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
The UN Security Council in the 21st Century

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1

Introduction

*Sebastian von Einsiedel, David M. Malone,
and Bruno Stagno Ugarte*

IN 2004, WHEN THE PREDECESSOR VOLUME TO THIS BOOK WAS published, the UN Security Council was widely seen as being at a crossroads. The UN had recently embarked on major new peacekeeping operations in Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), but its ability to address the shortcomings that had led to disastrous peacekeeping failures in Somalia, Srebrenica, and Rwanda in the early 1990s remained uncertain. The dustup among the Council's permanent five members (P5) around the Kosovo crisis in 1999, leaving lasting scars in Moscow, still reverberated, and disagreement persisted over the circumstances under which humanitarian suffering would trump national sovereignty, calling for coercive action. The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States temporarily restored unity in the Security Council, leading to robust responses, including recognition of the right of the United States to self-defense in these circumstances, which provided cover for its Afghanistan intervention, and the establishment of far-reaching, globally binding counterterrorism norms. For a brief period, there was hope that the P5 could forge a lasting strategic partnership around counterterrorism. But that unity soon dissipated due to the toxic diplomatic struggle preceding the 2003 US-led intervention in Iraq, which was fought in the name of the "war on terror." At the time, the very relevance of the Council, and the UN, was widely questioned: supporters of the Iraq invasion lamented the Council's inability to enforce its own resolutions and address new threats, whereas opponents criticized the Council for failing to prevent the United States from waging a war they saw as illegal. And there was concern that the

Council faced a future in which it was confined to mandating mop-up operations after US-led military interventions.

Today, the Security Council is arguably facing an even deeper crisis of relevance. The record of UN peacekeepers, increasingly deployed by the Council into situations where there is “no peace to keep,” in Darfur, the DRC, and South Sudan, has raised questions about their ability to bring stability to conflict-ridden countries and act effectively on civilian protection mandates. Council-mandated multinational operations have fared no better, with Afghanistan and Iraq going through renewed cycles of violence, seeming to show the limits of third-party postconflict statebuilding—even when that third party is led by a major power willing to invest significant resources. Celebrations over the Council’s authorization to implement the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine through the use of force in Libya in 2011 appeared premature when deep divisions emerged among the P5 over the manner in which the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) implemented its mandate to protect civilians from slaughter by the Muammar Qaddafi regime. These divisions extended to Syria, where the Council’s inability to agree on any meaningful response to the escalating civil war is widely seen as the Council’s biggest failure since the Rwandan genocide. Meanwhile, the outbreak of the Ukrainian crisis in 2014 has evoked the specter of a new Cold War, raising fears the Council will be thrown back into the state of near paralysis it had been in for nearly forty-five years. Also reinforcing the sense that the Council may be entering a new era is the perception of US retrenchment. The dominant fear in 2004 that the Council could be rendered obsolete by US unilateralism has since been replaced by concern that Washington, the main driver of the Council’s liberal interventionism since the end of the Cold War, has lost its desire and will to lead forceful action within (and even outside) a UN framework.

Meanwhile, the Council’s own procedures have become increasingly sclerotic and stylized as the embattled P5 are criticized ever more loudly by the membership at large and circle the wagons around their own privileges, some enshrined in the UN Charter, others invented through practice over the years.¹

Looking at the UN Security Council today, one may thus easily become disillusioned by its shortcomings, ineffectiveness, and episodic failures. And there is indeed much to criticize in the Council’s performance across different areas. However, if one traces its evolution and impact since its inception, and in particular since the end of the Cold War, it also becomes clear that the Council has been highly adaptable and innovative, in both procedural and substantive terms. It has creatively interpreted the UN Charter to redefine dramatically the notion of sovereignty, expand its authority, refine Charter tools, and develop new instruments. Maybe most important, along the way it has consolidated its position as the ultimate

arbiter on the legitimacy of the use of force other than self-defense. While some of the Council's innovations (such as the invention of peacekeeping) date back to the Cold War, most of them occurred in the 1990s. As the focus of this volume is on the period since the turn of the millennium, this introductory chapter will offer an overview of the historical background against which most of the rest of the volume is situated.

Origins and Cold War

Conceived by the Allies during the last year of World War II, and founded in the war's immediate aftermath at the San Francisco Conference in 1945, the UN's main purpose was to prevent a future world war. To that end, member states committed themselves in Article 1(1) of the UN Charter to "take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace." While the Charter does not contain the term "collective security"—because, in the words of Michael Howard, "it smelled of the failures of the 1930s"²²—the concept is nevertheless firmly enshrined in Chapters I, V, and VII of the Charter. As the primary UN organ concerned with the maintenance of international peace and security, the Security Council can invoke the collective security mechanisms of the Charter, including the coercive measures of Chapter VII, when it determines the existence of a threat to international peace and security.

In its design, the Security Council was meant to fix the flaws that had rendered ineffective its predecessor body, the Council of the League of Nations. Most important, the major powers of the day, World War II's victors, were endowed with special rights (permanent membership and the veto, first and foremost) and responsibilities, which were to ensure the lasting presence of these major powers, with their military capacities for possible enforcement action, in the new system.

Originally counting eleven members (the membership was enlarged to fifteen in 1965 through the addition of four nonpermanent members), the Security Council was imbued by the Charter with two sets of powers that differentiate it from any other intergovernmental organ. The first one was the power to take decisions that are legally binding on concerned member states. Indeed, contrary to widely held perception, the Charter, according to Article 25, commits concerned member states to carry out *all* decisions the Council adopts, not just those under Chapter VII. The second power unique to the Council is its authority, under Chapter VII, to enforce its decisions through various sanctions and embargoes (Article 41) as well as through the use of military force (Article 42). The Charter also foresaw the establishment of a standby system under which member states would make available earmarked military forces for Council-mandated operations. However, no member state showed any interest in entering into such arrange-

ments, dooming the UN to this day to rely on self-appointed groups of states for enforcement action.³

In any case, the advent of the Cold War just a few years after the establishment of the new world organization rendered the new collective security system largely ineffective for the following four decades. Before 1990, the Security Council explicitly authorized military action under Chapter VII in only two instances. The first such authorization occurred in 1950, to reverse a North Korean invasion into South Korea, and then only because the Soviet Union—to its later regret—had boycotted the Security Council at the time. The second instance was the robust peacekeeping mission deployed in the Congo in the early 1960s (ONUC). This episode constitutes a notable exception to the UN's inability to intervene forcefully in any of this period's many internal violent conflicts due to the standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union, which often supported opposing parties in what were in many respects proxy wars between them. But the Congo intervention cost the life of the UN's much admired second Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld, and brought the organization close to financial ruin, confirming to many that the Council should aim to avoid the use of force. (Precipitating a crisis over the funding of UN peacekeeping, France and the Soviet Union challenged their related assessments of dues for ONUC.) Mandatory sanctions were imposed by the Council in only two instances during the Cold War, against Southern Rhodesia in 1966 and South Africa in 1977. But these were exceptions that were only made possible by the universally condemned racial policies of the white minority regimes there.

