

Vedārtha Sangraha of Sri Ramanujacarya

English Translation
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With a foreword
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FOREWORD

Sri Ramanuja wrote nine works in Sanskrit¹ on the philosophy of Visishtadvaita. Of these, the Vedartha-Sangraha occupies a unique place inasmuch as this work takes the place of a commentary on the Upanishads, though not in a conventional sense or form. The work mirrors a total vision of the Upanishads, discussing all the controversial texts in a relevant, coherent manner. It is in fact an independent exposition of the philosophy of the Upanishads. Prof. M. Hiriyanna describes it as ‘an independent treatise explaining in a masterly way his philosophic position, and pointing out the basis for it in the Upanishads.’ Sudarshana-suri, the celebrated commentator on the Sri-Bhashya and the Vedartha-sangraha, says that the work was expounded in the form of a lecture before Lord Srinivasa at Tirumalai. Thus it is his testament at the feet of the Lord whom he served throughout his life. Sri Ramanuja refers to this work more than once in his Sri-Bhashya.

The Vedartha-sangraha is written in a lucid, vigorous prose without the usual divisions of chapters, but the structure of the thesis is developed in a scientific manner. Sri Ramanuja refers in this work to ancient teachers of theistic tradition, Bodhayana, Tanka, Dramida, Guhadeva, Kapardin and Bharuci, besides his own teacher, Sri Yamunacarya. Tanka and Dramida are quoted profusely to support his interpretation. He takes abundant help from the Brahma-Sutras, the Ramayana, the Mahabharata, the Vishnu-Purana, the Manusmrti and other genuine smrtis in the exposition of his philosophy.

At the outset Sri Ramanuja states that the Upanishads, which lay down the welfare of the whole world, move around three fundamental notions:—

- (1) A seeker must acquire a true knowledge of the individual self and the Supreme;
- (2) he must devote himself to meditation, worship and the adoration of the Supreme;
- (3) this knowledge with discipline leads him to the realization of the Supreme.

To put it briefly, the first affirms the *tattva* or the nature of the Reality, the second declares the *hita* or the means, and the third states the *Purushartha* or the ideal of human endeavour.

A chief difficulty in understanding the meaning of the Upanishads arises in determining the relation of Brahman to the individual self on the one hand, and to the non-sentient world on the other. There are some texts which declare that the world is only an appearance in the ultimate analysis. There are other texts which affirm that the world is not an appearance, but real and distinct.

Bhartṛprapanca, who was anterior to Sri Sankara, held that the self and the universe are identical with and different from Brahman, the triad constituting a unity in variety. That is to say, that the reality is at once one as Brahman and many as the self and the world. For example, an ocean consists of water, foam, waves, etc. As the water is real, so also are the foam, waves, etc. The world, which is a part and parcel of Brahman, is necessarily real. The import of all this is that according to this view the Upanishads teach the eternal difference and identity between Brahman on the one hand, and the self and the world on the other.’

¹ *Vedartha Sangraha, Sri-Bhashya, Gita-Bhashya, Vedantadipa, Vedanta-sara, Sharanagati-gadya, Vaikuntha-gadya, Sriranga-gadya and Nitya-grantha.*

Sri Sankara rejects the view of Bhatrapranca, because mutually contradictory attributes cannot be predicated of one and the same thing. According to Sri Sankara the passages which affirm manifoldness and reality of the world do not embody the essential teaching of the Upanishads. It is a concession made to the empirical view that demands a real world having causal connection with time-space. Since variety is but an appearance having no foundation in the ultimate Reality, the true essential doctrine of the Upanishads, according to him, is only pure unity. The individual self is nothing but Brahman itself appearing as finite due to limiting adjuncts which are Superimposed on it.

Sri Ramanuja also attempts to systematize the philosophy of the Upanishads, taking the cue from the ancient theistic philosophers. He recognises three lines of thought in the Upanishads concerning the relation between Brahman, the self and the world: —

(1) Passages which declare difference of nature between the world, the self and Brahman. Here the world is the non-sentient matter (*acit*) which is the object of experience, the self is the experiencing conscious subject (*cit*), and Brahman, the absolute ruling principle.’ These may be named analytical texts.

(2) Passages which teach that Brahman is the inner self of all entities which constitute his body. For instance, ‘He who dwells in the earth and within the earth, whom the earth does not know, whose body the earth is, and who rules the earth within, he is thy Self, the ruler within, the immortal’ etc. (Br. 3:7:3-23). These are called *ghataka-shrutis* or mediating texts.

(3) Passages which proclaim the unity of Brahman with the world in its causal as well as effected aspect. The famous text, ‘That thou art, O Svetaketu’ (Chan. 6:2-8) comes under this category. These may be termed as synthetic passages. Sri Ramanuja lays down that the interpretation of the various passages must be such that they are not made to contradict each other, and not a single passage should be so interpreted as to be divested of its primary significance.

The first group of texts distinguishes Brahman from the world and the individual selves. In a way it emphasizes the transcendent character of Brahman. The second group of texts declares Brahman to be the inner self of all entities. Neither the individual self nor the world can exist by itself. They are inseparably connected with Brahman as his body, and thus are controlled by him. These texts teach duality in so far as distinction is made between body and self, and unity in so far as the self, the substantive element, predominates over and controls the body, its attribute. The last group of texts aim at proclaiming the non-dual character of Brahman who alone constitutes the ultimate Reality. The self and the world, though distinct from each other and real, have a different value. They only exist as a mode or attribute of Brahman. They are comprehended in the reality of Brahman. They exist because Brahman exists.

On this principle of interpretation, Sri Ramanuja recognizes that the passages declaring distinction between Brahman, the world and the ‘self, and those affirming Brahman to be the same in the causal as well as effected aspects, do not in any way contradict the mediating passages which declare that the individual selves and the world form the body of Brahman, and they in their causal state do not admit the distinction of names and forms while in the effected state they possess distinct character.

The notion of unity may be illustrated by the example, ‘A purple robe’. Here purpleness is quite different from robe. The latter is a substance while the former is an attribute. This

integral and essential relation is not found in the case of a man wearing a wrist-watch. If the former relation is inseparable (*aprthaksiddhi*), the latter is separable and external. A word signifying attribute does not stop after denoting the usual meaning, but extends till it reaches the substantive. This is the true significance of an attribute. The individual selves and the world constitute the body of Brahman who is their inner self. Brahman is the integral principle without whom neither the self nor the world can exist. Hence all names finally denote him.

The way in which Sri Ramanuja interprets the famous text, 'That thou art' (*Tat tvam asi*) is unique. This is done by means of co-ordinate predication (*samanadhikaranya*). In a co-ordinate predication the identity of the substantive should not be established through the rejection of the natural significance of co-ordinate terms. The identical import of terms taken in their natural signification should be brought out. The Mahabhashya of Patanjali defines co-ordinate predication thus: 'The signification of an identical entity by several terms which are applied to that entity on different grounds is co-ordinate predication.' In such a proposition the attributes not only should be distinct from each other but also different from the substance, though inseparable from it. In the illustration of a 'Purple robe', the basic substance is one and the same, though 'purpleness' and 'robeness' are different from it as well as from each other. That is how the unity of a 'Purple robe' is established. In the co-ordinate predication asserting identity between 'that' and 'thou', Brahman himself with the self as his mode, having the self as his body, is pointed out.

The term 'thou' which usually stands for the self here stands for Brahman ('that') who is the indweller of the self and of whom the self is the mode as a constituent of his body. The term 'thou' does not mean the physical body or the individual self. Since Brahman has interpenetrated all matter and self, 'thou' signifies Brahman in the ultimate analysis. The term 'that' signifies Brahman himself as the ground of the universe and the soul of all individual selves. Hence in the identity of 'that' and 'thou' there is no rejection of the specific connotation of the co-ordinate terms. The upshot of the dictum is that the individual selves and the world, which are distinct and real attributes, are comprehended in Brahman. Brahman as the inner self of the jiva-Brahman as the ground of the universe are one. The central principle is that whatever exists as an attribute of a substance, that being inseparable from the substance is one with that substance.

Thus Sri Ramanuja upholds all the three streams of thoughts in the Upanishads, namely, unity, plurality and both. He himself clinches the argument: 'We uphold unity because Brahman alone exists with all other entities as his modes. We uphold both unity and plurality, as the one Brahman himself has all the physical and spiritual entities as his modes and thus exists qualified by a plurality. We uphold plurality as the three entities — the individual selves, the world and the supreme Lord — are mutually distinct in their substantive nature and attributes and there is no mutual transposition of their characteristics.'

The summum bonum is the vision of the supreme Person, known as Brahman or Sriman-Narayana. The chief obstacle in the path towards perfection is the accumulation of evil tendencies. These can be destroyed only by the cultivation of good tendencies. This is followed by self-surrender which generates an inclination towards life divine. Then one has to acquire the knowledge of the Reality from the scriptures aided by the holy teachers. Then the practice of virtues like the control of mind and sense, austerity, purity, non-violence, compassion, etc., becomes easy. *Nitya* and *naimittika* duties are to be performed, and prohibited actions are to be avoided — the whole conduct being conceived as the

worship of God. God, the embodiment of love and compassion, showers his grace on the aspirant, which puts an end to all his obstacles. Finally *bhakti* rises which is an enjoyment of bliss in itself. *Bhakti* is but meditation which has assumed the character of the most vivid and direct perception of the Supreme.

Sri Ramanuja, like his predecessor and teacher, Sri Yamunacarya, declares that *Bhakti* succeeds the twofold training of the mind by *karma* and *jnana*. *Karma-yoga* is performance of duties of one's station in life with no thought of reaping any personal benefit in the spirit of Gita's teachings. *Karma* that is performed in this manner cleanses the heart. *Jñana-yoga*, which immediately follows the previous discipline, is meditation upon the individual self as distinct from matter like body, mind, etc., with which it is associated. It helps the aspirant to determine the true nature of one's self in relation to the Supreme. He realizes that he is absolutely subservient to God.

The discipline does not stop with the knowledge of one's self alone. It is incomplete without the knowledge of God.

Here the word *Bhakti* does not connote the popular sense in which it is understood. *Bhakti-yoga* is loving meditation upon God. When the meditation attains the form of 'firm remembrance' (*dhruvanusmrtih*) characterised by intense love, the vision of the Supreme is attained. It must be mentioned here that the final release is attained after the dissolution of the body. One endowed with such *Bhakti* and self-surrender attains the fitness to earn the grace of the Lord. This *Bhakti* itself is *upasana* or *vidya* mentioned in the Upanishads. It is same as knowledge spoken of in the Shrutis: 'One who knows Brahman attains the Supreme' (Tai. 2:1), 'He who knows him becomes immortal here' (Pu. 20), and 'He who knows Brahman becomes Brahman' (Mu. 3:2: 9). As the vision of the Supreme is not possible through ordinary means of perception, he can be seen only through *Bhakti*, which is a unique form of knowledge. This is in consonance with the Gita declaration, 'I am attainable only through undivided *Bhakti*' (11: 54).

It was already mentioned that the ideal to be realized is the vision of the Supreme. It is an experience of absolute peace, perfection, bliss and freedom, untouched by the cosmic limitations of space and time. Sri Ramanuja is accused of having given a 'picturesque description' of the ideal realm. But a little insight into the spirit of his writings reveals that the ideal is not such a fairyland as it is made out to be. The domain, he points out, is of the nature of pure immutable *sattva*. It is transcendent without the taints of the material gunas of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. Similarly the individual self also, in the state of *Moksha*, gives up its material body and assumes a transcendent form. The substance of *Shuddha-sattva* is common to God, the self and the realm of the ideal known as *nitya-vibhuti*. The first chapter of the Kaushitaki Upanishad gives a figurative account of the pilgrim's progress till he reaches the feet of God.

The individual self is the essence of knowledge. This knowledge in its attributive aspect (*dharmabhuta-jñana*) gets more or less contracted in samsara, but it expands infinitely in the state of *Moksha*. It becomes all-knowing and enjoys perfect bliss and love in divine communion. In short it is an ineffable enjoyment. In this natural state it yields its spirit to the will, glory and adoration of God. Sri Ramanuja characterises this state as '*ananya-prayojana*' having no other end except itself. In this ideal place there is no break in the enjoyment of divine communion.

Sri Ramanuja is not unaware of the criticism that there is subservience to and dependence upon God in his conception of *Moksha*. The critics say that subordination in any

form cannot conduce to the joy of self. The divine fetters are not less strong to bind. Further Manu says that servitude is a dog's life. Sri Ramanuja effectively meets this criticism in his characteristic way. He enunciates a principle 'that what an individual pursues as a desirable end depends upon what he conceives himself to be'. Different people pursue different and mutually conflicting values. Hence the notion that independence is happiness proceeds from the misconception that one is identical with the body, mind, etc. This attachment to the body is a sort of dependence itself. Instead of dependence on God, it is dependence on matter. The metaphysical fact is that he is not the body, and consequently there must be something else with which his self is related. There cannot be relation of the principal entity and the subsidiary (*Sheshin* and *shesha*) between any finite objects. The only object with which such a relation can exist is God. Hence dependence on anything other than God is painful and subservience to God is joy and freedom. Similarly bondage is indeed a dog's life when one serves those who are unworthy of service. The only entity which is worthy of love, adoration and service is God. Sri Ramanuja clinches the issue by quoting a text, 'He is to be served by all'. The emancipation consists in service of God, and true bondage is independence of God and service of body.

Sri S. S. Raghavachar, who is a deep student of philosophy, especially of Visishtadvaita, has achieved a large measure of success in his difficult task of translation. The learned translator has done a signal service to the students of philosophy by translating this masterly treatise of Sri Ramanuja. I am sure that it will prove to be of great help to the students of Indian philosophy.

SWAMI ADIDEVANANDA

PREFACE

It was nearly two years ago and to be more exact, it was on the birthday of Sri Ramanuja in the year 1954 that the idea occurred to me of the desirability of rendering Vedartha-sangraha into English. The work has struck all students as a magnificent treatise on account of the comprehensiveness of its theme, its vigour of execution and the luminous style of its prose. I immediately communicated my thought to Swami Adidevananda. He wrote to me promptly commanding me to take up the task and promised all possible help. I set myself to the work and submitted my draft to him for scrutiny, and another copy was submitted to Pandit Hemmige Desikachar. After collecting the detailed observations of the Swami and the criticisms and suggestions of Pandit Desikachar I rewrote the whole translation incorporating all the help thus offered. By the time my work was completed, it came to my notice that nearly fifty years ago a translation of the work had appeared serially in the *Brahmavadin* of Madras. It was too late for me to benefit from the first translation. So the new translation presented here is an independent one.

The translation is based completely on the *Tatparya-dipika* of Sri Sudarshana-suri whose guidance in the matter of understanding Sri Ramanuja is indispensable and is most illuminating.

I acknowledge with sincere gratitude the help I have received from Pandit H. Desikachar, Sri K. V. S. Tatachar, Sri N. S. Anantarangachar, Vidvan Selva Pillai Sarma and Pandit D. Tangavelan. My indebtedness to Swami Adidevananda is indeed beyond words. He has criticized and guided me at every stage of my work. It is in the fitness of things that the work should go forth with his masterly foreword.

The difficulty in translating a work of this kind is that the grandeur of the original produces deep discontent with one's poor rendering of it. Under this circumstance the translator must satisfy himself with the twin aims of accuracy and intelligibility. The power and beauty of the original are beyond reproduction. How far I have achieved my modest aims I leave it to others to judge. Personally the experience of translation has been a reward in itself as it has enabled me considerably to get into grips with the architectonics of a classic in the philosophy of the Upanishads. I have put on record my analysis of the text and connected reflections in the form of a detailed introduction which is being published by The Mangalore Trading Association (Private) Limited.

Swami Shambhavananda with his characteristic generosity and readiness to help, agreed to publish the work. I acknowledge most gratefully my indebtedness to him for giving my humble work the sanctifying recognition of the great Order bearing the name of Sri Ramakrishna. I am grateful to Swami Somanathananda for the kind interest he took in the work and for making the necessary arrangement for its publication.

I acknowledge with sincere gratitude the uniform courtesy and good work of the management of the Sharada Press. My particular thanks are due to Sri A. S. Kamath, who took a personal interest in the work and has expeditiously brought out the book in a fine form.

In preparing the text I have consulted three editions and have depended throughout on the reading adopted by the *Tatparya-dipika*.

The editions consulted are:

1. The edition in Telugu characters published by the Saraswati Bhandara, Madras, in 1883.

2. The Devanagari edition of Pandit Rama Misra Sastri published by Messrs. E. J. Lazarus & Co., Benares, in 1924.
3. The Devanagari edition in the Sri Vaishnava Sampradaya Granthamala, published by T. T. Devasthanams, Tirupati, in 1953.

The work is offered in the devout spirit of service.

S. S. RAGHAVACHAR

(Abbreviations: Vi. Pu. = Vishnu Purana; Chan. = Chandogya Upanishad; B.S. = Brahma Sutras;

Pu. Suk. = Purusha Suktam; Tai. = Taittiriya Upanishad; Tait. Ar. = Taittiriya Aranyaka; Brh. Ar. = Brhad-aranyaka Upanishad; M.B. = Mahabharata; Ra. = Ramayana;

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VEDARTHA SANGRAHAH

I offer adoration to Vishnu, the all-pervading Supreme Being, who is the overlord of all sentient and non-sentient entities, who reposes on the primordial Shesa, who is pure and infinite and in whom abound blissful perfections. (1)

Gloriously triumphs the sage Yamuna, who dispelled the delusive darkness filling the world in the shape of doctrines devoid of both scriptural authority and reason maintaining that :—

- (a) the highest Brahman itself is bereft of knowledge and is caught up in illusion and hence wanders in the realm of transmigration,
- (b) it is conditioned by an alien adjunct and is rendered helpless and that
- (e) it has become the seat of evil. (2)

1. The crown of Vedas i.e., The Upanishads, which lays down the good of the whole world, enshrines this truth: A seeker, after first acquiring a true understanding of the individual self and the Supreme and equipped with the performance of the duties pertaining to his station in life, must devote himself to the meditation, worship and adoring salutation of the blessed feet of the supreme Person. This done with immeasurable joy leads to the attainment of the Supreme.

The individual self is subject to beginningless nescience, which has brought about an accumulation of karma, of the nature of both merit and demerit. The flood of such karma causes his entry into four kinds of bodies — heavenly, human, animal and plant beginning with that of Brahma downwards. This ingress into bodies produces the delusion of identity with those respective bodies (and the consequent attachments and aversions). This delusion inevitably brings about all the fears inherent in the state of worldly existence. The entire body of Vedanta aims at the annihilation of these fears. To accomplish their annihilation they teach the following:

- (1) The essential nature of the individual self as transcending the body.
- (2) The attributes of the individual self.
- (3) The essential nature of the Supreme that is the inmost controller of both the material universe and the individual selves.
- (4) The attributes of the Supreme.
- (5) The devout meditation upon the Supreme.
- (6) The goal to which such meditation, leads.

The Vedanta aims at making known the goal attainable through such a life of meditation, the goal being the realization, of the real nature of the individual self and after and through that realization, the direct experience of Brahman, which is of the nature of bliss

infinite and perfect. The passages to this effect may be illustrated by the following: ‘That thou art (Chan. 6:9:4)’; ‘This self is Brahman (Brh. Ar. 6:4:5)’; ‘He who dwells in the self, who is in the self, whom the self does not know, whose body this self is, who rules this self from within, that one is your self, the inner Ruler, the Immortal. (Brh. Ar. 5:7)’; ‘He is the inner self of all creatures, free from all imperfections, the divine, the sole God Narayana (Su. 7)’; ‘The Brahmanas desire to know this one, through the study of the Vedas, through sacrifices, charity, austerities and fasting (Brh. Ar. 6:4:22)’; ‘The knower of Brahman attains the Highest (Tai. 2:1)’; ‘He who knows him thus attains immortality here. There is no other pathway to this goal (Pu.Suk. 6)’.

2. The essential nature of the individual self is devoid of the manifold distinctions pertaining to the various modifications of material nature constitutive of the bodies of the various kinds like heavenly and human. It has only knowledge and bliss as its attributes. When the bodily differentiations born of karma are destroyed, the essential individuality, indescribable but self-cognised, can only be represented as of the ‘nature of consciousness (Vi, 1:4:40)’. This essential nature is common to all individual selves.

This world, of the aforesaid nature, consisting of spiritual and physical entities, has the supreme Spirit, as the ground of its origination, maintenance, destruction and of the liberation of the individual from transmigratory existence. He, the supreme One, is unique, transcending in character every other entity, because his nature is opposed to all evil and is of the sole nature of supreme bliss. He is the abode of countless auspicious attributes unsurpassed in their perfection. He is Bhagavan Narayana, the highest Spirit. He is presented by the entire Vedanta, through variations of terminology as the ‘Soul of all’, ‘Highest Brahman’, ‘Highest Light’, ‘Highest Reality’, ‘Highest Self’ and ‘Being’. Such is the nature of the inner Controller. The Vedas devoted to the exposition of his glory, expound the fact that he controls all entities, sentient as well as non-sentient, as their indwelling self. (They do it in two ways): —

(1) They describe them as his ‘power’, ‘part’, ‘splendour’, ‘form’, ‘body’ and ‘organism’ and through such other terms.

(2) They also affirm the oneness of these entities with him.

3. Some engaged in the explanation of these passages, like the proposition expressing identity, descriptive of the glory of Brahman put forth the following explanation: Undifferentiated Consciousness alone is Brahman. It is eternally free and self-luminous. Still its identity with the individual self is made known through propositions positing identity such as ‘That thou art’. Brahman itself, being ignorant, gets bound and is (subsequently) released. Apart from the undifferentiated consciousness, the whole universe, consisting of endless plurality exhibiting differences like that between Ishvara and the creatures, is unreal. That there is some one who is liberated and some one that is bound is an arrangement that does not exist. That some have attained liberation before now is not true. One body alone is ensouled. The other bodies are soul-less. It is not determined which that body is. The teacher who imparts knowledge is just a phenomenal appearance. The knower (in all cognitions) is also a phenomenal appearance. The scripture is also unreal. The knowledge arising out of the scripture is also unreal. All this is known from the Scripture itself which is unreal.

4. Others hold thus: Brahman, though possessed of all auspicious attributes like freedom from sin, is subject to bondage and attains liberation and is the seat of many varieties of

evil owing to its association with a particular limiting adjunct. This doctrine is necessitated by the passages affirming identity.

5. Others again maintain, in explanation of the same principle of identity, the following view: Brahman, an ocean of great attributes, inherent and unlimited, acquires the character of the individual selves of all kinds, the divine, the human, the animal and plant, those consigned to hell, those enjoying heaven and the liberated individuals. This Brahman is inherently differentiated from and not so differentiated from them. It is subject to various modifications thus evolving into entities like the (element) ether.

6. Those given to a thorough reflection on the import of the Vedas point out fallacies in the first view, which can in no way be obviated. The criticism can be elaborated as follows: The term 'that' (in 'That thou art') signifies Brahman, the subject-matter of the discourse. The statements like 'It thought, "Let me be many, let me grow forth into many"' (Chan. 6:2: 3)', and 'All these creatures have Being as their source, they abide in Being and they are based on Being (Chan. 6:8:6)' affirm that the origin, maintenance and disappearance of the world are the sport of Brahman, by whose will these processes are brought about. Other scriptural passages dealing with the same theme enunciate, as related to Brahman's authorship of these processes, countless auspicious attributes of surpassing perfection like omniscience, omnipotence, universal overlordship, the possession of all entities as its modes, the negation of the superiority and equality of everything else to it, and the power of realising all desires and will and the effulgence that illumines the whole universe. And several other passages like 'Free from sin (Cha. 8:7:1)' etc., speak of Brahman as being free from all imperfections. Now all these characterizations of Brahman get negated on the first view.

7. The following defence may be put forward by the *purva-paksin*: In the section under consideration, in the commencement itself, the sole reality of the cause is propounded through the declaration of that one knowledge from which all knowledge is said to follow. It is further shown that the cause alone is real and that all its modifications are unreal, through the illustrations of clay and its products. It is then asserted of that Brahman, the real, that it is undifferentiated, as it is without any other entity either generically the same or different. The idea is embodied in the statement, 'Being alone was this in the beginning, one only, without a second (Chan. 6:2:1)'. Passages, found in other parts of the scripture, which determine the exact nature of Brahman affirm that 'Brahman is real, knowledge and infinite (Tai. 2:1)' and that it is 'without parts', 'actionless', 'flawless', 'attributeless', 'consciousness', 'bliss', etc., and thus teach that the sole nature of Brahman is to be contrary to all differentiating determinations. The terms signifying the unitary essence are not tautologous on that account. Even though the entity is absolutely one, the several terms serve to demarcate it as opposed to all pluralizing characterizations. Thus all terms have significance.

8. We reply that this interpretation is inadmissible. The knowledge of the one cannot lead to the knowledge of all, on this interpretation, as all the entities to be known, being unreal, simply do not exist or the identity of the real and the unreal will follow by implication. On the contrary, if all the entities are real only by virtue of being included in the one (or being embodiments of the one) the knowledge of the 'one' will lead to the knowledge of all.

To discuss the whole section — the question that Uddalaka puts to Shvetaketu is this: 'You are arrogant. Did you inquire into that law? (Chan. 6:1:3)'. The question means, 'You dissemble perfection. Did you seek to learn from those teachers concerning that law also?' The term 'law' signifies here him by whom the law is ordained. Law literally

means 'command'. In that case the conception here would cohere with the passage, 'Owing to the command of the Imperishable, the sun and the moon stand apart sustained (Brh. Ar. 5:8:9)'. So runs the words of Manu (12: 122) also when he says, 'The one who commands all' etc. Even this section itself propounds first the idea that Brahman is the material cause of the universe by the phrase 'one only' and then excludes another efficient cause by the expression 'without a second'. Therefore the whole question may be interpreted thus: Have you enquired into that principle which is the commanding spirit as well as the material cause of the world, by hearing of which, by thinking of which and by understanding which, everything that was not heard of before, not thought of before and not understood before, comes to be heard of, thought of and understood ?

