

# Responding to Bolivian Democracy: Avoiding the Mistakes of Early U.S. Cuban Policy

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**F**OR MORE THAN 50 YEARS, U.S. Government policy has been to promote democracy in Latin America. The election of Evo Morales as president of Bolivia is perhaps the strongest evidence to date that countries on the Andean Ridge are achieving that often-stated policy goal. By all accounts, Morales's election gave him the first true public mandate in Bolivia's history. But Morales's platform, even since taking office, has included anti-foreign and anti-U.S. commitments that have disconcerted some U.S. policymakers (and to some extent European and Latin American policymakers as well). In turn, these policymakers have declared Morales a threat. That kind of reaction is premature, however, and could undermine long-term U.S. policies concerning human rights and democratic values.

The purpose of this essay is threefold: first, to consider whether failed U.S. relations with revolutionary and reformist regimes in the past, especially with Castro's Cuba, offer any lessons for building an effective U.S. policy toward the new Morales government; second, to analyze the key aspects of Bolivia's current social, political, and economic situation; and third, to evaluate the validity of North American concerns.

## The U.S. and Latin American Revolutionary Movements

Revolutionary movements in Latin America have been especially challenging to U.S. interests. Overall, the United States has been inconsistent in its approach to these movements and often unfaithful to its own stated policies or to the humanitarian and democratic values that supposedly underpin its policies.<sup>1</sup>

U.S. policies toward revolutionary change in the hemisphere (and in other parts of the world) have been shaped by three factors: consideration of larger strategic concerns in other regions of the world, especially fear of global threats and Great Power rivalries; ideological and moral imperatives such as anticommunism and democratic enlargement; and protection of the economic interests of the private sector and the free market.<sup>2</sup>

As a result, in almost all of Latin America's major revolutions (Mexico, Guatemala, Cuba, and Nicaragua—Bolivia in 1952 being the one exception), the United States treated revolutionary change as a threat to its interests. It believed such change would have an adverse impact on U.S. investors and would decrease U.S. political influence because new governments would adopt "more independent domestic and foreign policies and . . . [would be] less likely to conform to U.S. policies."<sup>3</sup>

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UN Photo

**Secretary-General Kofi Annan shakes hands with Evo Morales Aima, President of Bolivia, in Vienna, Austria, 12 May 2006.**

To be fair, in the cold war setting of the era, U.S. policy largely hinged on genuine security concerns associated with the Great Power rivalry pitting Western democracies against nations aligned with the communist Soviet Union and Maoist China. However, legitimate concerns about Latin America often degenerated into a single-minded obsession with anticommunism, an obsession that viewed popular revolutionary movements with suspicion and as little more than Soviet and Communist Chinese surrogates. U.S. policymakers justified subversive actions and militaristic confrontations with revolutionary regimes throughout the region, including those in Guatemala and Cuba, by citing the need to stem communism.

One such intervention occurred in Guatemala in 1954, when a CIA paramilitary operation overthrew the democratically elected government of Jacobo Arbenz. As its codename suggests, Operation Success was initially viewed as a political victory. But it was a success only in the most mechanistic, superficial sense, and only for the short term.<sup>4</sup> In its aftermath, Guatemala descended into 30 years of authoritarianism, civil war, and ultimately ethnic genocide that claimed hundreds of thousands of lives. The Guatemala case can hardly be considered a long-term success when viewed against the standard of human rights values upon which America was founded. In fact, only relatively recently has something like a democracy appeared in Guatemala. Simmering bitterness and the legacy of political violence unleashed in the 1950s have long scarred the country's political process.

## The U.S. and Castro

Similarly heavy-handed and short-sighted U.S. policies toward Cuba needlessly forced Fidel Castro to align Cuba with the Soviet bloc in the interest of regime survival. Subsequently, all the consequences of cold war confrontation followed, to include a near nuclear catastrophe.

