The Vienna Circle and Freud

Fred Wilson

University of Toronto

Gustav Bergmann was one of the last of the Vienna Circle to flee. In 1938 Otto Neurath had already been in Amsterdam for several years, and there he arranged for funds to enable his younger colleague to obtain passage to New York. He asked in return only that Bergmann write a memoir of his time as a member of the circle. These recollections have recently been published.[1] Bergmann mentions how in the young left culture of Vienna there was a coming together of sympathizers with the program of the Circle and a number of young Freudians (p. 199). Bergmann was a member of both these groups. Arne Naess, in his somewhat later memoir,[2] describing the meetings of the Circle from the viewpoint of an invited *Ausländer*, also notes how there was cooperation between some of the Freudians and members of the Circle (p. 14ff).[3] So there were personal connections. But the regard in which members of the Vienna Circle held Freud can best be gauged by an anecdote that Bergmann once told,[4] though it does not occur in the memoir. While in Amsterdam waiting for his passage to the United States, Bergmann was despairing of what was happening in Europe. Neurath attempted to reassure him, somewhat at least. “Don’t worry,” Neurath said, “in 200 years Hitler will be just another mad dictator who lived at the time of Freud.” Neurath had no doubt underestimated the evil that had been descending upon Europe and the world. But that is not the point, which is rather that when Neurath, the Marxist and positivist, had to choose a figure as representing not the evil but the greatness of our century, he chose Freud.

Given the criticisms that have more recently been made of Freud’s work, and given that the Vienna Circle was a champion of scientific method and of the methodological unity of science,[5] it would seem an odd choice: it would seem that in fact Freud had succeeded in pulling the wool as it were over the eyes of the positivists, misleading them into believing that what he was doing was in fact scientific. I do not, however, think that it is so easy. Gustav Bergmann, who was one of the younger members of the Vienna Circle, had himself undergone analysis in the 1920s – though he never met Freud himself, he did know Anna Freud – and he was later to write a detailed critique and evaluation of psychoanalysis. Furthermore, Egon Brunswik, not a member of the circle, but close to it, wrote the monograph on psychology for Neurath’s *International Encyclopedia of Unified Science*;[6] in the latter he provided a critical account of psychoanalysis.

Writing the Austrian Traditions: Relations between Philosophy and Literature.
Ed. Wolfgang Huemer and Marc-Oliver Schuster. Edmonton, Alberta:
Wirth-Institute for Austrian and Central European Studies, 2003. pp. 13-35.

What I propose to do is first to look at psychoanalysis and the psychoanalytic method, to see whether these stand up to the sort of scrutiny upon which the Vienna Circle rightly insisted. In this examination, I will begin with the work of Bergmann and Brunswik, but then go on to comment on some of the recent work of Adolf Grünbaum.[7] I shall suggest that Freud has in fact provided good grounds for accepting his theories, in broad outline at least, and that they pass any sort of reasonable test that the Vienna Circle might have proposed. I shall then go on to look at the broader context, at the shared background in Nietzsche and neo-Kantian philosophy, and at the cultural aims of the Vienna Circle and how Freud's views fit into that framework.

– A –

I. Bergmann and Brunswik

Freud himself acknowledged the impact of Darwinism on his thought and on his approach to the mind. In speaking of Darwinism, I am thinking not so specifically of Darwin's own theories, but rather that broader stream of thought that became a characteristic frame of reference for so much in the nineteenth century. In particular, there came with this frame of reference an emphasis upon *functions*.[8] In psychology the group that most directly took up this theme were the American functionalists. These psychologists were inspired by John Dewey's study in "The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology."[9] Dewey's emphasis on functions derived as much from his background in Hegelianism and German Romantic philosophy as it did from Darwin. But those who took up Dewey's themes soon dropped the metaphysical trappings and simply looked at the person as an animal whose organs performed certain functions enabling it to survive and reproduce. The mind was one of those organs, and by turning to functions they began to think of psychology as dealing with behavior and not just what could be grasped by our inner consciousness.

The functionalists were not yet behaviorist, but they did make behavior a central part of psychology, and it was not long before the next generation of psychologists became simply behaviorists. They were led by John B. Watson,[10] who was many things besides a behaviorist. He favored classical conditioning over re-inforcement – the latter seemed too close to teleology and all the bad metaphysical theories of mind such as that which one could find, for example, in Dewey. He favored peripheral theories for bodily localization rather than central theories – it seemed easier to get rid of minds if the central nervous system played but a minor role in explaining behavior. But no one is now troubled by re-inforcement theories of learning: metaphysical teleology no longer is a worry for psychologists. As for the issue of peripheral vs. central theories, it too is no longer an issue: with cognitive science the balance has shifted to the central nervous system, but in general psychologists simply take it to be a matter of fact that functions have their bodily

locations. Above all, Watson was a metaphysical behaviorist – he simply denied that there are any conscious states. The latter theory is just silly, to use the felicitous expression of C.D. Broad.[11] Watson himself recognized the point when he argued on the one hand that there are no conscious states and on the other that they are to be identified with certain bodily states.[12]

Psychologists now for the most part do not deny conscious states; they simply ignore them, proceeding to study behavior and to explain it in the same sort of causal terms that are used to explain the behavior of stones or trees. Psychologists are now simply methodological behaviorists: psychology has become an objective science, methodologically the same as any other science.[13] To be sure, there is nothing particularly non-scientific about introspection. In principle the data obtained by introspection could be treated in straightforward scientific fashion.[14] What was non-scientific was the insistence that somehow by their nature conscious products escaped the same sort of causal analysis that applied to stones and trees. Scientific psychology had by the end of the century abandoned these mystical ideas. The point is not that behaviorism made psychology into a science but that it made it into an objective science. Psychology was already most of the way there; the parallelistic hypothesis had become common among late nineteenth-century introspectionists, and according to this there was always a physical state of the system parallel to any conscious state. Once this was granted, then there was no need to try to explain behavior in terms of mental states: the parallel physical state sufficed. In that sense, psychology was already prepared for methodological behaviorism.[15] We can therefore see that Watson, however important he was historically, made only a small step when he transformed psychology into an objective science of human behavior.

Bergmann[16] and Brunswik[17] both emphasize the close connection of Freud's work in psychology with that of the American functionalists.[18] Both also emphasize that methodologically there is a close fit, in principle at least, between the psychoanalytic approach to human behavior and that of the methodological behaviorists. It is clear that with its emphasis on the unconscious, psychoanalysis can hardly adopt the introspective methods of the older psychology. At the same time, however, psychoanalysis by the nature of what it is trying to do carries on some of the spirit of the older views, insofar as it must rely for much of its data upon verbal reports of dreams and of purposely uninhibited streams of ideas ("free association").

Brunswik notes how psychology had previously concentrated on sensation, or, what is the same, on peripheral processes. It was only with psychoanalysis that a determined attempt was made to investigate central processes (p. 714). At the same time, however, he criticizes psychoanalysis for its narrow view of functions. In particular, it focuses its attention on proximate effects, tending to ignore the importance of distal effects (p. 678, p. 715). The latter are for the most part social factors. Brunswik is thus criticizing Freud for not taking sufficiently into account social variables. Brunswik therein finds himself strangely allied with what Bergmann called the "nicifiers" such as Karen Horney, who wanted to de-emphasize the sexual in favor of the social. It is a strange criticism, however. As Ernest Jones once remarked, "It would not be a gross exaggeration to say that psycho-analysis is

essentially a detailed study of the relations between a child and his parents."[19] The social is thus hardly ignored by psychoanalysis. The point becomes even more evident when one realizes that the socialization of the child, the making of the child fit for society, takes place in the context of the family: it is through the parents that social values and social skills are passed on to future generations.

