

Redefining Automation

Siemens Safety Integrated

Navigating Standards for Safety-Related Parts of Control Systems

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AGENDA



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- Why Safety?
- Machine Safety Standards
- Comparison of ISO 13849-1 and IEC 62061
- Safety-related parts of Control Systems

Tool to calculate safety levels

Machine Safety Life Cycle Support


Machine Safety History of Safety - USA/Europe

	History of Machine Safety in the USA
1877	Massachusetts, required guarding belts, shafts and gears
1890	Nine US states required machine guarding
1930	All US states had established job-related safety laws
1934	Bureau of Labor Standards (F.D. Roosevelt – Frances Perkins), Promote safety and health for working men and women
1971	Occupational Safety and Health Administration was established
1981	Lost Workday Incident Rates policy established by OSHA
1919	EN292 – Basic Concepts of Machine Safety
1996	EN 954 and EN 1050 – Machinery Safety

	History of Machine Safety in Europe
1989	1st pub. of the "Machinery Directive" as Directive 89/392/EC
1996	EN 954-1 with "Categories" is published
1998	2nd pub. of the "Machinery Directive" as Directive 98/37/EC
1999	IEC 61508 & SIL help to evaluate, "complex" state of the art
1997- 2000	STSARCES project of EC: EN 954-1 with SIL quantifiable? YES.
2005	Pub. of IEC 62061 (SIL, application standard of IEC 61508)
2006	Pub. of ISO 13849-1 (PL, successor standard of EN 954-1)
2009	Commencement of the 3rd "Machinery Directive" 2006/42/EC
2012	New Work Item Proposal" to merge ISO 13849 & IEC 62061
2017	Planned completion of the merging into ISO/IEC 17305

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 Source Control Design – Machine Safety, Dec 2014 - Market Intelligence Report


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Safety Life Cycle – Step 1 (Safety Education) International Safety Standards

ISO – International Standards (ISO 13849, ISO 12100) USA: Asia: UL, ANSI, NFPA JIS Europe: (JIS B 9705-1, JIS C 0508, JIS B 9961, etc.) (OSHA, ANSI B11, UL 1998, etc) IEC (IEC 61508, IEC 62061, IEC 61511) U.S. Department of Labor www.dol.gov/elaws LAW: Fed/State OSHA www.osha.gov EN (EN/ISO 13849) CONSENSUS: ANSI www.ansi.org **NFPA** www.nfpa.org Trade Requirement : CE RIA www.robotics.org

The regulations and standards applicable at the installation location of the system or machine are decisive. All countries follow the same basic principles for application. The European standards and regulations are recognized worldwide.

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Machine Safety Standards USA & OSHA

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USA – Machine Safety

Ensure Safe and Healthy Work Conditions

OSHA - The law " have to comply"

States must meet or exceed

OSHA Regulations defined in Code of Federal Regulations Title 29

Reference to Standards such as ANSI and NFPA

- Considered consensus standards.
- Standards are Voluntary
- Unless they become part of the law
- "Incorporated by Reference"
- ANSI Coordinates Voluntary Standards

ANSI - Official representative to ISO/IEC

TUV – OSHA recognized NRTL

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OSHA

Part 1910: Occupational Safety and Health Standards

Subpart O: Machinery and Machine Guarding 1910.211: Definitions 1910.212: General Requirements for all Machinery

1910.147(a)(2)(ii)

The minor service exception provides that minor tool changes and adjustments and other minor servicing activities which take place during normal operation may be exempt from LOTO if the activity is routine, repetitive, and integral to the use of the equipment for production purposes, provided that the work is performed using alternative measures which provide effective employee protection.

1910.213-190.219: Machine Specific Regulations

Subpart J: General Environment Controls 1910.147: The Control of Hazardous Energy (Lockout/Tagout)

Machine Safety Standards NFPA 79

Original NFPA 79 1997 - Restricted machine safety to electromechanical devices.

9.6.3 Where a Category 0 stop is used for the emergency stop function, it shall have only hardwired electromechanical components. In addition, its operation shall not depend on electronic logic (hardware or software).