From the outset of the 1959 Cuban revolution, U.S. policymakers and intelligence experts assessed Castro as a figure with potentially great influence in the region because of his powerful, charismatic personality. In fact, early U.S. assessments expressed cautious but open admiration for Castro. A 1959 CIA memorandum described Castro as “a new spiritual leader of Latin American democratic and anti-dictator forces.”<sup>5</sup>

As a result, U.S. policymakers initially pursued a primarily passive “policy of forbearance” toward Castro. Experts at the time believed Castro's objectives for his new regime were vague, and that, rather than working from a blueprint, the regime was developing through a process of “day-to-day accretion.”<sup>6</sup> Indeed, Castro later admitted that “his early political ideas were not truly Marxist and his position in coming to power was still somewhat ‘idealistic’ and ‘utopian.’”<sup>7</sup> The U.S.'s first response was therefore quite favorable: It promptly recognized the new government and dispatched a more sympathetic ambassador to Cuba.<sup>8</sup>

For the first few months Castro followed a basically reformist program. Significantly, there were no anti-U.S. comments, and he promised to respect Cuba's 1940 constitution and forego expropriation of private property, especially U.S. assets, which were substantial.<sup>9</sup> Soon, though, in apparent response to the consequences of U.S. policy elsewhere in the region and because of the lessons of Arbenz's overthrow in Guatemala, Castro began to publicly assert that if Cuba's revolution were to survive, it “could not afford the luxury of the democratic process.”<sup>10</sup>

U.S. assessments turned to suspicion as Castro began to act independently, with defiance toward the United States and criticism of its perceived involvement in Cuba's internal economy and political affairs. U.S. policymakers were also dismayed by Castro's growing cult of personality and the example Cuba's revolution set as it rapidly gained influence throughout the region. When Castro visited Venezuela in



March 1959, the CIA station chief in Caracas said, “It seemed to me that something like a chain reaction was occurring all over Latin America after Castro came to power . . . a new and powerful force was at work in the hemisphere. It had to be dealt with.”<sup>11</sup> U.S. officials at the time appeared as much or more alarmed by Castro’s caudillo-like leadership style than by his Marxist tendencies or any early contact he might be having with Moscow and Peking.<sup>12</sup>

In short order, Castro’s program to neutralize political opponents and consolidate power in his own hands aroused the U.S. Government’s ire and enmity. The United States had exerted overriding influence over Cuba’s political and economic affairs since 1898, and moves to nationalize certain economic assets, along with Havana’s increasing flirtation with Moscow, sounded alarm bells in Washington. However, what seemed to antagonize President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s government most was “Castro’s open and belligerent defiance of U.S. political primacy in the hemisphere.”<sup>13</sup>

In retrospect, U.S. policymakers failed to understand that Castro’s actions addressed legitimate, popular concerns about Cuba’s political and economic sovereignty. They were also blind to the fact that Castro’s regime was utterly dependent on aid from an outside sponsor to ensure its stability and survival. The blunt, intimidating U.S. policy of threats and economic reprisal that followed only made Castro and his followers more intransigent toward the United States and more susceptible to the overtures of other Great Powers. Among the latter, the only viable and willing sponsor was the Soviet Union, which was actively seeking ways to increase its influence.

As a consequence, according to then-U.S. Ambassador to Cuba Philip W. Bonsal (who had been reassigned from Bolivia), the high-handed, clumsy U.S. response succeeded in “driving the Soviet Union into Castro’s arms.”<sup>14</sup> With Latin American analyst Cole Blasier, Bonsal has also suggested that the U.S. decision to cut its sugar quota

(so vital to the Cuban economy) and arm an exile force gave Castro an excuse to do what he had been unable or reluctant to do: break with the United States. In Bonsal’s words, the United States was “unwisely cooperative in removing the obstacles to” Castro’s turn to the Soviets.<sup>15</sup> Blasier concludes that “the effects of U.S. policies toward Cuba were diametrically opposite to their purposes, and . . . appear to have been totally self-defeating.”<sup>16</sup>

The situation began to unravel after March 1960, when Eisenhower gave the CIA the green light to organize and train a counterrevolutionary force.<sup>17</sup> Up to that point, and perhaps as late as 16 April 1961—the day Castro declared the Cuban revolution to be “socialist”—Castro’s policies might still have been moderated and U.S.-Cuba relations normalized.<sup>18</sup> The next day, however, the CIA launched the Bay of Pigs fiasco, and after that things went entirely wrong.



Fidel Castro speaks with members of Cuba’s Revolutionary Armed Forces from his base in Jaguey, Cuba, during the Bay of Pigs invasion, April 1961.