Bergmann makes a different point. He does not downplay the importance of functions. But functions are merely effects, and, in the case of minds, acquired effects.[20] What science aims at is *causal explanation*, where to speak of causes is to speak, as Ernest Jones had made clear, in Humean fashion, of regularities. Jones contrasts the older concept of causality with that of correlation or regularity. "Psychological science," he states, "any more than any other, cannot do without the latter concept, and in its postulate of orderly relationship subsisting between phenomena must therefore be as deterministic as the rest of science."[21] The ideal is to understand functions as originating within a causal context. Focusing on functions establishes the temptation to teleological thinking, and to the idea that to understand is to grasp the function. As Bergmann puts it, "The disadvantage inherited from the Darwinian outlook I see in the propensity to teleological thinking and in the tendency to take teleological patterns for scientific explanation."[22] This is a temptation to which Freud and the psychoanalysts too often succumbed, Bergmann argues. He cites in particular the so-called death wish or death instinct.[23] The end-point becomes a goal or terminus which in turn becomes explanatory. There is the same temptation in the Deweyan side of American functionalism. What is important from the viewpoint of explanation is not functions but rather the causes of those functions. This led the American functionalists almost directly, by way of Watson, into learning theory. This of course is the point of the slogan that psychology seeks "stimulus-response" relations.

It was Bergmann's argument that if one looked carefully at psychoanalytic theory, then there was nothing incompatible with that and learning theory in experimental psychology (p. 365ff). The first training of libidinal hungers occurs at an early stage of infancy, long before there is any significant development of language. But the process is complicated by the development of language, that is, by the development of the human symbolic apparatus (p. 367). The point is that symbols can in the case of humans start the same train of events as the thing symbolized: ideas are potent. The complexities of the human personality cannot be understood apart from the many roles language plays in learning. These are complexities far beyond the skills of the experimental psychologist to grasp – though in principle at least there is no reason to suppose that these complexities are not the cumulative result of rather simple learning processes.

At the same time, however, if one does want to come to grips with such complexities, if one does want to put them into some sort of causal story, then one must perforce work in ways that take for granted the complexities of the symbolic apparatus of language. This means, on the one hand, that the methods will hardly be those of the controlled experiment. Other means must be found to explore the

complexities. It means, on the other hand, that the theorizing will in fact and inevitably be relatively loose. In terms of theory, one could reasonably expect nothing much better than what Freud and the psychoanalysts have provided.

The verdict of the Vienna Circle, then, as represented by Bergmann and Brunswik, was that on the whole one should be prepared to accept the scientific claims of Freud. There were to be sure negative tendencies. In particular there was the tendency to lapse into the sort of teleological thinking that was characteristic of German Romantic philosophy. But those awkward details aside, they were prepared to accept the claim of psychoanalytic theory that it passed the verifiability test: one could take it for granted that it was reasonable to claim that it was scientific.[24]

II. Grünbaum

The great British psychologist Henry Maudsley[25] recognized the limits of introspectionist psychology.[26] As a psychiatrist he was clear that there are often unconscious forces at work in or on the human mind. He therefore proposed that one use the method Cuvier had developed in anatomy, the comparative method.[27] What he proposed comparing were the sane and the insane.[28] But in order to do this, one already has to have some method for exploring the mind of the non-normal person. The best that Maudsley could suggest was some retreat to physiology. But exactly how physiology was to do the job remained unclear indeed. It was a program, not a practical method for undertaking practical research.[29] In the end, he failed to provide a serious method of research for the non-normal.[30]

It was Freud's genius to have discovered a method for dealing with, if not the insane, then at least the non-normal.[31] It built on the fact that even the insane have a set of symbols: their language. Their symbols may not be normal; their language may be confused and confusing in many ways. But it is for all that language. As we look back on the history, the method is not all that surprising. Psychologists had used the method of association to investigate sensory phenomena. This method involved the mind attending to associations connected to a stimulus and inferring from these the genetic antecedents of conscious events. The theory goes back to practices recorded by Aristotle.[32] Orators had learned about association and had used the technique to help them in remembering the topics they wished to present in their speeches. Aristotle recorded this knowledge in his three laws of association. With Hobbes and Locke these laws were recalled in the seventeenth century, and they became a central part of psychological theory, of learning theory specifically, a place which they retain to this day.[33]

Like King John, we all have our little ways.[34] Often enough, more often than we perhaps like, there are thoughts and impulses that force their way into our consciousness; often enough, more often than we perhaps like, there are actions and behavior that impose themselves upon us. This is true of all of us. Most of these little ways can safely be ignored, passed off as simply slips or accidents. But at times and for some people they become crippling. These are our psychoneuroses. Philosophers have recognized that if we are to talk of free will then we must acknowledge that there are what can be called second order desires, desires about

our own desires. The point about our psychoneurotic thoughts and impulses is that these are for the most part things that we do not desire. We do not want them yet they impose themselves upon us. It is my thought, my impulse, my action, yet it is not mine and not wanted.[35]

Because these thoughts are not wanted, we ignore them: they are not ours, we say. Psychology in particular ignored them. This was not merely because it had difficulty dealing with the higher or central processes. They were not even included in the "in principle" sketches of psychological theory. Slips were slips, and did not need to be accounted for. Even Maudsley, for all his success in treating the mentally ill, simply ignores these little ways. But they are in fact part of our mental life, part of human behavior. They too, on the very principles traditional psychologists were using, ought to be thought of as having causes. But when slips become incapacitating, they need to be recognized. His training as a physician sensitized Freud to these cases. His training as a scientist made him search for causes. His humanity led him to seek a way to free people from these slips, these little ways that impose themselves upon us.

It is not possible simply to forbid these thoughts, impulses, and actions. Freud in fact tried this route. Following Breuer he tried using hypnosis. The patient was put under hypnosis and the physician directed the patient to in effect remember earlier experiences that seemed to lie behind the symptoms. Upon remembering them the patient would cathartically re-experience them. The symptom would disappear. In effect, the use of hypnotic suggestion amounted to the physician instructing the patient to stop having those little ways. The little ways did indeed stop. Unfortunately, it was only for a while, or only to be replaced by another little way.

The aim is to make the patient free, that is, free in the sense of being in charge of his or her own thoughts and impulses. The method of forbidding does not work. And Freud came to understand why it does not work: it fails to uncover the causes. We all smile when we hear tales of William Ewart Gladstone, while he was Queen Victoria's Prime Minister, taking prostitutes from the East End of London to Downing Street and giving them scripture-based lessons in the expectation of reforming them. He had little effect. Forbidding prostitution is not effective, and neither is making suggestions or giving instructions. One must get to the causes, and only if one seizes control of them will one eliminate the problem. It is the same with our little ways: it is necessary to seize control of the causes, and only then will one be able to free oneself of the problem.

It was with this aim in view that Freud went from hypnosis to the method of free association and dream analysis.[36] The method of free association proceeds as psychologists had traditionally proceeded, by recording the associations that occurred when a certain stimulus was produced. Traditionally, however, the stimulus was controlled – the primary concern was sensory processes. Moreover, the response was also controlled. Details are not important: the point is that the method involved constrained associations.[37] Freud used the same method but with no constraints.[38] The patient was purposely instructed simply to report the ideas that

came to mind, and by looking at these ideas one could come to an understanding of the associations that had become established in the patient's mind.[39]

The injunction of the Delphic Oracle was to "Know Thyself." This was the aim of Freud's method. It was to discover the patterns of causation that were at work in the patient. And it was not simply a matter of the physician coming to know these patterns. It was rather the patient, him- or herself, coming to know these patterns. Nor was the aim simply intellectual. The aim rather was to give the patient the knowledge that he or she needed to become a person who is free, in control of him- or herself. If you know yourself, that is, know yourself in a practical way, then it is you who will be in charge.

