

## **Too Big to Jail: How Prosecutors Compromise with Corporations**

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### **Chapter 1. United States vs. Goliath**

“I know what this is about. I have been expecting you.”<sup>1</sup>

It was not until 2006 that The Banker finally got the knock on his door. Six police officers and a prosecutor were standing there with an arrest warrant.

He later recalled, “I was a true Siemens man, for sure. I was known as the keeper of the slush fund. We all knew what we were doing was illegal.” The Banker was in charge of just some of the multinational bribery operations at Siemens Aktiengesellschaft, a German multinational firm, ranked in the top 50 of the Fortune “Global 500” list of the world’s largest corporations. It has more than 400,000 employees in 190 countries, and makes everything from trains to electrical power plants to home coffee makers. Among its many activities was paying more than a billion dollars in bribes around the world to secure lucrative business from foreign governments. Now Siemens would be prosecuted, and not just in Germany, but also in the United States.

This book is the first to take a close look at what happens when a company is prosecuted in the United States. A corporate prosecution is like a battle between David and Goliath. One would normally assume that federal prosecutors play the role of Goliath. They wield incredible power, with the ability to hold a corporation liable for a crime by even a single employee and the benefit of expansive federal criminal laws. It is hard to think of prosecutors as the little guy in any fight. Yet they may play the role of David when up against the largest and most powerful corporations in the world.

Some companies are not just “too big to fail” but also “too big to jail”: they are considered to be so valuable to the economy that prosecutors may not hold them accountable for their crimes. The expression “too big to jail” has mostly been used to refer to failures to prosecute Wall Street banks. A dismayed reaction to the lack of prosecutions after the last financial crisis is understandable, but to see why corporations may escape prosecution, it is important to understand exactly how a company can be prosecuted for a crime and the many practical challenges involved. The very idea that a corporation can be prosecuted for an employee’s crime seems odd on its face, and even among criminal lawyers, the topic of

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corporate crime had long been obscure. Over the past decade, corporate crime exploded in importance—not only because of greater public interest in accountability, but also because prosecutors transformed their approach to targeting corporations.

In this book, I present data collected from more than a decade of cases to show what really happens when prosecutors pursue corporate criminals. I examine the terms of the deals that prosecutors now negotiate with companies, how prosecutors fine companies to punish them, the changes companies must make to prevent future crimes, and whether prosecutors pursue individual employees. To go deeper inside the decision-making of prosecutors and companies, in each chapter not only do I present data describing the larger patterns in corporate prosecutions and non-prosecutions, but I also tell the stories of how particular companies such as Siemens fared. The Siemens story is an important one to begin with: the case broke all records for the biggest prosecution for foreign bribery.

How were the Siemens bribes paid? The Banker did not pay them himself. True to his nickname, he instead “organized the cash” by transferring funds from anonymous bank accounts in Switzerland and Lichtenstein or using dummy corporations to hide where the money was coming from and where it was going. He explained how he carried the cash undetected: “For a million euros, you don’t need a big suitcase because the bills aren’t very big. A briefcase is enough—200,000 euros isn’t so much that you couldn’t carry it in your coat pocket.”<sup>2</sup> In the countries where Siemens was pursuing lucrative government contracts—whether it was Greece, Nigeria, Argentina, or Bangladesh—executives hired “consultants” to help them “win” the government contracts. The consultants received a fee and personally delivered the bribes to government officials.

Siemens paid bribes around the world—more than a billion dollars from 2002 to 2007. The Banker’s division dealt with telecommunications and had a bribery budget of \$40-50 million a year. He recalled how the telecom unit was kept “alive” by bribes and how other major divisions at Siemens operated this way. Bribery was pervasive and “common knowledge.”

Bribing foreign government officials is a crime in Germany, the United States, and in many other countries. In 2008, prosecutors in Germany charged The Banker with corruption, leading to a conviction, two years’ probation, and a \$170,000 fine.<sup>3</sup> He received leniency on account of his cooperation with the authorities. When he later spoke to journalists, he expressed disappointment that Siemens treated him like an “outsider” and gave him a “kick in the pants” while people at the top were not held accountable. “I would never have thought I’d go to jail for my company,” he later said. “Sure, we joked about it, but we thought if our actions ever came to light, we’d all go together and there would be enough people to play a game of cards.”<sup>4</sup>

The controversy surrounding this global bribery scheme would eventually bring in prosecutors around the world, notably those in the United States. They would wield a powerful new approach to targeting corporations, one I explore throughout this book. In the Siemens case,

was The Banker right that underlings would be the only ones held accountable—or would the storm reach the summit—the top executives or the company itself?