NFPA 79 2002 – Allowed the use of safety PLC in safety-related.

11.3.4 Use in Safety-Related Functions. Software and firmware-based controllers to be used in safety-related functions shall be listed for such use. [Annex to NFPA 79 2002, A.11.3.4 IEC 61508]

NFPA 79 2007 – Allowed drives as a final switching device.

9.2.5.4.1.4 Drives or solid-state output devices designed for safety-related functions shall be allowed to be the final switching element, when designed according to relevant safety standards.

NFPA 79 2012 – Allowed the use of cableless control

9.2.7.1* General. Cableless control (e.g., radio, infrared) techniques for transmitting commands and signals between a machine control system and operator control station(s) shall meet the requirements of 9.2.7.1.1 through 9.2.7.1.4.

Machine Safety Standards Overview

	<u>Standards</u>	Descriptions	<u>USA</u>	<u>EU</u>	<u>Comments</u>
ISO	International Organization for Standardization	ISO 13849-1, FS, Appl. specific std (PL), H-P ISO 13849-2, FS, Validation ISO 12100, FS, Risk Assessments	X - -	X X X	More guidance with safety calculations with the Safety Evaluation Tool
IEC	International ElectroTechnical Commission	,		More guidance with safety calculations with the Safety Evaluation Tool	
O SHA	Occupational Safety and Health Administration	OSHA 29 CFR 1910, Subpart O, Machinery and Machine Guarding Safety OSHA 29 CFR 1910.147 Control of Hazardous Energy (Lockout / Tagout)	X X	-	Siemens Safety Solutions Tested and certified by NRTL's (as per OSHA's requirement)
ANSI	American National Standards Institute	ANSI B11 Series – 2007–2010	Х	-	To be followed for application specific standards
	National Fire Protection association	NFPA 79 – 2015, Machine Safety NFPA 85 – 2011, Burner Mgmt. Systems NFPA 86 – 2011, Burner Mgmt. Systems	X X X	- -	Compliance required, Wireless and Drives safety allowed
	Underwriters Laboratories	UL NRGF covers ANSI / UL 508 / 1998 / NFPA79 and IEC 61508 Also new UL Functional Safety mark like TUV	Х	-	New UL Functional Safety Mark and recognition (similar to TUV- NRTL certification)
	Robotics Industries Association	ANSI / RIA R15.06-2012,	Х	-	Required for all robotic machine safety applications
ROBOTIC INDUSTRIES ASSOCIATION		ANSI / RIA / ISO 10218-1-2007	Х	Х	
	Canadian Standards Association	CSA Z434: Safety requirements for robots and robot systems	-	-	Canadian requirement.

Machine Safety Standards Overview - ISO 13849-1 and IEC 62061

The EN 954-1 (CAT B, CAT 2, CAT3 & CAT4) was replaced by ISO13849-1:2006 because programmable electronic systems were considered insufficiently and the time response (e.g. testing intervals, life cycles) and the failure probability of components were not considered.

18 December 2009: EN 954-1 extension confirmed as two years , until 31 December 2011.

Two important standards:


ISO 13849-1:2006 and IEC62061:2005 – apply the time element to safety systems for the machinery sector.

<u>ISO 13849-1:2006</u> builds on the "categories" of safety structure, uses the term "performance level" (PL), and then uses the alphabet, PLa through Ple.

<u>IEC 62061</u> builds on the foundation of the structure or what is called "Hardware Fault Tolerance" and uses the term "safety integrity level" (SIL), Only three SILs apply to machine systems: SIL1, SIL2 and SIL3

A third element, diagnostics, not new at all, is added to the picture to give the safety system designer more flexibility to achieve the safety requirements. Putting these three elements together yields a time-sensitive level of integrity in a safety system.