9. The inner idea is this: Have you learnt about Brahman which is the primeval cause of the processes like creation, maintenance and destruction of the entire universe and which is the ocean of limitless perfections like omniscience and realized desires and will that gets realized ? The father keeping in his mind the thought that cause itself assuming manifold configurations comes to be known as the effect and that Brahman being the sole cause of all, the knowledge of Brahman in its causal aspect possessing as its body the sentient and non-sentient entities in their subtle unmanifest condition, includes the knowledge of the universe in the state of the effect, asks the son about that 'Whereby the unheard of becomes heard of, the unthought of becomes thought of, and the misunderstood becomes understood? (Chan. 6:1:3)'. The son not intuiting the idea at the back of his father's mind that all that exists proceeds from a single cause thinks that among different existences, the knowledge of one existence cannot lead to the knowledge of another existence. Hence he inquires, 'How can there be such a law, Sir? (Chan. 6:1:3)'. Questioned thus the father proceeds to demonstrate the preliminary principle of the identity of cause and effect, a matter of common experience. While he does so his purpose is to expound ultimately his inner idea, operative in his discourse from the very beginning. That idea may be set forth as follows: The highest Brahman is purity, bliss and knowledge in substance. Its grandeur is inconceivable. It is resplendent with countless auspicious attributes, like the will that irresistibly realizes itself, in surpassing perfection. It is immutable in nature. Still, out of its causal state, in which the sentient and non-sentient beings form its body in their subtle condition, undifferentiated in name and form, it, through its own will, passes in sheer sport into the state of the effect, by one of its aspects, and comes to possess the limitless and diversified world of moving and non-moving beings as its own configuration. With this idea in his mind he proceeds to propound how knowledge of Brahman leads to knowledge of all. As a preliminary step in exposition, he demonstrates the identity of cause and effect, a principle quite obvious to common experience. For that purpose he has taken this instance, 'Even as, by knowing the lump of clay, all that is made of clay is known and "by speech, the modification and name are brought about and only as clay is it real" (Chan. 6:1:4.)'. The meaning is this: The same substance, clay, in a part of itself, becomes modified into a multitude of forms and conditions and acquires a multitude of names for serving different practical purposes. Even then these different products, being nothing other than particular forms of clay, the original substance, clay itself exists in these several conditions. The products are not entities other than clay. Then it is pointed out that by knowing the lump of clay, all its varied configurations like pots and pans are known. Then the son, not knowing that Brahman alone is the cause of the entire cosmos, asks, 'May your blessed self, instruct me about that matter (Chan. 6:1:7)'. Then the father instructing that the omniscient and omnipotent Brahman is the cause of all, lays down, 'Being alone, this was in the beginning, one only, without a second (Chan.. 6:2:1)'.

10. In this proposition the term ‘this’ signifies the world. The expression ‘in the beginning’ signifies the time prior to creation. At that time the world was one with Being. But the world is one with being even after creation. Therefore it is pointed out that the world was one with Being then in the sense that it was without distinctions of names and forms. ‘This is signified by the expression ‘one only’. The fact that Being is the material cause of the world is thereby enunciated. Then the possibility of another entity being the intelligent operative cause is repudiated by the term ‘*advitiya*’ meaning ‘one without a second’. By these elaborations is the idea now revealed, which was in the heart of the teacher from the beginning as cryptically indicated in the opening statement, ‘Did you learn that law, by which, that which is not heard of, becomes heard of’ etc.— the idea of the great law-giver being the material cause of’ the world. This idea is further explained. The Being itself, the material and efficient cause of the world, thought, ‘Let me be many, let me multiply (Chan. 6:2:3)’. The entity described as Being is the highest Brahman, all-knowing, all-powerful and has its will realizing itself unfailingly. Though all its desires are eternally realized, it willed, for purposes of sport, ‘Let me be many’, assuming the form of the world, consisting of the wondrously varied and limitless entities both sentient and non-sentient. For that purpose It thought, ‘Let me multiply’; out of a part of itself it acquired the elements like ether. Then that highest Deity named Being deliberated thus, ‘I will enter these three deities as atman, the jiva and differentiate names and forms (Chan. 6:3: 2)’. Here the expressions ‘atman, the jiva’ bring out the idea that the jiva or individual self has Brahman as its soul. Thus it is brought out explicitly that all that is non-sentient attains the status of an entity because of the entry into it of the individual Self having Brahman as its inner atman and that only as such do the non-sentient entities acquire names and forms.

11. The matter stands this way: —The individual self constitutes a mode of Brahman being its body. Hence it is ensouled by Brahman. The fact that the individual is the body of Brahman is set forth in another passage of the Veda, ‘Whose body the atman is (Su. 6)’. The physical forms like the heavenly and human bodies, are the modes of individual souls being bodies. Therefore all these forms have Brahman as their ultimate self. Therefore all terms like gods, men, yaksa, demon, beast, bird, tree, creeper, wood, stone, grass, jar and cloth, which have denotative power, formed of roots and suffixes, signify the objects which they name in ordinary parlance and through them they signify the individual selves embodied in them and through this second signification, their significance develops further till it culminates in Brahman, the highest Self dwelling as the inner controller of all individual selves. Thus all terms are denotative of this totality.

12. Thus, the section of the Upanishad under consideration develops in details the thought that the entire universe of sentient and non-sentient entities has Being as its material cause, its efficient cause, its ground, its controller and its Lord to which it is instrumental in value. This is done in the passage commencing with the text, ‘All these creatures have Being as their source, abide in Being and are based on Being (Chan. 6:8: 4-6)’. Secondly it proceeds through the principle of causality to the thought that the only truth about the universe is that it is animated by Brahman: ‘All this is ensouled by this (Being). That is the truth (Chan. 6:8: 6)’. He is the self of the whole world and the whole world constitutes his body. Hence the section proceeds to the thought that the entity signified by the term ‘thou’ is Brahman itself having the individual self as its mode. The universal principle enunciated that all entities are ensouled by Brahman is applied to a particular self (Shvetaketu) and the particular conclusion is drawn there from.

13. The crux of the matter is this: ‘All this is ensouled by this’. By the term, ‘All this’ the world of finite spirits and matter is signified and the fact of the world being ensouled by

this atman is affirmed. The character of having Brahman as the inner soul is predicated of the subject, namely, the world. Now this fact of Brahman being the soul of the world must be exactly elucidated. There are two alternatives: Does it mean that Brahman is the self of the world in terms of the relation of soul and body? Or is the world, identical in substance with Brahman? If the alternative that the world is identical with Brahman in substance is admitted, the attributes of Brahman, like the will that realizes itself unfailingly, asserted in the opening section itself, 'It thought, "Let me be many" (Chan. 6:2: 3)' get nullified. The second alternative of immanence as soul in the body, is specially made out in other passages of the scripture, 'He has entered into all creatures, he is the ruler of all creatures and he is the self of all (Tait. Ar.. 3:24)'. It means: He has entered into all creatures as their soul, being their ruler; therefore he is the self of all creatures and all creatures constitute his body. Thus Brahman being the self of all is definitely explained. There is another passage also to the same effect: 'He who dwells in the atman, who is in the atman, whom ;atman does not know, whose body the atman is, who rules the atman, know him, as your atman, the inner ruler, immortal (Brh. Ar. Ma. 5:7:22)'. Even in this very section, 'The atman, the jiva (Chan. 6:3:2)' the same idea is elucidated as set forth before. Therefore all the sentient beings and non-sentient objects being the body of Brahman, Brahman having all entities as its body, as its modes, is itself the subject denoted by all terms. Hence in the proposition embodying co-ordinate predication asserting identity between 'That' and 'Thou', Brahman itself, with the jiva as its mode, having the 'jiva as its body, is spoken of.

14. The meaning implied in such a manner of speaking is this: He the individual self, who was cognised previously as the controlling principle in the body, is just constitutive of the body of the highest Self and so is his mode. His existence reaches up to the highest Self. Therefore the term 'Thou' denotes the inner ruler qualified by the individual self as his mode. The Vedanta text, 'As this atman, the jiva, entering, I will differentiate names and forms (Chan. 6:3:2)', makes it clear that the individual self embodied as he is, can have his individual name only by virtue of Brahman being his indwelling soul. Hence both the terms 'That' and 'Thou' signify only Brahman. The term 'That' refers to Brahman, the cause of the world, the abode of all (perfections, the faultless and the immutable. The term 'Thou' refers to the same Brahman, the inner ruler in all individual selves, qualified by the jiva along with its body as its mode. Thus the two have different connotations and denote the same Brahman. The perfection, immutability, possession of all auspicious attributes and the causality in relation to the world are not denied of Brahman.

15. Men, unacquainted with Vedanta, do not see that all things and all individual selves have Brahman as their self. They think that all terms exhaust their significance by signifying the various objects by themselves, which objects are in reality a part and not the whole of the meaning of terms. Now by the study of Vedanta, they understand that all such objects are the effects of Brahman, that Brahman is the inner ruler of them all and that they are animated by Brahman as their very soul. Therefore they come to understand that all terms signify Brahman itself having as its modes the entities, to which latter alone the terms are applied in common usage.

16. 'In that case', it may be objected, 'the significance of term like cow in relation to what they normally denote in standard usage will stand negated'. Our reply is that no such results follow. All terms are denotative of the highest Self, which is qualified by inanimate nature and individual selves. This is what is urged in the text, 'I will differentiate names and forms (Chan. 6:3:2)'. In this matter ordinary people, while putting language to use, imagine that the denotation of terms is exhausted by their reference to the various

empirical objects they signify. But this is just a part of the range of the denotation that really belongs to terms. This restriction of the denotative significance is due to the fact that the principal part of the objective meaning of the term, namely the highest Self, transcends ordinary modes of cognition like perception. The study of Vedanta completes the understanding of the significance of terms (and does not cancel that significance as alleged).

17. Thus all Vedic terms denote their respective referents in such a way that the denotation stretches up to the highest Self. The highest Brahman brought forth the various beings of the world as before and took out the terms of the Vedas and applied them as before as names to those beings, which have their being in Brahman. Manu says, 'In the beginning He created the names of all actions and the different configurations even according to the words of the Veda (1:21)'. Configuration (*samsthana*) means form. Bhagavan Parashara says, 'In the beginning he set forth names, forms and duties of beings like the gods through the words of the Vedas themselves (Vi. Pu. 1, V, 63)'. The Vedas also declare, 'The Creator fashioned the sun and the moon as before'. It means that he fashioned entities like the sun is before and determined their names as before.

18. Thus the identity between the world and Brahman is explained. On this ground that all is known when the 'one' is known is accounted for. Since all entities are real only as the effects of Brahman and as ensouled by Brahman, it has been said, 'That is true'. In no other ways are they real. Just as, in the illustration of clay and its products, the products are real only as of the nature of clay, even so the world is real only as sustained by the indwelling Brahman.

19. The propositions determinative of the nature of Brahman, determine it as being devoid of imperfections and as full of auspicious attributes. Even if they are interpreted as determining Brahman through the negation of all else, that very negation must be based on positive grounds in the nature of Brahman. As these positive grounds of negation characterize Brahman, it is impossible to uphold that Brahman is without differentiating characteristics.

20. 'But', it maybe said, 'as it is laid down that Brahman is pure knowledge, we must admit that it is undifferentiated knowledge'. We reply that such a conclusion does not follow. Terms signifying attributes definitive of the substantive nature of an entity denote the substantive nature also through the connotation of such definitive attributes. This is so in the analogous cases of terms like 'cow'. The author of the Sutras (2:3:29-30) holds, 'As it is the essential attribute, the substance itself is designated thus, as in the case of the omniscient one', and 'There is no flaw in this procedure, as the attribute is co-terminus with the substance'. Through the attribute of knowledge, the substantive nature is also determined and mere knowledge is not Brahman. 'How is this construed? It may be asked. It is so construed because there is the passage, 'He who is all-knower and all-cognisor (Mun. 2:2:7)' making out that Brahman is a knower. There are hundreds of passages holding this position like the following: — "Transcendent and manifold power of his is sung in the scripture and also his inherent knowledge, strength and activity (Sve. 4:4:17)' and 'By what means can you know the knower? (Brh. Ar. 4:4:14)'. Further, knowledge is only an attribute and an attribute merely by itself cannot constitute an entity. Therefore, the terms like, 'Real, Knowledge' denote Brahman as characterized by the attributes they connote.

21. In the case of the terms ‘That and ‘Thou’ to hold that both terms signify the undifferentiated substratum through the elimination of the distinctive connotations of ‘That’ and ‘Thou’ is to reject their principal significance.

22. (Objection): Since unity of import is assured, there is no error in resorting to secondary meaning. Such is the case in the proposition, ‘This is he, that Devadatta’. Here by the word ‘He’ a person associated with a different time and place is meant. By the word ‘This’ a person associated with the present time and the immediate vicinity of the speaker is meant. The identity of the two persons is conveyed by the proposition of co-ordinate predication. Since the same person cannot be conceived simultaneously as being present in two contradictory points of space and time, both the terms signify only the substantive personality of the man and the sameness of the person is brought out.

23. (Reply): This account of the situation is wrong. There is not even the slightest recourse to secondary meaning in the case of the proposition, ‘This is he, that Devadatta’. This is due to the fact that there is no contradiction in the primary meaning. The same individual can, without any contradiction, be associated with actions in the past and the present. Presence at a different place is an event of the past. Presence in the immediate vicinity is an event of the present. Therefore there is no contradiction involved in positing the identity of the individual associated with activities of the past and present. The association with two different locations in space is free from contradiction on account of the difference in the time of such association. Even if the secondary meaning is adopted, both the terms should not be understood in that implied manner, because adoption of secondary meaning for one of the terms would resolve the contradiction. And we have urged that there is no secondary meaning whatever in the instance under discussion. The absence of the secondary meaning follows from the fact that no contradiction is involved in the association of an entity with a different point in space at a past instant and its association with another point at the present instant.

24. Thus even here, in the case of the aphorism, ‘That thou art’, Brahman the cause of the universe, being the self of the jiva, as its inner ruler, involves no contradiction whatever. It is Such unification of the import of terms in their natural significance that is brought out in co-ordinate predication (*samanadhikaranya*). The reference to the identity of the pure substratum, through the rejection of the natural significance of the co-ordinate terms, is not the meaning of co-ordinate predication. The experts on such matters define it thus: ‘The signification of an identical entity by several terms which are applied to that entity on different grounds is co-ordinate predication’. Our explanation of this instance entirely fulfils that principle. The identical import of terms taken in their natural signification is brought out by us.

25. Moreover, it is incorrect to construe the concluding proposition in a way that would stultify the initial declaration. The initial declaration is, ‘It thought “Let me be many” (Chan. 6:2:3)’ etc. It affirms that Brahman’s will is unfailingly realized and that it is the sole cause of the world. The opposite view will make Brahman the locus of nescience etc., and such imperfections as liability to nescience would flagrantly contradict the initial assertion of perfections.

26. Further, to proceed to a more general consideration, verbal testimony owes its authoritativeness to being made up of words and sentences corresponding to various referents of the words and their specific inter-relations. Hence verbal testimony of this nature can never communicate knowledge of an undifferentiated entity. Therefore verbal testimony cannot furnish the proof for such an entity. Even terms like ‘undifferentiated’

deny of the subject of discourse characteristics belonging to other entities and the subject would then be conceived as characterized by other characteristics. If they function otherwise, they impart no information whatever. Even a single word constituted of its root and affix embodies several determinate constituents of meaning and a sentence conveys the combination of such determinate meanings as it is a combination of words with determinate meanings.

27. It may be objected as follows: Now, we do not hold that scripture is a means for knowing about the undifferentiated and self-luminous Reality. The Reality being self-evident does not stand in need of any proof. The scriptural statements only serve to negate the differentiations like being the subject, object or process of knowing, which differentiations eclipses the self-luminous principle. When all such eclipsing differentiations are eliminated, the pure Reality, unconditioned and self-revealing, abides by its own right.

28. (Reply): This contention cannot stand. By what term is that reality indicated while negating the differentiations of it? It cannot be said that it is indicated by the term 'Pure Knowledge', for even that term points to a differentiated reality. That term contains within itself both a root and affix and thereby has a determinate import. It represents by its root 'jñā' a particular activity (of the mind), which is related to an object and belongs to a subject. The process of knowing differentiates itself from all other activities. All this reference to a subject and object and difference from other operations is embodied in the meaning of the root 'jñā' (to know) itself. The affix points out the other particulars like gender and number. Even if knowledge is self-evident, it must be self-evident as such, as being of this determinate nature. Otherwise it is in no way evident. Further, the self-evident character of knowledge is proved on the ground that it is the cause of the revelation of other things.

29. Moreover, if the entire nature of Brahman shines by itself always, it would be impossible that the properties of anything else could be superimposed on it. Surely when the nature of the rope is fully apprehended, the snake cannot be superimposed on it. It is precisely for this reason that you postulate a nescience, that is supposed to conceal the real. It is for this reason again, it should be held that scriptural knowledge destructive of the world-illusion, must be about that part of Brahman which is concealed. Otherwise it cannot destroy the illusion. Indeed the 'snakeness', superimposed on the rope can be eliminated only by the apprehension of its 'ropeness', which latter aspect is over and above that aspect of rope which was apprehended even through the illusion. If you admit some one differentiating attribute characterizing pure knowledge and admit that this attribute is connoted by the word standing for Brahman, the logical consequence would be that Brahman characterized by all the attributes, affirmed by all the scriptural texts, must be admitted. Therefore, for those who go by proofs, there is no proof for an undifferentiated reality.

30. Even in the case of indeterminate perception, an object distinguished by characteristics is apprehended. Otherwise in determinate perception the recognition of the characteristics previously observed (in the indeterminate perception) would not occur as in the perceptual judgement, 'This is he'. The characteristics like 'cowness' are of the nature of the structure (form) of the objects. In the state of indeterminate perception also, objects are apprehended as characterised by their structures as in the perceptual judgement, 'This of this character'. In the second and later apprehensions the commonness of the same form to other objects is cognised. The second and latter perceptions are designated determinate, because in them the possession of the same structure as their characteristic by many objects is grasped. For

the same reason, the view maintaining both the difference and the identity of things, and thus positing the (self-contradictory) twofoldness of reality stands rejected as untenable. Structure being the mode of a substance, is different from its Substantive essence. Because it is a mode, it does not exist independently of its substantive substratum. Because it is a mode, it is not cognised independently of the substance of which it is the mode. For these reasons, the twofold character is unity and difference cannot be affirmed of reality.

31. And again those who assert that Reality is un-differentiated and that particular characterizations eclipsing the self-luminous Reality are eliminated by scriptural texts must point out what such eliminating texts are.

(Objection): ‘On speech depend changes and names, but clay alone is true (Cha. 6:1:4)’ is what is stated. It means that modifications and names have no basis except mere words; and what is indicated there as the cause, is the only Reality and all else is unreal.

32. (Reply): If this be said, we urge that such an explanation is unreasonable. As the knowledge of the ‘one’ is declared to lead to the knowledge of ‘all’, the pupil questions the possibility of the knowledge of one entity leading to the knowledge of others. In reply it is maintained by the teacher that If one substance itself takes on, through actual modifications, a plurality of real forms, then the knowing of that one substance leads to the knowledge of its modifications, for though they have forms different from the causal form, there is continuity of substantive essence. For explaining this principle, the illustration under discussion is offered. It denies no differentiation as alleged. The text means as follows: “Through Speech” means through practical use commencing with verbal reference. ‘*Arambhana*’ means association. The clay having the form of a lump has a different name and different uses. The same clay having the form of a pot etc., for instance, has different names and different uses. Even then the same clay-substance takes different names, different forms and serves different purposes. Thus the substance, clay, is real all through. Thus the possibility of knowing one thing by knowing another is exemplified. That this passage negates nothing has already been explained.

33. If you were to argue that the proposition, ‘By which that which was not heard of, becomes heard of (Chan. 6:1: 3)’ etc., means that everything other than Brahman is unreal, we urge in reply that, in that case, the illustration of clay and its modification (Chan. 6:1:4) would not serve to establish that purport. That clay-products like a jar are unreal, like the snake-in-the-rope, is not a point that is obvious and well-known to Svetaketu through any other valid source of knowledge and reasoning. If it be said, ‘Even that point is sought to be established in this proposition’, we say that it cannot be the case for if so, reference to the illustration as a previously well-established matter would be impossible.

34. (Objection): But, by the two terms of exclusive emphasis in the phrases, ‘Being alone’ and ‘One only’ and by the expression, ‘Without a second’ all entities other than pure Being both of the same kind as well as of a different kind are repudiated.

(Reply): The reply to this is that the matter is not so. That the same substance is the cause in one state and is the effect in another state and that by the understanding of that substance in its causal state, we understand it as existing in another state also owing to the continuity of substance are the principles that are explained to Svetaketu with illustrations. Then the fundamental truth that Brahman is the cause of all, altogether unknown to Svetaketu, is introduced in the words, ‘Being itself, this was in the beginning’.

35. It means, 'This, in the beginning, was Being itself'. The words, 'In the beginning' signify a particular period of time, and the term 'was' signifies a particular mode of activity consisting of fusion with Being implying that the world has Being as its substantive essence. The words 'One only' signify that differentiations of names and forms were non-existent then. When these ideas are clearly laid down, it becomes manifest that the world has 'Being' as its material cause. In other cases of causation, the material cause requires an efficient cause other than itself. But in this case of cosmic causation the omniscient Brahman, being unique, transcendent and being distinguished from everything else, there is no contradiction involved in its being omnipotent. The words 'without a second' affirm the absence of another intelligent cause. This wholly follows from the omnipotence of Brahman. Some texts state first that Brahman is the material cause and then add that the efficient cause is also Brahman itself. To this class of texts belongs the present passage.

36. Other texts begin with the statement that Brahman is the efficient cause and then raise the question as to how it can be the material cause also and develop the answer that Brahman, being omnipotent, can be the material cause also and all other accessory causes as well. The following passage (Rig. 10:6:13:4) is an instance in point: 'What was the wood, what was the tree, from which they shaped the heaven and earth? You wise ones, search in your minds; where on fie stood, supporting the worlds? Brahman was the wood, Brahman the tree from which they shaped heaven and earth; you, wise ones, I tell you, he stood on Brahman, supporting the worlds'. The oneness of the material and efficient cause is questioned on the ground of the common conception of causation and is supported in answer, on the ground of the uniqueness and uncommon power of Brahman.

37. Therefore in the very statement, 'Being alone, this was in the beginning (Chan. 6:2:1)' several differentiations are affirmed in relation to Brahman by phrases like 'in the beginning'. There is not a single word whatever which negates distinctions as you desire. 'In the beginning' implies the existence of a specific time. 'Was' implies a specific mode of action. The attribute of being the material cause and the attribute of being the efficient cause are also ascribed to Brahman. The denial of the dualism of material and efficient causes brings in the all-accomplishing power of Brahman — Thus differentiations are posited in thousands, which are not matters of previous knowledge.

38. The passage propounds areal causal relation between Brahman and the world. Precisely for this reason it undertakes to refute the view that the effect does not pre-exist in the cause. To this effect is the section starting from, 'Non-being alone this was in the beginning (Chan. 6:2:2)'. It goes on, 'How can that be? If the effect, it is urged in criticism, does not pre-exist in its cause, its origination amounts to causeless origination. It asks, 'How can Being originate from Non-being?' That which originates from Non-being must be of the nature of Non-being, even as a product of clay is of the nature of clay. The origination of something that is already existent means just its passage into a new state in order to make a new use possible.

39. The position concerning causation out of the previous existence of the effect can be explained as follows: The same causal substance is called effect by passing into a different state. On this basis the knowledge of 'one' leading to the knowledge of 'all' was elucidated. That account of one knowledge leading to all knowledge is objected to by the theory of causation on which the effect does not pre-exist as I lie cause. That theory may be put thus: Out of the efficient, material and instrumental causes, a new substance, a new composite entity, other than all the causal factors comes into being. The entity that constitutes the effect is, in consequence, different from the entity constituting the

cause. Hence the knowledge of cause can, in no way, render the effects known. How can the novel composite entity be repudiated ? In reply to this it may be said that the causal substance (or substances) undergoes a change or enters into a new state of being according to all theories including the present theory asserting the origination of a new substance. This passage of the causal substance into a new state can itself account for the three factors, the unity of the effect, its bearing a new name and its capacity to serve a new purpose and such other factors to account for which the origination of a new entity is posited. And also no new substance is observed in the effect, over and above, the constitutive elements in a new state of being. For these reasons, it is maintained that the cause itself passing into a new state of being constitutes the effect.

40. (Objection): Now this is not the purport of the (Upanishad) discussion. The idea of the origination of a new substance in causation is repudiated just to establish that all illusion rests upon the substratum of reality. The only reality, pure consciousness, enmeshed in nescience appears falsely as the world. The reality of the primordial cause must be presupposed as furnishing the substratum for that nescience. It is for this purpose that the origination of the previously non-existent is disproved in the passage.

(Reply): This way of construing the text is not correct. The theory of the origination of an effect from its own previous existence becomes relevant to and its consideration is directly necessitated by the initial proposition about the knowledge of the one issuing in the knowledge of all and the illustrations offered in support.

41. On your theory it is impossible to maintain that an illusion rests on a real basis. If a thinker admits that a sentient being is subject to real defects, and that its liability to defects is real, then only can he account for the fact of illusion, the real defects producing the perception of unreal phenomena. But for a philosopher, according to whom the defects are unreal and the 'liability to defects is also unreal, it should not be impossible to admit an illusion on a fictitious basis as well. Therefore you cannot rule out the possibility of illusion resting on a fictitious substratum.

42. Coming to those passages in the Scriptures which aim at determining the nature of Brahman, the direction of interpretation has already been laid down. The definitive sentences like 'Brahman is real, knowledge and infinite (Tai. 2:2)' and 'Brahman is bliss (Tai. 3:6)' following the principle of co-ordinate predication, define Brahmin as characterized by plurality of qualities. There is no contradiction involved in the procedure. Brahman characterized by all the qualities is thus presented. If it be said that negation is conveyed in many ways as in the declaration, 'Then, therefore, the instruction is, "Not so, not so" (Brh. Ar. 4:3:6)' we urge that what exactly is negated here must be determined. If it is pointed out that the whole universe consisting of forms and formless principles as enumerated in the sentence, 'There are two aspects of Brahman that with form and that without, form (Brh. Ar. 4:3:1)' is negated here by the instruction 'Not so, not so', we contend that this is an unreasonable method of interpretation. After imparting the knowledge that all that, which from the normal empirical point of view is not known as an aspect of Brahman, constitutes an aspect of Brahman, to go on to negate It is surely a very unreasonable method of discourse. The rule is that 'it is better to avoid mire from a distance than to wash it off after staining oneself with it'.

