

# Wargame



## Design

Vol IV, Nr. 10

Preparing to Play the TLNB

German troops in Spain

Antiquated Principles of 18<sup>th</sup> c. Warfare

How to Use the NAB Expansion Kit

## Wargame Design, Spring 2020

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### 11,258 SCIENTISTS FROM 153 COUNTRIES DECLARE A 'CLIMATE EMERGENCY'

"World scientists' warning of a climate emergency," published in the journal *Bioscience*, marks the first time a large group of scientists has formally come out in favor of labeling climate change an "emergency," caused by increasing greenhouse gas emissions.

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### EDITORIAL

## What is History?

"History is lies agreed upon," said Napoleon. A convincing liar believes his own lies. History becomes a contest determined not so much by the skill of the liar as by the amplification it receives through repeated tellings.

Has it ever occurred to you that the entirety of history up to the present day is one great mass hallucination? After all, our human brains are wired to receive stories from the members of our tribe. As we look into things, time and again, we find a thin veneer of fact and a giant layer cake of fabrication.

When Napoleon asserts his right to crown himself Emperor, he is setting up as "real" that he has the authority to do so and is not just a nut. As Eckhart Tolle points out,

If you stand on a street in New York, point to a huge skyscraper and say "That building is mine. I own it," you are either very wealthy or you are delusional or a liar. In any case, you are telling a story in which the thought form "I" and the thought form "building" merge into one.<sup>1</sup>

Napoleon was a master of symbolism, and understood the art of mass communication when the available media were paintings, books, and newspapers.

Napoleon's staging was so breathtaking that the old dynasty was thrown out of Augustan business for good. He even made sure that this time *(cont'd on page 20)*

<sup>1</sup> Eckhart Tolle, *A New Earth*, p. 42

## PREPARING TO PLAY

**TLNB CAMPAIGNS****Vince Hughes**

Large OSG projects such as the campaigns and mini-campaigns require a degree of research and preparation before jumping in at full throttle and just throwing the games onto the table. Having that good working knowledge of the rules—warts, crinkles and obscurities included—allows one to spot potential spikes that might cause debate or at least require a 'chat'. Having those potential glitches already ruled before play means a much smoother play experience. Quite a few games have become held up due to players having to sort out how a rule or incident should be played out on the table.

The extra bit of effort will be worth the modest time investment. Foreseen hurdles will arise with little comment as we simply played through them as per the rules-notes document that was compiled before the battle/campaign.

So what are the areas that require pre-game investigation? From my own experience and taking all the comments from posters at CSW having some issues, I see that problems arise in the following areas:

- **Series Rules being misunderstood, or ignorance thereof, due to their existence not being remembered.**
- **Study-Folder rules needing clarification or misinterpreted.**
- **Specific special scenario rules.**
- **Cards causing debates, often due to their brevity.**
- **Terrain effects and their application.**
- **Errata not being used, as it hasn't been checked for or even known about.**
- **Interpretation differences of the rules by the grognards at the table.**

Failure to head-off problems before a counter is moved can end with games being ruined due to a heated debate, or exasperation at multiple issues arising in one encounter. The 'work' entailed is a fraction of the game time, and pays its dividends with the probability of an overall much smoother and ultimately enjoyable experience.

All players should be armed equally with the same information. It's no good going into a game having jotted down somewhere your decisions and rulings on matters, if the others haven't agreed with you.

So before play, create a word doc and send it out to all concerned and thrash out how each matter should be judged. Sorting out the grey areas *before* sides are chosen is going to make discussion a lot easier and less partisan. Not owning a side whilst discussing each matter should allow everybody to see things without bias.

**Series Rules:** Most importantly, make sure you are using the same rules version and note which, if any, rules sections you will be omitting. Some people prefer to use the rules that came with the set being played. Quite a few people either do not grok all the rules or have been playing some of them in error or unaware of a particular rule's existence. Even now, I often have a flick through the rule book and re-read a section. I can't remember when I last found a 'new' thing, but it wasn't that long ago. There are 22 pages, so things can and will be missed or not fully understood. If you know you have a weak grasp in some parts, liaise with your group before playing so that you can understand those weak areas. Encourage others to raise any points on the rules they might be unsure of. Be prepared, if you are a solo player, or if you are to play somebody

who usually solos, that a particular rule may have been played wrong for years. This unfortunately will not become apparent until it happens and so that has to be put down to a learning experience. The same applies if people from different groups are playing each other. Groups of players can unwittingly have been happily playing a rule wrong for years. The most common mis-play I have come across are players moving leaders that have either not been placed in command or have rolled for Initiative (remember a failure affects his formation troops within command range). They have been under the impression that leaders may move regardless. March orders is another popular rules question section and prone to be played incorrectly it seems?

**House Rules:** The option should be given to be playing the game RAW or whether anybody fancies house-rules to be used. Don't come to the table on the day of the game making the offer. Remember that when playing somebody new, people are usually more polite and accommodating than usual. If a house-rule is suggested on the day of the game, they are more likely to agree to it albeit privately, they'd prefer not to. House rules obviously benefit the player that is used to them, so if you want to use a house-rule, posit it before the day of the game. Examples of our group's house-rules are the opponent chooses which counter will lose a step in a 1R Shock Combat result. No bridge burning unless it occurred or was attempted in the real battle (unrestricted bridge burning spoils some scenarios—Hanau being a good example). Also remember that house rules might have been used for so long that they have become ingrained as part of the series rules in the mind of the user. If that is the case and you have forgotten to mention it, don't get the hump if challenged and not allowed to use it mid-game.

**Study Folder Rules & SSR's:** These do need careful study. They can change series rules. They can add processes that are unique and therefore require careful reading and understanding. One SSR that comes to mind are the *Transiting Austrian Corps* in the Abensburg scenario from *The Last Success*. It made such a difference to how the scenario played out and if played wrong it will make the scenario simply not what it was meant to be. I tend to list SSR's in the word doc that I compile for discussion (*see page 4*) and how I interpret them. That means we can both check them over and see if we agree. It's surprising how many times somebody sees something that I didn't, and vice versa. Before the SSR's are listed under each scenario comes the general Study Folder rules. Most of these are the same from box set to box set. But they DO have differences. One example of this is the Replacements rules from game to game. They are not all the same. So if you are playing a campaign linking the 4 or 5 battles in the box, make sure you grasp how the Replacements work in that particular set. Don't assume that they will be the same as the previous title you used.

**Cards:** These do tend to cause a lot of questions on CSW. Most of the cards in each box are the same. So once you have checked these through once, you would have completed most of the work for all future titles. Read the cards carefully. Check that they make sense to you. If it does not, do an advanced search at CSW (putting the date range back a bit) and see if anybody else has asked the question before (they probably have). An example of a card that needs clarifying would be No.22 *From the Jaws of Death*. This one saves your stack if they have to retreat into an EZOC. However, the card states you cannot move from one EZOC to another EZOC. For a standard 1 hex retreat, that would basically make the card useless as you'd already start in an EZOC (that's

why there was combat after all) and you then retreat into an EZOC. If it does not allow you to do this, then the card would have no use? What the text means here is when say, you receive a DR2 or DR3. The stack cannot then retreat into multiple EZOC's. So make sure you are both aware of the anomaly. There will be cards particular to the set you are playing. Check these cards and make sure you both agree on their meanings. Finally, agree which "Using the Cards" pamphlet you are going to be using. Is it the one from that set? Or will it be your most recent one? They have changed over the years, so it's worth making sure you are both reading identical versions.

