THE COSMOPOLITAN OUTLOOK: HOW THE EUROPEAN PROJECT CAN BE SAVED

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Europe is one thing for sure: a moving target. Another change in priority and topic is taking place as we speak: at the present historical moment, the defining issue in European politics is no longer the euro bailout policy but instead the confrontation with nuclear-armed Russia. In the upcoming European elections in May, the EU could once again appear to the voters as a force for peace and not as a money guzzling bureaucratic monster.

So, let's start with the "simple" question: what exactly is Europe? My answer is – I have four theses.

First thesis: *Europe is not a fixed condition, not a territorial unit, not a state, not a nation writ large. In fact, there is actually no "Europe"; there is Europeanization, a process of ongoing transformation or 'Verwandlung" - "*metamorphosis*" - as I define it. We need a new notion to understand Europeanization. "Metamorphosis'' is not revolution, not evolution, not reform, not crises, not war; it is a change in the mode of existence through the politics of side-effects. In the case of Europe "metamorphosis" is another word for variable geometry, variable national interests, variable internal-external relations, variable borders, variable democracy, variable statehood, and variable identity. This also holds for the institutional core of Europeanization, the EU.*

What does "European metamorphosis" mean and where does this power of transformation come from?

With Europeanization as metamorphosis I mean: (a)"polities of side-effects". European politics and society did not emerge on the open stage in a heroic political act but evolves a regime of side-effects. The trademark of this "side-effects history" of the EU is a fundamental ambivalence.

On the one hand, it reflects a *List der Vernunft*, a "cunning of reason" (Hegel) that enables Europe to step out of the long shadow cast by its bloody history. On the other hand, a Europe of side-effects is something that nobody really intended and authorized but nevertheless turns people's lives upside down, and thus provokes national and ethnic resistance.

The regime of side-effects means that, although the process of Europeanization – the "realization of an ever closer union of the peoples of Europe," as the EU-treaty puts it - was intended, its institutional and material consequences were unintended. The strikingly fact is that the process of integration did not follow any master-plan; the opposite is the case: the goal was deliberately left open. Europeanization "operates" in the specific mode of institutionalized improvisation. This politics of side-effects seemed for a long time to have one major advantage: even the juggernaut of Europeanization presses ahead relentlessly, it did not seem to require an independent political programme or a political legitimation. The development of the EU could

occur through transnational co-operation of *elites* with their own criteria of rationality, largely independent of national publics, interests and political convictions. The European elites love the concept of "governance" which means: ongoing transformation without democratic legitimation. This understanding of "technocratic governance" stands in an inverse relation to the political dimension. The framework of European treaties exercises a "meta-politics" that alters the rules of the game of national politics through the backdoor of side-effects.

(b) Who is the actor of the Europeanization as transformation? The "invention of Europe" was a product not of public deliberation and democratic procedures but of *judicial prescription and praxis*. It was the European Court of Justice (ECJ), which, in accordance with its self-definition, elevated the European founding treaties to the status of a "Constitutional Charter" in two leading decisions, in 1963 and 1964. With this it erected one of the two main pillars of the principle of European supra-nationalism, namely, the immediate jurisdiction of the European Court law and its priority over national law. Consequently, a European law emerged that claims constitutional priority, which was duly acknowledged and accepted as such by the key actors in European politics. In this way, a European legal framework and an associated culture developed that is potentially in a position to criticize the national legal systems and to replace them by the European administration of justice.

(c) Where, then, did the power of transformation come from? The power of European metamorphosis emerged with the anthropological shock and the horror of the Second World War. Thereby a normative horizon emerged - *never again Holocaust!*

The basic idea is that the world-wide shock of the violation of the ethical foundation of humanity creates a normative horizon of expectations which challenges the existing order of things from within. The ethics of "Never again Holocaust!" implies an understanding of justice and law, which is an obligation to change existing national institutions and attitudes. What I am referring to here is something profound (therefore the notion of "metamorphosis"). A basic principle of national law was that an act could not be judged in hindsight against a law that did not exist at the time the act was performed. So, for example, while it was legal under Nazi law to kill Jews at that time, it became a crime against humanity in hindsight, pulling down the principle of national law.

Second thesis: *Europeanization as politics of side-effects as created a Europe without Europeans. A revolutionary movement is rocking Europe in the context of the euro crisis. However, it is not pro-European, but anti-European, as is shown by the work of Edgar Grande, among others, in my Collaborative Research Centre in Munich.*

The framework for this crisis is the hazy power space of global domestic politics involving a strategic interaction of three actors - the *state* (financed by taxes and legitimized by votes), the *economy* (how global economic actors try to impose their own rules of action upon states) and, finally, the *citizens* who lend this state their political support only if it satisfies their interest in return. All three "players" are confronted with the common problem of global risks (we are living not in a "network society" or "world society", but in the World Risk Society, marked by a common fate: the threat to humanity).