With enforcement action largely ruled out by Cold War constraints, the Council nevertheless maintained a certain relevance by making creative use of the Charter's less intrusive Chapter VI provisions, which allow the Council to "investigate any dispute" and "recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustments." Building on Chapter VI (but falling short of Chapter VII), the Council deployed two military observer missions in the late 1940s, one to Palestine (UNTSO) and one to Kashmir (UNMOGIP), providing an early template of what later evolved into peacekeeping. Dubbed by Hammarskjöld a "Chapter VI ½" instrument, peacekeeping is actually not mentioned in the UN Charter, which did not prevent the Council from deploying fourteen further peacekeeping or military observer missions to defuse mostly interstate conflicts between 1958 and 1990.⁴ (It should be noted that the first proper peacekeeping operation, meaning one involving lightly armed troops, was UNEF I, which was deployed in 1956 in the context of the Suez crisis, and was mandated by the General Assembly instead of the Security Council. The Council was deadlocked on the issue, not least because France and the UK were belligerents, alongside Israel and against Egypt.) In doing so, the Council managed to play an

often overlooked “role in the mitigation and containment of conflicts which, it was feared, would otherwise bring the superpowers into more direct confrontation.”⁵

Early Post–Cold War Euphoria

Mikhail Gorbachev’s ascent to power in the Soviet Union in 1985 and the initiation of his reformist *perestroika* program a year later heralded the end of the Cold War. One important signal of the decisive thaw in the superpower standoff was a noticeable improvement in the climate among the P5 in the second half of the 1980s. In 1986, John Thomson, the UK permanent representative to the UN, took the initiative to call together his fellow P5 ambassadors, at his residence away from UN headquarters, for an informal discussion on how they could contribute to an early end of the murderous Iran–Iraq War.⁶ The others welcomed this initiative and a system of regular P5 informal meetings soon took hold. These meetings helped anticipate and defuse conflicts among the five and allowed them to exchange notes on their national positions regarding various crises of the hour, if not formally to coordinate their positions. This newfound trust paid off a year later when, after having been publicly challenged by Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuellar to tackle a resolution to the Iran–Iraq War, Security Council proposals for a ceasefire, monitored by a small UN observer mission, made serious headway.⁷ The post–Cold War era had started at the UN.

A celebrated *Pravda* article by Gorbachev of September 17, 1987, sought the “wider use of . . . the institution of UN military observers and UN peacekeeping forces in disengaging the troops of warring sides, observing ceasefires and armistice agreements,” and called for the P5 to become “guarantors” of international security.⁸

While P5 cooperation required some time to take root,⁹ the much improved climate among the permanent members could soon be gauged by the sharp decline in the use of the veto: only 12 substantive vetoes were invoked from January 1990 to June 2003, compared to 193 during the first forty-five years of the UN’s history. Veto threats remained highly relevant, as the Council’s dealings on Bosnia in 1993–1995, Kosovo in 1999, and Iraq in early 2003 made clear, but very few issues seriously divided the P5 after 1987. Meanwhile, the ability and disposition of the P5 to cooperate with each other seriously diminished the margin for maneuver of elected Council members, who were soon grumbling that they were systematically marginalized, a complaint lent more weight by a tendency of the Secretariat to consult privately with some or all of the P5 before advancing recommendations to the Council as a whole.

Converging perspectives among the P5 on a number of violent conflicts around the world, particularly on the need to disentangle the super-

powers from them, allowed the Council to initiate action toward settlements. Between 1988 and late 1989, it established five peacekeeping and observer forces to assist settlement of the Iran-Iraq War (UNIIMOG); the crises in Afghanistan (UNGOMAP), Angola (UNAVEM I), and Namibia (UNTAG); and interlinked conflicts within Central America (ONUCA).

While the end of the Cold War had to some extent already unlocked the Council's potential to contribute to the resolution of serious problems of international peace and security by drawing on newfound cooperation between the superpowers, the Council's approach to conflicts remained relatively cautious until the Iraqi invasion and annexation of Kuwait in August 1990.

These events led the Council to impose a comprehensive trade embargo on Baghdad only four days later (Resolution 661), and in November of that year to authorize the use of force by a US-led coalition of member states.¹⁰ These steps, along with the Council's decisions following the March 1991 liberation of Kuwait, including disarmament obligations imposed on Baghdad as well as measures adopted to encourage protection of Iraqi minorities and to provide humanitarian assistance to the Kurdish population, were important not only in their own right but also because they proved precedential and consequential in many respects and would continue to move the Council for years to come.¹¹

The success of the coalition's military campaign against the Saddam Hussein regime induced what in retrospect appears to have been an unwarranted era of euphoria about a "new world order," at the center of which a reinvigorated Security Council would have the potential and capabilities to address conflicts worldwide. Having successfully tackled a conceptually straightforward challenge to international peace and security in the form of Iraq's attack on Kuwait, the Council then waded into the murkier waters of civil wars and of intercommunal strife.

The Council's initial record of successfully managing the unwinding of conflicts in El Salvador, Cambodia, and Mozambique that had been fueled by the Cold War, provided reason for optimism. Presaging later complex peace operations, these missions, all deployed in 1992, were trendsetting in two ways: first, unlike most of their Cold War predecessors, they were deployed to help settle civil wars instead of serving as "plate-glass windows" deployed along international borders; and second, they had significantly broader mandates than their Cold War predecessors, with large civil components tending to the political, human rights, civil affairs, electoral, humanitarian assistance, and policing tasks of the missions.¹² (Civilian leadership of large UN peacekeeping operations had been initiated with great success in Namibia in 1989–1990 by Martti Ahtisaari, later president of Finland.) The missions in El Salvador, Cambodia, and Mozambique also reflected the Council's growing engage-

ment in democracy promotion, as well as the tendency to see elections both as a means of effecting a “new deal” in postconflict countries in which power could be shared with former combatants in rough proportion to electoral results, but also as an exit strategy for the missions. The success of these three missions benefited from strong UN leadership on the ground, adequate resourcing, and a strongly engaged and supportive Security Council.¹³ However, they also benefited from a permissive environment that was all too absent in later UN operations, including a robust political settlement among conflicting parties who ultimately shared a desire for peace, (relatively) functional state institutions, and small territories.

Building on an emerging view in much of the world that the Council was at last coming into its own, the first-ever Security Council summit was convened on January 31, 1992, to discuss new orientations and activities for the Council. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who had just assumed the UN’s top job, was asked to submit “analysis and recommendations on ways of strengthening and making more efficient within the framework and provisions of the Charter the capacity of the United Nations for preventive diplomacy, for peacemaking and for peace-keeping.”¹⁴ Boutros-Ghali responded with a wide-ranging, thoughtful, and ambitious document, *An Agenda for Peace*. This report advocated, among other things, for consideration in certain circumstances of a “preventive deployment” of UN peacekeepers to forestall hostilities known to be looming, and, when circumstances warranted, the use of force by the UN itself rather than by coalitions of member states.¹⁵ *An Agenda for Peace* noted that peacekeeping had been carried out “hitherto” with the consent of all parties, hinting that this might not be necessary in the future. It seemed to assume a quantum leap in the willingness by member states to support robust UN action in the peace and security field.