**Terrain Effects:** These can range from the application of terrain effects on movement and combat, as well as checking you both have the same understanding of the LOS rules. Remember how crests and hill levels work; that LOS is not always reciprocal at different levels; that terrain effects are not cumulative and you only use the best one for the defender; how chateau hexes work if they are adjacent to one another with opposing forces occupying one each. It can be worth throwing out a few LOS examples to your opponent pre-game to check you have the same understanding.

**Errata:** All the sets have it and the most recent version is posted on the *Consimworld* folder header that relates to the game. Go through it all and make sure your opponent is aware. It's poor form to foist an official rule change on somebody mid-game that they were not aware of. *Boardgamegeek* can also be worth a check before the game too. Many questions are asked there and you may find one or two in the game's folder that clear up an issue before it even becomes one.

**Interpretation:** There is the unconscious interpretation, where the rules have been read and digested and, as far as you're

concerned, fully understood. Therefore, somebody interpreting something differently simply cannot be helped and either a friendly debate or a check on the internet and questions posted therein may resolve the matter. Then there is the conscious interpretation. You have read the rule but you are aware that you are not entirely sure. In that case, such rules can be highlighted to the other player and see how he interprets it. If differently, then once again, make some searches to find the answer and then come to an agreed use.

As you go through all those headings, compile your notes onto a word.doc. When completed, post it out. Between you both, you should be able to come to agreed rules usage, leading to a smoother experience of game play. I hope these pointers inspire at least one or two players to make some pre-game preps in future. I also find that doing so gets me in the mood to play the game and also gives me a confident working knowledge of the whole of that particular package.

The following Word documents are two actual samples of the pre-game .docs my gaming pals and I have actually used.

These were constructed *before* we diced to see which side we were representing. The decisions made before we find out whom it will benefit or hamper.

## THE LAST SUCCESS

This was to be played with a new(ish) player to the group. It was prepared with so that the campaign game would be played as per the Study Folder, all the games knit into a pattern of sequential battles with each battle affecting the next one. There would also be a carryover of losses and VP's as per Study Folder rules. The battles were all to be Approach to Battle versions and would include card play.

You can see within the doc that there are plenty of rules reminders, the sort of rules that can easily be passed over. Changes to the standard VP's and losses are also highlighted. With a new player to the group involved, some of the card explanations were included to avoid misinterpretation at the crucial moment.

## **The Last Success Campaign Rules**

**19.13:** Campaign to consist of four AtB scenarios. Abensberg, Eckmuhl, Aspern-Essling & Wagram. There will be **no** extra bonus cards for winning previous battles.

**19.21:** Units marked \* should be ignored and set-up on their full strength side (exception – any such units at Abensberg). Reduced units will appear as a consequence of previous battles. They may or may not receive replacements dependent on Mode cards and/or rule 25.23 (Pursuit Table).

**19.22:** Any overstacked units at start of play are displaced as per displacement rules before the game begins.

**19.25:** Officers and Commander-Officers may set up with a unit of their formation, Commanders with any friendly unit.

**19.32 & 19.35:** Countermixes are changed at Wagram. However, any unit reduced or PEU by the time of that scenario will use a reduced Wagram counter or not appear at all respectively.

**19.6:** One March Order may be issued at the start of a game **if** a friendly commander is on the map. This may be changed or modified by SSR's.

**19.71:** Austrian non-cooperation. Austrian units from different corps cannot stack or combine together in an attack. This also applies to Bombardment. **Exception** – units receiving **direct** command points from a commander may do so and also those under A.G Leader Nordmann.

### **20.0 Victory Conditions Point Allocations**

**20.11:** case **a** amended below, case **b** amended below, case **f** will not apply at all, case **g** amended below.

**20.12: SP's Eliminated** will include **all** those in the PEU and those remaining in the Awaits Recovery & Recovered boxes **plus** the SP's removed from units on map that have been 'hit' in **this** battle. Units that are in reduced state from previous battles do **not** count.

**20.13: Enemy Corps Demoralised:** The amount of SP required to demoralise a corps will influence the VP allocation given as a score.

1-4 SP = 2VP

5-8 SP = 3VP

9+ = 4VP

**20.6 First Player:** French in every scenario.

**21.31: Abensberg:** Transiting corps. The Austrian player will move these troops every turn toward their exit point at full speed. Whether they are in March Order or in normal march is up to him. They will do so until exited or the March Order is revoked via an Alternative reinforcement card.

**Bonus Cards:** I would suggest that in games with only 2 bonus cards, we take out the General Retreat card and only put it back in when the player opts to have it in the deck.

#### **Card Text:**

Any cards mentioning "Cannot move from EZOC directly to another" will not include the unit's first EZOC hex.

**No.6 Formation Scattered:** The 2/3MP reference is for inf/cav

**No.9 General Retreat:** Note that all movement has to be toward a friendly supply source or map exit. No sideways to conveniently battle. Should be played with this thought in mind. Also, as above, I think we will have the players call it into their deck.

**No.14 Another Chance (Austrian):** Change any die roll. The player may verbally choose what he wants the result number to be. He can also cancel one die roll and roll it again. So all in all, a total of two rolls affected.

**No.16 Point Blank Fire:** Unit that bombards, even though adjacent cannot then take part in any subsequent standard combat.

**No.21 Turning Movement:** The reference to 'formation' will mean the formation officer. If he is within the requisite range for the card, then any units of his formation within usual command range (3 hexes or 4 hexes for Commander-Officer) will also be in-command.

**No.26 Reinforcements Take Other Route:** Applies to that turn only

**No.27 Destroyed Bridge:** Aspern-Essling – Applies to all reinforcements throughout the day. Other battles as per card.

**No.30 Marshal Lannes:** "Can command up to 5 units from any formation" add "in addition to his usual abilities"

## NAPOLEON AGAINST RUSSIA

A different approach to this one as it was played with an experienced player with whom I have rattled sabres for many years. For this campaign, we decided that we wanted to see what the actual battlefields, OOB's and dispositions looked like on the historical day. Also, as the great city of Smolensk was to be involved, we wanted that to be a sweeping epic. This was a change of campaign play for us as we had followed the study folder campaign rules and carried losses etc. in previous years.