These anti-European movements instrumentalize the contradictions of Europeanization as politics of side-effects. The resentment is not only directed against Muslims and other foreign elements, but against the so-called "liberal elites." They are the ones who in the opinion of many are destroying national identities. These elites are also the ones who allowed the cities to be inundated with "foreigners" - whether legal or illegal. They are the ones who created the "European Union" - this demonic abstraction - as well as the welfare state in which the "outsiders" are now making themselves at home,

The European crisis, and the reasonable fear that our children will be less well-off than we are, has dealt a blow to the ideals of social justice and the educated class that did the most to promote them. Just invoking the fact that immigration means cultural enrichment is no longer enough. But to blame the liberal elites is to miss the point. For those European elites are much less responsible for the destructions of customs and traditional communities than something quite different. Just as Thatcherite laissez-faire economics did much

to sweep away traditional institutions in Britain, the new neoliberal global economy is doing the same all over the world.

But there is a contradiction in exploiting this anti-European feeling. In Britain, for example, supporters of the anti-European party UKIP want Britain to break away from Europe and become a kind of Western Hong Kong. Whatever this means, it might be good for London, but would surely be a disaster for provincial England - where most of their voters live. Thus the paradox is: neither Mr. Wilders nor Ms. Le Pen will shield the vulnerable from the global market forces.

If the elites in Europe want to stave off the storm of destructive hatred, they have to come up with some idea of a social metamorphosis of Europe. One important signal could be - to pick up the *Portuguese Manifesto* from March 2014 - to call for a timeout for economic integration while Europe starts to establish some elements of a common fiscal and social investment policy. It could begin with modest measures related to minimum income and unemployment support. European-wide programs aiming at upgrading the skills of the low skilled labor market "flexicurity" and open education systems would send signals to all Europeans that Europe from now on would build its competitiveness on competence - and not on low wages. Green investment plans would show that Europe takes into account also the survival of the coming generation.

But in order to understand the movements of anti-European sentiments much differentiation is needed, as the research of Adrian Favell and David Raimer shows: there has to be a clear distinction between the consequences of Europeanization on everyday life and the conscious support for the EU. Precisely for those who live a highly Europeanized life, the EU is politically highly controversial. Cosmopolitanism can be conceived in a number of ways; the research team defines it empirically in terms of three dimensions:

- the spread of tolerance for cultural, ethnic, religious diversity, i.e., the recognition of other cultures;

- the willingness to accept some responsibility for the fate of foreign countries/populations;

- the acceptance of international institutions as better ways to manage certain large-scale (global or macro-regional) issues.

Using these dimensions, the researchers uncover the following paradox EU-skepticism grows with the Europeanization of everyday life. For example, the Danes and the British are both Europeanized in their everyday practices and EU-skeptical or even anti-European voters. "On toleration and recognition of other cultures, British respondents score high and Danish low relative to all others. Interestingly, though, less than fifty percent of Danes, Britons and Germans would describe themselves as 'citizens of the world, 'while the majority of Southern and Eastern Europeans do (that is, 80% of the Spanish, 71% of the Romanians and 65% of Italians)."

Generally, there seems to be a positive association between transnationalism and cosmopolitan values everywhere - including Denmark and the UK! This has clearly been facilitated by the EU. But - as I said - this relationship is immediately weakened once the EU is specifically invoked.

Third thesis: *But how can Europe overcome this crisis of coexistence? If the EU has been constructed by the politics of side-effects, why should people living Europeanized lives identify with the EU? Is there anything that makes the EU 'sexy"? Yes, not the emerging German Europe but the vision of a Mediterranean Europe.*

A large proportion of the Euro-critics and anti-Europeans who are now raising their voices are prisoners of outdated national nostalgia. This is how, for example, the French intellectual Alain Finkielkraut argues: Europe thought that it could constitute itself without, or even against, the nations. It wanted to punish the nations for the horrors of the twentieth century. But there is no post-national democracy. Democracy is monolingual. If it is to function, it needs a shared language, shared life references and a shared project. We do not come into the world as world citizens. Human communities have limits. Europe does not take this into account. This is why the European public cannot work up any enthusiasm for the European Union.

But this criticism of Europe is based on the national delusion that a return to the nation-state idyll is possible under Europeanized social and political conditions. It presupposes the national horizon as a diagnostic

framework for Europe's present and future. To these critics I say: Broaden your outlook and then you will see that, not just Europe, but the whole world is in a process of transition where the boundaries of European political thinking are no longer even real.

We need a cosmopolitan outlook just to understand what kind of despair is seething beneath the surface of the milieus of the European suburbs and is spilling over into enthusiasm for anti-European protest. All nations are faced with a new cultural plurality not only as a result of migration but also of Internet communication, climate change, the euro crisis and digital threats to freedom. People of the most diverse backgrounds, with different languages, conceptions of value and religions, are living and working alongside each other, their children are attending the same schools, and they are trying to become established in the same legal and political systems. The cosmopolitization of the nations is in full swing.

