UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

BACKGROUND GUIDE

CAHSMUN HORIZONS 2020

Letter from the Director

Dear delegates,

Welcome to the United Nations Security Council! My name is Andrew Liu, and it is my pleasure to serve as your Director at Horizons 2020. I am currently in my junior year at St. George's School and have participated in Model UN since Grade 9 as both a delegate and a staff member. Reminiscing about my own transformative experiences in the UNSC, I am excited to witness the fruitful debate to come.

Model United Nations has been a highlight of my high school experience, and I am ever so grateful for the amazing friendships and experiences that I have attained along the way. Model UN is genuinely the best way to encapsulate the sophistication of debate, public speaking, and international affairs. My own experiences with this extracurricular have helped me improve my public speaking skills as well as my interpersonal skills. I can assure you that you, too, will undergo such an enlightening experience at Horizons 2020.

For this upcoming iteration of the UNSC at Horizons, we will be discussing the Libyan Civil War. This conflict has torn Libya apart, and thousands have been killed or have had their livelihoods threatened. Immense determination and unity will be required from the UNSC to resolve this complex and long-running conflict. I am eager to hear the creative solutions you will undoubtedly devise.

With that in mind, I wish you the best of luck. If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me via email at horizons-unsc@cahsmun.org. I look forward to meeting all of you.

Sincerely,

Andrew Liu
UNSC Director — Horizons 2020

Committee Description

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is unique among organizations within the United Nations (UN). Not only does it hold power to take military actions on behalf of the UN, but it can also impose economic sanctions on countries and organizations. Additionally, it can appoint individuals to important positions such as the Secretary-General and Judges of the International Court of Justice (ICJ).[1] The UNSC consists of 15 member states, five of whom are permanent (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States), and 10 of which are elected on a regional basis every two years.[2] The permanent members, the P5, have the ability to veto any draft resolutions in the Council. Such a veto power allows the P5 to overrule committee decisions on substantive resolutions but does not allow intervention for procedural votes. The UNSC's mandate is to protect and preserve international security and stability, prevent friction between state actors, and resolve existing disputes and conflicts. The Council is the only body in the UN that can issue binding resolutions to states. As one of the UN's principal organs, this committee retains its relevance to almost any conflict around the globe.

The UNSC is instrumental in coordinating UN peacekeeping forces in conflict regions across the globe. Troops have been stationed in Yemen, Korea, between Israel and Palestine, between India and Pakistan, and many other tension-ridden areas. However, while it has the capacity for peaceful intervention, it also has failed in many cases to defend human life. Two such glaring examples are the War in Darfur and the Rwandan Genocide. In both situations, the Council, constrained by conflicting interests, opted not to intervene in what would become deadly conflicts.[3] The UNSC has also failed to intervene in Syria due to Russian interests there, much in the same way that it has been unable to act in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict due to American interests. Despite this, the UNSC plays a critical role in aspects of global geopolitics as ant supervisor of individual states' actions in an increasingly globalized world.

Topic Overview

The major regional actors in the Libyan Civil War are the Government of National Accord (GNA), the General National Congress (GNC), the Libyan House of Representatives (HoR), and the Libyan National Army (LNA).[4]

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[1] https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/.

[2] https:// www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/current-members.

[3] https://www.intpolicydigest.org/2016/01/11/70-years-of-successful-security-and-fatal-failures-at-the-unsc/.

[4] https://www.ecfr.eu/mena/mapping_libya_conflict.

The GNC was the official legislature of Libya before the formation of the GNA, and it is still politically connected to it. The GNA is based in the Libyan capital, Tripoli, and assumed power after an internationally-brokered deal. One of its major mandates was to create a new constitution for Libya within eighteen months. The GNC failed to meet this deadline, and as a result, new elections were called for the national legislature. These elections formed the HoR. However, the Supreme Court of Libya declared that the elections were illegal and that the HoR had no legal justification for continuing as the elected government. The HoR rejected this, claiming that the Supreme Court had been controlled by GNC-supporting militias at the time. It relocated to Tobruk in late 2014 for fear of violence. At the same time, the commander of the LNA, Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, declared a coup against the GNC for failing to meet its mandate and aligned himself with the HoR instead.