43. Then, what is the import of this negative proposition ? The author of the Vedanta-Sutras (3:2:22) himself furnishes the interpretation: 'That the aforesaid principles exhaust the forms of Brahman is what is denied, just because the passage goes on to speak of the further glories of Brahman.' The further text of the Shruti is 'Then its name is "The real

of the reals”, for life-principles are real and this is more real than life-principles (Brh. Ar. 4:3:6)’. Thus further attributes are praised in the subsequent portions of the text. Therefore the text, ‘Not so, not so’ fundamentally means that Brahman is not confined to the aspects enumerated. Thus the finitude of Brahman is what is denied in the text in question.

44. If it be said that the dictum, ‘There is no plurality here (Brh. Ar. 6:4:19)’ and many other texts repudiate plurality, we explain as follows — The text adduced is followed immediately in the same discourse of the Upanishad by the glorification of the ‘Ruler of all, the Lord of all (Brh. Ar. 6:4:22)’. The subsequent texts assert that Brahman’s will comes true and that Brahman is the Lord of all. The truth is that the supreme ruler has all sentient and non-sentient entities as his body and has them as his modes. He is the sole lord of all existence. Plurality of existence as not sustained and ensouled by Brahman is repudiated in this passage. It is this plurality, antithetical to the assertion of the absolute supremacy of the highest Self that is denied. So this denial of plurality does not meet the requirements of your position. All texts of this character follow this fundamental principle. Nowhere, therefore, do we meet with a scriptural utterance that repudiates all differentiations.

45. Further you hold that pure undifferentiated knowledge is Brahman and having its essential nature veiled by the veiling nescience, it observes pluralities within itself. Now this is an untenable doctrine. Veiling means elimination of light. As you do not admit an attributive light distinct from the substantive nature of Brahman, and as you hold that the substantive nature of Brahman is this light of knowledge, the postulated elimination of light would be the destruction of the substantive nature of Brahman. If it be said, ‘Light here means knowledge. Knowledge is eternal. The light of knowledge is veiled by nescience, we say in reply that these are contentions indicative of immaturity of thought. If the light is concealed by nescience, this concealment should take one of these two forms: It must obstruct the generation of light or it must annihilate the existing light. Since you do not admit that this light is subject to processes like generation, the concealment posited can be nothing but annihilation. When you assert that it is eternal and immutable and it abides as such, you are saying in effect that though nescience is there, nothing is concealed in Brahman. In the same breath you say that Brahman observes plurality. Surely a doctrine like this cannot be submitted to the scrutiny of those who know.

46. (Objection): But you too must hold that the essential nature of the Atman is consciousness. Atman is self-luminous. To account for its wrong identification with the body, the concealment of the essential nature must be postulated. If the nature of an entity stands revealed, it is impossible that characteristics that do not belong to it can be wrongly attributed to it. Therefore, the difficulty, you urge against us, faces you also. Indeed the position is far worse for you. Since we maintain that there is only one self, the unaccountability urged, attaches to our account of that one single entity. As you uphold the existence of an infinite number of selves, you have to face this charge of unaccountability in your account of all those infinite number of entities.

47. (Reply): Our thesis about the Reality and the ways of knowing can be formulated in this way: The supreme Brahman is by its inherent nature antithetical to all imperfections. Its substantive nature consists solely of infinite knowledge and bliss. It is an ocean of exalted attributes which are natural to it and are all-surpassing in their excellence. Its glories are boundless and not tainted by mutations in time, time which is the operative principle of change in the form of origination, subsistence and destruction and consists of limitless number of units, like seconds, minutes, hours up to vast epochs. Brahman has as the instruments of its mighty sport and as forming its own parts an infinite number of

individual souls bound as well as free and also the physical universe, which latter has the power of passing through evolutions marvellous and boundless. Brahman is the inner ruler of the finite selves and the non-sentient nature. They form its body. It owns them as its modes. Such supreme Brahman is the reality to be known. The Veda, Rik. Yajus, Saman and Atharvan, branching forth thousand- fold, beginningless and endless in its unbroken tradition, embodying the ultimate truth, is the basis of philosophical knowledge. This, in all its three sections, namely, injunctions, explanations and hymns, is supported and interpreted by the Itihasas, Puranas, and Dharma Shastras, composed by the great sages, like Bhagavan Dvaipayana, Parashara, Valmiki, Manu, Yajñavalkya, Gautama and Apastamba, who have attained the direct vision of the supreme Brahman. This body of transcendent knowledge, interpreted and augmented in the supplementary sacred texts of these perfect sages, is the final authority. Can there be any insuperable difficulty for us, possessed of this magnificent conception of knowledge and reality?

48. Bhagavan Dvaipayana says in the Mahabharata:— ‘He who knows me, the birthless, and beginningless One, the supreme Lord of the worlds (Gita, 10:3)’ and ‘There are two persons in the world, the perishable and the imperishable. All creatures are the perishable *Purusha*. The immutable One is the imperishable *Purusha*. The *Purusha* who is other than and far surpassing these two is called the supreme Atman. He fills the three worlds and sustains them. He is the everlasting Godhead, (Gita, 15:26)’. ‘Time is subdued there by him. Time is not the master there. All these are places of punishment in contrast to the blessed region of the highest Atman’ and ‘All this, beginning from the unmanifested to the particular objects in creation, is subject to mutation and growth. Let all this be understood as the perishable embodiment of Hari’s cosmic play (Bha. Moksha, 25:9)’. ‘Krishna is the beginning and the end of all the worlds. The entire universe of animate and inanimate existences is for his sake (Bha. Sabha, 38: 23)’. The terms ‘for his sake’ mean that it has value only in being instrumental to him.

49. Bhagavan Parashara also says: ‘Maitreya, the name “*Bhagavat*” is applied to the pure One of infinite glory, to the supreme Brahman, who is the cause of all causes (Vi, 6:5:72)’ ‘The word “*Bhagavat*” signifies knowledge, power of action, sustaining strength, sovereignty (in rule), energy and radiance. It signifies these perfections in their entirety and also the total exclusion of evil attributes (Vi, 6:5:79)’. ‘Thus the great name “*Bhagavat*” denotes Vasudeva, the highest Brahman. It applies to none else. It also carries the significance of the word “adorable”. Its application to the highest One, Vasudeva, is direct and primary. When it is used for any one else, it is used in a secondary sense (Vi, 6:5:75)’. ‘Such is the ultimate ideal called “Vishnu”. It is pure, real, omnipresent, and imperishable. It transcends all evil (Vi. Pu. 1:22:53)’. ‘Time consisting of durational units like *kala* and *muhurta*, has no power of affecting his glory with change (Vi, 1:2: 84)’. ‘Look at him, sporting like a boy (Vi, 1:2:18)’.

50. Manu also voices forth the same truth: ‘He is the supreme law-giver for all. He is subtler than the subtlest (M.S.22:122)’. Yajñavalkya also says: ‘The individual spirit attains the highest purity through the knowledge of God (34)’. Apastamba has it thus: ‘All *pranis* are the *puh* of this One, the in dweller in all caverns (20:4)’. *Puh* means ‘city’. That means body. ‘*Pranis*’ means creatures which are material configurations ensouled by individual selves.

51. (Objection): But what is the use of all this flourish? Our criticism remains unanswered. (Reply): The answer follows. For us who hold this conception of Brahman and the Veda, the criticism has no force. Consciousness, we maintain, though an inherent attribute of the individual is subject to real contraction and expansion by the force of karma. Thus the

difficulty urged is eliminated. For you, consciousness is the substantive nature of the self and not its attribute. You do not admit either contraction or expansion. In our account, concealing factors like karma, bring about the non-origination of the spread of consciousness. If the nature of nescience is to veil, nescience, the agency that veils, must be, as urged before, destructive of the essential nature of consciousness itself. According to us karma, in the form of nescience, brings about the contraction of the consciousness that is an eternal attribute of the substantive nature of the atman. By virtue of this contraction arises the wrong attitude to the self, taking it for gods, men, or any other empirical creature.

52. This position has been laid down thus: ‘The third power is nescience called karma. By this, the all-penetrating power of the individual knower is over-powered. Hence it becomes subject to the persistent afflictions of samsara. Concealed by nescience, the power, called the individual knower, exists in all creatures in various grades (Vi. Pu. 6:7:61—63)’. Thus the scripture points out that nescience, called karma, causes the contraction and expansion of the consciousness which forms a natural attribute of the individual self.

53. (Objection): This principle of concealing nescience has been postulated for two reasons: Some sacred texts posit it and the teaching of identity between the jiva and Brahman necessitates it. It has been maintained that this nescience veils the nature of Brahman.

(Reply): Now, we argue that this nescience is also phenomenal and unreal. Just as the manifold world being unreal, can become an object of perception only owing to a defect, namely this nescience, this nescience also, being equally phenomenal, presupposes a defect to account for its becoming an object of perception. Therefore nescience itself cannot be considered the fundamental and original defect, at the root of all illusion. Thus you will be driven to regard Brahman itself as the root of all illusions. Even if nescience is considered beginningless, since it can be beginningless only as phenomenal and as such, only as an object of the perception of Brahman, and since you do not admit a real, non-phenomenal defects as its root, Brahman itself must be the source of the illusory perception of nescience. Brahman being eternal, it follows that there can be no liberation.

54. The foregoing refutes by implication the following also: Only one body is animated by a jiva. The other bodies are not so inhabited by jivas, as in the case of bodies seen in dreams. In dream, the body of the dreamer alone is ensouled. The many bodies that one observes in dreams are not ensouled. This one jiva of the dreamer fictitiously imagines the other jivas and their bodies as existing. Therefore all (other) jivas are unreal.

55. Really on your hypothesis, Brahman fictitiously sets up in imagination individuation and all bodies, both of which are other than its essential nature. Even in a single body, since the body and likewise the individuation of the jiva in it, are unreal, all bodies are unreal and the individuation of the jiva in all of them is unreal. This being the case, there is no meaning in attaching any speciality to a single body and the individuation of the self in relation to it. In our account of the matter, the dreamer’s body and the existence of the self in it, are not sublated in the waking state. The other bodies seen in dream and the individual souls embodied in them are sublated in the waking state. Therefore the latter are all unreal and the dreamer’s body and soul are real. Herein lies the distinction.

56. Further, how is nescience eliminated? What is the nature of the elimination? These questions should be discussed.

(Objection): The unitive knowledge is the means for putting an end to nescience. The nature of that elimination of nescience lies in its being antithetical to the 'indefinable' nescience and its effects.

57. (Reply): If this be your view, the following objection arises. To be antithetical to the 'Indefinable' is to be definable. The 'definable' must be either existent or non-existent or both. There is no fourth alternative. If this 'definable' termination of nescience is admitted to be other than Brahman, nescience (being the cause of the perception of everything other than Brahman) remains un-eliminated. If Brahman itself is this elimination of nescience, the former being eternally real, this elimination must also be held to have existed eternally. Thus the elimination of nescience remains an accomplished fact prior to the rise of the knowledge of Vedanta. In consequence your philosophy holding that the unitive knowledge eliminates nescience and that the absence of the knowledge constitutes bondage stands nullified.

58. And again, the knowledge effecting the elimination of nescience is also, on your theory, a particular form of nescience. Through what means is that specific form of nescience removed? 'This knowledge eliminating nescience, eliminates all differentiations first and then, being momentary, disappears by itself without any other cause bringing about its disappearance. There are instances of self-annihilation in nature, like forest-fire and poison administered to expel poison'. This argument is not open to you. This knowledge causing the termination of nescience is conceived by you as being other than Brahman. As such, its nature and the events connected with it like its origination and annihilation have only phenomenal existence. Therefore, the nescience, that consists in bringing about the perception of this phenomenal event, namely, the annihilation of the eliminating knowledge, continues to exist. You have to provide for the factor that eliminates the nescience which consists in the perception of the self-annihilation of the knowledge that brings about the elimination of cosmic nescience. In the case of forest-fire etc., what disappears continues to exist in states other than the previous one and this continuance in and through a chain of states obtains necessarily.

59. And now let us turn to the knower involved in the knowledge that negates everything other than Brahman, which is of the nature of pure consciousness. Is that knower the ego that emerges from the fictitious subject-object superimposition? That would be untenable, for that ego falls within the area of the object of negation and therefore cannot be the subject of negation. If it be said that the knower is Brahman itself, then the question arises whether that knowership of Brahman is real or superimposed. If it is superimposed, then this superimposition and the nescience at the bottom of the superimposition, remain falling outside the scope of the negating knowledge. If another means is posited for the negation of that superimposition and the nescience that is its basis, that means also must be knowledge and must therefore involve the three factors, knower, knowledge and the known. Further discussion about this new knowledge, which is inevitable, lands the argument in infinite regress. All knowledge, bereft of these three factors, loses the character of being knowledge. All knowledge is the apprehension of an object by a subject. Any knowledge that is not of this nature would be incapable of eliminating nescience, even as the consciousness constitutive of Brahman's nature — being devoid of this nature — is not capable of eliminating illusion. If you admit that the non-phenomenal nature of Brahman itself is to be the knower, you are accepting our theory itself.

60. The proposition that the knowledge that eliminates nescience and its effects and the knowership of the knower in that knowledge are also included in the body of what is eliminated sounds ridiculous like the proposition that 'Everything other than the floor

was cut by Devadatta and therefore in that process of cutting, the action of cutting, and the fact of Devadatta being a cutter, were also included in the body of what was cut’.

61. Now, what is the source of this knowledge of unity, which eliminates plurality? If it be answered that Shruti is the source, there is a difficulty. Shruti is different from Brahman and like everything else different from Brahman, it is a fabrication of nescience and therefore cannot give rise to the knowledge that negates the world. To explain: The illusion of snake generated by the deficiencies of the perceptual system, cannot be cancelled, by another cognition of the form, ‘This is a rope and not a snake’, if that cognition owes its own origin to similar deficiencies of the perceptual system. When there is fear proceeding from the illusion of snake, the speech of another person, who is himself the victim of an illusion and who is known to be such a victim, even if he were to say, ‘This is no snake, it is just a rope’, can remove neither the first illusory cognition nor the fear born of it. This applies to the present case, because to the competent student at the very time of his learning the Shruti, the Shruti is known to be different from the pure Brahman and hence to be a production by illusion.

62. It also follows as the knowledge that is to eliminate the cosmic illusion, the knower in that knowledge and the source of that knowledge, namely, the scriptures, are all different from Brahman and therefore liable to negation, the sublation of the world would be unreal and the world, the contradictory of the sublation, must be treated as real. The man seen in the dream may report one’s son’s death in the dream and his words being false, the son would be alive of necessity. And again, the passage like ‘That thou art’ are powerless to sublimate the world, for they are products of illusion, just as the speech of the deluded man, known as such, seeking to correct the illusory cognition of the snake by another is powerless to effect the correction.

63. But, it may be argued, ‘supposing a man is experiencing some terror in a dream. The terror will surely disappear, if in the same dream, the dreamer were to get the knowledge that the terror-causing experience was a mere dream. Even so is the situation here’. The explanation cannot be sustained. If in the same dream one were to get a further knowledge that the knowledge that removed the terror was itself a dream, the original terror will return and continue. Thus the explanation does not improve the position. The basis of the objection is the fact that even during the learning of the scriptures, it is being learnt by the student that the scriptures are also illusory like dreams.

64. A further point is made by you: Though the scriptures are fabrications of illusion and therefore unreal, the content of the scriptures, ‘Pure Being’, happening to be unsublated in later experience, they do impart the knowledge that ‘Brahman is absolute existence, one without a second, (Chan. 6:2:1)’. This is also illogical. The doctrine upholding ‘*shunya*’ (nothingness or the void) as the ultimate, furnishes the sublation of the content of the scriptures as described by you. You cannot urge that the doctrine of ‘*shunya*’ originates from error, for the sacred texts also like, ‘Brahman is absolute existence, one without a second’ are products of error according to your own view. The distinction lies in the fact that only the assertion of ‘*shunya*’ is free from subsequent sublation. The upholders of the doctrine of ‘*shunya*’ and those who deny the reality of everything other than Brahman have no right to philosophy; for they both refuse to admit the reality of the sources of knowledge, on which, they base their systems. This has been pointed out by the revered teachers: ‘The philosophers of “*shunya*” have no right to dialectics, because they have no means of knowledge.’

65. By what means of knowledge is it established that the world revealed by perception is unreal? If it is contended that perception is tainted by a defective origin and that its deliverances can be accounted for without admitting their truth, while the sacred scripture is flawless in origin and its deliverances cannot be accounted for except by the admission of their truth and therefore scriptural knowledge can sublimate perception, it is necessary for the completion of the argument to specify the exact defect that falsifies perceptual experience which presents to us the world of measureless multiplicity. You describe the defect as the beginningless pluralistic predilection. But alas ! the sacred scripture also, on your hypothesis, suffers from the same defect. Since the radical defect is common, it is impossible that one of the two, scripture and perception, can bring about the sublation of the other.

66. Our own method of adjusting the claims of these sources of knowledge is free from these inconsistencies. Perception is the apprehension of elements like ether and air and their products possessing properties like touch and sound and existing in forms like that of men, animals and other objects. The theme of scriptures comprehends principles not determinable by perception. They are the nature of Brahman, characterized by infinite attributes, like omniscience, the pervasive immanence in all as their ultimate self and absolute reality, the various modes of worship of Brahman like devout meditation, the attainment of Brahman and the attainment of the summum bonum, following that meditation and issuing out of the grace of Brahman and the particular methods of suppressing and eliminating the root of all evil, which consists in going contrary to Brahman.

67. The thinkers who hold that the scripture is superior to other means of knowledge, on the ground of innumerable excellences like its enjoying unbroken continuity of tradition, without beginning and end are obliged, logically, to admit the veracity of perception. The theory under discussion is inherently weak, being a vicious view proceeding from unsound logic. It is further assailed by hundreds of Vedic declarations. As its critical examination conducted so far is quite ample, we conclude its refutation.

68. The second view admits no entities besides Brahman and the limiting adjunct. Hence the limiting adjunct must operate on Brahman itself. All the imperfection arising out of the operation of the limiting adjunct must affect Brahman itself, as they arise within it. In consequence, the texts speaking of Brahman being free from sin and other imperfections, get nullified.

69. (Objection): It may be argued that the universal space is different from space conditioned by a jar, because the latter is limited. There is thus a difference between universal space and the limited space contained in a jar. The merits or defects pertaining to the limited space do not affect the universal space. Even so is the case in the present context. The imperfections belong to the individual self, whose distinction from all else is determined by the limiting adjunct. The unconditioned Brahman is free from these imperfections.

(Reply): We answer that the explanation is not correct — Space being partless and non-composite, cannot be divided. The limiting conditions like the jar cannot break it up into parts. Therefore the universal space itself is in conjunction with the conditions like the jar. Similarly Brahman being invisible, the limiting conditions must condition Brahman itself.

70. If you maintain that the part of space conditioned by the jar is distinct from other parts of space, a fresh difficulty crops up. The universal space is one and the jar is not fixed to any one part of it. If the jar is moved, it conditions different parts of space at successive moments without any fixities of conjunction to or separation from any part of space. On the same principle, the limiting machinery, the cause of bondage, when in motion must come in conjunction with different parts of Brahman without any fixity of association. These parts are *ex-hypothesi* mutually distinct. The upshot of this is the implication that the limiting condition is actually in conjunction with Brahman invariably, not with any particular part thereof and that every moment, when the limiting physical machinery of the body is in motion, there must be spontaneous release and bondage respectively for the part of Brahman from which the machinery moves and the part of Brahman to which it moves.

71. (Objection): The impartite space itself is the organ of hearing; but still the organ of hearing is a well-determined part of space and not the whole space indefinitely. On the same principle the phenomenon of individuation can be explained.

(Reply): If this be said, we do not accept the explanation. Space by itself is not the organ of hearing. Only that part of space, which is conjoined with the region of the ear which is influenced by a particular kind of air, constitutes the organ of hearing. Even if there is no fixity of conjunction between any part of space and the region of the ear, there is no difficulty in accounting for the location of the organ of hearing in a particular part of space. Just as space, without any fixity of points of contact, comes in conjunction with the moving organisms, Brahman's parts also must be conceived as coming in conjunction with the moving limiting adjuncts without any definiteness and fixity of one to one conjunction.

72. The phenomenon of specific location of the organ of hearing in space has been explained, assuming for the sake of the argument, the theory that space becomes the organ of hearing. But, as a matter of fact, space (or ether) does not constitute the organ of hearing. The Vedic view is that the eleven senses are the products of the *vaikarika* (sattvika) *ahankara*. It has been so enunciated by Bhagavan Parashara:— 'Some say that the senses are *taijasa* (products of *rajasika ahankara*). But in reality, the ten senses and the mind, the eleventh sense, are *vaikarika*'. The meaning of the verse is as follows: There are three kinds of *ahankaras* — *vaikarika*, *taijasa* and *bhutadi*. They are *sattvika*, *rajasik* and *tamasik* respectively. Elements like space (*akasha*) are produced by *bhutadi ahankara* in the order of creation. A *prima facie* view holds that the eleven senses are produced by *taijasa*. But the correct view, upheld by the author, is that the eleven senses are products of *vaikarika ahankara*. By the term 'devas' in the text the senses are meant. That the senses, which are the products of the *vaikarika ahankara*, are satisfied and nourished by the elements like *akasha* (and are not produced by them) is laid down in the Mahabharata.

73. Even if the senses are the products of the elements, there is no difficulty in accounting for the determinate localization of the senses, just as there is no difficulty with regard to bodies, also products of the elements. But Brahman indivisible, non-composite and changeless, becomes, on this theory, subject to the evil of conjunction with an infinite number of limiting conditions without any determinate localization of effects. There is no way of escaping this consequence. The theory is only for the consumption of the believers and can withstand no open-minded inquiry. The wise, learned in the philosophical sciences, do not have any esteem for it.

74. This school admits that the substantive nature of Brahman is liable to mutation. The Vedic affirmations of the immutability and perfections of the ultimate are thereby negated.

If it be said that only the shakti or power of Brahman undergoes change, we ask what this shakti is. Is shakti a modification of Brahman? Or is it something indefinable but not different from Brahman? Both these definitions would inevitably imply the mutability of Brahman in its substantive nature.

75. The third standpoint also maintains that there is both identity and difference between Brahman and the jiva. The position is similar to that of the sage Saubhari, said to have been embodied in several bodies simultaneously. It is also similar to that of God in relation to his multiplicity of incarnations. In that case, the evils attaching to the individual selves would affect the supreme Self itself. The explanation of the school is that God himself, in his own essential nature exists as the individual selves of the various species— gods, men, animals and plants and so on. Thus is the universal selfhood of God explained. But the various uses to which the many products of one lump of clay are put are really the uses of clay-substance itself. In the same way the joys and sorrows that happen to individual selves would all be joys and sorrows of God himself.

76. (Objection): That part of the substance, clay, which has not been used for making any of the articles like jar, remains unconnected with the effects of those products of clay. In the same way the part of God not involved in the formation of the individual selves like those of gods and men, remains in his uncompromising majesty, omniscient and full of auspicious attributes like having his will always fulfilled.

(Reply): We admit your explanation and urge the consequence of that explanation, that the same God is full of perfection in one part of his being and in another part he is equally full of imperfections. Both are equally parts of God.

77. If you say that the two parts of God are distinct and that there is no overlapping, we ask, 'What is the gain thereby?' When the same person is eternally miserable in one part, his being happy in a different part, cannot raise him to the status of the supreme Godhead. Suppose one, Devadatta, has one of his arms bedecked with superfine jewels and perfumed and anointed with sandal paste, while the other arm is hammered and placed in deadly flames. Such is the predicament of God in this theory. In the final estimate, this theory of identity and difference is more unholy than even the view that ascribes nescience to Brahman; for the unlimited sorrow of transmigratory existence is taken as real and that transmigratory existence will never cease as an infinite number of individual selves are posited.

78. If you were to say that the jiva-part is different from the other part which is God, you are adopting our own way of thought. This error results from your taking the identity taught in the Upanishads as identity of essential substance. If that identity is interpreted in terms of the relation of body and soul, between the individual self and the supreme Spirit, there is absolutely no error. Not merely is there no error, but there is also the merit of fully elucidating the great attributes of God involved in his sustaining the entire universe as its Ruler. And further, the passages embodying co-ordinate predication are taken in their direct and primary import.

79. Further, an entity cannot have, as already stated identity-cum-difference because of the essential self-contradictoriness of such a character. If a jar is different from a piece of cloth, it means that the piece of cloth does not exist in the jar. If it is identical with it, the piece of cloth must exist in the jar. Such being the nature of the case, the same entity, at the same time, in the same point of space, being the locus of both the existence and non-existence of another entity, is a sheer contradiction. It is said that the two entities are one

by virtue of the same universal inherent in both of them and different by virtue of their individuality, as individuals. Even on that supposition the contradiction is not removed. If the universal 'cowness' is identical with the individual cows like the one without horns and the one with broken horns, then the cow without horns must be one with the cow with broken horns. And again, if the universal 'cowness' is both identical with and different from the individuals, contradiction is inevitable, for, in so far as the universal is the same as the individuals, the cow with broken horns and the one without horns must be one and the same and in so far as the universal is different from the individuals, the two must be different like a horse and a buffalo.

