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# SYNTHESIS OF EVALUATIONS ON TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE



EVALUATION STUDY 2007/2

# Synthesis of Evaluations on Technical Assistance

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<sup>1</sup> All errors and/or omissions are of course, the responsibility of NCG.

## List of Abbreviations

AUSAid	Australian Agency for International Development
BMZ	German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development
BTC	Belgian Technical Cooperation
CAFS	Conflict Affected Fragile States
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
DGDC	Directorate-General for Development Cooperation
ECDPM	European Centre for Development Policy Management
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JPO	Junior Professional Officer
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
RAMSI	Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands
Sida	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SWAp	Sector wide approaches
TA	Technical Assistance
TAP	Technical Assistance Personnel
TC	Technical Cooperation
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

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## **0. Summary of Findings**

### Background

The objective of this report is to provide an overview and synthesis of the approaches and experiences of donors in the provision of technical assistance personnel (TAP). The report draws upon recent evaluations of technical assistance personnel provision. The evaluations/reviews/studies researched are numerous, but only few of the materials reviewed were found to be useful in informing this report<sup>2</sup>. The DFID evaluation and the ECDPM evaluation study stand out by far, as the most informative materials available (for full references see List of Literature in Annex 10).

### Setting

Although TAP is considered to be a programming issue by most donors, it is a very recognizable part of development assistance. Donors therefore place considerable importance to TAP and although it is an instrument of development assistance, it carries a special role as it is recognizable, ‘people oriented’, and associated with influence. Changing modalities of aid, as well as a move towards more national ownership and management of assistance, which entails harmonised approaches and pooling of funds under different types of arrangements, places new roles upon TAP. Consequently more than before, there is a need to learn from ‘good practice’ and develop specific principles for particular context-types.

### Good practice principles

TAP should be contributing to organisational outputs rather than be understood as a modality, which can carry measures of outcome and effectiveness on its own. In this light, it is the partners’ perceptions, which are the most adequate as proxies for assessing TA effectiveness.

The broader context of aid, (i.e. the main characteristics of the society receiving assistance), was brought up in the selection of case countries of the ECDPM study.

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<sup>2</sup> The following agencies have been reviewed for relevant evaluations and policies on TAP: ADB, AusAid, BTC, DFID, ECDPM, EU, GTZ, IMF, the Netherlands, Norad, OECD, DAC, SDC, Sida, World Bank and UNDP. Only BTC, DFID, ECDPM, IMF and Sida were found to be relevant for this synthesis.

These case studies do illustrate the importance of context, and sees the context as the main determinant for design, employment, management and monitoring of TAP. It is useful to think along the following broader categories of context, which can be appropriate in defining future TAP roles: a) fragile states (in their various forms); B) states, which are heavily aid dependent and have human resource constraints; and C) less aid dependent states, with relatively well functioning human resources systems in the public sector. The framework for decision making on TAP seem to be that the stronger a state is, the more ownership there is on the TAP. This comes with more commitment and a more clear-cut accountability relationship. Conversely, the weaker a state is, the more will TAP be driven by donors.

In general the cases showed that there is very little data on aid effectiveness of TAP. This is in fact not surprising, as it is not possible to view the provision of TAP in isolation from the broader context of development assistance modalities. TAP is not a fundamental reform process of public services, and often TAP in the public sector has no link to civil service reform. The provision of TAP is simply not viewed in the context of the overall human resource management in the public sector. It is seen as a programming modality designed to address a particular bottleneck. This way of looking at TAP has a negative consequence for long-term sustainability.

There is no demand/supply relation in TAP in the common understanding of the terminology. This has implications for establishment of ownership, commitment, accountability relations and sustainability. Provision of TAP has often come as a 'free good' provided to the recipient, and although this is changing, it is still common for donors not to be fully transparent about TAP costs.

Regional and national advisers are increasingly available and used at the expense of donor country nationals. In certain posts regional and national advisers are preferred because of their different skills sets and they are often more adaptable. Moreover such TAP is considerably cheaper. As discussed above transparency about the costs and benefits of different types of TAP is therefore important to create a more genuine demand environment, and this enhances the associated effects of commitment. There is a need to find mechanisms for openness and transparency of TAP costs, so recipients can make better, informed choices. The Mozambique case of the ECDPM study showed that there is also a demand and a need for TAP at the sub-national level, but this is often not articulated at national level.

Pooled financing through for example swaps and GBS has improved coordination with partner countries' national development strategies, institutions and procedures. Available documentation underlines the importance of pooling as a way to make aid more effective. Interesting in this respect is that at present donors hold the view that pooling does not equal a higher degree of effectiveness.

TAP management by DFID was more effective in the cases were DFID applied different styles and techniques. It was shown that effectiveness was enhanced where

the choice of contractor was a joint decision between DFID and the Government in question and where decisions followed an extensive interview-based selection to identify the right adviser/consultant. This finding is again supported by the ECDPM evaluation study, which found that joint recruitment processes and transparency in this process enhances ownership. The ECDPM case study from Vietnam found that the Vietnamese considered interviews by videoconference too superficial in an interview process.

The DFID evaluation team was of the opinion that one could not draw any general conclusion about the relationship between the type of technical assistance, which has been provided, and effectiveness and impact. With that said a few points were drawn up. On the issue of long-term versus short-term support, long-term TA support had been successful in the case studies reviewed. But, it was noted that the effectiveness of long-term support "... varied depending both on the context and on the quality of the technical co-operation ..."<sup>3</sup> Short-term support had principally been effective when it was provided as part of an overall package of support. In many cases, local consultants were a better choice and more cost efficient and sometimes outweighed the advantages of an international consultant. The pooling study also noted that a move towards pooling arrangements, in the countries reviewed, appeared to lead to greater flexibility about the choice between using local and international consultants. The ECDPM study found that regional and national consultants have certain advantages, and in respect to a country context with a more dynamic labour market, moving towards more flexibility in types of TAP seems to be the way forward. Making the choices more transparent in the design process, i.e. both with regard to costs and benefits will enable the recipient to make informed choices, which is likely to enhance ownership and commitment.

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<sup>3</sup> DFID, *Developing Capacity? An Evaluation of DFID-Funded Technical Co-operation for Economic Management in Sub-Saharan Africa*, Synthesis Report Vol. 1, 2006, p. 56

## 1. Background

This report contains a synthesis of relevant evaluations on technical assistance personnel (TAP), provided through official development assistance (ODA)<sup>4</sup>. The objective is to provide an overview and synthesis of the approach as well as experience of donors in provision of technical assistance personnel. This note will serve as a reference document and an input for Danida in the upcoming revision of the Technical Assistance in Danish Bilateral Aid-Policy Paper (Danida 2005). The report attempts to trace how evaluation findings have been applied in subsequent policies and guidelines in organisations. The relationship between evaluation findings and guidelines/strategies is not a straightforward and linear process, and this part of the report is not well mapped out, due to limited availability of evidence.

The report primarily draws upon recent evaluations of technical assistance personnel provision (Annexes 1-9), and the consultant's participation in a workshop held in Maastricht in May, 2007 discussing the evaluation study entitled 'Joint Evaluation Study of Provision of Technical Assistance Personnel: What can we learn from promising experiences?' This study was commissioned jointly by Denmark, Australia and Germany and carried out by the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) in 2007. The study is empirically based on case studies from Mozambique, Vietnam and the Solomon Islands, and the most recent and substantive evaluation study informing this synthesis report. Studies by numerous organisations were screened, but only a limited number of these were found to be useful in informing this report.

The report is structured with a view to provide the reader with a user friendly document that highlights key issues in respect of provision of technical assistance personnel. The report synthesises: objectives; focus; weight given to context analysis; coverage of themes and methodologies, of the evaluations. Particular themes have been highlighted in the analysis.

The DAC terminology guides the use of terminology in this report. Technical assistance (TA) is understood as 'the transfer, adaptation, mobilisation and utilisation of

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<sup>4</sup> The report has been written by Anne-Lise Klausen. Christina Dahl Jensen conducted the web research and the preparation of the annexes.



service, skills, knowledge and technology”. TA includes both short and long-term personnel from both national and foreign sources, as well as training, support equipment, consultancies, study visits, seminars and various forms of linkages. This broad concept of TA, which essentially comprises any form of non-financial aid aimed at supporting capacity development efforts, is similar to the term ‘technical cooperation’. This study focuses more narrowly on technical assistance personnel (TAP)<sup>5</sup> and as such deals with a sub-set of the TA concept.

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<sup>5</sup> ECDPM, Provision of Technical Assistance Personnel in Mozambique, draft, May 2007

## 2. Setting of the Report

### 2.1 *Unbundling the TAP concept*

Technical assistance personnel (TAP) is widely understood among donors and recipients of ODA as the provision of personnel in technical cooperation.

TAP is an *instrument* within development assistance, but one with a special status within the range of development assistance instruments. TAP carries the ‘people to people relationship’ and is one of the most recognisable features of development assistance and as such it is associated with influence and intercultural co-operation and building of personal relations. This special importance of TAP as ‘carriers’ of particular countries’ characteristics is expected to gradually diminish within the new modalities of assistance and the harmonisation and alignment of assistance following the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. At the same time there is no sign that TAP, as a modality, will be reduced (although for some countries like Denmark the importance has been diminishing in recent years see Box 2).

#### **Box 1: OECD/DAC terminology**

The OECD/DAC uses the terminology *technical assistance* and *technical co-operation*. Both categories overlap, and include transfer, adaptation, mobilisation and utilisation of services, skills knowledge and technology. With regard to personnel, the terms include short and long-term advisers from national and foreign sources, training, support equipment, study visits and consultancies. The broad terminology is not satisfactory because it bundles together basically most of what is non-financial assistance. In the annual reporting to OECD/DAC the category of TA/TC is therefore not particularly informative.

*Capacity development* is the main label under which TAP is positioned as an instrument, but it is also recognized to have a broad range of explicit and implicit objectives associated with it, depending upon the context in which it is provided. The many roles and tasks of TAP are discussed throughout this report. The ECDPM study distinguishes between four categories of capacity development and their terminology is self-explanatory: *do*, *direct*, *indirect*, and *hands-off*. Most development assis-

tance operates in the continuum between direct (transactional) and indirect (transformational) approaches<sup>6</sup>.

Being an instrument, most organisations appear not to have prepared policy documents to guide TAP, but have regulations and guidelines integrated in overall policies and management guidelines. TAP provision is mostly considered a programming issue and defined and implemented within a programme context. It has been said that TAP cannot be discussed as a policy/strategic issue unless it is positioned within a particular context. Turning this argument around, the contextual analysis is crucial for understanding and defining appropriate and effective TAP.

There are *blurred accountability relationships* in the TAP provision, simply because those who pay are not officially the ones who manage. Development agencies use TAP as 'extended arms' to assist in various reporting and information tasks, for control of funds, etc., and often these functions are not outlined in job descriptions.

Both the *broader context and the immediate programme/project context*, in which TAP operates determines its role and accountabilities. In recent years, broader context groupings in relation to TAP capacity development type modalities have crystallised more clearly. In particular among the low income group countries there are an increasing number of conflict affected fragile states (CAFS) and failed states, which require urgent attention by ODA providers<sup>7</sup>. In this context TAP is used to keep a rudimentary number of key functions operational. TAP is 'transactional' and often the accountability relationship is directly to the donor agency, with counterparts playing a lesser role in the management process. In this context outputs are both tangible and short-term, while long-term sustainability is questionable. A major question is how countries can move away from using TAP in a transactional role and move towards a more sustainable and endogenous process<sup>8</sup> of development, in which TAP has an indirect and facilitative role.

In the category of low-income countries, which are peaceful and building up their institutions, TAP is partly transactional and partly transformational, but the drive is generally to move towards a more transformational role. Some states have very weak institutions and few trained human resources readily available, while others have a much stronger base and stand better chances of moving towards a sustainable, institutional environment that is managed by their own human resources. In particular African countries face a multitude of financial and capacity constraints, and this combination leads to a centrality (and visibility) of TAP in development processes. These countries are cooperative, party to major international agreements

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<sup>6</sup> ECDPM, Joint Evaluation Study of Provision of Technical Assistance Personnel, June 2007, Box 1, p 4.

<sup>7</sup> AusAID representatives at the Maastricht workshop (29/30<sup>th</sup> May 2007) made it clear that 9/11 had changed the agenda for Australia ODA in the Pacific Region, and the urgency to intervene and prevent state disintegration had become a high priority issue.

<sup>8</sup> Solomon Islands, etc.

and considered to be moving in the right direction. In such a context TAP struggles to become more transformational, i.e. part of larger capacity development agenda in which the country institutions are in charge of their own development, although heavily supported by foreign technical and financial assistance. Within this context TAP do have more than a capacity development role. TAP plays an important role in managing the donors' fiduciary risks and 'guarding' that reform processes move ahead as anticipated.