So we decided that the Smolensk game would be the mini-campaign scenario that includes Valutino. That way, we get the whole city onto the table and two Russian armies to face the Grande Armée at its healthiest. Truly an epic awaits! The following three battles were to be Day of Battle scenarios. As stated, this was much for our own learning and visuals of the historical lay out. Because we wanted those historic OOB's, we had to make some penalty for player's that suffer heavy losses,

especially late ones in previous scenarios. After all, if we already knew that our troops were coming back regardless of previous events, this would probably lead to *ASL* style late game do-or-die attacks just to win the scenario. What was there to lose? So I invented an SP penalty, the percentage of which gets higher the later the SP casualties are inflicted. This means going into the next battle carrying over SP points onto your losses numbers. No counters damaged, just a notional number and therefore a points handicap for not looking after your army previously. So although you may win the next scenario in its naked form, it may be that in campaign form you lost it due to those previous high-losses. And yet, we still get to see the historical situation.

There are also some house-rules listed. But cards and much else have been omitted here, because, as old lags that have fought each other many times, we already know between us how to proceed.

### Rules for Our Russian Campaign

**Smolensk & Valutino Mini Campaign** (dark blue initiative): Play this as the mini-campaign so that we can use the two maps together. The game will be the 16<sup>th</sup>, 17<sup>th</sup> & 19<sup>th</sup>. We can miss out the 18<sup>th</sup>. See rules for mini-campaign below.

**Shevardino DoB** (yellow initiative or dark blue if no yellow)

**Borodino DoB** (yellow initiative or dark blue if no yellow)

**Maloyaroslavets DoB** One day only (red initiative but dark blues come back)

**34.22 Replacements:** There will be no Replacement rule. Instead, each battle will be fought with the actual OOB's for that particular engagement. Instead, there will be SP penalties carried over from the previous battle which will be added to the SP totals lost in the current battle. The SP penalty points table will be used to determine exactly what amount each side carries. That table is based on more SP points being carried over the later you lose them in the battle. It might not inhibit suicidal last turn attempts, but it will at least provide a punishment for doing so.

**Leader casualties.** Usually, Leaders will be lost as per the rules (rolled 6). But for artillery retreat Leader Loss checks, roll a D10. If a Leader is lost, they are only lost for that battle and the usual Replacement Leader rules are used (rated one less and appears in two turns time). Should the removed leader reappear in the next battle OOB, then they were obviously wounded and thus returned. Nonetheless, once again, to curb profligacy, there will be a points penalty for such leaders lost as shown here.

Officer rated 1 or 2 = 1VP, Officer rated 3 = 2VP, Officer rated 4 or Commander-Officer = 3VP, Commanders 4VP.

**22.0 Recovery:** Each turn, each player will roll 2 x dice to attempt to instigate a Recovery turn. If the total rolled is between 5-9, then there is NO Recovery that turn. A player that goes 5 consecutive rolls without a Recovery opportunity may do so on the 6<sup>th</sup> turn and need not roll.

**25.17 Russian Commanders:** Note rules on the non-cooperation of Russian command and Kutuzov, Wittgenstein and Konstantine restrictions.

**25.19 French Command:** Note Murat cannot place Poniatowski or Junot In-Command.

**25.61 March Orders:** One March Order per side IF commander on map AND scenario instructions do not modify this amount.

**25.73 Davout's Corps Demoralisation:** NOTE that in Davout's corps, the individual DIVISIONS become demoralised at a VP cost of 2pts per division at end of game.

**25.74 French Guard:** The OG & YG need card No.11 to have a chance of being activated. GC are always available.

**26.1 VP Awards:** Any battle ending with either side with no more than a 1.15 points advantage will be resulted as a draw.

**26.12: Total Combat SP Eliminated:** Will include ALL units in the PEU, Unrecovered and Recovered boxes on the casualty track. Also, it will include any units damaged during the battle but on the map. With these, we will only count the SP's lost in their strength. So for example a 6-4 infantry reduced to a 4-4 infantry will be 2 SP's. Units that start the game damaged will not have their missing points counted.

**26.15 Control:** Note box specific rule of 1pt per enemy Improvised Position captured and held.

**26.17 No Leaders in Town VP's . . .** Will not be using this as a VP rule.

**26.3 General Retreat:** Can be instigated by card or announcement. A General Retreat announcement can only be permitted once per army per day. If it is later rescinded and then desired again the same day, then a General Retreat card would have to be played. A General Retreat card can also be played for movement only during the Card Segment.

## THE BATTLES

### Smolensk & Valutino Mini Campaign Rules

**Smolensk Chateau Rules:** Recent updates from KZ have decided that troops in Chateaux hexes need not attack, even if adjacent to another Chateau.

**Duration:** 16 August Night AM to 17 August 8pm. And then 19 August. 6am – 8pm. The 18<sup>th</sup> will be skipped. However, on the 18<sup>th</sup>, each side may move each *unit* up to 4 HEXES. Players do this alternatively by dealing with a stack by stack basis, although each unit can move individually. 'First' player moves first. Units so moved may not move further away in terms of hexes from their formation leader. This restriction is per hex moved and not their ending location. During this move, units may not enter an EZOC and may not end the move in a hex that would place them Out of Supply.

**Mode Cards at Start:** 3 each and played on the 6am turn.

**Card Deck:** Using the updated 'Remove Cards From Deck' sheet for AtB Smolensk and 27.13. When cards are reshuffled at night turn, replace the Alt.Reinforcement cards onto the deck.

**Bonus Cards:** 3 each for 16<sup>th</sup> & 17<sup>th</sup>. Reduce French to 2 on the 19<sup>th</sup>.

**Pontoon Trains:** Russian 2 = 1 each with Bagration & Barclay: French 1 = with 3<sup>rd</sup> Div/I

**Counter-Mix:** Plain or dark blue units.

**Set-Up:** Use the revised set-up & TRC sheets downloadable at CSW.



**First Player:** French

**Alternate Reinforcements**

**French at 1301W**

- #1 16<sup>th</sup> Div/V
- #2 18<sup>th</sup> Div/V
- #3 Cav Div/V
- #4 17<sup>th</sup> Div/V, Doumerc IIIC, Latour IVC

**Russian**

**16/17 Aug**

- #1 Wittgenstein, AG Div/I at 3906E
- #2 5<sup>th</sup> Div, 14<sup>th</sup> Div, Res Div/I at 3906E
- #3 -
- #4 -

**19 Aug**

- Raevsky, VII corps at 0554E
- Wittgenstein, AG Div/I at 3906E
- 5<sup>th</sup> Div/I at 3906E
- 14<sup>th</sup> Div, Res Div/I at 3906E

**27.35 Fords:** French need card to discover them.

**32.4 Victory Points:** Calculate VP's at the end of each battle (26.1). Therefore end of 17<sup>th</sup> at 8pm and again 19<sup>th</sup> at 8pm. VP locations count only on map for that battle scenario. Then tally the two scores for final result. This means for example that scoring points for a demoralised formation can only count once for the 16/17<sup>th</sup>. But if it is reorganised for the 19<sup>th</sup>, it could be scored for again if it once more became demoralised.

When calculating the points to be carried over to the next battle, Shevardino, then both days of the Smolensk battle are to be carried over as if two separate battles.

