



**HISTORY
HIGHER LEVEL AND STANDARD LEVEL
PAPER 1**

Wednesday 9 May 2007 (afternoon)

1 hour

SOURCE BOOKLET

SOURCE BOOKLET - INSTRUCTIONS TO CANDIDATES

- Do not open this examination paper until instructed to do so.
- This booklet contains all of the sources required for Paper 1.
 - Section A page 2
 - Section B page 5
 - Section C page 7

Sources in this booklet have been edited: word additions or explanations are shown in square brackets []; substantive deletions of text are indicated by ellipses ... ; minor changes are not indicated.

SECTION A

Prescribed Subject 1 The USSR under Stalin, 1924 to 1941

These sources refer to collectivisation under Stalin.

SOURCE A *Speech by Stalin to peasant party activists, in Siberia, January 1928, taken from **Stalin** by Dmitri Volkogonov, originally published in Russian, Moscow 1989; English edition, London 2000.*

You are working badly! You are idle and you indulge [favour] the kulaks. Look at the kulak farms, you will see their granaries and barns are full of grain, they have to cover the grain with sheets of canvas because there is no more room for it inside. The kulak farms have a thousand tons of surplus grain per farm.

I propose:

- a) you demand that the kulaks hand over their surpluses at once at state prices
- b) if they refuse to submit to the law, you should charge them under Article 107 of the Criminal Code and confiscate their grain for the state, 25 per cent of it to be distributed among the poor and less well-off peasants
- c) you must steadfastly unify the least productive individual peasants into collective farms.

SOURCE B *Extract from **Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar** by Simon Sebag Montefiore, London 2003.*

In November 1929, Stalin returned refreshed from holiday and immediately intensified [increased] the war against the peasantry, demanding “an offensive against the kulaks... to deal the kulak class such a blow that it will no longer rise to its feet.” But the peasants refused to sow their crops, declaring war on the regime...

Days after Stalin’s birthday party [December 21 1929] soviet officials realised they had to escalate [intensify] their war on the countryside and wipe out the kulaks as a class. They waged a secret police war in which organised brutality, vicious pillage and fanatical ideology, destroyed the lives of millions. Stalin’s circle was judged by success in collectivisation.

In 1930, Molotov planned the destruction of the kulaks, who were divided into three categories: first category to be immediately eliminated; second category to be imprisoned in camps; third category, 150 000 households, to be deported. Molotov oversaw the death squads, the concentration camps and the railway carriages, like a military commander.

SOURCE C

*Extract from **Gulag** by Anne Applebaum, London 2003.*

In 1929, the Soviet regime accelerated [quicken] forced collectivisation in the countryside, a vast upheaval which was in some ways more radical than the Russian Revolution itself. Rural commissars forced millions of peasants to give up their small landholdings and join collective farms, often expelling them from land their families had farmed for centuries. The transformation permanently weakened Soviet agriculture and created conditions for terrible famines in 1932 and 1934. Collectivisation also destroyed – forever – rural Russia’s continuity with the past.

Millions resisted collectivisation, hiding grain in their cellars, or refusing to co-operate with the authorities. These resisters were labelled kulaks, a vague term which could include nearly anyone. The possession of an extra cow, or bedroom, was enough to qualify any poor peasant, as was an accusation from a jealous neighbour...

As famine increased, all available grain was taken out of the villages, and denied to kulaks. Those caught stealing, even tiny amounts to feed their children, also ended up in prison. A law of 1932 demanded the death penalty or long camp sentence for all such “crimes against state property”.

SOURCE D

*Extract from the 1933 diary of Tikon Puzanov, a young peasant supporter of collectivisation, taken from **Stalinism** edited by David Hoffmann, Oxford 2003.*

All that I think about is how we will obtain a happy future. Others think differently – and they are the majority. They are not interested in their work. They don’t care about how they work, as if they were serving a sentence. They are not involved in the present world. For them it is difficult, since collective labour has not yet entered their minds. These people are dreaming about a small farmer’s existence.

SOURCE E *Statistics on collectivisation, taken from **Stalin and Khrushchev: The USSR, 1924–64** by Michael Lynch, London 1998 (10th edition).*

Percentage of peasant holdings collectivised in the USSR between 1930 and 1941.
Individual percentages for the years 1937 to 1940 were not available.