Freud's basic argument was that his method did put the person in control of him- or herself. In Freud's later terminology, it is the ego that is the center of consciousness, the surveyor of reality that provides the knowledge of how best the instinctual urges might be satisfied. The instinctual urges themselves he refers to as the id. It is here that one finds the mental energy that moves us to act. Much of the id is beyond consciousness, and some of the urges of the id lie unsatisfied, repressed by the ego at an early stage of life because they are found by the ego to be unacceptable: so dangerous are they that they must be repressed. But they will have their way, one way or another. It is these repressed instinctual urges that are the roots of psychoneurotic ideas and impulses. The ego strenuously attempts to deny the existence of these urges, but in vain: if they cannot be satisfied directly, then they will be satisfied indirectly. These dangerous impulses have to do with the child's relations with his or her parents. In therapy, the patient-therapist relationship mimics in many respects the parent-child relationship. This is the phenomenon known as transference.[40] The similarities enable the associative mechanisms to work, and the patient begins to recall the experiences and the impulses that he or she has been forbidding him- or herself to remember. The patient begins to recognize the causes of those ideas and impulses that are found to come quite involuntarily into one's consciousness: one begins to understand the real causes, deep in the past, of one's little ways. He or she also becomes aware of the forces that are leading him or her to resist acknowledging these events even as events let alone causes. The analyst may make suggestions as to the relationships that are present – his or her experience will provide many plausible hypotheses. But there is only one test as to which are the correct hypotheses. It is not simply that the patient finds them acceptable. It is that in coming to know them the patient acquires self-understanding, the knowledge of him- or herself that is required to put him or her in control, that is, in control of him- or herself, that is, in *conscious* control of him- or herself. The most frequent outcome is one in which "*Repression* is replaced by a *condemning judgement* carried out along the best lines." A second sort of outcome is sublimation, the re-direction of the impulse to some culturally approved end. On this outcome, it becomes possible for "the unconscious instincts revealed by [analysis] to be employed for the useful purposes which they would have found earlier if development had not been interrupted." Then there is the third possible outcome, the actual satisfaction of the libidinal impulse. As Freud noted, "A certain portion of the repressed libidinal impulses has a claim to direct satisfaction and ought to find it in

life."[41] Whichever outcome the ego allows, the libidinal energy receives a release which the ego approves. No longer must there be a release which intrudes in unwelcome fashion on the territory of the ego: the ego is now in control. As Freud put it, "Psycho-analysis is an instrument to enable the ego to achieve a progressive conquest of the id."[42] Where *id* was, there *ego* shall be.

It is in this sense that one must understand Freud's remark that the test of truth for any hypothesis about the causes of the patient's psychoneurotic behavior must be that it "tallies" with his or her thoughts and behavior. Freud puts it this way: "[the patient's] conflicts will only be successfully solved and his [or her] resistances overcome if the anticipatory ideas he [or she] is given tally with what is real in him [or her]."[43]

Adolf Grünbaum, in his work on *The Foundations of Psychoanalysis*,[44] has argued carefully the thesis of Bergmann and Brunswik that psychoanalytic theory fits the notion of science defended by the Vienna Circle. He defends the scientific nature of the theory on the one hand against those such as Habermas and Ricoeur who want to place Freud's thought in the anti-scientific stream deriving from German Romantic philosophy which insists upon the idea that the study of human behavior requires a method radically different in kind from the method that science uses to study stones and trees. And then, on the other hand, he also defends the scientific status of psychoanalysis against the claims of Popper and others that it cannot be scientific because it is not falsifiable. On Grünbaum's reading, Freudian theory is falsifiable and the method that Freud attempts to use to justify his claims is of a piece with the methods of physics and biology.

At the same time, however, Grünbaum also argues that the specific psychoanalytic method provides no foundation for the theoretical claims. It is science but not good science: it is science without foundations. Indeed, his suggestion is that not only does the theory lack foundations but that there are counterexamples to its claims. It may be falsifiable, but it is also falsified. The theory is in this respect like astrology. Since Freud bases his claims for the theory on the fact that it has had success in the therapeutic context, Grünbaum concentrates on this argument. This is the claim that the theory is supported because the hypotheses located by the theory in fact "tally," to use Freud's term, with what the patient discovers within him- or herself. Grünbaum (p. 138) quotes Freud on this point, about how hypotheses must tally with the experience of the analysand, but argues that Freud provides no grounds for accepting the claim that the hypotheses do so tally. On the contrary, since there are many cases in which psychoneurotic symptoms undergo spontaneous remission (p. 160), there are no grounds to think that the hypotheses finally accepted by the analysand are anything more than mere suggestions of the analyst.

But, does this really touch the claim made in Freud's "tally argument"? This argument is to the effect that the psychoanalytic hypotheses are necessary to effect a cure. What, however, is a cure? A cure, as we have seen, is not the mere absence of the symptom. It is rather a matter of the patient coming to be in control over his or

her ideas and impulses, becoming free from the imposition of unwanted things on his or her consciousness or behavior. A "cure" in this sense could never be anymore than partial, a fact that Freud recognized. But in the context of Grünbaum's argument, the point is that spontaneous remission by itself does not count as a cure. Breuer's use of hypnosis could free the patient of a symptom. It aimed at helping the person recall the event or events that had caused the symptom, and cathartically re-live the experience to eliminate the forces that were otherwise finding their outlet as it were in the symptom. But this method by-passed the forces that normally prevented the recalling of the crucial event or events. It bypassed, in other words, the resistances, the forces that were blocking the recall. But these forces, too, are part of the problem. Since the method of hypnosis did not deal with these factors, it could not effect a cure, it could not free the patient, and put him or her in control. Nor does the fact that other therapeutic methods also have success in eliminating psychoneurotic symptoms (p. 161) tell against Freud's claim. On the one hand, it is to be expected on psychoanalytic principles that such will occur: just as a sympathetic listener will do a world of wonders, so can aversion therapy. However, this does not mean that the patient is cured in the sense of being genuinely free; it does not mean that the ego is now in control. On the other hand, if these therapies really do uncover the causes of the psychoneurotic thoughts, impulses and behavior, then why ought that to tell against the psychoanalytic theories? It tells against those theories only if there is disagreement in the assigning of causes. That different therapies are equally successful does not by itself imply that those therapies disagree as to the nature of the causes, the knowledge of which will enable the ego – the person – to take full, or at least fuller, control of his or her own life.

I conclude that Grünbaum's argument that Freud has not vindicated his theories is not successful. To be sure, not all aspects of psychoanalytic theorizing are reasonable; Bergmann and Brunswik had already made this point. But much of the psychoanalytic theorizing is scientific in terms acceptable to the Vienna Circle, at least within the limits imposed by the difficulty of the material: human beings after all, and to repeat, are very complex creatures. The point here is that not only does it pass the test of being an empirical or testable theory but that it is well founded in the facts. There are data that support the theory. These data come from the cures that have been effected by the methods that emerged from Freud's struggle to help people free themselves from aspects of themselves that they did not want. These data are not merely the remission or disappearance of psychoneurotic symptoms; the data consist in the fact that as a result of psychoanalytic therapy patients do come to be in control of themselves, do, in other words, become free – not, to be sure, fully free, but freer, much freer, than they were. Ask them.

– B –

Freud's theories are, I think we can safely say, both empirical and soundly based. In his insistence that our little ways, our slips of the tongue, our dreams, all have causes that need explaining, his work was of a piece with that of Maudsley, though deeper and more comprehensive. Where he went beyond others such as Maudsley was in discovering a tool to explore the causal structure of those little ways. But Freud also went beyond people like Maudsley in his humanity. Unlike Maudsley, he did not attribute the ills of the son to the fact that the father had masturbated.[45] We have seen the three ways in which repressed impulses might express themselves once they are brought under the conscious control of the patient. They might be consciously repressed, they might be allowed to sublimate into wants with more culturally acceptable objects, or they might simply be satisfied. Freud showed that indeed many of the prohibitions that late nineteenth century society imposed on people were in fact pointless, that there were no problems to be found in allowing many of these impulses to be satisfied, and, even more importantly, that repressing them could in fact be dangerous, both to the individual and to society. In this respect, Freud represented in another way the freeing of human beings from unreasonable shackles.

What Freud was arguing is that, in itself, there is nothing wrong with pleasure, and if it can be obtained without harm to oneself and others then there is no reason not to accept it. The idealists had denied the importance of pleasure. "What Act of Legislature was there that *thou* shouldst be Happy?" Carlyle asked,[46] and rejected utilitarianism, or, more generally, Epicureanism. This he did in the name of the higher self, which was held to impose a variety of higher obligations which might well conflict with utility and require the denial of pleasure. Kant could think of few sins more troubling than masturbation. We can smile at that, and use it to provide our undergraduates with something else at which to smirk. But people at one time did in fact take that sort of thing seriously: witness Maudsley. If we are now free from those shackles, then it is due in part to Freud, but not Freud alone. Freud as a humanist was part of the tradition deriving from the Enlightenment, aiming to free humankind from the chains of superstition and to provide through science rather than metaphysics and theology the tools that could be used to improve the human lot. The Vienna Circle was part of that same tradition.

