors	Yes	Unknown, reported that housing monitors system	Police, only if called	An audible alarm sounds and the door software shows a "held" alarm. At night a rover is dispatched to the door and checks to make sure it is working properly and no longer held. If the alarm sounds during the day, a housing person checks the door.
Response capability for forced doors	Yes	Unknown, reported that housing monitors system	Res Hall staff	If the door is forced, same as above. Rover at night and housing by day. If the door is broken, someone is called in to repair it.
Alcohol policy	Individuals that are 21 can have alcohol in their room. No common source container	Individuals that are 21 can have alcohol in their room. No common source container	Individuals that are 21 can have alcohol in their room. No common source container	Alcohol is not permitted in our freshman halls.

11.12. Appendix 12 – Copies of UMass Feedback on Draft Report

Hi Frank:

I hope that you and the BPS Team are doing well.

I am writing to check and see how the final draft of the report is progressing. In addition, I have the following specific requests/questions regarding the Findings and Recommendations that were provided:

1.) Rec. 2: Please expand on your findings and recommendations regarding banning alcohol in all residence halls that house freshmen students, which I believe should also include all students under the age of 21.
2.) Rec. 24: Please provide a more detailed explanation of what you would determine a "residence hall lockdown" to be and what it would look like.
3.) Rec. 31: Please provide and explanation as to what is meant by "Enhance Resident Life Community Standards by incorporating specific security prohibitions" and what this enhancement should look like.
4.) Rec. 35: Please provide more detail (interview feedback possibly) with regard to the request and/or need for a vehicle to respond around campus. Did you get the sense that RHS rapid deployment was something that occurred frequently or was needed? UMPD does not want to set an expectation of 'emergency response' by RHS staff.
5.) You did not address the numbers of guests (4 guests per resident) in the draft report. Is this something you will address in the final report? I would like to know if BPS supports the number of 4 guests per resident or has an opinion otherwise based upon research and comparison

Thank you in advance and have a nice weekend.

John K. Horvath
Chief of Police/Director of Public Safety
University of Massachusetts Amherst
Police Department
585 East Pleasant Street
Amherst, MA 01003-9600

Jhorvath@admin.umass.edu
413.545.2125

Hi Frank,

I have the following requests for the upcoming report:

1.) Please include an executive summary that speaks to the strengths of the current RHS Refer to Sect. 1.1
program and leads into the challenges that you identified. This is summary will be valuable
as we move forward with sharing the information and maintaining transparency.

2.) Please provide a cost estimate in line with Rec. 4 that includes the following: Refer to Appendix 6
   a) Cost estimate for 24/7 private security for all residence halls
   b) Cost estimate for 24/7 student security for all residence halls

3.) Please provide further explanation of Rec. 21 Refer to Rec 5a and detailed tech costs

4.) The inclusion of information for comparable university campuses from across the country
and how they staff their RHS. Refer to Appendix 11

If you have any questions please let me know.

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UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST POLICE DEPARTMENT

Memorandum

To: Frank Pisciotta
            Business Protection Specialists

From: Chief John Horvath

Date: July 19, 2013

Subject: RHS Review – First Draft Report Information

Please find the following information pertaining to the first draft of the Residence Hall Security Review you provided. This information is a compilation of feedback provided by members of the Residence Hall Security Working Group. If you have any questions please let me know.

a. Page 5. 1.1.3. Factors Impacting Existing Conditions, bullet 2. "RAs are on call, and no longer working desk duty this delays response to incidents". For 2012-2013 academic year, role of RA on duty changed from staffing the Cluster Office (with implementation of Residential Service Desks), to being visible and available within the residential community. There is no data to indicate whether this delayed or sped response to incidents. RAs are more available to respond since they are no longer staffing an office that provides services to students. RAs are available by phone at all times on duty and are able to respond upon receipt of the call. In the past, they had to close up and lock an office prior to responding. In some locations (where former cluster office was next to the security desk) response is probably delayed in the eyes of the residence hall security monitor.

b. Page 5. 1.1.3 Factors Impacting Existing Conditions, bullet 6. There is disagreement that this is the current practice.

c. Page 6 1.1.3, bullet 2 (changes in process), 2.1 bullet 3, 2.1 bullet 11, and 2.1 bullet 12 all address a similar issue with incident reporting. We don't have any evidence that the number of incidents reported has changed over time. There have never been a significant number of reports from security monitors related to policy violations of any kind. We do think that we need to agree on what monitors are expected to report and then the process by which they report these incidents. In bullet 11, this statement is inaccurate. All student conduct issues are reported in Symplicity. This is the software used by DOS and Residential Life for all conduct matters.