Because the United States failed to appreciate Castro's nationalist and humanist-socialist goals, and instead adopted policies aimed at humiliating and isolating his regime, Cuba was converted into a principal conduit for Soviet influence in Latin America. In the end, Castro's revolutionary agenda would transform Cuban society for the worse (at least as far as the economy and democracy are concerned) and bitterly sour U.S.-Cuba relations up to the present day.

## **Lessons Learned: Guatemala and Cuba**

Guatemala and Cuba provide a foreign policy lesson: Both regimes might have been influenced and moderated through normalized U.S. relations with less damage to democratic development and human lives. In particular, the eventual U.S. response to the Cuban revolution—the Bay of Pigs—was “one of those rare events in history—a perfect failure,” which actually succeeded in consolidating Castro's authoritarian regime internally and enhancing his international image.<sup>19</sup> At the same time, it tarnished the U.S. image in the hemisphere and beyond.

These cases also highlight the moral question of whether it is proper for the United States to roll back a country's revolution or radical reforms, especially popularly supported democratic reforms, as in the cases of Arbenz in Guatemala, Salvador Allende in Chile, and Morales in Bolivia today. For the United States, all these cases (Cuba too) suggest an important lesson: The most effective way to encourage democratic and socioeconomic change in a revolutionary or reformist government and to improve long-term regional stability is to compromise and engage constructively with those governments. Otherwise, U.S. conflicts with such governments turn into confrontations that challenge a people's right to determine their own political destiny—and that is an unwise approach in an age when U.S. policy ostensibly aims at democratic expansion. This lesson is especially important as the United States attempts to define its relations with Morales in Bolivia.

## **Lessons of Cuba Applied to Bolivia**

Morales's election affirmed the Bolivian people's clear preference for democratic solutions and under-

lined the resilience of Bolivian state institutions.<sup>20</sup> History and previous foreign policy misadventures suggest that the foremost goal of U.S. policy in Bolivia—and in all of Latin America—should be to facilitate representative institutions and respect democratic governments, even if they seem to impinge on American interests.<sup>21</sup> Washington's response to Morales must be measured and constructive, and not overreact to the anti-American and anti-imperialist rhetoric that he uses to rally his constituency. Policymakers should consider the confused U.S. policy response to Castro in 1959 as instructive for today.

Early U.S.-Cuba relations suggest several cautions for current and future U.S.-Bolivia relations. First, this is a critical time to influence relations with the Morales government. Morales's policies are not fully defined and are idealistic and utopian, just as Castro's were in 1959. Second, Morales's anti-American posture is not sustainable without third-party assistance. Although an earlier Bolivian revolutionary government (1952) did not have a viable third-party option as Castro did in 1960, Morales clearly does today: He is capitalizing on his close alliances with Castro and Venezuela's President Hugo Chávez. Indeed, Bolivia is for Venezuela what Cuba was for the Soviet Union—a strategic place to showcase its influence and counter U.S. goals.<sup>22</sup> The majority of Bolivians live in extreme poverty and are not interested in ideology or geopolitics; they welcome Venezuelan and Cuban economic assistance. Moreover, Bolivia's already anti-American climate amplifies high-profile “civic action” and humanitarian assistance by Caracas and Havana.<sup>23</sup>

The pragmatic response to Morales's approach to Chávez might be for the United States to increase rather than decrease economic assistance to Bolivia; in effect, the United States could supplant Venezuela and become Bolivia's third-party sponsor. To do so, it will have to de-link aid as much as possible from “conditionality,” whether that concerns Washington consensus models or coca leaf eradication and the drug war.

Bolivia's struggle for economic development can be assisted (or impeded) by effective globalization and the U.S.'s support. U.S. aid, trade agreements, and tariff arrangements should not be contingent on strict “Washington consensus” economic policies;

North American policymakers must appreciate the importance and viability of alternative socialist and hybrid development models. Many Bolivians (especially the majority indigenous peoples and communities) oppose “privatization” and the neoliberal policies that betrayed the spirit of the 1952 revolution to benefit elites and foreign investors. Opposition to neoliberalism has fueled popular rebellion against previous presidents. U.S. policymakers must see that significant backsliding by Morales on this issue will impede his government’s democratic development and stability. The United States should remain flexible regarding “nationalization” of Bolivia’s energy sector and help the nation develop its last major resource efficiently and justly. Bolivia’s 2003 “Gas War” and a 2004 referendum confirmed overwhelming support for a new gas law.<sup>24</sup> Morales’s May 2006 decree “nationalizing” the gas industry represents the culmination of this process and is central to his continued credibility and popular support.