A third type of context, are those developing countries, with a relatively low percentage of contribution of development assistance in GDP. Such countries (Vietnam, South Africa, and Indonesia, to give examples) are middle-income countries or advancing towards this status. They have a relatively dynamic private sector (and an associated labour market), and they have relatively stronger institutions and human resource capacity. They are capable of managing most functions of government<sup>9</sup>, but seek highly specialised skill sets for innovation through development assistance. These countries appear to have some degree of public sector human resource management, have overall guidelines and management requirements for TAP and have an emerging consulting industry. Here the degree of ownership of the development process is high and thereby their need for TAP is lower and highly specialised with national and regional TAP starting to play a role.

This development assistance environment has changed considerably particularly in the cases of aid dependent low income countries because of the implementation of the Paris Declaration, which brings about pooled arrangements of funds and new forms of TAP, focusing on the recipient country spearheading design, management and monitoring of national development.

## **2.2. *Employment and other operational issues***

TAP is sourced in several ways. Most development agencies procure personnel from private companies ('contractors' is the term used by agencies like USAID and AusAID), both for long-term and short-term assignments. Danida and most other bilateral agencies also recruit personnel directly, primarily long-term advisers, who then become direct employees of the supplying government. In all cases, there is an agreement between the supplier and the recipient on the content of the job description, reporting structures, etc., but the degree to which the partner institution is part of the design of the TAP position varies, as does the involvement of the partner in recruitment. The ECDPM case studies showed that management of TAP largely remains a donor responsibility.

More recently basket fund arrangements is a push factor for pooling technical assistance personnel<sup>10</sup>. These funding arrangements are intended to increase effectiveness of aid, efficiency (operations) and national ownership. The ECDPM synthesis

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<sup>9</sup> Vietnam is the example of such a country in the ECDPM study.

<sup>10</sup> ECDPM: Mozambique case study includes a box in Annex 7 on five different ways of pooling TA. This report cannot go into this in any detail, but refers the reader to that study.

report found that recipient governments are interested, to some degree, in managing TAP, but not to take responsibility for the full contractual and employment issues.

Citizenship was once a factor in recruitment, but with international competition in procurement, the pooling arrangements of aid, and the recipient country management of development processes, skills have become the predominant determinant. Associated with this is also an increasing demand for cost transparency of TAP packages and weighing of alternatives to TAP arrangements. It is not often that partner countries are given full disclosure of the cost implications of different types of technical assistance personnel and a choice of TAP modalities. In the ECDPM study it transpired that AusAID is developing and in some situations applying an open menu of TAP options, Germany operates within a system with a Government agency (GTZ) handling all TAP and with relatively limited options for the partner country. Denmark takes position in between the other two agencies.

Partner countries particularly in the ECDPM case studies did not have a preference towards agency recruited advisers above advisers recruited by companies. To them it was the quality of the individual rather than the mode of recruitment. In a context requiring highly specialised, short-term as well as long-term TAP, it appeared that company advisers were advantageous. Partner institutions expect to be fully part of a recruitment process and the case of the ECDPM case study from Vietnam found that interviews through video conference is insufficient, as this fails to provide the necessary person to person interaction. The ECDPM study also showed that the person-to-person relationship is crucial because of the multitude of roles played by the TAP<sup>11</sup>.

In Box 2 Danida's technical assistance is briefly introduced. Danida has different types of advisor programmes and operates with both bilateral programme advisors and multilateral advisors. Advisors are both recruited directly and through companies. The number of both short-term and long-term advisors is decreasing.

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<sup>11</sup> ECDPM, Study on the Provision of Technical Assistance Personnel: What can we learn from promising experiences? 2007

## Box 2: Danida and TAP

### Bilateral Advisors

It has proven difficult to recruit advisors of Danish nationality. In 2005 67% of the bilateral advisors were Danish in 2006 the percentage had fallen to 55% (Source: Redegørelse for Personalebistanden, Danida, 2007, p. 3.). A new recruitment strategy is currently being outlined. It focuses on attracting new types of advisors through more focused ads, which inter alia provides more information on family life on mission. The number of bilateral advisors has in general decreased and from 2002 to 2006 long-term advisors have been cut back with 22% and short-term advisors have declined by 30% (Source: Redegørelse for Personalebistanden, Danida, 2007, p. 4.)

In the annual technical assistance report 2004 the issue of recruiting women is raised several times. It has proven difficult to recruit women and different types of strategies have been outlined in order to improve this situation. In 2003 24% of all long-term advisors were women. Out of the number of women who applied for a long-term advisor position 42% were single. The 2004 report therefore concludes that there is a core relationship between family and how many women apply for long-term positions. If the percentage of women is to increase it is important to take the family into consideration. Information on currently contracted female long-term advisors was not available in the 2007 report. The 2007 report shows that 50% of the senior advisors were women and 63% of all JPO posts were occupied by women.

### Multilateral Advisors

Danida not only hires bi-lateral advisors who are posted directly for Danida around the world. Danida also supports multilateral advisors who are paid by Danida but work for international organisations. At the end of 2006 109 multilateral senior advisors, junior advisors and special assistants were placed in international organisations. In 2003 133 multilateral advisors were placed in international organisations. In the diagram in Annex 9 (p. 53) it is shown that the number of JPO's has gone from 119 in 2003 to 82 in 2006, a decrease of 32%. Whereas the number of senior advisors has grown from 6 in 2003 to 14 in 2006 more than doubling the amount of senior advisors.

### Company Advisors

In 2003 the equivalent to 394 full year positions were occupied by company contracted by Danida. This is a decrease from 2001 where 521 full year positions were filled. Except for 2004 the number of contracted companies has continued to decline and amounted to only 298 full year positions in 2006. In the overview below (divided into sectors) the allocation of resources to different sectors is almost the same from 2003 to 2006 except from transport and social infrastructure. Education, Democracy and Human Rights and Governance have decreased with up to 40% in allocations of company contracts.

Company Advisors divided into Sector	2003	2006
Education	5.50%	2.90%
Health	2.80%	3.30%
Water and Sanitation	13.10%	12.60%
Governance	17.20%	10.60%
Planning	0.60%	6.10%
Social infrastructure	0.10%	0.0%
Transport	8.60%	14.60%
Communication and Energy	4.90%	5.70%
Farming	8.80%	9.50%
Environment	21.70%	23.90%
Democracy and Human Rights	8.30%	3.60%
Other	8.50%	7.20%

Source: Danida, Redegørelse for Personalebistanden, 2004 and 2007

### 3. Synthesis of Evaluations

#### 3.1. *The sample*

The overview below shows the coverage of the key studies of the sample. The ECDPM and DFID evaluations are the most comprehensive. The DFID and ECDPM evaluations have gathered materials from case countries and taken samples, which span contextual differences (although the DFID sample is concentrated on Sub-Saharan Africa and does not include a fragile state environment). No other evaluations have included fieldwork at country level. The ECDPM study has as the only one in the sample been carried out jointly. The BTC study focuses on the provider, and is essentially a catalogue and background analysis to guide the future of TAP to be provided by BTC. The study, which essentially raises the same issues as the DFID evaluation and the ECDPM evaluation study, takes the provider angle and the provider organization perspective in the findings and recommendations. The Sida study is not an evaluation of TAP, but a forward-looking study on capacity building, which touches on TAP. The IMF has made the observation that extensive resources to transfer skills are necessary and TA is a useful instrument in this respect, advisers covering more than one country (regional advisers) are considered in favourable terms.

#### Overview of selected reports of the sample

<u>Evaluation</u>	<u>Case country</u> <i>Fragile states</i>	<u>Case country</u> <i>Aid dependent state</i>	<u>Case country</u> <i>Non aid dependent state</i>	<u>Other cases</u>
<b>Belgian Technical Cooperation, 2006</b> <i>(desk study by ACE and ECDPM)</i>	-	-	-	The paper assesses how seven international providers organise TAP
<b>Danida, BMZ (Germany) and Australia, 2007</b> <i>(by ECDPM)</i>	Solomon Islands	Mozambique	Vietnam	Annexes on how the Australia, Germany and Denmark organises TAP
<b>DFID, 2006</b> <i>(by OPM)</i>	-	Ghana, Kenya and Zambia	South Africa	Economic Management selected as focus
<b>Sida 2005</b>	-	-	-	Capacity building in which one method is closer collaboration between partner and Swedish institutions
<b>IMF 2002</b>	Afghanistan	Yemen and Mozambique	-	-

DFID has developed a 'How to' note based on a specific evaluation of TAP. The IMF has also recently prepared a 'How to' note, which discusses how it can post technical advisers in key positions, this note is based on an evaluation carried out in 2002.

#### Typologies of context

The broader context of aid (i.e. the main characteristics of the society receiving assistance) was raised in the selection of case countries in the ECDPM study. The case studies illustrate the importance of context, and acknowledges context as the main determinant for design of role, employment, management and monitoring of TAP. It is useful to think along the following broader categories of context, which can be appropriate in defining future TAP roles:

- Fragile states (in its various forms);
- States which are heavily aid dependent and have human resource constraints;
- Less aid dependent states with relatively well functioning human resources.

The Solomon Islands case study, although it had very particular circumstances, raised some general issues of how TAP functions within the context of a fragile state and more importantly how TAP changes from a transactional position towards a transformational position. The conclusions drawn are that when TAP is transactional and needed across all key functions of government, there will be significant difficulties in transferring skills and no easy substitute to TAP. This results in a low level of sustainability. The ECDPM case study did not give any firm recommendations on the way forward to reduce the dependency on TAP and has raised the issue of complexity in a fragile state context; which is important for donors rethinking their TAP engagement. The case studies of Mozambique and Vietnam gave more hands on conclusions on the role of TAP in the aid dependent situation and the less aid dependent context. Obviously these broad categories cannot include all the specificities of a particular country and the study also raises a pertinent question as to how change/transition will occur from one typology to another.

### **3.2. Objectives and focus**

The DFID evaluation had a high level of ambition and the objective was 'to map and test the chain results from DFID-funded TAP personnel inputs to enhance partner country capacity and better policies and service delivery. In doing so the lessons will be drawn on the best ways to provide TAP personnel in different contexts in order to maximise effectiveness, efficiency and impact on partner country capacity'<sup>12</sup>. The evaluation concludes that it was not possible to draw conclusions on the 'effectiveness, efficiency and impact', because capacity was not benchmarked ini-

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<sup>12</sup> DFID, Developing Capacity? An Evaluation of DFID-Funded Technical Co-operation for Economic Management in Sub-Saharan Africa, Synthesis Report Vol. 1, 2006, p1.



tially. In fact only in a minority of cases reviewed was it even possible to identify outputs. When outputs could not be traced, the causes were found to be lack of government commitment, uncertainty about mandates, management weaknesses and design flaws. The ECDPM evaluation study had more realistic objectives and set out to “gain a better understanding of the future demand for technical assistance, to relate that to past experience and to recommend how TA personnel can best be mobilised, used and managed in the future to strengthen national capacity”<sup>13</sup>. Moreover it is said that “there are formidable methodological challenges associated with assessing TA personnel effectiveness, particularly when capacity building is the main objective”<sup>14</sup> The BTC study did not state its objectives, but was commissioned by the Special Evaluator of the Belgian Government, as a broader analysis of the institutional arrangements, relationships, and regulations among the different organisations involved in Belgian development assistance. The questions to be answered by that report were: “(i) the direction of the broad international policy discussions on TA and the placement of TA, in the context of the Paris Declaration on Harmonisation and Alignment; (ii) good and innovative practices for how TA provided by BTC could be made more effective by taking into account the international discourse on the topic and lessons learned by other international development organisations; ... (iv) how the metier of TA, particularly BTC expert positions, could be made more attractive for experts working in Belgian development cooperation organisations, with a focus on BTC.”<sup>15</sup>

### **3.3. *Weight given to context analysis***

The DFID evaluation found that more comprehensive studies on context is required to develop a clear framework for capacity development within which TAP should be positioned as one element. This includes considerations on partner government’s policy commitment, benchmarking capacity of the organisation supported, adapting realistic views on what is achievable and choice of appropriate instruments. The findings were that DFID was not substantial enough in context analysis and that “a more rigorous and systematic approach to the assessment of the institutional and organisational context is required, if DFID’s activities are to contribute to the sustainable building of capacity – to have a transformational impact on the organisations supported and to bring about the strengthening of the economic management process. And further that this needs to be reflected in a long-term and strategic approach to engagement in capacity development processes and a greater attention to understanding the process by which change may occur, as well as strengthened monitoring of key factors affecting the scope for effective capacity development.”<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> ECDPM, Study on the Provision of Technical Assistance Personnel: What can we learn from promising experiences?, May 2007, p1

<sup>14</sup> ECDPM, Study on the Provision of Technical Assistance Personnel: What can we learn from promising experiences?, May 2007, p Viii

<sup>15</sup> BTC, Changing Minds and Attitudes, 2006, p.16.

