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(U) NRO Classification Guide

Version 6.0

May 21, 2005 (22 February 2008)

CL Reason: Declass. On: Derived From: Multiple Sources

Classified By: Kenneth W. Renshaw, NRO, Director of Security 1.4 (c) Intelligence Sources and Methods DCI Only

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(U) Change Log

(U) As approved changes are made to the NRO Classification Guide, the text will be updated appropriately and a summary of the change will be logged here.

REQUEST FOR CHANGE (RFC) NUMBER	CHANGE DATE	PARAGRAPH(s) AFFECTED	GENERAL CHANGE DESCRIPTION
2008-001	29 Jan 08	1.38.2	Per SIGINT PCG Line 1.0.t and 1.0.y, this information is classified REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
2008-001	29 Jan 08	1.47, 1.47.1	Added information concerning piece parts
2008-002	22 Feb 08	Table of Contents Table 22.0	Added information concerning Systems, Applications and Products (SAP) Classification Guidance
2008-002	22 Feb 08	Header/Footer	Removed declassification field from the classification banner lines
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(U) Change Page

(U) Recommendations for changes to this Guide may be made by completing the form below and forwarding it to the Office of Security Policy through your security organization.

TO: Security Policy Staff			Date:		·	
FROM:(PSO)			Originator:	Originator:		
		T	(Name, org	anization & function	nal activity)	
Proposed Information		New		Declassify		
Change/Challenge:	•	Remov	e 🗌	Decompartm	ent	
		Modify		Reclassify		
Item/Listing:	ltem	Number:		Page Numb		
Rationale						
Rationale: (To Be Completed by Secu	rity Policy St	táff)				
(To Be Completed by Secu	rity Policy St	taff)	Date:			
(To Be Completed by Secu	rity Policy St	taff)	Date:			
Rationale: (<i>To Be Completed by Secu</i> Action Officer: Request Approved:	rity Policy St	táff)	Date:			
(To Be Completed by Secu Action Officer: Request Approved: If "No", state justification:	······································	táff)				
(To Be Completed by Secu Action Officer:	······································					

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(U) FOREWORD

(U) National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) Classification Guide 6.0 provides authoritative classification and compartmentation guidance for NRO information based on criteria established in Executive Order 12958, as amended, Director of Central Intelligence Directives, and classification guidance of other Intelligence Community members.

(U) The overall objective of this guide is to ensure that proper classification and compartmentation determinations are made for NRO information in order to protect the NRO's people, operations, assets and sensitive intelligence sources and methods. Also, as NRO systems are integrated into tactical operations, we must strive to classify and compartment our data at a level that is most usable to the customer.

(U) This guide is designed to be the capstone for all NRO program classification guides and the focal point for NRO classification guidance. Should there be discrepancies between this guide and NRO program classification guides or contractual specifications, the program specific guides and current contracts take precedence until resolved by the NRO Director of Security (DOS). Similarly, the DOS will also resolve discrepancies between this document and other agency classification guidance pertaining to the security of the NRO.

(U) The NRO Director of Security is responsible for maintaining the currency of this guide. Discrepancies or conflicts regarding classification issues must be brought to the attention of your Program Security Officer (PSO) and, if appropriate, referred to the Security Policy Staff in order that the classification guidance may be properly amended. Once the cognizant program security office determines that there is cause for changing the NRO Classification Guide, those recommended changes would be appropriately coordinated and incorporated. Questions or comments should be directed to the Security Policy Staff by phone

(U) Effective 21 May 2005, the NRO Classification Guide 6.0 is approved for use by all NRO government and contractor personnel as well as members of the Intelligence Community who are authorized access to NRO program information.

Kenneth W. Renshaw Director, Office of Security National Reconnaissance Office

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A. (U) PURPOSE

(U) This Guide provides general classification guidance for information, products, and activities relating to the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). Personnel engaged in security classification and compartmentation determinations in the TALENT-KEYHOLE (TK), and COMINT (SI) control systems should use this Guide. This Guide complements specific NRO program classification guides as well as relevant Intelligence Community imagery intelligence (IMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), and measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) guides.

(U) The absence of an item in the classification table of this Guide does NOT suggest that the item should be considered UNCLASSIFIED. Consult the relevant NRO program classification guide or an NRO Program Security Officer if classification is unclear or not addressed in this guide.

B. (U) RESPONSIBILITY AND AUTHORITY

(U) The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) is responsible for the protection of sensitive intelligence sources and methods including those related to the NRO in accordance with the *National Security Act of 1947* and *Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-49, National Space Policy, 14 September 1996.* The DCI is the only authority for declassifying NRO program information per the "National Space Policy".

(U) The Director, NRO (DNRO), as a Senior Official of the Intelligence Community (SOIC), is the equivalent of the head of a Cognizant Security Agency (CSA) for the purpose of protecting Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) and for implementing Director of Central Intelligence Directives (DCIDs). The DNRO, as head of an Executive Agency, is responsible for establishing a uniform system for classifying, safeguarding and granting access to national security information national security information generated in support of the NRO activities (5 U.S.C. 105, Executive Order (EO) 12958, (as amended), and EO 12968). In this capacity, the DNRO also has the authority and responsibility to protect classified information generated in support of non-Sensitive Compartmented Information (non-SCI) NRO activities, i.e., collateral information.