In late 2010, a series of anti-government protests known as the Arab Spring spread across much of the Arab world in response to low living standards under repressive regimes. Being one of the major catalysts of the movement, Libya initially emerged as a democratic nation after a brief civil war in 2011. However, pressure from local militias and widespread corruption and security instabilities inside Libya quickly destabilized the country once again, culminating in the primary Libyan Civil War in 2014 that this committee will discuss. Factions of the original democratic government split and began fighting for control over the country. A previous UN-led initiative, unanimously supported by the UNSC, established the GNA to act as the internationally recognized government of Libya.[5] However, the GNA quickly drew antagonism from within Libya due to its inability to fulfill its mandate of creating a new constitution and pushed the LNA to begin taking military action against the Tripoli-based GNA. In an effort to relocate power to the Tobruk-based HoR government, a series of military campaigns by the LNA severely crippled the security and political structures inside Libya's capital city of Tripoli. These campaigns, though widely condemned, were largely successful in seizing territory from the GNA. No government has recognized the LNA or its leadership, yet the UNSC has taken little action to rectify the belligerents. A mission in Libya known as the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) has operated since the 2011 civil war in the time of former Prime Minister Muammar Gaddafi, but its nature has been purely political and bears no military influence in the region.[6] Its goals in Libya have been to restore public security and promote the rule of law, though its presence in Libya is inconsistent.

This topic takes a closer look at the aftermath of a failed Arab Spring movement in Libya that is reflective of the larger failings of movements in many Arab countries. Despite democratization and demands for regime changes leading to the overthrowing of autocrats and monarchs, Libya, along with various similar nations, was unable to completely democratize before it descended into violence again. There is no one defining factor to democracy, but it is

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[5] https://www.unsmil.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/Libyan%20Political%20Agreement%20-%20ENG%20.pdf.
[6] https://https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/s/res/2009-%282011%29.

clear that a lack of security and stability in these transitional democracies is not conducive to their long-term stability. If Libya continues on the path of instability, the conflict will likely spill into neighbouring countries such as Tunisia and Egypt.

Additionally, Libya's lack of political and military control over its own country has led to the formation of several extremist militant groups under the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) banner. Libya's economic capacity has been destroyed by the conflict and destruction of vital infrastructure, despite it being a major source of oil in North Africa. Insecurity in the country has also drastically increased the number of human rights violations caused by various belligerents, a number that will continue to climb if the situation in Libya continues on its present path.

Timeline

September 1, 1969 – While King Idris I is abroad, Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi and his Free Officers' movement establish a coup d'état and overthrow the monarchy.

January 10, 1970 – The Cabinet members of Gaddafi's government, the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) is unveiled to the public. None have Post-Secondary certifications and are in stark contrast to the previous wealthy, conservative ruling elite in Libya.[7]

February 18, 2011 – After three days of protests and police brutality, demonstrators in the city of Benghazi take control of the local government and military installations, with some police and soldiers defecting to join them.

February 27, 2011 – The National Transitional Council (NTC) is established by the rebels as the political face of the anti-Gaddafi movement.[8]

October 20, 2011 – Gaddafi is found by militia members outside Sirte and killed. By some accounts, he died of a gunshot wound; in others, he is tortured before being left for dead en route to Misrata.[9]

July 7, 2012 – The NTC calls for elections for the General National Congress (GNC). The subsequent handover of power in August is the first peaceful transition of government since the toppling of the Senussi monarchy in 1969.

May 16, 2014 – Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar begins Operation Dignity, seizing military assets

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[7] https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-0-230-61386-7_2.

[8] https://www.reuters.com/article/libya-council-revolution/anti-gaddafi-figures-say-form-national-council-idUS.

[9] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-15390980.

in the city of Benghazi. He accuses the Tripoli government of allowing terrorists to enter Libya and fostering extremism. Hostilities begin once again.[10]

August 4, 2014 – A new House of Representatives (HoR) is created after an election which the GNC and Supreme Court deemed illegitimate. As a result of pressure from militias within Tripoli, the HoR moves its meetings to the city of Tobruk.