<sup>16</sup> DFID, Developing Capacity? An Evaluation of DFID-Funded Technical Co-operation for Economic Management in Sub-Saharan Africa, Synthesis Report Vol. 1, 2006, p. 66

The DFID evaluation also found that in contexts that are ‘favourable’ a transformational approach was effective, even on limited resources. The transactional approach proved more effective in ‘unfavourable’ contexts. The evaluation said that, “in designing capacity building interventions, a more rigorous and systematic approach to the assessment of the institution context is required.” This finding is supported by the findings of the ECDPM evaluation study, which showed that the broader context determined the type and role of TAP.

Furthermore, the DFID evaluation found that in cases where role (transactional/transformational), mandate and policy of the supported government were unclear problems would occur. This finding is again supported by the ECDPM study, which talks about the different roles played by TAP and the unclear lines of accountability in particular in environments, which are heavily dependent on aid. The ECDPM study uses other words, but has essentially drawn similar conclusions to the DFID evaluation in this respect.

### ***3.4. Main themes – towards good practice***

#### TAP as part of human resource planning

As discussed above, the DFID evaluation found that insufficient attention was given to the institutional context analysis in the design of TAP interventions. Moreover *design processes* tend to overstate the capacity and commitment of partners institutions. The lack of progress on civil service reform was in three out of four country cases the most significant factor contributing to the limited capacity development impact. A similar conclusion was drawn by the ECDPM evaluation study, this study said that TAP was not seen as part of in an overall human resource management context and not linked to civil service reform. The same study recommended that donors start a dialogue with partner governments on these issues.

#### New aid modalities change TAP roles

Although TAP is considered to be a programming issue by most donors, it is a very recognizable part of development assistance. Consequently donors place considerable importance on TA and although considered to be an instrument, TAP has a special role given its visibility and people to people relationship. In other words it is useful to have guidelines and policy notes, which include the basic principles of future TAP. The changing modalities of aid, and the move towards increased national ownership and management of assistance, which entail harmonised approaches and pooling of funds under different types of arrangements, place TAP in new roles. Therefore, now more than ever, there is a need to define some general principles of TA to learn from ‘good practice’ and to develop more specific principles for particular context-types. The DFID and ECDPM studies place TAP as contributing to organisational outputs rather than as a modality, which can carry measures of outcome and effectiveness on its own. In this light, it is the partners’ perceptions, which are the most adequate, as proxies for assessing effectiveness of TA.

Demand/supply – leading to ownership and commitment by the partner,

The practical constraints for country driven approaches to TAP are: HR capacity is weak; ‘real’ demand has no independent parameters, because functional analyses of organizations are hardly ever undertaken, and TAP is not viewed in a strategic human resource context nor in a civil service reform context.

Certain factors are known to be shaping demand. These are an ability to identify needs and articulate demand, and knowledge of costs and benefits. In the ECDPM study the case of Vietnam showed that low dependency on foreign assistance and capacity of the country’s civil service gives more specialised, more focused TA requests, and often a mixture of short-term and long-term needs. The same case also showed that company advisers, because of the flexibility and mix between short-term and long-term, were slightly preferable. Further in the case of Vietnam, regional and national advisers are increasingly available and used at the expense of donor country nationals. In certain posts regional and national advisers are preferred, because of their different skills sets and they are often more adaptable. Moreover such TAP is considerably cheaper. As discussed elsewhere, transparency about the costs and benefits of different types of TAP is therefore important to create a more genuine demand environment, and this enhances the associated effects of commitment. Annex 8 gives an example of a transparent and costed menu of capacity development options used by AusAID in the dialogue with partners in Papua New Guinea.

The DFID evaluation showed that the South African government has articulated a policy framework for the use of TAP. South Africa is stated as a case with a strong level of ownership and commitment, (both associated demand factors). In the more aid dependent countries of Ghana, Zambia and Kenya, the DFID supported activities were part of wider multi-donor efforts. It was concluded that pooling initiatives have the potential to improve ownership. The case studies generally found that the cases where outputs had not been achieved, the TA situation was characterised by lack of appropriate skills, insufficient controls from the organisations supported, insufficient attention to the use of organisational capacity and *lack of effective government commitment*.

The DFID note has in its main principles formulated good practice associated with ‘demand’ as:

1. “Give more support to partners’ capacity to design, procure, manage and monitor TC (technical cooperation) personnel, including through the development of TC policy frameworks.
2. Fund TC in response to demand and where there is a good level of political and technical ownership for it.
3. TC should be accountable to the partner organisation. We should reduce reliance on Project Implementation Units and integrate TC into partner management structures where possible.

4. Ensure rigorous outcome based monitoring and include TC in mutual accountability processes.”<sup>17</sup>

The BTC study concludes that because many countries still do not have the capacity to procure technical assistance, ownership remains with development agencies instead of partner country institutions. In this situation, major effort to develop capacity would be required. “These difficulties need to be juxtaposed to the views of partner countries on TA. They generally want less TA, to have it unbundled (unconnected to projects), and un-earmarked. Without some movement in these directions, it is unlikely that partner countries will feel more committed to improving the effectiveness of TA.”<sup>18</sup>

The ECDPM study found that provision of TAP has often come as a ‘free good’ to the recipient, and although this is changing, it is still common for donors not to be fully transparent about their TAP costs.

A generalisation on demand/supply seems to be that the stronger the state is, the more ownership to the development process and to demand/acceptance of TAP. With this come more commitment and ownership, and therefore a more clear-cut accountability relationship. The weaker the state is, the more will the TAP demand/supply situation be in the hands of the donor.

Another angle of the demand/supply nexus is that donor agencies have a demand from their own country context to supply TAP as part of development assistance. The focus on control of funds by the agencies and their parliaments are most easily solved by placement of TAP, which besides capacity building functions is a watchdog of public funds supplied by a particular donor.

National level decision makers and a particular donor are often the parties, who agree on the provision of TAP. The Mozambique case showed that there is demand and need for TAP at sub-national level, but this is often not articulated at national level. Moreover are the mechanisms for providing TAP to sub-national level not clear-cut? Is TAP free standing or part of an overall resource envelope to a province? More focus on this in future both by recipient governments and donor agencies is called for.

#### Aid effectiveness – pooling of TAP

The DFID evaluation found that commitment towards strengthened harmonisation will improve the framework for effectiveness of capacity building and thereby the TAP. Compared to earlier assessments, improvements have been made in addressing capacity constraints and issues of realistic assessments of time and resources need. National ownership in relation to harmonisation, alignment and management of TA seems to be increasing. Pooling initiatives still stand as labour intensive and

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<sup>17</sup> DFID, How to provide Technical Cooperation personnel, 2006, p. 14

<sup>18</sup> BTC, Changing minds and attitudes, 2006, p. 6

time consuming for donors as well as government, but the pooling initiatives have now begun to realise their potential for improving ownership. DFID is recommended by the evaluation to continue strengthening its commitment to the Paris Declaration as it provides an improved framework for the effectiveness of capacity development. However, the evaluation team also found that negotiations between donors often revolve around whose procedures should be used for management. In some cases this lead to coordinated approaches and harmonised activities in some form. The harmonisation seems to have increased the transparency between donors around TA related issues. It seems that key strategic decisions still tend to remain under joint donor control and are not handed over to the government.

The DFID evaluation also found that TA pooling is organised with different arrangements depending on context and type of support. Funding initiatives such as general budget support, sector support, targeted sector, sub-sector and cross-sector support are all lined up as pooling opportunities.

It is the view of the ECDPM evaluation team that the move away from project support to sector and budget support has "... increased the opportunity to engage in discussions and agreements on the harmonisation of donor practices in line with partner country policies, especially in terms of TC pooling."<sup>19</sup> It appears that pooled financing through for example swaps and GBS has improved alignment with partner countries' national development strategies, institutions and procedures.<sup>20</sup> Both the BTC Study, the Study on Implementation of the Danida Policy Paper, and Morgan and Fraser each stress the importance of pooling as a way to make TAP more effective. Interesting in this respect is that caution is also voiced in the studies to not automatically conclude that pooling equals effectiveness. The general optimism on pooling in on the opportunity the modality opens up.

The ECDPM study concludes that the case studies showed found very few data on aid effectiveness of TAP. The Mozambique case study has a discussion on the potential effects of pooling TA funding which is seen as a positive step towards increased effectiveness in principle. The Mozambique case study provides a useful overview of all the explicit and implicit roles played by TAP and measurement of outputs, let alone outcome, is almost impossible because of all the different functions, which even if written down beforehand, follows its own path dependent on the counterpart's needs. Expecting to measure the effectiveness of TAP - understood in the sense of contribution to outcomes- is only partially feasible. Assessing the role of TAP within the context of an organisational output is therefore more realistic, and this should be the level of ambition. In budget support arrangements the role of TAP, will even more than in programmes, be just one element of a larger assessment of performance.

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<sup>19</sup> DFID, *Developing Capacity? An Evaluation of DFID-Funded Technical Co-operation for Economic Management in Sub-Saharan Africa*, Synthesis Report Vol. 1, 2006, p. 60

<sup>20</sup> DFID, *Developing Capacity? An Evaluation of DFID-Funded Technical Co-operation for Economic Management in Sub-Saharan Africa*, Synthesis Report Vol. 1, 2006, p. 61

### Management and types of TAP

TAP management by DFID was more effective in the cases where DFID applied different styles and techniques. It was proven likely that effectiveness was enhanced where the choice of contractors was a joint decision between DFID and Government and where extensive interview based selection was used to identify the right consultant. This finding is again supported by the ECDPM evaluation study, which found that joint recruitment processes and transparency in the process enhances ownership. The finding from the Vietnam case also found that videoconferencing was too superficial in an interview process.

The DFID evaluation team was of the view that one could not draw any general conclusion about the relationship between the type of technical assistance, which has been provided and effectiveness and impact should be used. With that said, a few points were drawn up.

On the issue of long-term versus short-term support TA it was seen that long-term support in the case studies had been successful. But the effectiveness of long-term support "... varied depending on both on the context and on the quality of the TC provided – with the most relevant aspect of quality relation to much more process and personal interaction, rather than technical skills."<sup>21</sup> Short-term support had mainly been effective, when provided as part of an overall package of support. The use of local consultants (advisors), as opposed to international consultants was brought up in the evaluation in relation to the case studies. Findings showed that the use of international consultants could provide the initial access to international experience and was also perceived as independent of local interests. Also the international consultants were less likely to be perceived as a threat by staff of organisations supported. The argument used in many cases for local consultants were that these were better adapted and more cost efficient and these advantages sometimes outweighed the advantages of an international consultant. "The pooling study also noted that the move towards pooling arrangements in the countries reviewed appeared to lead to greater flexibility about the choice between using local and international consultants."<sup>22</sup> International and national consultants were viewed by governments to have pros and cons, as they provide different skills and experience. The ECDPM study found that regional and national consultants have certain advantages in country contexts with a more dynamic labour market, and moving towards more flexibility in types of TAP seems to be the way forward. Making the choices more transparent in the design process, i.e. both costs and benefits will enable the recipient to make informed choices, which is likely to enhance ownership and commitment.

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<sup>21</sup> DFID, *Developing Capacity? An Evaluation of DFID-Funded Technical Co-operation for Economic Management in Sub-Saharan Africa*, Synthesis Report Vol. 1, 2006, p. 56

<sup>22</sup> DFID, *Developing Capacity? An Evaluation of DFID-Funded Technical Co-operation for Economic Management in Sub-Saharan Africa*, Synthesis Report Vol. 1, 2006, p. 57

Long-term TA was more effectively delivered, where the provider "... was of a high technical calibre and was seen by the organisation being supported as responsive to its needs and as under its direct management control. In the case of short-term technical cooperation, the provision of flexible consultancy resources has in most cases been effective at a transactional level."<sup>23</sup>

The findings indicated that providing TA in a transactional role could have an important impact. This was due to the fact that the intervention could be seen as extremely valuable "... and responsive to the needs of the organisation concerned, where it cannot otherwise perform its functions effectively because of wider institutional constraints".<sup>24</sup> The transfer of the actual skills had more to do with the skills built into the role and ToR of the provider and with the interpersonal and process skills of the provider than with the identification of a particular counterpart.

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<sup>23</sup> DFID, *Developing Capacity? An Evaluation of DFID-Funded Technical Co-operation for Economic Management in Sub-Saharan Africa*, Synthesis Report Vol. 1, 2006, p. 40-41

<sup>24</sup> DFID, *Developing Capacity? An Evaluation of DFID-Funded Technical Co-operation for Economic Management in Sub-Saharan Africa*, Synthesis Report Vol. 1, 2006, p. 58

## **Annex 1: ECDPM Evaluation Study**

### Title of the evaluation document:

Joint evaluation of provision of technical assistance personnel (ECDPM Evaluation study)

### Author and commissioning agencies

European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM)

Published: June 2007

Country cases included: Vietnam, Mozambique and the Solomon Islands

### Overall objective and focus of the policy

Danida, BMZ Germany and AusAID has commissioned an evaluation study of the provision of technical assistance, which include three country case studies conducted in Mozambique, Vietnam, and the Solomon Islands<sup>25</sup>. More over the study has produced an inception report, which gives an overview of literature and technical annexes describing how the agencies commissioning the study use technical assistance personnel in their strategies and programming. A first draft of the synthesis report was presented to the agencies commissioning the study as well as representatives from JICA, DFID and the European Commission in late May 2007 at the Maastricht workshop and revised in June 2007. This section of the report will briefly present key themes from the country case studies and then synthesize and discuss issues, which are expected to be of relevance for the future provision of TAP.