(U) The Director of Security, NRO, (DOS/NRO) is responsible for developing and implementing security policies for the protection of NRO sensitive sources and methods in accordance with DCI Memorandum to the DOS/NRO, dated 10 February 2005, subject: *Delegation of Central Intelligence Agency Security Authorities in Support of National Reconnaissance Office Activities.* The DOS/NRO is also responsible for providing a secure mission environment by protecting NRO people, operations and assets with realistic, innovative security solutions developed through partnership with our customers.

(U) The TALENT-KEYHOLE (TK) Control System is a DCI SCI control system jointly managed by the Director, NRO; Director, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA); the Chairman, National SIGINT Committee; and the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Directorate for MASINT Technical Collection. Changes and modifications to the system require coordination by each Director/Chairman and approval of the DCI/Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI). Detailed classification and compartmentation procedures for IMINT and MASINT are contained in relevant classification manuals. The Director, National Security Agency (DIRNSA) manages the COMINT control system for the DCI. The Signals Intelligence Security Regulations (SISRs) constitute the basic implementation of the TK system for satellite originated SIGINT tasking, collection and product information. Changes and modifications to the COMINT control system require coordination by DIRNSA and approval of the DCI/DDCI.

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C. (U) COMPARTMENTATION CRITERIA AND OTHER MARKINGS

(U) TALENT-KEYHOLE (TK) protects certain information, products, and activities relating to the following intelligence disciplines.

Imagery Intelligence (IMINT),	
Signals Intelligence (SIGINT),	
Electronic Intelligence (ELINT),	
Foreign Instrumentation Signals Intelligence (FISINT)	 -
Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT)	

(U) NRO data protected within the TK system includes: relationships and data relating to satellite research & development (R&D), engineering design, specifications, algorithms, interface controls, test plans, operations manuals, and reference documents; satellite capabilities and vulnerabilities; equipment and information technology equipment involved in the operation of the satellite systems to include spacecraft, sensor(s), and mission ground station equipment; software programs used to operate hardware to include spacecraft maintenance, command and control, targeting, sensor operation, data conversion, processing, and exploitation operations, as well as the overall and detailed funding profile for both the development and operation of the NRO satellite collection systems.

(U) The COMINT Control System (SI or Special Intelligence) is a DCI SCI control system expressly authorized for handling or transmitting communications intelligence derived from satellite surveillance and other sources.

Communications Intelligence (COMINT) Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Electronic Intelligence (ELINT), (most ELINT is SECRET collateral) Foreign Instrumentation Signals Intelligence (FISINT)

(U) Proper Compartmentation of Information. The decision to compartment information should be made using the guidelines and tables in this guide as well as specific program classification guides. Proper compartmentation is critical in order to interact effectively with our mission partners/users. Defaulting to the TK Control System is not acceptable as it may result in over-compartmentation.

(U) Collateral Material. National security information that has been determined pursuant to Executive Order 12958, as amended, or any predecessor order to require protection against unauthorized disclosure and is marked CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET or TOP SECRET to indicate its classified status when in documentary form. NRO has authority to classify within the collateral classification system.

(U) Classification Categories. The E.O. 12958, as amended, states that national security information may only be classified in one of the three categories:

(U) TOP SECRET: applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause *exceptionally grave damage* to the national security that the original classification authority is able to identify or describe;

(U) SECRET: applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause *serious damage* to the national security that the original classification authority is able to identify or describe; and

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(U) CONFIDENTIAL: applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause *damage* to the national security that the original classification authority is able to identify or describe.

(U) UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (U//FOUO). U//FOUO is an administrative marking available for use under certain circumstances to limit dissemination of information. It does NOT afford classified protection, but it does flag material that meets one of the Freedom of Information Act's (FOIA) criteria for exemption from public release. NRO Directive 50-12a and NRO Instruction 50-9a provides guidance both for deciding when to use the marking and for directions for proper handling of the material so marked.

(U) Authorized For Release To [country(ies)/international organization trigraph] (REL TO). This marking is used to identify classified intelligence that an originator has determined to be releasable or has been released, through established foreign disclosure procedures and channels, to the foreign country(ies)/international organization(s) indicated. Further foreign dissemination of the material (in any form) is authorized only after obtaining permission from the originator and in accordance with DCID 6/7, and National Disclosure Policy-1 (NDP-1).

(U) Not Releasable To Foreign Nationals (NOFORN). The NOFORN marking is used to identify classified intelligence that may not be released in any form to foreign governments, foreign nationals, foreign organizations, or non-US citizens without permission of the originator and in accordance with provisions of DCID 6/7 and NDP-1.

D. (U) SECURITY AND CLASSIFICATION

(U) Classification or Control System Resolution. The classification tables in this guide specify the classification and/or control system for information relating to NRO systems, products and data. Where the control system or classification of an item of information is not listed in, or readily apparent from, the table in this guide or other program classification guides, such information, products, relationships and activities will be protected at an appropriate classification level with the most limited distribution, pending a review by the Program Security Office in conjunction with NRO/Security Policy Staff. As a general rule, the level of detail revealed will determine the classification and compartmentation. NRO/Security Policy Staff will also coordinate as necessary with the respective DIA, NGA or NSA functional program managers for TALENT-KEYHOLE, COMINT and collateral classification matters under their original classification authority.