Moritz Schlick, who, while he lived, was the center of the Circle, wrote on ethics. His little book on *The Problems of Ethics* is exemplary.[47] He argued that the primary motivators were the pleasantness and unpleasantness of our feelings.[48] Otto Neurath, too, was another major figure in the Circle who also looked to Epicurus to provide the basic framework for ethics.[49] Like Neurath, Schlick rejected the whole idea that ethical principles somehow find their basis in a self that is outside the world of ordinary experience. Like Neurath, he accepted the basic premise of Epicureanism, that human beings aim at pleasure, and he rejected the romantic ideal expressed by Carlyle that there are duties which demand that we forgo pleasure,

duties which demand that we live up to standards in a way that denies us the pleasures of this world.

John Stuart Mill had argued,[50] no doubt with the example of Carlyle in mind, that pleasure or happiness was the test of morality because pleasure was not only one of the ends that people seek but the only end.[51] This, he emphasized, was not to say that people did not seek things other than pleasure. On the contrary, there are many ends that humans have, and to aim simply at pleasure almost certainly ensures that it will not be attained. But those things at which humans do aim are *pleasurable*; as Mill put it, they are sought as "parts" of pleasure. Such things are first sought as means to pleasure, and then they come through association to be in themselves pleasant. And so Mill argues on the basis of these psychological principles that people not only do but must seek pleasure: that is just the way they are.[52] However, since they must seek pleasure, it is unreasonable to propose duties of the sort that Carlyle clearly had in mind that would require them to seek some end contrary to that of pleasure. There may be no Act of the Legislature that makes it obligatory that people seek pleasure, but for all that it is true that they *must* seek pleasure.[53] This fact delimits the range of things that could be our duties. Since people are going to seek to maximize their pleasure, what one is going to count as worthy of pursuit, what one is going to count as one's duty, has to be something that will produce that effect. We need an ethics, then, which is an ethics without renunciation.[54]

This was Mill's argument. It in fact goes back as far as Epicurus himself. Schlick does not quite understand Mill on this point; he takes more seriously than one should G.E. Moore's criticism of the inference from "desired" to "desirable." But in his own argument, Schlick adopts the Epicurean position, that what is sought is sought because it is pleasant, that nothing is sought that is not pleasant, and that the task of ethics is to find those things that can as a matter of fact bring about a maximization of pleasure. Schlick's view was that a liberal state, with a minimum of government, would best serve these interests. Neurath thought it better to wed Marx and Epicurus: he argued that one could best achieve the greatest happiness in a society with a planned economy and that Marxist theory pointed the way to such an economic order.[55] These differences are, from the philosophical point of view, differences in detail, mere matters of fact – though of course from the perspective of political action they make a world of difference.

But what of the heroes of whom Carlyle made so much? John Stuart Mill pointed out the problem with reference to St. Simon Stylites.[56] It was a case that showed what people can do, but, surely, he argued, it was not a case that showed what they ought to do. St. Simon could do what he did atop his pillar because in fact he took joy in the idea that he would, by virtue of his being high up there in the air of Asia Minor, be the first to see the Lord upon his second coming. It was Mill's argument that through a process of association, Simon came to feel pleasure in that thought. Schlick makes much the same point: the hero who sacrifices him- or herself for the cause, Carlyle's hero, who forsakes pleasure for duty, does in fact take joy in knowing that he or she is doing what is required.[57]

The problem is that all this just does not ring true. Carlyle is a better psychologist than Mill or Schlick. There is an important sense in which the hero, whether it is Simon or a member of the Hitler SS killing squads, does not take joy in what he or she is doing: it is duty, not pleasure. Duty is the forsaking of pleasure. Whatever Schlick says, it does involve renunciation. Neither Mill nor Schlick make plausible how it is that human beings can find joy in renunciation.

It is Freud's contribution to psychology to reveal the mechanisms by which this happens. It is also his contribution to the enlightenment project. Hume and Mill both knew Calvinism. Both knew the sorts of self-flagellation that Calvinism could produce when one did not live up to the impossible standards that Christian faith required of one. But the psychological theories, which they developed, simply did not provide any plausible explanatory sketch of how the joyless pursuit of duty is possible, or how it is that one can punish oneself for taking pleasure in simple and harmless things like masturbation. Freud provided us with a theory that makes understandable how people can be this way, how they can cripple themselves with guilt, on the one hand, and how they can become intolerant and vicious political and religious fanatics on the other.

None of this challenges the Epicurean argument that pleasure is the standard of duty since we all, of necessity, seek pleasure. But it does enable us to understand how for some people their little ways can include self-mutilation or the burning of others at the stake. We can now understand how it is that being human includes being nasty. If we read Hume or Mill, what we find is a portrait of human beings all of whom are basically decent, good members of the club. They, and thinkers like them, knew that there were counter-examples, from Calvinists to Inquisitors, or, in our own day, to Nazis. But their psychology lacked the resources to account for the deep and evil side of human beings. For better or for worse, but mostly for better, Freud provided the psychological theory that was required. It was a liberating theory. As Thomas Mann put it in his lecture celebrating Freud's eightieth birthday, "on every page he [i.e., Freud] seems to instruct us that there is no deeper knowledge without experience of disease, and that all heightened healthiness must be achieved by the route of illness"; it is through the route of illness that "we have succeeded in penetrating most deeply into the darkness of human nature."[58]

We have so penetrated into the dark side: that is what the methods of psychoanalysis for the first time permitted. In that respect Freud helped further the enlightenment project that he shared with Schlick and the Vienna Circle. Indeed, it was the project of the Delphic Oracle, "Know thyself." But it provided not only understanding but also relief. Freud showed the way out of self imposed human suffering, whether it be the suffering imposed on oneself by the Calvinist or the suffering imposed on others by the religious or political enthusiast. Psychoanalysis provided the tools through which human beings could become masters of themselves and could locate within themselves a way of taking joy in things without having to suffer or without having to make others suffer.

– C –

Carnap was confident. When he wrote in 1928 his book on *The Logical Structure of the World*,[59] what he was attempting was a picture of reality as it is and as it presents itself to us, without the illusions of metaphysics. The "Preface" is important. "This requirement," he tells us in reference to the requirement enjoined upon science by the Vienna Circle "for justification and conclusive foundation of each thesis will eliminate all speculative and poetic work from philosophy" (p. xvii). This project, the elimination of metaphysics and poetry from philosophy, was the enlightenment project. This is not to say that there is no role for the emotions: of course there is. Carnap puts it this way: "The practical handling of philosophical problems and the discovery of their solutions does not have to be purely intellectual, but will always contain emotional elements and intuitive methods." However, as he then adds: "The *justification* [...] has to take place before the forum of the understanding; here we must not refer to our intuition of emotional needs." The work of the Vienna Circle is part of a broader movement. While the irrational forces of religion and metaphysics are both present and, alas, active, nonetheless, Carnap tells his readers,

> We feel that there is an inner kinship between the attitude on which our philosophical work is founded and the intellectual attitude which presently [i.e., 1928] manifests itself in entirely different walks of life; we feel this orientation in artistic movements, especially in architecture, and in movements which strive for meaningful forms of personal and collective life, of education, and of external organization in general. We feel all around us the same basic orientation, the same style of thinking and doing. (p. xviii)

Carnap goes on:

> It is an orientation which demands clarity everywhere, but which realizes that the fabric of life can never quite be comprehended. (p. xviii)

We all have our little ways. But there is no reason to think that in the broad outlines at least we are doomed to failure in our attempts to use science not only for self-understanding but for relief from our suffering. The orientation of the Vienna Circle

> makes us pay careful attention to detail and at the same time recognizes the great lines which run through the whole. It is an orientation which acknowledges the bonds that tie men together, but at the same time strives for free development of the individual. (p. xviii)

The aims of the Vienna Circle are those of Freud: the freedom of the individual from the bondage of illusion and of the constraints that we impose on ourselves and others through those illusions of religion and metaphysics. Carnap is hopeful: "Our work is carried by the faith that this attitude will win the future" (p. xviii). It was more hope than history would justify.[60]

The issues, however, are not just social, they are also personal. As Carnap explains about the philosophers in the Vienna Circle:

> We too have "emotional needs " in philosophy, but they are filled by clarity of concepts, precision of methods, responsible theses, achievement through cooperation in which each individual plays his part. (p. xvii)

We are moved by our cognitive interests. These interests are ends in themselves. But the satisfaction of these interests is also a means. The criticisms of traditional metaphysics and religion that come through clarity are a means to social justice and harmony.[61]

Hume expressed this important point in his own way: "Reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions."[62] It *is* the slave of the passions in the sense that the love of truth, which reason attempts to satisfy, is itself a passion. It *ought* to be the slave of the passions for the reason that when it makes pretense of coming to know things and more specifically duties that come from beyond the world of ordinary experience, then the result is *dangerous*.