80. Features of objects like the universal are the configurations of those objects and their modes. The objects and their modes are distinct as categories, and the mode does not exist apart from the object of which it is the mode. Nor is the mode cognised independent of the object. The configuration is inherent in several objects as their mode. These are considerations already enunciated. When we judge of any entity as 'This is that one', the sameness of the mode characterizing many objects is the basis, as in the judgement, 'This one is also a person holding a staff'. The mode of a substance consisting of features like the universal is described as the distinguishing character of the substance. It is the possession of such a mode that furnishes the ground for the proposition, 'This object is different'. Such a mode, supplying the ground for differentiating the entity in which it inheres from other entities, differentiates itself also from all else. It is capable of this twofold function of differentiation, just as consciousness is revelatory of the objects of consciousness and is also self-revelatory. It is for this reason that theories holding that 'perception is the apprehension of pure being and perception is not the apprehension of difference' stand refuted. They are untenable because in perception there is the apprehension of an entity only as characterized by its configuration consisting of features like its universal and the same configuration becomes the ground of the subsequent differentiation of the entity from others on the part of the cognisor in the light of his subsequent acquaintance with other entities. The error of imputing mutation to the substantive nature of Brahman has already been exposed.

81. 'He, who dwells in the earth, who is in the earth, whom the earth does not know, whose body the earth is and who rules the earth from within, he is thy atman, the inner controller immortal (Brh. Ar. 5:7: 3)', 'He who dwells in the self, who is in the self, whom the self does not know, whose body the self is and who rules the self from within, he is thy atman, the inner controller the immortal (Brh. Ar. 5:7:22). 'He who moves within the earth, whose body the earth is, whom the earth does not know' etc. and 'He who moves within the imperishable, whose body the imperishable is, whom the imperishable does not know, he who moves within death, whose body death is, whom death does not know, he is the inner Self of all beings, free from all imperfections, the Divine, the sole God, Narayana (Su. 7)', 'There are two birds always together, two friends; they live on the same tree; of them, one tastes sweet pippala fruit and the other not eating, shines (Mu. 3:1:1)', 'The Self of all, who has entered into all, the Lord of all created beings (Tait. Ar. 3: 21)', 'Having created that, it entered into it, having entered it, it became the living and the non-living; aye! having become the real and the unreal, it remained the real (Tai. 2: 6)', 'Entering, as this atman, the jiva (Chan. 6:3: 2)', 'Comprehending the Self and the directing Supreme, as different, he gains the grace of the Supreme and attains immortality (Sve. 1;12)', 'Having comprehended the experiencer of pleasures and pains, the objects of his experience and the directing Supreme, the whole of this threefold Brahman is described by me (Sve. 1;25)', 'The one eternal Spirit who fulfils the desires of the many eternal selves (Sve 2:5:13)', 'He is the Master of primordial nature and of the individual selves. He is the Lord of qualities (Sve. 6: 33)', 'There are two unborn ones, one of them is ignorant and the other knows,

one is the Lord and the other is the ruled (Sve. 1:17)'; such Shruti texts abound in hundreds. There are supporting supplementary texts also with the same purport: 'The whole universe is thy body; your stability has become the earth (Ra. 6:120:26)', 'In all cases of creation, whatever may be the created being and whoever may be the creator, ultimately all that is responsible for the creation is the body of Hari (Vi. Pu. 1:20:38)', 'I am the atman, O Arjuna, as dwelling in the hearts of all (Gita, 10:20)', 'I am established in the hearts of all. From me emanate remembrance, knowledge and ratiocination (Gita, 15:15)'; such are the words of the sages, like Valmiki, Parashara and Dvaipayana, who are the best among the knowers of the Vedas. From both the Vedas and the words of the sages, emerges the following teaching: The supreme Brahman is the self of all. The sentient and non-sentient entities constitute its body. The body is an entity and has being only by virtue of its being the mode of the soul of which it is the body. The body and soul, though characterized by different attributes do not get mixed up. From all this follows the central teaching that Brahman, with all the non-sentient and sentient entities as its modes, is the ultimate. The scriptures declare this glory of Brahman by saying that Brahman has the whole universe as its body. They also identify Brahman and the world in the manner of co-ordinate predication, which bears in this connection direct and primary meaning.

82. Co-ordinate predication is the application of two terms to a single entity through connotation of its two modes. On our view co-ordinate predication is given its straight and primary significance. To explain: In the passage affirming identity 'That thou art', the term 'that' signifies Brahman, as the cause of the world, as the abode of all perfections. By the term 'thou' also, denotative of the individual self, Brahman itself is signified as the inner ruler of the jiva, as possessed of it as its body, as existing within the jiva as its self and as possessing the jiva as its mode. On all other theories, two glaring errors ensue, namely, that of giving up the governing principle of co-ordination and of ascribing evil to Brahman itself.

83. When we say, 'Brahman exists thus', the term 'thus' signifies the mode in which the subject, Brahman, exists. Now the universe of sentient and non-sentient entities, in both its gross and subtle states, forms the meaning of the term 'thus' as it forms the mode of Brahman. It is only from this standpoint that the passage, 'Let me become many, let me grow forth (Chan. 6:2:3)' becomes meaningful. Ishvara exists as the cause and as the effect, assuming diversity of forms. The sentient and non-sentient entities constitute those forms.

84. (Objection): 'But only the generic character (universal) and attributes are seen to be modes of things and to constitute the meaning of the term 'thus'. No substance ever becomes such a mode and the meaning of the term 'thus'. Therefore, substances, capable of independent existence, cannot be the meaning of the term 'thus' in relation to Ishvara; nor can they be his modes'.

(Reply): Even substances like a staff or ear-ring can become modes of other substances as implied in terms '*dandin*' (man holding a staff) and '*kundalin*' (man wearing ear-rings).

85. (Objection): The cases instanced are different from the one under consideration. When a substance itself is a mode of another substance, an affix indicative of possession is used (indicative of the meaning of 'having') as in the examples of staff-bearer and ear-ring-wearer. Therefore the individual selves and physical entities, being substances, cannot be mere modes of Ishvara, like 'cowness' in relation to a cow and the terms standing for them cannot signify God (without the aforesaid affix) as it is contended.

(Reply): The terms, cow, horse, man and god signify substances, brought about by specific combination of basic material elements. They are material products and substances. So both in empirical usage and Vedic usage, the terms used for them are put in apposition with terms representing the souls embodied in them, as they are just modes of those individual selves. We say, ‘Devadatta, owing to particular merit is born a man, Yajñadatta, owing to sinful actions in the past, is born a cow, another soul, owing to excessive merit, is born a god’. Thus the bodies being the modes of the souls, the terms representing the bodies are equated with those signifying the souls and are treated as standing for the souls themselves.

86. The central principle is this: Whatever exists only as an attribute of a substance — be it a generic character or a quality or a substance itself, there being no speciality attached to any category in this matter — that being inseparable from that substance, as its mode only, can be designated as one with that substance. But if a substance, capable of independent being, comes to from a mode of another substance contingently at only some points of space and time, the term signifying the modal substance can signify the basic substance through the use of the possessive affix. Thus all substances, sentient and non-sentient, have reality and being only as constituting the body and thus as forming the modes of Ishvara Ishvara. Ishvara, having them as his mode, is designated by the terms denotative of them. Thus the co-ordinate propositions are quite appropriate. All this has been already expounded in the course of the interpretation of the passage dealing with the differentiation of names and forms.

87. Therefore, Brahman itself is the effect as it exists having for its mode the configurations consisting of *Prakriti*, individual selves, *mahat*, *ahankara*, *tanmatra*, elements, senses and the product of these, the cosmic sphere of Brahma, made up of the fourteen worlds, and the varied forms of being like gods, men and animals, and plants. The knowledge of Brahman in its causal state leads to the knowledge of all. The idea of the knowledge of the ‘one’ leading to the knowledge of all, becomes, thereby, perfectly intelligible. Through a consideration of the principles like causation, the great truth that Brahman is the self of all, as all sentient and non-sentient entities are its modes, is propounded.

88. (Objection): It has been maintained by you that highest Brahman is not subject to modification in its substantive nature; otherwise the sacred texts proclaiming that highest Brahman as changeless and flawless are contradicted. In the same breath, it is maintained by you that the Supreme person is the material cause of the universe in accordance with the aphorism, ‘It is the material cause, on account of the opening declaration and the illustrations cited (B.S. 1:4:24)’, on the authority of the Upanishad declaration of one knowledge leading to all knowledge and the illustrations of clay and its products etc., cited. To be a material cause is to be subject to modification. How can these two conflicting assertion be both true ?

89. (Reply): (Brahman) inclusive Of individual selves and the universe is maintained to be the cause as a whole. If Ishvara is admitted to transform himself into the individual self, the aphorism, ‘The self is not originated, because the scripture denies origination of the self and also because the scriptural texts speak of the eternity of the self (B.S. 12:3:19)’ is contradicted. The ascription of partiality and cruelty to Ishvara is repudiated on the ground of the beginninglessness of the individual selves and the responsibility of their karma for the inequalities and sufferings of individuals. The aphorisms connected with this issue are, ‘Partiality and cruelty are not to be ascribed to Brahman, because of the dependence on karma’, and ‘If it be said, “There is no karma, as there was no differentiation” we deny that

supposition on the ground of beginninglessness; it is reasonable and so found in actuality (B.S. 2;1:35-36)'. It is also pointed out that if the individual self were to be non-eternal, there would be actions, unproductive of fruits and experiences of fruits of action, uncaused by action.

90. In the same way the texts state that *Prakriti* is also beginningless: 'There is one who is unborn, has red, white and black colours and gives birth to many creations similar in form. One "unborn one" abides with her, happy in her company and another "unborn one" abandons her having experienced the pleasures and pains she could give (Sve. 4:5)' This passage points out the unoriginated existence of both the finite selves and nature. 'From that the magician fashions the entire world and another is imprisoned in the magic; know *Prakriti* to be *Maya*, the wielder of *Maya* is the great Lord (Sve. 4:9-10)'. It is pointed out here that *Prakriti* is subject to change in its essential being. 'The cow, without a beginning and end, is the creatrix fashioning all beings'.

91. The Smritis also say, 'Know that *Prakriti* and *Purusha* are both beginningless (Gita, 13:19),. 'The earth, water, fire, air, ether, mind, intellect and ego, these eight constitute a distinct *Prakriti* of mine. This is my inferior *Prakriti*. There is a superior *Prakriti* of mine. That, know thou, O Arjuna, is of the nature of the jivas, by which this world is sustained (Gita, 7:4)', 'Utilizing my own *Prakriti*, I release them into being again and again (Gita, 9:8)', 'Supervised by me the supreme supervising power, *Prakriti* brings forth the world of moving and non-moving beings (Gita, 9:10)'.

92. Now *Prakriti* also constitutes the body of Ishvara. Therefore, the term '*Prakriti*' denotes Ishvara, who is the inner self of *Prakriti* and has *Prakriti* as his mode. The term '*Purusha*' also denotes Ishvara, who is the inner self of the *Purusha* and has *Purusha* as his mode. Therefore, Ishvara is the indwelling self of the modification of *Prakriti* as well as *Purusha*. This truth is recorded thus: 'The manifested nature is Vishnu. Even so the unmanifested nature is Vishnu. The individual self is Vishnu. Time is Vishnu (Vi. Pu. 1:2:18)' and 'He, the supreme Lord is the agitator as well as the agitated (Vi. Pu. 1:2:31)'. Thus in the supreme Self, characterized by *Prakriti* as his mode, there is change in the aspect of the mode consisting of *Prakriti*, and changelessness in the substantive aspect, in which the mode is inherent. In the same way, in the highest Self, characterized by the individual self as his mode, there are imperfections in, the aspect of the mode consisting of the individual self, while in the substantive aspect, in which, the mode is inherent, he is the ruler, free from flaws, the abode of all auspicious attributes and has a will that unflinchingly realizes itself. Thus it is the supreme Lord, that exists in the causal state and again it is he, that exists in the state of the effect, as the world, of which the material cause is the supreme Lord himself. In this manner the identity between cause and effect is to be comprehended and thus all utterances of the sacred scriptures are rendered free of contradiction.

93. Brahman is in the causal state, when its body consists of the individual selves and physical nature, in their subtle condition not distinguishable by differentiations of name and form. The passage of the world to this phase of existence is what is termed 'dissolution'. Brahman, having as its body, the individual selves and nature, in their gross manifested condition distinguished by differentiations of names and forms is in the state of the effect. The assumption of this manifestation and grossness of aspect is described as 'creation'. So says Bhagavan Parashara: 'He is the cause of the effects, the unoriginated *pradhana* and *Purusha* (Vi. Pu. 1:9:37),.

94. Therefore, terms denotative of primordial nature and individual selves, in all their states of being, are denotative, in the primary sense itself, of the highest Self, of which *Prakriti* and *Purusha* are the modes and which exists having them as its modes. So do terms denoting bodies denote the individual selves indwelling in them. Terms like gods and men, denoting the varied physical bodies, signify in their primary signification, the individual selves, of which the bodies form modes and forming modes of which they possess existence. So the sentient and non-sentient beings forming bodies of the Supreme and thus acquiring their existential status as the modes of the Supreme, all terms denotative of them are denotative of the Supreme in their principal signification.

95. This is the fundamental relationship between the Supreme and the universe of individual selves and physical entities. It is the relationship of soul and body, the inseparable relationship of the supporter and the supported, that of the controller and the controlled, and that of the principal entity and the subsidiary entity. That which takes possession of another entity entirely as the latter's support, controller and principal, is called the soul of that latter entity. That which, in its entirety, depends upon, is controlled by and subserves another and is therefore its inseparable mode, is called the body of the latter. Such is the relation between the individual self and its body. Such being the relationship, the supreme Self, having all as its body, is denoted by all terms.

96. So declare the Vedas with massive unanimity: 'That Goal which all the Vedas reveal (Ka. 2:95)' and 'That in which all the Vedas become one (Tait. Ar.. 3:11)'. The meaning of all the Vedas becoming one is that all the Vedas are unanimous in their import as that 'one' is their purport. The one God existing in the many (Tait. Ar..3:14)' and 'The gods do not comprehend Him, who is verily with them (Tait. Ar..3:11)'; here the word 'gods' means the senses. The senses including the mind of all beings like gods and men, do not comprehend him, who is verily with them, being the inner ruler and the very soul of all the beings like gods and men.

97. Similar is the drift of the Puranas: 'We bow down in obeisance to that, in which all words are eternally established (Vi. Pu. 1:14:3)'. In the entity signified are the words established truly. 'The prior cause of all effects, the best significance of words (Jitante stotra, 7)' and 'I am the one theme of all the Vedas (Gita, 15:95)'; All words signify the inner ruler characterized by the individual souls, along with their bodies. Indeed the Vedanta text has it, 'Entering these three deities, as the atman, the jiva, I will differentiate names and forms'.

98. So are the words of Manu: 'Let one know the controller of all, subtler than the subtlest, of the radiance of gold, the supreme Person, who is comprehended by the intelligence operative in dream (M.S.12:122)'. The various descriptions mean as follows. 'The controller of all' means one who has entered into all beings as their inner ruler and thus controls them all. 'Subtler than the subtlest' means that the individuals are subtle as they pervade all the non-sentient existence and he pervading even the individual selves is subtler than they. 'Of the radiance of gold' means that he has the colour of the sun. 'To be comprehended by the intelligence operative in dream' means that intelligence, like that in dream-consciousness, can comprehend him. That means that meditation which has developed the vividness of the clearest perception, is the instrument for attaining him. 'Thus some say he is Agni, others say he is Prajapati, others again say that he is Indra, while some others say he is Prana. Others say that he is the eternal Brahman (Ma. 12:123)'. 'Some' means the Vedic passages. The meaning of the whole text is that like the term 'Eternal Brahman' all the terms like Agni also signify the supreme Brahman only, on the principle formulated, because, as the controller and self of all, he abides within all. Other

Smṛti texts carry the same purport like in following: ‘Those who worship the manes, gods, Brahmins along with their sacred fire, worship indeed Vishnu himself, who is the inner self of all beings (Daksa)’. The terms like manes, gods, Brahmins and fire signify the entities so named in ordinary discourse and through them ultimately name Vishnu himself who is the inner soul of all beings.

99. The heart of the whole Shastra is this: The individual selves are essentially of the nature of pure knowledge, devoid of restriction and limitation. They get covered up by nescience in the shape of karma. The consequence is that the scope and breadth of their knowledge is curtailed in accordance with their karma. They get embodied in the multifarious varieties of bodies from Brahma down to the lowest species. The knowledge is limited in accordance with their specific embodiment. They are deluded into identification with their bodies. In accordance with them they become subject to joys and sorrows, which, in essence constitute what is termed ‘the river of transmigratory existence’. For these individual selves, so lost in samsara, there is no way of emancipation, other than surrender to the supreme Lord. For the purpose of inculcating that sole way of emancipation, the first truth to be taught by the Shastra is that the individual selves are not intrinsically divided into several kinds, like gods, men, etc., and that they are fundamentally alike and are equal in having knowledge as their essential nature. The essential nature of the individual self is such that it is wholly subservient and instrumental to God and therefore God is its inner self. The nature of the supreme Being is unique, on account of his absolute perfection and absolute antithesis to everything that is evil. God is the ocean of countless, infinitely excellent attributes. The Shastras further assert that all sentient and non-sentient entities are sustained and operated by the supreme Being. Therefore, the Supreme is the ultimate self of all. They teach meditation along with its accessory conditions as the means for attaining him.

100. That these are the quintessential principles may be substantiated: ‘The self is filled with nirvana; and is filled with knowledge and is pure. Sorrow, ignorance and impurity are the properties of matter and not of the self (Vi. Pu. 7:7:22)’. The latter are contingent, having been brought about by karma, which is due to association with matter. They are not due to the inherent characteristics of the self. By the method of difference, they are stated to be the properties of matter.

101. ‘The wise look upon as equal one blessed with knowledge and humility, a mere brahmin, a cow, an elephant, a dog and an outcaste (Gita, 5:18)¹. The wise are those who can distinguish the essential nature of the self even though it is associated with any of the varied kinds of bodies, like the heavenly, human, animal and plant. They are enlightened about the nature of the self, as transcending the varied and specialized modifications of material nature. They discern the equal nature of all selves, embodied in the most unequal and dissimilar material forms. Therefore they are said to have the vision of equality.

102. It is further said, ‘Those whose minds are established in equality, have overcome bondage even while here. The Brahman is stainless and equal. Therefore they are established in Brahman (Gita, 5:19)’; ‘stainless’ means freed from the stain that consists in being associated with the various material forms. All selves, existing in their intrinsic and original character, have only knowledge of the nature of nirvana as their essential form and therefore are equal.

103. Further, the individual self, so constituted, is wholly subservient to the Lord and is controlled by him and has him as its sole support. This idea has been expressed by Shruti, Smṛti, Itihāsa and Purāna through the description of the individual self as the body

of Brahman and through statements affirming the identity of the individual self and Brahman. All this has been explained before.

104. ‘This *Maya* of mine, characterised by the qualities of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, being divine, cannot be crossed. Those who surrender to me only are the ones that cross this *Maya* (Gita, 7:14); the individual self, of the character described above, knows no emancipation from this bondage, of the nature of association with physical forms characterized by the various qualities which has been brought about by karma, except by surrender to the Supreme. The Shruti also says, ‘There is no other way for this goal (Pu.Suk. 17)’.

105. ‘By me, of the imperceptible form, is all this permeated. All beings have their being in me and I do not have my being in them. And again, they do not have their being in me. See this transcendent power of mine, the power of Ishvara (Gita, 9:4-5)’; as the Supreme has all powers, its control of the cosmos is surpassingly wondrous. The text says, ‘Controlling all this universe by a mere part of myself I abide (Gita, 10:42)’. The meaning of this is, ‘I have entered this infinitely variegated and wondrous universe as its inner self by an infinitesimal part of myself and control all by mere will. In this form I abide, possessed of infinite and immense glory, an ocean of exalted attributes and an unsurpassed wonder’.

106. The mystery of the Divine is further praised, ‘Who can comprehend that incomprehensible form of Brahman, which being one, is many and being many, is one’. God is one as the ruler of the universe. But he enters into all spiritual and physical entities as their inner self, appropriates them as his wondrous forms and modes and causes wondrous activities. Thus he flourishes in a plurality of forms. Having thus entered into this wondrous and manifold universe by an infinitesimal part of himself as its inner soul and controlling it all, though God stands in a plurality of forms, he remains absolutely one, the repository of infinite and surpassingly perfect attributes, the Lord of lords, the highest Brahman, the supreme Person, Narayana; Narayana, who is the supreme marvel, who is like the blue cloud, with eyes wide and pure like the petals of lotus, and with the radiance of a thousand suns. He dwells in the transcendent realm as spoken of in the Vedic passages, ‘Who knows him as treasured in the cavern of the highest sky (Tai. 1, 4)’ and ‘In that imperishable and highest sky’.

107. No entity, other than Brahman, endowed with one type of nature, capable of performing one type of activity and having one particular type of form, can possess another type of form, another type of nature and another type of capacity. Only the supreme Brahman, even though it is a single reality, has all natures and capacities, being unique and altogether different from every other entity. Though it is one only, it has wondrous, infinite and manifold forms, and again by reason of its infinite, unlimited and mysterious powers it is of one form. This is not a self-contradiction in Brahman. Because it is similar to others, in being an entity, we ought not to regard it a self-contradiction in Brahman to have diversity of forms, powers and qualities as well as unity of being.

108. This has been stated by Bhagavan Parashara in the following verses: ‘O the best of ascetics! the powers of all beings, incomprehensible to thought, like the power of creation, belong to Brahman. All such powers belong to it, even as heat belongs to fire (Vi. Pu. 1:3:2-3)’. The significance of the statement is this: Among the varied kinds of beings like fire and water, a power observed in one cannot be inferred as belonging to another category of things. The powers like heat and light, though not observed in water, do belong to fire, a substance of a different kind. Even so, Brahman which is unique and different from all other entities in kind, ought not to be conceived as limited in its powers, forms

and qualities on the misapplied principle of analogy. Therefore, Brahman has wondrously manifold and infinite powers. (Akrura exclaims), ‘O Krishna, I am united with thee, the infinite Spirit, whose form this immensely marvellous universe is, and who in thyself art the grandest marvel (Vi. Pu. 5:19:7)’. This insight is the outcome of a devoted application to the study of the manifold and boundless Shrutis and the commentaries thereon adopted by the great teachers.

109. There are several types of Shruti passages speaking of the creation and dissolution of the universe by Brahman, proceeding in rigorous order, involving a multitude of entities, subject to infinite modifications. All these matters relating to creation and dissolution are beyond the bounds of other sources of knowledge.

110. There is one group of texts which describes Brahman as attributeless and as of the nature of knowledge like the following: ‘Free from imperfection’, ‘free from evil’, ‘Knowledge’, ‘bliss’, ‘changeless’, ‘partless’, ‘actionless’, ‘full of peace’ and ‘attributeless’.

111. There is another type of texts which denies plurality. The following serve as illustrations: ‘There is no plurality here. He goes from death to death, who sees plurality here (Brh. Ar. 4:4:19)’; ‘Where everything becomes the atman, there, what is there to be seen? And by what means can anything be seen? There, what is there to be known? And by what means can anything be known? (Brh. Ar. 4:5:15)’.

112. There is another class of Shrutis which denies of Brahman everything that is cognised as evil in the world and predicates of it infinite and surpassing auspicious attributes, omniscience, omnipotence, the authorship of the differentiations of all names and forms and the attribute of being the support of all. They are exemplified by the following: ‘He, who knows all, who cognises all and whose penance consists of knowledge (Mu. 1:1:9)’; ‘The intelligent one created all forms, gave names and remained proclaiming them all (Pu.Suk., 16)’; ‘From this luminous Person are all moments born (M.B. 2:5)’; ‘He is free from sin, old age, death, sorrow, hunger, and thirst. He has all desires fulfilled and his will comes true (Chan. 8:8:1)’.

113. There is, again, another variety of Shruti: ‘All this is indeed Brahman, as all arises from, subsists in and dissolves into Brahman (Chan. 6:14:1)’; ‘All this is ensouled by this (Chan. 6:7:7)’; ‘Being one he is spread manifold (Tait. Ar.. 6:3)’.

These describe the world created by Brahman in all its multiplicity and at the same time affirm its oneness.

114. The following texts maintain that Brahman is distinct from all, that all else is subordinate to him, while he is their supreme ruler and that all entities are subsidiary to him, while he is their master: ‘Knowing the self and the directing one as different (Sve. 1;12)’; ‘Comprehending the experiencer, the experienced and the directing one (Sve. 1;25)’; ‘The Lord of creatures desired, “Let me bring forth creatures”’, ‘The master of the universe, the Lord of souls, ever-existent, the holy and the imperishable (M.B. 11)’; ‘Him, who is the great Sovereign of sovereigns, the ultimate God of gods (Sve. 6:13)’; ‘He in whose control everything is, and who rules all (Brh. Ar. 6:4:22)’.

115. Lastly, there are Shruti texts like the following which declare that Brahman is the self of all other entities and that all of them constitute his body: “Having entered within, he rules and is the soul of all (Tait. Ar.. 3:29)’ ‘He is your Atman, the inner controller immortal (Brh. Ar. 5:7:3)’; ‘He, whose body the earth is, whose body the waters are, whose body fire is, whose body the unmanifest is, whose body the imperishable is, whose

body death is, whose body the individual self is (Su. 7)'. The interpretation of the various types of texts must be such that they are not made to contradict among themselves in their contents; and not a single text should be so interpreted as to be divested of its primary and fundamental significance. Such is the exposition developed herein.

116. The texts of the Shruti declaring 'changelessness' are taken in their primary import, because modification in the substantive nature of Brahman has been denied. The propositions affirming Brahman to be 'attributeless' are given a determinate import as negating of Brahman the properties pertaining to matter and imperfections. The texts denying plurality, have their affirmations supported and sustained, through the conception that the whole universe, formed of sentient and non-sentient entities, constitutes the body and mode of Brahman and that Brahman alone exists as the self of all and has everything as its mode. The passages speaking of Brahman 'as different from all, as the Lord, as the supreme ruler, as the ocean of perfections, as having all desires fulfilled and as having a will that comes true' have been sustained by the admission of the affirmed attributes as ultimately real. The texts describing Brahman as sheer 'knowledge' and 'bliss' have their principal import thoroughly maintained. The supreme Brahman, the unique, the abode of all excellences, the ruler of all, the principal entity to which all are subsidiary, the supporting ground of all, the ground of creation, maintenance and destruction, the faultless and the immutable and the soul of all — has as its defining attribute, knowledge of the form of bliss, antithetical to all impurity; and being self-luminous, its substantive nature also is knowledge itself. This is the significance of the declarations that Brahman is sheer bliss and knowledge. The passages proclaiming unity have a well-established significance. Through the conception of Brahman and the world as constituting soul and body, identification, urged by co-ordinate predication, is brought out in the primary manner and thus the concept of ultimate unity is made to stand secure.