1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1941
23.6 %	52.7 %	61.5 %	66.4 %	71.4 %	83.2 %	89.6 %	98.0 %

Consumption of foodstuffs (in kilos per head), 1928 and 1932

	Bread	Potatoes	Meat and Lard	Butter
1928	250.4	141.1	24.8	1.35
1932	214.6	125.0	11.2	0.7

Comparative numbers of livestock, 1928 and 1932

	Horses	Cattle	Pigs	Sheep and Goats
1928	33 000 000	70 000 000	26 000 000	146 000 000
1932	15 000 000	34 000 000	9 000 000	42 000 000

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SECTION B

Prescribed Subject 2 The emergence and development of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), 1946 to 1964

These sources refer to mass campaigns: the Three and Five-Antis campaigns and the Hundred Flowers campaign.

SOURCE A *Directive from the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, dated 8 December 1951.*

The struggle against corruption, waste, and bureaucracy should be witnessed as much as the struggle to suppress counter-revolutionaries. As in the latter [campaign] the masses, including the democratic parties and also people in all walks of life, should be mobilised [stirred to action], the present struggle given wide publicity, the leading cadres should take personal charge and act quickly, and people should be called on to confess their own wrongdoing and report on the guilt of others. In minor cases the guilty should be criticised and educated; in major ones the guilty should be dismissed from office, punished, or sentenced to prison terms (to be reformed by labour), and the worst among them should be shot.

SOURCE B *Extract from Mao Tse-tung, by Stuart Schram, London 1969.*

The “Three-Antis” campaign, into which the thought reform movement blended at the end of 1951, and the “Five-Antis” campaign during the spring of 1952, put a greater stress on social utility and a lesser stress on inner transformation; but they nonetheless called upon the techniques used in thought reform, as well as on mass denunciations used against counter-revolutionaries... The “Five-Antis” campaign directed against the “five poisons” of bribery, tax-evasion, fraud, theft of government property, and theft of state economic secrets, affected primarily merchants and industrialists of the “national bourgeois” who were still operating their firms in a semi independent manner... Its purpose was not, as in the case of agrarian reform, to eliminate a class. Peasants did not require landlords to work the land, but the skills of factory owners and businessmen were still required to direct their enterprises. The aim was to remould their thinking and destroy their independence. They were fined, submitted to psychological pressure, and the worst offenders were sent to prison.

SOURCE C *Table taken from **The Search for Modern China** by Jonathan Spence, London 1990.*

Results of the Five-Antis Movement in Shanghai, 1952

	Small firms	Medium firms
Law-abiding	59 471 (76.6 %)	7 782 (42.5 %)
Basically law-abiding	17 407 (22.4 %)	9 005 (49.1 %)
Semi law-abiding	736 (0.9 %)	1 529 (8.3 %)
Serious lawbreakers	2	9
Total	77 616	18 325

SOURCE D *Speech by Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) to the Supreme State Conference on 27 February 1957.*

“Let a hundred flowers blossom, let a hundred schools of thought contend” and “long-term coexistence and mutual supervision” – how did these slogans come to be put forward? They were put forward in the light of China’s specific conditions, on the basis of the recognition that various kinds of contradiction still exist in socialist society, and in response to the country’s urgent need to speed up its economic and cultural development. Letting a hundred flowers blossom and a hundred schools of thought contend is the policy for promoting the progress of the arts and sciences and a flourishing socialist culture in our land. We think it harmful to the growth of art and science if administrative measures are used to impose one particular style of art or school of thought and to ban another... Often correct and good things have first been regarded not as fragrant flowers but as poisonous weeds. Darwin’s theory of evolution was once dismissed as erroneous [wrong].

SOURCE E *Extract from **Modern China, A History**, by Edwin Moise, London 1997.*

In 1956 Chairman Mao began to feel it was time to take some of the restrictions off public expression. He was becoming disturbed by the arrogance and inflexibility of some communist bureaucrats, and he hoped that allowing the intellectuals to criticise such people might help to improve their behaviour...