Nietzsche[63] ridiculed the love of truth as a motive for philosophers.[64] They were in fact moved by such things as the need to secure a university chair. But mostly his argument was, on the one hand, the positivist idea that transcendental metaphysics is illusion and, on the other, the idea that these illusions were disguised wishes, the aim of which was to enchain humankind with ostensibly objective duties.[65] These duties were not, when it came down to justification, rules that enabled people to live together, though they are that. The will to power is the will to command others. One commands others in the enterprise of satisfying one's own instinctual urges. One commands them not personally but through the illusion of objective duties. German Romantic metaphysics provided the rationale once the illusions of religion had lost their force. Somehow, these metaphysicians said, there is beyond the world of ordinary experience an objective self or being that commands us.

Nietzsche's program was of a piece with that of the British empiricists. He found his basic ideas in Friedrich Lange's *History of Materialism*.[66] Lange restated the Humean position that what we know we know by sense and that there is nothing in things that is beyond that way of knowing.[67] Nietzsche accepts by way of Lange Hume's argument that there is no self beyond the empirical self, that there is no reality beyond sensible reality, and that this world including humankind as a part of it can be explored under the guidance of the principle that whatever happens has a natural cause, a cause that can be found in the world of ordinary experience. Nietzsche's *Genealogy of Morals*[68] echoes Hume's *Natural History of Religion*:[69] both are part of the enlightenment enterprise of freeing humankind from illusion. To be sure, there are differences. For both, religion is an illusion. But Hume locates the roots of the religious illusion in fears raised by the terrors that confront us from the natural world: God is the means to help us psychologically confront the dread raised by the unknown forces of nature. Nietzsche, in contrast, begins with a natural history of morals. He contrasts the ethics of self-fulfilment of the ancient world and the ethics of renunciation of the modern world;[70] it is the *ressentiment* of the persons who are not successful under the former that leads to development of the latter.[71] It

is in *ressentiment* that one finds the psychological origin of our ordinary concept of justice.[72] With this concept goes the concept of punishment,[73] and with that in turn comes the phenomenon of conscience and guilt – self-punishment[74]: "thus began the gravest and uncanniest illness, from which humanity has not yet recovered, man's suffering *of man*, *of himself* ..."[75] Out of this illness of bad conscience comes the concept of supernatural forces that will enforce the rules of justice, first the ancestors, and these as transmuted into gods: "in the end the ancestor must necessarily be transfigured into a *god*. Perhaps this is even the origin of gods, an origin therefore out of *fear!*"[76] And the gods come, again through fear, to be magnified into the one God.[77] Where Hume has the origins of the gods in a fear of nature, Nietzsche locates the origins in the fear of oneself: God is the dispenser and enforcer of the rules of justice, the *self-imposed* rules of justice. It is these sorts of psychological forces that Freud was to explore. In Nietzsche, as in Hume, the causal story is speculative. Freud provides a causal account of this sort of illusion that is rooted in the scientific picture of humankind provided by psychoanalysis. Hume, Nietzsche, and Freud are all part of the developing enlightenment project of freeing humankind from illusion and from the unreasonable self-imposed constraints demanded by such illusions.[78] We have to see the program of the Vienna Circle, so well expressed by Carnap, in just this same context of the enlightenment program of making humankind free.

It has become a commonplace to locate the Vienna Circle, Carnap at least, within a neo-Kantian framework.[79] After all, had not Carnap studied with them as well as with Frege? This means that one locates the Vienna Circle in the framework that includes Lange and also Nietzsche: all defend and pursue the enlightenment project. Where Nietzsche goes beyond the Vienna Circle is in going back to Hume and offering not only a critique of religion and morality but also a causal story about how these illusions arise and about the interests they serve.

But for Nietzsche, as for Hume, it is only a story: there is no background method beyond the literary to support the claims about the psychological origins of the power that these illusions have over humankind. The requirement of the Vienna Circle for the clarity that comes from the demand for empirical truth goes only so far. One wants also to control oneself, to so control oneself that no longer is it these illusions that are in charge. In order to seize control one needs more than a story, one needs to "know thyself" in the sense that one has the causal knowledge about one's own self that puts one in control of how one thinks and feels and behaves. The positivist critique will not by itself do that. Neither will the insights of literary critics, not even if they are Nietzsche. What one needs is a real method that enables one to gain control of oneself. It was Freud who gave us this method. This was the central human achievement of the twentieth century: for the first time genuine self-understanding really was possible. It was only with this that the enlightenment project of the Vienna Circle could be realized.

There were not only personal relationships between the Freudians in Vienna and the Circle that Schlick gathered about himself. Deeper than that there was the shared project of furthering the enlightenment. Neurath recognized the significance of Freud in this project. Nothing, however, not even Freud's insights into the dark side of

human nature, not even the insights of the Nietzsche and the Vienna Circle into the irrationality of religion and German Romantic philosophy – nothing had prepared anybody for the horrors that were to come. Maybe in the end the human condition is beyond comprehension. That is not something that Freud would have said. Neither would Neurath have said that. It might just the same be true … unfortunately.

[1] Gustav Bergmann, "Memories of the Vienna Circle: Letter to Otto Neurath [1938]," in Friedrich Stadler, ed., *Scientific Philosophy: Origins and Developments*, Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer, 1993, pp. 193-208.

[2] Arne Naess, "Logical Empiricism and the Uniqueness of the Schlick Seminar: A Personal Experience with Consequences," in Stadler, ed., *Scientific Philosophy*, pp. 11-25.

[3] Naess was himself going through an intensive psychoanalysis at the time he was attending meetings of the Circle (*ibid*., p. 14).

[4] He told me the story when I was a doctoral student writing a dissertation under his supervision.

[5] The manifesto of the Vienna Circle has recently been re-published and translated; see H. Hahn, O. Neurath and R. Carnap, "Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung: Der Wiener Kreis" ("The Scientific Conception of the World: The Vienna Circle"), in O. Neurath, *Empiricism and Sociology*, ed. M. Neurath and R. S. Cohen, Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer, 1973, pp. 299-318. A careful reading of this document shows that many of the commonly held views about logical positivism are false. For example, the manifesto nowhere commits a logical positivist to a foundationist account of knowledge.

[6] The original plan was for Naess to co-author this monograph, but that proposal was later abandoned; see Naess, "Logical Empiricism and the Uniqueness of the Schlick Seminar," p. 20.

[7] It should be noted that alone among the positivists who came to the United States, Bergmann had an impact on the actual development of psychological theory and research. This was through his association with K.W. Spence at the University of Iowa. On the details of this relationship and its importance, see Laurence D. Smith, *Behaviorism and Logical Positivism*, Stanford: Stanford UP, 1986; for the Bergmann-Spence relation, see p. 208ff.

[8] On all these things, see E.G. Boring, *A History of Experimental Psychology*, second edition, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1957, Ch. 22.

[9] John Dewey, "The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology," *Psychological Review* 3 (1896), pp. 357-370.

[10] See Gustav Bergmann, "The Contribution of John B. Watson," *Psychological Review* 63 (1956), pp. 265-276.

[11] C.D. Broad, *The Mind and Its Place in Nature*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1925, p. 6, p. 623.

[12] John B. Watson, "Image and Affection in Behavior," *Journal of Philosophy* 10 (1913), pp. 421-428. On the one hand he asserts that there are no images, and cites as evidence that claimed fact of "the failure on the part of the most earnest upholders of the doctrine of centrally aroused sensation to obtain any objective experimental evidence of the presences of different type-images. I refer to the researches of Angell and of Fernald" (p. 422). On the other hand, he also proposes that between the stimulus and a delayed response in explicit

behavior there must be a piece of "implicit behavior"; it is this with which the image is identified. "There are no centrally initiated processes," Watson claims (p. 423), and he suggests that "it is this type of implicit behavior that the introspectionist claims as his own and denies to us because its neural seat is cortical and because it goes on without adequate bodily portrayal" (p. 424). So they do not exist but are, rather, implicit responses in the periphery of the nervous system. Angell, by the way, disputed Watson's citing his work as an authority for all this; see James B. Angell, "Professor Watson and the Image," *Journal of Philosophy* 10 (1913), p. 609.