(U) Compilation/Aggregation of Information. As stated in E.O. 12958, as amended, 1.7(e) Compilations of items of information that are individually *unclassified* may be classified if the compiled information reveals an additional association or relationship that (1) meets the standards for classification under this order and (2) is not otherwise revealed in the individual items of information. As used in the Order, "compilation" means an aggregation of pre-existing unclassified items of information. If a classified document contains certain portions that are unclassified when standing alone, but classified information will be revealed when they are combined or associated, those portions will be marked as unclassified and the page will be marked with the highest classification of any information on the page. The reason for classifying the compilation must be stated at an appropriate location at or near the beginning of the document.

(U) Classification Authority. In accordance with E.O. 12958, as amended, only a limited number of NRO officials have Original Classification Authority (OCA). All remaining NRO personnel classify information derivatively. In establishing the information categories and classification of an item of information, E.O. 12958, as amended, further directs that the OCA must be able to identify

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or describe why unauthorized disclosure would result in damage, serious damage, or exceptionally grave damage to the national security.

(U) Reason for Classification. Under the provisions of EO 12958, as amended, information may not be considered classified unless it falls under one or more of the categories listed below and the reason(s) for a classification decision documented. To meet this requirement, the EO specifies that, at a minimum, reference to the pertinent classification category(ies) described in Section 1.4 of E.O. 12958, as amended, plus the letter(s) that correspond to the category(ies) should be listed. The classification categories preceded by their corresponding letter designators are listed below.

(a) military plans, weapons systems, or operations;

(b) foreign government information;

(c) intelligence activities (including special activities), intelligence sources or methods, or cryptology;

(d) foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States, including confidential sources; (e) scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to the national security, which includes defense against transnational terrorism;

(f) United States Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities; (g) vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, projects, plans, or pro-tection services relating to the national security, which includes defense against transnational terrorism; or

(h) weapons of mass destruction.

(U) Declassification Instructions

(U) Original Classification. E.O. 12958, as amended, specifies that when determining the duration of classification in the first instance, i.e. original classification, the original classification authority have four choices:

- a date or event less than 10 years from the date of the decision
- a date 10 years from the date of the decision
- a date greater than 10 years and less than 25 years from the date of the decision; or
- a date 25 years from the date of the decision.

(U) The NRO has a short list of individuals who have original classification authority.

(U) Derivative Classification. All individuals have derivative classification responsibility. NRO classified documents, media, and materials that are sources of derivative classification will use the following Declassification Date Markings.

- Exemption Category (e.g., 25X1 (replaces X1)); or
- Specific Date (e.g., YYYYMMDD) (used when a specific date or event for the declassification can be determined based upon the duration of the national security sensitivity of the information.)
- Manual Review (MR) (Used in cases where EO 12958 requirements are superseded by statute, treaty, or other agreement and can only be used in the document header and footer and not on the "Declassify On" line.)

(U) Declassification Exemptions

(U) An agency head may exempt from automatic declassification under paragraph (a) of section 3.3 of EO 12958, as amended, specific information, the release of which could be expected to:

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- (1) reveal the identity of a confidential human source, or a human intelligence source, or reveal information about the application of an intelligence source or method;
- (2) reveal information that would assist in the development or use of weapons of mass destruction;
- (3) reveal information that would impair U.S. cryptologic systems or activities;
- (4) reveal information that would impair the application of state of the art technology within a U.S. weapon system;
- (5) reveal actual U.S. military war plans that remain in effect;
- (6) reveal information, including foreign government information, that would seriously and demonstrably impair relations between the United States and a foreign government, or seriously and demonstrably undermine ongoing diplomatic activities of the United States;
- (7) reveal information that would clearly and demonstrably impair the current ability of United States Government officials to protect the President, Vice President, and other protectees for whom protection services, in the interest of the national security, are authorized;
- (8) reveal information that would seriously and demonstrably impair current national security emergency preparedness plans or reveal current vulnerabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, or projects relating to the national security; or
- (9) violate a statute, treaty, or international agreement.

(U) Classification Sources. For completeness, this guide contains items of information classified and compartmented by other agencies as well as NRO Program Offices. These items were derivatively classified after consulting a number of documents to identify the Original Classification Authority for the specific items of information. The documents are listed below.

- Presidential Decision Directive/NSC 49, "National Space Policy," dated September 1996.
- Executive Order 12958, as amended, Classified National Security Information, dated 23 March 2003.
- Executive Order 12951, Release of Imagery Acquired by Space-Based National Intelligence Reconnaissance Systems, 22 February 1995.
- National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) Imagery Policy Series, Section 5, Part A.
- Declassification of the "Fact of" Overhead SIGINT, The National SIGINT Committee memorandum, dated 1 December 1995.
- Signals Intelligence Security Regulations (SISR) dated May 26, 1999.
 - NRO approved Program Classification Guides:
 - IMINT Classification Guide (CG)
 - SIGINT Classification Guide (CG)
 - Communications Classification Guide (CG)
 - Office of Space Launch Information Protection Guide (IPG)
 - NRO Operations Squadron (IPG);
- Implementation Plan for Further Decompartmentation and Declassification of the National Reconnaissance Office, April 24, 1995.
- DCI memo titled, "Declassification of Specified Information Relating to the National Reconnaissance Office," dated September 15, 1992, and Secretary of Defense approval, dated September 17, 1992.
- Implementation Plan for NRO Launch Declassification dated 1 March1997.
- Declassification Guide for CORONA, ARGON, LANYARD Programmatic Data, dated 2 August 1996.