### **No Soul to be Damned, No Body to Kick**

How exactly are corporations convicted of a crime? The word *corporation* comes from “corpus,” the Latin word for “body.” A corporation may be a body, but it is a collective body that can act only through its employees. As the British Lord Chancellor Edward Thurlow reportedly remarked in the late Eighteenth Century, corporations have “no soul to be damned, no body to kick.”<sup>5</sup> Corporate persons obviously cannot be imprisoned. However, companies can face potentially severe and even lethal consequences, even if in theory they can be “immortal.” They can be forced to pay debilitating fines or suffer harm to their reputation. When convicted they can lose the government licenses that make doing business possible; for example, a company can be suspended or even barred from entering into contracts with the federal government.

The federal rule for corporate criminal liability is powerful and longstanding. In its 1909 decision in *New York Central & Hudson River Railroad v. United States*, the Supreme Court held that a corporation could be constitutionally prosecuted for a federal crime under a broad rule.<sup>6</sup> The rule is simple: an organization can be convicted based on the criminal conduct of a single employee. That standard comes from a rule called the Master-Servant Rule or respondeat superior—“let the master answer” in Latin—which makes the master responsible for the servant’s acts. Under that rule, an employer was responsible for an employee’s wrongs, if committed in the scope of employment and at least in part to benefit the employer. As the Court suggested in *New York Central*, the master or corporation may be in the best position to make sure employees are properly supervised to prevent law breaking. The Court emphasized “the interest of public policy,” since giving companies “immunity” from criminal prosecution would make it hard to “effectually” prevent “abuses.”<sup>7</sup> Rather than spend time on theoretical questions about when and whether corporations should constitute legal persons, I focus on whether corporate prosecutions are actually effective in preventing crime. Many have debated corporate personhood, including in response to the Court’s ruling in *Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission* (2010) that the First Amendment protects corporations against regulation of election spending.<sup>8</sup> To understand corporate prosecutions, though, what matters is not *Citizens United* but rather the strict master-servant rule from the less well-known *New York Central* case.

Today, a corporation is a “person” under federal law, as are other types of business organizations. The very first section of the U.S. Code, with definitions that apply to all federal laws, including those dealing with crimes, defines a person to include “corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals.”<sup>9</sup> As a result, federal prosecutions may be brought against any type of organization. The *U.S. Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual* uses the word *organization* because the guidelines cover criminal sentences for all kinds of companies, including partnerships not formally

incorporated by a state. Prosecutors convict giant multinational corporations such as Siemens, large domestic public corporations with millions of shareholders, and mom-and-pop companies with just a few owners or only one owner.

In theory, a corporation can be prosecuted for just about any crime that an individual can be prosecuted for (except for crimes with heightened intent, such as homicide). In practice, corporations are prosecuted for crimes likely to take place in a business setting, such as accounting fraud, banking fraud, environmental violations, foreign bribery, money laundering, price fixing, securities fraud, and wire fraud. Important corporate prosecutions are chiefly brought by federal prosecutors, in contrast to prosecutions of smaller-scale corporate crimes or prosecutions of individuals, which are overwhelmingly brought at the local level.<sup>10</sup>

### Data on Corporate Prosecutions

Over the past decade, there has been an increase in the size and importance of federal prosecutions of corporations, though not in the number of cases brought. One of my goals in writing this book was to uncover and present data explaining how corporations are actually prosecuted. As Figure 1.1 illustrates, the data that I have gathered shows a large spike in corporate criminal fines over the past few years.




Figure 1.1. Total Criminal Fines for Organizations (1994 – 2012)

In the past, given the modest sentences for companies, it was often not worth the effort to prosecute them.<sup>11</sup> Corporate fines grew after 1991, when the U.S. Sentencing Commission, a group convened by Congress to write rules for sentencing federal criminals, adopted the first sentencing guidelines specifically designed for corporations. More resources were also devoted to corporate prosecutions in response to Enron and other corporate scandals that shook the U.S. in the early 2000s, prompting the Department of Justice to form an Enron Task Force, later a

Corporate Fraud Task Force (now called the Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force).<sup>12</sup> Figure 1 shows total fines for the approximately 3,500 companies convicted from 1994 to 2009. It includes data from the Sentencing Commission for the earlier period, but from 2001 to 2012, the more dramatic rise in fines is shown in the data that I collected by hand from more than 2,250 court dockets and corporate prosecution agreements.