In addition to resisting the urge to make aid conditional, the United States must also rethink how it apportions that aid. Over the last 2 decades, the bulk of U.S. funds spent in Bolivia have gone to coca leaf eradication, militarization of the Andean “drug war,” alternative crop development, and attempts to shore up Bolivia’s weak criminal justice system. Instead, aid should emphasize local economic and human development and people-to-people interaction (like the medical and educational assistance provided by Cuba and Venezuela). Despite some \$1 billion in U.S. foreign aid to Bolivia since the nation’s return to democracy in 1985, about \$100 million annually in U.S. aid is either invisible to the people or dismissed (and even resented) as self-serving and manipulative.

No single issue—such as the U.S. anti-drug policy—should dominate U.S. policy with Bolivia. An obsession with coca production will only embitter U.S.-Bolivia relations at the expense of long-term U.S. national security interests. Current Andean drug war policies have failed to reduce the



**Compensation for Bolivian farmers in the Chapare, who were given \$2,500 per hectare to voluntarily manually eradicate their fields, has been ended. Fields planted after 1988 are now subject to forced eradication without compensation. Bolivia intends to eliminate all “excess” coca by the year 2002 under its 5-year plan.**

supply of illicit drugs and caused collateral damage in Bolivia and the region.<sup>25</sup> Much like the economic sanctions against Cuba, U.S. counterdrug policy in Bolivia has been inflexible and self-defeating. Pressure to meet counterdrug targets has had a destabilizing effect economically and politically, contributing to the fall of previous Bolivian governments.<sup>26</sup> Coca eradication is a bone of contention between the Bush and Morales administrations. Rather than emphasize eradication and forcible crop reduction, the United States should seriously consider the alternative uses of coca leaf and their commercialization—a plan that Morales (like previous Bolivian presidents) has proposed. Bolivian coca farmers are not “narcofarmers” or linked to global terrorist networks. Defining the Bolivian drug problem as a terrorist threat will only complicate its resolution and contribute to instability. Coca growers primarily seek a viable economic livelihood; therefore, sustainable development and economic growth will address the country’s drug trafficking problem at its root.<sup>27</sup>

Production of coca leaf is not only an economic issue, but also a cultural one: Ironically, because of U.S. opposition the leaf is an especially potent symbol of ethnic identity, national pride, and anti-imperialist (read anti-U.S.) defiance. Approaches to it need to take this into account.



## Seeing Things As They Are

The world outside the United States almost universally views Morales's election as a historic victory for democracy, Indian rights, and global indigenous populism. Morales promotes popular causes and promises radical change. He is a man of the people, not a member of Bolivia's educated economic elite, and he has been chosen by the majority of the people in one of the fairest elections in the country's history. Self-made, informally educated, and with limited political experience, he ran for congress in 1997 and won, receiving one of the highest votes of confidence in this election as well. His cabinet today is representative of all of Bolivia, not just its political class. Many of his ministers are university-educated radicals and leaders of the country's indigenous, labor, peasant, and social movements, not professional politicians. Several are women, and others are Indian. As Bolivia's first president of a radical labor-peasant movement (sindicalismo), Morales might also become Bolivia's first elected socialist president.

Long before assuming the presidency, Morales led the Coca Growers Federation. In that role, he revived labor-peasant militancy and radicalism and brought the movement to national prominence. Only months after assuming the presidency, Morales was reelected as head of the federation, making him simultaneously the leader of a national peasant union and the country. While this poses a potential conflict of interest, it might also give Morales great leverage to moderate the coca growers' demands and influence them politically. This affinity might help his government fulfill its electoral promises and reforms within the rule of law and constitutional legitimacy—in other words, by democratic means. After 7 presidents in 6 years, Bolivia's people are desperate for political stability and democratic continuity.