[13] On the distinction between various sorts of behaviorism, see Bergmann, "The Contribution of John B. Watson."

[14] See F. Wilson, "Some Controversies about Method in Nineteenth-Century Psychology," *Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Science* 30 (1999), pp. 91-127.

[15] See F. Wilson, *Psychological Analysis and the Philosophy of John Stuart Mill*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990, Ch. 8.

[16] G. Bergmann, "Psychoanalysis and Experimental Psychology" *Mind*, n.s. 52 (1943), pp. 122-140; reprinted in M. Marx, ed., *Psychological Theory*, New York: Macmillan, 1951. Page references are to the latter.

[17] E. Brunswik, *The Conceptual Framework of Psychology*, in O. Neurath, R. Carnap and C. Morris, eds., *International Encyclopedia of Unified Science*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955. The various monographs collected in this combined edition were all originally published separately. Brunswik's monograph came out in this form in 1938. References are to the combined edition.

[18] Bergmann, "Psychoanalysis and Experimental Psychology," p. 353ff [see endnote 16]; Brunswik, *The Conceptual Framework of Psychology*, p. 713ff.

[19] Ernest Jones, "Rationalism and Psychoanalysis," in his *Essays in Applied Psychoanalysis*, vol. II, New York: International Universities Press, 1964, p. 233.

[20] Bergmann, "Psychoanalysis and Experimental Psychology," p. 355.

[21] Ernest Jones, "Free Will and Determinism," in his *Essays in Applied Psychoanalysis*, vol. II, New York: International Universities Press, 1964, p. 186.

[22] Bergmann, "Psychoanalysis and Experimental Psychology," p. 355.

[23] *Ibid*., p. 358.

[24] Another member of the Vienna Circle who took psychoanalysis seriously was Herbert Feigl. Though he never presented an extended examination of the theories or methods of Freud, he did state that

> There is little doubt in my mind that psychoanalytic theory (or at least some of its components) has genuine explanatory power, even if any precise identification of the repression, ego, superego, id, etc., with neural processes and structures is still a very long way off. I am not in the least disputing the value of theories whose basic concepts are not in any way micro-specified. What I am arguing is that even *before* such specifications become possible, the meaning of scientific terms can be explicated by postulates and correspondence rules [...] and that this meaning may later be greatly enriched, i.e. much more fully specified, by the addition of *further* postulates and correspondence rules.
>
> After recovery from radical behaviorism and operationism, we need no longer hesitate to distinguish between *evidence* and *reference*, i.e. between manifestations or symptoms on the one hand, and central states on the other, no matter whether or not central states are micro-specified (neurophysiologically identified).

From: H. Feigl, "The 'Mental' and the 'Physical'," in H. Feigl, M. Scriven, and G. Maxwell, eds., *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, vol. II, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958, pp. 370-497, here: pp. 394-95. This opinion was expressed long after the demise of the Circle, but there is little doubt that this was also his view back when the Circle was having its meetings.

[25] On Maudsley, see T.H. Turner, "Maudsley, Henry," *Dictionary of National Biography: Missing Persons*, Oxford: Oxford UP, 1993, p. 453f.

[26] Cf. Henry Maudsley, *Physiology and Pathology of the Mind*, London: Macmillan, 1867; and Henry Maudsley, *Body and Mind*, London: Macmillan, 1873.

[27] See Georges Cuvier, "Letter to J.C. Mertrud," in his *Lectures on Comparative Anatomy*, trans. W. Ross, London: T.N. Longman and O. Rees, 1802, vol. I, pp. xix-xl.

[28] Maudsley, *Physiology and Pathology of the Mind*, p. 24.

[29] Maudsley's part in the methodological debates has been examined in Wilson, "Some Controversies about Method in Nineteenth-Century Psychology" [see endnote 14]. On these issues, see also F. Wilson, "Mill and Comte on the Method of Introspection," *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences* 27 (1991), pp. 107-129.

[30] Cf. Wilson, "Some Controversies about Method in Nineteenth-Century Psychology," p. 125f [see endnote 14].

[31] Cf. S. Freud, "The Technique of Psychoanalysis," Ch. VI of *An Outline of Psycho-analysis*, in his *Historical and Expository Works on Psycho-analysis*, trans. J. Strachey, London: Penguin, 1993, pp. 405-416.

[32] Aristotle, *On Memory*, trans. J.I. Beare, in J. Barnes, ed., *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, vol. I, revised Oxford translation, Princeton: Princeton UP, 1984, pp. 714-721, 451b,17-22.

[33] Cf. F. Wilson, *Psychological Analysis and the Philosophy of John Stuart Mill*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990, Ch. 1 and Ch. 8.

[34] A.A. Milne, *Now We Are Six*: "King John was not a good man – / He had his little ways" (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1927, p. 2).

[35] See Nietzsche's comment that "[W]ith regard to the superstitions of logicians, I shall never tire of emphasising a small, terse fact, which is unwillingly recognised by these credulous minds – namely, that a thought comes when 'it' wishes, and not when 'I' wish; so that it is a *perversion* of the facts of the case to say that the subject 'I' is the condition of the predicate 'think'" (Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, trans. Helen Zimmern, fourth edition, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1923, Ch. 1, § 17, p. 24).

[36] See S. Freud, *Five Lectures in Psycho-analysis* [1910], trans. J. Strachey, in *Two Short Accounts of Psycho-analysis*, London: Penguin, 1991; see the First and Second Lectures.

[37] For details on how this fits into the standard scientific methodology of empirical science, see Wilson, *Psychological Analysis and the Philosophy of John Stuart Mill*, Ch. 3 and Ch. 8 [see endnote 15]; and "Some Controversies about Method in Nineteenth-Century Psychology" [see endnote 14].

[38] On the difference between free and constrained or controlled introspective analysis, see E.B. Titchener, "The Schema of Introspection," *American Journal of Psychology* 23 (1912), pp. 485-508, here: p. 490ff; see also his "Prolegomena to a Study of Introspection," *American Journal of Psychology* 23 (1912), pp. 427-448. In the former Titchener refers to G.E. Müller, *Zur Analyse der Gedächtnistätigkeit und des Vorstellungsverlaufes*, I. Teil, in *Zeitschrift für Psychologie*. *Ergänzungsband* 5, Leipzig: Verlag von Johan Ambrosius Barth, 1911, p. 73, p. 79, p. 95, p. 98f, p. 120. As J.W. Baird states in his review of Müller's extended study, the "presentation is marred at times by an unfortunate tendency toward

prolixity of statement" (*Psychological Bulletin* 15 (1916), pp. 372-375, here: p. 375).

[39] See Freud, "The Technique of Psycho-analysis" [see endnote 11]: "With the neurotics, then, we make our pact: complete candour on one side and strict discretion on the other" (p. 407).

[40] S. Freud, "Transference," Lecture 27 of his *Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis*, [1915-1917], trans. J. Strachey, London: Penguin, 1991, pp. 482-500.

[41] Freud, *Five Lectures on Psycho-analysis*, p. 86 [see endnote 36].

[42] S. Freud, *The Ego and the Id*, trans. J. Riviere, New York: Norton, 1960, p. 46.

[43] S. Freud, "Analytic Therapy," Lecture 28 of his *Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis*, pp. 501-517, here: p. 505.

[44] A. Grünbaum, *The Foundations of Psychoanalysis*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984.

[45] For the hereditary nature of mental illness, see H. Maudsley, "Illustrations of a Variety of Insanity," *Journal of Mental Science* 14 (1868), pp. 149-162; for masturbation, see his "Insanity and Its Treatment," *Journal of Mental Science* 17 (1871), pp. 311-334, at p. 325.

[46] Thomas Carlyle, *Sartor Resartus* [1853-54], ed. Kerry McSweeny and Peter Sabor, Oxford: Oxford UP, 1987, p. 146.

[47] M. Schlick, *The Problems of Ethics*, trans. D. Rynin, New York: Dover, 1962.

[48] *Ibid*., Ch. II, sec. 4.