To understand what has really changed, we need to look behind the aggregate data displayed in Figure 1. The bulk of those corporate fines were actually paid in a small number of blockbuster cases, such as the Siemens case. For example, the large spike in 2009 is because the pharmaceutical giant Pfizer paid a then-record fine of nearly \$1.2 billion. That single fine made up about half of the total for that year. Other massive antitrust cases, foreign bribery cases, and illegal pharmaceutical sales cases involve fines in the hundreds of millions. There is still more about corporate prosecutions that those totals do not capture. The criminal fines are only a fraction of the costs imposed on companies. For example, as part of criminal settlements, companies were required to pay billions more to victims of fraud. Also not reflected in the fines are structural reforms that prosecutors require companies to adopt to prevent future crimes.

What is clear from the reported activity of prosecutors is that over the past decade they have embraced a new approach: deferred prosecution agreements. Prosecutors enter agreements that allow the company to avoid a conviction but which impose fines, aim to reshape corporate governance, and bring independent monitors into the boardroom. The rise of such deferred prosecution agreements, and non-prosecution agreements, in which no criminal case is even filed, means that the official Sentencing Commission statistics on corporate convictions, as shown in Figure 1, fail to capture many of the most important cases. Corporate fines are up, but the big story of the twenty-first century is not corporate fines or convictions but prosecutors changing the ways that corporations are managed. Prosecutors now try to rehabilitate a company by helping it to put systems in place to detect and prevent crime among its employees, and more broadly, to foster a culture of ethics and integrity inside the company. This represents an ambitious new approach to governance in which federal prosecutors help reshape the policies and culture of entire institutions, much as federal judges oversaw school desegregation and prison reform in the heyday of the Civil Rights Era in the 1960s and 1970s.

A single prosecution of a company like Siemens can have enormous repercussions in the U.S. and the global economy, particularly since other industry actors will be watching and nervous about whether they might be next. I quickly learned, however, that there is not much information out there about when or how corporations are prosecuted. There is no official registry for corporate offenders, nor is there an official list of deferred or non-prosecution agreements by federal prosecutors. I decided to create these resources. Over the years, with invaluable help from the UVA Law Library, I created a database with information on every federal deferred prosecution or non-prosecution agreement with a company. In one place or another, this information was publicly available, but I wanted to put it together in order to learn who these firms were, what they did, what they were convicted of, and how they were punished.

There have been more than 250 such prosecution agreements entered over the past decade. I made this database available online as a public resource and it remains the most authoritative and complete source.<sup>13</sup> I then amassed a second and much larger archive of more than 2,000 federal corporate convictions, mostly guilty pleas by corporations, and placed these data online as well.<sup>14</sup> These data have real limitations; although prosecutors pound their chests when bringing the largest corporations to justice, in many other cases no charges are brought. We have no way to know how often prosecutors decline to pursue charges against corporations—they do not usually make those decisions public—except when they enter non-prosecution agreements. We do not know how often corporations commit crimes, as the government does not keep data on corporate crime, which is hard to detect and to define.

More than 250 federal prosecutions since 2001 have involved large public corporations. These are the biggest criminal defendants imaginable. Prosecutors have taken on the likes of AIG, Bristol-Myers Squibb, BP, Google, HealthSouth, JPMorgan, KPMG, Merrill Lynch, Monsanto, and Pfizer. Such Fortune 500 firms can and do mobilize astonishing resources in their defense. The Siemens case illustrates the titanic scale of the power plays at work in federal corporate prosecutions, making them unlike anything else in criminal justice.

### **Convicting Siemens**

The story of the prosecution of one of the world's biggest corporations began in one of the world's smallest countries—the principality of Lichtenstein. In early 2003, a bank in Lichtenstein owned by the royal family was having auditors review its records. The bank auditors noticed something strange: millions of euros were bouncing around between Panama, Lichtenstein, and the British Virgin Islands. The bank secrecy laws in Lichtenstein, like those in Switzerland, make banks an attractive place for some people to keep money. Auditors were on the lookout for unusual transactions that might be the work of terrorists or other criminals trying to take advantage of this secrecy to engage in money laundering. They noticed odd transactions between offshore companies, including large sums going into an account of an offshore firm called Martha Overseas Corp. That company was incorporated in Panama, but it was controlled by an executive of Siemens working in Greece—and the money going into the account was coming from another offshore company, one based in the British Virgin Islands and controlled by another executive of Siemens.