December 17, 2015 – Representatives of both the New GNC and HoR meet to sign the UN-backed Libyan Political Agreement (LPA), also known as the Skhirat Agreement. As a result, the GNA is formed, with both previous legislatures combining to form an internationally recognized government. Despite this agreement, fighting still continues.[11]

December 17, 2017 – Haftar declares that the Skhirat Agreement is void, with the GNA reaching the end of its international mandate.[12]

April 4, 2019 – After years of fighting militias and terrorists in Libya, Haftar begins an offensive in Western Libya to seize control of Tripoli and oust the internationally recognized GNA seated there.

July 3, 2019 – A migrant detention centre in southern Tripoli is bombed, killing 44 civilians.[13] An inquiry finds that the Tajoura detention centre was situated adjacent to a military complex, likely the original target of the LNA airstrike.

January 12, 2020 – A ceasefire—one of many over the years—is broken mere hours after having been brokered under pressure from Turkey and Russia.[14]

June 2, 2020 – The GNA and LNA agree to resume ceasefire talks.[15]

June 3, 2020 – GNA forces retake several strategic towns as well as Tripoli's airport, driving Haftar's forces back.

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[10] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-27492354.

[11] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/17/libyan-politicians-sign-un-peace-deal-unify-rival-governments.

[12] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/12/qa-happening-libya-171220114305008.html.

[13] https://apnews.com/2b6635eb3f1045acad5fc8d0d1710ded.

[14] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-51082365.

[15] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/06/libya-warring-sides-agree-restart-ceasefire-talks-200602082543712.html.

Historical Analysis

Libya was originally a monarchy; however, King Idris I's mismanagement of wealth inspired the formation of the Free Officers' Movement. This movement was led by Muammar Gaddafi, who held a coup d'état to overthrow the regime in 1969. This began the rule of a 12-member Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), the *de facto* government of Libya after the coup.[16] As Gaddafi was the RCC chairman, he became the *de facto* head of state of the Libyan Arab Republic. This new government was strikingly socialist and anti-imperialist, and Gaddafi's rule began with heavy government spending and public benefits, even though political repression still existed. His time in power was marked by close ties with the Soviet Union and socialist Cuba, along with western governments who were interested in Libya's nationalized oil industry.[17]

In the late 2000s, a wave of movements calling for democratic reform washed over the Middle East and North Africa, notably in Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria. This international movement was known as the Arab Spring.[18] Proponents of the movement spoke out against governments with low standards of living, political suppression, corruption, and alleged violations of human rights. Such public anger had been growing for decades, and the younger generation's refusal to accept the status quo caused tensions to boil over. Tunisia was the only country where the Arab Spring was a 'success,' as protesters in other countries were either suppressed with force by governing regimes, such as with Bahrain or unable to maintain the democratic system they had created as in Egypt.[19] In some countries, large-scale protests and lack of government cooperation even led to civil war. Such was the case with Libya, in which peaceful demonstrations for more freedoms inspired by similar protests in neighbouring countries turned violent, eventually leading to the formation of rebel paramilitary groups. After months of fighting, dictator Muammar Gaddafi was killed, restoring civilian rule in the country.

After Gaddafi was deposed, the first round of elections saw a 60 percent voter turnout rate and elected the GNC as the official legislature following the end of the first civil war in 2011.[20] The GNC was tasked with creating a new Libyan constitution by a given deadline. However, it was unable to do so as a result of infighting within the ranks of GNC members. With no national constitution and widespread distrust towards the legislative body, the GNC was forced to call an election in 2014, which saw the Libyan House of Representatives (HoR) rise to power. Immediately after its formation, the HoR began to find itself at odds with the Tripoli-based GNC. Voter turnout was 18 percent, which was drastically lower than the 2011 election, where

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[16] https://www.jstor.org/stable/4324585.

[17] https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/capsule-review/1987-12-01/qaddafi-and-libyan-revolution-making-pariah-state-adventurist.

[18] https://www.history.com/topics/middle-east/arab-spring.

[19] Ibid.