Machine Safety Comparison of ISO 13849-1 and IEC 62061



Machine Safety Comparison of ISO 13849-1 and IEC 62061

The SIL and/or PL safety levels define just how reliable a safety system must be:

Performance Level (PL)	dangerous failure per IEC61508 and safety system failure		Maximum acceptable safety system failure	Technology	EN ISO 13849-1	EN 62061
EN ISO 13849-1	hour	EN IEC 62061		Hydraulic	Applicable	Not
а	$\geq 10^{-5}$ to <10^{-4}	-	One risk failure every		••	applicable
		10000 hours		Pneumatic	Applicable	Not
b	\geq 3X10 ⁻⁶ to <10 ⁻⁵	1	One risk failure every			applicable
	1250 days		Mechanical	Applicable	Not	
С	$\geq 10^{-6}$ to <3X10 ⁻⁶				11	applicable
			115.74 years	Electrical	Applicable	Applicable
d	> 10 ⁻⁷ to <10 ⁻⁶	3	One risk failure every			
ŭ		Ŭ	115.74 years	Electronics	Applicable	Applicable
е	$\geq 10^{-8}$ to <10 ⁻⁷	4	One risk failure every 1,157.41 years	Programmable Electronics	Applicable	Applicable

When a safety system is correctly used - its probability of failure is the same as the probability of a hazard.

This means that IEC 62061 und ISO 13849 define a **quantitative** risk and therefore go further than EN 954-1.

Machine Safety Comparison of different safety standards per ANSI B11.0:2010

Risk Reduction	System Architecture						
Column 1	Column 2	Column 3	Column 4	Column 5	Column 6		
ANSI B11.TR6 (ISO 13849-1:1999)	ANSI B11.0	Robotics Industry (RIA R15.06 / CSA Z434)	CATEGORY (ISO 13849- 1:1999)	SIL (IEC 61508)	Performance Level (ISO 13849-1: 2006		
Highest: Requirements of B and the use of well-tried safety principles shall apply. Safety-related parts shall be designed, so that a single fault in any of these parts does not lead to a loss of the safety function, and the single fault is detected at or before the next demand upon the safety function, but that if this detection is not possible, an accumulation of undetected faults shall not lead to loss of the safety function.	Highest: Redundancy w/ continuous self- checking (e.g., Dual channel w/ continuous monitoring)	R1 / R2A (Control reliable)	4	З	e		
Intermediate / High: Requirements of B and the use of well-tried safety principles shall apply. Safety-related parts shall be designed, so that a single fault in any of these parts does not lead to the loss of the safety function, and whenever reasonably practicable, the single fault is detected.	Intermediate / High: Redundancy w/ self-checking upon start-up (e.g., Dual channel w/ monitoring at cycle/start-up)	R2A / R2B (Control reliable / Single channel with monitoring)	3	3 to 2	d or c		
Low / Intermediate: Requirements of B and the use of well-tried safety principles shall apply. Safety function shall be checked at suitable intervals by the machine control system.	Low / Intermediate: Redundancy that may be manually checked (e.g., Dual channel w/ optional manual monitoring)	R2B / R2C (Single channel with monitoring / Single channel)	2	2 to 1	Ь		
Lowest: Requirements of B shall apply. Well-tried components and well-tried safety principles shall be used.	Lowest: Single channel	R3A (Single channel)	1	o	а		
B: SRP/CS and/or their protective equipment, as well as their components, shall be designed, constructed, selected, assembled and combined in accordance with relevant standards so that they can withstand the expected influence. Basic safety principles shall be used.		R3B / R4 (Simple)	в		а		

*Taken from ANSI B11.0:2010



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Machine Safety Standards

Status of ISO/IEC 17305

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Status of ISO/IEC 17305 Today

- Two standards: ISO 13849 und IEC 62061 are overlapping and can be used alternatively.
- What do? Optimizing or to strike a new path?
- Optimizing:
- ISO 13849-1 Amendment is still not practice-oriented
- New Concepts:
- Working Draft 17305
- The planned Merging of both standards ISO 13849 and IEC 62061

Status of ISO/IEC 17305 Why improving & merging? – the most relevant reasons for -