The bank informed Siemens of this problem in 2004, and began to block these money transfers. They also notified bank regulators in Germany and Switzerland, who in turn contacted regulators in Austria and Italy. Two years later, German police appeared on The Banker's doorstep in Munich and seized documents from more than thirty Siemens offices.<sup>15</sup>

The case of Siemens (and three of its subsidiaries in Argentina, Venezuela and Bangladesh) became a truly global prosecution. Siemens had paid more than \$1.4 billion in bribes between 2002 and 2007 to government officials in sixty-five countries in Asia, Africa,

Europe, the Middle East and South America. All sorts of major public works projects were implicated. The focus of the U.S. case against Siemens were kickbacks paid under the U.N. oil-for-food program in Iraq, in which Siemens paid \$1.7 million in return for forty-two contracts with \$80 million in revenue and over \$38 million in profits.<sup>16</sup>

At first glance, the Siemens scandal might seem to be a problem for German prosecutors, not American ones. After all, why would bribes paid to foreign officials by a German company, already under investigation in Germany trouble U.S. prosecutors? But many companies, Siemens included, do business in the U.S. Bribe transactions may pass through U.S. wires. Even more importantly, Siemens is a public corporation with stock listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), giving U.S. prosecutors jurisdiction. The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which regulates companies with publicly listed stock, both have authority over a firm such as Siemens.

It would be U.S. prosecutors who seized the lead in this multinational case and collected the lion's share of the fines. The DOJ and the SEC began to investigate upon hearing of the raids; they both handle matters related to foreign bribery. When a company such as Siemens has ties in the U.S., it falls under a law called the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). The FCPA makes it a violation to bribe foreign officials, to keep inaccurate books and records, or have inadequate internal procedures to prevent bribe payments. This criminal law was enacted in 1977 in the wake of the Watergate scandal and revelations that corporations regularly bribed government officials. The SEC discovered in the mid-1970s that hundreds of U.S. companies had spent millions of dollars from slush funds for illegal bribery overseas.<sup>17</sup> The head of enforcement at the SEC at the time recalled wondering, "How does Gulf Oil record a transaction of a \$50,000 cash payment? I wanted to know, what account did they charge? Do they have an account called 'Bribery'?"

The idea of a bribery account was not far off the mark in the Siemens case. Prosecutors discovered that Siemens kept "cash desks" in its offices—literally desks filled with cash—where employees could withdraw large sums to write off as "useful expenditures," which were understood to be bribes. The SEC called the bribery "unprecedented in scale and geographic reach." The DOJ called it "corruption on an absolutely stunning scale."<sup>18</sup>

In response to the threat of a federal prosecution, Siemens' board launched a massive internal investigation on their own, spending more than \$500 million investigating the case. Siemens also hired attorneys at a New York law firm who billed an additional \$800 million. The attorneys then brought on board accountants who reviewed 40 million bank documents and 127 million accounting records, billing \$100 million more just on information technology to analyze all of that data.<sup>19</sup> The investigators uncovered \$100 million in bribes to Argentine officials, perhaps well spent, since Siemens secured a \$1 billion contract to create national identity cards. They found \$5 million in bribes for mobile phone contracts in Bangladesh. The list went on and

on. They reviewed transactions in more than sixty-five countries and uncovered over \$1 billion in bribes not found by European regulators.<sup>20</sup>

Why would a company such as Siemens want to investigate its own wrongdoing? It does not help a murder suspect to confess his guilt to one crime and then go on to admit to dozens of others. That might even be a good way to get the death penalty. Yet Siemens not only confessed, but also spent hundreds of millions hiring top-notch lawyers to uncover its own crimes—and rather than seal its fate, somehow this all helped the firm.

Like the vast majority of criminal defendants big or small, corporate or human, Siemens eventually pleaded guilty. Each year just a handful of corporations have trials, just as few individual defendants have them. The Siemens plea bargain was entered in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia and included \$450 million in fines paid to the DOJ, \$350 million to the SEC, and \$800 million to the Munich Public Prosecutor's Office.<sup>21</sup>

Paying a record \$1.6 billion in fines for activities it helped to discover itself may sound like a raw deal. But like any other criminal defendant, Siemens bargained to avoid a “trial penalty.” At a trial, the fines could have been far greater; the plea agreement cited a Sentencing Guidelines fine range of \$1.35 billion to \$2.7 billion. Consider too the gains that Siemens received from paying billions of dollars in bribes over the years; Siemens may have profited many times over from bribes used to secure lucrative government contracts around the globe.

The cooperation may have also paid off in still other ways beyond a lower fine. Siemens pleaded guilty only to violations of FCPA accounting requirements and not to payment of illegal bribes, which is also prohibited by the FCPA (and which Siemens admitted it had done a grand scale). In so doing, Siemens apparently avoided being suspended or barred from U.S. government contracting, which would have had a huge impact on its long-term business—perhaps far more harmful than any fine.<sup>22</sup>

But the plea agreement went further than simple punishment. Siemens had to rehabilitate itself through a range of structural reforms. The company agreed to undertake ongoing compliance obligations, including a new ethics program specially designed to detect and prevent foreign bribery and other corruption. Siemens also agreed to commit “no further crimes” and to cooperate with the U.S. government in ongoing investigations, particularly of its own employees.