Here are a couple of paradoxical examples of this. Eurosceptical Great Britain is being permeated by an unprecedented wave of European publicity. All of the daily newspapers and TV news shows are full of complaints about the EU. Or: China has long since become an (informal) member of the euro zone on account of its investment policy and its economic dependencies - should the euro fail, China would be hit hard economically and politically.

The conflict over Ukraine, in turn, exhibits a cash of two worldviews of the national, namely, that of Russia's aggressive ethno-nationalism (symbolized by "rolling tanks" in the Crimea) and that of really-existing cosmopolitanization (symbolized by "lack of investment"). Both images of the national have their "weapons," though each follows a completely different geographical, material and political logic. Carefully targeted sanctions are a powerful twenty-first-century "weapon" with which to punish a nineteenth-century act of military aggression. The outcome is, of course, open.

Here it again becomes clear that cosmopolitization does not create world citizens. On the contrary, it creates skepticism concerning Europe and anti-European resentment. But this is also a reason why Vladimir Putin's maxim "Everywhere where Russians live should also be Russian territory" meets with sympathy.

While globalization is dissolving borders, people are searching for new ones. Yet, Putin's aggressive Russian interventionist nationalism shows that one cannot project the past of the nations onto Europe's future without destroying Europe's future. But perhaps the converse is true: does Putin's imperial ethno-nationalism represent a salutary shock for a Europe plagued by national egoism? Whoever plays the national card - and this applies not only to Putin, but in a different way also to the UK and the anti-European Right and Left in France and everywhere - once again conjures up the self-destruction of Europe.

But there is also a paradoxical consequence: Putin's ethnic-national aggression is not only frightening the West. It is also unifying it. The German Chancellor Angela Merkel speaks a remarkable, undiplomatic clear language. She accused Russia of resorting to "the law of the jungle" in the Ukraine conflict. She said that if Russia continues with this aggression, "we, the neighboring states, would understand this as a threat to us."

Merkel - and, of course, Germany - faces a fundamental choice. should she go on acting as "Merkiavell", (what she does in the context of the Euro crises) that is, should Germany be guided by its narrow national self-interest, or should it assert its leadership position within the EU and forge a united European response reviving European solidarity, which has been violated so deeply with the Euro crises?

This could become a step to overcome the split in Europe - Thanks to Putin. But there is more to it. Why should national Europeans identify themselves with the future of the European Union and what face should this Europe have? Certainly not the ugly face of austerity.

Albert Camus wrote: "From the coast of Africa where I was born, one sees the face of Europe better. And one knows that it is not beautiful."

For Camus, the admirer of Nietzsche, beauty is a criterion of truth and of the good life. Europe's secret, in Camus' disenchanted diagnosis, is "that it no longer loves life ... Out of despair at their own humanity, Europeans finally launched themselves into an inhuman excess. Because they disavowed the true grandeur of

life, they had to celebrate their own excellence. For want of anything better, they deified themselves and their misery began: These gods have blind eyes."

But what is the antidote, the counter-vision of a different EU in which enjoyment of the pure present is lived out? The European vision of the Southern Europe! – for example, the dream of a "Mediterranean wedding-bed" (Michael Chevalier) in which the East and West, North and South would make love. This conjures up the image of an amiable Europe of the regions that is worth living - even if this image was severely tarnished by the financial crisis and the austerity politics.

The seemingly necessary link between the state, national identity and a single language would be dissolved. The Union, the member states and their regions concern themselves at different levels with the welfare of the citizens. They lend the citizens, on the one hand, a voice in the globalized world, while giving them, on the other, a sense of regional security and identity. Democracy is becoming a multilevel affair, indeed we are already beginning to practice it as such: Mediterranean culture - as savoir vivre in a world of contradictory certainties, as joie de vivre, indifference, despair, distress, uncertainty, beauty and hope, thus that contradictory mixture that we northern Europeans romanticize as the gardens of the South where "the lemon trees bloom" (Goethe) and shamelessly project onto the South.

Granted, the debt crisis imposed an ugly face also on this aesthetics and artistry of life-affirming, cosmopolitan, Mediterranean existence. But isn't it true nevertheless that if the Germans had gone to school with the boules players of the South, they would never have plunged the world into the Second World War? Or that if Chancellor Merkel had been a passionate boules player, she would never would have proselytized the Mediterranean countries with evangelical austerity policy? Even Putin, assuming hypothetically that he had been born into a Mediterranean boules-playing family, presumably would never have had the utterly crazy idea of annexing the Crimea in order to impress the world.