For 16th/17<sup>th</sup> August: Turns 1-10 (6am-3pm 16<sup>th</sup> Aug) = 25% SP's count, Turns 11-24 (4pm 16<sup>th</sup> – 2pm 17<sup>th</sup>) = 33%. Turns 25-30 (3pm-8pm 17<sup>th</sup> Aug) = 50%

For 19<sup>th</sup> Aug, this counts as a standard 15 turn game from the SP Chart.

**32.53 March Orders at Start:** 2 each

**Shevardino DoB** (yellow initiative or dark blue if no yellow)

**29.16 First Player:** Russian player is the First player.

**29.41 Shevardino VP's:** Effectively, this rule is a point at the end of each FRIENDLY player turn that it is held. As there are 5 turns, it means a max of 5pts. However, the player that holds it at the end of the game automatically gets 5pts. The other player will get as many points as end of friendly turns he had possession of it.

**34.22 Replacements:** As stated above but using the colour coded counters as per Study Folder.

**Borodino DoB** (yellow initiative or dark blue if no yellow)

**30.16 First Player:** Russian player is the First player.

**30.2 Alternate Reinforcements:** None

**30.37 Konstantine:** Not present at battle. Replacement officer should be of 1 less value than Konstantine.

**Cards**

All cards pertaining to not moving from one EZOC to another does not include the units starting hex.

Russian 7 = 1 turn only

## REGIMENTAL HISTORIES

## The Porbeck/Kruse Brigade from *Napoleon's Quagmire*



Vince Hughes and John H. Gill

A check on which regiments make up which brigades can lend a hanger for the imagination, helping establish the scene unfolding in the game. The two counters in the *Napoleon's Quagmire* French Player forces—Porbeck's 5(3)4 and Kruse's 4(3)4—are described in the Study Folder as “Baden-Nassau, grey-green or feld-grau.” If you have *Napoleon's Last Gamble* or *Napoleon's Last Battles*, you will have at least 1SP of this unit. The two counters contained in “Quagmire” represent one and the same brigade at different dates and features four remarkable battalions—the 4<sup>th</sup> Baden Infantry Regiment and the 2<sup>nd</sup> Nassau Infantry Regiment (2 bns. apiece).

The first counter, Porbeck takes us up to and through the battle of Talavera. The second, shows Kruse as the new OIC following Porbeck's demise at Talavera and the transfer-out of Nassau General-Major von Schäffer. Their tales are scattered among the pages of history usually as side notes or maybe mentioned as being there.

Baden and Nassau joined the Confederation of the Rhine upon its inception in 1806 and both participated in the Campaigns of 1806–1807, in the several sieges along the Baltic coast rear (Danzig and Stralsund). Baden was rewarded by aggrandizements from Napoleonic dispensations equaling three times its original size! These lands were ceded from both Bavaria and the now defunct Holy Roman Empire. Nassau-Usingen and Nassau-Weilburg combined to form the single Duchy of Nassau ruled by both rulers of the previous smaller states. In return for

these gains, both states had to provide manpower to Napoleon's armies. Baden was called upon for 8,000 troops and Nassau, 1,680.

Napoleon's campaigns in Spain demanded a far higher investment of troops than the Emperor originally envisioned. He decreed that his allies would fulfil part of the requirement. Polish, Westphalian, Dutch, Baden, Nassau and Frankfurt troops were among those sent that feature in this set of games.

The 4<sup>th</sup> Baden & 2<sup>nd</sup> Nassau were assigned to Sebastiani's IV corps in Leval's 3<sup>rd</sup> German division (comprised also of the Dutch, Frankfurt and Hessian contingents) and these crossed the Spanish border south of Bayonne on the 13<sup>th</sup> of October 1808.

Porbeck/Kruse contains the 4<sup>th</sup> Baden and the 2<sup>nd</sup> Nassau infantry regiments. Each had also their TO/E reconfigured to that of the French infantry battalion. Each battalion now had six companies including one voltigeur/ “jaeger” company (light), one grenadier company (elite), and four line/musketeer companies. Company paper strength was designated as 140 bayonets though on campaign they often had 50% or less of full their complements.


### Uniforms

The Nassau uniform was quite distinctive and the infantry were famous for their green tunics and trousers in both line and light. When they first marched into Spain the two grenadier

companies were distinguished by a unique style of high-crested black leather helmet with fur crest, in addition to red epaulettes and trim. The helmets proved cumbersome and degraded over time to become unusable (and they stank).

Resupply of uniforms was a major problem for all German troops, and by 1810 the Nassau regiment had largely adopted the reddish-brown trousers and overcoats that were common among all French and allied troops in Spain—especially after most of the trousers in an 1810 shipment from home proved too short for the men. In the absence of replacements from home, and with permission from their duke, the regiment obtained brown fur colpacks in the French style, made in Spain, considered very fashionable headgear. This re-equipment arrived in late 1809 or 1810, so at the time of OSG's four battles, the grenadiers were still making do with their stinky helmets.

Nassau regiments all carried an identical flag of a plain yellow field centred by the Nassau coat-of-arms—blue heart shield with lion rampant to the left—very similar to both the Netherlands and the Grand Duke of Luxembourg's coat-of-arms.




*Nassau infantry flag*

The Baden infantry in our counter was a composite organization, created by combining the 2<sup>nd</sup> Bn/3<sup>rd</sup> IR (garrisoned in Rastatt, red facings) and the 1<sup>st</sup> Bn/4<sup>th</sup> IR (garrisoned in Freiburg, white facings). The base color of the Baden infantry tunic was a dark blue, but the color of the regiment's facings when it marched to Spain is unclear. A contemporary source says that I/4<sup>th</sup> Infantry was issued red cloth and rebranded itself before departing Freiburg so the entire regiment would be in red by 1810. In 1809 the men wore a large fur-crested helmet modelled on the

Bavarian "Raupenhelm." As with the Nassau grenadiers, the Badeners found their Raupenhelms unsuited for the heat and sun of Spain; moreover they shrank over time until they barely fit the men's heads. A welcome resupply arrived from Baden in 1810 to replace the helmets with shakos for the infantry (the entire army was changing to shakos), but there were not enough for the Baden artillerymen, so the gunners had to make do with their Raupenhelmen.

It is not clear which flags the 4<sup>th</sup> Baden carried in Spain. Since two battalions from different regiments were sent to Iberia, I/4<sup>th</sup> Infantry would have had a "Leibfahne" and II/3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry a "Regimentsfahne," each of different colors. It is possible that each battalion retained the Fahne it possessed before the amalgamation; but the Leibfahnen were supposed to have been put in secure storage in 1808, so it is possible that only the II/3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry flag was taken to Spain. Pictured is the Leibfahne that would have been carried by I/4<sup>th</sup> IR.



To support this infantry, Baden contributed an artillery battery of eight pieces. Initially composed of six 6-pounders and two howitzers, the battery exchanged three or four of its guns for French 4-pounders before crossing the Pyrenees. These were more practical for the difficult terrain and poor roads the gunners would encounter in Iberia. The battery exhausted its 6-pounder ammunition at the Battle of Medellin, so it exchanged the remaining two pieces of that calibre for two captured Spanish 8-pounders. By the time of Talavera, therefore, the battery consisted of two 8-pounders, four 4-pounders and its original pair of howitzers.