[20] https://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/08/world/africa/libyans-vote-in-first-election-in-more-than-40-years.html.

local militias in Tripoli heavily supported the GNC's members.[21] Additionally, members of Parliament (MPs) elected into the HoR held considerably progressive views when compared to their religiously conservative GNC peers. In 2014, the GNC declared that the HoR was illegitimate and declared itself the official legislature of Libya.[22]

In May 2014, Haftar launched Operation Dignity against Islamist militants in an effort to eradicate terrorism and extremism in Libya. While most of the fighting was initially directed towards eradicating militias and terrorist cells in Libya, fighting quickly poured over to political agendas after the GNA was formed.

In 2015, the GNC and HoR signed an UN-supported initiative known as the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA). As a result of the Agreement, a new government was formed by the combination of the two legislatures. The GNA and its legislature, the High Council of State, was unanimously voted for by the UNSC and was declared the legitimate government of Libya. Despite this, however, both the HoR and factions within the GNC quickly withdrew their support for the GNA, accusing them of being at the mercy of non-state militia groups in Tripoli. The Agreement set a one-year limit on the GNA's mandate and could only be renewed once. As a result of this, in 2017, two years after the signing of the Skhirat Agreement, Haftar declared that the GNA's mandate had expired and was, therefore, illegitimate.[23] Accusing the GNA of condoning terrorism and militias, Haftar began taking over GNA-held territory, seizing assets such as oil fields, ports, and airfields, and moving his troops west towards Tripoli.

Current Situation

At the outbreak of the Libyan Civil War in 2014, the LNA and GNC were politically divided. The GNC declared the 2014 Libyan election illegitimate and therefore rejected the formation of a new legislature. The opposing HoR, supported by Haftar and the LNA, moved their meetings to Tobruk and began the formation of a separate government in the east. Not long after this, ISIL cells began to rise in central Libya and in coastal cities such as Derna. Both the GNC and Tobruk governments focused their efforts on eradicating Daesh's terrorist province, as well as any radical Islamist factions in the country. This was made particularly difficult due to the support of certain GNC members by the Muslim Brotherhood, deemed by some nations to be a terrorist organization. In April 2016, the GNC dissolved and was replaced by the High Council of State, leaving the conflict to be between the LNA—who is aligned with the HoR—and the GNA.

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[21] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/06/libyans-mourn-rights-activist-amid-turmoil-201462616143 6740827.html.

[22] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/11/libyan-court-suspends-un-backed-parliament-2014116 91057750925.html.

[23] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/11/haftar-won-topple-libyan-pm-serraj-election-181113125419991.html.

An arms embargo on Libya has existed since 2011 to avoid escalation to the first civil war, and was recently renewed by the Security Council. Officials from the LNA have long requested a pause in the embargo to aid the LNA in gaining full control of Libya, with the promise of elections soon after, but to no avail. At the same time, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have been involved with airstrikes against GNA positions while Qatar and Turkey have been supporting similar campaigns against Haftar's forces.[24] This proxy war between Qatar and the UAE is a manifestation of political divisions between the two countries. Egypt supports the more militaristic Haftar with its own failed attempt at democracy during the Arab Spring movement in its own country, while Turkey supports the international GNA government instead.

After weeks of fighting in Benghazi in Libya, Haftar's LNA forces successfully retook the city from radical Islamist militias with political support from the HoR in 2017. In the same year, the GNA's foreign minister named Haftar as the leader of the country's armed forces provided that Haftar recognized the GNA as the sole authority in Libya instead of the HoR. This was a turning point in the relationship between the GNA and LNA—the GNA was willing to allow Haftar to continue and serve as the leader of a national army in Libya, which implied the long-term goal of reuniting Libya. However, Haftar did not agree to this due to his rejection of the GNA as a whole. In December of the same year, Haftar declared that the GNA's 2015 mandate had expired its two-year limit and therefore was no longer the legitimate governing authority in Libya.[25]

In early 2019, Haftar launched Operation Flood of Dignity, a campaign to take over oil fields, ports, and eventually the GNA-held capital city, Tripoli.[26] Haftar had already taken over several key oil fields in the country as well as Tripoli's international airport. One of Haftar's stated goals is to secure all of Libya's oil infrastructure. This is a strategic objective, as nearly 70% of Libya's export earnings come from oil exports.[27] Thus, controlling Libya's oil infrastructure would place the country's economy under Haftar's control, cementing his power. He is currently supported by Italy and France, who hold interest in Libya's oil exports via the Greenstream natural gas pipeline.[28] As of April, LNA forces control some neighbourhoods in southern and eastern Tripoli. In turn, GNA forces have been involved in counteroffensives supported by militias in Tripoli and from nearby cities such as Misrata in an effort to regain full control of the city.