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E. (U) INFORMATION SHARING

<u>(S//NÉ)</u> All NRO classified information must be marked either REL TO (Authorized for Release to [country(ies)/international organization trigraph]) or NOFORN (Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals). The President has emphasized the need to ensure the timely and efficient flow of information to our closest US allies, Accordingly, the use of restrictive markings should be the rare exception rather then the rule. The presumption of disclosure and release should be the primary consideration in the preparation and dissemination of classified defense information and intelligence information relating to the circumstances set forth below.

(U) Release and Disclosure. The NRO Designated Intelligence Disclosure Official (DIDO) must approve the release and/or disclosure of NRO intelligence information to foreign nationals by in accordance with NRO Directive 50-8a and NRO Instruction 50-4a. The NRO DIDO is the only NRO official who can authorize the disclosure and/or release of NRO intelligence information. If the intelligence information originates from another Intelligence Community agency or is classified military information, the requestor must seek guidance from the NRO Office of Policy (OP) prior to the disclosure and/or release of that information as well.

F. (U) PORTION MARKING

(U) Executive Order 12958, as amended, mandates that all classified information, regardless of its physical form, indicate which portions are classified. The NRO has been granted a limited waiver from the requirement to portion mark information. The NRO is not required to portion mark information that will be maintained internal to the NRO by its government staff and/or contractors. Information produced by the NRO that is disseminated externally must be portion marked. In this case, the term external is defined as any organization or entity outside the cognizance of the DNRO.

G. (U) REQUESTS FOR CHANGE TO CLASSIFICATION

(U) The NRO Classification Guide is intended to be a living document and changes will occur as necessary to keep it current. Any and all requests for changes and/or challenges to classification and/or compartmentation must be submitted to NRO Security Policy Staff by using the Change Page form (see page 4). Requests for change will be evaluated and vetted prior to acceptance or rejection. The requestor will be notified of the final decision and the change will be incorporated into the guide.

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(b)(1) (b)(3)