It is unclear to what extent Morales and his political party, the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS, Movimiento al Socialismo) will implement actual socialist principles of political economy in Bolivia. Although he favors the typical anti-imperialist, anti-globalization rhetoric, Morales is not a dogmatic Marxist; he is a pragmatist whose ideological orientation is more indigenous and communitarian. Moreover, he has pledged to govern justly, not according to Marxist-Leninist dogma, but according to ancient

Aymara-Quechua ethical principles: "Don't be lazy, do not steal, do not cheat, and do not lie." Some of Morales's closest advisers and ministers, like Andrés Solíz Rada, the Minister of Hydrocarbons, are Marxist and anti-globalist, but Morales is following a more pragmatic path to reform. How long he continues with this approach might depend in large measure on the U.S. and international response to his government and its policies.

***The most effective way to encourage democratic and socioeconomic change in a revolutionary or reformist government and to improve long-term regional stability is to compromise and engage constructively with those governments.***

## Nationalization: A Litmus Test?

Policymakers have often associated nationalization with leftist and Marxist regimes. Cuba's expropriation of U.S. properties chilled its relations with the U.S. and has remained a major stumbling block to normalization. Therefore, Morales's 2006 May Day "surprise" announcing the "nationalization" of Bolivia's oil and gas sector and the military "occupation" of foreign operations raised negative associations and policy responses in Washington. However, the decree suggests that moderation rather than radicalism might be Morales's style. Indeed, the action was not really a surprise, a nationalization, or an occupation. During his electoral campaign and post-inaugural international junket, Morales frequently alluded to his intention to nationalize the country's energy resources (while also promising to respect private property rights). Moreover, 80 percent of the voters in the 2004 referendum had supported nationalization, and when Morales's predecessor, President Carlos Mesa Gisbert, failed to follow through, it precipitated his early departure. In this context, Morales's nationalization was "nothing but the long needed and awaited contract-renegotiation

under a populist guise.”<sup>28</sup> Thanks to this “renegotiation,” the state increased its share of production in the largest concessions from some 18 percent to 82 percent. The move is projected to more than double the revenue from the energy sector.

While the government increased its share of the energy take by 350%, Morales’s move didn’t really nationalize the industry; rather, it was “a symbolic nationalization” that served to defuse the nationalization agenda and boost Morales’s popularity rating, which had fallen (but never fell lower than 65 percent) in the months after he took office.<sup>29</sup> The decree was also a strategic move to influence voting for the Constituent Assembly elections then underway, and to shore up support for Morales’s party.<sup>30</sup> Citizen reaction to the decree indicated that most Bolivians—even those who did not vote for Morales and generally oppose his policies—supported “nationalization.” Although U.S. private property will not be greatly affected, the decree concerned U.S. policymakers, since respect for private property has long been a U.S. litmus test for Latin American governments. Bolivian policymakers might have learned from the Cuban case and remained largely noncommittal in their public responses to U.S. reactions.

Much of the U.S.’s concern about Morales has focused on the growing role in Bolivia of Venezuela’s Chávez, who applauded Morales’s “nationalization” decree as “historic.” It is no secret that Morales counts Chávez, along with Ernesto “Ché” Guevara and Fidel Castro, as one of his heroes. Pretty clearly, Morales’s political roots, like Chávez’s, lie in social revolutions in Mexico, Cuba, Nicaragua, and, of course, Bolivia’s earlier revolution. Unlike his Venezuelan mentor, however, Morales has strong democratic credentials and credibility.<sup>31</sup> Morales and the MAS were swept into power by an unprecedented democratic, populist landslide. After decades of run-off elections in which major presidential candidates failed to achieve an absolute majority in the first round of balloting, Morales won 54 percent of the vote, clearly a popular mandate. That mandate was for change, inclusion (especially of the poor and indigenous groups), economic development, and social justice; in short, it was for meaningful, effective democracy.

Morales’s election was also a mandate to reassert national sovereignty and autonomy over Bolivia’s

domestic policies, including coca leaf production, economic development, natural resources, and foreign relations. It stands to follow that, given the tremendous U.S. influence in all of these areas historically, and especially since 1952, Morales’s mandate implies greater autonomy from Washington. The U.S. foreign policy challenge will be how to assist Bolivia’s democratic development while encouraging Morales to pursue an independent democratic path, one that does not depend on Chávez’s Bolivarian Revolution and its largesse.<sup>32</sup>

In the past, the U.S. confronted governments that pursued independent policies of which it disapproved. Bolivia, though, has been an interesting and somewhat anomalous case. Unlike elsewhere, U.S. policy toward Bolivia’s revolutionary government in 1952 and its democratic successors was constructive and supportive; it became the basis for more than a decade of close, cooperative relations.<sup>33</sup>