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[24] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/29/-sp-briefing-war-in-libya.

[25] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/11/haftar-won-topple-libyan-pm-serraj-election-181113125419991.html.

[26] https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2019/04/05/khalifa-haftar-libyas-strongest-warlord-makes-a-push-for-tripoli.

[27] https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/166.htm#:~:text=Libya%20facts%20and%20figures&text= Apart%20from%20petroleum%2C%20Libya's%20other,per%20cent%20of%20total%20GDP.

[28] https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2018/11/08/libyas-feuds-cross-the-mediterranean.

Arms Embargo

An arms embargo prohibits the exportation, selling, supplying or transfer of military goods and technology to a certain country. There has been such an international arms embargo on Libya since the outbreak of the first civil war against Gaddafi in 2011. In August 2019, LNA representatives requested that the arms embargo be lifted to allow states to legally arm Haftar's forces, with the promise of instituting elections after Tripoli had been captured.[29] No such collective action has been taken yet, as the UN does not officially recognize the LNA or the HoR as the legitimate government of Libya. However, countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Russia, France, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have been supporting the LNA's advances with military support and expertise. Saudi Arabia is reported to have given $20 million USD worth of support to Haftar to support his Tripoli campaign, though it has not gained him any apparent military victories.[30]

In particular, Russia has been providing considerable support for Haftar's forces. It vetoed a Security Council resolution condemning Haftar and the LNA's escalation of violence near Tripoli, saying that such a resolution should have condemned all sides of the conflict.[31] Along with Russia, Egypt and Saudi Arabia have been funding and providing air support to LNA forces in the country as well. Both Russia and the United States have reiterated calls for ceasefires and for a political solution to the violence. At the same time, Turkey and Qatar continue to support the internationally-recognized GNA, providing aid for GNA forces and local militias.

Humanitarian Concerns & Crimes

Haftar has been accused of committing war crimes and contributing towards the destabilization of infrastructure and support networks within Libya, including bombing civilians and vital infrastructure.[32] United States President Donald Trump received harsh backlash from voters in America after praising Haftar (who holds United States citizenship) in a phone call released by the White House.[33] According to Amnesty International, both sides of the conflict are conducting deliberate strikes using rockets and other weaponry against primarily civilian targets in Haftar's offensive on Tripoli.[34] As most of the fighting has taken place in the residential neighbourhoods in southern and eastern Tripoli, both warring parties have left large amounts of destruction in their wake. In one study of rocket debris in the "Kikla Buildings," a residential complex in

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[29] https://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2019/08/03/al-sisi-haftar-discuss-securing-shared-borders-lifting-arms-embargo-on-lna/.

[30] https://www.wsj.com/articles/saudi-arabia-promised-support-to-libyan-warlord-in-push-to-seize-tripoli-11555077600.

[31] https://www.scmp.com/news/world/middle-east/article/3005069/air-strikes-bombard-tripoli-eastern-libyan-forces-attempt.

[32] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/25/khalifa-haftar-libyan-general-accused-of-human-rights-abuses.

[33] https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/15/politics/libya-war-crimes-allegations-intl/index.html.

[34] https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/10/libya-civilians-caught-in-the-crossfire-as-militias-battle-for-Tripoli.

Tripoli, Amnesty International, found that there was no evidence to suggest the complex held any military significance.[35] As a result, the organization stressed the importance of oversight from the International Criminal Court (ICC) and greater authority for investigations in Libya.

In addition to attacks on civilian residences, migrant and refugee detention centres have also been attacked as a result of Haftar's Tripoli offensive, injuring detainees that were originally displaced by the fighting. These detention centres are placed adjacent or even within active military complexes and are therefore constant targets of drone strikes conducted by the LNA.