Most significant, Siemens agreed to submit to a continuous audit by a corporate monitor, who would for four years have power to review documents, speak to employees, supervise compliance efforts, and make recommendations about how Siemens would improve its corporate governance to prevent corrupt payments. The monitor selected, Dr. Theo Waigel, was extremely prominent; he had been a German Minister of Finance and was the first non-American monitor appointed in a federal prosecution. The selection of a German monitor to oversee compliance at a German firm represented a new kind of cross-national collaborative prosecution. Siemens also hired a separate independent U.S. counsel to help monitor FCPA compliance.



The prosecutions led to the resignation of Siemens's CEO at the time, who wrote a memoir titled *Summit Storms* denying knowledge of the corruption schemes.<sup>23</sup> There were also additional convictions. Siemens Argentina, Siemens Bangladesh, and Siemens Venezuela all pleaded guilty and agreed to pay \$500,000 fines.<sup>24</sup> Munich prosecutors convicted two former Siemens employees in addition to The Banker.<sup>25</sup> U.S. prosecutors have announced grand jury indictments of six additional former executives at Siemens. Siemens was the cooperator—the corporate informant if you will—blowing the whistle on its former employees. In return, the prosecutors lauded Siemens's “outstanding” help in making it possible to prosecute the former executives.

The Banker's fears were thus realized. He was right that individual low-level employees like him would get prosecuted as scapegoats while those at the top would go free. But perhaps the prosecution would lead to significant changes in how Siemens operates. The former CEO may never have been implicated, but the company did have a chance to transform itself.

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In the French novelist Honoré Balzac's novel *Le Père Goriot*, a jaded Parisian advises a young student that honesty “will get you nowhere.” “The secret of great fortunes, when there's no obvious explanation for them, is always some forgotten crime—forgotten, mind you, because it's been properly handled.”<sup>26</sup> Today, just as in 1830s Paris, great business crimes can go undetected and unpunished. In the wake of the last financial crisis, many people have asked if prosecutors are doing enough to bring corporations to justice. Prosecutors have been using a new strategy for fighting business crime, seeking to target not only greedy people but also corporations themselves. The new approach represents a real break from the past, and it is as fascinating as it is understudied. Each chapter of this book poses a different question to explore a different aspect of how corporations are now prosecuted.

**How is a corporation prosecuted?** The corporate trial of the century, the 2002 trial of the Big Five accounting firm Arthur Andersen, was the rare case that shows what happens when a corporation takes its case before a jury. Andersen was prosecuted for its obstruction of efforts to investigate its role in the collapse of Enron. The sheer scale of the document destruction by Andersen was remarkable—trucks were carting off documents to be shredded around the clock—but did employees intend to break the law? Andersen tried its case in the media, mobilizing protesters, a public relations campaign, and squadrons of top lawyers. Federal prosecutors brought the case as a showpiece to demonstrate their new seriousness about corporate crime. At the eleventh hour, Andersen rejected the deal prosecutors offered and took the case to the jury. This was a serious gamble: if Andersen was convicted it would be barred from doing certified accounting for public companies. The case ended in twin disasters for the company and for prosecutors: a conviction that destroyed the firm, yet thrown out on appeal by the U.S. Supreme Court.

**How do prosecutors negotiate with corporations?** Prosecutors compromise. Regrouping and licking their wounds after the Andersen case, federal prosecutors developed a new, subtler form of jujitsu: the deferred prosecution. The approach had humble origins in a plan to give lenient treatment to first-time drug offenders in Brooklyn back in the 1930s—file a case, defer it or put it on hold to give the defendant a chance to stay clean, and if he does, have the judge dismiss it. The later prosecution of KPMG, a major accounting firm like Andersen, ended very differently from that of its former competitor. KPMG avoided a grand jury indictment and a conviction by signing a deferred prosecution agreement. The agreement saw KPMG pay large fines, close down part of its business, and hire a monitor to supervise a new compliance program. This is an example of the most striking change in the past decade: many of the largest firms now receive deferred prosecution agreements or non-prosecution agreements. Well over half (148 of 255, or 58 percent) of the firms receiving such agreements between 2001 and 2012 were public firms or their subsidiaries. These agreements ostensibly reward efforts by corporations to implement reforms on their own, but often it is not clear what reforms are demanded or whether they actually work.

