Title: Cybersecurity as it Applies to the Survivability Key Performance Parameter









Certification Training

Knowledge Sharing

Continuous Learning Mission Assistance

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DepSecDef (DSD) directed Joint Staff to develop Cybersecurity KPP

- DOT&E Cybersecurity Report ... "<u>Highlighted multiple weapon systems with vulnerabilities</u> <u>that should have been known and fixed prior to DT&E.</u>"
- JCS Guidance from JROC Memo 009-17, 27 Jan 2017:
 - Cyber Survivability Endorsement (CSE) Implementation Guide (now v1.01a)
 - 10 Cyber Survivability Attributes (CSAs)
- CSE Implementation Guide helps sponsors articulate cyber survivability requirements in the ICD, AoA, CDD (KPP starts here), & CPD entered in the Knowledge Management / Decision Support (KM/DS) tool for programs with Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) interest, Joint Capabilities Board (JCB) Interest, or qualify as Joint Integration.
- Although the CSE is only required for these levels of Joint interest, the Services are encouraged to use this guide for requirement documents that are validated by the DoD Component sponsor.

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Cyber Survivability Requirement

- System Survivability Key Performance Parameter (KPP)
 - SS KPP = Kinetic, EW & Cyber
 - Cyber Survivability Endorsement (CSE) From Joint Staff
 - Three pillars:


Prevent-
design principles
that protect
system's mission
functions from
most likely cyber
threats

Mitigate –

design principles to detect and respond to cyberattacks; enable the mission system to survive attacks and complete the mission

Recover-

design principles to enable recovery from cyber-attacks and prepare mission systems for the next fight






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Cyber Survivability Endorsement (CSE)

SS KDD	DOD Information Technology Information Weapon Systems ICS / SCADA Uncluding Support Systems ICS / SCADA	Kinetic Threats
SS KPP Pillars	Cyber Survivability Attributes (CSA)	Electromagnetic
	CSA 01 - Control Access	
	CSA 02 - Reduce Cyber Detectability	Configura 1
	CSA 03 - Secure Transmissions and Communications	Tactic
Prevent	CSA 04 - Protect Information from Exploitation	Cyber
	CSA 05 - Partition and Ensure Critical Functions at Mission Completion Performance Levels	Relev
	CSA 06 - Minimize and Harden Cyber Attack Surfaces	Must address Cyber
Mitirata	CSA 07 – Baseline & Monitor Systems, and Detect Anomalies	Survivability Attributes (CSA)
Mitigate	CSA 08 - Manage System Performance if Degraded by Cyber Events	
Recover / Resiliency	CSA 09 - Recover System Capabilities	କୁ ଜିନ୍ଦୁ ଅଧି ସ




Systems Security Engineering (SSE) Sub-Elements





Cyber System Survivability Risk





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Cyber Survivability Attributes (CSA) & the Risk Management Framework (RMF)

- ~800 NIST 800-53 Cybersecurity Technical Controls
 - o Supports the Risk Management Framework (RMF)
 - o Consist of 18 Control Families

ID	FAMILY	ID	FAMILY
AC	Access Control	MP	Media Protection
AT	Awareness and Training	PE	Physical and Environmental Protection
AU	Audit and Accountability	PL	Planning
CA	Security Assessment and Authorization	PS	Personnel Security
CM	Configuration Management	RA	Risk Assessment
CP	Contingency Planning	SA	System and Services Acquisition
IA	Identification and Authentication	SC	System and Communications Protection
IR	Incident Response	SI	System and Information Integrity
MA	Maintenance	PM	Program Management

• 239 Identified NIST controls potentially applicable to CSAs


- o 98 Highly Applicable
- o 86 Somewhat Applicable
- o 55 Require Interpretation




CSA to RMF to System Security Engineering (SSE) Mapping


- SS KPP to CSA to RMF (NIST Security Controls) to <u>SSE Mapping</u>
 - Least Privilege
 - Resistance to Attack
 - Continuous Monitoring
 - Prioritized Operations
 - Data Segregation
 - Recover from a Trusted Source
 - Periodically Save State
 - Threat Evolution
 - Failover
- "Mesh" Interrelation
- Focus on <u>Weapon System</u> germane controls
- Adapt controls for SSE which is <u>more relevant to Weapon Systems</u>
- Exemplar SSE Requirements Language for:
 - ICD/CDD/CPD
 - RFP
 - SOW

CSA to SSE






RMF - SSE



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Implementation of CSA 9 Recover System Capabilities might require SSE sub-elements:

- "prioritized operations" to shed lower priority tasks,
- "periodically save state" to establish the restart point, and
- "recover from a trusted source" to ensure return to normal operations.