### Findings and recommendations

The key findings based on three country case studies with implications for future TAP provision were that the ‘bigger picture’ (i.e. the context for TAP) plays an important role, and there are strategic and more operational implications of this<sup>26</sup>.

### The Solomon Islands

The Solomon Islands are one of the most aid dependent countries in the world. About 51% of the GDP comes from aid receipts. The country case of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) and TA personnel in the Solomon Islands has exposed the fragile states dilemma. There is a multitude of tasks, conflicts, and a weak state apparatus, which includes an enormous shortage of skilled human resources. The RAMSI mission restored peace swiftly in 2003 and estab-

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<sup>25</sup> The ECDPM study began on 1<sup>st</sup> July 2006 and an inception workshop was conducted at the end of September 2006.

<sup>26</sup> The methodology applied in the case studies includes review of TAP in a number of selected programmes. Very little emphasis was placed on the sub-national level. This should be born in mind, as both Mozambique and Vietnam are quite decentralised and local governments are assigned the main service delivery functions of Government. Solomon Islands is a special case, with major logistic challenges between islands.



lished initial credibility. The Australian government dominates the RAMSI and the mode of operation is a ‘whole of Government’ approach. RAMSI personnel constitutes about half of the TAP in the Solomon Islands but this case study concentrates only on the category of RAMSI, which supposedly limits the overall applicability of the findings. The case study concludes that there is an urgent need to rethink RAMSI and to move from a direct/transactional to an indirect/transformational approach. Having stated this, the challenge is enormous. The absorptive capacity of the country is low and there is urgency for deep institutional reforms and capacity building and at the same time swift visible change towards the better, in order to keep potential unrest at bay. Due to weak institutions, it is also difficult to draw up a clear role for more transformational TAP.

The case poses a very particular case for the Australian government, as it is a dominant player in the geo-political region. The presence and interests of the Australian government is likely to have drawn in other states to participate in the RAMSI (which includes 13 Pacific states). Some of the smaller nations in the same region facing similar problems as the Solomon Islands cannot draw upon international assistance.

The study recommends that some new approaches be adopted to modify the ‘whole of government’ approach and the transactional mode of operation, without providing any clear-cut recommendations. The major lesson to be learned is that engagement of TAP in fragile states requires an exit strategy at entry and very clear terms and conditions for engagement. The needs are long-term and the reality is that it is difficult to be transformational, because of the weak institutional environment and the scarcity of trained human resources.

#### Mozambique<sup>27</sup>

Mozambique is heavily dependent upon foreign assistance, with almost half of its public spending provided through development assistance. This country case shows an assistance dependent country, with a weak human resource management system and a weak civil service. Public sector management is heavily dependent on TAP, (25% of ODA according to DAC statistics). Various capacity development assessments have been carried out but so far the country has not embarked on a civil service reform, and human resources are not viewed and treated as a strategic resource for public sector development. The country case also shows how TAP may be positioned within the new assistance modalities, as the Government and its development partners seek to implement the Paris Declaration on harmonization and alignment.

This case poses questions with regards to the sustainability of assistance, including TAP. Another issue for the future is the question of whether TA pooling really is efficient and working on the terms of the partner institution, as it was found that

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<sup>27</sup> The Mozambique case study is rich with concrete examples and valuable reflections, which will be useful in Danida’s work of revising the present policy on technical assistance.

major decisions are taken by donors, in spite of all the good intentions. TAP decisions are not embedded at a strategic level, but seen as a programming issue. Moreover, the case exposes how TAP has many different roles: Controlling, engaging in policy dialogue, providing technical advice, facilitating organisational change and reform; innovating/exploring; protecting/buffering; gap filling/implementing. This is interesting in as far as the multiplicity of roles, which are most often not part of the job description, and raises the point of how TAP effectiveness can be measured when the roles are multiple and often not well described. The answer is that effectiveness measures would only be theoretically possible if all roles are specified in measurable terms, and this is not realistic, as it takes away the process and flexibility, which is one of the most features most appreciated by the partner.

The Mozambique case also raises the question of the effective demand for TAP and questions how long term ownership is created. The key to effectiveness of TAP is recognized being linked to demand, followed suit by a degree of ownership. Ownership only comes if there is a demand for TAP, so there is chicken and egg situation. The country case suggests that joint design of programmes and other support modalities are important, because this can prime demand and increase ownership of TAP. This in turn increases the likelihood of recipient management.

Looking ahead, the conclusions arising from the Mozambique country case are interesting in a broader context. With such an extensive input of TAP there is an urgent need for donors to associate TAP with a dialogue on the country's human resource management and civil service. Human resource capacity in the public sector must be looked at as a strategic issue of national importance and not only addressed as programming. TAP in Mozambique is fragmented, because it is viewed as a programming issue. The Paris Declaration guides the move towards pooling of resources. It is anticipated in the study that pooling will empower the recipient organisation because the recipient is managing the aid resources, while individual donors are taking a back seat.

An interesting finding of this study is although there is an overall wish to move from direct (transactional) to indirect (transformational) approaches, a combined mix of direct and indirect approaches also make good sense. The direct approaches may be valuable in certain steps of a reform process. The study also found that needs for TAP at sub-national level tends to be overlooked, and while some institutions at national level increasingly have capacity to use more transformational technical assistance, the low capacity at sub-national level calls for more direct approaches.

### Vietnam

In *Vietnam* ODA only represents 4% of GDP and human resource capacity exists within the civil service. Vietnam is in other words a case of a country, which is not heavily dependent on foreign assistance. Vietnam is a 'donor darling' with competition among donors and the country to which Danida deploys most TAP (together

with Mozambique). In principle advisors are recruited for those highly technical positions rather than as generalists (although an illustration in the case study shows that TA is also used for direct interventions, yet generally moving more towards an indirect role (p.35 – May report 2007). The TAP is noted in the government’s strategic framework on ODA utilisation, and seen as particularly important in the fields of law preparation (on enterprise, land, commercial procurement, competition, and anti-corruption). The government has guidelines on how to use TAP; management of TAP has recently been transferred to the institutions in which the personnel are placed. The experience is that TAP has limited possibilities for direct access to policy makers and in this sense TAP is truly managed as a technical strengthening.

At a more operational level, this case study found there are positive experiences with regionally sourced TAP, even while national TAP are increasingly coming into play. The case study found that it was difficult to draw ‘unambiguously hard-and-fast criteria’ with regard to which mode of TAP interventions have worked best and why. Even so, there remained certain advantages within the programmes reviewed for hiring companies. These reasons included: Working with a team in which diverse skills are often required; a possibility to mix short and long-term; agreed milestones in ToR; and, the advantage that poor performing personnel can be dismissed. Advantages of hiring individuals included: Cost effectiveness (no corporate overhead); close involvement of counterpart agency in monitoring; and the ease to which duties can be changed and rescheduling, as there are no ToR to fulfil, but only a broad job description. Within this context, the study concludes that company advisers seem to better fit the bill more than the general long-term advisers. The Vietnamese government appreciates having a hand in the recruitment process as well as setting up rigorous mechanisms to monitor TAP. With the specificity attached to TAP, it has also been made clear that it is preferable for government representatives to jointly recruit TAP with the donor.

Looking ahead the following picture emerges: With the growth of the private sector there is a dynamic labour market, which builds up a consulting industry which can supply TA to the public sector at the same time as it poaches the best and brightest from the public sector. With the ownership to TAP, donors and the government must work closely to define the role of TAP within the broader context of budget support and programmes, and the recruitment should be much more in the direct hands of the Vietnamese counterparts of a donor.

#### The ECDPM list of literature

The literature provided by the ECDPM study generally proved to be helpful and satisfactory. The list showed the centrality of the studies carried out by ECDPM, or by the authors in earlier incarnations. The documents in the list were found to be up to date, but it was unclear why exactly those documents were chosen and also unclear whether other documents had been found, but not used. The list of literature provided in “Vision for the Future Technical Assistance – Final Report” from Ox-

ford Policy Management was found to include more critical literature, not included in ECDPM's overview.

A general comment on ECDPM is the inconsistency in the way in which the draft reports are titled. Changing authors and final reports, that are classified as working drafts, seem confusing to the reader and creating an overview takes time.

Many of the documents from the ECDPM study were not relevant for this particular desk study and an extensive search was needed to conduct the desk study. However, this search showed that there still is a gap of literature on 'know-how' specifically in regards to TAP. Overall, only a few donors provided in depth information on their practises. Many documents, evaluations and policy formulations were very broad in their descriptions of how they provided technical assistance.

## **Annex 2: Evaluation Findings BTC**

### Title of the document

Changing minds and attitudes – towards improved Belgian Technical Assistance. (BTC) Reflection and discussion paper.

### Author and commissioning agencies

BTC CTB empowering development, ACE Europe, ECDPM

Published: January 2006

Period covered: Unknown

### Country cases included

Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom and Australia (desk study)

### Overall objective and focus of the technical assistance evaluation

ECDPM conducted in collaboration with ACE Europe a study on behalf of BTC in preparation for up coming discussions with DGDC (Directorate-General for Development Cooperation) on the future role of TA in Belgian development cooperation. The study conducted focused on how TA personnel are provided or financed. The following questions guided the report:

- (i) “The broad international policy discussions on TA and the current thinking about the place of TA in the context of the Paris Declaration on Harmonisation and Alignment;
- (ii) Good and innovative practices of other International Development Organisations (IDOs) in the area of TA, particularly bilaterals with similar mandates to those of BTC;
- (iii) Possible approaches for how TA provided by BTC could be made more effective by taking into account the international discourse on the topic and lessons learned by other IDOs, and
- (iv) How the metier of TA, particularly BTC expert positions, could be made more attractive for experts working in Belgian development cooperation organisations, with a focus on BTC.”<sup>28</sup>

### Main findings and Recommendations

BTC has a de-linked identification and formulation phase as DGDC identifies and BTC formulates. This has proven a problem for the coordination and effectiveness of the mobilisation of TA. Other donors in the study have linked process adding more control and coordination to the TA process. It is therefore recommended that the identification and formulation is seen as the initial stage of the implementation process, and not as the end of a strategic phase as is the current situation. It seems

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<sup>28</sup> BTC, Changing minds and attitudes, 2006, p. 16

that decentralising technical assistance is not a priority at the moment. In the report, it is found that decentralisation provides a closer link to policy formulation, strategic prioritisation and planning for implementation and also for better understanding among parties.

BTC has not untied its recruitment of expertise to the extent possible. BTC recruits personnel from the international labour market but only when it cannot find candidates in Belgium. Increasing numbers of BTC experts are non-Belgian even though there is pressure from politicians to hire Belgian experts.<sup>29</sup> There is an increasing demand for TA to function as buffers, brokers, negotiators, facilitators and catalysts, all requiring an advisory approach. BTC wishes to de-link experts from projects so that they can concentrate on providing advice and building capacity. Engaging local TA is currently not used but the report is of the opinion that local TA is something which should be pursued and a policy should be formulated. This is also in line with the wish to move towards a more collaborative approach as outlined in the Paris Declaration.

Drivers of Change or Power analysis are used by organisations like DFID, GTZ and Sida to help them "... understand the institutional context in partner countries in the sense of cultural norms and the formal and informal laws of society which affect activities at a lower level".<sup>30</sup> BTC is developing an institutional assessment instrument. In the report it is stated that the instrument will not be able to make full use unless BTC works in close cooperation with DGCD.<sup>31</sup>

The evaluation team is of the opinion that putting a clear priority on TA would require some major changes in BTC. To do this agreed approaches to institutional analysis during the identification phase, solid analysis of the organisational context and solid human resources are needed.<sup>32</sup>

### Management of TA

The field staff of BTC were interviewed and contributed with some clear formulations on issues of TA personnel. The field staff called for clear policy direction as it was unclear what BTC's understanding was of capacity development, BTC's approach to supporting institutional reform and BTC's role regarding new aid mechanisms. Field staff also wanted enhanced orientation prior to their assignments. Many of the interviewed staff felt that they were left on their own in the field and that exchanges between headquarters and the field and among TA personnel were insufficient.<sup>33</sup> More involvement of key actors and more involvement in strategic discussions and decisions were also issues, which were raised by field staff. The report found that only few efforts have been taken to maintain field staffs expertise. De-

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<sup>29</sup> BTC, Changing minds and attitudes, 2006, p. 10

<sup>30</sup> BTC, Changing minds and attitudes, 2006, p. 10

<sup>31</sup> BTC, Changing minds and attitudes, 2006, p. 10

<sup>32</sup> BTC, Changing minds and attitudes, 2006, p. 11

<sup>33</sup> BTC, Changing minds and attitudes, 2006, p. 14

rived from this the evaluation team expects BTC to give particular attention to the dichotomy between advisory and management responsibilities in TA assignments. Also BTC's co-management approach should be given attention. "For BTC, it could be useful to build on the experiences of the Fond d'Expertise in Congo and to discuss the creation of other complementary funding mechanisms at a decentralised level, such as AusAID's 'facilities' or partnership funds, which would allow for targeted recruitment of TA as stand alone advisors based on demand formulated by the partner government."<sup>34</sup>

Besides the ordinary management tools, knowledge management and networking among Belgian development actors should be increased as there is a potential to cooperate with universities and other research institutes on the management of technical assistance which could help fill knowledge gaps and provide backstopping.