In addition to exchanging their artillery pieces, the Baden troops, infantry and gunners alike, turned in their muskets for French models during the march through France to ensure

commonality of ammunition supply with their French allies. The Nassau regiment did likewise.

The artillery was often detached: such as two guns accompanying a Nassau battalion on a punitive expedition or even with an entirely different corps. Additionally, the Baden guns and gunners were often intermixed with the small, poorly equipped Hessian half-battery to a point where they were almost indistinguishable.

The Baden battery commander, Hauptmann (later Major) Carl von Lasollaye (1784–1863) was evidently an officer of considerable competence and extraordinary energy. Endeavoring to get his guns to the far side of a rushing river, for instance, he nearly drowned when he tried to get across himself on a raft improvised from some local inhabitant's house door. At another point, he personally led his gunners forward as ad hoc skirmishers when artillery fire seemed inappropriate to the tactical situation.

It is difficult to track units at the brigade level in Spain, in part because there is as yet no comprehensive, archives-based study of *l'Armée d'Espagne* over its 7-year existence. The nature of the conflict meant that large parts of units, French and German, might be detached at any point throughout the period. Brigade designations became more or less irrelevant when commands were involved in counterinsurgency operations. Officers would simply be assigned some mix of troops to secure a region or to conduct punitive and foraging missions.

The Germans of Leval's division are particularly problematic. In the first place, the French were often inattentive to the details of German organization, so records can be incomplete or haphazard. Second, Leval's men switched from IV Corps to I Corps and back again, so they could be lost in the shuffle, when it came time for one corps or the other to submit its reports. There were frequent changes in order of battle *within* the division, especially in the first weeks and months after entering Spain. For example, a battalion of the *Garde de Paris* was assigned to the division when the Prince of Isenburg (or Ysembourg) temporarily commanded one of the brigades. Even when composition settled into the four German contingents and the Dutch

regiment, the number of subordinate brigades could vary from two to four, in part because of a surfeit of brigade generals (*General-Major* or *Général de Brigade*) meaning that a "brigade" could comprise a lone regiment, such as General Chassé's Dutch regiment—leaving a general in charge of as few as 550 men! To add to the confusion, there were two brigadier generals named "Schäffer," GM Conrad Rudolph von Schäffer from Nassau and GM Ludwig von Schaeffer-Bernstein from Hesse-Darmstadt.

### Campaign history

The Nassauers built quite a name for themselves in 1809 and participated in some 42 battles and engagements during their time in Spain.



Our Germans participate in all four battles featured in *Napoleon's Quagmire*. Their involvement at Talavera would be one of only two times they faced off against British troops, the other being Vitoria in 1813. Despite appearing in all four battles, it should be underlined that after 1809 most of the division's involvement in Spain was at company and battalion level: guarding supply routes, escorting baggage trains, anti-guerrilla operations with frequent skirmishes and small engagements.

During 1809, however, the division fought in a number of important battles and consistently earned high praise from senior French commanders. Leval clearly respected his German

troops and seems to have developed a special affection for them as well (even if some of the German officers regarded his military talents with near-disdain). Other senior French generals also formed strongly favourable impressions of the German Division. In actions along the Tagus River, for example, the Germans were paired with GD Charles Lasalle's cavalry, developing an especially close bond: "never were troops better combined, especially French and German, cavalry and infantry!" enthused Baden Major Ludwig von Grolmann. They also garnered compliments from the renowned French cavalryman: "We have to protect the Germans," he told his troopers, "When things start happening, they hit the hardest." The Germans were key to the success gained at Mesa de Ibor on 17 March and at Vadecañas on the 18th. "Yesterday you saw Nassau, today I will show you Baden," Leval proudly told Marshal Victor as they surveyed the field at Vadecañas. Victor acknowledged Leval's men in his after action report for "displaying an ardour and a courage that I cannot praise enough." In a special order of the day he applauded the German troops, expressing "his complete satisfaction for the distinguished conduct of these brave troops on the 17th and 18th."

#### **Mesa de Ibor and Valdecañas:**

*Keen to make a good impression, a Nassau officer was overly fussy about strict adherence to alignments and drill as the regiment deployed for battle. He thereby earned a rebuke from Nassau GM Schäffer for exhibiting too much "pedantry" in the face of the enemy.*

*An odd scene developed as the German troops were rushing to claim the honor of capturing the Spanish artillery left on the field: a Nassau lieutenant and a similarly junior officer of the Frankfurt battalion both asserted their right to one of the cannon. As their dispute escalated, they both leaped atop the gun tube, drew the sabers and began belabouring one another with their blades until other officers intervened to halt the impromptu duel.*

The division was organized into four brigades for these engagements: Schäffer (Nassau) commanded the Nassau regiment and an ad hoc battalion combining all eight of the division's voltigeur companies, Oberst von Porbeck

commanded the Baden 4<sup>th</sup> Infantry, Schaeffer-Bernstein the Frankfurt battalion and a lone Hessian battalion (the other was detached), and Chassé led the Dutch regiment. It retained this structure at Medellin and Talavera as well.

#### **Medellin, 28 March 1809**

At Medellin, the Germans were deployed in squares in the first line, intermixed with the French cavalry. Villatte's division just behind close to Medellin itself and Ruffin remained in reserve on the western side of the Ortiga. With the Hessian, Frankfurt and Dutch battalions detached, Leval's division only consisted of the Nassau and Baden regiments along with the combined voltigeurs. The Baden 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion was on the far left near the Guadiana, then Lasalle's horse, Baden 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion in the center, then Latour-Maubourg's 1<sup>st</sup> Dragoon Division, followed on the extreme right by GM Schäffer with the Nassau regiment and the voltigeurs together. The Spanish had been deployed by Cuesta in a 4-mile long continuous line that was no more than 4 men deep at any point. Apparently, there was not even a Reserve to the rear. Latour-Maubourg had been ordered to rush forward if an opportunity for a breakthrough arose. Early in the battle, Latour believed he saw this chance and sent some of his dragoons forward. Unlike many previous Spanish efforts in the campaign, their infantry stood firm and in line and delivered a number of effectively painful volleys into the French horsemen. These came from Del Parque's regiments of guards and Cantabrians. Losing a number of men and horses, the dragoons could only recoil and in some disorder at that. The steady Spanish advance in the low ground, with skirmishers harassing the German squares, slowly forced Lasalle and the Germans back towards Medellin and Villatte's division. The Nassau and Baden troops, however, retained their composure, their squares remaining unbroken and impenetrable. They and Lasalle conducted an orderly passage of lines with Villatte's men, reformed and prepared to counterattack. In the meantime, Latour-Maubourg, the Nassau infantry and a French regiment had defeated the Spanish left wing, leaving the enemy's center and right vulnerable to flank attack from the heights.