United Nations Involvement

United Nations Support Mission In Libya (UNSMIL)

The UN has been involved in Libya since the first civil war in 2011. Since the outbreak of the first conflict, the United Nations Support Mission In Libya (UNSMIL) has facilitated political mediation between belligerents in the country through various means, including mediating peace talks, contributing to peace proposals, and even aiding in the organization of elections during transitions of power such as in 2014. Since Gaddafi's flight from power, UNSMIL seems to have been less relevant in the subsequent conflict between the GNC and LNA.

UN Resolutions

The UN has passed several resolutions in regards to Libya. Some, such as UNHRC Resolution 37/41, deals with monitoring and ameliorating the situation within the country.[36] Others, such as Security Council Resolution 2009, established UNSMIL and outlined the stances the UN took on the Libyan Civil War.[37] In more recent times, Resolution 2240 gave member states the authority to intercept ships in international waters to enforce the arms embargo placed on Libya.[38] Additionally, there have been several rounds of sanctions placed on Libyan officials accused of committing human rights abuses or unnecessarily prolonging the political and social conflict in the region, and documents such as Resolution 2174 directly extended those sanctions.[39] All these resolutions have been generally successful in de-escalating the situation in Libya; however, they have been unable to incentivize organic change or successfully help negotiate sustainable paths for reconciliation between the various groups involved in the conflict. A major reason for this is the continued support of both sides of the conflict by different countries, turning Libya into the staging ground for multiple proxy wars by other nations. For instance, with the UAE and

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[35] https://www.amnestyusa.org/press-releases/libya-evidence-of-possible-war-crimes-underscores-need-for-international-investigation/.

[36] https://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?si=A/HRC/RES/37/41.

[37] https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/s/res/2009-%282011%29.

[38] https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/806095?ln=en.

[39] https://www.undocs.org/S/RES/2174(2014).

Egypt continuing to supply Haftar with supplies, while Turkey does the same for the GNA, the measures imposed by UN resolutions simply do not put enough pressure on belligerents of the conflict for them to reconcile.

Aside from resolutions, the UN has also taken political steps. In a Security Council Presidential Statement, the President endorsed the Skhirat Agreement saying that "the LPA remains the only viable framework to end the Libyan political crisis."[40] The same document disregards Haftar's characterization of the GNA's expired mandate by writing that "the Council emphasizes the continuity of the LPA throughout Libya's transitional period and rejects incorrect deadlines that only serve to undermine the UN-facilitated political process."[41] The UN has consistently condemned military actions taken in Libya, particularly in relation to offensives taken by Haftar towards Tripoli.[42] It has done the same with terrorist attacks as well.

In response to the UN's calls to protect the Libyan people from violence, a NATO-led coalition began a military intervention in Libya in March 2011. Consequently, NATO became heavily involved in the brief civil war in 2011 and used aerial bombardments to attack pro-Gaddafi forces in the country. NATO essentially became the enforcer of UNSC measures regarding Libya, including those outlined in Resolution 1973. However, the use of force has been denounced by the international community following the formation of the legitimized GNA. France, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and the United States released a joint statement on the situation in Libya in August 2019, calling for an extension of previous ceasefire agreements like those on the day of Eid el-Adha.[43] Despite international calls to avoid violent conflict, deep political instability within the country and the existence of well-armed Islamist militias continue to threaten all belligerents in post-Gaddafi Libya.

Possible Solutions

Ceasefire Agreement

Most solutions require a ceasefire agreement of sorts to phase out violence and foster cooperation between belligerents. Such an agreement will be especially important in preventing damage to infrastructure and reducing the number of civilian casualties. In addition, a ceasefire agreement would allow more humanitarian and political intervention by non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Such an agreement has the potential to be successful, especially given the recent ceasefire agreement on Eid al-Adha, but would require commitments

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[40] https://undocs.org/S/PRST/2017/26.

[41] Ibid.

[42] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/02/19/timeline-haftars-months-long-offensive-to-seize-tripoli/.