(U) Acronym List

	NYM	EXPLANATION	
	<u> </u>	NOTE: * SECRET WHEN ASSOCIATED WITH THE NRO. ** SECRET//TK WHEN ASSOCIATED WITH THE NRO. *** U WHEN ONLY GENERICALLY ASSOCIATED WITH THE NRO.	- - (b)(1)
(U)	AFB	Air Force Base	(b)(1) (b)(3)
(U)	AFP	Air Force Program	
່ເບົ	AFSCN	Air Force Satellite Control Network	
(U)	AS&TD	Advanced Systems & Technology Directorate	
(U)	CCAS	Cape Canaveral Air Station	1
(U)	C	CONFIDENTIAL	- .
(U)	CAAS	Contractor Advisory and Assistance Services	-
(U)	CAL	Corona, Argon and Lanyard	-
(-)			-
			1
(U)	CG	Classification Guide	1
(U)	CIA	Central Intelligence Agency	
(U)	CIA/OD&E	CIA/Office of Development & Engineering	1.
(U)	CIA/CRES	CIA/Collection Requirements and Evaluation Staff	1
	COMINT		-
(U)	COMMENT	Communication Intelligence	
(U) (U)	COMM	Communication Intelligence Communications	(b)(1 (b)(3
(U) _			
(U)	DDSE DCI	Communications Deputy Director Systems Engineering Director of Central Intelligence	
(U) (U) (U) (U)	COMM DDSE DCI DCID	Communications Deputy Director Systems Engineering Director of Central Intelligence Director, Central Intelligence Directive	
(U) (U) (U) (U) (U)	COMM DDSE DCI DCID DDNRO	Communications Deputy Director Systems Engineering Director of Central Intelligence Director, Central Intelligence Directive Deputy Director, National Reconnaissance Office	
(U) (U) (U) (U) (U)	COMM DDSE DCI DCID DDNRO DIA	Communications Deputy Director Systems Engineering Director of Central Intelligence Director, Central Intelligence Directive Deputy Director, National Reconnaissance Office Defense Intelligence Agency	
(U) (U) (U) (U) (U) (U) (U)	COMM DDSE DCI DCID DDNRO DIA DIRNSA	Communications Deputy Director Systems Engineering Director of Central Intelligence Director, Central Intelligence Directive Deputy Director, National Reconnaissance Office Defense Intelligence Agency Director, National Security Agency	
(U) (U) (U) (U) (U) (U) (U) (U)	COMM DDSE DCI DCID DDNRO DIA DIRNSA DNRO	Communications Deputy Director Systems Engineering Director of Central Intelligence Director, Central Intelligence Directive Deputy Director, National Reconnaissance Office Defense Intelligence Agency Director, National Security Agency Director, National Reconnaissance	
(U) (U) (U) (U) (U) (U) (U) (U) (U)	COMM DDSE DCI DCID DDNRO DIA DIRNSA DIRNSA DNRO DoD	Communications Deputy Director Systems Engineering Director of Central Intelligence Director, Central Intelligence Directive Deputy Director, National Reconnaissance Office Defense Intelligence Agency Director, National Security Agency Director, National Reconnaissance Department of Defense	
(U) (U) (U) (U) (U) (U) (U) (U) (U) (U)	COMM DDSE DCI DCID DDNRO DIA DIRNSA DIRNSA DNRO DoD DOPS/CIA	Communications Deputy Director Systems Engineering Director of Central Intelligence Director, Central Intelligence Directive Deputy Director, National Reconnaissance Office Defense Intelligence Agency Director, National Security Agency Director, National Reconnaissance Department of Defense Director of Personnel Security/CIA	
(U) (U) (U) (U) (U) (U) (U) (U) (U) (U)	COMM DDSE DCI DCID DDNRO DIA DIRNSA DNRO DoD DoD DOPS/CIA DOS	Communications Deputy Director Systems Engineering Director of Central Intelligence Director, Central Intelligence Directive Deputy Director, National Reconnaissance Office Defense Intelligence Agency Director, National Security Agency Director, National Reconnaissance Department of Defense Director of Personnel Security/CIA Director of Security	
(U) (U) (U) (U) (U) (U) (U) (U) (U) (U)	COMM DDSE DCI DCID DDNRO DIA DIRNSA DIRNSA DNRO DoD DOPS/CIA DOS DRSP	Communications Deputy Director Systems Engineering Director of Central Intelligence Director, Central Intelligence Directive Deputy Director, National Reconnaissance Office Defense Intelligence Agency Director, National Security Agency Director, National Reconnaissance Department of Defense Director of Personnel Security/CIA Director of Security Defense Reconnaissance Support Program	
(U) (U) (U) (U) (U) (U) (U) (U) (U) (U)	COMM DDSE DCI DCID DDNRO DIA DIRNSA DNRO DoD DOPS/CIA DOS DRSP DSCS	Communications Deputy Director Systems Engineering Director of Central Intelligence Director, Central Intelligence Directive Deputy Director, National Reconnaissance Office Defense Intelligence Agency Director, National Security Agency Director, National Reconnaissance Department of Defense Director of Personnel Security/CIA Director of Security Defense Reconnaissance Support Program Defense Satellite Communications System	
(U) (U) (U) (U) (U) (U) (U) (U) (U) (U)	COMM DDSE DCI DCID DDNRO DIA DIRNSA DNRO DoD DOPS/CIA DOS DRSP DSCS DSPO	Communications Deputy Director Systems Engineering Director of Central Intelligence Director, Central Intelligence Directive Deputy Director, National Reconnaissance Office Defense Intelligence Agency Director, National Security Agency Director, National Reconnaissance Department of Defense Director of Personnel Security/CIA Director of Security Defense Reconnaissance Support Program Defense Satellite Communications System Defense Support Program Office	
(U) (U) (U) (U) (U) (U) (U) (U) (U) (U)	COMM DDSE DCI DCID DDNRO DIA DIRNSA DNRO DoD DOPS/CIA DOS DRSP DSCS DSPO EELV	Communications Deputy Director Systems Engineering Director of Central Intelligence Director, Central Intelligence Directive Deputy Director, National Reconnaissance Office Defense Intelligence Agency Director, National Security Agency Director, National Reconnaissance Department of Defense Director of Personnel Security/CIA Director of Security Defense Reconnaissance Support Program Defense Satellite Communications System Defense Support Program Office Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle	
(U) (U) (U) (U) (U) (U) (U) (U) (U) (U)	COMM DDSE DCI DCID DDNRO DIA DIRNSA DNRO DOD DOPS/CIA DOS DRSP DSCS DSPO EELV ELINT	Communications Deputy Director Systems Engineering Director of Central Intelligence Director, Central Intelligence Directive Deputy Director, National Reconnaissance Office Defense Intelligence Agency Director, National Security Agency Director, National Reconnaissance Department of Defense Director of Personnel Security/CIA Director of Security Defense Reconnaissance Support Program Defense Satellite Communications System Defense Support Program Office Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle Electronic Intelligence	
(U) (U) (U) (U) (U) (U) (U) (U) (U) (U)	COMM DDSE DCI DCID DDNRO DIA DIRNSA DNRO DoD DOPS/CIA DOS DRSP DSCS DSPO EELV ELINT EO	Communications Deputy Director Systems Engineering Director of Central Intelligence Director, Central Intelligence Directive Deputy Director, National Reconnaissance Office Defense Intelligence Agency Director, National Security Agency Director, National Reconnaissance Department of Defense Director of Security/CIA Director of Security Defense Reconnaissance Support Program Defense Satellite Communications System Defense Support Program Office Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle Electronic Intelligence	
(U) (U) (U) (U) (U) (U) (U) (U) (U) (U)	COMM DDSE DCI DCID DDNRO DIA DIRNSA DNRO DoD DOPS/CIA DOS DRSP DSCS DRSP DSCS DSPO EELV ELINT EO ESD	Communications Deputy Director Systems Engineering Director of Central Intelligence Director, Central Intelligence Directive Deputy Director, National Reconnaissance Office Defense Intelligence Agency Director, National Security Agency Director of Personnel Security/CIA Director of Security Defense Reconnaissance Support Program Defense Satellite Communications System Defense Support Program Office Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle Electronic Intelligence Executive Order Ephemeris Support Data	
(U) (U) (U) (U) (U) (U) (U) (U) (U) (U)	COMM DDSE DCI DCID DDNRO DIA DIRNSA DNRO DoD DOPS/CIA DOS DRSP DSCS DSPO EELV ELINT EO ESD FIA	Communications Deputy Director Systems Engineering Director of Central Intelligence Director, Central Intelligence Directive Deputy Director, National Reconnaissance Office Defense Intelligence Agency Director, National Reconnaissance Department of Defense Director of Security Agency Director of Personnel Security/CIA Director of Security Defense Reconnaissance Support Program Defense Satellite Communications System Defense Support Program Office Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle Electronic Intelligence Executive Order Ephemeris Support Data Future Imagery Architecture	
	COMM DDSE DCI DCID DDNRO DIA DIRNSA DNRO DoD DOPS/CIA DOS DRSP DSCS DSPO EELV ELINT EO ESD FIA FISINT	Communications Deputy Director Systems Engineering Director of Central Intelligence Director, Central Intelligence Directive Deputy Director, National Reconnaissance Office Defense Intelligence Agency Director, National Security Agency Director, National Reconnaissance Department of Defense Director of Security Defense Reconnaissance Support Program Defense Satellite Communications System Defense Support Program Office Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle Electronic Intelligence Executive Order Ephemeris Support Data Future Imagery Architecture Foreign Instrumentation Signals Intelligence	
	COMM DDSE DCI DCID DDNRO DIA DIRNSA DNRO DoD DOPS/CIA DOS DRSP DSCS DSPO EELV ELINT EO ESD FIA	Communications Deputy Director Systems Engineering Director of Central Intelligence Director, Central Intelligence Directive Deputy Director, National Reconnaissance Office Defense Intelligence Agency Director, National Reconnaissance Department of Defense Director of Security Agency Director of Personnel Security/CIA Director of Security Defense Reconnaissance Support Program Defense Satellite Communications System Defense Support Program Office Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle Electronic Intelligence Executive Order Ephemeris Support Data Future Imagery Architecture	