#### Country ownership and accountability

Because many countries still do not have the capacity to procure, TA ownership still often rests with development agencies instead of partner country institutions. In this situation major effort to develop capacity would be required. "These difficulties need to be juxtaposed to the views of partner countries on TA. They generally want less TA, to have it unbundled (unconnected to projects), and un-earmarked. Without some movement in these directions, it is unlikely that partner countries will feel more committed to improving the effectiveness of TA."<sup>35</sup>

#### Coordination

On harmonisation and effectiveness BTC is still a young player in the field of development and has yet to find its niche. BTC will have to pay special attention to harmonising its activities with other donors. For this to materialise capacity in the field must become clearer, "... included decentralisation of decision-making, improve field management capacities and the clarification of roles and responsibilities between BTC and DGDC."<sup>36</sup>

#### Basket funding/SWaps

"New aid mechanisms such as SWAps and budget support and the change processes they imply involve a substantial capacity development agenda for IDOs. Bigger bilateral development organisations, like DFID, Sida or DGIS have made significant investments in their organisations and have built internal capabilities to work with these mechanisms. BTC has a clear view of its purpose, which for a small donor is all about added value. "It is not about money changing hands but about ideas changing minds."<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> BTC, Changing minds and attitudes, 2006, p. 10

<sup>35</sup> BTC, Changing minds and attitudes, 2006, p. 6

<sup>36</sup> BTC, Changing minds and attitudes, 2006, p. 11

<sup>37</sup> BTC, Changing minds and attitudes, 2006, p. 10

Weight given to context analysis in the technical assistance evaluations

BTC is currently developing an analytical framework, which will help them provide context analyses.

Coverage in terms of themes sectors and countries

The report only concentrates on the use of technical assistance personnel generally speaking. There is therefore no specific sector or countries.

Overview of applied methods, methodological approaches and degree of collaboration with other donors and partner countries

The report is based on a desk study. Individual and group interviews were conducted with representatives from Belgian development organisations, universities based in Belgium, and TA experts, attachés working for Belgian organisations in the partner countries, representatives of IDOs in the UK (DFID), the Netherlands, France, Danida, Sida, GTZ and AusAid.<sup>38</sup> “After the first phase of the work, there was a consultative meeting with Belgian stakeholders from BTC, the DGDC and Belgian universities. A Steering Committee consisting of staff members of BTC accompanied the work of the ECDPM/ ACE Europe team. Three meetings took place during the execution of this assignment which took place between mid-January and early April 2006.”<sup>39</sup>

The degree to which the technical assistance evaluations conclusions have been used in policy.

There has not yet been developed a policy or ‘How to’ note.

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<sup>38</sup> BTC, Changing minds and attitudes, 2006, p. 5

<sup>39</sup> BTC, Changing minds and attitudes, 2006, p. 5



### **Annex 3: Evaluation Findings DFID**

#### Title of the document

Development Capacity? An evaluation of DFID funded technical co-operation for economic management in Sub-Saharan Africa - Synthesis report, Vol. 1.

#### Author and commissioning agencies

Evaluation department (EvD) of DFID and Oxford Policy Management

Published: June 2006 Period covered: 1999-2004

Country cases included: Ghana, Kenya, South Africa and Zambia

#### Overall objective and focus of the technical assistance evaluation

The overall objective of the evaluation of technical cooperation (TC) was “to map and test the chain of results from DFID-funded TC personnel inputs to enhanced partner country capacity and better policies and service delivery. In doing so, lessons will be drawn on the best ways to provide TC personnel in different contexts in order to maximise effectiveness, efficiency and impact on partner country capacity.”<sup>40</sup> To be able to respond to this overall objective a set of eight questions were designed covering issues of delivering outputs, support of partner countries, efficiency and effectiveness, ownership, context analyses, type of methods, policy process’, and key facets of capacity development.

#### Main findings and recommendations in summary

Activities reviewed in the evaluation addressed important issues with a potential to have a significant effect on the public sector performance in the supported country. The evaluation team recommends that “in designing capacity building interventions, a more rigorous and systematic approach to the assessment of the institutional context is required.”<sup>41</sup> Problems were found where role, mandate and policy of the supported government were unclear. This was due to the finding of limited adequacy in analysis of the implications of institutional context and organisational capacity. Also a clear distinction between transactional and transformational lacked not indicating clear how the transformational impact was to be brought about. For this reason relevance was questionable for many of the review activities.

In Ghana, Kenya and Zambia the supported activities were part of a wider multi-donor effort – being most effective in Ghana and Zambia due to the moving towards finalisation of the HIPC initiative. In South Africa government had articulated a policy framework for the use of TA. South Africa is also stated as the case study with a strong level of ownership in contrast to the other three countries where

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<sup>40</sup> DFID, Developing Capacity? An Evaluation of DFID-Funded Technical Co-operation for Economic Management in Sub-Saharan Africa, Synthesis Report Vol. 1, 2006, p. 1

<sup>41</sup> DFID, Developing Capacity? An Evaluation of DFID-Funded Technical Co-operation for Economic Management in Sub-Saharan Africa, Synthesis Report Vol. 1, 2006, p. xii

the level of ownership varied depending on organisational and political level. Therefore one of the findings was formulated in such a way that it was underlined pooling initiatives had begun to realise the potential for improving ownership, even though there still remains constraints on progress. The case studies where outputs have not been achieved are characterised by lack of appropriate skills, insufficient control from the organisation supported, insufficient attention to the use of organisational capacity and lack of effective government commitment.

Recommending that the commitments towards strengthening harmonisation and alignment were given in line with the Paris Declaration so to provide an improved framework for the effectiveness of capacity development. The evaluation team found that harmonisation with other donors had improved because of development of wider frameworks ex. in Ghana and Zambia.

Measuring the impact of the output proved to be difficult because the review in general did not include exercises to benchmark capacity and because capacity targets were not set. Only in a minority of the cases reviewed was it possible to identify output. In these cases it showed that failure to meet the predefined output was because of lack of government commitment and progress, uncertainty about the mandate of the organisation supported, management weaknesses or design flaws.<sup>42</sup> It was also found that the quality and appropriateness of skills belonging both to the potential TC provider and beneficiary organisation were critical, with interpersonal skills being particularly important.

#### Evidence on capacity development technical cooperation emerging from the evaluation<sup>43</sup>

It was found in the evaluation that in contexts that are favourable a transformational approach was effective even on limited resources. The transactional approach proved effective in more unfavourable contexts. The underlying conclusion being that effectiveness is not necessarily related to capacity development but can be a result of other things such as good leadership and well structured and well delivered TA. The evaluation team points out that DFID lacks an overarching policy to guide the use of TA and guidance on the most effective approach depending on the context.

#### Evidence on identification and design<sup>44</sup>

Generally the design of the TA activities did not pay sufficient attention to context, which could have improved the performance and enhanced impact. Also the findings of the evaluation team suggested that there was a tendency to overestimate the capacity

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<sup>42</sup> DFID, Developing Capacity? An Evaluation of DFID-Funded Technical Co-operation for Economic Management in Sub-Saharan Africa, Synthesis Report Vol. 1, 2006, p. xiv

<sup>43</sup> DFID, Developing Capacity? An Evaluation of DFID-Funded Technical Co-operation for Economic Management in Sub-Saharan Africa, Synthesis Report Vol. 1, 2006, p. xv

<sup>44</sup> DFID, Developing Capacity? An Evaluation of DFID-Funded Technical Co-operation for Economic Management in Sub-Saharan Africa, Synthesis Report Vol. 1, 2006, p. xvi

and commitment of the partner country or organisation. And that lack of progress in civil service reform in three out of four case studies was the most significant factor in explaining the limited capacity development impact achieved. “The most successful activities reviewed were marked by high levels of government ownership and consensus between DFID and other development partners on priorities and approach, and on close involvement of the organisation receiving support in the selection of TC providers.”<sup>45</sup>

#### Evidence on management and delivery of technical cooperation<sup>46</sup>

TC project management by DFID was more effective in the cases where DFID applied different styles and techniques. It was proven likely that effectiveness would be enhanced where the choice of contractors was a joint decision between DFID and Government and where extensive interview based selection was used to identify the right consultant. Quality assurance from an independence source was also likely to enhance the quality of certain types of projects. External management units operating outside the civil service structure can be proven necessary but impact and sustainability are questionable. Finally the use of special allowance and performance bonuses was not a successful tool in the cases reviewed.

#### Evidence on TC pooling initiatives<sup>47</sup>

Compared to earlier assessments improvements have been made in addressing capacity constraints and issues of realistic assessments of time and resources need. National ownership in relation to harmonisation, alignment and management of TA seems to be increasing. But pooling initiatives still stand as labour intensive and time consuming for donors as well as government, but the pooling initiatives have now begun to realise their potential for improving ownership.

#### Implications for DFID policy and practice<sup>48</sup>

Highlighted by the evaluation team DFID is recommended to continue strengthening its commitment to the Paris Declaration as it provides an improved framework for the effectiveness of capacity development. To support sustainable building of capacity DFID must apply a more rigorous and systematic approach to the assessment of the institutional and organisational context of the partner supported. The above mentioned issues should also be taken into consideration in the drafting of a new policy.

#### Management of TA

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<sup>45</sup> DFID, Developing Capacity? An Evaluation of DFID-Funded Technical Co-operation for Economic Management in Sub-Saharan Africa, Synthesis Report Vol. 1, 2006, p. xvi

<sup>46</sup> DFID, Developing Capacity? An Evaluation of DFID-Funded Technical Co-operation for Economic Management in Sub-Saharan Africa, Synthesis Report Vol. 1, 2006, p. i-ii

<sup>47</sup> DFID, Developing Capacity? An Evaluation of DFID-Funded Technical Co-operation for Economic Management in Sub-Saharan Africa, Synthesis Report Vol. 1, 2006, p. xvii

<sup>48</sup> DFID, Developing Capacity? An Evaluation of DFID-Funded Technical Co-operation for Economic Management in Sub-Saharan Africa, Synthesis Report Vol. 1, 2006, p. xviii

In general the evaluation team is of the opinion that caution in drawing any general conclusion about the relationship between the type of technical assistance which has been provided and effectiveness and impact should be used. When this is said some few points were drawn up.

On the issue of long-term versus short-term support it was seen by the evaluation team that long-term support in the case studies in the evaluation had been successful. But with this said the capacity development effectiveness of long-term support "... varied depending on both on the context and on the quality of the TC provided – with the most relevant aspect of quality relation to much more process and personal interaction, rather than technical skills."<sup>49</sup> Short-term support had mainly been effective where it had been provided as part of an overall package of support.

The use of local consultants (advisors) opposed to international consultants was brought up in the evaluation in relation to the case studies. Findings showed that the use of international consultants could provide the initial access to international experience and was also perceived as independent of local interests. Also the international consultants were less likely to be perceived as a treat by staff of organisations supported. So the argument used in many cases that local consultants were a better choice and more cost efficient sometimes outweighed the advantages of an international consultant. "The pooling study also noted that the move towards pooling arrangements in the countries reviewed appeared to lead to greater flexibility about the choice between using local and international consultants."<sup>50</sup> Both international as local consultants were seen by local government as having pros and cons providing different skills and experience.

Long-term TA was more effectively provided where the provider "... was of a high technical calibre and was seen by the organisation being supported as responsive to its needs and as under its direct management control. In the case of short-term technical cooperation, the provision of flexible consultancy resources has in most cases been effective at a transactional level."<sup>51</sup>

The findings indicated that providing TA in a transactional role could have an important impact. This was due to the fact that the intervention could be seen as extremely valuable "... and responsive to the needs of the organisation concerned where it cannot otherwise perform its functions effectively because of wider institutional constraints".<sup>52</sup> The transfer of the actual skills were more to do with the skills

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<sup>49</sup> DFID, *Developing Capacity? An Evaluation of DFID-Funded Technical Co-operation for Economic Management in Sub-Saharan Africa*, Synthesis Report Vol. 1, 2006, p. 56

<sup>50</sup> DFID, *Developing Capacity? An Evaluation of DFID-Funded Technical Co-operation for Economic Management in Sub-Saharan Africa*, Synthesis Report Vol. 1, 2006, p. 57

<sup>51</sup> DFID, *Developing Capacity? An Evaluation of DFID-Funded Technical Co-operation for Economic Management in Sub-Saharan Africa*, Synthesis Report Vol. 1, 2006, p. 40-41

<sup>52</sup> DFID, *Developing Capacity? An Evaluation of DFID-Funded Technical Co-operation for Economic Management in Sub-Saharan Africa*, Synthesis Report Vol. 1, 2006, p. 58

built into the role and ToR of the provider and with the interpersonal and process skills of the provider than with the identification of a particular counterpart.