## Democratic vs. Revolutionary Change

The 2005 Morales election can be a watershed event for democracy in Bolivia and Latin America and can help remake the U.S. image in the hemisphere. Historically, the Monroe Doctrine—a containment policy—and emphasis on security and hegemony at the expense of popular democracy has proved damaging to U.S. principles and credibility. The human rights interlude of President Jimmy Carter in the late 1970s was meant to rehabilitate American foreign policy, much as President Franklin Roosevelt’s 1933 Good Neighbor Policy rehabilitated the Monroe Doctrine by renouncing intervention; however, in response to the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua in 1979 and civil wars elsewhere in Central America, the United States refocused its policy on containment and counterinsurgency. As a consequence, for more than a decade the region’s democratic development was sacrificed for short-term national security interests.

Today, the United States has an opportunity to help make Bolivia a model of successful democratic development and consolidation. Rather than react emotionally and precipitously to the Morales election, as the United States did to Castro’s revolution, a more constructive, collaborative engagement with the Morales government will better advance Bolivian and U.S. policy interests in the long run. **MR**

## NOTES

1. Cole Blasier, *The Hovering Giant: U.S. Responses to Revolutionary Change in Latin America* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1976). Published over 30 years ago, Blasier's might have been the first comparative analysis of U.S. responses to revolutionary change. The study includes the failed Guatemalan reforms of 1954, but predates the 1979 Nicaraguan Revolution. Many of his observations could be applied here as well.

2. *Ibid.*, 232.

3. *Ibid.*, 211.

4. Peter Kornbluh, ed., *Bay of Pigs Declassified: The Secret CIA Report on the Invasion of Cuba* (New York: The New Press, 1998), 8. See also Nick Cullather, *Secret History: The CIA's Classified Account of Its Operations in Guatemala, 1952-1954* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999); Piero Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991); Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit: The Untold Story of the American Coup in Guatemala* (New York: Doubleday, 1982); Richard Immerman, *The CIA in Guatemala* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982).

5. Kornbluh, 6.

6. Blasier, 182.

7. *Ibid.*

8. *Ibid.*, 179. Also Philip W. Bonsal, *Cuba, Castro, and the U.S.* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971).

9. *Ibid.*, 179; see 183 for figures on the U.S.'s intimate trade and investment relations with Cuba. For similar and varying interpretations, see Wayne S. Smith, *The Closest of Enemies: A Personal and Diplomatic Account of U.S.-Cuban Relations since 1957* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1987), 43; Hugh Thomas, *Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom* (New York: Harper and Row, 1971); Richard E. Welch Jr., *Response to Revolution: The U.S. and the Cuban Revolution, 1959-1961* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985).

10. *Ibid.*, 185.

11. Kornbluh, 7.

12. *Ibid.*, 6. See also Anatoly Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, *"One Hell of a Gamble": Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958-1964* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997).

13. Blasier, 194. See also Thomas G. Paterson, *Contesting Castro: The United States and the Triumph of the Cuban Revolution* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). Paterson argues that U.S. officials were more worried about Castro's "Third World neutralist posture" and his aspirations "to become a hemispheric if not global anti-imperialist leader," a kind of Caribbean Nasser, 257. Paterson quotes a State Department officer who felt the United States should not "give in to Castro" or "we would get kicked around in the hemisphere," 255.

14. Quoted in Blasier, 198. See also Jorge I. Domínguez, *To Make a World Safe for Revolution* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989). Domínguez does not believe that the United States pushed Castro into the arms of the Soviets.

15. Blasier, 208. Also Welch, 10 and 26. Paterson quotes Ambassador Bonsal as saying that "Russia came to Castro's rescue only after the United States had taken steps designed to overthrow him," 258.

16. Blasier, 205. Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev announced at the time that the Monroe Doctrine was dead and that "Castro will have to gravitate to us like an iron filing to a magnet." Khrushchev quoted in Arkady Shevchenko, *Breaking With Moscow* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), 105.

17. Blasier, 190-91. Also see Trumbull Higgins, *The Perfect Failure* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1987).