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<u> </u>		NOTE: * SECRET WHEN ASSOCIATED WITH THE NRO. ** SECRET//TK WHEN ASSOCIATED WITH THE NRO. *** U WHEN ONLY GENERICALLY ASSOCIATED WITH THE NRO.
Û)	GEO	Geostationary Earth Orbit
U)	GPS	Global Positioning System
U)	HANU	High Accuracy Navigation User
U)	I&W	Indications & Warning
U)	IMINT	Imagery Intelligence
U)	IOSA	Integrated Overhead SIGINT Architecture
U) U)	LEO	Low Earth Orbit
U)	MASINT	Measurement and Signature Intelligence
U)	MCS	Mission Control Station
0)		
J)	MGS	Mission Ground Station
<u>J)</u>	MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
J)	MSD	Mensuration Support Data
J)	MS&O	Management Services & Operations
J)	MWCSE	Midwest COMM Support Element (Schreiver AFB, Co. Springs, CO)
J)	NAM	National Reconnaissance Office Acquisition Manual
J)	NAVSECGRU	Naval Security Group
Ü)	NAVSECGRUCOM	Naval Security Group Command
Ú)	NAVSUPSYSCOM	Naval Support Systems Command
J)	NGA	National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
J)	NOPS	NRO Operations Squadron
<u>J)</u>	NOFORN	Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
<u>J)</u>	NRO	National Reconnaissance Office
<u>(L</u>	NROL	National Reconnaissance Office Launch
<u>J)</u>	NRP	National Reconnaissance Program
<u>)</u>	NSA NSC	National Security Agency National Security Council
<u>)</u>	NSC	National Security Council National Space Communications Program
ן) <u> </u>	NWFCU	National Space Communications Program
	OAS	Onizuka Air Station
	OAS OCA	Original Classification Authority
J)		Office Counterintelligence
ן) (ר		
ר) (ר (ר		
U) U) U) U)	OCMC	Overhead Collection Management Center
U) U) U) U) U)	OCMC OH	Overhead Collection Management Center Overhead
U) U) U) U)	OCMC	Overhead Collection Management Center

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Approved for Release: 2018/12/21 C05102142