The Council, too, seemed to believe that because enforcement of its decisions against Iraq had been successfully carried out, the constraints on and limitations of UN peacekeeping had fallen away. In the barely thirty-one months that followed Resolution 686 on the end of hostilities in the Gulf region on March 2, 1991, the Council accelerated the pace of its work by adopting 185 resolutions and launching fifteen new peacekeeping and observer missions as compared to 685 resolutions and seventeen missions in the previous forty-six years of UN history.¹⁶ Along the way, the peacekeeping budget increased from \$240 million in 1986 to \$2.7 billion in 1993, and the number of troops in the field from 10,000 to almost 55,000.¹⁷

Similarly, starting with the sanctions imposed on the Saddam Hussein regime in 1990, the Council also moved rapidly in the early post-Cold War years to impose a dizzying array of sanctions regimes to coerce conflicting parties to comply with Council decisions and international law as well as to

deny them access to arms and resources. From 1991 to 2000, the Security Council imposed twelve different sanctions regimes, not only against states but increasingly also against nonstate actors such as the Khmer Rouge, UNITA in Angola, the RUF in Sierra Leone, and the Taliban in Afghanistan. Along the way, the Council moved away from comprehensive trade embargoes (imposed in the early 1990s on Iraq, the former Yugoslavia, and Haiti) toward ever more targeted sanctions on diplomats, as well as bans on travel, financial transactions, air flight, and arms, once the humanitarian costs of sanctions regimes in Iraq and Haiti became widely known. The ability of regimes in countries struck by sanctions to enrich themselves greatly by controlling black markets in prohibited products also took some time to sink in.

The Sobering Effect of the Triple Peacekeeping Disasters

As Mats Berdal has pointed out, the large increase in the deployment of peacekeeping missions meant they soon “dominated the day-to-day business of the Council in a manner unprecedented in the Cold War years . . . and created severe strains on the organization’s limited capacity for mounting, managing, and sustaining operations.”¹⁸ These strains, together with the application of insufficient or inappropriate resources, wishful thinking, and a flight from reality, largely account for the UN’s triple peacekeeping disasters in Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda, unfolding during the years 1993–1995, which brought lasting shame on the UN and a sudden end to the first boom period of peacekeeping in the post–Cold War era.

In Rwanda, a cost-conscious Security Council, having deployed an understaffed and underequipped mission to implement a peace agreement, decided to cut and run when the genocide broke out, leaving hundreds of thousands of Rwandans to their fate. (The UN Secretariat shoulders a significant degree of blame in the episode by failing to share essential information with the Council about possible planning for a genocide and for failing at least to try to press the Council into action.)¹⁹ In Bosnia, the Council resorted to rhetorical posturing when its mission, UNPROFOR, ran into difficulties on the ground, equipping it with a robust Chapter VII mandate, including to protect civilians in so-called safe areas, without providing the necessary military hardware and political support to fulfill that promise. This led to disaster in Srebrenica, where thousands of civilians who had sought refuge in one of the safe areas were slaughtered.²⁰ In Somalia, the Council, whose initial mission (UNOSOM I) of just 500 soldiers was unable to protect the delivery of humanitarian aid, first mandated a robust US-led multinational mission (UNITAF), which was later replaced by a 28,000-strong UN peacekeeping mission (UNOSOM II). The Council, in the spirit of Boutros-Ghali’s interventionist peace agenda, authorized the

mission under Chapter VII to take military action against any faction threatening the ceasefire, thus breaking with the well-established peacekeeping principles of impartiality and minimum use of force. The mission soon found itself at war with a powerful militia, culminating in the “Black Hawk Down” episode in which eighteen US soldiers were killed and leading eventually to the ignominious withdrawal of the mission.²¹

The peacekeeping failures in Rwanda, Bosnia, and Somalia had two lasting consequences at the UN. First, they led to a retrenchment of UN peacekeeping. Excluding successor, follow-up, and replacement operations for the previously established missions in Yugoslavia, Angola, and Haiti, the Council established only one new peacekeeping operation with “boots on the ground” between January 1, 1995, and January 1, 1999, the relatively short-lived MINURCA in the Central African Republic in 1998. It was not until 1999 and 2000 that the deployment of a new generation of peacekeeping operations in Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone, and the DRC pointed to a resurgence of this tool. Overall, the number of Council resolutions addressing civil war situations dropped from over seventy in 1993 to below thirty in 2000.²²

The second legacy, specifically reflecting lessons from Bosnia and Somalia, was a widely accepted notion that the UN was ill-suited to wage war. Member states concluded that transition from peacekeeping to peace enforcement represented more than “mission creep,” and started viewing the two types of operations as fundamentally different, one requiring consent (by the warring parties) and impartiality (of the peacekeepers), the other requiring robust forces to confront one or several belligerent groups, even if in defense of a Council mandate conceived as neutral relative to the parties to the conflict. (This “black-and-white” view may have made the UN excessively risk-averse, however, as in complex conflict theaters there can be consent by the main warring factions and impartiality, but there may still be the need for forceful action against other spoilers.) Boutros-Ghali, in his 1995 *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace* (more of a reassessment than an addendum), concluded: “Neither the Security Council nor the Secretary-General at present has the capacity to deploy, direct, command or control [enforcement] operations except perhaps on a very limited scale. . . . It would be folly to attempt to do so at the present time when the Organization is resource-starved and hard pressed to handle the less demanding peacemaking and peacekeeping responsibilities entrusted to it.”²³

Consequently, the Security Council increasingly left enforcement of its decisions to “coalitions of the willing” such as Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti, 1994–1995; IFOR and then SFOR in Bosnia, since 1995; MISAB in the Central African Republic, 1997; INTERFET in East Timor, 1999; and ISAF in Afghanistan, early 2002.²⁴ It also alternately both worried about and supported in qualified terms enforcement activi-

ties by regional bodies, notably ECOMOG, the military arm of the West African economic cooperation arrangement ECOWAS, in Liberia and Sierra Leone.