- Need for a simple/practical standard, with practical examples to be added: More explanation/guidance (to avoid deviating interpretation)
- The request to have more flexibility for the quantification of the risk estimation seems to be interlinked with the problems reported with regard to the determination of the required PL or SIL
- The ideas behind "functional safety" and "safety related control system"
 need to be clarified
- Particular problems with DC, CCF and validation: Those parts need more guidance/clarifications

Status of ISO/IEC 17305 **Design of Safety Control System (SCS)**

connissioning 5aley Manager construction Ergonomy Electric ON Activities Documentation Safety-Plan Safety Plan, Verification plan... **Risk Analysis Risk Analysis** Specification Specification, Manuals Realisation **Select Devices** Data sheets,... Mounting Wiring Diagrams Program Software Documentation Test **Test Reports** Verification Reports Verification CE **Technical Documentation** Validation Leader Member

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Machine Safety Standards

Safety Related Parts of Control System

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Safety Related Parts of Control System Basic Implementation Procedure – Risk Reduction

Steps to be performed by the machine manufacturer

- 1 Risk assessment
- 2 Risk reduction
 - Step 1: Safe design
 - Step 2: Technical protective measures
 - Step 3: User information on residual risks
- 3 Validation of the machine
- 4 Placing the machine on the market

Technical documentation

Each step must be comprehensibly documented:

Procedure and results

Test strategy and test results

Responsibilities, ...

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Safety Related Parts of Control System Step 2: Technical Protective Measures

Technical protective measures

- A safety function must be defined for each hazard that cannot be eliminated by design
- Safety functions can be performed by safety systems

Example: Safety function, without safety system

Access to the hazardous location is permanently prevented (fixed mechanical cover, ...)

Example: Safety function, with safety system

"When the protective cover is opened during normal operation, the motor must be switched off."

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
Safety Related Parts of Control System Step 2: Technical Protective Measures


Safety system

- Performs safety functions
- Consists of subsystems

Subsystems of a safety system

- Detecting (position switch, light curtain, ...)
- Evaluating (fail-safe controller, safety switching device, ...)
- Reacting (contactor, frequency converter, ...)





Safety Related Parts of Control System **Step 2: Technical Protective Measures**

Relevant standards for designing and realizing safety systems for machinery

EN 954-1 (was valid until the end of 2011)

EN ISO 13849-1

EN 62061 (identical to IEC 62061)

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Safety Related Parts of Control System Step 2: Technical Protective Measures

Basic procedure for each safety function

- a) Specifying the safety function
- b) Determining the **required** safety level
- c) Designing the safety function
- d) Determining the achieved safety level
- e) Realizing and testing the safety function



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Safety Related Parts of Control System Step 2: Technical Protective Measures, a) Specifying the Safety Function

Boundary conditions of the safety function


- Hazard to be prevented on the machine
- Affected persons on the machine
- Concerned operating modes of the machine



- Functional description of the safety function
- Required reaction time
- Reaction to faults
- Number of operations for electromechanical components

• ...

• ...



Safety Related Parts of Control System Step 2: Technical Protective Measures, b) Determining the reqd. Safety Level

Significance of the required safety level

The required safety level is a measure for the reliability of the safety function.

The required safety level depends on:


- Severity of the injury
- Frequency / exposure time
- Possibility of avoiding

The more severe the injury and the more

probable its occurrence, the higher the required safety level.

EN 62061 and ISO 13849 show procedures for determining the required safety level.

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
Safety Related Parts of Control System Step 2: Technical Protective Measures, b) Determining the reqd. Safety Level

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Frequency / exposure	Fr	Pro	bability of occurrence	Pr		Possibility of	Р	
time Less than 1 hour	5	+ Free	quently	5		avoiding Impossible	5	
1 h to 1 day	5	Like		4	+	Possible	3	
1 day to 2 weeks	4		sible	3		Likely	1	
2 weeks to 1 year	3	Rar		2				1
More than 1 year	2		gligible	1				
Irreversible: E.g., broken lir Reversible: E.g., requiring	attention f	rom a meo	dical practitioner			3 2 1		
Reversible: E.g., requiring	inst alu							
Severity of	Class Cl = Fr + Pr + P							
the injury Se	;	3 to 4	5 to 7	8 to	10	11 to 13		14 to 15
4		SIL 2	SIL 2	SIL	2	SIL 3	>	SIL 3
3				SIL	1	SIL 2		SIL 3
2						SIL 1		SIL 2
1								SIL 1