NIST SP 800-53 Control CP-10 "Information System Recovery and Reconstitution":

- Specifically, the control CP-10 (4) "Restore Within Time Period" would be germane
- Language from NIST SP 800-53 for use in ICD/CDD could include:
 - "Restoration of information system components includes reimaging which restores components to known, operational states".

SSE RFP Language for CSA 9 might include:

• "In the event of cyber attack, compromises, or events, the system must be capable of being restored to an effective operational state in which the system's software, configuration and operational information, security protections, and mission systems information are at pre-attack assured levels".

CSA 9 clearly is interrelated to **CSA 7** Baseline and Monitor System And Detect Anomalies & **CSA 8** Manage System Performance if Degraded by Cyber Events



System Security Engineering Analytical Sequence

Architecture

CSA 5 Partition and Ensure Critical Functions at Mission Completion Performance Levels
 CSA 6 Minimize and Harden Attack Surfaces

<u>Mitigation</u>

3) CSA 7 Baseline and Monitor System And Detect Anomalies

4) CSA 8 Manage System Performance if Degraded by Cyber Events

Protection

5) CSA 1 Control Access

6) CSA 2 Reduce System Cyber Detectability

7) CSA 3 Secure Transmissions and Communications

8) CSA 4 Protect System Information from Exploitation

<u>Recovering</u>

9) CSA 9 Recover System Capabilities
10) CSA 10 Actively Manage System Configurations to Counter
Vulnerabilities At Tactically Relevant Speeds



CSE Scorecard Assessment Process


- **CSE assessment** occurs during the 21 day Document Review and commenting stage within the JCIDS <u>Deliberate</u> process.
- **Requirements Sponsors** use the CSE Scorecard to document that appropriate <u>CSAs</u> are in requirement's documents.
- **CSE analysts** use the CSE Scorecard to <u>assess ICD,CDDs & CPDs</u> with Joint interest.

Assessments, Service Threa	t asses	sments,	applicable to ICD/AOA/CDD/CPD = System Threat Assessment Reports a Library	nd the Defe	inse Intelligence Threat	SE Gatekeeper Assesment
Capability Name:			horitative Intelligence Assess	nents	Date	SSE
Date: Status:	Document Title:				 	
otatas.		nent Titl				- B
						- a
						. ×
Cyber Survivability Ri	sk		Cuber Survivab		ibute Mitigation of Cyber Risk	ă :
Category (CRSC)			Cyber Survivab	inty Attri	ibute writigation of Cyber Kisk	. O
How was the CRSC calculated?		Cyber Survivability Attributes State where CSAs are included in the document. To (CSAs) avoid delays, please explain why a CSA does not apply.				S
Step 1 . Mission Type (MT 1-4):		CSA 1	Control Access	Page:	Paragraph:	Y/N
Step 2. Cyber Dependence Level (CDL 1-4):		CSA 2	Reduce Cyber Detectability	Page:	Paragraph:	Y/N
Step 3. Adversary Threat Tier (ATT 1-4):		CSA 3	Secure Transmissions and Communications	Page:	Paragraph:	Y/N
Step 4. Impact of System Compromise (IL 1-4):		CSA 4	Protect Information from Exploitation	Page:	Paragraph:	Y/N
Step 5. Cyber Survivability Risk Category (CSRC 1-4) :		CSA 5	Partition and Ensure Critical Functions at Mission Completion Performance Levels	Page:	Paragraph:	Y/N
ICD - Is the cyber survivability language consistent with the threat, and the CSRS rating?	YZN	CSA 6	Minimize and Harden Cyber Attack Surfaces	Page:	Paragraph:	Y/N
AOA - Were the System Surivability Pillars assessed within the AoA?	Y/N	CSA 7	Baseline and Monitor Systems and Detect Anomalies	Page:	Paragraph:	Y/N
CDD/CPD - Is the CSRC referenced in the document and were the CSAs considered?	Y/N	CSA 8	Manage System Performance if Degraded by Cyber Events	Page:	Paragraph:	Y/N
		CSA 9	Recover System Capabilities	Page:	Paragraph:	Y/N
		CSA 10	Actively Manage System's Configuration to Counter Vulnerabilities at Tactically Relevant Speeds	Page:	Paragraph:	Y/N




Cyber Survivability & DoD Acquisition

The Cyber Survivability Endorsement (CSE) will ensure ICD exemplar need statements incorporate the projected cyber threat based on a Cyber Survivability Risk Category assessment.