It took a while for this invitation to be treated seriously, but in the spring of 1957 the intellectuals responded. Mao was shocked. Where he had hoped for criticism directed mainly against people who violated communist norms [standards], a great deal of what he got was directed against the system itself. Mao seems to have allowed this to run on for a few weeks unchecked, to find out just how extreme the attacks would become and who would make them, but then the crackdown came in the form of the “Anti-Rightist” campaign. Many who had spoken out ended up under arrest or shipped to the countryside to reform themselves through agricultural labour.

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SECTION C

Prescribed Subject 3 The Cold War, 1960 to 1979

These sources relate to nuclear disarmament and the SALT I agreements in the 1970s.

SOURCE A *Extract from **The Cold War** by Bradley Lightbody, London 1999.*

The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 took the United States and the Soviet Union to the brink of nuclear war and convinced both superpowers of the need for arms limitations. The immediate disarmament successes were the Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 and the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty of 1968. By 1969, however, the Soviet Union achieved nuclear parity with the United States and the certainty of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) and the emerging competition to develop anti-ballistic missiles (ABMs) and, most significant, the multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) – that is the ability to place several independent targeted warheads on a single launcher or delivery vehicle – encouraged both superpowers to pursue disarmament. Détente and disarmament became two sides of the same coin in the 1970s as both superpowers engaged in efforts to halt the arms race... Arms limitations was attractive to both superpowers not only to reduce the danger of war but to curb the high financial costs of weapons development. Defense costs in 1969 were running at 39.7 billion dollars for the United States, approximately 7 per cent of national income, against 42 billion dollars for the Soviet Union, which was 15 per cent of the Soviet Union national income.

SOURCE B

*An American cartoon published in **Time Magazine**, November 1969 in the early stages of the SALT I talks. A 1969 Herblock cartoon, copyright by The Herb Block Foundation.*

“Shall We All Agree That There’s No Hurry?”



SOURCE C

*An extract from **Cold War: an illustrated History, 1945–1991** by Jeremy Isaacs and Taylor Downing, New York 1998.*

... On 26 May 1972, at a summit in Moscow, President Nixon and Soviet leader Brezhnev signed the agreement that became known as SALT I. Both sides agreed to limit the number of anti-ballistic missiles (ABMs) and to freeze the number of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) at the level of those then under production or deployed. But SALT was silent on the issue of multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) so the Russian advantage in missile numbers was matched by the US advantage in deliverable warheads. The agreement did not cover medium-range and intermediate-range missiles, nor US bases in Europe. However, SALT was an important first step. It would eventually usher in a new era of détente between the superpowers. In 1972 the SALT I Treaty effectively froze the military balance between the Soviet Union and the US. They now realised that each side must be able to destroy each other, but only by guaranteeing its own suicide. In its mad way, this ensured a form of nuclear stability.

SOURCE D

*An extract from **Detente and Confrontation: American Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan** by Raymond L Garthoff, Washington DC 1994. Garthoff is a former American diplomat and was a member of the SALT I delegation.*

The effort to achieve strategic arms limitation marked the first, and the most daring, attempt to follow a collaborative approach in meeting military security requirements. Early successes held great promises, but also showed the limits of readiness of both superpowers to take this path. SALT generated problems of its own and provided a focal point for objection by those who did not want to see either regulated military parity or political détente... The early successes of SALT I contributed to détente and were worthwhile. However, the widely held American view that SALT tried to do too much was a misjudgment: the real flaw was the failure of SALT to do enough. There was remarkable initial success on parity and on stability of the strategic arms relationship but there was insufficient political will (and perhaps political authority) to ban, or sharply limit, MIRVs. This failure led in the 1970s to the failure to maintain military parity between the USA and USSR.

SOURCE E

*An extract from **The Cold War 1945–1991** by Joseph Smith, Oxford 1998. Smith is a lecturer in American diplomatic history in the University of Exeter (UK).*

... The domestic political difficulties of the Nixon administration contributed to the failure to conclude a new SALT treaty to replace the 1972 interim agreement, which was due to expire in 1977. The main obstacle to progress on arms control, however, was the evident unwillingness of both superpowers to abandon the arms race with each other. Behind the public advocacy of détente and disarmament, lay the reality that the freeze on missile numbers in SALT I had never been intended to prevent either side from continuing to develop and modernize its existing weapons... Both superpowers, however, wanted détente to continue and regarded the negotiating of a new arms control treaty as an essential element in the process...