Villatte, Lasalle and the Baden infantry now drove towards the thin Spanish line in the low ground while the Nassauers and dragoons advanced from the heights along with the 94<sup>th</sup> Line and 27<sup>th</sup> Light. Threatened in front and turned on the left by the dragoons, the whole Spanish position basically collapsed on itself like a house of cards turning what should have been a minor reverse into a catastrophic rout of the whole Spanish army. The Germans, though few, had played a major part in this success, leading Victor to state that “Nassau decided the battle.” A month later, French General Dessolles introduced Oberst Kruse to King Joseph with the words: “Here, Sire, is the Colonel Kruse who commanded the moving citadel at Medellin!”

On arriving in Villadrigos on his way back to Germany in January 1809, Nassau General-Major von Schäffer and fellow brigade commander, Dutch GB Chassé had been lucky to find an intact kitchen and had just settled in by the fire

*Despite their role in the victory, the German division was left behind to clean up the battlefield, “black with vultures.” However, in performing their grisly task, the men had some recompense in finding that many of the Spanish dead carried considerable quantities of gold about their persons.*

*When the Spanish cavalry attacks stalled outside the German squares, the Nassau and Baden officers launched their foot soldiers to attack the milling horsemen with the bayonet, an unusual but in this case successful tactic.*

when one of Marshal Ney’s adjutants arrived and claimed the kitchen for the marshal in rather peremptory tones. The two non-French generals were about to vacate their warm refuge when Ney himself appeared. Instead of forcing the occupants out, he invited them to dine with him and chastised his adjutant for being discourteous: “If you had spent as many nights in bivouac as me, you would content yourself with a house without a roof; we are at war and not in Paris.”

### Talavera, 28 July 1809

On the day of battle, the Germans found themselves deployed on the far left flank of Sebastiani’s IV Corps. Leval arrayed the division with the Nassau 2<sup>nd</sup> Infantry on the right under Schäffer, next Porbeck’s Badeners, then the Dutch regiment under Chassé and finally Schaeffer-Bernstein on the left with the Hessian and Frankfurt battalions. The Baden and Hessian guns were interspersed amongst the infantry for the advance. Following the early morning posturing and engagements and the resultant midday truce, Marshal Victor ordered what was little more than a grand assault across the whole front. This began around 2PM and, anchoring the French left, General Leval found his division struggling through thick olive groves and undergrowth as they marched towards the regiments commanded by Campbell. Overly worried about losing time and arriving for the attack too late, Leval encouraged his brigade commanders to rush things up; so much so that in fact, the division came out of the groves much earlier than any of the other divisions along the front. With their right flank in the air due to being so far ahead, Leval’s German and Dutch troops advanced straight into the face of British musketry and cannister fire. It was here that von Porbeck was killed, one bullet driving his Commander’s Cross of the Baden Order of Military Merit into his chest. Despite an effort to advance in stages and deliver their own volleys, it was soon evident that they would be unable to force the redcoats out. The brigade fell back through the olive groves, chased by British guardsmen (whom they’d stand with shoulder to shoulder defending Hougoumont 6 years later) and rallied on the IV Corps reserve troops, Werlé’s Polish division. Victor was not convinced that the allied line could not be broken and thus summoned the army to make another assault. The mauled German and Dutch troops went forward once more for a second attempt at Campbell’s position. This attack, unsurprisingly, was weaker than the first and failed. Once more the brigade retreated into the olive groves and were not called on again that day.

*The death of Oberst von Porbeck was keenly felt by the Baden 4<sup>th</sup> Infantry. His officers and men regarded him as a father figure and the regiment was anxious and ashamed that they could not retrieve his body at once. During the night, therefore, several officers and enlisted men crept through the olive groves. Despite close proximity to the enemy, they somehow managed to locate their unfortunate colonel's remains and buried him beneath an olive tree on the battlefield.*

*The Baden regimental band acquired a new uniform item after the battle: British light dragoon helmets. The British 23<sup>rd</sup> Light Dragoons had lost heavily in an abortive charge and left many pieces of equipment behind, including their helmets. These became the new style for the Baden musicians who especially admired the sirens that decorated the British headgear.*



*August von Kruse*

### **Almonacid 11 August 1809**

GM Schäffer commanded the brigade containing the Nassau and Baden regiments as well as the combined voltigeurs after Talavera. At Almonacid, the brigade was deployed on the French right and once again within an area of olive groves. They were used in the movement to encircle the Cerrajones during which they found themselves under attack from countering Spanish cavalry. The whole of Leval's division formed in five squares (one being the voltigeurs) in echelon with the guns of a French artillery battery deployed between and repelled the enemy cavalry with very heavy losses. The division chief of staff, a French colonel with the curiously

appropriate name Allemand (Joseph Nicholas, 1768–1814), took the Baden regiment to support the Poles in their assault on the hill that anchored the Spanish defense, while the rest of the division pressed ahead, holding off the timid Spanish horse. Following the victory at Almonacid, there was a pause in hostilities

*The Baden 4<sup>th</sup> Infantry went into action with the feeling "that the eyes of our dead colonel were upon us."*

*The Polish division was advancing up the hillside on the left of the Germans when a Polish soldier received a flesh wound on his left ankle. Lifting his trouser leg to examine his injury, he saw a Spanish silver coin embedded in his skin. News of this unusual occurrence spread instantly and soldiers concluded that the Spanish artillerymen were loading their cannon with silver pieces out of sheer cockiness. The result was "an heroic race for the guns," while every man who was struck searched his body for silver before stanching the blood. Great was the disappointment when the Spanish guns were captured and the caissons turned out to contain nothing but ammunition. Sometime later, the men learned that a Spanish ball had hit a Pole's money pouch (while wounding him badly) and thus propelled one of his coins into his compatriot's ankle.*

### **Ocaña 19 November 1809**

By the time of the battle of battle of Ocaña, the brigade was under the command of August von Kruse (another Waterloo connection) as Schäffer had taken ill and would soon return to Germany. Ocaña was fought on a huge plain and Kruse's brigade was positioned on the center-right of the French line with the rest of the German Division. A strong Spanish infantry attack forced the Germans back against the reserve division commanded by Girard. With the Germans caught in flux and with nowhere to go, the Spanish artillery raked Kruse's brigade with their fire causing heavy casualties. Despite this torrent, the brigade rallied and reformed. Forward was the only direction open so the brigade took part in a

divisional counter-attack under a hail of fire. GdD Leval himself was wounded and so the Dutch GdB, David Hendrik Chassé took temporary command. The whole division crashed into their Spanish attackers in a furious hand-to-hand fight. Neither side gave ground until a regiment of Polish lancers attacked the Spanish flank and sent them into rout. One by one, the Spanish divisions were rolled up by the French forces and exited the field leaving twice as many dead as Soult's army. Soult joined the list of French commanders who commended the German troops, writing that "The Polish and German divisions engaged in combat and displayed the greatest valor. The German regiments rivalled each other in ardour and dedication."