**Who goes to jail?** Usually no one. In about two-thirds of the cases involving deferred prosecution or non-prosecution agreements and public corporations, the company was punished but no employees were prosecuted. This is surprising, because a corporation is like no other snitch. KPMG did not just sign an agreement—it also agreed to cooperate, turn over information to prosecutors, fire employees involved, and refuse to pay their attorneys’ fees. Employees are in a terrible bind—they can be fired for not cooperating in an investigation of what went wrong, and their employer may also turn them in, along with their documents and emails, to get a good deal from prosecutors. A judge threw out prosecutions of former KPMG employees, finding prosecutors had pressured KPMG to take action against them. Just as in the Siemens case, few employees were ultimately convicted. A handful of notable cases involve convictions of CEOs and high-level officials, but not many. It can be very hard to hold employees accountable in complex cases where many people took part in decisions—but that makes it all the more crucial for prosecutors to really hold the company accountable.

**What role do victims play in corporate prosecutions?** Victims cannot easily participate in corporate criminal cases. The victims of the tragic and preventable explosion at the British Petroleum Texas City refinery in 2005 tried to make their voices heard and convince the judge to make sure BP never acted so recklessly again. They failed. Other victims had modest successes. Companies can pay large sums in restitution to victims—a few cases involve multimillion-dollar restitution funds—but most do not. In addition, if the victim is the public at large, some corporations do community service—not by cleaning up litter or whitewashing graffiti but by contributing money to causes such as the environment, affordable health care, or investor awareness. With the persistence of cases in which judges ignore victims’ objections to lenient corporate settlements, one lesson of the BP incident is that we need better ways for judges to consider the public interest in corporate prosecutions.

**How is a corporation punished?** Not by relying on strict and narrow sentencing guidelines, as with individuals, but by using more flexible guidelines that may give the biggest fish the best deals. Fewer major public corporations are convicted each year; they usually get leniency. Yet many mom-and-pop corporations plead guilty each year, and their names illustrate how far from the Fortune 500 they can be: Andy’s Orchids, Joe’s Cajun Seafood, Little Rhody Beagle Club, and Ohio Fresh Eggs. Many are unable to pay a fine, and a few are put out of business—the corporate “death penalty.” In contrast, large firms often receive deferred prosecution agreements and pay lower fines, if any: 47 percent of those getting deferred prosecution or non-prosecution agreements paid no fine at all. Almost every time prosecutors explained how a fine was calculated, it was at the very bottom, or quite a bit below the bottom, of the range suggested in the sentencing guidelines. If prosecutors are not adequately rehabilitating firms, then they should impose the full criminal fines that the law demands.

**Who oversees corporate prosecution agreements?** A new kind of person—the corporate monitor—can play a crucial part in overseeing the process of trying to rehabilitate a prosecuted company. Monitors have sweeping powers and represent a new role in criminal justice. The monitor appointed to supervise reforms at Bristol-Myers Squibb did more than oversee compliance—he asked the board to fire the CEO and investigated entirely new violations. Although 25 percent of the deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements provide for monitors (65 of 255 agreements), this raises the question of why 75 percent do *not*. And none of the work that monitors do is made public. Nor is selection of these high-paid monitors transparent, leading to controversy over allegations of favoritism and cronyism. A substantial number of agreements (31 percent) do not even speak to implementing a compliance program. One wonders again how seriously prosecutors are taking corporate reforms.

**What criminal procedure rights do corporations have?** Corporations have many of the same constitutional criminal procedure rights as individuals. How often are those rights used in criminal cases? Not often. But one corporation went to trial and had a conviction reversed. Lindsay Manufacturing was exonerated and had a trial conviction dismissed after “flagrant” prosecutorial misconduct came to light. Lawyers specializing in white-collar crime and corporate defense form a growing and prominent part of practice at the nation’s top law firms, and we may see much more constitutional litigation by corporations—with the result bring still more lenient results in criminal cases.

**How are foreign corporations prosecuted?** Foreign corporations are increasingly important targets and pay far larger fines on average: \$35 million compared with \$4.7 million for domestic firms. One example is the prosecution of a multi-national defense contractor, BAE, based in the United Kingdom. U.K. authorities had long declined to prosecute it for extensive bribery, but the United States eventually took action, resulting in a prosecution agreement. Although few foreign countries hold corporations strictly criminally liable, they must now reckon with the unparalleled reach of U.S. prosecutors. Indeed, in response to the BAE case, the U.K. passed a new Bribery Act much like the FCPA. Corporate prosecutions have gone global.

**Are corporate prosecutions effectively preventing crime?** Corporate prosecutions can be made stronger, as I detail in Chapter 10. However, there are fundamental questions that cannot be answered, as prosecutors target corporations in a way that is strikingly opaque. What is the corporate crime rate? Not only is there little in the way of data, but also defining what constitutes a crime can be difficult. How many companies go unpunished? Are some corporate crimes uncovered but not investigated or charged? While I present data describing outcomes in corporate prosecutions, these data still cannot tell us everything we would want to know about how well prosecutors exercise their discretion, which largely remains a “black box.”