What, therefore, could reconcile the anti-European Europeans with the idea of Europeanization? Anti-centralism - the anti-ideology that is free of ethnic-national nostalgia. The turning towards and returning home to the beauty of the regions, which in the meantime are also globalized, as cultural métissage. The Mediterranean sensibility - making this the center of a vision of the Europe of the Regions was a clever idea that Nicolas Sarkozy was not able to push through in 2007 against Angela Merkel's imperial vision of a German Europe and subsequently let fall: savoring the love of life in small and unimportant things. The ability to accommodate oneself to the chaos of the world. Respecting internal and external nature. Seeking coexistence with the other for the sake of enriching oneself. Or, as Gabriel Audisio puts it: *Live well and die well*.

Fourth and last thesis: *The Europe of side-effects needs an intentionally Europeanization from below. It needs, in other words, the building of a strong European civil society based on the participation and identification of the European citizens with the future of Europe. But, taking the stand-point of the Europeanized individual, then the problems are: what is the purpose of the European Union in the twenty-first century world at risk of? Is there any purpose? Why Europe - why not the whole world? Why not do it alone in Germany or Portugal, the UK or France etc.? What do already Europeanized individuals gain from the "different" Europe, a new institutional architecture designed as answer to the problems of the future?*

I think there are four answers in this regard. First, the success story of the EU, which is about how enemies become neighbors, is suddenly challenged by Russia's imperialistic territorial ethno-nationalism and could fail or revive the peace-creating power and meaning of the EU. Here internal and external to the EU a "conflict of the two notions of nationhood" arises - between the ethnic nation (nationalism) and the cosmopolitan nation (nationalism). The first is based on the "Declaration of independence", the second on the "Declaration of *Inter*dependence". This lends "Europe at risk" a new vision and mission.

The second point is that we should therefore not only think about "another Europe", we also have to think about the next step of European metamorphosis; how European nations undergo a meta-change from an ethnic-territorial to a cosmopolitan self-understanding of nationhood. This cosmopolitan metamorphosis is not an obstacle to national sovereignty as such; it includes the change from national to cosmopolitan

(national) sovereignty. Europeanization must not threaten nationhood; it is part of what makes nations open to the world, cooperative, attractive and powerful in the age of world risk society.

The third point is that European modernity, which has been disseminated all over the world, is a suicidal project. It is producing all kind of basic problems, such as climate change and financial crises. It's a bit like if a car company created a car without any brakes and it started to cause multiple accidents. The company would take these cars back to resign them and that's exactly what Europe should do with modernity: reinventing modernity could be a specific task for Europe in the twenty-first century. So far we have thought about things like institutions, law and economics, but we haven't asked what the other European Union means for *individuals*?

The fourth purpose of Europe is not only about the free movement of people across Europe; it is to focus on the EU's promotion of wider, global and cosmopolitan values grounded in European law and not only focusing on European identity per se. Everyday experiences of mobility and transnational connections had good effects across the population (not just the elites); but the Europeanization of everyday life needs to become part of the self-consciousness of the people and public discourse. Since Europeanization as side-effect did empower an anti-European revolution, there is an urgent need for a different Europeanization *from below*, for the creation of a European civil society internal and external to the EU, including the neighboring countries and Russia.

It would be a serious error to equate the Moscow political elite surrounding President Putin with Russian society and civil society. The collapse of the Soviet Union opened up the opportunity to create an open, cosmopolitan Russia. Today Russia is a one-dimensional world power. It relies on nuclear weapons, but cannot compete either economically or politically. At the moment, Moscow (unlike Beijing) is not a model for anyone. The Russian soldiers in the Crimea are an expression of this weakness. Russia was incapable of binding Ukraine, or parts of the country, to itself except with tanks. For this very reason, the idea and practice of an Europeanization of the national civil societies that recognizes and bridges internal and external national differences is acquiring major importance.

Therefore, to pick up the argument from the beginning of my presentation, today the issue of European metamorphosis arises in a new way: Who actually speaks the language of Europe? Who "is" the European We? The national governments? The European Parliament? The European Court of Justice? Brussels? Berlin? (Hence the unelected Chancellor of Europe, Angela Merkel?) Or now finally the citizens of Europe after all? But what does "citizens of Europe" mean? And how do we avoid the mistake trying to create a Europe of the citizens, a Europe from below - from above?

Maybe, that shouldn't be a United Nation but a United Cities or Regions of Europe - multi-polar vision of the Union, which includes *"doing Europe from below!"*

Thinking on this line, we must reconsider how to redefine, first, the "European sovereign" and, second, the "European vision." For this the crucial question is: How can Europe ensure peace and freedom for its citizens in the face of old and new threats in the twenty-first century and in this way win the support of the Eurosceptical European citizens for a new "European dream" (to borrow Churchill's formula) a multipolar Union of Citizens, Cities, Regions and Nations?