#### Country ownership and accountability

One of the constraints which DFID was faced with was difficulty of maximising ownership. Some aspects of project design, procurement and management did not maximise ownership, especially where the supported organisation didn't have control over the selection of consultants and management.<sup>53</sup>

#### Coordination

It has been found by the evaluation team that the many negotiations between donors revolve around whose procedures should be used for implementing management. Coordinated bilateral arrangements seem to have worked well in approaching this problem. Donors have harmonised their activities in terms of an effective pool but still do individual implementation. The harmonisation seems to have increased the transparency between donors around TA related issues. But still issues arise. It seems that key strategic decisions still tend to remain under joint donor control. "There is a conflict between the ability to meet urgent demands (which can be effectively addressed by informal coordination arrangements or individual bilateral donors) and the process of capacity building for effective procurement and management of assistance. The scope for progress (and the priority to be placed on moving forward in this area, compared to lower cost and simpler processes of coordination and cooperation between donors) depends on the national context but the long-run determinants of success are likely to be the strength of government commitment to exercising more effective control over TC, and the level of success in developing organisational capacity for effective procurement and financial management."<sup>54</sup>

#### Basket funding/SWaps

It is concluded in the evaluation report that TA pooling arrangements have been used in the case studies, but that in practice different arrangements exist. On page 60 in the report, funding initiatives as general budget support, sector support, targeted sector, sub-sector and cross-sector support are lined up as pooling opportunities. The evaluation team explains that only few examples of pooling arrangements that are not complemented by additional bilateral support from pooled fund partners have been seen. It is the view of the evaluation team that the move away from project support to sector and budget support has "... increased the opportunity to engage in discussions and agreements on the harmonisation of donor practices in line with partner country policies, especially in terms of TC pooling."<sup>55</sup> It appears that pooled financing through for example swaps and GBS has improved alignment

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<sup>53</sup> DFID, *Developing Capacity? An Evaluation of DFID-Funded Technical Co-operation for Economic Management in Sub-Saharan Africa*, Synthesis Report Vol. 1, 2006, p. xii

<sup>54</sup> DFID, *Developing Capacity? An Evaluation of DFID-Funded Technical Co-operation for Economic Management in Sub-Saharan Africa*, Synthesis Report Vol. 1, 2006, p. xviii

<sup>55</sup> DFID, *Developing Capacity? An Evaluation of DFID-Funded Technical Co-operation for Economic Management in Sub-Saharan Africa*, Synthesis Report Vol. 1, 2006, p. 60

with partner countries' national development strategies, institutions and procedures.<sup>56</sup>

#### Weight given to context analysis in the technical assistance evaluations

The evaluation has built its report on the findings in the case studies. More overall and technical discussions are briefly drawn in through out the paper – but the evidence found is derived from the case studies only and the context of these findings. The cases evaluated do not represent a whole continuum of state types but gives the overall recommendation that a comprehensive study on context is required to develop a clear framework for capacity development. This including considerations on partner government's policy commitment, benchmarking the capacity of the organisation supported, adapting realistic views on what is achievable, and chooses appropriate instruments.

The evaluation team found that DFID was not substantial enough in their context analysis and that “a more rigorous and systematic approach to the assessment of the institutional and organisational context is required if DFID's activities are to contribute to the sustainable building of capacity – that is to have a transformational impact on the organisations supported and to bring about the strengthening of the economic management process. This needs to be reflected in a long-term and strategic approach to engagement in capacity development processes and a greater attention to understanding the process by which change may occur as well as strengthened monitoring of key factors affecting the scope for effective capacity development.”<sup>57</sup>

#### Coverage in terms of themes sectors and countries

The approach for the evaluation team was to focus on organisational capacity for economic management in Kenya, Ghana, South Africa and Zambia. This includes looking at “... strengthening the capacity of the partner organisations to define policy objectives, reach policy decisions, design policy instruments and implement them effectively.”<sup>58</sup>

#### Overview of applied methods, methodological approaches and degree of collaboration with other donors and partner countries

It was originally intended that the evaluation team should undertake “... a study of technical cooperation as an aid “instrument”, to complement work already being undertaken on general budget support”.<sup>59</sup> Because of the danger of attributing to technical cooperation effects which are associated with wider challenges of effective

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<sup>56</sup> DFID, Developing Capacity? An Evaluation of DFID-Funded Technical Co-operation for Economic Management in Sub-Saharan Africa, Synthesis Report Vol. 1, 2006, p. 61

<sup>57</sup> DFID, Developing Capacity? An Evaluation of DFID-Funded Technical Co-operation for Economic Management in Sub-Saharan Africa, Synthesis Report Vol. 1, 2006, p. 66

<sup>58</sup> DFID, Developing Capacity? An Evaluation of DFID-Funded Technical Co-operation for Economic Management in Sub-Saharan Africa, Synthesis Report Vol. 1, 2006, p. 1-2

<sup>59</sup> DFID, Developing Capacity? An Evaluation of DFID-Funded Technical Co-operation for Economic Management in Sub-Saharan Africa, Synthesis Report Vol. 1, 2006, p. i

capacity development the focus was after the inception phase adjusted and refocused. The study instead focused on the contribution of technical cooperation to capacity building in the area of economic management.

The study was built upon first an inception phase and subsequently a desk study about technical cooperation pooling. Four case studies were examined and broader cross-country studies were studied. The findings were summarised in a synthesis report which included recommendations for the future use of DFID-funded personnel in Sub-Saharan Africa.

The degree to which the technical assistance evaluation conclusions have been used in policy.

The 'How to provide Technical Cooperation Personnel' note is a hands on guideline on the principles for TA personnel. "The forward vision should be for partners to lead on identifying TC needs, designing Terms of Reference, procuring consultants through their systems, and line managing and monitoring them against clear outcomes – a more "market based", fully pooled approach."<sup>60</sup> In summary the principles for TA personnel are:

- 1) "Give more support to partners' capacity to design, procure, manage and monitor TC personnel, including through the development of TC policy frameworks.
- 2) Fund TC in response to demand and where there is a good level of political and technical ownership for it.
- 3) Take a strategic approach that aligns and links the TC to wider country led processes supporting poverty reduction.
- 4) Promote coordinated and pooled donor approaches to TC.
- 5) Appraise the organisational and institutional context and understand the limits of what TC personnel can achieve in terms of transformational capacity development, particularly where there are constraints in terms of commitment, staffing, management and incentives.
- 6) Be more realistic that TC personnel are one input and one input alone to capacity development. Capacity development is a long and complicated political process involving a range of factors. The key is that TC outputs contribute incrementally to this process.
- 7) Recognise the importance of having clearly defined and shared roles and expectations.
- 8) Recognise that TC for capacity development requires soft skills and personal qualities including for coaching, skills transfer, facilitation, flexibility to listen and respond to others' views and the changing context.
- 9) Ensure that there are no barriers to using local or regional consultants where needed.
- 10) Build ownership and effectiveness in DFID's TC procurement process by having shared and clear Terms of Reference, letting partners meet all long term TC personnel (interviews for self-employed and presentations for com-

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<sup>60</sup> DFID, How to provide technical cooperation personnel, 2006, p. 12

panies), specifying the range of skills and personal qualities that are needed beyond technical ones; and ensuring that partners take a good practice approach when we are delegating responsibility to them.

- 11) TC should be accountable to the partner organisation. We should reduce reliance on Project Implementation Units and integrate TC into partner management structures where possible.
- 12) Ensure rigorous outcome based monitoring and include TC in mutual accountability processes.”<sup>61</sup>

DFID’s ‘How to provide Technical Cooperation personnel’ note on technical assistance was written within the same period of time of which the evaluation was carried out. Findings from the evaluation were handed over to the team writing the ‘How to’ note. The ‘How to’ note’s goal was to contribute to the impact of technical cooperation. The vision for TA supply was to in the future to have a more market oriented approach so that the supply of TA assistance was untied from donor country suppliers. Also the question of harmonisation and alignment through coordinated programmes was highlighted in the evaluation report recommending the adaptation of the goals set in the Paris Declaration. DFID no longer wished to have the imposition of external solutions by consultants detached from the local context and a two way learning process was emphasised in the ‘How to’ note. Evidence from the evaluation suggested that effective TA required investment in a joint process through which ownership could be enhanced. In general recommendations from the evaluation report had been implemented in the ‘How to’ note and there was a good compliance between the two documents. The rating of the recommendations had also been taken into consideration as it was seen in the case of appraising capacity of the organisation in question to procure the TA directly.<sup>62</sup>

In the ‘How to’ note it was stipulated that the procurement process and the development of capacity systems still remained challenging. For example it was harder to coordinate TA in post-conflict states where less consideration was given to long term harmonised frameworks. The Paris Declaration was in the note used as an incentive to for example move towards pooling. Even though DFID had been one of the main supporters of pooling many off-budget TA arrangements still remained in place alongside with other pooled arrangements.

More initiatives to transfer control to government or the non-state partner institutions was recommended as it was found that DFID often relied on project implementation units to manage initiatives, which did not enhance ownership or the direct feeling of accountability towards the donor. As TA often had been criticised DFID wished to support “... good evidence base on impact and apply lessons learning.”<sup>63</sup>

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<sup>61</sup> DFID, How to provide Technical Cooperation personnel, 2006, p. 14

<sup>62</sup> DFID, How to provide Technical Cooperation personnel, 2006, p. 7

<sup>63</sup> DFID, How to provide Technical Cooperation personnel, 2006, p. 12



## **Annex 4: Evaluation Findings IMF**

### Title of the document

Review of Technical Assistance Policy and Experience

### Author and commissioning agencies

Prepared by the Office of Technical Assistance Management

Published: June 12, 2002

Period covered: FY 2001-2002

Country cases included: Afghanistan, Yemen and Mozambique

### Overall objective and focus of the policy

The overall objective of the evaluation was to focus on the experience with the new prioritization process, which IMF put in place in the financial year 2001. This was done to more effectively allocate TA resources, as there had been an increase in demand. More specifically the report deals with experiences “with the two pilot programs – the Technical Consultations (TCs) and the Technical Cooperation Action Plans (TCAPs) – introduced to enhance the focus of Fund TA and better integrate it with UFR (use of fund resources) and surveillance work; (iii) the evolving regional approach to delivery of TA; (iv) efforts to enhance coordination with other TA providers; (v) options to broaden the dissemination of information on TA both internally and externally; and (vi) options to enhance monitoring and evaluation.”<sup>64</sup>

### Weight given to context analysis

In the report much weight is given to statistics on all the TA provided from the IMF. More than 29 pilot projects were reviewed for the report the country cases in the report merely pose as examples and do not cover all reviewed cases.

### Management of TA

The technical consultant’s objectives were to promote a country-centred approach in funding TA and in providing meaningful information to the Board on the implementation process. Some positive outcomes were registered out of the pilot projects, but in general TC’s were not as useful as expected. The report therefore recommends that TC’s should be given other objectives. The objective of the TCAP strategy was to promote a “proactive approach to the planning and coordination of TA, and to provide TA within a comprehensive, multi-year framework to countries requiring substantial assistance.”<sup>65</sup> Experience showed that this approach was highly resource demanding and would be an important tool when working with in post-conflict/isolation countries, where large TA needs have to be addressed comprehensively.

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<sup>64</sup> IMF, Review of Technical Assistance Policy and Experience, 2002, p. 4

<sup>65</sup> IMF, Review of Technical Assistance Policy and Experience, 2002, p. 4

### Country ownership and accountability

In some of IMF's programmes a regional approach has been adopted. These arrangements have proven to be cost-effective. Not only was the regional approach cost-effective but it also promoted cross-boarder understanding fostering regional policy initiatives. Cooperation with other TA providers and TA efficiency was enhanced. These initiatives required substantial oversight because of monitoring and evaluation processes and a strong commitment from the partner country.

Sharing knowledge with internal staff, the Board and with development partners is becoming increasingly important as TA is having an increased impact on the effectiveness of the IMF's work.

### Coordination

Cross-cutting thematic, regional or country-specific evaluations have increased in numbers, some with the participation of external consultants. But management tools are still an obstacle towards a more coherent approach to TA project planning, monitoring and evaluation.<sup>66</sup>

### Basket funding/SWaps

The IMF does not highlight basket funding or swaps directly but indicate that coordinated funding between donors enhances efficiency across the lines of work.

### Coverage in terms of themes sectors and countries

TA departments in IMF have over the past two years developed new systems and procedural changes to plan for the monitoring and evaluation of their TA programs. The methodological approaches in using design, monitoring, and evaluation has been strengthened and subsequently heightened the effectiveness of TA.

### Overview of applied methods, methodological approaches and degree of collaboration with other donors and partner countries

IMF applies an economic analysis to the evaluation of the effectiveness of technical consultants and to the work done.