117. It may be asked, 'What is your final position? Do you uphold unity or plurality or both unity and plurality? Which of these three forms the substance of the Vedanta on your interpretation?' We reply that we uphold all the three as they are all affirmed in the Veda. We uphold unity because Brahman alone exists, with all other entities as its modes. We uphold both unity and plurality, as the one Brahman itself, has all the spiritual and physical substances as its modes and thus exists qualified by a plurality. We uphold plurality as the three categories, sentient selves and non-sentient existents and the supremo Lord, are mutually distinct in their substantive nature and attributes and there is no mutual transposition of their characteristics.

118. 'But', it may be said in objection, 'Only knowledge of unity is put forward as the means of attaining the summum bonum, the final liberation, in the passages, "That thou art, Svetaketu" and "Only as long as he is not liberated"'. The position is not as you construe it. Here is a passage speaking of this matter, 'Knowing the self and the directing power as distinct, and thereby favoured by that power he attains immortality (Sve. 1;12)'. This is the meaning of the passage: Having known the self and the inner controller as distinct and by virtue of this knowledge of distinction, he attains immortality, graciously favoured by the supreme Self. Thus the direct means for the achievement of immortality is laid down to be the understanding of the difference between the individual self and the supreme controller.

199. (Objection): As this passage is in conflict with the monistic passages, it must be construed as not giving us the knowledge of reality but only as inculcating the method of attaining the phenomenal Brahman qualified by attributes.

(Reply): If this view be urged, we ask, 'Why should not the contrary be the proper course of interpretation, especially in view of fact that the direct way leading to immortality is explicitly laid down in this passage ?'

120. The proper approach to the whole situation would be to discern and extract a reconciling principle, when there are two (seemingly) contradictory pronouncements, possessing equal authority as sacred texts. If we are asked how our understanding of the texts establishes reconciliation, we reply thus: We maintain in the first place, that Brahman is the inner ruler and of this inner ruler, the individual self is a mode, being his body. Thus by the term 'thou' only the highest Brahman, characterized by the individual self as his mode is designated and denoted. This truth must be apprehended as such without any qualification. This is the meaning of the text 'That thou art'. In the second place, the highest Self is other than the individual self, in which the Supreme abides as the inmost self. As the Supreme is devoid of all imperfections and is characterized by countless and surpassing attributes of excellence, this 'otherness' in relation to the individual self is a verity. That this difference must be contemplated upon is the purport of the second passage. This has been set forth already many times.

121. The distinctions, whose knowledge is inculcated, are outlined in the passage, 'Comprehending the experiencer, the objects of experience and the directing power, all this threefold Brahman is expounded (Sve. 1;12)'. All objects of experience are insentient, real and are always subject to modification. These qualities of physical nature must be discriminated. The individual self who enjoys and suffers has pure and unlimited knowledge and bliss as his inherent character. But his inherent character of knowledge and bliss sometimes expands and sometimes contracts in a multiplicity of ways conditioned by nescience, taking shape as the stream of beginningless karma. Consequently there is association with physical nature, described previously as 'the objects of experience'. The emancipation of the individual self is effected by the meditation on the supreme Self. These are the distinctive facts concerning the individual self. Brahman exists as the inner ruler of the non-sentient realm of 'the objects of experience' and of the individual self, the 'experiencer', both possessing the aforesaid characteristics. Brahman exists in its own intrinsic form, radiant with its own infinite perfections. These three forms of its existence are to be understood. The passage in question inculcates discriminating knowledge of the three entities and the three forms in which Brahman exists.

122. The great ancient teachers dealing with the meditation on 'sat' (advocated in the Chandogya Upanishad), in relation to which meditation, the dictum 'That thou art' occurs, have maintained in their commentaries that Brahman, the subject-matter of the meditation is characterized by excellences of attributes and that the fruit of that meditation is the attainment of Brahman as abounding in attributes. The Vakyakara says, 'It is as qualified by attributes that Brahman is attained, for the meditation on Brahman is also as qualified'. Dramidacarya, who advocated choice of meditations, explains the principle as follows: 'The seeker meditating on 'sat' does not pursue meditatively the attributes to the exclusion of the Deity. But still he meditates on the Deity as inclusive of attributes and as such, the Deity attained is also possessed of attributes'. 'The seeker meditating on "sat" ' means one who is devoted to the meditation prescribed and elaborated in the section of Chandogya known as *sadvidya*. 'Does not pursue meditatively the attributes to the exclusion of the Deity' means that even though the devotee of the meditation on 'sat' does not dwell on the auspicious qualities like 'freedom from sin' apart from the Deity unlike the devotee of the meditation on *dahara*' (i.e., subtle ethereal space in the heart), he does meditate on the Deity as inclusive of attributes. All the glorious attributes of Brahman are

inherent in its substantive nature and even when only some inherent and unique attributes, like being the cause of the world, are taken up for meditation along with the Deity, in reality, the Deity is meditated upon as characterized by all the inherent excellences of attributes. Therefore the Brahman to be reached by this meditation on sat' also, is Brahman with attributes. Therefore either of these two types of meditation, *sadvidya* or *daharavidya* can be chosen for cultivation.

1. Tankacarya Brahmanandin.

123. (Objection): The following criticism may be raised: Now, you have held that all creatures are governed by the Supreme and that the Supreme is the inner controller of all. If that is the case, there appears to be no one to whom the scriptural injunctions and prohibitions could apply. Only he, who is capable of doing or abstaining from actions by initiative of his own intelligence, can be subject to the injunction of 'ought' and to the prohibition of 'ought not'. Such a personality is ruled out in your scheme. The supreme Self is held to be the directing spirit in relation to all activity and is said to cause action to be done. Such is the way in which his cosmic control is conceived. Further, sacred texts say, 'He gets good actions done by those whom he wants to lift up and gets evil actions done by those whom he wants to cast down (Kau. 3;9)'. By thus getting actions, good and bad, performed the godhead would be responsible for cruelty.

124. (Reply): We answer this criticism as follows: The supreme Being endows all sentient beings with the power of thought and power of action. Thus the general equipment needed for the performance as well as the non- performance of actions is furnished by him. Then in order to manage the situation, he becomes the support and basis of all, enters into all beings and governs from within by his approbation of acts of individual will. He abides as the fundamental *Sheshin'* of all, all the individuals being subsidiary to him. The individual, thus equipped with all the requisite powers and facilities, endowed with the power of initiative, engages in actions and abstinence from action by his own spontaneity of will. The Supreme Being, witnessing his activity, remains unconcerned. Thus the whole situation is intelligible. God's causing good and bad actions to be performed is not universal in relation to all moral agents. It is a situation that obtains in certain determinate circumstances. If an individual by himself is engaged in the pursuit of what is most in accordance with the will of God, God being pleased with him, confers upon him spontaneously a holy disposition of will and intellect and actuates him in the right and holy direction. If, on the other hand, an individual is pursuing what is most contrary to the divine will, the Lord gives him evil intellect and will and actuates him to proceed along evil lines.

125. The Lord has stated these principles: 'To those, who seek union with me always, and are devoted to me, I give with love, the power of wisdom, by which they attain unto me. And I, dwelling in their hearts, am moved by compassion and therefore destroy their darkness of soul born of ignorance by lighting the luminous lamp of their knowledge. But I cast again and again into unholy births, into samsara, those who hate me, who are hard-hearted, who are wicked and are the worst of men (Gita, 10:10-11 & 16:19)'.

126. Now this supreme Brahman, the supreme Person is to be attained. The pathway through which he is to be attained is as follows: By an accumulation of the greatest merit, the sins of the past gathered through all past lives, are destroyed. A person, whose sins are thus destroyed through great merit, seeks refuge at the feet of the supreme Person. Such self-surrender begets an inclination towards Mm. Then the aspirant acquires knowledge of reality from the scriptures aided by the instruction of holy teachers. Then by a steady effort

he develops in an ever increasing measure the qualities of soul, like the control of the mind, the control of senses, austerity, purity, forgiveness, straightforwardness, discrimination as to what is to be feared and not feared, mercy and non-violence. He is devoted to the performance of the *nitya* and *naimittika* duties pertaining to his *varna* and *ashrama*, and avoids actions prohibited, such a course of conduct being conceived as the worship of the supreme Person. He offers his all and his very self at the lotus-like feet of the supreme Person. Actuated by loving devotion to him, he offers perpetual praise and obeisance, engages in perpetual remembrance of him, bows down before him in adoration perpetually, exerts himself always in the god ward direction, always sings his glories, always listens to the exalted accounts of his perfections, speaks perpetually of those perfections, meditates upon him continuously, ceaselessly worships him and dedicates himself once for all to him. The supreme Person, who is overflowing with compassion, being pleased with such love, showers his grace on the aspirant, which destroys all his inner darkness. Bhakti develops in such a devotee towards the supreme Person, which is valued for its own sake, which is uninterrupted, which is an absolute delight in itself and which is meditation that has taken on the character of the most vivid and immediate vision. Through such Bhakti is the Supreme attained.

127. The great teacher, Bhagavan Yamunacarya says, 'He is attainable through the pathway of Bhakti, which is an end in itself and ceaseless and succeeds the double training of the inward parts (Siddhi-traya)'. 'The double training of the inward parts' means the culture of the inner sense by the discipline of *jñāna* and *karma*. The Shruti also says, 'One who knows *vidya* and *avidya* together, crosses death through *avidya!* and attains immortality through *vidya* (Isa. 11)'. Here the word *avidya* signifies what is other than *vidya*, namely, the duties pertaining to one's station in life, like *varna* and *ashrama*. By the term *vidya* is meant meditation that has developed into Bhakti. It has been said, 'Resting on knowledge, he performed many sacrifices, with a view to overcoming death by means of *avidya!* and reach the *vidya* of Brahman (Vi. Pu. 6:6:12)'. Further the Shruti say: 'Knowing him, one becomes immortal here. There is no other way to that goal (Pu.Suk. 17);' 'Those who know this one, become immortal (M.B. 1, 10);' 'One who knows Brahman, attains the Highest (Tai. 11, 1);' 'He who knows Brahman, becomes Brahman (Mu. 3:2:9).' In all these and similar cases the term 'Knowledge' (*vedana*) signifies meditation (*dhyana*). Knowledge is to be so understood because coherence with such texts as 'He is to be meditated upon (Brh. 6:5: 6)' must be maintained.

128. That meditation is further defined by the text, 'This atman is not attained by the reflection on the sacred texts, by the exercise of intelligence or by excessive learning of the texts. By him, whom this atman chooses, is he attained. To such a chosen one, the atman reveals his form'. (Mu. 3:2:3 & Ka. 1:2:22)'. This determination of the character of meditation lays down that only meditation of the form of Bhakti leads to the attainment of Brahman and the efficiency of mere meditation is denied by the phrase, 'Not by the exercise of intelligence'. To explain: When the seeker after emancipation, established in the knowledge prescribed in the Vedanta of the form of meditation, develops within himself all-absorbing and all-surpassing love for that meditation itself, just at that very point of time is the supreme Person attained by him. The words of the Lord are to this effect: 'That supreme *Purusha*, Partha, is attainable by undivided Bhakti (Gita, 8;22);' 'I, of this nature, Arjuna, am such that by undivided Bhakti one is able to understand me, to have a vision of me and to merge into me (Gita, 11:54);' 'By Bhakti one truly understands me, as to what I am and the full expanse of my being. Then, by the same means, knowing me he enters into me (Gita, 18:53)'. Here the sentence 'Then, by the same means, knowing me, he enters into me' means that a person after understanding through Bhakti, enters into the Supreme through Bhakti itself. Bhakti is that particular kind

of knowledge, which is a state that elicits absolute love towards itself, which is an end in itself, and eliminates the desire for everything else. One blessed with such Bhakti attains the fitness to be chosen by the supreme Self. By him is the Supreme attained. This is the significance of the Shruti under discussion.

129. This particular kind of knowledge of the nature of the highest Bhakti, is brought about only by Bhakti yoga already delineated, which grows by continuous practice, and is assisted by karma which follows jñana. Bhagavan Parashara says, ‘A man, who performs the duties of his varna and ashrama, can worship the supreme Person, Vishnu; no other way pleases him (Vi. Pu. 2:8:9)’. The highest Brahman, the supreme Person, incarnated on earth for the uplift of the whole world, has himself ordained, ‘Listen, how a man devoted to his own duties can attain realization. By worshipping the Lord, from whom proceed all beings and by whom all this is pervaded, through such duties as are appropriate to oneself, one attains realization (Gita, 18:45-46)’. Thus the Supreme is attainable only through Bhakti, which is the fruition of the spiritual development described.

130. The philosophical approach developed herein is one that has been presented by the Vedas, whose import has been clearly revealed by the ancient commentaries on the Vedas and Vedanta and has been unanimously adopted by the great ones like Bhagavan Bodhayana, Tanka, Dramida, Guhadeva, Kapardin and Bharuci. By this, the extra-Vedic schools of thought like those of Carvaka, Sakya, Aulukya, Aksapada, Ksapanaka, Kapila and Patanjali along with the schools of some followers of the Vedas whose vision is perverted, are refuted.

131. That even the followers of the Vedas, who take a wrong view of things, are to be judged on a footing of equality with the non-Vedic thinkers has been laid down by Manu himself. He says, ‘The smritis that are non-Vedic and the views that are perverse, are futile, being established in *tamas* (XII, 96)’. Only those who have *sattva* uncontaminated by *rajas* and *tamas* as their innate propensity have a taste for the Vedas and an understanding of the real contents of the Vedas. Matsya-Purana accords with this proposition: ‘There are four categories — the mixed, the *sattvik*, the *rajasik* and the *tamasik*’. Some epochs of Brahma are mixed, some are dominantly *sattvika*, some are dominantly *rajasik* and some dominantly *tamas*. After this classification of epochs, it is stated that Brahma dominated by the predominant quality of each epoch, proclaims the greatness of principles that correspond in quality to the epoch in question and to his own dominant propensity in that epoch. ‘in the various Puranas produced in the past by Brahma, deities have been praised corresponding to the dominant qualities of the epoch of production (*Matsya*)’. The principle is more specifically laid down (in the following verses): ‘In the epochs of *tamas* the greatness of Agni and Shiva is praised. In the epochs of *rajas* the greater greatness of Brahma is praised (*Matsya*. LIII, 68);’ ‘Then in the epochs of *sattva* the still greater greatness of Hari is praised. Those who reach realization in them attain the highest goal (*Matsya*. LIII, 67);’ ‘In the mixed epochs the greatness of Sarasvati and manes is praised (*Matsya*. LIII, 69).’

132. The idea of the foregoing is this: Brahma is the first individual self (in the realm of samsara). Therefore even in him, some days *sattva*, some days *rajas*, and some days *tamas* preponderate. The Lord has said, ‘There is no creature either on earth or in heaven among the gods, which is free from these material properties (Gita, 18:40)’. The Vedic text ‘He, who first creates Brahma and imparts the Vedas to him (Sve. 6:35) ‘implies that Brahma is a creature, and is subordinated to the commandments of the scriptures and therefore is an individual self in bondage. Further, it is to be understood, that in case there is a conflict

between the Puranas that have been composed by Brahma on the days in which *sattva* preponderates and the Puranas that have been composed by him on other days, the Puranas composed on the days of *sattva* are true and the others in conflict with them and composed on other days are untrue. This principle of evaluation has been formulated by Brahma, himself, when established in and devoted to *sattva*. The effects of the three qualities have been enumerated and classified by the Lord himself: '*Sattva* originates knowledge, *rajas* originates covetousness and *tamas* originates inadvertence, delusion and ignorance (Gita, 14:17);

“O Partha, do thou understand that buddhi is *sattvika*, which discerns action and non-action, what is to be done and what is not to be done, what is to be feared and what is not to be feared, and bondage and emancipation. That buddhi is *rajas* through which dharma and adharma, actions to be done and actions not to be done are not cognised in the correct manner. That buddhi is *tamasa*, which being enveloped in darkness takes adharma for dharma and in general takes everything, for its exact opposite (Gita, 18:30-32)’.

The author of each of the Puranas, first of all gathered from Brahma himself all the materials that should go into the particular Purana and then transmitted that body of information through his composition. Accordingly it has been stated, ‘I will tell you, as Brahma, told, in reply to the questions put to him by the great sages like Daksa (Vi. Pu. 1:2:8)’. (This is the governing principle of evaluation in connection with the Puranas). It may be asked, how we ought to proceed when we are confronted with conflicting passages of the Vedas, which are not personal compositions. Our reply is that the conflict can be eliminated by the determination of the total import of the texts, as already demonstrated.

133. (Objection): But there appears to be a discrepancy in the purport of the following texts: ‘Establishing the prana along with the senses on the highest Self, at the end of the Nada, in the mind, let one meditate on Isana. Let the seeker reflect that all these, these gods, Brahma, Vishnu, Rudra and Indra, are all subject to birth and so they are not the cause. But the cause is to be meditated upon. Sambhu, the overlord of all, to whom belongs universal sovereignty, must be meditated upon in the centre of the akasha (Atharva.);’

‘He, other than whom there is none that is great, subtle or big, stands firm like a tree in the heaven and he stands alone. By that *Purusha* is all this filled. That which is superior to him (*tatah*) and is formless and stainless is Bhagavan Shiva, whose are all the faces, heads and necks, who abides, in all hearts and who pervades all and has gone into all. Knowing him they attain immortality while others sink in sorrow. (Sve. 3: 9-11);’

‘In that darkness, which was neither day nor night, in which there was neither being nor non-being, only Shiva remained. He is imperishable, is great beyond the sun, and from him did all the ancient wisdom flow (Sve. 4:18)’.

But at the same time the Shruti says, as previously propounded, Narayana is the supreme Brahman (M.B.)’. How can these two sets of texts be free from mutual contradiction?

134. (Reply): This is a very trivial issue. The truth may be summed up in these words: The entire body of the Vedas, amplified by the words of the best of the knowers of the Vedas and the canons of interpretation, declares that Hari is the cause of the origin etc. of this universe. To explain: On the authority of the aphorism

‘That from which the creation etc. of this universe proceed is Brahman (Brh. Ar. 1, 1, 2)’ and the text

‘That from which all these creatures are born ‘ that in which they all subsist and that into which they all enter, enquire into that and that is Brahman (Tai. 111, 2)’, we make out that cause of the creation etc. of the world is Brahman. We have to study it only in the sections which deal with the subject-matter of creation and dissolution. The text ‘Being only, without a second (Cha. VI, ii, 1)’ declares that the ultimate cause, described therein as ‘Being’ is Brahman by virtue of its being the material cause, efficient cause and the inner controller of the world. The same entity is spoken of in another section and is designated ‘Brahman’, as ‘All this was Brahman, Brahman only, in the beginning (Brh. Ar. 3:4;10)’. By this we are made to understand that the principle described as ‘sat’ is Brahman. The same truth is conveyed in another branch of the text, ‘All this was atman only in the beginning and nothing else was there (Ai. 1)’. This brings out that atman itself was described in the other two sections as ‘sat’ and ‘Brahman’. Similarly in another text it is said, ‘Only Narayana existed, neither Brahma, nor Isana, nor the sky and earth (Mahopanisad, 1, 1)’. The culminating inference is that Narayana himself has been described in the other sections by the terms ‘sat’, ‘Brahman’ and ‘atman’ all of which are applied to the ultimate cause.

135. Further, the text commencing with ‘In the centre of the sea the wise men intuit him’, goes on to say, ‘none grasps him above, none horizontally, none in the centre; none rules over him. His glory is indeed great. His form does not get sighted. None sees him with his eyes. He is grasped by the wise with the heart and the mind. Those who know him become immortal (M.B.)’. Thus his greatness beyond all else is declared and that there can be anything greater than him is denied by the sentence, ‘None rules over him’. Then the direction ‘Here the hymn commencing with “Born out of the waters” and eight rks commencing with “Hiranya- garbha” must be recited’ connects the passages with the hymn to *Purusha*. That hymn has as its theme the supreme *Purusha*. The supreme *Purusha* is revealed to be Narayana by the text, ‘The goddess Hri and the goddess Lakshmi are the two consorts (Pu.Suk. 24)’.

136. This truth is elaborately elucidated in the section called Narayana Anuvaka (in Mahanarayana-upanishad). It commences with ‘Thousand-headed god’ and proceeds to the text, ‘He is Brahma, he is Siva, he is Indra, he is Aksara, He is the highest Svarat’. In the various branches of the scriptures’ purporting to describe the supreme Reality, these terms, ‘Aksara, Siva, Sambhu, Parabrahman Paramjyoti, Paratattva, Parayana, and Paramatman’ are applied to that Reality. Now this section applies all those terms to Narayana on the ground, that the attributes which those terms connote, are all found in Narayana. It also asserts that all entities other than Narayana depend upon him, are pervaded, supported and controlled by him, are subsidiary to him in value and have him as their self. It further treats Brahma and Shiva as equal to Indra and other minor deities and thus ascribes to them the status of the glory of Narayana. This section aims solely at the determinate enunciation of the supreme Being. Nothing else is enjoined in it. The other scriptural sections like the one starting with the sentence ‘The knower of Brahman attains the Highest (Tai. 11, 1)’ prescribes meditation etc. on the supreme Brahman, enunciated in this section.

137. Therefore the text beginning with ‘Establishing *pranas* along with the senses on the highest Self (Atharva)’ etc. inculcates that all effects like prana and the senses must be drawn back to their fundamental cause, the highest Self and that the same highest Self, the Lord of all, must be meditated upon. Thus the meditation on Narayana himself, the supreme Brahman, is prescribed in the text. That he is the sovereign of all is brought out in the passages, ‘The Master of the universe’ and ‘There is no ruler over him’. Therefore the injunction, ‘Sambhu, the overlord of all, to whom belongs universal sovereignty, must be

meditated upon in the centre of the akasha (Atharva.) just advocates meditation on Narayana who is the ultimate cause and is designated 'Shambhu'. The basis for this interpretation is that the text opens with the question, 'On what should one meditate?' and offers the answer, 'The cause is to be meditated upon' affirming thereby the unworthiness of the effects to be made the objects of meditation and the exclusive worthiness of the cause to be the object of meditation. Now, the section, Narayana-Anuvaka, wholly devoted to determining the ultimate cause, makes it clear that Narayana is the ultimate cause and that he is called Sambhu To put an interpretation on the present passage inculcating meditation on the cause, contrary to Narayana Anuvaka which specifies that cause would be wholly unreasonable.

138. The sentence 'That which is superior to him (*tatah*) (Sve. 3: 10)' has been construed as positing an entity higher than the *Purusha*. That construction is ruled out by the following consideration of the text. In the text 'He, other than whom there is none that is great, subtle or big (Sve. 3: 9)' the clause 'other than whom there is none that is great' means that there is no principle other than this which has any kind of greatness. In the same passage, 'subtlety' means minuteness and 'bigness' means the supremacy over all. Denial of the subtlety and bigness of everything else means that, as this entity is all pervading and all-controlling, there is no entity beside it which is either subtle or big. The clause 'Other than whom there is none that is subtle or big' denies the possibility of any entity other than the *Purusha* being great and so, nothing can be higher than *Purusha*. This consideration rules out the supposition in question of an entity higher than the *Purusha*.

139. Then what is the purport of the passage in question? The discourse runs thus: In the beginning of the section it is said, 'Knowing only him, one passes beyond death. There is no other way (Sve. 6:15)'. The knowledge of the *Purusha* is stated to be the means for immortality and nothing else is said to lead to that goal. Then beginning with 'Other than whom there is none that is great (Sve. 3: 9)' and ending with 'By that *Purusha* is all this filled (Sve. 3: 10) the discourse explains the greatness of the *Purusha* beyond all else. Then the text '*Tatah yaduttarataram*' occurs. It means: Because the Reality, the *Purusha*, is great beyond all else, therefore (*tatah*) that same great *Purusha*, which is formless and stainless, is such that those who know it become immortal and others sink into sorrow. Thus knowledge of that *Purusha* is the road to immortality and nothing else is. The opening declaration is brought to a reasoned conclusion. On any other interpretation, the (two) opening propositions would be nullified. And again, as this *Purusha* is pure, texts like 'Eternal Shiva, imperishable (M.B.)' describe him as Shiva. In the present text also Shiva signifies the *Purusha*. In the further sentence, 'This *Purusha* is the great Lord, the initiator of *sattva* (Sve. 3:12)' the ground for designating him 'Shiva' is stated. On the same principle other passages like 'There was no being or non-being, Shiva alone existed (Sve. 4:18)' must be explained.

140. Again, in this section of the Upanishad, which speaks of the *Purusha*, as one 'over whom no one rules' meaning that it is impossible even to imagine any other being either as equal or superior to the *Purusha*, and as 'subtler than the subtlest', he, the *Purusha* is further on described as the supreme Godhead as he is denoted by the letter 'A' which is the root of the pranava, which in its turn is the seed of the Vedas, being the foundation as well as the fruition of the Vedas; and the meditation on him is advocated as dwelling in the akasha in the centre of the subtle lotus of the heart.

141. Its explanation is as follows: The root of all the Vedas is said to be pranava, the sacred syllable 'Aum'. The root of pranava is the sacred letter 'A'. The whole of the Veda, being the modification of pranava, is resolved into pranava, its cause. Pranava, the modification

of the letter 'A', is resolved into its cause 'A'. He who is named by that 'A' which is the root of pranava, is the supreme God. The root of all names is 'A' and the root of all entities, that bear those names, is Narayana. This Narayana, who is the root of all entities named by the expression which is the root of all names, is the supreme God.