Given that corporations have “no soul to be damned, no body to kick,” a number of scholars have argued over the years that corporations should not be prosecuted at all. They contend that since only individuals can be held morally accountable for crimes, prosecuting a corporation is as nonsensical as prosecuting a stone. Critics also point out that the company can be fined in a civil case brought by an agency such as the SEC, which may be more experienced with industry practices and regulations and better able to supervise structural reforms. In my view, criminal punishment of the most serious corporate violators is justified, because the corporation itself may promote a culture of lawbreaking that can be remedied only at the corporate level. And corporations do not fear civil cases the way they fear prosecutions—for good reason. Criminal prosecutions bring with them far more serious consequences, including potentially debilitating fines, harm to reputation, and collateral consequences such as suspension and debarment.

Most corporate violations are not handled criminally, and the decision to bring a corporate criminal case should not be reached lightly. But society’s ideas about what should be criminally punished can and should evolve. Congress has not been shy about defining new business-related crimes. Over the past decade, holding corporations criminally accountable has become more firmly ingrained in prosecution practice, in sentencing, and perhaps also in our culture. Companies such as Siemens probably did not think much about the FCPA a decade ago; now they know a serious breach can mean prosecution. Ten or fifteen years ago people might not have asked after a financial crisis why no big banks were prosecuted. Now it is a common belief that the company itself should sometimes be held accountable.

Still, there are good reasons to worry whether the right corporations are being prosecuted and whether the punishments fit the crimes. Prosecutors say that they target the most serious corporate violators. Yet the fines are typically greatly reduced in exchange for little oversight. If one justification for prosecuting a company in the first place is egregiously bad compliance, then one wonders why so little is typically done to deter or correct it. Are these prosecutions really helping to reform corporate criminals? Which compliance programs actually work? We simply do not know. While there are no silver-bullet solutions to these vexing problems, there are concrete ways to improve matters, including by insisting on more stringent fines, imposing ongoing judicial review, monitoring, and mandating transparency.

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Corporate prosecutions upend our assumptions about a criminal justice system whose playing field is tilted in favor of the prosecution. It is admirable that prosecutors have taken on the role of David in prosecuting the largest corporations—but if they miss their shot at Goliath, the most serious corporate crimes will be committed with impunity. The surge in large-scale corporate cases shows how federal prosecutors have creatively tried to prevent corporate malfeasance at home and overseas, but real changes in corporate culture require sustained oversight of management, strong regulators, and sound rules and laws. Congress enacts new criminal laws intended to bolster regulations, but it is perennially unwilling to provide adequate resources to many agencies to carry out enforcement of those regulations. That is why prosecutors can fill an important gap—and when they do prosecute a corporation, they can wield the most powerful tools. A broader political movement toward greater corporate accountability more generally, with stronger regulations and enforcement, could make prosecutions far less necessary. But if we take as a given the larger dynamics of our economic and political system, modest changes could improve the role criminal cases play in the larger drama.

Corporate criminal prosecutions serve a distinct purpose—to punish serious violations and grossly deficient compliance—and this purpose is not served if companies obtain kid-glove non-prosecution deals in exchange for cosmetic reforms. Corporate convictions should be the norm, and in special cases in which prosecutors defer prosecution, they should impose deterrent fines and stringent compliance requirements. A judge should carefully supervise all corporate agreements to ensure their effective implementation. Sentencing guidelines and judicial practices could be reconsidered, but prosecutors themselves can revitalize the area by adopting a new set of guidelines to strengthen the punishment reserved for the most serious corporate criminals.

Although I propose reforms, my main goal in this book is to describe the hidden world of corporate prosecutions. Corporate crime deserves more public attention. What is particularly chilling about the problem is that corporate complexity may not only enable crime on a vast scale but also make such crimes difficult to detect, prevent, and prosecute. We need to know much more. When we ask if some companies are being treated as “too big to jail,” it is not enough to ask whether the largest firms are so important to the economy that they are treated as immune from prosecution. We also need to ask whether individuals are held accountable. We need to evaluate whether the corporate prosecutions that are brought are working. We need to look beyond the press releases announcing eye-catching fines and ask whether adequate criminal punishment is imposed and whether structural reforms are working

The Banker feared that although Siemens was punished, most others would not face the same consequences. He may have been right to worry. After all, not only do prosecutors regularly offer leniency, but we do not know how many corporate crimes go undetected or unprosecuted. As The Banker put it: “The Eleventh Commandment is: ‘Don’t get caught.’”<sup>27</sup>