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ACRC	ONYM	EXPLANATION	
<u> </u>	<u></u>	NOTE: * SECRET WHEN ASSOCIATED WITH THE NRO. ** SECRET//TK WHEN ASSOCIATED WITH THE NRO. *** U WHEN ONLY GENERICALLY ASSOCIATED WITH THE NRO.	
(U)	R&D	Research & Development	1
(U)	ROM	Resources Oversight & Management	1
(U)	RSEN	Risk Sensitive	-
(U)	S	SECRET	1
(U)	SAD	SOCOMM Address Designator	1
<u></u>			2
			(b)(1) (b)(3)
(U) (U)	SAF/SD	Secretary of the Air Force/Office of Space Systems	4
	SAF/SL	Secretary of the Air Force/Space Launch	1
(U)	SAF/SN	Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Space)	
(U)	SAF/SO	Secretary of the Air Force/Space Operations	1
(U)	SAF/SP	Secretary of the Air Force/Special Projects	1
(U)	SAF/SS	Secretary of the Air Force/Space Systems	1
(U)	SAF/ST	Secretary of the Air Force/Space Technology	1
(U)	SCI	Sensitive Compartmented Information	(b)(1) (b)(3)
(U)	SCIF	Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility	
(U)	SCTS	Space Cargo Transportation System	1
(U)	SECDEF	Secretary of Defense	1
(U)	SETA	Systems Engineering and Technical Assistance	1
(U)	SIGINT	Signals Intelligence	1
(U)	SISR	Signals Intelligence Security Regulations	1
(U)	SOCOMM	Special Operations Communications	1
(U)	SOIC	Senior Official of the Intelligence Community	1
(U)	SPA	Special Procurement Activity	1
(U)	SPAWARSYSCOM	Navy, Space Warfare Systems Command	1
(U)	STS	Space Transportation System (Space Shuttle)	1
(U)	SV	Satellite Vehicle	1
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			1 (b)(1)
(U)	IK] (b)(3)] (b)(3
(U)	TS	TOP SECRET	
(Ŭ)	TT&C	Telemetry, Tracking and Control	1
_(U)	Ú	UNCLASSIFIED	1
(U)	USAF	United States Air Force	1
(Ú)	VAFB	Vandenberg Air Force Base	1
(Ū)	VDC	Visual Design Center	1

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(U) Definitions

(U) Air Force Program (AFP) Number: Unclassified number assigned by the Office of Space Launch, when it is necessary to mask program name or identity.

(U) Classified: Information or material that requires protection against unauthorized disclosure in the interest of national security. This material consists of three categories:

1) **TOP SECRET -** applied to information or material the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security that the original classification authority is able to identify or describe.

2) **SECRET** - applied to information or material the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national security that the original classification authority is able to identify or describe.

3) **CONFIDENTIAL** - applied to information or material the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security that the original classification authority is able to identify or describe.

Security classification judgments must be made based on an approved Classification Guide (CG) or by an original classification authority (OCA), in accordance with the rules for such determinations set forth in Executive Order 12958, as amended.

(U) Collateral: All national security information classified CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET under the provisions of an Executive Order for which special Intelligence Community systems of compartmentation (such as, sensitive compartmented information) are not formally established.

(U) COMINT Control System: A Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Sensitive Compartmented Information Control System expressly authorized for handling or transmitting technical and intelligence information derived from the monitoring of foreign communications signals by other than intended recipients from satellite intelligence and other sources. The Director, National Security Agency (DIRNSA) manages the COMINT Control System.

(U) Confidence Ellipse: A measure of the uncertainty in the location of an emitted signal described in the parameters of an ellipse (for example, length of the semi major axis and semi minor axis and the compass heading for either axis).

(U) Derivative classification: The incorporating, paraphrasing, restating or generating in new form information that is already classified, and marking the newly developed material consistent with the classification markings that apply to the source information. Derivative classification includes the classifications based on classification guidance.

(U) FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY: For Official Use Only (FOUO) is an administrative marking available for use under certain circumstances to limit dissemination of information. It does NOT afford classified protection, but it does flag material that meets one of the Freedom of Information Act's (FOIA) criteria for exemption from public release.

(U) The For Official Use Only (FOUO) marking limits the dissemination of information, including E-mail, to official channels. The originator may use this marking whenever unclassified, non-sensitive intelligence or information does not warrant a national security classification but does require some limitation in dissemination. FOUO is not a classification and must not be used as a substitute classification, nor does it guarantee that information will be withheld from release. Under the Freedom of information Act (FOIA), only information that meets categories 1-9 below may be officially exempt from disclosure. Unclassified information, with or without the FOUO marking, that does not meet one of the exemptions, will most likely be released to the public if requested through the FOIA. Therefore, the FOUO marking should only be used on

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information that will not have an impact on the NRO or its operations if released. If there is an identifiable impact, the information should be evaluated for a classification decision.

(U) For Official Use Only categories exempt from public disclosure:

1- Classified Records

2- Internal Personnel Rules and Practices

3- Other Statutes (such as sources and methods statutes under which NRO and other members of intelligence community have general and specific protection)

4- Confidential Commercial Information

5- Inter- or Intra-Agency Records

6- Invasion of Personal Privacy

7- Investigative Records

8- Financial Institutions

9- Wells (Records with geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells)

(U) Imagery Intelligence (IMINT): The collection and analysis of photography and electronic imaging across the electromagnetic spectrum, to include visual, radar, infrared, and ultraviolet data.

(U) Inter-Range Operations Number (IRON): Number assigned by AFSPC for identifying satellites in the Air Force Satellite Control Network (AFSCN).

(U//FOUO) Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT): MASINT is technically derived intelligence (excluding traditional imagery and signals intelligence) which, when collected, processed and analyzed, results in intelligence that locates, tracks, identifies or describes the signatures (distinctive characteristics) of fixed or dynamic target sources. MASINT includes the advanced processing and exploitation of data derived from overhead and airborne IMINT and SIGINT collection systems.

(U) Mission: The NRO mission of the satellite; the fact of and details revealing the collection capabilities of a specific NRO mission.


(U) Mission Number: The four-digit identifier for individual NRO satellites. Each NRO satellite system is assigned a series of four-digit numerical series associated with that collection system. These numbers are primarily chosen for use by the collection/tasking/user community to identify NRO satellites.

