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The Impact of Economic Sanctions on Corruption in Target Countries: A Cross Country Study

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ABSTRACT

Using a sample of 73 sanctioned and 60 non-sanctioned countries, as well as corruption data spanning the years 1995 to 2012, we attempt to find a relationship between economic sanctions and corruption in target countries[1]. Our findings suggest that countries that have undergone economic sanctions appear to be more corrupt than non-sanctioned countries. We also find that comprehensive economic sanctions tend to generate more corruption than partial sanctions. In this study, we run a regression to determine a linear relationship between corruption as the dependent variable and a number of independent variables, to include economic sanctions, the origin of legal system, the percentage of Protestant population, democracy, and economic development.

***Keywords*:** Corruption; economic sanctions; target countries

1. INTRODUCTION

Economic sanctions[2] are one of the most controversial statecrafts in international diplomacy. Although the application of economic sanctions in international conflicts is not a

[1] In this paper, we follow other researchers in using the term "target country," which denotes a country under economic sanctions, and "sender country," which is the country that applies economic sanctions.

[2] In this article we use economic sanctions and economic coercion interchangeably

new phenomenon, the dispute regarding whether it is a suitable option for settling international conflicts is a highly debated issue in political and economic literature. Much of this disagreement stems from the increased use of economic coercion as a foreign policy since the Cold War, particularly during the 1990s. Hufbauer and Oegg (2003) state two reasons for this increase: the introduction of new players such as the EU and UN in international politics, and the proliferation of foreign policy objectives (pp. 305-308).

Advocates of economic coercion consider it a simultaneously powerful and peaceful foreign policy tool, highlighting its deterrent power in international conflicts, while skeptics question whether the economic sanctions can be an effective yet peaceful solution. A host of scholars have investigated the effectiveness of sanctions from different perspectives, and demonstrated varying results and conclusions (Dashti-Gibson et al., 1997; Drezner, 1998, 1999, 2000; Galtung, 1967; Hufbauer et al., 1985, 1990, 2008; Lektzian and Souva, 2007; Nooruddin, 2002; Pape, 1997; Tsebelis, 1990).

The present study will not deal with the debate over the effectiveness of economic sanctions; rather, it will investigate one of the side effects of economic coercion: corruption. Several researchers have studied the unwanted effects of sanctions; however, research regarding the relationship between sanctions and corruption remains considerably sparse. The effect of economic sanctions on target countries can be overwhelming, particularly considering their tendency to be developing countries. According to Davis and Engemran (2003), in most cases of imposed economic sanctions, the size of the sender or senders is more than 10 times that of the target economy, and this proportion can reach up to 400 times in some instances (p. 191). This disproportionate relationship between sender and target country indicates the substantial effect of economic sanctions on sanctioned countries; therefore, there is a need to thoroughly investigate the direct and indirect impacts of sanctions on target countries. Although corruption has been examined scientifically and has accumulated a rich literature base, it has been poorly addressed in the study of sanctions. The present report addresses the impact of economic sanctions on corruption in target countries. The authors are specifically interested in determining whether the imposition of economic sanctions leads to an increase in the level of corruption in target countries. To establish this relationship, we use data regarding economic sanctions between 1995 and 2012, as well as corruption levels in sanctioned and non-sanctioned countries during this period. We then run a regression to ascertain whether there exists a relationship between the imposition of sanctions and the level of corruption in target countries. According to Hufbauer et al. (2008), economic sanctions are the "deliberate, government-inspired withdrawal, or threat of withdrawal, of customary trade or financial relations" (p. 3), while Pape (1997) states, "Economic sanctions seek to lower the aggregate economic welfare of a target state by reducing international trade in order to coerce the target government to change its political behavior" (pp. 93-94). Undoubtedly, the imposition of any degree of economic pressure may bring about unwanted side effects in a target country, as well as in countries that engage in economic exchange with that country. Corruption is one of the side effects of this type of implementation, and there is a need to investigate it more precisely.

The present study defines *corruption* according to Transparency International (TI), identifying it as "the abuse of entrusted power for private gain" (Lambsdorff 1999, 2008). Based on this definition, corruption involves various misappropriations of power for private gain, to include bribery, embezzlement, rent seeking, and smuggling, among others. Having introduced the applicable terminology, in section two we analyze the theoretic impact of

economic sanctions on corruption, and identify the mechanisms that lead to increased corruption in target countries. In the third section, we present data and methodology, followed by section delineating the results of the study as well as our concluding remarks.