Safety Related Parts of Control System Step 2: Technical Protective Measures, b) Determining the reqd. Safety Level

Specification according to EN ISO 13849: PLr a to PLr e






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Safety Related Parts of Control System Step 2: Technical Protective Measures, b) Determining the reqd. Safety Level

Requirements of the safety levels: Probability of failure

EN 62061 and EN ISO 13849 describe requirements for the maximum permissible probability of failure of the safety function:

- Probability of dangerous failure per hour PFH_D
- The higher the safety level, the lower the required PFH_D



Not more than 1 dangerous failure of the safety function in **10** years Not more than 1 dangerous failure of the safety function in **100** years Not more than 1 dangerous failure of the safety function in **1000** years

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Safety Related Parts of Control System Step 2: Technical Protective Measures, b) Determining the reqd. Safety Level

Requirements of the safety levels: Safety system

EN 62061 and EN ISO 13849 describe requirements for the reliability of safety systems:

	PL _r a	
SIL 1	PL _r b	
	PL, c	
SIL 2	PL _r c PL _r d	
SIL 3	PL _r e	

Increasing requirements for the reliability of safety systems

All phases of the lifetime of a machine are considered:

- From planning
- to shutdown

Safety Related Parts of Control System Step 2: Technical Protective Measures, b) Determining the reqd. Safety Level

Requirements of the safety levels: Safety system

The requirements concern:

- Engineering (depends strongly on the required safety level)
- Procedure

Requirements for engineering:

- Hardware structure (o
- Fault detection capability
- Reliability of components

Requirements for the **procedure**:

- Project management
- Test concept
- Technical documentation, ...

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(low → high safety level)
(one-channel → two-channel)
(none → comprehensive diagnostics)
(increasing)

Safety Related Parts of Control System Step 2: Technical Protective Measures, c)Designing the Safety Function

Subsystem 1:

Detecting

Objective of the design

The safety system performing the safety function must meet the requirements of the necessary safety level (SIL, PL_r).


Example

Safety function: "When the protective cover is opened during normal operation, the motor must be switched off."

Required safety level: SIL 3 or PL_r e



Protective cover





Design for SIL 3 or PLr e

Safety Related Parts of Control System Step 2: Technical Protective Measures, d)Determining achieved Safety Level

Design review

Can the required safety level (SIL, PL,) be achieved?

Basic procedure

Assessment of the individual subsystems


- Achieved safety level (SILCL, PL)
- Probability of failure PFH_D

Assessment of the safety system

 Achieved safety level (SILCL, PL): Normally, the lowest achieved safety level of a subsystem determines the achieved safety level of the safety system.

- Probability of failure PFH_D: Total of PFH_D of the subsystems
- Achieved safety level of the safety system (SILCL, PL) = required safety level of the safety function (SIL, PL_r)?

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Safety Related Parts of Control System Step 2: Technical Protective Measures, d)Determining achieved Safety Level

Assessment of the subsystems

Safety-relevant characteristics of a subsystem:

- Achieved safety level (SILCL, PL)
- Probability of failure PFH_D


Finished subsystem

 Characteristics and certificates from the manufacturer

Designed subsystem

- Characteristics have to be calculated
- EN 62061 and EN ISO 13849 show how

Subystem 2: Evaluating



Safety Related Parts of Control System Step 3: User Information

User information warns of residual risks

User information does not replace

- safe design
- technical protective measures

Examples:

- Warnings in the operating instructions
- Special work instructions
- Icons
- Personal protective equipment



Document the measures External and internal documentation

Proof

External technical documentation

For customer

- Operating instructions with description for intended use
- Necessary circuit diagrams
- Safety guidelines
- Where appropriate, servicing manual
- EC certificate of conformity