The Shifting Limits of Sovereignty

The UN's deepening involvement in civil wars led to an increasing tension with the traditional cornerstones of UN collective security: sovereignty and noninterference. In his *Agenda for Peace*, the Secretary-General had already acknowledged that the new security environment forced the UN to look inside the borders of a state. Reiterating that "respect for [the state's] fundamental sovereignty and integrity are crucial to any common international progress," he cautioned that "the time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty, however, has passed: its theory was never matched by reality."²⁵

It was also the Security Council that, driven by its three Western permanent members (P3), did more than any other actor on the international scene to erode traditional conceptions of state sovereignty. Broadening its understanding of "threats to peace," the Council in the early 1990s increasingly invoked collective security measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter in response to developments that beforehand would have been considered to fall outside the realm of collective action.²⁶ The first such case was Resolution 688 of April 5, 1991, in which the Council implicitly invoked Chapter VII, stating that massive cross-border flows of Kurdish refugees from northern Iraq posed a threat to international peace and security in the region.²⁷ Other instances of Chapter VII action in response to largely internal developments with only tenuous effects on international peace and security include the 1992–1993 intervention during a humanitarian catastrophe in Somalia, the UN's efforts from 1992 to 1995 to end the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the authorization of a multinational force in 1994 to restore democratically elected president Jean-Bertrand Aristide in Haiti.

Further qualifying the concept of sovereignty, and enlarging its own authority, was one of the Council's most consequential innovations in international relations, namely the creation of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR) in 1993 and 1994 respectively. While the slow proceedings of the tribunals were initially much criticized, these steps by the Council greatly intensified pressure for a more universal International Criminal Court (ICC), a statute for which was adopted at a diplomatic conference in Rome in 1998. These new international tribunals were the main manifestations of what Anne-Marie Slaughter has termed the progressing "individualization of international law"—that is "the process by which we have taken the black box of the state and made it gradually transparent to focus on indi-

viduals rather than states as unitary political entities.”²⁸ However, the UN’s expanded role in peace and security was accepted only reluctantly by many member states, in particular from the developing world. They were highly critical of the UN’s increasing interference in the name of international peace and security in what had traditionally been internal matters. Self-critical introspection over the genocide in Rwanda and vows of “never again” notwithstanding, humanitarian intervention and the limits of sovereignty remained highly controversial issues in the Security Council, often inducing paralysis rather than action vis-à-vis armed conflicts and humanitarian crises.

Serious tensions in the Council around issues relating to state sovereignty and legitimation of the use of force resurfaced over conflicting objectives and approaches among the P5 to the situation in Kosovo. Things came to a head in the 1999 Kosovo war, when NATO’s bombing campaign against Serbia in the absence of a Security Council authorization proved hugely controversial not only among a number of UN member states but also among some international lawyers and humanitarian experts.²⁹ When the Secretary-General, in his speech before the General Assembly that same year, welcomed the “developing international norm in favour of intervention to protect civilians from wholesale slaughter,”³⁰ the reaction among many countries from the Group of 77 (G-77), a grouping of developing countries, ranged from cool to hostile. This highlighted the urgent need to establish consensus on this question and to provide intellectual underpinning for it.

An answer to the key question “When is it right to fight?”³¹ was attempted in the influential report “The Responsibility to Protect” by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, commissioned by Canada in 2000.³² The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) concept interprets sovereignty not just as a shield against outside interference but also as an obligation of states to shield their respective populations from humanitarian disasters. If states fail to live up to this responsibility, it shifts to the international community, possibly requiring, in the last instance, the use of force. Member states, building on the thoughtful report of the UN’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change at the 2005 World Summit, subsequently endorsed the so-called R2P concept, committing “to take collective action . . . through the Security Council . . . on a case-by-case basis.” That latter clause, highlighting the Council’s nature as a political rather than principled body, proved crucial, as its willingness to apply the norm remained highly selective in the following years.

During the 1990s, the Security Council proved increasingly willing to interpret dangers to international peace and security more broadly, and repeatedly turned its attention to socioeconomic issues and their interrelationship to security. The Council adopted resolutions on, among other

things, illicit flows of small arms and light weapons to Africa (Resolution 1209 of 1998), civilians in armed conflict (Resolution 1296 of 2000), HIV/AIDS (Resolution 1308 of 2000), and gender in postconflict peacebuilding (Resolution 1325 of 2000). However, this change in Council deliberations was not driven by any new, formal doctrine or procedures. Instead, many nonpermanent members tended to use their two-year stint on the Council in order to identify and spotlight nontraditional security threats. Despite the cries of critics arguing that the Council had become a “theme park” dedicating precious time to issues with little operational relevance, the trend has proved enduring.

September 11, Terrorism, and the Iraq War

When the terrorist attacks of 9/11 hit Washington, D.C., and New York, the Security Council was still reeling from its divisions over Kosovo, and many of its members were concerned over the unilateralist signals emanating from the recently elected George W. Bush administration. The attacks led to an unprecedented unity and resolve in the Security Council, where delegates were visibly shaken by the destruction terrorism had wrought just a few dozen blocks away from the Council chamber. The Council, before 9/11, had already been far more active in countering terrorism than it is sometimes given credit for, having earlier imposed sanctions on Libya, Sudan, and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan for failing to comply with Council demands to hand over individuals suspected of participation in international terrorist acts.³³

But 9/11 proved to be a game changer. Only a day after the attacks, the Council passed Resolution 1368, condemning the attacks and recognizing “the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in accordance with the Charter.”³⁴ For the first time, the Security Council invoked Article 51 against an attack from a nonstate entity, al-Qaeda, providing a legal basis for the US invasion of Afghanistan two months later. On September 28 the Council adopted what still remains perhaps its most groundbreaking (in terms of ambition rather than effect) resolution ever—Resolution 1373—which imposed significant binding obligations on all states to, among other things, enhance legislation, strengthen border controls, coordinate executive machinery, and increase international cooperation in combating terrorism.³⁵ Resolution 1373 also created the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC), which the Council complemented soon thereafter with the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED), to monitor compliance of all states with the resolution. While the CTC got off to a brisk start under the energetic leadership of UK ambassador Jeremy Greenstock, it rapidly proved to be more of a “process” response to events than a substantively effective initiative. It lacked teeth to decide on whether and how to

deal with states clearly not in compliance with Council decisions.³⁶ This did not prevent complaints against the Council for turning itself into a global legislator, because Resolution 1373 included provisions from international treaties related to terrorism that had not yet entered into force. (That complaint grew louder when the Council, three years later, adopted a similar resolution—Resolution 1540—imposing globally binding obligations on member states to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction to non-state actors.)