Theory and Hypotheses

One of the more controversial topics regarding the use of economic sanctions is its effect on target countries, which has led to a considerable amount of research on the matter. Corruption, specifically, has not been a major focus in the ongoing conversation, although it is been mentioned sporadically throughout the literature. One of the first comments about the interplay between economic sanctions and corruption can be found in Galtung (1967), in which the author suggests that, regardless of intention, sanctions have unwanted consequences (p. 380). Galtung argues that one possible outcome of economic sanctions is a restricted economy and the emergence of new economic elites. He uses Rhodesia as an example of how a target nation adjusted to irregular modes of business, and how the sanctioned nation justified the ethics of those irregularities (p. 397). In his book *Invisible War*, author Joy Gordon similarly points to the emergence of corruption amidst oil-for-food programs and embargoes in Iraq (p.109). Gordon states that in times of economic sanctions, some citizens fare far better than others. In his example, Iraqi elites and those loyal to the Hussein regime took advantage of limited imported goods, and officials in charge of trade who had access to foreign currency made a fortune while ordinary people struggled in poverty. Gordon argues that this poverty led to an increase in behaviors such as bribery, theft, and begging, compounding the already deleterious effect of the sanctions. In a similar vein, Lektzian (2007) explains how economic sanctions increase rent-seeking opportunities, and shows that trade limitations imposed by economic sanctions provide a platform for determined economic sectors to take advantage of new conditions. Lektzian believes that sanctioned governments attempt to stay in power by "encouraging smuggling" and "granting domestic contracts," ultimately providing rent for the essential few (pp. 853-854).

Highlighting the corruption of companies from sender states during embargoes on Iraq in the 1990s, the Security Council Report (2013) points to corruption as a consequence of economic sanctions and underscores various sanction-evading methods, such as black market trading and cross-border smuggling (pp. 12-13). Daniel Drezner (2011) emphasizes the link between economic sanctions and corruption, explaining that economic sanctions undermine regular economic activities, and business-minded individuals will resort to the "criminal route" if they are properly incentivized (p. 98). Although experts explain the impact of economic sanctions on corruption from different perspectives, they share a common argument: whether directly or not, economic sanctions can trigger corrupt activity in target countries. While the direct corrupting effect of sanctions is evident in smuggling, bribery, and rent-seeking activities, indirect effects manifest in the form of decreased competitiveness or the emergence of new economic elites. Experts in corruption believe that a lack of competitiveness in the economy increases corruption.

Ades and Di Tella (1999), for example, argue that less competition results in higher rent, in turn raising the possibility of involvement in corrupt activities by the officials charged with negotiating or collecting that rent (p. 982). The authors show that in addition to trade barriers, higher rent in an economic environment tends to increase corruption (p. 992). Economic sanctions might therefore affect corruption by restricting trade and financial

exchanges between the target country and external partners, which in turn would lead to a decline in economic competition and, consequently, an increase in corruption.

Drezner (2011), Galtung (1967), and Lektzian (2007) point out that targeted countries resort to illegal activities in order to mitigate the repercussions of economic sanctions; however, anti-corruption programs are also neglected during these periods as the state focuses on decreasing economic pressure. This study examines the nuanced relationship between economic sanctions and corruption, specifically testing the following hypothesis: *there is a significant relationship between economic sanctions and the level of corruption in target countries.*

In general, the sender or senders may impose various restrictions on target countries, to include export restrictions, import limitations, or hampering financial flows to and from the target state. There are also a new form of economic sanctions, known as "smart sanctions," are intended to target only certain individuals or groups within the target state; therefore, each target country might experience more than one type of sanction. In light of this practice, the present study examined whether the severity of an economic sanction resulted in greater corruption in target countries. In order to study this phenomenon, we divided sanctioned countries into two groups: The first group consisted of countries that were the target of severe *comprehensive sanctions*, from export and import restrictions to financial sanctions; the second group included countries that were under partial economic restrictions, referred to as *limited sanctions*. Thus, we state the following second hypothesis: *Sever comprehensive economic sanctions cause more corruption than partial and limited sanctions.*