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d. Page 6 2.1 Incident Reporting - We don't believe the statement that students are "unable to easily fulfill the most basic requirements of their roles of the compliance regulations outlined in Clery" is accurate. Students have phones and radios that allow them to communicate incidents/crimes immediately to their supervisors and police. Yes, they may have to complete written reports at a (much) later time which can be improved upon. The fact remains we have contact with them at the scene and that if we need a written statement for an incident we can, and will, request that on the scene or later through Jim or John. I agree any reports delayed beyond a reasonable period is a problem but the wording used sounds like we get all reports days later and are in violation of Clery. This is not an accurate reflection of all incidents.

e. Page 8 2.2, bullet 5. This bullet overstates a human error issue. It is the expectation that all alcohol violations are documented by residence hall staff when they are witnessed. The number of violations and referrals to BASICS would indicate that most are addressed and documented. The only component of the alcohol policies that would fall into the "alcohol PLUS" model is intoxication as the other behavior is what leads a staff member to determine that a student is likely intoxicated.

f. Page 9: Rec. 9. Please expand on your findings and recommendations regarding banning alcohol in all residence halls that house freshmen students, which we believe should also include all students under the age of 21.

g. Page 9, 2.3 bullet 4. Resident Assistants and Peer Mentors have access to all buildings within their residential cluster (the halls for which they are responsible), not all buildings within their residential area

h. Page 9, 2.3 The first four bullets are not changes in practice. Bullet 1: All staff who serve in an on-call capacity have 24/7 access to all residence halls in order to fulfill their responsibilities. This includes Residence Directors and Residence Education leadership staff. Grads have always had access to all halls, this is not a change. Bullet 2: Permanent guests of live-in staff also have had access to the hall in which they live. They are residents, so is not in contradiction to "residents only". Bullet 3: also not a change from a few years ago. Bullet 4: RAs access to their communities has not changed.

i. Page 10, first bullet. Student Government does not have access to any residence halls. Area Government has had access, but we are no longer providing access for Area Governments to all halls in their areas. They will only have access to the hall in which their office is located.

j. Page 10 first bullet under next section "Staff has multiple lists…" List is not accurate: NRHH – no, Area Government – yes (but now eliminated, except for office location), Student Government – no, RAs from other clusters – no, tutors – no (I have no idea to what this refers), and 800+ students for math section was for Fall 2012 only and will not be returning. The last was a political issue that we had to make happen for one semester, but I don't think required mention in this report.

k. Page 11: Section 2.4 "According to some persons interviewed, turnover increases with the use of students. In some cases, seniors are being hired out of necessity to achieve coverage"
- Not sure what the context here is.
- RHS hiring is "age blind" and does not ask students what class year they are. If they can perform the job, they're considered for hiring.

l. Page 12: Section 2.5 2.5 Cadet Observations - We do not believe the Cadet program has a significant role clarification crisis. They perform the function to which they are hired and paid. Res Life, in fact, greatly appreciates what they do. What the Cadet program has is eager young men and women who want to do more…of course they do. But that doesn't make it right or legal. It's not true that Cadets are trained as police officers. We need to be mindful that some of these students are very slight and inexperienced, and no matter what kind of training we give them they will be at a significant disadvantage if our expectations and provided training is to engage a situation physically. The Cadet Program will be enhanced in the future, but written as a role crisis is inaccurate.

m. Page 17 regarding door alarms that are never working properly.
- These locations do not have door alarms to our knowledge.

n. Page 24: ███████████████████████████████████ ████████████████████████████████████ Alarm Arming should be automated through the access control system."
- This statement is inaccurate. Local alarms were recored with the installation of the new access control system, starting in 2010. RHS Supervisors visit each door to ensure that it's actually closed and latched at the commencement of shift, but there is no need for them to be arming door alarms unless they see that the visual indicators are off or the wrong color. This practice will continue.

o. Page 27: Rec. 49 ██████████████████████████████████ ████████
- Can this reference be clarified? The only exception to camera control is for the interior cameras in the ████████. Control was taken away from all except in Dispatch after an unknown operator improperly used the cameras.

p. Page 34, no mention of security…
- The Community Standards page on the RL website addresses guests and that residents and guests are expected to present photo identification to security staff, escort guests, etc. http://www.housing.umass.edu/living/standards.html We would agree that it is not currently comprehensive, but it is not accurate to say that there is no mention of security.

q. Page 37: Rec. 74 OTHER BEST PRACTICE OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.
- The statement that individually supervised tamper switches is a "waste of money" is simply an opinion. The decision to know which of as many as 10 cabinets in a building has been tampered with is preferred by the owner over simply knowing that one of them was tampered with.

r. Page 37: Rec 75. There is currently no vehicle to enable efficient deployment or movement of supervisory or cadet resources around a large campus.
- This is incorrect. We own a 12 passenger van and although our staff aren't emergency responders, if the need arose, that van is available to all evening staff.

s. Please address the following as previously communicated:
- You did not address the numbers of guests (4 guests per resident) in the draft report. Is this something you will address in the final report? We would like to know if BPS supports the number of 4 guests per resident or has an opinion otherwise based upon research and comparison.
- Please provide a cost estimate that includes the following:
  o 24/7 private security for all residence halls
  o 24/7 student security for all residence halls.

Thank you for your work to date and attention to this information.