142. The Lord says, "I am the beginning and the end of the whole universe (Gita, 7: 6)", "There is nothing else higher apart from Myself (Gita, 7:7)" and "I am the letter "A" among the letters (Gita, 10: 33)". The Shruti also lays down, "A" is the designation of Brahman", and "All speech is "A" ". All speech evolves out of 'A' and all entities constituting the subject-matter of all speech evolves out of Brahman. Therefore, as Brahman is affirmed to be the meaning of 'A', Narayana whose name 'A' is, is determined to be the Supreme.

143. Of that Narayana, transcendent supremacy is predicated in the Narayana-Anuvaka, commencing with 'Thousand-headed God', which anuvaka has as its sole purport the determinate characterization and exposition of the ultimate reality. The supreme principle is what is so determined by this section, which has no other function than such determination. Other sections whose purport is other than this determination, may designate the ultimate principle in other ways, through other terms. The Sutra-kara, in the aphorism 'The instruction is from the standpoint of the Shastra as in the case of Vamadeva (B.S. 1, 1, 31)', conveys the decision, that what is named by other names in sections not devoted to the determination of the supreme principle must be taken as one with the principle, which is specifically designated and determined in this section with the sole purport of such specific designation and determination.

144. If this ultimate principle is sometimes referred to as Brahma or Siva, it does not prove that the deities Brahma and Shiva, are the highest reality. That possibility is ruled out in the section, which equates them with Indra etc. and thus assigns to them status of the glories of the ultimate principle, Narayana. The exegetical situation is similar to the other, well-established practice (in Vedanta) of not taking the physical akasha and prana as the highest principle, just on the ground that some scriptural sections refer to the highest principle as akasha and prana.

145. A further objection is raised by the opponent in connection with the section dealing with the meditation on Brahman, as seated in the heart: 'Then in this city of Brahman there is the mansion of the subtle lotus. In this abides the subtle akasha. What is in that akasha must be searched out, must be investigated (Chan. 8:1:2)'. Here the term akasha stands for the material cause of the world and some other specific principle that dwells in it is held out as the goal of search and investigation. This akasha is said to evolve names and forms and in the hymn on the *Purusha*, *Purusha* is declared to be the architect of names and forms. In the present section, therefore, a principle, other than the *Purusha*, the latter being named akasha here, is represented as the object of meditation.

146. Now, this objection could emanate only from those who have not studied the Vedas and not met seers who have comprehended the Vedas. We judge so because the sacred text itself answers the objection and also the commentator, Vakyakara. To the question, 'What is in that subtle, inner akasha which has to be searched out and investigated? (Chan. 8:1: 2)' the answer is provided by the sacred text: 'As extensive as this outer akasha is that inner akasha in the heart (Chan. 8:1:3)'. This brings out that the inner akasha by which the supreme Person is meant is of infinite immensity and is the cause and ground of the whole universe. Further the statement 'In it are treasured the desires (Chan. 8:1: 5)' explains that the eightfold perfection of attributes like freedom from sin, the power of fulfilling all desires and will, are treasured in that supreme Person named the 'inner

akasha'. Thus, just as the supreme Person is to be meditated upon, the eightfold attributes of the supreme Person are also to be made objects of distinct meditation. When the Shruti says, 'What is in that is to be searched out, to be investigated (Chan. 8:1: 1)', it is this meditation on the attributes that is commended. Thus all objections are answered by the sacred text itself.

147. The substance of the answer to the question 'What is in that, which has to be searched out, to be investigated?' Is that in Brahman (represented here as the subtle space in the lotus of the heart) are found existing the perfect attributes like being the creator, the ground, the controller and the master of the whole world and the freedom from imperfections. The Vakyakara expresses himself to the same effect: "What is in that" means the desires'. By desires are meant what are desired. What are desired are the excellences of attributes, like the absence of imperfection.

148. The passage may be summed up in these words: The supreme Brahman which is designated here as 'the subtle space' is that reality, whose play unfolds itself as the creation, maintenance, and dissolution of the entire cosmos. To that reality belong the eightfold qualitative perfections like the total impossibility of sin and sorrow. Both these — the substantive being of Brahman and its glorious perfections — are to be searched out and investigated. There are concordant texts like the one which says, 'To those who understand here the atman and his eternal excellences, will accrue freedom in all the worlds (Chan. 8:1: 6)'.

149. In some passages directing the seeker to meditate upon the cause of the universe Vishnu, specifically determined as the highest reality in sections meant exclusively for the specific determination of the highest reality, is himself included and enumerated among the effects. That inclusion and enumeration among the effects of that ultimate cause itself is to be understood in terms of the descent of the cause into the realm of the effects, as a matter of voluntary ingression, in pure sport, for fulfilling its own effects-series and to accomplish the good of the world. The supreme Lord did become the younger brother of Indra, thereby fulfilling the realm of the gods. He voluntarily descended to the mundane world and became the son of Dasaratha, thereby fulfilling the dynasty of the solar kings. The same Lord took birth in Vasudeva's household voluntarily for removing the burden on earth, thereby fulfilling the Lunar Dynasty. In the sections devoted specifically to the topic of the creation and dissolution of world, Narayana alone is represented as the ultimate cause, as previously elucidated.

150. In the Upanishad called Atharvangiras, Rudra expatiates upon his universal greatness and glory. That has to be understood as a speech grounded on the fact of Brahman entering into all beings as their soul. The text itself clarifies the whole position by saying, 'He entered the inmost recess'. The law governing the right interpretation of all such texts has been laid down by the author of the Sutras, 'The instruction is from the standpoint of the Shastras as in the case of Vamadeva (1, i, 31)'.

151. Even Prahlada proclaims, 'As the infinite one is all-pervading, I am he, all things arise out of me and they all dwell In me, the primeval one (Vi. Pu. 1:19:85),. Here the basis for such a proclamation is given clearly by the clause, 'As the infinite one is all-pervading'. As the highest Self pervades all beings, sentient and non-sentient, and as they form his body, all terms denote him, whose body all these entities are. Therefore the term 'I' signifies the Paramatman of whom the individual self is a mode.

152. It is for this reason that the Vakyakara holds, ‘One should grasp it as one’s own atman, for all emanates from it’, and thus advocates the meditation on Brahman as the ‘ego’. All entities—individual selves and physical forms—both in unmanifested and manifested states are constitutive of the body of the highest Self. So it is that itself which exists as cause and effect. He alone is thus embodied in all conditions. The Vakyakara brings out the reason in the words, ‘For all emanates from it’. The Sutrakara has formulated the idea in the Sutra, ‘The seekers meditate on him as the self and the scriptures teach him as the self (4:1:3)’.

1.53. In the Mahabharata Brahma addressed these words to Rudra: ‘Your inner self, my inner self, and the inner self of all embodied beings is the supreme Lord, Narayana (Moksha. 179:4)’. The supreme Lord Narayana exists as the inner self of Rudra, Brahma and all other embodied beings. And in the same work these further passages are found: ‘Vishnu is the atman of the blessed Bhava, possessing unlimited energy. He withstood therefore the touch of that bow-string (Karna. 35: 50).’ Again, these two are the best of the celestials. They are born of favour and anger. They are shown the way by him and bring about creation and destruction (Moksha. 169:19)’. It means that Narayana, who dwells in them as their inner soul, shows them the way and thus they, Brahma and Rudra, become the creator and destroyer respectively.

154. Those who posit that the material cause and the efficient cause are different entities, are outside the pale of the Vedas. They would be flagrantly contradicting the Sutras framed by the knower of Vedas; as, ‘That from which the origin etc. of the world proceed (B.S. 1, 1, 2)’ and ‘it is the material cause in accordance with the opening declaration and the Illustrations advanced (B.S. 1:4: 23)’. All the aggregates of Shruti passages also would negate that position; such as, ‘Being alone, all this was in the beginning, one only, without a second (Chan. 6:2:1)’; ‘Brahman is the forest and Brahman is the tree, out of which they fashioned the earth and the sky. He stood on Brahman, sustaining the world. (Tai. Brahmana, 2:8:9)’; ‘All moments of time, originated from the *Purusha*. with the brilliance of lightning (M.B.)’; ‘No one rules over him, his fame is indeed great (M.B.)’; ‘There is no plurality here (Brh. Ar. 6:4:19)’; ‘He is the controller of all, the Lord of all (Brh. Ar. 6:4:22)’; ‘*Purusha* is all this, whatever is past and whatever is future. He is the Lord of immortality. There is no other way to the Goal (Pu.Suk. 2-4)’.

155. Passing on to Itihasas (Epics) and Puranas, in the sections relating to the creation and destruction of the universe, an identical conclusion is reached on the question of the ultimate godhead. These questions are raised in the Mahabharata: ‘Whence is the creation of this world of moving and non-moving entities? Whither does it go at dissolution? Instruct me in this matter O Sire (Moksha. 181:1)’. They are answered by the grandfather, Bhishma: Narayana, whose form the universe is, is the infinite self, the eternal one (Moksha. 181:12)’ and ‘The sages, the manes, the gods, the great elements, the minerals, and in short, this whole universe, consisting of moving and non-moving entities originates from Narayana (Anu. 229)’.

156. The Vishnu-Purana has been unanimously adopted by all the great sages, from the East, West, North and South, as an all-sufficient authority for the ascertainment of all righteous conduct and Reality. On the authority of the aphorism, ‘Whence the origin etc. of this (B.S. 1:1: 2)’, Brahman is understood to be the cause of creation etc. of the universe. Now, the Purana in question, opens with a clear statement of the question as to what constitutes the source of the creation etc. of the universe and proceeds to answer, ‘From Vishnu is all this born (Vi. Pu. 1:1:31)’. All agree on the point that such a procedure

proves that the work has as its sole purpose the exposition of the specific character of Brahman. In the same text we have the statement, ‘She, who has been named *Prakriti* by me, has both a manifest form and unmanifest form. Both she and the *Purusha* (individual self) dissolve in the Paramatman. Paramatman is the supporting ground of all and is the supreme godhead. He is sung in the Veda, as well as Vedanta, as Vishnu (Vi. Pu. 6:4: 39)’. In all the Vedas and Upanishads, he is sung as the ultimate cause through all modes of expression.

157. Even as among all the srutis, the Narayana-anuvaka, has as its sole aim the specific determination of nature of Brahman, Vishnu-Purana is also a work solely devoted to that particular end. It opens with these questions (Vi. Pu. 1:1: 4-5): ‘O Knower of dharma, I desire to hear from you how this world was and how it will be in future. By what is this world filled? Whence are these moving and non-moving beings? By what is it brought to dissolution and into what does it dissolve?’ The question in essence is ‘What is Brahman?’ The answer making a decisive declaration of the nature of Brahman follows. ‘The universe originates from Vishnu and exists in him. He is its maintainer and controller. He is the world. He is greater than the greatest. He is supreme. He is the Paramatman. He dwells in the selves. He is beyond all characterizations in terms of form, colour, etc. He is beyond decay and cessation, beyond modification, increase and characterizations in terms of forms, colour, etc. He is beyond birth. He can be described only as the ‘Ever-existent’. He dwells in all and all things dwell in him. Therefore the wise name him ‘Vasudeva’. He is the supreme Brahman, eternal, unborn, imperishable and undecaying. He is always of the self-same form, free from evil, and thus pure. He is all this and has both this manifested and unmanifested as his form. And also he exists as the individual spirit and time (Vi. Pu. 2:1:1-14). He transcends, O Sage, the character of all material elements, all mutations and all qualities of nature, which are essentially imperfections. He is beyond all obscuration of ignorance. He is the soul of all and by him was spread out whatever is contained in the universe. He is of the nature of all auspicious attributes. By a tiny fragment of his power the aggregates of beings are lifted up. He assumes by his own desire a multiplicity of bodies. Thus he accomplishes the good of the whole world. He is a mass of only excellences like radiance, power, rulership, omniscience, vigour and strength. He is greater than the greatest. Not one of the imperfections like affliction ever approach him. He is the sovereign of the high and low. He is the Lord. He has the sum total of all subtle entities as his form. The gross universe is also his form. He is of the unmanifested form and manifested form. He is the Lord of all. He sees all. He knows all. He is all-powerful. He is the supreme God. That by which this pure, taintless, transcendent, faultless and undivided and sole reality is cognised, perceived and realized, is the only knowledge. All other processes of cogitation are mere ignorance (Vi. Pu. 6:5: 83-87)’. Thus the (Vishnu-Purana) exhibits itself as meant solely for the declaration of the determinate identity of the supreme Brahman.

158. All other Puranas with other aims must be interpreted consistently with this Purana. That they have other aims is discerned in the manner of their commencement. Whatever is found in them, altogether inconsistent with this Purana must be set aside as being of the nature of *tamas*.

159. (Objection): But in this Purana, the equality in status of the three deities Brahma, Vishnu and Shiva is put forth. ‘That same Bhagavan Janardana assumes three names, Brahma, Vishnu and Shiva, by virtue of the three functions of creation, maintenance and destruction (Vi. Pu. 1:2:66)’.

(Reply): If this be said, we answer that such is not the case. The unity of Janardana, who is referred to by the expression ‘the same Janardana’ with the whole universe commencing

with Brahma, Vishnu and Shiva is asserted here. What was stated previously in the proposition, ‘He is the world (Vi. Pu. 1:1: 31)’ is expanded thus: ‘The same Lord as creator creates himself, as Vishnu protects all that is to be protected and as destroyer, he withdraws into himself (Vi. Pu. 1:2: 67)’. Both the creator and the created, the destroyer and the destroyed are together taken up and the unity of all with Vishnu is proclaimed. The creator and the destroyer are treated as of the same status as the created existence and the objects of destruction, in the matter of being the manifestations of Janardana. When it is said that Janardana assumes three names and forms as Brahma, Vishnu and Shiva (Vi. Pu. 1:2:66), because the terms Janardana and Vishnu are synonyms, the Lord, whose manifestation all things are, is said to enter into the realm of his own manifestations and become included among his own glories. This is an act of his own choice and constitutes his own play.

160. This Position is further developed: ‘The earth, the waters, fire, the air, the space, all the senses, the mind and the individual self and in short the world as a whole, is he. He is the soul of all beings, and the universe is his form, as he is imperishable. The processes like creation that happen to entities are for his sake. He is the creature and he is the author of creation. He protects, withdraws and is what is protected. Vishnu, the excellent one, the beneficent one, the adorable one, is of universal form as he assumes states like that of Brahma. (Vi. Pu. 1:2: 68-70)’.

161. Here the oneness of all with him is asserted. The question would arise as to how he, free from evil and change and abounding in all auspicious excellences, could be one with the world which is mixed up with evil. The position is explained in the text itself, ‘He is the soul of all beings. He has the universe as his form, as he is imperishable (Vi. Pu. 1:2: 68)’ The text first states that the same Vishnu, who is supreme Brahman, the Sovereign of sovereigns, is the world. Then it adds the reason for that conclusion by saying, ‘He is the soul of all beings, and the universe is his form, as he is imperishable’. It means that he is the soul of all beings, and has the universe as his form, because he is imperishable. Further on the same truth is stated, ‘All that is the body of Hari (Vi. Pu. 1:22:38)’. The fundamental idea is that though Vishnu, the supreme Brahman is imperishable, there is nothing contradictory in his being one with the universe in the sense of having it as his body. The distinctive characteristics of the body and soul remain unmodified.

162. And this supreme Vishnu descends by His own choice into the created world and becomes one among the dependent creatures like gods, animals and men beginning with Brahma. This descent among the creatures on the status of equality with them is for making himself accessible to them in order to facilitate their coming to him for support. This conception of avatar has already been expounded. In the sixth chapter of Vishnu-Purana dealing with question of the proper object of meditation, which should be at once holy as well as accessible, the whole position is clarified. There it is pointed out that beings like Brahma are associated with the three inner efforts (i.e., *karma-bhavana*, *brahma-bhavana* and both) and therefore are subject to karma. It is established there that the supreme Vasudeva, the highest Brahman, descends in his own form, by his own choice, for working out the good of the world, into the world of beings like gods and men. Mahabharata says that his body is not physical, even in incarnations. ‘The body of this supreme Self is not a structure compounded of physical elements’.

163. The Shruti also says, ‘The birthless One takes many births. The wise ones comprehend his birth (Pu.Suk. 21)’. Brahma and other individual selves, being subject to karma, are compelled to take birth in physical bodies, Structure compounded of physical

elements, in accordance with their karma. This is inevitable for them, even if they were to be unwilling to be reincarnated. But in the case of the Lord, whose will perfectly fulfils itself, and is the controller of all, there is no evil birth of this nature. On the contrary, by his own desire, in his own supremely holy form, he takes many births among gods, men, etc. for the purpose of effecting the good of the world. Though he does not take births other than the good, out of the infinity of his auspicious qualities, he takes ‘many births’ i.e., multiplicity of births. ‘The wise ones’ i.e. the supremely intelligent ones comprehend (this).

164. The Sutrakara, first of all, declares that Brahman is the material and efficient cause of the world [in the aphorisms, ‘That from which the origin etc. of this world proceed (B.S. 1:1: 2)’ and ‘He is the material cause also, in accordance with the opening declaration and the illustrations advanced B.S., 1:4:23)’. He formulates the *prima facie* view that there is some principle transcending and surpassing the highest Brahman, the supreme Person so defined, in the following aphorism: ‘There is something higher than that; on account of the designation of bridge, measure, connection and difference (B.S. 3:2:30)’. Then he himself refutes that view in the following aphorisms: ‘But on account of resemblance (B.S. 3:2: 31)’. ‘It subserves the purpose of thought; as in the case of feet (B.S. 3:2: 32)’, ‘Owing to difference of place as in the case of light and so on (B.S. 3:2: 33)’, ‘And on account of possibility (B.S. 3:2: 34),’ ‘Thus, from the denial of anything else (B.S. 3:2: 35),’ ‘The omnipresence (possessed) by that, (understood) from the declaration of extent (B.S. 3:2: 36).’

165. So also in the scripture from Manu we learn as follows: ‘The impeller of darkness (*mula-Prakriti*) manifested (Ma. 1, 6);’ ‘Desirous of creating the creatures (Ma. 1, 7);’ ‘He first created the waters and scattered over them the potency (Ma. 1, 8);’ ‘There Brahma took birth (Ma. 1, 9).’ The birth of Brahma is thus narrated. That makes it clear that Brahma, is an individual self. Further on the distinct designations of the supreme Person, the creator, and of Brahma, the creature projected by him are given: ‘They were his abode in the beginning. So he is known as “Narayana” (Ma. 1, 10);’ ‘That person, who was projected by him, is known as “Brahma” in the world (Ma. 1, 11)’.

166. Similarly Vishnu-Purana, by maintaining that the gods like Hiranyagarbha, being associated with the three *bhavanas* and hence being impure, are not fit to be taken as the ‘holy supports’ for meditation, works out the conclusion that they are mere individual selves.

167. Another view (concerning the correct interpretation of the Vedas) has been upheld by some thinkers. Their main contention is this: The whole body of the Vedas consisting of injunctions, explanations and hymns must be expounded as conveying ideas as to what is to be done .by way of action. It is impossible to apprehend the meaning of words except in connection with action. Action springs from the consciousness of something to be accomplished. Therefore words have only the idea of something to be accomplished as their meaning. From this it follows that nothing that is an accomplished reality can be revealed by verbal testimony.

168. We reply as follows: That the meaning of words must be grasped only in the context of sentences including action is not an absolute rule. It is being insisted upon by the opponent as if it were a royal order. As a matter of fact it is very easy to make out that words have power of denoting existing entities. Suppose a person tells another person by means of gesture that the latter must tell Devadatta that ‘the staff is to be found in the inner apartment’. Accordingly the second person proceeds to Devadatta and communicates to

him the message not by gestures but by actual words. A fourth person is witnessing the whole proceeding from the first gesture-communication of the first person to the second person and latter's discharge of his commission. We have to suppose him to be ignorant of the meaning of the words to start with and he has all along watched the proceeding like a dumb person. He understands the significance of the gestures of the first man and hears the words of the second man addressed to Devadatta. He apprehends that the meaning conveyed through the first person's gestures is the meaning of the words spoken by the second, 'The staff is to be found in the inner apartment'. What is the difficulty in understanding the existential import of words here ?

169. (The way children learn language is this). The child is trained gradually by the parents and elders by being shown persons and things and by the utterance at the same time of words like 'This is father', 'This is mother', 'This is uncle', 'This is a man', 'This is the moon' and 'This is a serpent'. This the elders do gradually and frequently. Afterwards whenever the child hears those words again, its mind recalls the meanings. It also makes out that things and persons were pointed out and the words were uttered, because the words are naturally the names of those persons and things, especially as there is no other possible relation between those words and things and as no particular convention is known to have been made by any individual to that effect. Thus gradually realizing and again receiving training from elders, it learns the meaning of all words. It itself begins to use language. It is thus that words acquire their determinate denotations, and groups of words come to represent particular relations of facts. Thus the regulation that all words acquire meaning in the context of action and imperatives has no foundation.

170. Therefore, as language is quite capable of conveying information about accomplished facts, all the texts of the Upanishads impart knowledge about Brahman, the cause of the universe and the repository of all excellences, as previously interpreted.

171. Further, let us even admit that all words convey ideas of what is to be accomplished. Vedanta texts inculcate action in the form of meditation and actually teach all else in enunciation of what accrues as a result of such meditation to persons on whom the injunction to meditate is imposed as an aid to meditations to be performed. This is so in the case of the injunction to sacrifice, which injunction is coupled with the information concerning heaven as an abode free from sorrow. This is so in the case of the injunction of night-sacrifice, to which is added the positive information about the great status that accrues to the performer of the said sacrifice. The prohibition of threatening a Brahmin is conveyed along with the definite positive information about the means-and-end relationship subsisting between the non-observance of that prohibition and the imposition of the penalty of a fine of one hundred gold pieces.

172. To explain: in the text, 'One who knows Brahman attains the Highest (Tai. 1)' the attainment of Brahman is promised as the fruition, accruing to one who fulfils the injunction to meditate on Brahman. It means that one who is desirous of the Highest, must seek to know Brahman. Brahman is presented here as that which is to be attained. Its nature and characteristics are all described existentially, as supplementary to the action of meditation enjoined. Included in that body of existential knowledge, are the truths that Brahman is the creator of the world, the destroyer of it, the ground of the world, the inner soul of it and all the other truths both previously mentioned and unmentioned. Thus even as subsidiary to the imperative prescribing meditation, all the existential propositions of the Vedanta, retain validity and significance. Therefore, the contents of texts, be they hymns or explanations, get established as subsidiary to injunctions provided they are special (apurva) to them and are free from contradiction.

173. The commentary of Dramida concurs with this standpoint: Commencing with the reference to the Shruti, 'The debt is born', it states, 'Though the sentence is a praise of sacrificial offering it cannot praise, if false'. The meaning of the comment is this: All the explanatory (i.e., laudatory) portions of the Vedas praise the virtues of the sacrifices, with the full complement of their limbs, the sacrifices being acts of worship offered to gods. They also praise the virtues of the gods so worshipped. The virtues praised are such that they are not open to ordinary means of knowledge. The explanations praise the virtues of the sacrifices and gods a thousandfold. The purpose of such praise is to create the idea of the worthiness of the religious action prescribed. If the virtues extolled do not actually exist, the idea of the worthiness of the said action will not ensue. So the explanatory passages, if they have to succeed in creating the idea of the worthiness of the actions prescribed, must, of necessity, affirm and teach the reality of the virtues praised. On these lines the truth of all hymns and laudatory explanations gets proved.

174. Now, those who hold that the meaning of words lies in what ought to be done must surely offer a definition of 'What ought to be done'. You may define that which is to be accomplished as 'What follows an act and is aimed at by it'. In that case we ask for the meaning of 'being aimed at'. You may add, 'That for the sake of which the act is undertaken is the meaning of being aimed at by the action'. Then what is the meaning of 'being that for the sake of which an act is undertaken', the act being something a man does? You may further reply by saying, 'That is being aimed at by an act, for the sake of the attainment of which an agent performs an act'. Then on that clarification, 'to be aimed at by an act' means precisely 'to be desired'.

175. You may develop your explanation this way: 'What is desired has two forms. In the first place, it is an object of desire. In the second place, it is what prompts effort on the part of the agent. This latter is the meaning of "being aimed at by an act".' Now we say, that this labour of explanation, proceeding, as it does from an undue attachment to your own theory, is indeed futile. Our argument is this: By this property of 'prompting effort' can be meant only 'the impossibility of what is conceived as an object of desire coming into existence, without the agent's effort to bring it about'. It is this consciousness (of the unattainability of an object of desire without one's own exertion) that starts all action. Those who know the truth on this matter describe the process as follows: After the origination of desire, if the agent understands that the object of desire cannot come into existence without his own volitional effort, he develops the desire to act. Then the man acts. Therefore, there is no meaning in anything being aimed at by an act, other than this one of the absolute dependence of the emergence into existence of an object of desire on the effort of the agent.

176. A further attempt at the clarification of 'being aimed at by action' maybe made. 'An object is desired because it is agreeable. To be agreeable is to be aimed at by action'. We dismiss the explanation. Pleasure is what is agreeable. Pain is what is disagreeable. Therefore nothing other than pleasure can be agreeable. You may object by saying that the removal of pain, which removal is different from pleasure, is also found to be agreeable. It is not so, we reply. That which is agreeable to the self is pleasure. That which is disagreeable is pain. This is the difference between pleasure and pain. Pleasure which is agreeable to the self, comes to be desired. Pain which is disagreeable to the self, comes to be disliked. Therefore, as the conjunction with pain is unendurable, its elimination also comes to be desired. Therefore, as there is similarity in being desired, the elimination of pain is also wrongly conceived as agreeable.

177. To explain: Man, enmeshed in matter, experiences three states, that of conjunction with the agreeable, conjunction with the disagreeable and that of existence in his own natural condition. Therefore, the elimination of the conjunction with the agreeable and that of the conjunction with the disagreeable would be the self's natural state. Therefore, if there is conjunction with the disagreeable, the elimination of that conjunction, even though it is merely a natural state, becomes an object of desire. Since there is similarity by virtue of being an object of desire, this elimination of the conjunction with pain is wrongly taken to be agreeable. Therefore, as to be agreeable is to be a pleasure, honest thinkers consider the view that the obligation is agreeable in nature as ridiculous.