*The Polish and German divisions were both placed under Leval as a sort of ad hoc wing commander until his wounding in the battle. Oberstleutnant Heinrich Wilhelm Hennig (1772–1844) had taken over the Baden regiment after Porbeck's death. King Joseph congratulated him on the fine "élan of the Badeners," but he was severely wounded during the battle, his place taken by Major Franz Lehmann.*


*To the great disgust of many in the division, the Germans were assigned to escort thousands of Spanish prisoners to France after Ocaña. This onerous duty was regarded as demeriting by men who felt that had fought well, suffered long and always received plaudits for their performance in the field. It did provide them an opportunity to improve their equipment as they quickly stripped the Spaniards of the new grey overcoats they had received from Britain.*

*The official name of the division was changed to "Division of the Confederation of the Rhine" according to an instruction issued in Paris on 29 July 1809, the day after Talavera.*

#### For Further Reading

- Sir Charles Oman: A History of the Peninsular War, Vols. II & III*  
*David Gates: The Spanish Ulcer – A History of the Peninsular War*  
*Jac Weller: Wellington in the Peninsular 1808-1814*  
*Digby Smith: Napoleon's German Division in Spain, Vol. I*  
*Ray Johnson: Napoleonic Armies*  
*Michael Broer: Europe Under Napoleon*  
*Liliane & Fred Funken: Arms & Uniforms of the Napoleonic Wars, Vol. II*  
*Otto von Pivka: Napoleon's German Allies (2) – Nassau & Oldenburg*  
*Keith Over: Flags and Standards of the Napoleonic Wars*  
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 Nick Lipscombe, *The Peninsular War Atlas*, London, 2014.  
 E. Costa de Serda: *Opérations des Troupes Allemandes en Espagne de 1808 à 1813*, Paris, 1874.  
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 [Ries]: "Bruchstücke aus dem Tagebuche eines Herzoglich Nassauischen Offiziers," *Europaischen Annalen*, 1813–1814.  
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 Conrad Rudolph von Schäffer, *Denkwürdigkeiten*, Pforzheim, 1840.  
 Friedrich von Weech: *Badische Biographien*, Heidelberg, 1875.  
 Karl von Zech, "Nekrolog des großherzoglich badischen General-Majors Heinrich von Porbeck," *Oesterreichische militärische Zeitschrift*, 1838.







# Napoleon at Bay Expansion Kit

Dave Demko and Kevin Zucker

## How to use the NABXK with different editions



### First edition

*Napoleon at Bay: The Campaign in France, 1814.* TSG, 1978. ziplock  
*Napoleon at Bay: The Campaign in France, 1814.* OSG, 1979. boxed, hussar cover

NOTE: Players with only the first edition should *not* use **Pitched Battle / Battle Rounds or Bombardment** since these are factored-in to their original CRT.

DOWNLOAD: Organization Displays for use with the above OSG Edition.

[Link to download displays \(pdf\)](#)

### Second edition

*Napoleon at Bay: The Campaign in France, 1814.* Avalon Hill, 1983. ugly box

### Third edition

*Napoleon at Bay: Defend the Gates of Paris.* OSG, 1997. boxed, Napoleon cover

### NABXK

*Napoleon at Bay Expansion Kit.* OSG, 2020. ziplock. Works best with the 2<sup>nd</sup> or 3<sup>rd</sup> Editions (no mods). Use the most recent version available.

## SCENARIOS

You have a number of choices. First, you can play the updated scenarios and campaign game purely at the campaign scale with whichever edition of the game (1978, 1979, 1983, 1997). You'll be playing with setups, unit strengths, and schedules based on the latest research OSG has developed on the 1814 campaign. Scenarios in the first edition included a quick Six Days scenario, the campaign game, and the "Unlimited Scenarios" guide to generating scenarios starting on any given day of the campaign. While you're still free to follow that approach, the *Expansion Kit* offers a campaign game plus seven scenarios with their own starting dates and durations. You can play the shorter "battle" scenarios as stand-alone contests or as alternate starting points for the campaign game, which runs through the March 29th game-turn (if not decided earlier). If you use the battle scenarios as alternate campaign starts, be sure to use the Campaign Rules starting on p. 4.

If you have *Napoleon Retreats*, you can start with any *Napoleon at Bay* scenario and use the interface rules to zoom in on part of the action at

TLNB scale, stepping-up the map scale by about 7:1. The interface rules are purpose-made to yield smooth transitions.

## NEW RULES

The new XK Standard Rules are derived from *Sun of Austerlitz*, with judicious reference to the Consolidated Rules. The objective was to create "a lighter set of rules" to speed and ease play like the original edition. We started with the rules as written in *Sun of Austerlitz* and cut "anything else that was put in there to gum up the works."

*Campaigns of Napoleon* is a game system of campaign-scale maneuver, force allocation, and command in which a player moves to take objectives, threaten enemy weaknesses, and misdirect his opponent. Combat resolution, especially in the original edition, is mostly a black box, a stochastic function into which the player feeds inputs and hopes for a good outcome. The inputs are the number of strength points, the unit types, and the mix of leaders. For example, having a commander with one or two bonus points is a luxury; organizing a subordinate leader commanding all cavalry for

pursuit is good planning. The player constructs his force ahead of time, moves it as advantageously as possible, and then—once in an enemy ZOC—lets the dice generate the outcome. Later editions of the *CoN* rules have added more player influence over combat resolution via battle types, bombardment, and reserves. Those rules satisfy players looking for more tactical detail than the original version provided, but they shift the emphasis temporarily from campaigning to battle management.

What makes for good play in *Campaigns of Napoleon*? Part of the knack is getting away from that wargamer-y idea of trying to get all your units into battle and then bashing away. *CoN* offers various ways for a player to waste his combat strength, including march attrition, unnecessary side battles, and force-on-force attrition-fests. A key skill is to achieve local superiority in an area the opponent can't afford to neglect, then win a lopsided battle, ideally with a Morale marker shift for a Critical Battle victory. As far as the Combat Phase is concerned, the player's emphasis is on creating conditions on the key battlefield that will yield a good, productive victory more than on directing the blow-by-blow details going on inside one combat resolution. To paraphrase Napoleon, "I'm taking a nap till 4:00, by which time the battle should be won. Don't wake me before then."

## SCRUTINIZE THE PLAN

We considered, consulted, and scrutinized which rules to cut. We came up with arguments for and against various rules and mechanics, including some—like vedettes—that were in no serious danger of being cut. Eventually we agreed on the scope of these rulebooks:

### Rules to cut:

*Rearguard Battle Type*

*Battlefield Dynamics*

*Reserves*

*Variable Movement Allowance for activation*

*March Regiments*

### Rules to Keep:

*Artillery Bombardment*

*Pitched and Pursuit Battle Type*

*Cavalry Differential Mod*

Austrian statecraft went out the window. We went back and forth on whether to retain the Rearguard battle type. The vedette rules moved into the standard rules, where they belong. According to these rules as written, you can use vedettes even in the short battle scenarios.