### The degree to which the technical assistance evaluations conclusions have been used in policy

The "Review of Technical Assistance Policy and Experience" was published in 2002 some few years before the Paris Declaration. In April 2007 the IMF published a fact sheet where a more 'How to' approach was applied. Below is a summary of the fact sheet, which is to be seen as a follow up to the above.

Technical assistance is provided as a service free of charge to those who are members of the IMF. IMF mainly provides TA in areas of macroeconomic policy, tax policy and revenue administration, expenditure management, monetary policy, the

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<sup>66</sup> IMF, Review of Technical Assistance Policy and Experience, 2002, p. 6

exchange rate system, financial sector sustainability, and macroeconomic and financial statistics.<sup>67</sup>

Especially low-income countries are supported with TA from IMF as there is a need to build capacity in order to implement poverty reducing programmes, to manage debt reduction programmes and to contribute to low-income countries participating in international trade.

IMF adheres to a participatory approach where the recipient country is fully involved in the entire process of technical assistance. This includes identification of needs, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation. The way in which the TA is delivered varies depending on the nature of the assignment. Staff can for example be provided through "... experts sent from headquarters, or the placement of experts and/or resident advisors for periods ranging from a few weeks to a few years. Assistance might also be provided in the form of technical and diagnostic studies, training courses, seminars, workshops, and "on-line" advice and support."<sup>68</sup>

As mentioned in the above the IMF has applied a regional approach to TA. The regional areas cover the Pacific; the Caribbean; East, West and Central Africa; and the Middle East. The TA provided by the IMF is financed from both internal and external sources. "The IMF finances directly technical assistance delivery, supervision, administrative, and other overhead costs"<sup>69</sup>. This accounts for about one-fourth of IMF's total net administrative budget. The organisation administers funding provided by both bilateral and multilateral donors giving the opportunity to avoid duplication and to leverage resources available.

Since 1999 IMF has taken initiatives to strengthen the effectiveness of their TA. This has been done through integrating TA "... more closely with surveillance and lending programs; reinforcing coordination with other providers, especially the World Bank; improving modalities of delivery, especially through the establishment of regional centres; strengthening the monitoring and evaluation of technical assistance programs; and promoting the dissemination of information on those programs more widely."<sup>70</sup>

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<sup>67</sup> <http://www.imf.org/external/x10/changeccss/changestyle.aspx>

<sup>68</sup> <http://www.imf.org/external/x10/changeccss/changestyle.aspx>

<sup>69</sup> <http://www.imf.org/external/x10/changeccss/changestyle.aspx>

<sup>70</sup> <http://www.imf.org/external/x10/changeccss/changestyle.aspx>

## **Annex 5: Policy Findings Sida**

### Title of the document

Sida's Policy for Capacity Development as a strategic question in development cooperation

### Author and commissioning agencies

Sida, Methods Development Unit.

Published: November 2000

Period covered: Unknown

Country cases included: No country cases included

### Overall objective and focus of the policy

The overall objective described in the policy document is to increase the current support for capacity building in partner countries. The focus of the policy is to increase support through the national systems of education, training, and research. Sida also adheres to a clearer focus on "... capacity development in all programmes and projects, and through more active collaboration with Swedish partners."<sup>71</sup>

In the policy document several main areas of work are indicated as a way of achieving the objective of the policy. Weight is given to a systematic integration of capacity development in projects and programmes, a strengthening of the cooperation with Swedish partners and also a strengthening of the professional exchange with Swedish partners. Providing further support to national systems of education, training and research in partner countries is highlighted in line with development of international competence in Sweden. Lastly Sida points at an improvement of its own ability to work in partnership with others towards capacity development as a focus area.

### Findings and Recommendations

There were no recommendations besides those mentioned under "overview of applied methods".

### Weight given to context analysis

The policy document works with an analytical approach to "knowledge, organisation, and capacity". Analysing previous approaches to capacity development Sida outlines how the organisation wishes to use the terms "knowledge, organisation, and capacity" in their future work. These outlines are translated into ways forward under approached to capacity development, which are summarised under overview of methods applied later in this document.

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<sup>71</sup> Sida, Sida's policy for Capacity Development as a strategic question in development cooperation, 2000, p. 10

### Management of TA

The policy document from Sida does not have any clear outlines of managerial guidelines on technical assistance.

### Country ownership and accountability

A word search done in Acrobat reader on the policy document showed that the word accountability was not used in the document. But on a broader basis Sida underlines the need for the institution to collaborate with the partner countries and to exchange experiences regarding capacity development although this is only a minor part in the overall policy.

Regarding country ownership it is highlighted that ownership in partner countries often is strengthened when the initiative comes from the partner country. This is specifically mentioned on project level.

### Coordination

Focus on developing approaches to capacity development is especially directed towards the internal institution of Sida. Strengthening the coordination between different departments within Sida has been pinpointed as an area of action. Similarly with the improvement of the internal coordination of basic education and support for higher education and research.

Sida does not disregard the exchanging of methodological issues with Swedish and international partner organisations. Nor does it disregard that Sida should play a stronger role as a catalyst and facilitator in development of "... networks and other forms of cooperation that aim at a wider sharing of professional experience between countries, organisations, and individuals."<sup>72</sup> Initiatives which should help increase Sida's efforts on using and strengthening knowledge and competences in partner countries.

### Basket funding/SWaps.

Under "action to be taken within Sida"<sup>73</sup> Sida commits itself to a sector wide approach where collaboration with other partners is based on Sida's policy for Sector Programme Support.

### Coverage in terms of themes sectors and countries

Themes: National education, training and research

### Overview of applied methods

The adjustment of methods depending on the problem analysis is set as a challenge for Sida. To reach its goal Sida identifies that it needs to carry out better analyses on

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<sup>72</sup> Sida, Sida's policy for Capacity Development as a strategic question in development cooperation,, 2000, p. 11

<sup>73</sup> Sida, Sida's policy for Capacity Development as a strategic question in development cooperation,, 2000, p. 11

country strategies and on project assessments and to focus more on differentiating educational inputs. Also lacking is a more significant focus on systems and a systems approach. Specifically mentioned in the policy document by Sida is the need to review some of the present forms of support for educational programmes. The following are mentioned:

1. Development of sector programme support
2. Institutional cooperation/twinning
3. Building of networks and contacts

Sida does not directly indicate which type of overall methodology the institution applies in their policy document.

#### Previous evaluations

In the document no previous evaluations or fact finding missions are stated. Putting this aside it is mentioned in the foreword that the policy builds on lessons learnt through out the years of working with technical assistance.

## **Annex 6: Other Findings - Danida**

### Title of the document

Implementing the “Technical Assistance in Danish Bilateral Aid - Policy Paper”.  
A contribution towards the formulation of practical guidance

### Author and commissioning agencies

Nordic Consulting Group commissioned by Danida

### Published

2005

Period covered: 2004-2005

### Overall objective and focus of the desk study

The report is a follow up on the introduction of the new TA Policy of 20<sup>th</sup> February 2004. The objective of the report was to provide guidance on how the TA principles best could be applied in practice. 19 projects which were finalised after February 2004 provided the basis for the assessment.

The aim of capacity development should ideally have the end result that TA is gradually withdrawn as the partner organisation’s corporate capacity expands. Lacking are exit strategies for the TA that are rarely elaborated in any great detail in the programme documents. The report recommends that increased emphasis is put on partner dialogue and partner involvement. Adequate time and resources should be allocated to this process during the identification and preparation process. Also “... increased emphasis should be placed on the TA design and the justification of this should be provided during the formulation process and subsequently clearly elaborated in the programme/ project document.”<sup>74</sup>

The overall recommendations are basically concerned with clarifying, deepening and disseminating the TA principles. In more detail it is recommended that the TA principles are linked to capacity development at all levels of engagement and that there is a clearer formulation of the national partner’s role in managing TA, especially in relation to applying SWAp and basket funding. Elaboration of the TA modalities and their comparative advantages are need and best practice should be included to demonstrate relative effects. Guidelines on TA should be developed with “... a view to strengthen the analytical model by, i.e. incorporating elements of Sida’s delivery chain model in order to better link TA design with capacity development needs. This could be an add-on to the TA Policy.”<sup>75</sup> Enhancing engagement of the national partner through out the programming and implementation process is finally an important issue, which still requires efforts.

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<sup>74</sup> Danida, Implementing the “Technical assistance in Danish bilateral aid - policy paper”, 2005, p. v

<sup>75</sup> Danida, Implementing the “Technical assistance in Danish bilateral aid - policy paper”, 2005, p. v

The assessment of the projects in the report show that 53% of the programmes do not comply with the TA principles. These programmes were all under Danida control or under control by consultant companies. Some of the programmes that did not comply had not explored the potential for alignment. The remaining 47% which complied with the TA principles were either under full partner control or used traditional approaches. “Programmes with well-designed TA do not necessarily imply or guarantee that the programmes are performing well, as there may be a number of other factors that can impede effective implementation.”<sup>76</sup> Regarding SWAp the question is not whether the country is ready for SWAp, “... but rather how the programme could contribute to reaching this stage of development.”<sup>77</sup>

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<sup>76</sup> Danida, Implementing the Technical assistance in Danish bilateral aid - policy paper, 2005, p. iv

<sup>77</sup> Danida, Implementing the Technical assistance in Danish bilateral aid - policy paper, 2005, p. iv



## **Annex 7: Other findings - The Pooling of TA/Baser & Morgan report**

### Title of policy document

The pooling of Technical Assistance, “An overview based on fields experience in six African countries”

### Author and commissioning agencies

Heather Baser and Peter Morgan

European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) Synthesis Report for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands

Published: November 2001

Country cases included: Six country cases included: Botswana, Ethiopia, Mali, Mozambique, Tanzania and Uganda

### Overall objective and focus of the policy

The study focuses on the status and contribution of TA pooling in six countries (Botswana, Ethiopia, Mali, Mozambique, Tanzania and Uganda). It is based on reviews and discussions with international development agencies (IDAs) with the aim to bring abstract thinking on improved aid management practices to the operational level. The study is an ongoing reflection within the development community with the scope to reduce the fragmentation of externally funded development activities as well as the considerable administrative burden they place on developing country administrations. One of the factors slowing the progress in pooling of TA is an extensive capacity shortage in the countries.

### Findings and recommendations

The report highlights five factors that appear to shape the use and performance of TA pooling in the six countries: 1) The countries policy and organisational context. 2) The behaviour within the international funding community in relation to TA pooling (this is much influenced by the policy and procedural restrictions, the strategies IDAs have developed for the use of TA, and the incentives within organisations to change their approaches) 3) Structure and management of the boarder aid relationship between the government and the IDA. If the culture of collaboration in a particular country is strong, TA will be more likely. 4) Relationships within the international funding community. If there is a group of donors with a common vision, TA is more likely. 5) Design and management of sector programme support.

The report recommends a number of reforms and improvements to encourage TA pooling. Most of them are general in nature and will require in-depth analysis to become more operational:

1) A rethinking of the means and ends of TA. TA has become a focal for criticism due to lack of clarity of purpose, dysfunctional management structures, and inadequate salaries for regular public servants etc. 2) Tendency on some circles to reject

TA. 3) Better frameworks for assessing progress in capacity building are required. It is suggested that organisational analysis seems to be missing in the attempt to make TA more effective. 4) More incremental approaches to learning by doing. 5) A clear assessment for the organisational support is required for success (working groups, administrative units and codes of conduct). 6) A harmonisation of IDA's procedures is critical for TA pooling. 7) Substitute control arrangements (e.g. improved reporting, monitoring, evaluation and auditing) as national governments take control of TA to support their own interests. 8) Restructured development cooperation relationships between the countries and IDAs.

#### Management of TA

The challenge in the management of TA in the years ahead will be to encourage more pooling that promotes ownership and control in a particular country, while at the same time maintaining an effective implementation. Structural reforms as public sector reforms are needed and can only be implemented in an environment with the adequate capacity to direct the process. The report concludes that although there are modest but promising signs of the effectiveness of TA in several of the six countries reviewed, TA is still in a stage of infancy.

Country ownership and accountability: N.a

Coordination: N.a

Basket funding/SWaps: N.a

Coverage in terms of themes sectors and countries: N.a.

Overview of applied methods, methodological approaches and degree of collaboration with other donors and partner countries: N.a

The degree to which the technical assistance evaluations conclusions have been used in policy: N.a.