However, the unity of purpose the Council demonstrated after 9/11 soon began to fray as the Bush administration began to set its sights on Iraq, arguing, among other things, that the modern terrorist threat made weapons of mass destruction in the hand of rogue regimes unacceptable. The question of how to implement the sanctions and disarmament demands that had been imposed on Iraq in 1990–1991 had, over the course of the 1990s, increasingly become a point of contention among the P5. Starting in 1994, Russia and France—later joined by China—began to argue ever more loudly in favor of a road map toward lifting the sanctions. They also became increasingly critical of the aggressive tactics of the inspection commission (UNSCOM) mandated by the Security Council to verify Iraq's compliance with disarmament obligations.³⁷ This culminated in Operation Desert Fox in December 1998, a US-UK bombing campaign against alleged weapons sites in Iraq without explicit UN approval, which served as a final blow to the original Gulf War coalition of 1991 and resulted in consensus within the Security Council on the Iraq situation.³⁸

Scars thus already ran deep in the Council when the Bush administration embarked on a major push, starting in the fall of 2002, to get the UN body to endorse robust disarmament action vis-à-vis Iraq. That push proved initially successful, yielding a robust resolution (1441) that afforded Iraq “a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations,” obliging it to declare all of its weapons and imposing a resumed inspections process. Any false statements or omissions by Iraq, or a failure to cooperate fully with the resolution, would trigger the requirement for the Council to “convene immediately.” Despite the fact that the inspection regime was able to conduct its work largely unhindered by Iraq and did not turn up any evidence of an active weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program, Washington continued to insist that Iraq was in noncompliance and called for military disarmament. Russia, France, and China, however, were unconvinced and publicly threatened to veto any draft resolution that would authorize the use of force. This was, as the situation unfolded, unnecessary, as by the time the Bush administration decided to give up on such a resolution, it was clear that it would not have received the necessary nine votes for it to pass. On March 20, 2003, the United States, supported by the United Kingdom and some others, initiated its second war against Iraq, this time, however, in

the absence of approval by the Security Council or the company of a significant coalition.³⁹

While public opinion might have proved relieved that the UN had not authorized this fool's errand, it seems to have blamed the Council for having failed to prevent the 2003 war from occurring. Compounding the fiasco was a management and financial scandal, breaking in slow motion later in 2003 and throughout 2004, relating to the Council-mandated oil-for-food program intended to alleviate the humanitarian impact of UN sanctions in Iraq, a development that profoundly undermined two years of Kofi Annan's otherwise successful second term as Secretary-General.⁴⁰ Overall, despite the Council's lead in settling the Iran-Iraq War through a peace plan it advanced in 1987 and its success in reversing by military means Saddam Hussein's 1990 aggression against Kuwait, Iraq remains the ultimate petri dish for study of Council dysfunction and delusion.⁴¹

What these episodes reveal is that the Council is above all a political body, driven by what Kieran Prendergast, former UN under-secretary-general for political affairs, describes as "expediency."⁴² Relentless reactivity and short-term thinking have caused the Council often to take very shortsighted decisions as well. The most convenient options for P5 members on any given day may win out over carefully developed analyses and plans advanced by others. As the chapters in this book will show, this remains as true today as it was in the 1990s.

Academic Context and Resources

It is hard enough to take a snapshot of the Council at any given time, due to its long, multifaceted agenda, opaque proceedings, and uncertain impact on international relations. Partly for this reason, throughout the 1990s the Council had been studied primarily through the lens of international law, one particular crisis, or one individual's memoirs. Sidney Bailey and Sam Daws's magisterial volume on the Council's procedures, which also covers with great acuity a number of substantive issues, served for a long time as the principal reference tool for students of the Council and—recently updated—continues to do so to this day.⁴³ The commentary on the UN Charter by Bruno Simma et al., first published in 1995 and now in its third edition, is an essential resource for any student of the Council.⁴⁴ Other brief but incisive overviews were offered by Brian Urquhart and the late Anthony Parsons in the early 1990s, but by the early 2000s these were already mostly of historical interest.⁴⁵ Important contributions to the understanding of the Council were made throughout the 1990s and beyond by international law scholars, such as Thomas Franck, Jose Alvarez, Simon Chesterman, Adam Roberts, and others, shedding light on the Council's impact on international criminal justice

and the laws of war.⁴⁶ Specific areas of Council activity such as peace-keeping, sanctions, or Council reform were examined in sectoral studies by Mats Berdal and Spyros Economides,⁴⁷ David Cortright and George Lopez,⁴⁸ and Bruce Russett.⁴⁹ Ian Hurd⁵⁰ and Ian Johnstone⁵¹ shed considerable, original light on considerations of legitimacy in the Council's record and of the power and uses of deliberation in the Council setting for member states.

Highly publicized diplomatic clashes in the Council around the 1999 Kosovo crisis and the 2003 Iraq War fanned wider interest in the body, leading to more systematic treatments. A compelling compilation of articles, *The United Nations Security Council and War*, edited by Vaughan Lowe, Adam Roberts, Jennifer Welsh, and Dominik Zaum, is strongly recommended.⁵² So is Bruce Cronin and Ian Hurd's more theoretically minded book on the Security Council's international authority⁵³ and Jared Genser and Bruno Stagno Ugarte's volume on the Council and human rights.⁵⁴ Meanwhile, a handful of single-author volumes have been published in recent years, including by Edward Luck⁵⁵ and David Bosco,⁵⁶ who provide easily accessible introductions to the Council's role in international politics. In 2006, David Malone wrote about the Council's interaction with Iraq over a twenty-five-year period, in a single-author volume, kicking off with the Iran-Iraq War in 1980.⁵⁷ Relative to later years, he drew on valuable ideas of James Cockayne with respect to the Council's weak capacity to manage complex regulatory-legal frameworks (such as the sprawling and vexed humanitarian, sanctions, and disarmament processes it launched in Iraq) rather than operating in the political-military mode of decisionmaking to which it was more accustomed and better suited. The present volume builds on all of this literature and includes many of the individuals involved in these different projects, but also draws on much other research.

Our approach is not theoretically driven. That said, what all authors of this book have in common is a belief that the Council matters. In that sense, most if not all of them would probably subscribe to a thought tradition that has been termed "liberal institutionalism" in international relations theory, namely the notion "that cooperation in world politics can be enhanced through the construction and support of multilateral institutions based on liberal principles"⁵⁸ and that in turn, the behavior and choices of powerful states can be altered (and occasionally constrained) by the existence of international institutions (and the norms and rules they are based on). This volume will provide ample evidence of application of these notions.

The shaping power of institutions notwithstanding, any longtime student of the Council would find it hard not to acknowledge the enduring relevance of some basic tenets of the so-called realist tradition, according to which international relations is marked by a constant struggle among self-

interested nation-states for power and influence. Indeed, major crises in the post–Cold War era, from Kosovo to Iraq, Syria, Ukraine, and the Middle East, remind us that the Council is a body dominated by major powers, whose national interests continue to shape Council deliberations. In that sense, the Council today displays elements of continuity with what was described so admirably by Andrew Boyd in *Fifteen Men on a Powder Keg* in the early 1970s, but in a completely altered geopolitical setting.⁵⁹

Indeed, as this book will highlight, the Council’s composition, powers, and voting arrangements as enshrined in the UN Charter reflect the concept of a great power concert that the main framers of the UN Charter had in mind in 1945, when the victors of World War II—the United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom, and France—were accorded permanent membership and veto rights in the body.