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- <sup>1</sup> Siri Schubert & T. Christian Miller, “At Siemens, Bribery was Just a Line Item,” *New York Times*, December 20, 2008.
- <sup>2</sup> Frontline, “Transcript: Black Money,” *PBS*, April 7, 2009, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/blackmoney/etc/script.html>
- <sup>3</sup> Carter Dougherty, “Ex-Manager at Siemens Convicted in Bribery Scandal,” *New York Times*, July 28, 2008.
- <sup>4</sup> Frontline: Black Money, *supra*.
- <sup>5</sup> John C. Coffee, “‘No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick’: An Unscandalized Inquiry Into the Problem of Corporate Punishment,” 79 *Michigan Law Review* 386 (1981).
- <sup>6</sup> 212 U.S. 481 (1909).
- <sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 494-496.
- <sup>8</sup> 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
- <sup>9</sup> 1 U.S.C. § 1.
- <sup>10</sup> More than 95% of felonies are prosecuted at the local level. Bureau of Justice Statistics, U. S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, *Felony Sentences in State Courts 2010* (2011). In contrast, while few states keep data on organizational prosecutions, reported cases suggest state and local prosecutors do not bring major corporate cases to the degree federal prosecutors do, with some notable exceptions, such as the Manhattan District Attorney’s Office and New York Attorney General’s Office, which have long stood watch over Wall Street. For an exploration of corporate prosecutions brought by local prosecutors, particularly in smaller cases, see Michael L. Benson and Francis T. Cullen, *Combating Corporate Crime: Local Prosecutors at Work* (Boston, MA: Northeastern U. Press, 1998).
- <sup>11</sup> Mark A. Cohen, “Theories of Punishment and Empirical Trends in Corporate Criminal Sanctions,” 17 *Managerial & Decision Economics* 399, 401 (1996).
- <sup>12</sup> U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Deputy Attorney General, Corporate Fraud Task Force, *First Year Report to the President 2.2* (July 22, 2003),
- <sup>13</sup> Brandon L. Garrett and Jon Ashley, Federal Organizational Prosecution Agreements, University of Virginia School of Law, [http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/prosecution\\_agreements/home.suphp](http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/prosecution_agreements/home.suphp). All deferred and non-prosecution agreements cited in this book by name of company can be read at that website.
- <sup>14</sup> Brandon L. Garrett and Jon Ashley, Federal Organizational Plea Agreements, University of Virginia School of Law, [http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/plea\\_agreements/home.php](http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/plea_agreements/home.php). All corporate plea agreements with judgments entered from 2001-2012 cited in this book by name of company can be read at that website, while any 2013-2014 agreements are cited in full.
- <sup>15</sup> David Crawford and Mike Esterl, “Inside Bribery Probe of Siemens: Liechtenstein Bank Triggered an International Hunt,” *Wall Street Journal*, December 28, 2007, A4.
- <sup>16</sup> Plea Agreement at ¶ 98, *United States v. Siemens Aktiengesellschaft*, No. CR-8-367 (December 15, 2008), <http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/documents/siemens.pdf>.
- <sup>17</sup> Frontline: Black Money, *supra*.
- <sup>18</sup> Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, “Siemens AG and Three Subsidiaries Plead Guilty to Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Violations and Agree to Pay \$450 Million in Combined Criminal Fines,” December 15, 2008.
- <sup>19</sup> Nathan Vardi, “The Bribery Racket,” *Forbes*, May 28, 2010.
- <sup>20</sup> Mike Esterl et al., “Siemens Internal Review Hits Hurdles,” *Wall Street Journal*, January 23, 2008, A18; David Crawford and Mike Esterl, “Siemens Ruling Details Bribery Across the Globe,” *Wall Street Journal*, November 16, 2007, A1.
- <sup>21</sup> Siemens Plea Agreement, ¶ 4.
- <sup>22</sup> Siri Schubert and T. Christian Miller, “Where Bribery was Just a Line Item,” *New York Times*, December 21, 2008.
- <sup>23</sup> Catherine Hickley, “Siemens Bribes Leave Von Pierer Unbowed in CEO Memoir,” *Bloomberg News*, January 26, 2011.
- <sup>24</sup> DOJ Press Release, *supra*.
- <sup>25</sup> “Ex-Siemens Execs Found Guilty in Bribery Case,” *Reuters*, April 20, 2010.
- <sup>26</sup> Honoré de Balzac, *Le Père Goriot* 124, 131 (W.W. Norton & Company; New York, NY: 1835).
- <sup>27</sup> Frontline: Black Money, *supra*.