Finally, we expected that countries under long-term economic coercion might tend to suffer more from corrupt activities than those under short-term sanctions. The rationale behind this hypothesis suggests that targeted governments will attempt to mitigate the crippling effects of sanctions through the trade and financial sectors. During long periods of duress, a state will be more motivated to invent and justify illegal ways of skirting sanctions, leading to the third hypothesis*: long-term economic sanctions result in more corruption in target countries than short-term sanctions.*

2. DATA AND METHODOLOGY

Measuring corruption and corruption data

One of the main challenges in studying corruption is the fact that, unlike other economic and social indicators, corruption is an imperceptible phenomenon in which complicit parties attempt to mask their activities. As a result, determining the actual level of corruption in each country is a difficult task. The most common measure of corruption involves survey-based perception data indexes, of which the CPI[3] from Transparency International (TI) is the most widely used. The CPI is an index comprising business elites' and experts' perceptions of the prevalence of corruption in their country. As Treisman (2000) notes, TI indexes are reliable across time, methodology, and source, and are consistent with similar corruption indexes from other organizations (p. 410). As mentioned previously, the definition of corruption in the TI survey is "the misuse of public power for private benefit" (Lambsdorff, 2008). The CPI index ranks countries according to their corruption scores, assigning a 10 and 0 to the least and most corrupt countries, respectively. In this study, an average value of the CPI between the years

[3] Corruption Perceptions Index

1995 and 2012 for each country is applied for the following reasons: First, it reduces the effect of abrupt changes in the CPI for a particular country in a particular year or years; and second, a lack of TI corruption data for most sanctioned countries in the years before 2004 leaves the data set grossly incomplete.

Determinants of corruption

For the purposes of this analysis, sanctions are considered the independent variable, and several determinants of corruption are included as control variables. We include four explanatory variables in our model, each of which has a confirmed correlation with corruption form previous studies and addresses cultural-historical, economic, and political indicators of corruption.

The first variable is the *legal system origin*, which indicates whether a country's legal system originated from British common law. La Porta et al. (1999) argue that common law systems, found primarily in Britain and its former colonies, differ from civil law systems, which tended to exist in other parts of Europe (p. 262). Treisman (2000) and La Porta et al. (1999) conclude that countries under common law tend to be less corrupt. In order to test this assertion, we employ the data source used by La Porta et al. (1999), coding a country as 1 if its legal system is based on common law, and as 0 if it is not.

The second variable considered a determinant of corruption is *religion*, which we index as the percentage of Protestant population in each country. According to Treisman (2000), countries in which the dominant religion or the majority of the population is Protestant are perceived to be less corrupt (p. 401). We again use data from La Porta (1999) as a source for this indicator, which has historically been the most common source in corruption studies.

Another key indicator in determining the level of corruption is *democracy*. Although controversial, the negative correlation between democracy and corruption has been demonstrated by several studies in the field. For example, Treisman (2002) asserts that long-term exposure to democracy is necessary to decrease national corruption, while Goel and Nelson (2004) claim that corruption declines with an increase in civil liberties (p.2). The present study uses 2003 Freedom House data to measure democracy. A combination of the Political Rights (PR) and Civil Liberties (CL) indexes, the Freedom House index is scaled from 2 to 14, where a lower value indicates greater democracy.

The last control variable in this study is *economic development*. For a long time, corruption experts have reached a general consensus regarding the negative correlation between economic development and corruption (Ades & Di Tella, 1999; Serra, 2006; Treisman, 2000). Most agree that poorer countries tend to be more corrupt.

In order to test our theories and corroborate past findings, we employ the logarithm of GDP per capita in 2003 as a proxy for economic development. The data for this variable were retrieved from the World Bank (World Development Indicators, 2003).

Economic sanctions data

In order to identify a relationship between sanctions and corruption, we use the independent t-test to compare corruption levels in sanctioned and non-sanctioned countries based on data from the Peterson Institute for International Economics database. Included as *sanctioned countries* are all countries under economic sanction in the period between 1995 and 2012, for a total of 73 countries, and *non-sanctioned countries* consist of 60 countries in

the same time period. In addition to our primary hypothesis, we intend to determine whether the severity or duration of economic sanctions play a role in the relationship between sanctions and corruption. For the purposes of this study, countries are categorized as undergoing *comprehensive sanctions* or *limited sanctions*, and sanction durations range from 1 to 18 years.