Structure of the Book

This foregoing history of the Security Council’s decisions from 1945 to 2003 provides the backdrop against which this book’s chapters are written. Complementing our introduction and helping to frame the rest of the volume is Chapter 2 by Peter Wallensteen, one of the world’s foremost thinkers on violent conflict, and his colleague Patrik Johansson, who look at key trends in Security Council decisions and actions over the past two and a half decades, drawing from a wealth of data on Council decisionmaking assembled at the University of Uppsala.

Part 1, “Competing Interests on the Security Council,” reflects the editors’ assessment that it is the national interests of powerful states, and in particular those of the P5, that remain the key drivers of Council decisions. This part suggests that the P5’s interrelationships and relative power in the international system have evolved significantly over time, with important consequences for the way they use and approach the Council. Chapters in this part also provide examples of how the deliberative process of multilateral Council diplomacy has at times shaped and constrained the P5’s choices. This part includes separate chapters on each of the P5, with the exception of France and the UK, whose positions on and approach within the Council we considered similar enough to justify covering them in a single chapter. We have deliberately chosen to select authors from the respective P5 countries to write these chapters, as we felt they would be best positioned to explain—rather than criticize—what drives each permanent member’s Council diplomacy. (For Chapter 6, on France and the UK, we brokered an Anglo-French coauthor arrangement.)

Opening Part 1, Stanford University political scientist and former senior UN official Stephen Stedman, in Chapter 3, dissects the ambiguous (some might say schizophrenic) approach of Washington toward the Coun-

cil, torn between the desire to have the body legitimize and generate support for its foreign policy goals, and the reluctance to make necessary compromises or accept any constraints along the way. In Chapter 3.1 in a brief complementary commentary on the “permanent one,” David Bosco, a US legal scholar and columnist on US multilateralism, argues that the US approach to the Council can best be understood as a search for “maximum flexibility.” Chapter 4, on China’s role in the Council, by Chinese scholars Zhu Wenqi and Leng Xinyu, highlights the flexibility Beijing displayed in the Council for the first fifteen years of the post–Cold War era, but also explains why and how China has become more assertive in the Security Council as its global influence and interests have grown. Dmitri Trenin, a leading Russian international affairs analyst, explains in Chapter 5 how Moscow’s evolving approach to the Council has been largely determined by its changing relations with the West. He argues that from Moscow’s perspective it is the United States that, in the post–Cold War era, has repeatedly led assaults on world order (in Kosovo, Iraq, and Libya), inducing Russia’s leadership to abandon the idea of a partnership with the West and to see the Council primarily as a tool to rein in unconstrained Western use of force. (This may help explain, yet not excuse, why Moscow proceeded to launch a major assault on world order by illegally annexing the Crimea and supporting separatist rebels in eastern Ukraine, which occurred after Trenin submitted his chapter.) Thierry Tardy and Dominik Zaum, prominent UN experts of France and the UK, argue in Chapter 6 that the two countries compensate for their relative decline in the international system through skillful and highly active Council diplomacy, working hard to make a case for their permanent seats, which may be increasingly contested by emerging powers who want to join the select club, and which do not sit particularly well with EU pretensions to a common foreign policy (compounded by occasional French and UK procedural and sometimes political arrogance vis-à-vis other EU members on Council business).

The remaining four chapters in Part 1 address how the unique position of the P5 has shaped their interaction with the ten elected Council members (E-10), emerging powers, and aspirants for permanent seats, as well as how the P5 engage with the reform pressures arising from these dynamics. In Chapter 7, Colin Keating, who admirably represented New Zealand on the Council during the turbulent period of 1993–1994 and later enjoyed a front-row seat on Council action as founding head of the research nongovernmental organization (NGO) Security Council Report, illuminates how the structure and culture of the Security Council magnifies the differences in power between its members with the veto (including the continuity of knowledge imbuing the P5 with a sense of “institutional exceptionalism”) and those without. While the elected Council members’ margin of maneuver was always circumscribed, Keating explains how, since the early 2000s,

the E-10 have become more marginalized, essentially relegating them to the role of rubberstamping decisions reached among the P5 or choosing between positions of contending members of the P5. In Chapter 8, Kishore Mahbubani, who proved during his time as Singapore's ambassador to the UN in the early 2000s that even small countries can play an ambitious role on the Council, shares Keating's concerns about P5 dominance. However, unlike Keating, he sees the solution in enlarging the club of veto-holding permanent members, a failure of which, in his view, would eventually condemn the Council to irrelevance. In Chapter 9, Christian Wenaweser, Liechtenstein's ambassador to the UN and one of the longest-serving permanent representatives in New York, equally laments the P5's stranglehold on the Council, but argues that the debate around Council reform has focused excessively on enlargement of the body, neglecting the possibly more important dimension of its working methods, reform of which would address (in part) the Council's lack of transparency and accountability. His chapter includes a compelling insider's account of his ultimately unsuccessful efforts on the front lines of a campaign for reform of Council working methods as one of the founders of the so-called Small Five initiative. In Chapter 10, Edward C. Luck, eminent UN scholar and former special adviser of the Secretary-General on the Responsibility to Protect, is more sanguine than either Keating, Mahbubani, or Wenaweser about the Council's current composition, its ability to adapt, and the opportunities of the E-10 to positively influence Council decisionmaking. Less concerned about P5 collusion than about the growing risk of P5 disunity, he warns against overambitious reform efforts that could damage the "concert of power" nature of the Council.

Part 2 of the volume, "Addressing Thematic Issues," focuses on how evolving norms and threats have shaped the Council's decisionmaking and actions over the past quarter century. In Chapter 11, Thomas G. Weiss, one of the foremost experts on the UN and humanitarian norms and action, traces the normative and ideational development in this field over the past quarter century and highlights the factors that circumscribe the consistent application of humanitarian values by the Council. In Chapter 12, Francesco Mancini, former director of research at the International Peace Institute in New York, surveys how and why democracy promotion became so prominent in the Council's operations during the 1990s yet is facing increasing headwinds since the early 2000s. Joanna Weschler, director of research at Security Council Report and former head of Human Rights Watch's UN office, explains in Chapter 13 why the Council, despite making important headway in factoring human rights into its work since the end of the Cold War, remains inconsistent and often disappoints in its human rights record. In Chapter 14, Peter Romaniuk, an expert on multilateral counterterrorism activity, tracks the Council's shifting approach to countert-

errorism, explaining why the Council's strong resolve in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks ultimately did not live up to its promise. James Cockayne, a rising star among scholars of organized crime, shows in Chapter 15 how the Council has been highly innovative in devising responses to the growing threat of organized crime and piracy, but also suggests that these experiments in international law enforcement face significant conceptual and operational challenges in a political body such as the Council. In Chapter 16, Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, Indian scholar of the UN and of weapons of mass destruction, assesses the Council's track record on nuclear nonproliferation throughout its seventy-year history, focusing on the Council's handling of the cases of Iraq, North Korea, Libya, Iran, and Syria, as well as its approach to nonstate actors on this issue.