[43] https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/libya/events/2019/article/libya-joint-statement-by-france-Italy-the-united-arab-emirates-the-united.

by both sides of the conflict.[44] Ceasefires have been short-lived up until now due to shaky promises made by actors that have no incentive or internal pressure to negotiate a sustainable agreement. Whether it is due to political and ideological differences between the belligerents, or if there are contradictory or inflammatory directions by foreign state actors, a ceasefire must avoid assigning blame to any actor and instead should focus on stopping violence. This ceasefire should be an opportunity for all sides to reposition and renegotiate without the potential for renewed violence.

It is also less certain whether local militias would cooperate to the same extent Haftar's LNA or the GNA would, due to their interests being focused more on internal interactions as opposed to international relations. The LNA and GNA are politically accountable to their support base, whereas local militias in Tripoli and elsewhere may be less inclined to cooperate with international demands or legal agreements and certainly have no legal or political obligation to do so. Ceasefires should also include consideration of the economic and social impacts of the conflict, including resuming negotiations and perhaps even trade with some of the belligerents.

Increasing Sanctions

Sanctions were placed upon Libya's top leadership during the time of Gaddafi and the First Civil War. They were generally successful in limiting Gaddafi's ability to fully quell the armed uprising and involved freezing the Libyan government's foreign assets, travel bans, and partial bans on import and export trade with Libya. Sanctions may also be used in this situation as a punishment for the war crimes committed by both parties. However, this tactic may do little to calm the conflict since it is unlikely that other Arab League states such as Egypt or Saudi Arabia would stop funding the LNA given the proxy war that they are fighting against rival nations like Turkey. Furthermore, if they are to pass a Security Council vote, the sanctions would require Russia's support or, at the very least, for them to abstain from the vote because of their veto. In this case, Russia would likely request proportional sanctions on GNA forces. This would, in turn, lessen the UN's ability to support the internationally recognized government in Libya. Alternatively, Western powers on the Security Council could entice Russia to support sanctions by agreeing to reduce their political and economic influence in Libya. For example, they could relinquish some of their current economic deals with the GNA and allow Russia to supply them with resources such as wheat instead.

Conceding to Haftar and LNA

Another possibility is to allow Haftar to seize control of the entire country. This is incredibly dangerous and would not sit well with members of the international community trying to end the conflict in a sustainable manner. Additionally, this would remove UN influence over Haftar and

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[44] https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/libya/events/2019/article/libya-joint-statement-by-france-italy-the-united-arab-emirates-the-united.

all of Libya, to the extent that the GNA would no longer be a legitimate authority within the country. The GNA's mandate depends upon support from the international community; if Haftar is allowed to seize Tripoli, it could avoid extended violence but delegitimize the GNA and the UN as a whole. That being said, this solution may be feasible if new rounds of elections are called under third-party supervision, and Haftar's legislature and political support is willing to peacefully hand over power to a new, democratically-elected government. Caution must be exercised with new elections, as all parties (the HoR, LNA, etc.) must fully support the new legislature without the possibility of engaging in political conflict with it, as we saw with the GNC and HoR in 2014.

UN/NATO Military Intervention

Much in the same way that NATO intervened in the 2011 civil war, the Security Council may choose to intervene as well, either by forming a military coalition of Council members or by calling on NATO to intervene. The vastly superior military capabilities of many countries on the Security Council and NATO would bring the war to a quick close in the GNA's favour. However, such military action may be blocked in the Security Council, and regardless would be politically unpopular for any foreign government. Additionally, foreign powers entering Libya could inflame tensions within the country and may lead to further radicalization of local populations.

Extending GNA mandate

The Council could also choose to extend the GNA's mandate in Libya, thereby allocating more legitimacy and authority to the Government of National Accord. The GNA's mandate is detailed in one document (the Skhirat Agreement), and a major section of it involves the responsibility of attempting to negotiate compromises with the other belligerents in the conflict. This could resolve the political vacuum that currently exists in Libya and may provide more support for military action taken by GNA forces. The difficulty lies in convincing both the GNC and the HoR to support the deal once again, especially considering Haftar's successes in securing Libya's oil fields. Both parties may be reluctant to give up more power. However, an extension of this mandate, if paired with calling a new round of elections and distributing and maintaining power between the GNC and HoR, could lead to a peace agreement.