3. EMPIRICAL RESULTS

In this study, we use the independent t-test to test our hypotheses regarding the general correlation between economic sanctions and corruption, and the impact of comprehensive and limited sanctions on corruption. To test our third hypothesis concerning the duration of sanctions, we apply Pearson correlation test. Controlling for four variables – legal origin, Protestant population, democracy, and per capita GDP – we use partial correlation analysis to test the correlation between economic sanctions and corruption. We subsequently run stepwise linear regression to estimate the equation between corruption as the dependent variable and the aforementioned factors as independent variables. As previously mentioned, our main purpose is to test whether there is a significant correlation between economic sanctions and corruption; therefore, we pose the following null and alternative hypotheses:

H_0: Economic sanctions do not have a significant effect on corruption in target countries

H_1: Economic sanctions have a significant effect on corruption in target countries

H_0: $\mu_1 = \mu_2$

H_1: $\mu_1 \neq \mu_2$

Table1 shows the two sample groups – sanctioned and non-sanctioned countries – as well as their mean corruption value and descriptive statistics.

Table 1. Group Statistics

	Sanctions	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Corruption	No	60	4.8487	2.44756	.31598
	Yes	73	6.9551	1.33933	.15676

No: countries that have not experienced economic sanctions
Yes: countries that have experienced at least one episode of economic sanctions

H_0: $\delta^2_1 = \delta^2_2$

H_1: $\delta^2_1 \neq \delta^2_2$

Table 2 offers inferential statistics and illustrates that the resulting level of significance (Sig) of Levene's test is less than 0.05; therefore, assuming equal variances, (H_0) is rejected.

Table 2. Independent Samples Test

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
									Lower	Upper
Corruption	Equal variances assumed	43.773	.000	-6.298	131	.000	-2.10640	.33446	-2.76805	-1.44476
	Equal variances not assumed			-5.972	87.283	.000	-2.10640	.35273	-2.80745	-1.40535

Sig = level of significance
Test assuming unequal variances average score is less than 0.05

In the second line, above, the upper and lower limits are both negative, therefore, the corruption average for non-sanctioned countries is less than that of countries experiencing economic sanctions. We conclude that economic sanctions affect corruption, which confirms our main hypothesis. In our second hypothesis, we intend to determine whether the severity of sanctions plays role in the relationship between economic sanctions and corruption:

H_0: Corruption is not higher in countries under comprehensive economic sanctions

H_1: Corruption is higher in countries under comprehensive economic sanctions

H_0: $\mu_1 = \mu_2$

H_1: $\mu_1 \neq \mu_2$

Table 3 presents the number, corruption mean, and descriptive statistics for two groups. The first group, coded (0), consists of countries that have not experienced comprehensive economic sanctions, and the second group, coded (1), includes countries that have experienced at least one episode of comprehensive economic sanctions.

Table 3. Group Statistics

	Comp	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Corruption	0	47	6.7062	1.51139	.22046
	1	26	7.4050	.79753	.15641

0: countries that have not experienced comprehensive economic sanctions
1: countries that experienced at least one episode comprehensive economic sanctions

$$\begin{cases} H_0: \delta^2_1 = \delta^2_2 \\ H_1: \delta^2_1 \neq \delta^2_2 \end{cases}$$

Table 4 shows that the resulting level of significance (Sig = 0.012*)* of Levene's test is again less than 0.05 and, assuming equal variances, (H_0) is rejected. Negative upper and lower limits indicate that corruption is lower in countries that did not experience comprehensive economic sanctions than countries under comprehensive economic sanctions; therefore, our hypothesis is confirmed.