Part 3 of the book, "Enforcing Council Mandates," focuses on the Council's enforcement actions under Articles 41 and 42 of the UN Charter. In Chapter 17, Adam Roberts, Oxford professor emeritus and dean of British international relations scholars, surveys the remarkably rich record of the Council in authorizing UN peacekeeping forces, regional peacekeeping forces, and coalitions of the willing to use force, arguing that its inconsistency and shortcomings suggest a system of "selective" rather than "collective" security. In Chapter 18, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, president of the International Crisis Group and former UN under-secretary-general for peacekeeping operations, illuminates the doctrinal, strategic, and operational challenges the UN faces when its peacekeepers are deployed to protect civilians in active conflict situations while having to adhere to the peacekeeping principles of consent, impartiality, and minimum use of force. In Chapter 19, Herman Schaper, who served as Dutch ambassador to both NATO and the UN, traces the evolving and at times tortured relationship between these two organizations since their origins in the 1940s, and, looking at the cases of Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Libya, explains why NATO has emerged as the UN's enforcer of choice since the end of the Cold War. In Chapter 20, Sue Eckert, former US assistant secretary of state and leading sanctions scholar, shows how the evolution of UN sanctions from a blunt hatchet (comprehensive trade embargoes) into a scalpel (targeted sanctions), and their employment in the service of a wide range of objectives against a wide range of actors, confronts the Council with increasing challenges of strategic coordination and management.

Part 4, "Evolving Institutional Factors," explores the Council's relationships with five key actors that are central to the Council's life. The most visible and important of these relationships is of course that with the UN Secretary-General, covered here in Chapter 21 by Simon Chesterman, dean of law at the National University of Singapore. Dependent on P5 support for election and reelection, endowed with a certain autonomy relative to the Council anchored in Article 99 of the Charter, yet confronted with pres-

tures—in particular from the P5—to act more as “secretary” than “general,” the Secretary-General faces a particularly difficult balancing act in his relations with the P5 members, especially when they are divided. In Chapter 22, Connie Peck, drawing on years of research she conducted as founding head of the preventive diplomacy program at UNITAR, turns the focus to the special representatives of the UN Secretary-General, who are responsible for overseeing the UN’s peace operations in the field, and whose success often depends on how deftly they manage their relations with the Council. Bruno Stagno Ugarte, coeditor of this volume, shows in Chapter 23 that even though the Council’s interaction with regional and subregional organizations evolved from a struggle for primacy during the Cold War to one of cooperation during the post-Cold War era, their relationship remains difficult due to competing interests and differing institutional cultures. In Chapter 24, longtime UN observer and mediation expert Teresa Whitfield shines a light on the changing role of Groups of Friends in the life of the Council. A much-used instrument throughout the 1990s for the Council to maximize leverage and involve knowledgeable non-Council members into its work, Groups of Friends have evolved significantly in their role and influence since the early 2000s, with new Groups of Friends having moved toward either a Contact Group model featuring comparatively little interaction with the Council, or a thematic model encouraging the Council’s engagement with crosscutting questions. In Chapter 25, on international courts tribunals, a promising young legal scholar, Eran Sthoeger, focuses on the dynamics and relationship between the Council and the international tribunals it has helped set up in Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia, Sierra Leone, and Lebanon, as well as the International Criminal Court, to which it has already referred two situations.

Part 5, “Key Country Cases,” offers a set of ten case studies and a commentary assessing the Council’s decisionmaking and its results in specific countries that have featured prominently in the Council’s life over the past two decades. In Chapter 26, longtime UN staffer and Middle East expert Markus E. Bouillon explores the Council’s involvement in the Middle East going back to 1947, noting that while the Council has often played a useful role as a crisis manager, divisions among its permanent members have prevented it from assuming leadership in efforts to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict. In Chapter 27, David M. Malone, coeditor of this book, and Poorvi Chitalkar, from the Global Centre on Pluralism in Canada, look at a quarter century of Council decisionmaking on Iraq, which shaped the body’s track record like no other issue. In Chapter 28, Mats Berdal, one of academia’s leading voices on civil wars, surveys the Council’s struggles throughout the 1990s to respond to the wars of succession in the former Yugoslavia, focusing in particular on the divisive questions arising from the use of force in Bosnia. In Chapter 29, John L. Hirsch, who served as a US ambassador and

senior diplomat in various positions in Africa in the 1980s and 1990s, traces the highs and lows of over twenty years of Council engagement in Somalia, which yielded temporary success in the early 1990s, but also revealed the Council's limitations during its confrontation with committed warlords, and documents recent reengagement with the country driven by growing concerns over terrorism and piracy. In Chapter 30, Heiko Nitzschke, member of Germany's permanent mission to the UN in New York covering Security Council issues and a former UN staffer in Sudan, provides a chapter that assesses the multifaceted yet often fraught Council decisionmaking on Sudan since the 1990s, from its early steps to confront Khartoum over its sponsorship of terrorism to its later parallel efforts to resolve the north-south and Darfur crises in the country. Chapter 31, Francesc Vendrell's account of the Council's engagement with Afghanistan from the mid-1990s onward, combines dispassionate analysis with firsthand accounts that draw on his experience as both the UN's and the European Union's chief diplomat in the troubled country. In Chapter 32, Africa scholar and UN expert Tatiana Carayannis looks at the Council's long engagement with the DRC. Initially remaining only a bystander after the outbreak of civil war in 1996, even though the war had its roots in the Rwandan genocide and the Council-mandated response thereto, the Council became ever more deeply involved after deploying a peace operation in 1999, leading Congo to become "the de facto laboratory for the Council's response to complex conflicts," with various experiments in peace enforcement. In Chapter 33, French peacekeeping experts Arthur Boutellis and Alexandra Novosseloff trace the (often French-driven) involvement of the Council in Côte d'Ivoire, extending over a decade, that culminated in 2011 in robust action to enforce the results of contested elections in the name of the protection of civilians.

The last three chapters of Part 5 deal with the Council's efforts to respond to the upheavals brought about by the Arab Spring. In Chapter 34, Alex Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, both leading experts on R2P and on peace operations, shine a light on Council dynamics around one of the most controversial episodes in the Council's recent history: its authorization of the use of force against the Qaddafi regime in 2011 and the much contested implementation of that mandate by NATO. The controversy around Libya complicated Council members' unsuccessful efforts to find a common approach to the escalating civil war in Syria, which is analyzed in great detail in Chapter 35 by Salman Shaikh and Amanda Roberts, with the former drawing on his insights into regional dynamics as head of the Brookings Institution's Doha Office and the latter from her perch as senior research analyst covering Syria for Security Council Report. Complementing this is Chapter 35.1, an analytical commentary from Lebanese journalist Raghida Dergham, longtime UN correspondent of *al-Hayat*, who laments the fecklessness of the P5 as well as other key players.