178. Further, the obligation is considered an obligation and as abiding and transcendent precisely on the ground that it brings into being an object of desire. In the injunction, 'Let one, desirous of heaven, perform a sacrifice (Ya. 2:1:5)',⁶ the import transcends the mere action, because it is determined to be the means of attaining heaven on account of the syntactically juxtaposed expression 'desirous of heaven'. It is not right to maintain, as is done by the opponent, that in the injunction 'Let him sacrifice', the element that gets first apprehended in an independent manner by the person to whom the injunction is addressed as the matter of intrinsic importance, is the element of obligation that he should sacrifice and that, afterwards, as a derivative thought, the idea of its being conducive to the attainment of heaven is brought in for purposes of causing the fulfilment of the obligation, as the words referring to the desire for heaven are juxtaposed. This account of the injunctive proposition is not right; as a matter of fact, when the agent hears the verb "sacrifice" the action that is the meaning of the verb-root presents itself as one that a person can perform. On account of the juxtaposition of the phrase referring to desire for heaven, something over and above just that meaning of the verb-root, as constituting an obligation, permanent and transcendent, presents itself to the mind of the person to whom the injunction is addressed. All that apprehension of the obligatoriness of the action proposed and so on follows definitely from the idea that its observance is the means to the attainment of heaven. The common understanding that the potential form of the verb etc. enjoin an obligation whose fulfilment is a means to the attainment of heaven, and which obligation in its inherent nature is interwoven with the words 'desirous of heaven' in meaning is simply rejected without any basis by the opponent's explanation.

179. To explain: Each word presents its meaning as fit to be connected with the meanings of the other words of the sentence in which it is used. This gets understood immediately after hearing the sentence which is a combination of words whose meanings form one inter-related system of meanings. Now, in the present case, this fitness of the meaning of the verb 'sacrifice' to enter into relationship with the meanings of other words lies in the sacrifice being instrumental to the attainment of heaven. Therefore, just as mere action is superseded and we have, in obligation instead, the independence and intrinsic nature of the meaning of the verb 'sacrifice' must also be abandoned in view of the contradiction resulting otherwise. This is the reason why, in the expression 'Village on the Ganga', the term, Ganga must be so understood as to mean something on which there can be a village. Just because, to start with, the term 'Ganga', means the river Ganga, the meaning of the term 'Ganga', in the expression 'Village on the Ganga' cannot be water, if the meaning of the term is to be fitted into the sense of the whole expression. Even so, here, in the sentence 'Let one, desirous of heaven, sacrifice' even if the verb 'sacrifice' recalls mere obligation or something to be done as soon as heard as an independent non-instrumental element, when the total and integrated import of the proposition is apprehended, the obligation cannot remain an unrelated and non-instrumental element.

180. It is also not true what has been admitted for the sake of argument that on hearing a term that signifies something to be done, we apprehend that something as an independent and non-instrumental obligation. At the time of understanding an obligation, actions like bringing a cow, being troublesome, cannot acquire the character of obligatoriness to the consciousness of the subject, unless the action is presented as a means to an object of desire. Thus the dictum, 'An obligation is that which is agreeable' violates universal understanding. The person who holds that an obligation is agreeable to the person to whom it is addressed is going against his own personal experience as well. In the case of the injunction, 'One, desirous of rain, should sacrifice with kariri', that obligation, instrumental to causing rain, can on no account be experienced as agreeable in itself apart from its declared relationship to rain. Even if in this life, the causation of rain is uncertain, that very uncertainty constitutes it an obligation (of a transcendent character). In that latter case, there is clearly no experience of the agreeable, the same as pleasure. Thus the meaning of 'being aimed at' cannot be seen to be anything different from the attainability through effort and the fact of being desired.

181. A new definition of 'being aimed at by the act' may be offered as that 'to which other things are subsidiary'. If that be the definition, these two expressions 'being that to which others are subsidiary' and 'that which is subsidiary to another' need definition. If you define 'the subsidiary' as that which is the correlative of what is to be done and the principal element as that which is the correlative of the subsidiary, from these definitions, it is evident that you define the principal element as 'that which is to be done'. But it is precisely this factor described as 'what is to be done' whose definition is sought. The subsidiary may be sought to be defined in another way: 'That which is invariably subsumed under an effort aiming at a purpose beyond itself is the subsidiary'. But the question as to what this 'aiming at a purpose beyond itself' is, comes up for consideration. It is in fact this idea of being aimed at as a purpose that is necessitating all this discussion. 'To be aimed at as a purpose is to be desired and to be possible.' That may be your definition. What is the meaning of being 'desired'? 'To be desired', you may reply, 'is to be the purpose of effort'. Now the purpose of effort is the purpose for realizing which an agent puts forth effort. We have already determined the nature of this purpose, as meaning an object of desire, depending on the effort of the agent to come into being.

182. The real and universal definition of *Shesha* and *Sheshin* (the subsidiary and the principal) must be enunciated as follows: That whose nature lies solely in being valued through a desire to contribute a special excellence to another entity is the *Shesha*. The other is the *sheshin* (i.e., that to which the subsidiary contributes: special excellence). Out of a desire to produce the fruit of sacrifice, both the sacrifice and the volitional exertion for the sake of sacrifice, come to be undertaken. The accessories of sacrifice come to be attended to, out of the desire to accomplish the sacrifice. Similarly, in the case of servants their nature lies only in being valued on account of the desire to contribute something special to the master. Similarly all entities, sentient and non-sentient, eternal and non-eternal, have as their sole nature, the character of being valued through a desire to make some special contribution to the Supreme. Hence all entities are described as subsidiary to him. He is the principal entity, the Lord of all, the *Sheshin*. The Shruti say, 'He is the controller of all, the Lord of all (Brh. Ar. 6:4:22)', 'The master of the universe (M.B.)' etc. Therefore the definition, "That which is attainable through effort and is the principal is the meaning of "what is to be accomplished" ' is one that can charm only the credulous followers.

183. Moreover, what ground is there for taking words like 'desirous of heaven' in a sentence like 'He, who is desirous of heaven, should sacrifice' as qualifying the subject of

the injunction and not the agent of the sacrifice? In the injunction, the mood etc. of the verb indicate the agent of the action proposed (who must be specifically characterised by some term), and the clause. ‘He, who is desirous of heaven’ supplies the required qualification of the agent. Taking it as a qualification of the subject of injunction and not of the agent of action is in contradiction to the principles of the science of language. You may argue, ‘The person with whom heaven is the end, cannot be made the agent of an action, not instrumental to the securing of heaven’². We answer, ‘He cannot also be, for the same reason, made the subject of the injunction’. Therefore it is to be construed decisively that the sacrifice is a means to the securing of heaven. The scripture connects him with the sacrifice as the agent, and therefore, we understand that the prescribed action must be the means for the desired end of securing heaven. When it is said, “One desirous of a meal, must go to Devadatta’s house”, the man desirous of a meal is brought into connection with the action of going to Devadatta’s house as the agent of that action, and therefore, we understand, even if it was not understood before, that going to Devadatta’s house is the means of securing a meal. Such is the case in the present instance also.

184. Further, one who is associated in the injunction with one action, as its agent, should not be, in interpretation, associated with another action as the agent of the latter. You are taking the man, spoken of in the sentence as the agent of sacrifice, and making him the agent of the mental act of accepting the injunction imposed. You can only understand the subject of injunction as the agent to whom the mental act of accepting an injunction is presented as the act he has to perform. It has been so explained: ‘He is the subject of an injunction, who cognises an imperative as pertaining to himself’. If you say that being an agent of cognition is conducive to being an agent of sacrifice, we urge the following application of your procedure. If the injunction ‘Let Devadatta cook’ is heard, Devadatta is associated in the sentence with cooking as its agent. If Devadatta goes somewhere for purposes of cooking, that going is conducive to his cooking. Therefore, the sentence enjoins upon Devadatta the action of going. The unreasonableness of such construction is evident.

185. Further, what makes you resort to an unseen potency (*apurva*), an abiding entity, supposed to be designated by the potential mood of the verbs in the injunctive propositions? If it be said, ‘Otherwise the juxtaposed phrase “desirous of heaven” would lose all meaning’, we ask, ‘What is the difficulty that makes it lose all meaning?’

(Objection): The man desirous of heaven is a person, the attainment of heaven by whom is the end desired. This attainment is an event that has to take place in future, at a point of time other than the present point of time. Action of the form of sacrifice etc. is an instantaneously perishing phenomenon. Such a perishing event of the present cannot bring about the attainment of heaven at a future point of time.

(Reply): If this be said, we answer, this is an impossibility that could strike only those who have not had even the faintest idea of the philosophy of the Vedas. Those who understand the Vedas maintain that the supreme Lord, Bhagavan Narayana, being worshipped through the various religious performances, rewards the worshippers with the objects they desire.

186. So says the, teacher, Dramida, foremost among the knowers of the Veda: ‘Desirous of fruits, they seek to please (the supreme) Atman. He being pleased, confers the fruits. This

² Though most of the printed editions have the reading *svarga-sadhana*, we have adopted the reading ‘*asvarga-sadhana* based upon the commentary of Sudarshanasuri which reads as follows-
svarga-kamasya asvarga-sadhane krtrtvanyo ghatate iti”.

is the order of things proclaimed in the scriptures'. He means the following: Out of a desire for the attainment of fruits, men seek to worship, through actions like *yaga*, *dana* and *homa*, the supreme Self, Bhagavan Vasudeva, through the deities like Indra, in whom he dwells as the inner ruler and therefore bears all the designations like "Indra". He being so worshipped gives them the fruits they desire.

187. So does the Shruti also declare: 'The hub of the universe bears all *ista* and *purta*, done before and being done now (Maha).' By '*ishta* and *purta*' are meant actions enjoined by the Vedas and Smritis. 'He bears all that' means that the Supreme Self accepts all performances, enjoined by the Vedas and Smritis, ordinarily thought of as associated with the deities like Indra and Agni, as he dwells in all deities as their inner soul. He is called the 'hub of the universe' as he is the supporter of the world full of all kinds of beings like Brahmanas and kshatriyas, by sustaining them through granting the various objects of their desire, when worshipped by them through their varied acts of worship. The Shruti also says that the supreme Self himself is named by the designations of all deities because he is the inner soul of all deities like Agni and Vayu. 'That is Agni, that is Vayu, that is Surya and that is Chandamas (Maha)'.

188. The Lord also says, 'Whatever form any devotee may desire to worship with earnest faith, I will myself bring about in him immovable faith. towards that deity of his choice. He, possessed of that faith, worship that deity and from that deity receives boons which, I myself, give unto him (Gita, 7: 21-22)'. 'Whatever form (*tanu*)' means the various deities, who are in reality his bodies, as the Lord dwells in them as their inner controller. 'I am indeed the one who enjoys all sacrifices and I am also their master (Gita, 9:24);' being 'their master' means that he is the giver of all fruits. Again the scripture say:— 'Acyuta, Thou art the embodiment of all gods and art worshipped always through sacrifices (Vi. Pu. 5:20:97);' 'Thou art, O Lord, worshipped by those who are devoted to their dharma; they cross this *Maya* wholly and attain release of soul (Vi. Pu. 5:30:16)'.

189. Thus in all the Vedas, along with the Itihasas (Epics) and Puranas, we learn that all religious acts are of the nature of the worship of the supreme Lord. He, the supreme Person so worshipped through them, grants all the desired fruits. This truth is everywhere explained.

190. All the Shruti declares that the omniscient, omnipotent, supreme Lord, Bhagavan accepts and enjoys all sacred acts like sacrifice, charity and oblation in fire prescribed in the Vedas, being the inner controller of all deities like Indra and confers on the worshippers all the fruits of those acts; for instance, 'Where the *catu-hotrs* get connected to the deities (Tait. Ar. 3: 21)'. *Catur-hotrs* means sacrifices. 'Where' means in Paramatma, who abides in the deities as the inner ruler; the sacrifices get connected to the deities in him. In other words, the deities like Indra etc. are brought into relationship with sacrifices, by the fact that they are the bodies of the supreme Self who dwells in them as the inner ruler. The Lord also says, 'Know me as the recipient of all sacrifices and penances and the great Lord of the worlds (Gita, V, 29)'. Therefore, all religious acts are of the nature of worship offered to the supreme Person indwelling in all deities like Indra as their inner ruler. It is he that grants all objects of all desire. Such being the case, what utility is there in positing an unseen power (*apurva*), which is far removed from the signification of terms as the direct meaning of terms or as a postulate to account for the fruition of karma ?

191. In that case, what meaning is to be attached to the imperative mood of verbs (like 'sacrifice' as in the injunction, 'Let him sacrifice') ? The root of the verb, 'yaj' means the

worship of gods. The imperative mood etc. signify that the act signified by the verb-root is such that it can be performed by the agent. There is clearly no difficulty. The affixes, referring to the agent, point out the specific ways in which the action referred to by the verb-root, is related to the activity of the agent. The other affixes tell the tense etc. The imperative mood etc., point out that act is something that can be accomplished by the agent.

192. Further, the injunctive propositions enjoin a certain course of action upon the person desirous of a certain result and the same propositions affirm that the Course of action enjoined is worship to be offered to deities, and the deities bring about the realization of the desired end. For example, we have this text, ‘Let him, who is desirous of prosperity, offer a white animal to Vayu; for Vayu is the swiftest god, The man thus approaches Vayu with his proper share and Vayu leads him to prosperity (Tai. Samhita, 2:1:1)’. In this instant we see nothing rendering the realization of the end impossible. Therefore it is unreasonable to suppose that the idea of the action enjoined being the means to the realization of the end is a later construction of thought built up for completing the injunction. The idea that the sacrifices etc. are the means for the attainment of ends is taught by the proposition itself and there is no need for any subsequent construction for completing the injunctive proposition.

193. In the proscriptive injunction, ‘Therefore a brahmin should not be threatened (Mi. 3:4:17)’, the rest of the sentence itself makes know that the prohibited act of threatening a brahmin leads to the fine of a hundred pieces of gold, and since this idea of the means-end relation between threatening a brahmin and the fine is contributory to the proscriptive injunction, it is accepted. In the other case of a man desirous of heaven being enjoined to perform a sacrifice, why should you resort to the supposition of a subsequent construction of the idea of sacrifice being the means of the attainment of heaven, with a view to completing the proposition when in fact the rest or the proposition itself explicitly lays down that the sacrifice leads to heaven? Why do you disregard the explicitly stated content of the proposition and posit a supplementary construction of the idea of this means-end relationship? It is said that a person placed his treasure of gold in the inner apartment of his house and went about begging of the poor and miserable for a handful of grains. Exactly similar is your attitude.

194. The causation of the penalty of a hundred pieces of gold is also not through any unseen power. Persons who perform. actions enjoined in the scriptures, those who fail to perform such, and those who indulge in prohibited actions, all these come to have happiness or misery as the case may be, through the favour or disfavour of the Supreme. The scriptures voice forth this principle: ‘it is he that causes joy (Tai. 2: 7); ‘then he attains fearlessness (Tai. 2:7),’ ‘Then there is fear for him (Tai. 2: 7);’ ‘Through fear of him the wind blows, through fear of him the sun rises, through fear of him Agni and Indra obey and Mytyu, the fifth, speeds along (Tai. 2:8);’ ‘By the command of this imperishable One, O Gargi, the sun and the moon stand sustained (Brh. Ar. III, viii, 9);’ ‘By the command of this imperishable One, O Gargi, men (dependent on gifts) praise those that give, the gods, (dependent on sacrifice), praise the sacrificer, and the manes, dependent on *darvihoma*, praise it (Brh. Ar. 3:8: 9)’.

195. The Dramida-bhasya also says, ‘By his orders, the wind blows, the rivers flow and the seas, bounded by him, swell and rise, as if intoxicated’. (Further, the *bhashya* continues), ‘These worlds, governed by his will, stand without failing and without bursting up. The Bhagavan, seeing one who abides by his commands, promotes out of compassion his progress seeing that he is a man of knowledge and capable in action.’

196. The seekers who, after acquiring an understanding of the real nature of the supreme Person, devote themselves to the performance of the correct modes of action like the meditation on him, will attain through his grace all joys up to the very attainment of him and perfect freedom from fear. Those, who, on the other hand, do not acquire that knowledge and do not devote themselves to the performance of the correct modes of action, like the meditation on him, and in fact,, indulge in actions prohibited, will, through his disfavour, have as their lot measureless sorrow and fear, resulting from the non-attainment of him.

197. The Lord says, ‘Perform the action that is ordained. Action is superior to non-action (Gita, 3:8)’. Commencing in this manner he enjoins all actions, preceded by knowledge, as worthy of performance and then goes on to say, ‘Surrendering all actions unto me (Gita, 111, 30)’ explaining thereby how all these actions are constitutive of the worship of him and how all the individual selves are subject to his control. He then commends those who conform to his commands and reproves the contrary as follows:

‘Those, who always following this view of mine in their life, with earnest faith and without envy are released from karma. But, O Arjuna, those who are envious and do not follow this teaching of mine, know them to be devoid of all knowledge, senseless and lost (Gita, 3: 31-32)’.

Then, again, he proceeds to point out that the persons, who do not abide by his commands, are included in the category of the demoniac in nature, and are heirs to a low destiny:

‘I cast, again and again, those worst of men, who hate me and who are hard-hearted and who are unholy, into demoniac births. Having taken demoniac births and being deluded in birth after birth, they fail to attain me and sink into great degradation (Gita, 16:19-20)’.

He says that those who follow his commands are heirs to everlasting life:

‘Even though constantly performing all actions, he who has come under my shelter, will attain through my grace, the good, ever-lasting and entire (Gita, 18: 56)’.

In the section discussing deities, exaggerated accounts of the self-sufficing efficacy of sacred works are given, to ward off the attitude of lack of faith concerning works in the minds of people, who have not yet learnt the Vedanta, the purpose being that they may have earnest faith at least in sacred works as such. But the true theory of those who know the Vedas is that the two systems, (*karma-mimamsa* and *jñāna-mimamsa*) form a single body of knowledge.

198. The texts of the Vedas define the substantive nature of this Narayana, the supreme Brahman, as infinite knowledge, infinite bliss and infinite purity. They also sing of his unsurpassed, perfect and Countless holy attributes like knowledge, power, sovereignty, strength, vigour and radiance. They describe him as one by whose will all other entities, both sentient and non-sentient, are sustained in their very being and controlled in all their activities. Similarly there are thousands of Vedic verses which describe him as follows: His divine form is wholly agreeable and appropriate to him; many kinds of numberless and infinitely auspicious ornament adorn him, suiting him eminently; he bears numberless, wondrous weapons, suited to his prowess; his divine consort is agreeable and stated to him in her essential nature, form, beauty, glory, sovereignty, compassion and unsurpassed greatness; he is served by (divine) accessories of service and numberless (divine) servants, who are suited to him and are endowed with holy knowledge and power of action and countless other virtues; his boundless and magnificent divine abode

containing all objects and means of delight suited to him, **is indescribable and inconceivable**; all these are eternal and perfect.

199. The texts are as follows: ‘I know this great *Purusha*, who is of the colour of the sun, and is beyond all darkness (Pu.Suk. 20);’ ‘He, who dwells within the Sun, having a form as if made of gold has eyes like the lotus just opening at sunrise (Chan. I, vi, 8);’ ‘In the space of the heart resides this *Purusha*, abounding in mind, immortal and resplendent (Tai. 1:6: 1)’. ‘Abounding in mind’ means that he can be apprehended only by a pure mind. ‘All moments originated from the *Purusha*, brilliant like lightning (Maha 1, 2)’. The meaning is that the *Purusha* has the colour of lightning.

200. ‘Luminous like a streak of lightning enclosing a blue cloud (M.B.).’ This means that the subject spoken of is like a streak of lightning enclosing a blue cloud. The sentence as a whole means as follows: The flame burning in the space in the centre of the lotus of the heart has within it the supreme Self whose radiant colour is like that of a blue cloud. Therefore that flame bears resemblance to a streak of lightning enclosing a blue cloud.

201. ‘Abounding in mind, having for his body *prana*, luminous in form, with desires and will that always fulfil themselves, pure in nature like *akasha*, creating all as his own work, having all objects of desire, all fragrances and all tastes, he has taken possession of all this (universe), speechless and disinterested (Chan. 3:14:2);’ ‘His raiment is saffron-coloured (Brh. Ar. 4:3:6)’ etc.

202. ‘The Queen of this world is the consort of Vishnu (Ya. 4:4: 12, 57);’ ‘Hri and Laksmi are his consorts (Pu.Suk. 24);’ ‘The highest abode of Vishnu, the enlightened seers always see (Ya. 6: 5);’ ‘He who lives beyond this *rajas* (Ya. 2:2:12);’ ‘That one, unmanifested, infinite, the totality of the universe, the primeval one, lives beyond *tamas*’ (M.B.); ‘He who knows that which is treasured in the cavern, in the highest heavens (.Tai. 2:1);’ ‘He who is the Lord of this is in the highest heavens Rig. 10:129: 7);’ ‘He is in the highest imperishable heavens. He indeed is all this, all that is past, that’ will be in future and that is present. (M.B.)’. Thus hundreds of Shruti passages specifically embody these truths.

203. The statement, ‘The enlightened seers always see the supreme abode of Vishnu’ meaning that the supreme abode of the Brahman is always seen by the enlightened seers, implies that ‘there are some endowed with complete knowledge, who always see. The sentence may be construed either as, ‘Those who are enlightened seers, always see’, or as ‘Those who always see are enlightened seers.

204. (Objection): Now, on either interpretation, the proposition is taken as embodying two different assertions. That is not a correct view, as every proposition must embody a single assertion.

(Reply): As all the contents of the proposition are not established otherwise than by this proposition, we have to interpret it as affirming the transcendent realm, as characterised by all else, which the proposition itself puts forward. (Such an interpretation is not uncommon in Vedic exegesis) For instance, it is said, ‘Its attributes are affirmed as there is no division in affirmation, provided they are not taken over from other sections (Mi. 1:4:9)’. In the injunction concerning ‘*agneya*’ ritual of the nature of ‘*astakapala*’ the ritual is enjoined, with all the particulars, specifically mentioned only by the injunction itself. The ritual in the specifically characterized mode, is prescribed. Similar is the situation in this passage which asserts the existence of the supreme abode of Vishnu as being perpetually seen by the enlightened seers. There is no contradiction in the method of interpretation adopted.

205. The followers of the Vedas maintain that the hymns, that are accessory to ritual action, describing the action under performance, of both the *stotra* and *Sastra* types of hymns, and those which are for sacred repetition, whether they belong to the relevant section of the Vedas or are taken from elsewhere, do actually teach all that they affirm, like the brahmana portions, provided what they affirm is not contradictory and is not given to us elsewhere. The texts throwing light on the act enjoined, subserve the purpose of the injunction itself, by describing the particulars about the deities etc., the particulars being free from contradiction and newly presented by the texts themselves under consideration.

206. The present passage cannot be taken as referring to the liberated souls, for they do not always see the transcendent realm. Nor can it refer to the stream of liberated souls, for the Shruti maintaining that each individual seer always sees, would then be contradicted. We have already proved that the contents of even hymns and laudatory explanations, that are subordinate to the injunctions of sacred obligations, ought to be taken as revelatory of existent realities. A fortiori the import of directly existential passages, like the present one, can, without any contradiction, be taken as objectively veridical.

207. (Objection): But the terms ‘The supreme abode of Vishnu’ need not be taken as referring to any realm. The very nature of Vishnu is represented as the supreme abode. No distinction is made between Vishnu and his realm in texts like, ‘The highest abode called Vishnu, free from all evil (Vi, 1:12: 53)’.

(Reply): This is not the correct position. The texts, ‘He who lives beyond this *rajas* (Ya. 2:2:12)’, ‘In that imperishable highest heavens’, ‘He, who is the lord of this, in the highest heavens (Rig. 10: 129:7)’ and ‘He who knows that one treasured in the cavern, in the highest heavens (Tai. 2:1)’ definitely proclaim the existence of the highest abode. The very description of it as Vishnu’s abode points to the realm as different from Vishnu. Even in the text adduced, the qualification ‘The highest abode called Vishnu’ proves that there is another highest abode, not one in substance with Vishnu. It is this abode that is described as being always seen by the enlightened seers.

208. The whole matter may be elucidated as follows:— In some texts, the highest abode is designated by the term ‘*parama-pada*’, in some, the nature of the individual self freed from matter, and in some, the very nature of the Bhagavan is designated ‘*parama-pada*’. The text ‘*parama-pada* of Vishnu’ illustrates the usage in relation to the highest abode. The text ‘His attributeless and great “*parama-pada*” undergoes threefold modification, owing to the action of the three attributes of matter, at the periods of creation, maintenance and destruction (Vi. Pu. I, 23:41)’ clearly speaks of the nature of the individual self freed from matter. The text ‘Free from evil, that *parama-pada*, called Vishnu (Vi. Pu. I,22:53)’ is speaking of the nature of Bhagavan. Now, all these three, (the highest realm, the pure status of the individual and the Lord) are the supreme ideals to be attained. Hence they are described as ‘*parama-pada*’.

209. ‘How can all the three be supreme ideals, the summum bonum?’ If this be asked, we answer thus: The Lord is primarily the supreme ideal to be attained, and therefore he is the ‘*parama-pada*’. The other two are included as constituent factors in the attainment of the Bhagavan. Hence they are designated ‘*parama-pada*’. The realization by the individual self of its real nature, through emancipation from the bondage of karma is included in the attainment of the Supreme. The text, ‘These eternal perfections are veiled by evil (Chan. 8:3:1)’ intimates that the auspicious attributes of the Bhagavan are veiled from the view of the individual self by its own karma. If it be asked how it is known that the individual’s

karma is the evil that conceals the Supreme, we cite the following textual authority: ‘There is the third power, *sattva*, called karma, by which power, the all-penetrating power of the individual self is covered up, and thus covered up, the individual gets enmeshed in all the persisting afflictions of bondage (Vi. Pu. 7:61-62)’. Even the ascent to the highest abode is included as a factor in the attainment of the Bhagavan.