Table 4. Independent Samples Test

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
									Lower	Upper
Corruption	Equal variances assumed	14.071	.000	-2.190	71	.032	-.69883	.31905	-1.33499	-.06267
	Equal variances not assumed			-2.585	70.907	.012	-.69883	.27031	-1.23782	-.15984

The third hypothesis examined whether a longer duration of economic sanctions results in greater corruption. The question is presented in the following hypotheses:

H_0: Longer-term economic sanctions do not result in more corruption

H_1: Longer-term economic sanctions result in more corruption

$$\begin{cases} H_0: \rho = 0 \\ H_1: \rho \neq 0 \end{cases}$$

According to Table 5, the resulting level of significance (Sig) from the Pearson correlation test is more than 0.05; therefore, (H_0) is accepted and our hypothesis regarding the impact of sanction duration on corruption is rejected. From this, we infer that economic sanctions with longer duration do not necessarily lead to more corruption.

Table 5. Correlations

		Years	Corruption
Years	Pearson Correlation	1	-.030
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.804
	N	73	73
Corruption	Pearson Correlation	-.030	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.804	
	N	73	73

Sig: level of significance

Correlation between corruption and sanctions, including control variables

We use partial correlation analysis to find the correlation between economic sanctions and corruption by including four determinants of corruption, in the form of control variables: *legal system*, *percentage of Protestant population*, *democracy*, and *economic development (GDP)*. Table 6 shows that the correlation between economic sanctions and corruption without controlling for these variables is 0.445 (significance level at p = .05). After controlling for determinants of corruption, the coefficient decreases to 0.153. In other words, the intended control variables have a significant effect on the relationship between economic sanctions and corruption, ultimately reducing the correlation between these two variables.

Table 6. Correlations

Control Variables			Corruption	Sanctions	Legal	Protestant	Democracy	GDP
-None-[a]	Corruption	Correlation	1.000	.455	-.098	-.491	.574	-.838
		Significance (2-tailed)	.	.000	.271	.000	.000	.000
		df	0	125	125	125	125	125

	Sanctions	Correlation	.455	1.000	-.160	-.342	.614	-.296
		Significance (2-tailed)	.000	.	.073	.000	.000	.001
		df	125	0	125	125	125	125
	Legal	Correlation	-.098	-.160	1.000	.156	-.045	-.022
		Significance (2-tailed)	.271	.073	.	.079	.614	.802
		df	125	125	0	125	125	125
	Protestant	Correlation	-.491	-.342	.156	1.000	-.263	.303
		Significance (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.079	.	.003	.001
		df	125	125	125	0	125	125
	Democracy	Correlation	.574	.614	-.045	-.263	1.000	-.482
		Significance (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.614	.003	.	.000
		df	125	125	125	125	0	125
	Log GDP per capita	Correlation	-.838	-.296	-.022	.303	-.482	1.000
		Significance (2-tailed)	.000	.001	.802	.001	.000	.
		df	125	125	125	125	125	0
Legal & Protestant & Democracy & GDP	Corruption	Correlation	1.000	.153				
		Significance (2-tailed)	.	.090				
		df	0	121				
	Sanctions	Correlation	.153	1.000				
		Significance (2-tailed)	.090	.				
		df	121	0				
a. Cells contain zero-order (Pearson) correlations.								

Stepwise linear regression

Finally, we run a regression to determine whether a linear correlation exists between corruption as the dependent variable, and economic sanctions, legal system origin, percentage of Protestant population, democracy, and economic development (GDP) as independent variables. We use the stepwise method and add independent variables to our model in order to

establish whether each variable plays a significant role in the model. If they do not play a role, they are omitted from the model.

Table 7. Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.838[a]	.701	.699	1.18052
2	.874[b]	.764	.760	1.05461
3	.888[c]	.789	.784	.99955
a. Predictors: (Constant), Log GDP				
b. Predictors: (Constant), Log GDP, Protestant				
c. Predictors: (Constant), Log GDP, Protestant, Democracy				

Hypotheses:

H_0: $\beta_1 = \beta_2 = \beta_3 = \beta_4 = 0$

H_1:at least one of the βs is not equal to 0

According to the result presented in Table 8, two explanatory variables – sanctions and legal origin – do not have a linear relationship with corruption; therefore, they are removed from the model.