(U) NRO Launch (NROL) Designator: Unclassified identifier used to distinguish an NRO launch, NROL-1, (b)(1) NROL-2, etc. NROL Designators have taken the place of Air Force Program numbers in identifying NRO launches.

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(U) Operational ELINT (OPELINT): The category of electronic intelligence concerned with the introduction, disposition, movement, utilization, tactics, and activity levels of known foreign noncommunications emitters and, where applicable, associated military systems.

(U) Operations Number: Unclassified number used to identify an activity or operation on the launch site, range or inter-range.



(U) Original classification authority (OCA): An individual authorized in writing, either by the President, or by agency heads or other officials designated by the President, to classify information in the first instance.

(U) Signals Intelligence (SIGINT): Technical and intelligence information derived from exploitation of foreign electronic emissions; includes COMINT, ELINT, FIS and PROFORMA (machine to machine communications). The interception, analysis and reporting of information comprising either individually or in combination, all COMINT, ELINT, and FISINT. SIGINT includes both raw data and the analysis product of that data. Subsets of SIGINT include:

1.) **Communications Intelligence (COMINT):** Technical and intelligence information derived from foreign communications by other than the intended recipients. COMINT does not include information from the monitoring of plain text public broadcasts. Special Intelligence (SI) is the unclassified term, which is used to identify COMINT in the unclassified environment.

2.) **Electronic Intelligence (ELINT):** Technical and intelligence information derived from foreign electromagnetic non-communications transmissions by other than intended recipients, and foreign non-communications electromagnetic radiation emanations from other than atomic detonation or radioactive sources.

3.) **Foreign Instrumentation Signals Intelligence (FISINT):** Technical and intelligence information derived from the intercept of foreign instrumentation signals (i.e., electromagnetic emissions) associated with the testing and operational deployment of non-U.S. aerospace, surface, and sub-surface systems. Signals include telemetry, beaconry, electronic interrogators, tracking/ fusing/ arming/ command systems, and video data links.

(6) Special Communications: Special Communications support high priority clandestine operational and intelligence gathering, and other national and tactical requirements including covert/clandestine communications

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(U) TALENT-KEYHOLE Control System: A DCI SCI control system jointly managed by the Director, NRO; Director, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA); the Chairman, National SIGINT Committee; and the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Directorate for MASINT Technical Collection. Changes and modifications to the system require coordination by each Director/Chairman and approval of the DCI/Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI). Detailed classification and compartmentation procedures for IMINT and MASINT are contained in relevant classification manuals. The Director, National Security Agency (DIRNSA) manages the COMINT control system for the DCI. The Signals Intelligence Security Regulations (SISRs) constitute the basic implementation of the TK system for satellite originated SIGINT tasking, collection and product information. Changes and modifications to the DCI/DDCI.

(U) TALENT-KEYHOLE (TK) protects certain information, products, and activities relating to the following intelligence disciplines.

Imagery Intelligence (IMINT), (most IMINT is SECRET collateral) Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Electronic Intelligence (ELINT), (most ELINT is SECRET collateral) Foreign Instrumentation Signals Intelligence (FISINT) Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT)

(U) NRO data protected within the TK system includes: relationships and data relating to satellite research & development (R&D), engineering design, specifications, algorithms, interface controls, test plans, operations manuals, and reference documents; satellite capabilities and vulnerabilities;

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equipment and information technology equipment involved in the operation of the satellite systems to include spacecraft, sensor(s), and mission ground station equipment; software programs used to operate hardware to include spacecraft maintenance, command and control, targeting, sensor operation, data conversion, processing, and exploitation operations, as well as the overall and detailed funding profile for both the development and operation of the NRO satellite collection systems. The TALENT-KEYHOLE Control System is managed jointly by the Director, National Reconnaissance Office, the Director, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA); the Director, National Security Agency; and the Chairman, MASINT Committee for the Director, Central Intelligence (DCI).

(U) Attachment #1

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

(U) NRO Revised Delegation of Original Top Secret Classification Authority, dated 6 November 1998

In accordance with Section 1.4 (c) (2) of Executive Order 12958, dated 17 April 1995, I respectfully request that you delegate original Top Secret classification authority to the following National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) officials:

Director, National Reconnaissance Office Deputy Director, National Reconnaissance Office **Deputy Director for Military Support** Chief of Staff Deputy Director for National Support Director, IMINT Systems Acquisition and Operations Directorate Director, SIGINT Systems Acquisition and Operations Directorate Director, Communications Systems Acquisition and Operations Directorate Director, Advanced Systems and Technology Directorate Director, Management Services and Operations Office Director, Operational Support Office **Inspector General** Director, Office of Contracts Director, Office of Security Deputy Director of Security for Security Policy and Operational Support Director, Office of Space Launch Director, Systems of Systems Architecture (SOSA) Chief Information Officer (CIO)

The NRO officials occupying these positions, include those individuals in an "Acting" capacity, have a demonstrable and continuing need to exercise this original classification authority.

This memorandum supersedes DNRO memorandum, 7 November 1995, ER 95-4819, subject as above.

/s/ Garnett Stowe for Keith Hall

Attachment:

Delegation of Original Top Secret Classification memo, dated 7 Nov 1995

DCI Decision: /s/ initials Approved

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