## Annex 8 Transparent Menu of TA Options

<b>LONG TERM PERSONNEL OPTIONS</b>			
<b>TECHNICAL ADVISERS</b>			
<b>Personnel Category</b>	<b>Expected Background and Experience</b>	<b>Unit Cost or Daily Fee Range AUD</b>	<b>When Would You Select This Category?</b>
<b>Long Term International Adviser (level 3)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Over ten years of experience working in their field of expertise</li> <li>▪ Extensive previous experience working as consultant</li> <li>▪ Five plus years experience working in developing countries or rural and remote areas</li> <li>▪ Post-graduate level qualification in area of expertise</li> <li>▪ High level skills in preparation of analytical reports</li> <li>▪ Demonstrated track record of success in an advisory role.</li> </ul>	\$12,167 - \$20,167 plus airfare \$1,400 (unaccompanied) plus mobilization and demobilization \$20,000 and insurances	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Skills not available in PNG.</li> <li>▪ Need for high level of external expertise to develop a new system or to develop competencies and capabilities of staff in identified areas.</li> <li>▪ Should be required to achieve key outcomes.</li> </ul>
<b>Long Term International Adviser (level 2)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Five plus years of experience working in their field of expertise</li> <li>▪ Five years of experience working in developing countries or rural and remote areas</li> <li>▪ Post-graduate level qualification in area of expertise</li> <li>▪ Experience in training, mentoring or capacity building. Prior developing country or rural and remote experience.</li> </ul>	\$11,167 – \$14,167 plus airfare \$1,400 (unaccompanied) plus mobilization and demobilization \$20,000 and insurances	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Skills not available in PNG</li> <li>▪ Need for specific external expertise to develop a new system or to develop competencies and capabilities of staff in identified areas</li> <li>▪ Should be required to achieve key outcomes.</li> </ul>
<b>Personnel Category</b>	<b>Expected Background and Experience</b>	<b>Unit Cost or Daily Fee Range AUD</b>	<b>When Would You Select This Category?</b>
<b>Long Term International Adviser (level 1)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ 2 - 5 years experience, with post-graduate qualifications</li> <li>▪ Well-developed skills in a technical area, or middle management experience</li> <li>▪ Up to 5 years development experience</li> </ul>	\$10,167 – \$11,167 plus airfare \$1,400 (unaccompanied) plus mobilization and demobilization \$20,000 and insurances	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Skills may not be available in NDoH.</li> <li>▪ Specific time limited developmental task to be undertaken (e.g. establish a new program or system)</li> <li>▪ Position requires technical experience and management, but not at highest level</li> </ul>

<b>Less Experienced Professional (International)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>3 to 5 years experience, university graduate qualifications</li> <li>This is a developmental role and would require supervision and guidance.</li> </ul>	Up to \$10,167 airfare \$1,400 (unaccompanied) plus mobilization and demobilization \$20,000 and insurances	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Skills not available in PNG</li> <li>Specific time limited developmental task to be undertaken (e.g. establish a new program or system)</li> <li>NDOH staff available to train</li> <li>This is not a recurrent role.</li> </ul>
<b>Local Adviser (Level 3)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Ten plus years of experience working in their field of expertise</li> <li>Ability to operate at a high level including leading work groups</li> <li>Previous experience working as a consultant</li> <li>Post-graduate level qualification in area of expertise preferable</li> <li>High level skills in preparation of analytical reports</li> </ul>	Up to \$4,000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Skills not available in NDOH</li> <li>Need for specific external expertise to develop a new system or to develop competencies and capabilities of staff in identified areas</li> <li>Should be required to achieve key outcomes.</li> </ul>
<b>Local Adviser (Level 2)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Five plus years of experience working in their field of expertise</li> <li>Post-graduate level qualification in area of expertise preferable</li> <li>level skills in preparation of analytical reports</li> </ul>	Up to \$3,000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Skills not available in NDOH</li> <li>Need for specific external expertise to develop a new system or to develop competencies and capabilities of staff in identified areas</li> <li>Should be required to achieve key outcomes.</li> </ul>
<b>Personnel Category</b>	<b>Expected Background and Experience</b>	<b>Unit Cost or Daily Fee Range AUD\$</b>	<b>When Would You Select This Category?</b>
<b>Local Adviser –Less experienced professional (Level 1)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>3 to 5 years experience</li> <li>University graduate qualifications</li> <li>This is a developmental role and would require supervision and guidance</li> <li>PNG Public Service rates at SS 04 or SS 03 levels.</li> </ul>	Up to \$2,000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Skills not available in NDOH</li> <li>Specific time limited developmental task to be undertaken (e.g. establish a new program or system)</li> <li>Staff available to train</li> </ul>
<b>PROJECT OFFICERS</b>			
<b>Project Officer (International)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>5 to 10 years experience, with post graduate qualifications.</li> <li>Well developed skills in a technical area, or middle management experience.</li> </ul>	\$5,000 - \$7,000 plus airfare \$1,400 (unaccompanied) plus mobilization and demobilization \$20,000 and insurances	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Skills not available in PNG</li> <li>Specific time limited developmental task to be undertaken (e.g. establish a new program or system)</li> <li>NDOH staff available to train</li> <li>This is not a recurrent role.</li> </ul>

<b>Senior Project Officer (PNG National)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ 5 to 10 years experience, with post graduate qualifications.</li> <li>▪ Well developed skills in a technical area, or middle management experience.</li> <li>▪ PNG Public Service level SS 02, SS 01, US 04 or US 03 level.</li> </ul>	\$1,800 - \$4,500	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Skills either not available in NDOH, or available but require financial support to release from substantive responsibilities and backfill position</li> <li>▪ Specific time limited developmental task to be undertaken (e.g. establish a new program or system)</li> <li>▪ If PO external to NDOH staff must be available to train</li> <li>▪ This is not a recurrent role.</li> </ul>
<b>Junior Project Officer (PNG National)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ University graduate qualifications.</li> <li>▪ This is a developmental role and would require supervision and guidance.</li> <li>▪ PNG Public Service SS04 or SS03 levels.</li> </ul>	\$950 - \$1,700	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Skills not available in NDOH.</li> <li>▪ Specific time limited developmental task to be undertaken (e.g. establish a new program or system)</li> <li>▪ NDOH staff available to train. This is not a recurrent role.</li> </ul>
<b>VOLUNTEERS</b>			
<b>Personnel Category</b>	<b>Expected Background and Experience</b>	<b>Unit Cost or Daily Fee Range AUD</b>	<b>When Would You Select This Category?</b>
<b>Australian Youth Ambassadors</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Salary and living allowance package</li> <li>▪ Full funding provided by AYAD Program</li> <li>▪ This is a developmental role and would require supervision and guidance.</li> </ul>	Costs met by AYAD Program	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Adequate supply of specific skills not currently available in PNG.</li> <li>▪ These can undertake "in line" positions to fill human resource gaps, or can undertake developmental tasks (e.g. establish a new program or system).</li> </ul>
<b>International Volunteer Programs (including AVI, Peace Corps, VSO)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Range of experience, qualifications and age.</li> </ul>	Rates and arrangements vary among organisations.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Skills not available in PNG</li> <li>▪ Specific time limited developmental task to be undertaken (e.g. establish a new program or system)</li> <li>▪ NDOH staff available to train</li> <li>▪ This is not a recurrent role.</li> </ul>
<b>Australian Expert Overseas Program (AESOP) now Austra-</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Experienced and/or retired specialists in all sectors.</li> </ul>	\$10,000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Skills not available in PNG</li> <li>▪ Specific time limited developmental task to be undertaken (e.g. establish a new program or system)</li> <li>▪ NDOH staff available to train. This is not a re-</li> </ul>

<b>lian Business Volunteers</b>			<p>current role.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Could also be in special “associated” business skills – like documents or database management, secretarial skills development, fleet management or IT</li> </ul>
<b>▪ SHORT TERM PERSONNEL OPTIONS</b>			
<b>Personnel Category</b>	<b>Expected Background and Experience</b>	<b>Unit Cost or Daily Fee Range AUD</b>	<b>When Would You Select This Category?</b>
<b>Short Term International Adviser (level 3)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ High level specialised skills</li> <li>▪ Executive level experience</li> <li>▪ Significant experience in developing countries</li> <li>▪ Specialist qualifications and highly regarded as an expert in a specialist area</li> <li>▪ Demonstrated experience in an advisory role and track record of achievement in short term consulting</li> </ul>	Up to \$1,500 plus per diem \$274 plus airfare \$1,400 and insurances	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Skills not available in PNG</li> <li>▪ Need for high level of external expertise to develop a new system or to develop competencies and capabilities of staff in identified areas</li> <li>▪ Should be required to achieve key outcomes.</li> </ul>
<b>Short Term International Adviser (level 2)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ 10 plus years work experience</li> <li>▪ Senior and management experience</li> <li>▪ High-level knowledge in area of expertise.</li> <li>▪ Experience in training, mentoring or capacity building</li> <li>▪ Prior developing country or rural and remote experience</li> </ul>	Up to \$800 plus per diem \$274 plus airfare \$1,400 and insurances	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Skills not available in PNG</li> <li>▪ Need for specific external expertise to develop a new system or to develop competencies and capabilities of staff in identified areas</li> <li>▪ Should be required to achieve key outcomes as part of a team.</li> </ul>
<b>Short Term Less Experience Professional (International)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ 3 to 5 years work experience in their field</li> <li>▪ No or limited experience in a developing country or rural and remote setting</li> </ul>	Up to \$350 plus per diem \$274 plus airfare \$1,400 and insurances	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Skills not available in PNG</li> <li>▪ Need for specific external expertise to develop a new system or to develop competencies and capabilities of staff in identified areas</li> <li>▪ Has some access to higher level technical guidance</li> <li>▪ Should be required to achieve key outcomes.</li> </ul>
<b>Personnel Category</b>	<b>Expected Background and Experience</b>	<b>Unit Cost or Daily Fee Range AUD</b>	<b>When Would You Select This Category?</b>

<b>Short Term PNG Adviser (level 3)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>High level specialised skills not available in the NDOH</li> <li>Executive level experience in field</li> <li>Specialist qualifications and highly regarded as an expert in a specialist area</li> </ul>	Up to \$500 plus per diem for travel outside of Port Moresby	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Skills not available in NDOH</li> <li>Need for specific external expertise to develop a new system or to develop competencies and capabilities of staff in identified areas</li> <li>Should be required to achieve key outcomes.</li> </ul>
<b>Short Term PNG Adviser (level 2)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>10 plus years work experience</li> <li>Senior management experience</li> <li>High-level knowledge in area of expertise</li> </ul>	Up to \$200 plus per diem for travel outside of Port Moresby	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Skills not available in NDOH. Need for specific external expertise to develop a new system or to develop competencies and capabilities of staff in identified areas. Should be required to achieve key outcomes.</li> </ul>
<b>Short Term Less Experience Professional (PNG)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>3 to 5 years work experience in their field</li> <li>No or limited experience working as an adviser</li> </ul>	Up to \$100 plus per diem for travel outside of Port Moresby	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Skills not available in NDOH</li> <li>Need for specific external expertise to develop a new system or to develop competencies and capabilities of staff in identified areas</li> <li>Has some access to higher level technical guidance</li> <li>Should be required to achieve key outcomes as part of a team.</li> </ul>
<b>SHORT TERM VOLUNTEERS</b>			
<b>Specialist Network Volunteers</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Skills and experience in specific health fields. E.g. HI-MAA WorkWeb</li> </ul>	No fee, accommodation and allowances only	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Skills not available in PNG</li> <li>Specific task, mentoring, training or time limited activity requiring highly specialised skills</li> <li>Dependant on availability of interested specialist groups.</li> </ul>
<b>Personnel Category</b>	<b>Expected Background and Experience</b>	<b>Unit Cost or Daily Fee Range AUD</b>	<b>When Would You Select This Category?</b>
<b>Australian Expert Overseas Program (AESOP) now Australian Business Volunteers</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Experienced and/or retired specialists in all sectors.</li> </ul>	\$300-500 plus per diem \$274	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Skills not available in PNG</li> <li>Specific time limited developmental task to be undertaken (e.g. establish a new program or system)</li> <li>NDOH staff available to train. This is not a recurrent role.</li> </ul>

<b>Australian Youth Ambassadors</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Salary and living allowance package. Full funding provided by AYAD Program. This is a developmental role and would require supervision and guidance.</li> </ul>	Costs met by AYAD Program	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Adequate supply of specific skills not currently available in PNG</li> <li>▪ These can undertake "in line" positions to fill human resource gaps, or can undertake developmental tasks (e.g. establish a new program or system).</li> </ul>
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\* Long term advisers have a monthly fee range inclusive of a housing and living allowance.

\*\* Per diem rate inclusive of accommodation and living allowance is as per the standard CBSC rate of AUD274 per day.


\*\*\* The standard international airfare is calculated Brisbane – Port Moresby return. This amount will vary depending on point of origin and availability/notice.

\*\*\*\* Per diems are provided for PNG Nationals (problems if this is for positions which are in-line positions – as not sustainable and not GOPNG levels – have been difficulties already this year) where they are required to travel outside their home base at the standard rate of Kina 125 per day.




## Annex 9: Overview of Bilateral and Multilateral Danida Advisors

In the case of the bilateral advisors it is important to notice that the figures for long-term advisors and JPOs in 2006 were split into two separate categories. Prior to 2006 the figures for JPOs were included under long-term advisors. <sup>78</sup>



Source: Redegørelse for personalebistanden 2007, Danida, p. 4



Source: Redegørelse for personalebistanden, Danida, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007

<sup>78</sup> Danida, Redegørelse for personalebistanden 2007, Danida, p. 3

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