Internal technical documentation

Stays with manufacturer

- Description of machine
- Overall drawing
- · Full detailed drawing
- Documents on risk assessment
- Applicable standards and other technical specifications
- Technical reports with results on inspections/ tests carried out
- Operating instructions
- Copy of EC certificate of conformity
- Declaration of incorporation / assembly instructions for partly completed machinery

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Machine Safety Standards

SET – Tool to calculate safety levels

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Safety Evaluation Tool SET

File Project p Library	Copy selector	a Paste Selection Delete sel Sensor group - ISO 13849-1 - Gener		Options		शि उ	echrical Parame	(02
Projects Oser projects		Name	Sensor group		Commenter of	\$7 Connection	Without	
Project Safety area A Safety f DETECT	function TION	Туре	Customerdata required SL/PL exists	Category	3	Nr. of components	1.	
TA EVA	ALUATION	Channel 1 Channel 2				Beteren		
- A 1	Logic group	Manufacturer	Siemens			Reference designations		
× A.	Actuator group	Productgroup	SIRUS Detecting Devices			DC (%)	90 (medium)	
		Producttype	Safety Position Switch with Tumb	ler	~	B10 (operation cycles)	1,000,000	
		Integrated communication connection	without			Ratio of dangerous failures (%)	20	
		Order number	35853	ান্থ		Max. service life (in years)	20	
		More order numbers				B10d (operation cycles)	5,000,000.00	
		Number of operations / test interval (switching cycles)	1 Per hour -			MTTFd (in years)	5,707.76 (high)	5
		Consideration of safety integrity act						
		CCF (points)	265 · Extimate CCF			PL	PL d	
						PFHD	4.29 E-08	
		Consideration of safety integrity						
		Safety function						

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Safety Evaluation Tool (SET):

- Online tool for determining safety levels of safety functions according to:
 - EN ISO 13849-1 (Performance Level, PL)
 - EN 62061 (Safety Integrity Level, SIL).
- Detailed configuration of the safety functions
 - Emergency stop, fence, etc.

This tool is one of a kind

- Product information (PFHd-, SIL- and PL-values) of Siemens components are used directly in the safety-calculations.
- Input of components from 'Third-Party-Manufacturers' is also possible.

Result

- Ready made <u>TÜV-certified</u> and compliant safety functions.
- Time saving: Less manual calculations required.
- Project documentation for the technical dossier of the machine.

Free use of the online tool: www.siemens.com/safety-evaluation-tool

> Next

Safety Evaluation Tool Risk graph for determining the required SIL/PL level

Integrated risk graph for determining the required SIL/PL level


	L acc. to ISO 13489-1, annex A	Low Risk	Required performance	Determination of the required s Determination of the r (by SIL assignment)						
			level PL			Frequency		Probability of	hzd. event	Avoidance
			lever FL					Pr		
			a			Fr ≥ 1 per hr		Pr Very high	5	Av
						<1 per hr	Departure 5	Likely	4	
Starting point	for P	2	>			<1 per day ≥ 1		Possible	3	Impossible
		<u> </u>	b			< 1 per 2wiks - 2	t 1 per yr 3	Rarely	2	Possible
risk reduction		1	►			< 1 per yr	2	Negligible	1	Likely
estimation		2				Class				
•	┥			Consequences	Severity	CI = Fr +	Pr + Av			
						4	5-7	8 - 10	11 - 13	14 - 15
		2	d	Death, loosing an eye or arm	4	SIL 2	SIL 2	SIL 2	SIL 3	SIL 3
Risk Parameter		1	`	Permanent, loosing fingers	3			SIL 1	SIL 2	SIL 3
S = Severity of injury				Reversible, medical attention	2	Other mea	isures		SIL 1	SIL 2
F = Frequency and/or exp F1 = Seldom up to often a	versible) injury including death.	2	→e	Reversible, first aid Procedure 1. Determination of damage				and avaid		SIL 1
S2 = Sever (normally irrev F = Frequency and/or exp F1 = Seldom up to often an F2 = Frequent up to contin P= Possibile under specif P2 = Scarcely possible.	versible) injury including death. osure time to the hazard md/or the exposure time is short. nuous and/or the exposure time is long. Ig the hazard or limiting the harm fic conditions.	High Risk	—▶ <mark>e</mark>	Procedure	severity Se r frequency Fr p v = class Cl and column Cl = nines and System rigendum 2)	required SIL	mentation of t	the European N		
S2 = Sever (normally irrev F = Frequency and/or exp F1 = Seldom up to often an F2 = Frequent up to contin P= Possibile under specif P2 = Scarcely possible. a,b,c,d,e = Estimates of same	versible) injury including death. osure time to the hazard md/or the exposure time is short. nuous and/or the exposure time is long. Ig the hazard or limiting the harm fic conditions. Ifety-related performance level	5		Procedure 1. Determination of damage 2. Determination of points fo 3. Total of points Fr + Pr + A 4. Interface line severity Se a Source: Functional Safety in Mad	severity Se r frequency Fr p v = class Cl and column Cl = nines and System rigendum 2)	required SIL	mentation of t			
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Safety Evaluation Tool Basic steps