[49] See, for example, O. Neurath, "Personal Life and Class Struggle," in his *Empiricism and Sociology*, ed. M. Neurath and R. S. Cohen, Dordrecht, The Netherlands: D. Reidel, 1973, pp. 247-298, esp. Sec. 5: "Marx and Epicurus."

[50] John Stuart Mill, "Utilitarianism," Ch. 4, in his *Essays on Ethics, Religion and Society*, vol. X of *The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill*, ed. J. Robson, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969.

[51] For various aspects of Mill's proof of the principle of utility, see F. Wilson, "Mill's Proof that Happiness Is the Criterion of Morality," *Journal of Business Ethics* 1 (1982), pp. 59-72; see also F. Wilson, "Mill's 'Proof' of Utility and the Composition of Causes," *Journal of Business Ethics* 2 (1983), pp. 135-158.

[52] Cf. Wilson, *Psychological Analysis and the Philosophy of John Stuart Mill*, Ch. 7 [see endnote 15].

[53] Cf. Wilson, "Mill's Proof that Happiness Is the Criterion of Morality" [see endnote 51].

[54] Schlick, *Problems of Ethics*, p. 199 [see endnote 47].

[55] Cf. Heiner Rutte, "Ethics and the Problem of Value in the Vienna Circle," in T. Uebel, ed., *Rediscovering the Forgotten Vienna Circle*, Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer, 1991, pp. 143-147; see also F. Stadler, "Otto Neurath – Moritz Schlick: On the Philosophical and Political Antagonisms in the Vienna Circle," *ibid*., pp. 159-168. Bergmann, in his memoir, indicates some of the relevant differences.

[56] Mill, "Utilitarianism," Ch. 2 [see endnote 50].

[57] Schlick, *Problems of Ethics*, p. 46 [see endnote 47].

[58] Thomas Mann, "Freud and the Future," trans. Helen Tracey Lowe-Porter, in his *Death in Venice, Tonio Kröger, and Other Writings*, ed. F.A. Lubich, New York: Continuum, 1999, pp. 279-296, here: p. 282.

[59] R. Carnap, *The Logical Structure of the World and Pseudoproblems in Philosophy*, trans. Rolf George, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967; this translates Carnap's *Der Logische Aufbau der Welt*, first published in 1928.

[60] Schlick, too, noted the social meaning of the philosophy of the Vienna Circle, and its opposition to metaphysics; see M. Schlick, "The Vienna School and Traditional Philosophy" [1937], in his *Philosophical Papers*, vol. II, ed. Henk L. Mulder and Barbara F.B. Van de Velde-Schlick, Dordrecht: Reidel, 1979, pp. 491-498. Schlick writes: "The fashionable

philosophic movements have no worse enemy than true philosophy, and none that they fear more. When it rises in a new dawn and sheds its pityless light, the adherents of every kind of ephemeral movement tremble and unite against it, crying out that philosophy is in danger, for they truly believe that the destruction of their own little system signifies the ruin of philosophy itself"; as for its opponents, "the metaphysicians have often accused empiricism of being antiphilosophical. In like fashion, the Vienna school is often reprobated for consisting, not of philosophers, but of enemies of philosophy. The doctrines of this school, it is said, in no way contribute to the development and progress of philosophy, but tend, rather, to dissolve it. It has even been asserted that they are a phenomenon of degeneracy, like so may other manifestations of contemporary culture" (p. 491).

For a placement of Carnap's *Aufbau*, and the Vienna Circle more generally, in a broader cultural context, see Peter Galison, "The Cultural Meaning of *Aufbau*," in F. Stadler, ed., *Scientific Philosophy: Origins and Development*, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1993, pp. 75-93.

[61] For an account of how conservative-clerical and German Romantic philosophy combined with German nationalism, national-socialism and anti-semitism to fight against the liberal-to-socialist views of the Vienna Circle and its anti-metaphysical empiricist orientation, see F. Stadler, "Aspects of the Social Background and Position of the Vienna Circle at the University of Vienna," in T. Uebel, ed., *Rediscovering the Forgotten Vienna Circle*, pp. 51-77 [see endnote 55]. Given the resistance, documented in this study, of the idealists and other representatives of German Romantic philosophy to the appointment of Schlick, one can understand how the positivists picked Heidegger in particular for well-justified ridicule. But these philosophers made their compromises where the positivists could not. They survived those compromises and now have apparently secured the University against any positivist influence; see Eugene T. Gadol, "Philosophy, Ideology, Common Sense and Murder – The Vienna of the Vienna Circle Past and Present," in Eugene T. Gadol, ed., *Rationality and Science*, Vienna and New York: Springer-Verlag, 1982, pp. 1-35.

[62] D. Hume, *Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge, London: Oxford University Press, 1888, p. 415. For an attempt to become clear on some aspects of what Hume means by this claim, see F. Wilson, *Hume's Defence of Causal Inference*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997, Ch. 3.

[63] We cannot underestimate the impact of Nietzsche; for a just evaluation, see Thomas Mann, "Nietzsche's Philosophy in the Light of Recent History," in his *Last Essays*, trans. Richard and Clara Winston and Tania and James Stern, London: Secker and Warburg, 1959, pp. 141-177. The impact extended to the Vienna Circle. Herbert Feigl indicates the importance of Nietzsche for Schlick's philosophy in his essay "Moritz Schlick: A Memoir," in Eugene T. Gadol, ed., *Rationality and Science*, pp. 55-82, here: p. 62. Schlick himself invokes the authority of Nietzsche in his essay "On the Meaning of Life," in his *Philosophical Papers*, vol. II, pp. 112-129, at p. 113 and p. 125.

[64] See Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, Ch. 1, on the "Prejudices of Philosophers" [see endnote 35]: "It has gradually become clear to me what every great philosophy up till now has consisted of – namely, the confession of its originator, and a species of involuntary and unconscious autobiography; and moreover that the moral (or immoral) purpose in every philosophy has constituted the true vital germ out of which the entire plant has always grown" (§ 6, p. 10f).

[65] Cf. *Beyond Good and Evil*, Ch. 1, § 11, on Kant. Nietzsche rightly points out that the Kantian appeal to categories is no more explanatory than an appeal to dormitive powers. He goes on to indicate how it became fashionable for German philosophers to find faculties for discerning things transcendental. But it was all illusion: "Enough, however – the world grew

older, and the dream vanished" (p. 17). He has already remarked that the "spectacle of the Tartuffery of old Kant, equally stiff and decent, with which he entices us into the dialectic by-ways that lead (more correctly mislead) to his 'categorical imperative' – makes us fastidious ones smile, we who find no small amusement in spying out the subtle tricks of old moralists and ethical preachers" (Ch. 1, § 5, p. 10).

[66] I have used F.A. Lange, *The History of Materialism*, third edition, trans. E.C. Thomas, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1925. The first German edition was published in 1865; volume I of the second edition appeared in 1873, volume II in 1875; the English translation is from this second German edition. Nietzsche's connections with Lange are explored in detail in G. Stack, *Lange and Nietzsche*, Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1983.

[67] Compare: "The world of phenomena, to which man belongs as a portion of them, is thoroughly governed by the law of cause; and there is no action of man, not even the supreme heroism of duty, which is not, physiologically and psychologically considered, determined by antecedent development of the individual, or by the shaping of the situation in which he finds himself placed" (Lange, *History of Materialism*, Second Book, p. 230). Lange contrasts his position on causation to those of Hume and Kant (p. 211f). On Hume's view: "The idea of cause cannot be derived from the pure reason, but rather springs from experience. The limits of its application are doubtful, but at all events it cannot be applied to anything that transcends our experience." On Kant's view: "The idea of cause is a primary idea of the pure reason, and as such underlies our whole experience. For this reason, therefore, it has unlimited validity in the sphere of experience, but beyond that has no meaning." On his own view: "The idea of cause is rooted in our organisation, and is, in point of the disposition to it, before all experience. For this very reason it has unlimited validity in the sphere of experience, but beyond it absolutely no meaning." One can see how Lange would be considered a neo-Kantian, given that he shares with Kant the view that the mind is so disposed that it must interpret events as causally related. The difference lies in the fact that the Kantian mind is in the end simply pure reason, where for Lange the mind is the empirical we know in everyday experience. But one can also see the connection to Hume: for Lange as for Hume, all causation is matter of fact regularity: there is no need for laws to be brought somehow under the forms of the categories of pure reason.