Table 8. Coefficients

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	14.450	.507		28.515	.000
	Log GDP	-2.515	.147	-.838	-17.139	.000
2	(Constant)	13.972	.460		30.351	.000
	Log GDP	-2.278	.138	-.758	-16.558	.000
	Protestant	-.026	.005	-.262	-5.712	.000

3	(Constant)	12.364	.602		20.540	.000
	Log GDP	-2.031	.145	-.676	-14.005	.000
	Protestant	-.024	.004	-.238	-5.425	.000
	Democracy	.103	.027	.185	3.878	.000
a. Dependent Variable: Corruption b. Independent variables: Log GDP, Protestant, Democracy						

According to these findings, the final regression model would appear as follows:

$Y = 12.364 - 2.031X_1 - 0.024X_2 + 0.103X_3$

(X_1: GDP per capita, X_2: protestant population, X_3: democracy)

4. CONCLUSIONS

Although economic sanctions and corruption have been the subjects of research for decades, fewer attempts have been made to determine the relationship between these two somewhat controversial issues. In the present study, we look for a significant relationship between economic sanctions and corruption in target countries. Results of an independent t-test support our hypothesis, suggesting that countries that have been the target of economic sanctions are more corrupt than those that have not experienced sanctions in the same period of time. We also find that countries that have undergone comprehensive economic sanctions appear to be more corrupt than those under partial economic sanctions.

Our hypothesis regarding the duration of economic sanction is ultimately rejected. Applying the Pearson correlation test, results do not show any statistically significant difference between long-term and short-term sanctions in terms of generating corruption in target countries. While we expected that countries undergoing longer-term economic coercion would be more likely to craft illegal tools in order to evade sanctions, resulting in greater corruption, our findings did not verify that assumption. Adjustment mechanisms adopted by sanctioned states after long-run economic sanctions could be to blame for this inconsistency.

After incorporating four determinants of corruption into our analysis, results show that these variables have a significant reductive impact on the correlation between sanctions and corruption. We ran a regression to determine a model, which would include corruption as a dependent variable, and economic sanctions, legal system origin, percentage of Protestant population, democracy, and GDP per capita as independent variables. The resulting model suggests a linear relationship between corruption and GDP per capita, protestant population, and democracy.

Although this study provides several answers to our questions, it also raises further questions for exploration. Future research should focus on the interplay between economic sanctions and corruption more thoroughly and precisely. While the present study focuses on the general relationship between economic sanctions and corruption, we suggest examining

the impact of different types of sanctions, as well as the emergence of various forms of corruption after the imposition of sanctions in target and neighboring countries.

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Appendix 1.

Sample 1- sanctioned countries between 1995 and 2012

Israel	Rwanda
North Korea	Ecuador
North Vietnam	France
Guatemala	Burundi
Libya	Zambia
Pakistan	Colombia
Iraq	Paraguay
Iran	Sierra L
Lebanon	India
Syria	Serbia
Turkey	Italy
Fiji	Afghanistan
Burma	Ivory Coast
Somalia	Haiti
China	Zimbabwe
Sudan	Guinea Bissau
Armenia	Central African Republic
Cuba	Congo (DRC)
Yemen	Guinea
Indonesia	Uzbekistan
Turkmenistan	Belarus
Peru	Georgia
Togo	Honduras
Azerbaijan	Niger
Equatorial Guinea	Algeria
Liberia	Bahrain
Latvia	Kuwait
Cameroon	Jordan
Cambodia	UAE
Nicaragua	Oman
Angola	Saudi Arabia
Nigeria	Tunisia
Ukraine	Qatar
Kazakhstan	Montenegro
Gambia	Slovenia
Macedonia	Croatia
Albania	

Appendix 2.

Sample 2- non-sanctioned countries between 1995 and 2012

Gabon	Hungary
Jamaica	Singapore
Benin	Namibia
Madagascar	Belize
Mongolia	Mauritius
Dominica	Costa Rica
Malawi	Brazil
Mozambique	Bulgaria
Tanzania	Mexico
Philippines	Poland
Moldova	Panama
Bolivia	Sri Lanka
Kenya	Ghana
Chad	Thailand
Bangladesh	Senegal
Finland	Mali
New Zealand	Argentina
Denmark	Papua New Guinea
Iceland	Tajikistan
Sweden	Cyprus
Norway	Chile
Netherland	Austria
Canada	Australia
Germany	
Hong Kong	
Belgium	
Ireland	
USA	
South Korea	
Barbados	
Japan	
Malta	
Portugal	
Trinidad	
Botswana	
Taiwan	
Malaysia	