Cyber Survivability Provides an Integrated Framework



Implementable Cybersecurity Requirements



HOWEVER..... Case Study of Warfighter Information Network – Tactical (WIN-T) Inc 2

Win-T Passed Adversarial Cyber FOT&E

• Directed by AT&L to change approach

Change of Approach

- Cybersecurity part *systems engineering* vice separate solution
- PM developed Tech Roadmap, responsive Vendors & instituted agile programming, incremental capability / patch drops
 - % Fix Effectiveness was key metric!
- Assumption of breach: Lowest level of trust between SoS
- Independent and continuous testing (JHU-APL) for fixes & capability drops
 - Level of knowledge required was not complete in Program Office or Vendors
 - On the Spot Test & Developer fixes
 - Development of threat models, with > 10 million threat simulations





Network Operations Security Center - Lite (NOSC-L

Tactical Communications Node - Lite (TCN-L)




RMF Security Controls and Cyber Survivability Attributes: only part of the solution



Asymmetric Warfare: Excess Armor Doesn't Help

Kinetic Warfare is a modern Goliath

- Strikes fear in the heart of Adversaries
- Survivability / Armor, weapons & support cost a lot



Cyber is like David & his Slingshot

- Another Warfare Domain
- Armor doesn't work well
- Offense is Cheaper
- Disruptive Technology





Security Armor: Diminishing Return On Investment (ROI)

- GAO Audit: DHS \$6 Billion "Einstein" IDS Not Effective
 - Does not scan for 94 percent of commonly known vulnerabilities or check web traffic for malicious content
- Multiple Denial of Service Vulnerabilities in Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) Software: firewall, IPS, endpoint security (anti-x)
 - More than the Router it protects!
- AFRL Avionics Cyber Hardening and Resiliency Manual:
 - <u>Attackers can use Security functions against you!</u>
 - Prevent Decryption of Data
 - Use Malware Detection to cause Shutdown
 - Use Monitoring System itself for Access to System






"Could protection add a vulnerability by adding features with unknown susceptibilities that an adversary could exploit or by causing the protection to trigger falsely?"



Uunderstanding Offense (Testing) is Key to Defining Sufficient Survivability

Resilient Military Systems and the Advanced Cyber Threat

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Defense becomes more and more complex, yet still outmatched by offense

*DARPA Brief to DSB, May 2011

* Malware lines of code averaged over 9,000 samples

Figure 3.2 Graphic Illustration of the Complexity of Software Required to Defend and Attack our Systems. Very Small Changes (Even Single Bits) Can Cause Major Impacts to the Operation of a System

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
TASK FORCE REPORT **Resilient Military Systems and the Advanced Cyber Threat**



*Not possible to prevent all hightier cyber attacks!



OODA: Offensive Cyber vs Cyber Defense





Cyber Survivability Courses of Action (COAs)

COA : Conventional Assumptions

- Armor (Flying Tanks / Diminishing Returns)
- Balance Performance & Survivability Engineering
- Don't Ignore Technological Change











Failure to Innovate Has Consequences



Cyber Survivability COAs

COA: Offense vs Defense

 Maneuverability Metric Ps=V(T-D)/W





- Red / Blue Teaming / Constant Practice
- Mission-based Cyber Risk Assessments (i.e., Cyber Table Tops)



Designs Focused on Attack Are More Survivable



Red Teaming is a Way of Life

Simian Army

- Kill/inspect running instances
 - Chaos Monkey
 - Janitor Monkey
 - Security Monkey
 - Conformity Monkey
 - Chaos Gorilla*
 - Chaos Kong*

https://github.com/Netflix/SimianArmy https://github.com/Netflix/security_monkey





10/10/14

Chaos Monkey randomly terminates virtual machine instances and containers that run inside of your <u>production</u> environment. <u>Exposing engineers to failures more</u> <u>frequently incentivizes them to build resilient services.</u>


@SonOfGar



Cyber Survivability COAs

- COA: Emergent Technology
- Automation Tools / Artificial Intelligence
 - Cyber Grand Challenge
 - Faster OODA with Machine Speed
 - Focus on Attacking (Yourself & the Adversary)





World's First Automated

Auto-Patch / Defend / Attack: The New Speed of Cyber



Cost of Cyber Survivability? Resilience vs Perfect Design

Airborne Unmanned Sensor System (GAUSS) Cyber Resilience Demo -Georgia Tech, UVA & FAA