Lange contrasts his view with that of the empiricists as depending upon the fact he accepts, where they do not, that "experience is no open door through which external things, as they are, can wander in to us, but a process by which the appearance of things arises within us" (p. 188). The importance of this point is that

> When it has once been demonstrated that the quality of our sense-perceptions is entirely conditioned by the constitution of our [sense] organs, we can no longer dismiss with the predicate "Irrefutable but absurd" even the hypothesis that the whole system also, into which we bring our sense-perceptions – in a word, our whole experience – is conditioned by an intellectual organisation which compels us to feel as we do feel, to think as we do think, while to another organisation the very same objects may appear quite different, and the thing in itself cannot be pictured by any finite being. (p. 158)

Nietzsche comments perceptively on this in *Beyond Good and Evil*:

> To study physiology with a clear conscience, one must insist on the fact that the sense-organs are *not* phenomena in the sense of the idealistic philosophy; as such they certainly could not be causes! Sensualism, therefore, at least as regulative hypothesis, if not as heuristic principle. What? And others say even that the external world is the work of our organs? But then our body, as part of this external world, would be the work of our organs! But then our organs themselves

> would be the work of our organs! It seems to me that this is a complete *reductio ad absurdum*, if the conception *causa sui* is something fundamentally absurd. Consequently, the external world is *not* the work of our organs – ?
> (Ch. 1, § 15, p. 22)

This brings Nietzsche back closer to Hume than to the neo-Kantianism of Lange.

[68] Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals, Ecce Homo*, ed. Walter Kaufmann, New York: Random House, 1967.

[69] David Hume, *The Natural History of Religion*, ed. H. Root, Stanford: Stanford UP, 1956.

[70] *Genealogy of Morals*, First Essay, § 10 [see endnote 68]: "While every noble morality develops from a triumphant affirmation of itself, slave morality from the outset says No to what is 'outside,' what is 'different,' what is 'not itself'; and *this* No is its creative deed" (p. 36). Schlick makes the same point, though of course in his more sober way: "It is characteristic," he says, of our modern morality that "all of its most important demands end in the repression of personal desires in favor of the desires of fellow men" (*Problems of Ethics*, p. 79 [see endnote 47]). To this he contrasts the ancients' ethics: "The ancient classical ethics is not an ethics of self-limitation, but of self-realization, not of renunciation, but of affirmation" (*ibid.*, p. 80).

[71] Nietzsche, *Genealogy of Morals*, First Essay, § 11.

[72] *Ibid*., Second Essay, § 11.

[73] John Stuart Mill made this point in "Utilitarianism," Ch. 5. [see endnote 50].

[74] Nietzsche, *Genealogy of Morals*, Second Essay, § 15.

[75] *Ibid.*, Second Essay, § 16, p. 85.

[76] *Ibid.*, Second Essay, § 19, p. 89.

[77] *Ibid.*, Second Essay, § 20.

[78] Nietzsche's "will to power" is simply the demand to be free of unreasonable constraints. Thus, he speaks of "the *instinct for freedom* (in my language: the will to power)" (*Genealogy of Morals*, Second Essay, § 17, p. 87). The will to power is simply what has come to be known as the desire for negative liberty. Nietzsche unfortunately too often clothes his notion of the will to power in rhetoric redolent of the German Romantic philosophy that he despised. He allows his despising of the reason of the German Romantics – the reason that claimed, wrongly, to be able to transcend this world for another – to become a despising of all reason, and an over-valuing of the instincts (cf. Mann, "Nietzsche's Philosophy in the Light of Recent History," p. 161 [see endnote 63]). This leads him at times to falsely contrast all morality, all restraint, with life, with the will to power (see *ibid*., p. 162). But, of course, even negative liberty, if it to be enjoyed to the fullest possible extent, requires *some* restraint. Otherwise it is simply the war of all against all. The errors are connected. Reason, in its reasonable sense, will tell you what restraints are necessary for the fullest possible self-realization of all. It is these combined errors that lead Nietzsche to the rhetoric of the blond beast who tramples others underfoot that so endeared him to the Nazis. When we read these parts of Nietzsche's writing, then, as Thomas Mann puts it, "the clinical picture of infantile sadism is complete, and our souls writhe in embarrassment" (*ibid*., p. 165).

[79] See Michael Friedman, "The Re-Evaluation of Logical Positivism," *Journal of Philosophy* 88 (1991), pp. 505-519; "Epistemology in the *Aufbau*," *Synthese* 93 (1992), pp. 15-57; "Carnap's *Aufbau* Reconsidered," *Noûs* 21 (1987), pp. 521-545; and "Geometry, Convention and the Relativized A Priori: Reichenbach, Schlick, and Carnap," in W. Salmon and G. Wolters, eds., *Logic, Language, and the Status of Scientific Theories*, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1994, pp. 21-34; and A. Richardson, *Carnap's Construction*

of the World, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998.

The general thrust of these works is to argue that Carnap's project is neo-Kantian *rather than* empiricist. "The aim of the *Aufbau*," we are told, "is not to use logic together with sense data to provide empirical knowledge with an otherwise missing epistemological foundation of justification. Its aim, rather, is to use recent advances in the science of logic [...] together with advances in empirical science (Gestalt psychology, in particular) to fashion a scientifically respectable *replacement* for traditional epistemology" (Friedman, "The Re-Evaluation of Logical Positivism," p. 509). The point is that the replacement could well be one that aims to meet the spirit of empiricist epistemology while rejecting some of the shortcomings that had become evident, e.g., the failure to take account of the relational structures present in the world as we ordinarily experience it – this was a real defect in traditional empiricism, and for this the tradition had been criticized by the idealists; on this point, see F. Wilson, "Bradley's Impact on Empiricism," in J. Bradley, ed., *Philosophy after F.H. Bradley*, Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1996, pp. 251-282.

A second point is that the positivists, Carnap in particular, rejected the traditional empiricist account of geometry and opted instead for a neo-Kantian position (Friedman, "The Re-Evaluation of Logical Positivism," p. 510ff, and also "Geometry, Convention, and the Relativized A Priori: Reichenbach, Schlick, and Carnap"). Where the empiricist tradition made geometry straight-forwardly empirical, the neo-Kantians, following Lange, located it in the necessary structure of how as a matter of fact we think about the world. The positivists maintained that an adequate account of geometry required that there be a conventional component. This component is *a priori*, but a relativized *a priori*, a convention adopted *pro tem* because it facilitates providing a factually adequate account of the geometry of the world. This introduction of an *a priori* element into geometry, it is claimed, makes the positivists more neo-Kantian than empiricist. But would empiricists such as Mill have disagreed? It is more that they would have welcomed such a view, as a more adequate re-statement of the position that they were trying to defend. Carnap, in his own way, may have been inspired by the neo-Kantian tradition, but his allowing a conventional element into geometry is much less neo-Kantian than it is an improved statement of the empiricist position.

Finally, it is claimed that the positivists took the special sciences as foundationalist for their philosophy, rather than their philosophy providing a foundation for the special sciences. "There is no privileged vantage point from which philosophy can pass epistemic judgment on the special sciences: philosophy is conceived as rather following the special sciences so as to reorient itself in response to their established results" (Friedman, "The Re-Evaluation of Logical Positivism," p. 515). But the positivists *did* conceive of their task as involving the critique of the special sciences. Thus, rather than simply being accepted, what biologists said in their scientific writings was to be scrutinized carefully for metaphysical error so that their views could be placed on a secure philosophical and epistemological footing; see, for example, Schlick's essay "On the Concept of Wholeness" (in *Philosophical Papers*, vol. II). Schlick and the other positivists were following good empiricist tradition in taking solid parts of natural science for granted and defending the body of science from the incursions of metaphysics. Hobbes and Locke saw it as part of their task to provide a foundation for the new science and to defend it against the Aristotelianism that was still deeply entrenched in the universities; on this latter point, see F. Wilson, *The Logic and Methodology of Science in Early Modern Thought*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999.

If there is neo-Kantianism in the background of the positivists, then it is also true that they mostly overcame it. As Nietzsche could accept the empiricist side of Lange and reject the Kantian dross, so the positivists such as Schlick and Carnap could accept from neo-Kantianism what suited their empiricist program and thus reject the Kantian refuse.