Finally, Part 6, “The Security Council and International Order,” explores the wider implications of Council decisionmaking for peace and security, international law, and global order. In Chapter 26, peacekeeping expert and scholarly pundit Richard Gowan traces the resurgence of peacekeeping since 1999, arguing that peacekeeping mandates and their implementation, rather than being a simple reflection of P5 preferences, are often the result of significant compromise and improvisation that results from competing interests of Council members, regional players, troop-contributing countries, and host nations, as well as unforeseen developments in volatile crises. International legal scholar and UN expert Ian Johnstone, in Chapter 37, on the Council and international law, demonstrates how the Council has expanded its original field of competence, increasingly acting over the past two decades as a lawmaker, as a quasi-judicial body, and as an enforcer of international law, raising important questions with respect to its accountability and legitimacy. In Chapter 38, Bruce Jones, a leading voice on multilateral security issues and global order at the Brookings Institution, explores how changing great power relations and the rise of emerging powers will affect the Council’s ability to engage in conflict management and humanitarian action and to address a range of emerging threats. In Chapter 39, Jeremy Greenstock, who served as the UK’s ambassador on the Security Council in the early 2000s, argues that the Council’s crisis management function has been complicated by the growing difficulty in reaching multilateral consensus in a world with an ever greater number of states, a proliferation and fragmentation of multilateral decisionmaking processes, multiple power centers, and a growing tendency of governments to cater to their domestic audience in international negotiations. Yet the Council also benefits from built-in incentives that draw the great powers toward pragmatic approaches to problem solving, even after major international disputes. Finally, in Chapter 40 the coeditors summarize major developments and trends the Council has undergone since the turn of the millennium, highlighting its achievements and shortcomings and the challenges it faces in adapting to a changing world.

In the Appendixes, we offer five tables that we hope will give readers easily accessible overviews of major Council decisions (or, in the case of vetoes, major nondecisions). The first table lists all UN peacekeeping operations and observer missions the Council has mandated since its inception, starting with UNTSO in 1948. The second table includes all Council-mandated political missions, which have been broadly defined as “UN civilian missions that are deployed for a limited duration to support Member States in good offices, conflict prevention, peacemaking and peacebuilding.”⁶⁰ While the General Assembly mandated a number of such missions in the late 1940 and 1950s, the Security Council only started using this tool in the post-Cold War era and with increasing frequency since the

start of the new millennium, although this trend seems to have ebbed as of late. The third table looks at peacekeeping and enforcement operations mandated by the Council since 1945 that were carried out by coalitions of the willing or regional organizations. The fourth table lists all sanctions regimes imposed by the Security Council, and the final table lists all the vetoes cast by any of the P5 in the post–Cold War era.

Notes

1. Deference to the P5 extends even to their near-automatic inclusion in other UN-elected and UN-appointed bodies, as well as to a presumption of their precedence over that of other countries in UN protocol, all of which could be challenged by other member states but rarely has been. Thus, complaints about the P5 by other states in the absence of any serious challenge to their privileges extending way beyond the Security Council itself, often strike observers as pointlessly whiny.

2. Michael Howard, “The Historical Development of the UN’s Role in International Security,” in *United Nations, Divided World: The UN’s Roles in International Relations*, edited by Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993).

3. Edward Luck, *UN Security Council: Practice and Promise* (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 25–26.

4. See Appendix 1 in this volume.

5. Mats Berdal, “The Security Council and Peacekeeping,” in *The United Nations Security Council and War: The Evolution of Thought and Practice Since 1945*, edited by Vaughan Lowe, Adam Roberts, Jennifer Welsh, and Dominik Zaum (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 179.

6. For an account of evolving dynamics within the Council, particularly among the P5, from 1986 to 1990, see Cameron Hume, *The United Nations, Iran, and Iraq: How Peacemaking Changed* (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1994), especially pp. 81–82, 88–102.

7. United Nations, press release, UN Doc. SG/SM/3956, January 13, 1987, p. 5.

8. Mikhail S. Gorbachev, “Reality and the Guarantees of a Secure World,” in *FBIS Daily Report: Soviet Union*, September 17, 1987, pp. 23–28.

9. David M. Malone, interviews with Alexander M. Belonogov, permanent representative of the Soviet Union to the UN, 1986–1990, and John Thomson, permanent representative of the UK to the UN, 1982–1987, conducted in Ottawa, March 20, 1996, and Princeton, April 15, 1996, respectively.

10. United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 (November 29, 1990), UN Doc. S/RES/678.

11. A number of the measures adopted by France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and their allies, particularly in northern Iraq (to protect, through a no-fly zone, and provide assistance to the Kurds), were initiated without explicit Security Council authorization. These measures were, however, not then seriously challenged within the Council. Some of the humanitarian activities of Operation Provide Comfort were eventually taken over by the UN.

12. See Michael C. Williams, *Civil-Military Relations and Peacekeeping* (London: Routledge, 1998).

13. See Blanca Antonini, “El Salvador,” and Aldo Ajello and Patrick Whitman, “Mozambique,” in *The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century*, edited by David M. Malone (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004).

14. United Nations Security Council, "The Responsibility of the Security Council in the Maintenance of International Peace and Security," UN Doc. S/23500, January 31, 1992, p. 1.

15. United Nations Secretary-General, *An Agenda for Peace, Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping*, UN Doc. A/47/277, June 17, 1992.

16. During this period, the UN launched the following new peacekeeping operations and observer bodies: UNIKOM in Kuwait (1991); MINURSO in Western Sahara (1991); ONUSAL in El Salvador (1991); UNAVEM II in Angola (1991); UNAMIC in Cambodia (1991); UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia (1992); UNTAC in Cambodia (1992); UNOSOM in Somalia (1992); ONUMOZ in Mozambique (1992); UNOSOM II in Somalia (1993); UNOMUR in Uganda and Rwanda (1993); UNOMIG in Georgia (1993); UNOMIL in Liberia (1993); UNMIH in Haiti (1993); and UNAMIR in Rwanda (1993). In addition, the Council authorized the US-led UNITAF in Somalia (1992); and an UNPROFOR presence, in effect a preventive deployment, in Macedonia (1992).

17. Simon Chesterman, "Blue Helmet Blues," *Security Dialogue* 34, no. 3 (September 2003): 369.

18. Berdal, "The Security Council and Peacekeeping," p. 191.

19. See Gérard Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995); Michael Barnett, "The UN Security Council: Indifference and Genocide in Rwanda," *Cultural Anthropology* 12, no. 4 (1997): 551; Matthew Vaccaro, "The Politics of Genocide: Peacekeeping and Disaster Relief in Rwanda," in *The UN, Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s*, edited by William J. Durch (New York: St. Martin's, 1996); Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke, "Rwanda," in *The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century*, edited by David M. Malone (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004), pp. 483–489; Romeo Dallaire, *Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda* (New York: Carroll and Graf, 2004).

20. United Nations Secretary-General, *Report to the Secretary-General Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35: The Fall of Srebrenica*, UN Doc. A/54/549, November 15, 1999; Mats Berdal, "Bosnia," in Malone, *The UN Security Council*, pp. 451–466.

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