Triple Diverse Dynamic Redundancy

- 3 different computer boards
- 3 separate operating systems
- 3 versions of the security software

High-Assurance Cyber Military Systems (HACMS) - DARPA

1. Vehicle Experts	2. Operating Systems	3. Control Systems	4. Research Integration	5. Red Team
Boeing Pilot-able Unmanned Little Bird Helicopter	NICTA Synthesize file systems, device drivers, glue code; Verified sel4 kernel; Verified RTOS	Galois Embedded DSLs; Synthesize and verify control system code	RC*/U. Minn Compositional verification; Integrated workbench	DRAPER*/AIS/ U. Oxford Traditional penetration testing; novel
HRL*/GM American-Built Automobile	SRI*/UIUC EF-SMT solvers; Synthesize monitors and wrappers	SRI* Synthetic sensors; Synthesis for controllers of hybrid systems	SRI* Lazy Composition; Evidential Tool Bus & Kernel of Truth; Vehicle Integration	
-	Princeton*/Yale/ MIT Build & verify in Coq OS for vehicle control; Verifying compiler for concurrent code; Program logics	CMU*/Drexel/ SpiralGen/UIUC Map high-level spec into low-level C code; Extend Spiral for hybrid systems	Kick-Off: Aug End of Phase End of Phase	Feb 23, 2012 8-10, 2012 1: Jan 2014 2: July 2015
D Boeing	Kestrel* Synthesize protocols: refinement of high- level spec to low-level implementations	UPenn*/UCLA Synthesize attack- resilient control systems	End of Phase 3: Jan 2017 Performers: 8 Primes (*) 22 Organizations Total	

Scientifically Proven Secure Code

- 5 years in Development
- Only Critical Control Systems
- Only 1000's SLOC

Survive Every <u>Attempted</u> or <u>Successful</u> Hacking Attempt! At a Great Cost / Schedule!



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Generic PP / SSE RFP Language

Examples:

- Section C: Statement of Work [SOWxxx1] The contractor shall develop and update mission criticality analysis(-es), vulnerability assessment(s), risk assessments(s), and identification and countermeasure implementation(s) for <u>Mission-Critical Functions</u>, the failure of which would result in either <u>Catastrophic</u> (Level I) or <u>Critical (Level II)</u> compromise of mission capability.
- Section C: System Requirements Document [SRD001] For critical components of Level I Mission-Critical Functions, the system shall establish basic protection requirements unless justified by a <u>cost-benefit analysis</u> approved by the government. Those basic protections shall include:

• Establish <u>least privilege</u> using distrustful decomposition (<u>privilege reduction</u>) or a similar approach to move Level I critical functions into <u>separate mutually untrusting</u> programs.

- Physical and logical <u>diversification</u> of critical components for Mission-Critical Functions which require <u>redundancy</u> to meet reliability or safety requirements.
- Physical and <u>logical</u> diversification with <u>voting</u> to establish trustworthiness of selected Level I Mission-Critical Function components.




- Stand up Integrated Cyber Warfare Engineering Group / SSEWG
 - Testers, SwA, Logistics, IT, Intel, EW, Users and most of all Hackers
 - Train them with the pros (UARCs, FFRDCs, NSA, National Labs)
- Immediately conduct regular MBCRAs throughout lifecycle
- Build team a Lab were they can Attack systems and Learn
- Use Cyber Survivability Guidance to develop requirements: "Survive a zero-day attack on mission and flight computers"
- Invite Red Teams from day one: Use the Cyber Ranges
- Reward cost-wise solutions & deletion of excess Armor

Unified Acquisition: RMF, T&E, PP/SSE, Intel, CSE




A rich man is nothing but a poor man with money – W. C. Fields



*


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Integrated Cyber Warfare / System Security Engineering





- Must PROACTIVELY ADAPT to new cyber threats
 - Must get inside of the Cyber Attacker's OODA!
- Sustaining Cyber Survivability requires PROACTIVE Resourcing, Design, Continuous Test, Life Cycle Sustainment Plans, and Ops & Maintenance procedures



Cyber threats will continue to increase



Questions?



- Cybersecurity Community of Practice (COP) <u>https://www.dau.mil/cop/cybersecurity/Pages/Default.aspx</u>
- Cybersecurity and Acquisition Lifecycle Integration Tool (CALIT)

https://www.dau.mil/tools/t/Cybersecurity-and-Acquisition-Lifecycle-Integration-Tool-(CALIT)

• Cybersecurity Black Card

https://www.dau.mil/tools/t/Cybersecurity-Quick-Reference-(Black-Card)



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