18. Blasier, 200.

19. Historian Theodore Draper, cited in Kornbluh, 2-3.

20. Mark Falcoff, "The Last Days of Bolivia?" American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (June), <[www.aef.org](http://www.aef.org)>. For more see Kent Eaton, "Bolivia at the Crossroads: December 2005," *Military Review* (March-April 2006): 76-81; Ramiro

Orias Arredondo, "Bolivia: Democracy under Pressure," in Russell Crandall, Guadalupe Paz, and Riordan Roett, eds., *The Andes in Focus: Security, Democracy and Economic Reform* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), 45-65; and Waltraud Queiser Morales, *Bolivia: Land of Struggle* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992).

21. For example, the dispute with Bolivia and other Latin American governments that ratified the treaty of the International Criminal Court but refused to sign a protocol exempting American military members from the Court's jurisdiction when operating in the country might do more harm than good. The suspension of U.S. military training and assistance to Bolivia will harm important bilateral military relations and close a valuable avenue for cooperation.

22. For this interpretation as well, see Juan Forero, "U.S. Aid Can't Win Bolivia's Love as New Suitors Emerge," *The New York Times*, 14 May 2006, A4.

23. *Ibid.*

24. The 2003 Gas War was a series of protests mounted by indigenous people and labor against government policies in the gas industry that were perceived to cater to foreign energy companies. As such, it was only the latest instance of popular discontent over the way Bolivia's natural resources have been mishandled. During the "war," which unseated President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada and sent him fleeing to Miami, government soldiers killed more than 60 protesters. The 2004 referendum was an attempt by Sanchez de Lozada's successor, President Carlos Mesa Gisbert, to quell the discontent over gas by asking Bolivians how they wanted the government to handle the gas industry. The referendum pointed toward nationalization, but fell short of soliciting it directly.

25. Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin, eds., *Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: The Impact of U.S. Policy* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005). Youngers concludes that U.S. international drug-control policy has undermined democracy and democratic development in the region and notes areas of concern: "the expansion of the role of military forces in drug control efforts; inappropriate roles assigned to police forces; human rights violations; restrictions on civil liberties; the fostering of political instability; undermining local decisionmaking; lack of transparency and accountability; and abuses resulting from forced eradication of crops used in drug production," 342. Also Sewall H. Menzel, *Fire in the Andes: U.S. Foreign Policy and Cocaine Politics in Bolivia and Peru* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1996).

26. Waltraud Q. Morales, *A Brief History of Bolivia* (New York: Facts on File, 2004), 230-234; and Youngers and Rosin, 350-351.

27. Youngers and Rosin, 352-53.

28. "Journal of Bolivian Business and Politics," Web Log of Jonathan Olguin, a Bolivian studying at Florida State University, <<http://b2bolivia.blogspot.com/>>.

29. *La Prensa*, La Paz, 3 May 2006, <[www.laprensa.com/bo/hoy/especial/especial101.htm](http://www.laprensa.com/bo/hoy/especial/especial101.htm)>.

30. The Constituent Assembly elections were in early July 2006. Morales's MAS party won more than half the seats, but it fell short of the two-thirds majority needed to authorize amendment of the constitution.

31. For example see, Javier Corrales, "Hugo Boss, How Chávez is Refashioning Dictatorship for a Democratic Age," *Foreign Policy* (January-February 2006): 32-40.

32. Coronel Max G. Manwaring, Ejército de los EE.UU., "El Nuevo Maestro del Ajedrez Mágico: El Verdadero Hugo Chávez y la Guerra Asimétrica," *Military Review Hispano-American* (January-February 2006): 17-29. Specifically, Coronel Manwaring asks: "¿Cuáles son las medidas más eficaces para apoyar un país que está bajo la mira del bolivarianismo para resistir este llamamiento revolucionario?"

33. See Kenneth D. Lehman, *Bolivia and the United States: A Limited Partnership* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1999) and the contrasting view of Laurence Whitehead, *The United States and Bolivia: A Case of Neo-Colonialism* (London: Haslemere Group, 1969).

## On Deck in the September-October **Military Review**

▶ LTG John R. Vines—*Operationalizing Battle Command*

▶ LTC Alfred E. Renzi—*Networks: Terra Incognita and the Case for Ethnographic Intelligence*

▶ Sarah Sewall—*Modernizing Counterinsurgency Practice: Demands for Risk and a Comprehensive National Strategy*

▶ LTC Chris Gibson—*Translating Battlefield Victories into Strategic Success: The Path Forward in Iraq*