210. In the passage, ‘He who lives beyond this *rajas* (Ya 2:2:12)’, the term ‘*rajas*’ signifies nature that abounds in the three qualities of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. This extension of meaning follows from the fact that pure *rajas* does not exist by itself. The passage, therefore, asserts that he exists in the abode, that transcends the natural realm of three qualities. From this it is understood that Vishnu’s abode is beyond objects characterized by the three qualities, forming the objects of experience of the individual selves. Again in the passage, ‘I know this great Person, resplendent like the sun, beyond *tamas* (Pu.Suk. 20)’, the word ‘*tamas*’ signifies the empirical nature distinguished by the three qualities. This extension of meaning also follows from the principle that pure *tamas* cannot exist by itself and the statement has oneness of import with the previous one speaking of the abode beyond *rajas*. The present text means, ‘I know this great Person, resplendent like the sun, beyond *tamas*’.

211. Again in the two texts, ‘Brahman is real, knowledge and infinite, and he who knows this as treasured in the cavern, in the highest heavens (Tai. 2:1)’ and ‘In that imperishable highest heavens (M.B.)’, that realm is characterized as immutable and is designated the highest heavens. By the phrase ‘imperishable highest heavens’, the imperishable character of that realm is affirmed and hence it cannot be any perishable region like the orb of the sun. The description, therefore, of it as the highest heavens cannot apply to such perishing situations.

212. In the same way, in the texts ‘Where the ancient sadhyas and the devas are (Pu.Suk. 18)’ and ‘Where the firstborn, primordial sris are (Ya. 2:60)’ the perfect seers are spoken of. The passage ‘The seers of intelligence, given to praise and of unfailing knowledge flourish glorifying that supreme abode of Vishnu’, also speaks of the same matter. It means that there are seers of supreme intelligence, devoted to praise, whose understanding never fails and that they always sing of the glories of this abode of Vishnu and thus flourish.

213. Now this abode and seers of timeless vision are included in the being of the Supreme, even as his attributes like knowledge and power are; and these, like the attributes, are incorporated in text, ‘Being alone, this was in the beginning (Chan. 6:2:1)’ as forming an element in the being of Brahman. They are taken as included in the significance of the term, ‘Being alone, one without a second’, for ultimately they constitute a part of the glorious attributes of the supreme Brahman. In the passage, ‘Being alone, this was in the beginning’ the term ‘this’ denoted the individual selves governed by karma and the objects of their experience. In the text, ‘The enlightened seers always see (Ya. 6: 5)’, these being timeless seers, are shown to be not included among the individual selves governed by karma.

214. In the passage, ‘That is the self, free from sin, ageless, deathless, griefless, free from hunger and thirst, whose desires are satya and whose will is satya’, beginning with the first epithet, ‘free from sin’ up to ‘free from thirst’, the evil characteristics of *Prakriti* with its threefold properties, its products and the individual selves caught up in *Prakriti*— all the three forming instruments of his cosmic play— are denied of Brahman. Then the term ‘*satyakama*’ occurs. The term signifies that entities which are objects and instruments of divine joy are eternal. *Satyakama* is one whose desires are real. Desire (*kama*) means

whatever is desired. Whatever entities are desired by the supreme Brahman as objects and instruments of his joy are said to be *satya* i.e., eternal. The instruments of his cosmic play, though real, being cognisable through valid means of cognition, are subject to change and therefore are not abiding. In contrast to them, these objects and instruments of divine (*nitya*) joy are abiding. The term ‘*satya*’ connotes this abiding nature of these entities.

215. The epithet ‘*satya-sankalpa*’ brings out the idea that, even though these objects and instruments of divine joy are eternal, unsurpassed and limitless, other entities, creations new and measureless, are brought into existence by his mere will. The term ‘*satya-sankalpa*’ serves to enunciate that these objects and instruments of divine joy (*nitya*) and divine play (*lila*) sentient and non-sentient, unchanging and changing, have their nature, existence, activities and differentiations, sustained and controlled by the will of the Supreme.

216. The Itihasas (Epics) and Puranas, works seeking to augment the Vedas, embody the same truth: Sri Ramayana undertakes to augment the Vedas as evidenced by the opening, ‘The master, seeing those two brilliant pupils, well established in the Vedas, took them up for purposes of reinforcing the Vedas (Balakanda, 4: 6)’. Sri Ramayana goes on: ‘It is clear that this is the great yogin, the supreme Self, the primordial One. He is without a beginning, middle and end. He greatly surpasses whatever is great. He is beyond *tamas*. He is the creator. He wears the conch, the discus and the mace. There is Srivatsa-mark on his chest and goddess Sri eternally belongs to him. He is unconquerable, eternal and everlasting (Yuddhakanda, 114: 14-15).’ And again, ‘The various arrows of many kinds and the bow, assumed personal forms and followed Sri Rama, the descendent of Kakutstha (Uttarakanda, 109:2)’. ‘He, even as embodied, passed into the realm of Vishnu, with all his followers (Uttarakanda, 110:12)’.

217. Sri-Vishnu-Purana says: ‘O King, that majestic form of Vishnu is different. It transcends all the forms of the universe. In that transcendent form are established all the powers (Vi. Pu. 7:70). That is the Brahman in form, O great one; Hari has, as contained in himself, all individual selves that are perfect (Vi. Pu. 1:22: 63). This Sri, the Mother of the universe, is eternal and knows no separation from Vishnu. Even as Vishnu is all-pervading, she is all-pervading (Vi. Pu. I,8:17). When he becomes a deva, she assumes the deva- form., When he becomes a man, she too becomes a human being. She makes her form conform to the form of Vishnu (Vi. Pu. 1:9:145). Those who are yogins, who meditate on Brahman always and whose devotion is undivided, attain to the supreme abode, which the enlightened seers always see (Vi. Pu. 1:6:38). Time, consisting of *kala*, *muhurta*, etc., cannot cause modification in that glorious manifestation (Vi. Pu. 4:1: 84)’

218. The Mahabharata says: “O Lord, go thou to that celestial, ageless, immeasurable, incomprehensible and primordial realm, knowable through the scriptures; by taking births in epoch after epoch in thy transcendent form, protect us, thy self-surrendering devotees. There, time is not the master, rather it is subdued there’.

219. That the supreme Brahman has a transcendent form is established by the Sutrakara in the Sutra: ‘The one proclaimed as dwelling in the sun and the eye is he, as his attributes are proclaimed (B.S. 1:1:21)’. (The Sutra contends that he, whose form is praised in the text under discussion, is the ultimate Brahman himself.)

220. His lustre is that of a fine mountain of molten gold — He has the splendour of a hundred thousand suns. His pure eyes have the beauty of the petals of a lotus, just unfolding under the rays of the sun and crowning a rich stalk, that has sprung up in deep

waters. His brows and forehead and nose are charming. His coral-like lips radiate a pure smile. His cheeks are tender and radiant. His neck is lovely like a conch. His exquisitely tender ear-lobes are almost touching his high shoulders. His arms are well-developed, round and long. His beautiful and roseate palms are adorned with fingers of the same hue. His waist is slender and chest broad. All parts of his person are proportionate and symmetrical. The divine harmony of his features beggars all description. His complexion is effulgent. His lovely feet are like full-blown lotuses. His gold-hued raiment eminently suits His person. He is adorned by pure, divine and infinitely marvellous ornaments like *kirita*, *kundala*, *hara*, *kaustubha*, *keyura*, *kataka*, *nupura*, and *udara-bandhana*. He is also bedecked with the conch, discus, mace, sword, bow, Srivatsa and vanamala. He has captivated the eyes and hearts of all by his Surpassingly sublime beauty. The nectar of his pervasive loveliness fills and overflows all existence, sentient and non-sentient. His eternal and inconceivable youthfulness is infinitely marvellous. He has the delicate freshness of smiling blossoms. The endless expanse of the universe is perfumed by his holy fragrance. He shines in his supreme majesty he envelopes the three worlds. He looks at his devotees with a look of compassion, love and sweetness. This supreme Person, seen within the sun is the ultimate one who sports, through the creation, maintenance and dissolution of the whole world, who is antithetical to all evil, who is an ocean I of all auspicious attributes and who stands unique above all other entities. He is the supreme Brahman, the highest Self, Narayana.

221. This is supported by the following: ‘The one proclaimed as dwelling in the sun and, the eye is he, as his attributes are proclaimed (B.S. 1:1:21);’ ‘He is the Lord of all the worlds and all objects of desire;’ ‘He rises beyond all sins (Chan. 1:6:7)’. To him belong the attributes enunciated in the following texts: ‘He is the ruler of all, the Lord of all, (Brh. Ar. 4:4: 22);’ and the text commencing with ‘He is free from sin and ageless’ and concluding with ‘His will fulfils itself without fail (Chan. 8:1:5)’. ‘Narayana is great beyond the universe, he is eternal, he is all; he is Hari (M.B.);’ ‘The lord of the universe and the individual selves (Maha,).’

222. The Vakyakara clearly states this: ‘The text, “The *Purusha* of the golden form is seen” is speaking of the omniscient one, the inmost soul of all; for the texts speak of him as being the Lord of the worlds and desires and as transcending the sins’. He himself repudiates the suggestion that the form is temporal. He takes note of the objection, ‘The form may be artificial being assumed to favour the individual self, as it is possible for the omnipotent Lord to assume such forms’. This prima-facie, view means that the form is taken by the supreme *Purusha* for favouring graciously those who meditate on him. He answers, ‘But His form is real and super sensuous, because the Shrutis state that it Is perceptible to the inner eye’. His meaning is that just as knowledge etc. are taken as inherent attributes of the supreme Brahman, because they are so stated in the scriptures, this form also described as inherent to the supreme Brahman, must be so taken.

223. The Bhasyakara (Dramidacarya) comments as follows: ‘Inherent and natural is the form of the creator. But it is not perceptible to the eye. It is perceptible only to the purified mind equipped with the other spiritual means. The Vedic text lays down, “He is not apprehended through the eye. He is not within the reach of speech. But he is apprehended through a pure mind (Mu. 3: 8)”. The form of the Deity inherently formless is not taught in the Shastra. The Shastra verily speaks the truth. There is the evidence of other sections: “His raiment is saffron-coloured (Brh. Ar. 4:3:6)” and “I know this great *Purusha* resplendent like the sun transcending all darkness (Pu.Suk. 20)”.’,

224. The Vakyakara says: ‘The Supreme is spoken of as of golden form (*Hiranmaya*)’ on the ground of likeness of lustre, as in the case of the expression, “moon-faced”.’ The Bhasyakara also says: ‘The *maya* suffix does not signify that the *Purusha* is a modification of gold, for the atman is not a product.

225. Just as, on the strength of the holy texts asserting the infinite auspicious attributes of Brahman like *jñana*, the supreme Brahman is admitted to be characterized by countless hosts of auspicious attributes, on the strength of the same holy texts like the one which describes him as ‘*Purusha* resplendent like the sun’, the supreme *Purusha*, Narayana, must be admitted as possessing the most auspicious and sublime form, at once pleasing to him and worthy of him. Similarly on the basis of texts like ‘The Queen of this world (Ya. 4:7:39)’, ‘Hri and Laksmi are your consorts (Pu.Suk. 24)’, ‘The enlightened seers always see’, ‘He is beyond *tamas* (Pu.Suk. 20)’, and ‘He lives beyond this *rajas*’, which speak of his divine consorts, servants and abode, they are to be admitted as realities. As ‘the Bhasyakara observes, ‘The Shastra verily speaks the truth’.

226. The matter stands this way: Just as, on the authority of texts like ‘Brahman is real, knowledge and infinite (Tai. 2:1)’, the substantive nature of the supreme Self is recognised as unique, transcending all else, being opposed to all evil, of the nature of absolute bliss and infinite, even so, on the authority of texts like ‘He knows all, cognises all (Mun.2:2:7)’, ‘His supreme manifold power and his inherent knowledge, strength and activity are spoken of in the Vedas (Sve. 6:7)’ and ‘.He is luminous and all ‘things shine after him, the luminous one. Through his radiance does all this shine (Ka. 2:5:15)’, Brahman is to be recognised as distinguished by unsurpassed and countless excellences which are his unique attributes; similarly, on the authority of texts like “The *Purusha* resplendent like the sun’, his (divine) form, (eternal) devotees and (transcendent) abode, which are unique and indescribable, must be recognized.

227. If the Vedas are the sources of valid knowledge, they truly teach all that is contained in the injunctions, explanations and hymns, provided they transcend other sources of knowledge and are free from contradiction. The truth of the Vedas is affirmed in the aphorism, ‘The relation of words to facts is natural (Mim. 1:1:7)’. Just as fire and water do naturally possess their properties like heat, just as the senses like sight and hearing are naturally productive of particular kinds of cognition. the words also have a natural power of imparting knowledge.

228. It is not reasonable to maintain that the signifying power of words is due to arbitrary conventions set up by men as in the case of gesture. This is proved by the fact that there is unbroken continuity of linguistic tradition from beginningless past, and there is no historical knowledge regarding the founding of such fresh and arbitrary conventions. Wherever there is such setting up of conventions, there is either direct or indirect knowledge bearing on the initiation of such conventions. The significance of all terms cannot be construed on the analogy of proper names like ‘Devadatta’. In relation to the latter type of words, there is either direct or indirect information on the fixing of such names. In the case of terms like ‘cow’ there is an unbroken tradition of usage from beginningless past and yet, there is no knowledge of any definite foundation of arbitrary symbolism. Hence, as fire etc., have their inherent properties like heat, and as the particular sense-organs originate cognition about particular aspects of nature, we are obliged to acknowledge that the power of words to signify is natural.

229. It may be asked in objection, why there is a necessity to learn the connection of particular words with particular meanings, if their power of giving information is natural

and Inherent, on the analogy of sense-organs. We reply that the necessity arises as in the case of the inferential mark (middle term). The smoke originates the thought of fire only through the understanding of the connection between smoke and fire. Even so a term originates thought of a particular object only through the understanding its connection with its proper meaning. 'If so', it may be said:— "words being nothing but inferential marks of meanings, apprehension originating from verbal testimony is merely a species of inference". We answer that the case is not so. The words are related to things as signifiers to the signified. The relation of smoke to fire etc., is relation of another type. It is through knowledge of that relationship that words have the power of originating knowledge.

230. Thus, the relationship between words and their meaning being understood, then power to cause the thought of things must be admitted to be natural as there is unbroken tradition of usage from immemorial past and yet there is no knowledge of the foundation of any arbitrary symbolism. Thus the power of words to convey meaning being natural, groups of words, conveying particular combinations of such meanings, are described as sentences. All cases in which the words are uttered in the order arranged by human intelligence are called 'personal'. Those cases are always said to be impersonal and constitutive of the Vedas in which the order of words in utterance is governed by the Culture born of a prior recitation.

231. This is what is meant by the impersonal character and eternity of the Vedas. This impersonal character and eternity may be defined in the following manner: A body of words is said to possess impersonal character and eternity, if their order of utterance conforms to a pre-established order and proceeds from a remembrance of that order, which arises from the culture shaped by the prior practice of utterance in the same order. This order is being maintained by the tradition of recitation. The group of words, so preserved in a fixed order, constitute the Vedas divided into Rik, Yajus, Sama, Atharvana, containing an endless number of branches. The Vedic statements have three forms — *vidhi* (injunction.) — *arthavada* (explanatory passage commending the prescribed action or condemning the prohibited action) and *mantra* (hymns). Now through all these divisions, branches and forms, the Vedas in their totality teach us the nature of Narayana, the supreme Brahman, the mode of worshipping him and the purposes whose fulfilment is brought about by him as a result of such worship. Even as the supreme Person is eternal, the system of words embodying the knowledge concerning him, his worship and the fruits accruing there from, is eternal.

232. As the Vedas are endless and as their import is unfathomable, profound, great sages, commissioned by the Supreme Being, recollect the import of the Vedas and compose in epoch after epoch the Dharma-Shastras, Itihasas (Epics) , and Puranas, rooted in the *vidhi's*, *arthavadas* and *mantras*, for the welfare of the whole world.

233. Even words used in ordinary linguistic practice, have been taken out of the huge mass of Vedic utterances and are used in their various meanings in accordance with previous usage and flow of tradition. If it is asked, 'If all words are Vedic words, why are there separate definitions of the Vedic sense and ordinary sense of words?' the explanation is that when words are used in the pre-established Vedic order, they carry their original significance, and when they are used in a different order, they bear other meanings. There is no flaw in the procedure whatever.

234. Thus the Vedas, along with the auxiliary disciplines, Supported by the Itihasas (Epics) , Puranas and dharma-Shastras, impart knowledge about the supreme Brahman. The Brahman knowable through the Vedas is Narayana, who is antithetical to all evil,

transcendent and unique. In his substantive nature, he is infinite knowledge and bliss. He is an ocean of countless hosts of auspicious attributes, inherent and unlimited in their excellence. All sentient and non-sentient entities, have their nature, existence, activities and mutual differences controlled by his will. His supreme glory is infinite and beyond thought in its nature and attributes. He has as the means of his sport, the entire universe, consisting of multitudinous kinds of countless sentient and non-sentient entities.

235. Brahman himself, qualified by all entities as his modes, constituting his body, is signified by all terms in these and similar texts, which are applied to him by way of coordinate predication: ‘All this verily is Brahman (Chan. 3:14:1), ‘All this is ensouled by this That thou art, O, Svetaketu (Chan. VI, viii, 7);’ ‘Some name him Agni, others name him Marut, others again speak of him as Prajapati. Some others name him Indra. Some others consider him as Prana, and others describe him as the eternal Brahman (Ma. 12: 123);’ ‘All fires, all lights, all the three worlds, all the divine rulers of worlds, all the Vedas, all the three sacred files and all the five oblations — all these are the son of Devaki alone (Bha.);’ ‘Thou art the sacrifice, the sacred *vasatkara* and the holy syllable “Aum”. Thou art the destroyer of foes (Ra. Yuddhakanda, 120: 20);’ ‘Thou were in the ancient times the Vasu, called Rtadhama, among the Vasus. Thou art Prajapati (Ra. Yuddhakanda, 120:7);’ ‘The whole universe is thy body. The earth is thy power of stability. Agni is thy anger, Soma is thy grace, thou art endowed with *Srivatsa-mark* (Ra. Yuddhakanda, 120:26);’ ‘The fires are Vishnu. The worlds are Vishnu. The forests are Vishnu. The mountains and quarters are Vishnu. The rivers and seas are Vishnu. He is all, O Brahmin all that is and all that is not (Vi. Pu. 6:5:72)’.

236. The supreme Brahman, whose will becomes irresistibly realized, resolved by himself to take up many modes and thought, ‘Let me become many’. In him were submerged the great elements in their subtle form, comprising the sum total of non-sentient nature. The aggregate of individual selves was also submerged in him. The Supreme brought them to manifestation through differentiation. Out of the subtle elements he created the great gross elements. He caused the individual selves to enter them as principles of their animation, He then brought into being the whole of this gross world out of those elements, animated by the conscious principles, through mutual permutations and combinations. Then the supreme Brahman entered into all those entities as their ultimate soul. Thus he exists in the state of effect as the supreme Self with all existence constituting his body. He exists characterized by these as his modes.

237. The great elements in their primeval subtle condition constitute what is called *Prakriti*. The sum total of individual selves is called *Purusha*. These two, *Prakriti* and *Purusha*, as they are constitutive of the body of the Supreme, are his modes. Thus the Paramatman, himself, with them as his modes, is designated by the terms ‘*Prakriti*’ and ‘*Purusha*’. All that has been so far elaborated on this matter, is brought out clearly even in this single passage: ‘He desired, “Let me be many ; having created that, he entered into that, having entered that, he became the unchanging and the changing, the defined and the undefined, the supporter and the supported, the sentient and the non-sentient. Remaining the real, he became the real and the unreal (Tai. 2:6)’.

238. The means for the attainment of Brahman is *para-Bhakti*, which is of the nature of meditation that has become an object of supreme attachment (to the meditator) and has acquired the vividness of clearest perception. This *para-Bhakti* is to be attained through the pathway of devotion, which in its turn is aided by one’s performance of his duties after a due understanding of the nature of reality through the scripture. The term *Bhakti* signifies a particular kind of love. (*priti*). Love is a particular kind of cognition.

139. ‘But love is the same thing as joy. Joy, as understood in the world, is something that results from cognition and is other than cognition’. If this objection be raised, we answer that the truth is not so. The cognition which said to result in joy, is itself that joy.

240. To Explain: Cognition of objects is common to all the three types of experiences — joy, pain and emotional neutrality. Cognition, which depends upon its objective content for its specific quality, acquires the aforesaid qualities (of joy or pain or the neutral state) as determined by its objective content. The cognition of that object — the cognition qualified by which object is said to lead to joy — is itself the joy in question. Nothing other than this cognition can be discerned in the experience of joy. By this cognition itself the experience of joy is accounted for.

241. Entities other than Brahman can be objects of such cognitions of the nature of joy only to a finite extent and for limited duration. But Brahman is such that cognising of him is an infinite and abiding joy. It is for this reason that the Shruti says, ‘Brahman is bliss (Tai. 2:6)’. Since the form of cognition as joy is determined by its object, Brahman itself is joy.

242. This has been so stated in the sacred text, ‘He is rasa; attaining this rasa, the cognisor becomes blissful (Tai. 2:7)’. It means that, as Brahman is joy, the person who attains Brahman becomes joyous. The supreme *Purusha* is unsurpassed and infinite joy by himself and in himself. He becomes the joy of another also, as his nature as joy is absolute and universal. When Brahman becomes the object of one’s contemplation, he (the meditator) becomes blissful.

243. Thus the supreme Brahman is the ocean of infinite and unsurpassed excellences of attributes. He transcends all evil. The expanse of his glory is boundless. He abounds in surpassing condescension, maternal compassion and supreme beauty. He is the principal entity (*Sheshin*). The individual self is subservient to him. If a seeker meditates on the Supreme with a full consciousness of this relationship (between the Lord and himself) as the principal entity and subsidiary entity, and if the supreme Brahman so meditated upon becomes an object of supreme love to the devotee, then he himself effectuates the devotee’s god-realization.

244. (Objection): ‘It is maintained that absolute subordination is the highest joy for the soul. This is opposed to the understanding of the whole world. All sentient beings have independence as the highest object of desire. Dependence is extremely painful. Smṛti also says, ‘All dependence on others is painful. All self-dependence is happiness (Ma. 4: 160)’ and again, ‘Service is a dog’s life. Therefore one should give it up (Ma. 4: 6)’.

245. (Reply): This is the attitude of those who have failed to comprehend the nature of the self as different from the body, and is due to their mistaken attachment to the body as the self. To explain: The body is the individual locus of the attributes like the generic character connoted by terms like man, god, etc., and is taken to be an independent entity. The individual self caught up in the transmigratory circle of existence looks upon the body as ‘1’. The conception of value is determined by the conception of the self. The individual selves looking upon themselves as lions, tigers, bears, men, yakshas, raksasas, pishacas, gods, demons, females and males, have corresponding and mutually separate conceptions of what is to be desired and what is to be avoided. These various conceptions of value are mutually contradictory. Therefore, the whole position is cleared up and explained on the

principle that what an individual pursues as a desirable end depends upon what he conceives himself to be.

246. In reality the nature of the self is that it is different from the body, that it is of the nature of consciousness and that in its essence it is subsidiary to the Supreme. When the individual forms a true conception of himself, he pursues ends that accord with that conception. That the nature of the self is consciousness is stated by the Smriti text, 'The self is full of knowledge and is pure (Vi. Pu. 6:8:22)'. The Shruti texts like 'He is the Lord of the universe (M.B.)', propound that the individual self's nature is to be subservient to the supreme Self. Therefore it is to be understood that, as the conception of oneself as lion or tiger is due to the misapprehension of the self arising from karma, even so is the conception oneself as self-dependent.

247. Therefore, the value of everything, other than the supreme Person, is due only to karma. Hence they are trivial and transitory. Only the supreme Person is intrinsically of the nature of joy. Hence only the joy in him is infinite and abiding. The Shruti says, 'Brahman is bliss, Brahman is *akasha*' (Chan. 4:10:5)', 'Brahman is bliss (Tai. 3:6)' and 'Brahman is real, knowledge and infinite (Tai. 2:1)'.

248. Bhagavan Parashara has set forth in the following verses how everything other than Brahman lacks intrinsic power to bring joy' and whatever joy we happen to derive from them is therefore transient, being determined by karma:— 'O Brahmin, by hell and heaven only demerit and merit are meant (Vi. Pu. 2:6:44). The same object causes pain, pleasure, envy and anger. Therefore, how can these features like causing, pleasure etc. be the essential nature of the object? (Vi. Pu. 2:6: 45) How can the causation of pleasure or pain be the universal and necessary nature of any object? The only universal and necessary factor in the causation of pleasure and pain is the determination by karma. This is the idea.

249. After thus determining the variability and relativity of the nature of empirical sources of- pleasure and pain in relation to different individuals, he goes on to show that empirical objects do not behave consistently even in relation to a single person: 'The same object, which please at one time, comes to cause pain at another time; the same causes anger at one time and at a later moment brings about tranquillity (Vi. Pu. 2:6:46). There is nothing that is pleasant in its inherent nature and nothing that is painful in itself (Vi. Pu. 2:6:47)'. It thus gets explained that all objects are pleasurable or painful through the force of karma and not through their intrinsic nature and therefore on the liquidation of the determining karma, the particular effects by way of pleasure and pain disappear.

250. The statement 'All dependence is painful' simply means that dependence on anything or anyone other than the supreme Person is painful, because there is no relationship of the principal entity and the subsidiary between anyone other than Brahman and oneself. 'Service is a dog's life' also means that service of one who is unworthy of service is dog's life. The following text says that the only one that ought to be served by all who are enlightened about the fundamental nature of the self, is the highest *Purusha*: 'He is to be served by people in all stages or life. He alone is to be served by all.' The Lord says:—

'He who serves me, following the path of undivided Bhakti, transcends these qualities (of *Prakriti*) and will attain self-realization (Gita 14: 26)'.

251. It has already been elucidated that It is only this service of the form of Bhakti that is spoken of as knowledge in the texts, 'One who knows Brahman attains the Highest (Tai. 2:1)', 'He who knows him becomes immortal here (Pu.Suk. 20)' and 'He who knows Brahman becomes Brahman (Mu.3:2:9)'. In the other text qualifying this knowledge, 'This