Create a safety function



Safety Evaluation Tool Basic steps

Create components

Detection **Evaluation** Reaction b Library Sensor group - ISO 1 - Projects + - User projects Name Project 🔻 Safety area Туре - DETECTION Channel 1 Cha Manufacturer Logic group > 📤 Actuator group Productgroup Producttype Integrated com connection Order number More order nun Number of oper interval (switch Unrestricted © Siemens Industry, Inc. 2014-2015 All rights reserved. Consideration of safe CCF (points)

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
Safety Evaluation Tool Basic steps

Enter data for components

ry .	Sensor group - ISO 13849-1 - Gener	al description							
cts									
ojects	Name	Sensor group		Comment	\$7 Connection	Without 🗸			
oject 'Safety area ▼	Туре	 Customerdata required SL/PL exists 	Category	3 🖵	Nr. of components	1 -			
> Sensor group	Channel 1 Channel 2	Channel 1 Channel 2							
 EVALUATION A Logio group REACTION Actustor group 	Manufacturer	Siemens -]		Reference designations				
	Productgroup	Productaroup SIRIUS Detecting Devices			DC (%)	90 Estima			
	ribudetgroup	Sintos beredang bereda	Into 5 Detecting Devices			(medium)			
	Producttype	Safety Position Switch with Tumbler		B10 (operation cycles)	1,000,000				
	Integrated communication connection	without -			Ratio of dangerous failures (%)	20			
	Order number	3SE53 -	[?]		Max. service life (in years)	20			
	More order numbers]		B10d (operation cycles)	5,000,000.00			
	Number of operations / test interval (switching cycles)	1 Per hour 🗸			MTTFd (in years)	5,707.76 (high)			
	Consideration of safety integrity acc	. to ISO 13849-1							
	CCF (points)	≥65 Estimate CCF			PL	PL d			
		and the second							

Safety Evaluation Tool Basic steps

Repeat steps for the other components



Safety Evaluation Tool Basic steps


Order number	3SE53	▼ [?]	Max. service life (in years)	20
More order numbers			B10d (operation cycles)	5,000,000.00
Number of operations / test interval (switching cycles)	1 Per hour		MTTFd (in years)	5,707.76 (high)
nsideration of safety integrity acc	. to ISO 13849-1			
CCF (points)	≥65	CF.	PL	PL d
			PFHD	4.29 E-08
nsideration of safety integrity				
		PLd PLe		
Safety function	PFHD PLa PLb PLC			



Show overall result

Safety Evaluation Tool Basic steps

Generate documentation and save as PDF



Tools for Safety Calculations Comparison

Major Software-tools available to simplify and speed up the calculations:

SISTEMA	Safety Evaluation Tool (SET)
Safety Integrity software tool for evaluation of machine applications available at no charge	The SET for the IEC 62061 & ISO 13849-1 standards takes you to your goal faster.
Tool for easy application of control standard EN ISO 13849-1	This TÜV-tested free-to-use, online tool supports the fast & reliable assessment of your machine's safety functions
Modeling tool for designated architectures & automated calculation of reliability values as per 13849-1	Automatic calculation in accordance with IEC 62061 & ISO 13849-1, certainty regarding compliance.
SISTEMA Cookbooks available	Faster online access to current product data
Printable summary document	Standard-compliant report, which can be integrated in the documentation as a proof of safety
http://www.dguv.de/ifa/en/pra/softwa/sistema/index.jsp	http://www.industry.siemens.com/topics/global/en/safety- integrated/machine-safety/safety-evaluation- tool/Pages/Default.aspx



Redefining Automation

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Machine Safety Standards

Evolution & Benefits of Machine Safety

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Siemens Safety Integrated Evolution of Machine Safety

FUTURE

Focus on Machine Productivity & Safety

- Integrated Safety
- Intelligent safety devices
- Productivity Enhancing



PRESENT

Focus on Machine Productivity & Safety

- Use of safety rated devices
- Increased focus on safety standards
- Safety Standards implemented & enforced
- Better diagnostics

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PAST

Focus on Machine Productivity

- Safety cumbersome
- Safety Often bypassed
- Increased injury & risks
- Standards often not implemented
- LOTO only

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Siemens Safety Integrated Evolution of Safety Solutions

FUTURE

- Focus on Machine Productivity & Safety
- Integrated Safety
- Intelligent safety devices
- Productivity Enhancing

PRESENT

- Acceptance of Safety PLC
 - for safety & non-safety functions
- Wide range of safety devices available
- Programmable Safety

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PAST

- Separate Automation controls
- Stand alone safety
- Hardwired safety
- Standards behind technology



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Siemens Safety Integrated Evolution of Safety Standards

FUTURE

- Global Standards
- ISO 17305 Merging of
 ISO 13849 & IEC 62061
- Partnerships between
 - IEC / ISO / ANSI



- Implemented & enforced
- ANSI B11, NFPA 79
- ISO 13849, IEC62061

PAST

- Used only Nationally Recognized Standards
- ANSI B11
- NFPA 79

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Machine Safety Key Trends in Safety

- Globalization of Safety Control Standards ISO/IEC
- Increased focus on Safety Design to Improve Productivity
- Merging of Standards. Ex. ISO 13849/IEC 62061
- Transition from Electro-Mechanical to Electronic Safety Controls
- Safety Technology Integrated into Standard Automation Hardware
- Integration of Standard Controls and Safety Controls
- Addition of Configurable and Programmable Safety Devices
- Addition of Safe Motion Technology
- Safety Networks
- Safety being transparent

Machine Safety Use of Safety – Increased Overall Equipment Efficiency (OEE)

- Work productively while minimizing their risk of injury
- Enable design flexibility and increased diagnostics
- Increased likelihood that Standard Operating Procedures will be followed.
- Make machinery safer and easier to operate and maintain
- Reduce the motivation to bypass



Redefining Automation

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Machine Safety Standards

Machine Safety Life-Cycle Support

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Siemens Safety Integrated Machine Safety Life-Cycle Support — USA

Siemens provides competent support throughout the entire machine safety lifecycle

Support

- <u>Safety Consultants</u>
- Safety Core Team
- <u>Safety Validation</u>

Implementation

- <u>Siemens Solution Partners</u>
 <u>– Safety</u>
- Safety Functional Examples
- Safety Training
- <u>Risk Assessment Training</u>



Products and Solutions

- <u>Safety Products</u>
- <u>Safety Software</u>
- <u>Wireless Safety</u>
- PC-Based Safety
- <u>BMS</u>

Safety Education

- Machine Safety Standards
- <u>Safety Webinars</u>
- <u>Newsletter</u>
- <u>Safety White Papers</u>
- Siemens Safety Website

Compliance

- OSHA Website
- Consensus Standards
- <u>Risk Assessment Standard</u>
- <u>Safety Evaluation Tool SET</u>

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The Complete Safety Solution



Redefining Automation

SIEMENS

Machine Safety Standards

Thank you for you time

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