Bloc Positions

Russia

Russia has consistently backed Haftar and the LNA within Libya. However, the country has attempted to remain relatively neutral in the conflict in government publications and statements. It has allies that support both sides of the conflict—Egypt and Saudi Arabia supporting Haftar,

and Algeria and Turkey supporting the GNA.[45] Russia has several incentives to keep both Saudi Arabia and Turkey on friendly terms, and as such, will be extremely cautious about taking sides in the conflict. That being said, Russia may benefit from playing the mediator in Libya and reducing tensions in the country. Additionally, Russia has strong incentives to ensure that terrorist cells within Libya are eradicated and will require a stable Libya in order to do so.

United States

The United States has a difficult situation to approach. On the one hand, the US government supports the legitimate GNA government; on the other hand, President Donald Trump has publicly praised Haftar's handling of the crisis and his securing of the oil fields. The US, calling the attack "abhorrent" though making little effort to reduce the violence on its part, blocked a Security Council condemnation of the LNA airstrikes in Tripoli in April.[46] If desired, the US could likely use its political leverage in Libya to call for a ceasefire; however, its resource interests in the Arab League as a whole may make it hesitant to step in. Recently, however, President Trump has stepped back from the conflict, and second-hand accounts quote him saying that he "would rather avoid being involved ahead of the presidential election with so many other domestic issues weighing him down and urged them to sort the issue out amongst themselves[47]

Europe

European countries are slightly more invested in the conflict in Libya because of their dependence on Libyan oil exports. For instance, the Greenstream pipeline runs through Libya before entering France. Despite this, France and its other European compatriots lie on different sides of the issue. There is evidence that France has been backing Haftar's forces in addition to contributing to European efforts against ISIL, with allegations claiming that French special forces have been helping Haftar in his operations.[48] On the contrary, Italy and Britain lack political influence in Libya, though both are likely to support an international push for a ceasefire. No country in Europe publicly supports Haftar, and there has not yet been any European military action taken in response to the recent Tripoli offensive.

Arab Countries

Arab countries are likely to be invested in the conflict due to geopolitical proximity to Libya's leadership. However, they are split in terms of support for Libya's warring parties. Qatar, Turkey and Algeria support the internationally recognized GNA under Fayez al-Sarraj, while the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt support Haftar's LNA. The tension among Arab countries has led to difficulties in resolving the conflict by the Arab League. The League has blamed increasing

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[45] https://www.dw.com/en/could-libya-be-russias-new-syria/a-48277255.

[46] https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/1149165/us-britain-libya-un-security-council-attack-spt.

[47]." https://www.cnn.com/2020/08/08/politics/trump-libya-civil-war/index.html.

[48] https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/libya-war-khalifa-haftar-gaddafi-tripoli-france-italy-us-a8860151.html.

tensions on foreign intervention and has called for de-escalation and peace in the country.[49] However, Tunisia was required to close its land borders with Libya as a result of growing security concerns as US and UN missions are carried out in neighbouring areas. This has been matched by most of Libya's neighbours, most of whom have closed their borders or increased security at border checkpoints.

Discussion Questions

1. How does religious extremism and terrorism play a part in the civil war? Analyze its impact.

2. Should the United Nations Support Mission intervene in Libya? If so, to what degree?

3. How has the legacy of the Arab Spring movement impacted Libyan politics and society?

4. Has the UN been effective in mediating the conflict? Why or why not?

5. How have other Arab League nations reacted to the conflict, and what actions have they taken?

6. Is Haftar a trustworthy actor in this conflict? How politically popular is he (and the Tobruk government) compared to the GNC and GNA?

7. Where are the priorities of countries that are interested in Libya's resources? What is the extent these countries are willing to remain consistent with their foreign policy if promised oil?

8. How do ideological beliefs impact the relationships between factions of the GNC, the GNA, religiously-motivated militia, and the HoR?

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[49] https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20190415-arab-league-envoy-foreign-countries-fuelling-war-in-libya/.

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