We even considered Pitched and Pursuit battle types, but only for a day. Kevin pointed out, "In 1814 we had only 8 Pitched Battles; at every one of these battles, the forces were at least 15,000 on a side:

*Brienne/La Rothiere (counts as 1 Pitched battle)*

*Montmirail*

*Craonne*

*Laon*

*Reims*

*Montereau*

*Arcis-sur-Aube*

*The Battle of Paris*

When devising the CRT for the '97 edition we reduced the bloodiness of the 6-line results in order to account for some battles being Pitched Battles (e.g. Laon, Craonne, Montmirail, La Rothiere...).

When running your game, don't mix charts & tables from different editions. Use the charts and tables that came in the box (or ziplock).

The original CRT is based on an analysis of losses from battles in 1814.<sup>1</sup> (*see sidebar below*).

The CRT in the third edition differs from the original: it is less bloody and gives fewer extreme results, because it is designed for use along with possible multi-round battles and artillery bombardment. **If using the 1978 edition, do not use Pitched Battle, Battle Rounds, or Artillery.**

## Counters and Organization Displays

• *All editions:* use the **new** counters and the track-type (1–10) displays from the second or third edition.

• The new set of counters includes several new units; with these added units, Organization Displays from any edition of the game **except the original TSG/OSG edition(s)**.

**Organization Displays** (*see link at top of article*).

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<sup>1</sup> *West Point Atlas for the Wars of Napoleon*; James Lawford's *Napoleon: The Last Campaigns*,

1813-15; and Appendix I of David Chandler's *The Campaigns of Napoleon*

## Developments in the NAB Series CRTs

Dave Demko

*Napoleon at Bay* first and second editions and *Battles of the Hundred Days* have the same CRT except that the latter doesn't show a possible "-1" die result (no functional difference). *Hundred Days* does have Pitched and Pursuit battle types, while original *NaB* does not. The CRTs for *Arcola* and *Bonaparte in Italy* 1979 look the same as the original *NaB*'s. Neither of these Italian-theater games has the Pitched battle option. Discrete artillery units and bombardment appear in *Struggle of Nations* (Avalon Hill 1982) and *1809: Napoleon's Danube Campaign* (Victory Games 1984). The *1809* game and all subsequent titles in the series include battle types (Pitched, Pursuit, sometimes Rearguard) as well as artillery.

*Napoleon at Bay* third edition has a substantially different CRT from the earlier editions, with 3:2 odds and lower result numbers at extreme odds (no more 10-0 or 1-10 results). The third edition does have artillery bombardment, and of course it has Pitched and Pursuit battle types. *Sun of Austerlitz*, the most recent of the 1x games/rulesets before the NABXK, has a CRT similar to *Napoleon at Bay* 1997 but with some differences at very low and very high odds and one fewer odds column. It has Pitched and Pursuit battle types and artillery bombardments.

My original assumption was for the Expansion Kit to include a set of charts & tables stapled in the Exclusive Rules book. Here's why it matters: Owners of the first and second editions of *Napoleon at Bay* now have the NABXK's artillery bombardment rules and a few artillery units, but no Artillery Fire Table. It's true that they'll be using a CRT designed when losses from artillery fire were not part of the game, but that ameliorates the problem partially at best. Players can now choose between pitched and pursuit battles, but the CRT included in their game may not yield the intended average results if players start fighting multi-round battles. Such battles, even without artillery fire, are more likely to result in critical battles, thus affecting the morale track and the victory conditions.

Identify a CRT from the 1x series by looking at the 1-1 (NA) odds column. If its top and bottom results are 1-5 and 4-0, that's a first edition style chart, for use when all battles are in effect Pursuit. If the results are 1-4 and 3-1, that's a later style chart for use with games offering Pitched and Pursuit battle types.

## BATTLE CASUALTIES ARE SECONDARY

Kevin Zucker

Believe it or not I produced a *Battle of Britain* design a long time ago. I used an approach similar to the NAB CRT to build a table of aircraft losses in battle. During the height of 1940, I discovered that losses did not go up in arithmetic lock-step with numbers of aircraft engaged. At Leipzig, the allies had so many troops they could not fit them all on the battlefield. In most cases a small proportion of the troops do the lion's share of the fighting.

As an experiment, let's say that:

- in each brigade, one regiment suffers most and fights longest.
- in each division, one brigade suffers more than the others; and so on, up the echelons.
- at Eylau, VII Corps suffered most of the losses.

Usually there is a key piece of terrain that both generals have appreciated the worth of. For example, at Austerlitz, both recognized the value of the Pratzen heights. When Napoleon "ceded" that dominating piece of terrain, the allies thought they had already won. However, for their planned "wheel" maneuver, a key piece of terrain was between Telnitz and Sokolnitz. The troops who fought there, Davout's III, suffered the most casualties on the battlefield. Their casualty rate should not be extrapolated throughout the whole French force: an average number means nothing. Casualties are terrain dependent, and holding those two key "chateaux" brought the ruination of their Ruskie assailants.

Usually the key terrain will channel the movement of one side—the one that has the burden of attack. If you want to understand that battle you have to bring the focus down to that key location.

Similarly, throughout history: at the battle of Grunwald, in 1410, the key piece of terrain happened to be where your commander was...

"Grand Master Ulrich von Jungingen then personally led 16 banners, almost a third of the original Teutonic strength, to the right Polish flank, and Władysław II Jagiełło deployed his last reserves, the third line of his army. The melee reached the Polish command and one Knight, identified as Lupold or Diepold of Kökeritz, charged directly against King Władysław II Jagiełło. Władysław's secretary, Zbigniew Oleśnicki, saved the king's life..."

The battle came to a halt as everyone watched to see whether Jagiello would live. So that combat and its (1/0) outcome was the key piece of the whole battle.

When I was a rookie game developer at SPI, I was living at John Young's apartment (I never knew where he was staying...) John had, obviously, a rich military history library, and I found a book, published during WWI, for military planners, which told them how many men would be chewed up in an hour or a day of the meat grinder. On the one hand this was the kind of statistic I wanted. But I found the inhumanity sickening, especially as it was being used to calculate 1000's of deaths before launching the operation...

This was, to me, a failure of imagination to look beyond the statistics, as the Germans managed to do in the inter-war period. Guderian and others developed a new view outside the box—a total Clausewitzian approach to war would never lead to victory.

*Blitzkrieg is the primacy of maneuver over battle.* Napoleon demonstrated this with every victory. By leaving the key terrain undefended, and then bringing his best general with his best division, onto the battlefield *after the enemy maneuver has commenced*, he used maneuver and terrain to trump raw numbers on the battlefield.

Napoleon's way of war necessitates taking the focus off of combat altogether, and placing it where it belongs, on maneuver.

My design intent with NAB was to show how *your* skill at maneuver—how savvy your play, how well you use vedettes, coordinate your offensive, disguise the timing and target—that maneuver is the prime determinant of victory, not battlefield statistics. Not the meat-grinder.

There are plenty of meat-grinder type games. NAB will obviously never fall in that category.

An attrition-based wargame could not produce any kind of approximation to the actual 1814 campaign. Napoleon is outnumbered 2.5:1 in manpower. He cannot afford to wage a war of attrition. (Just as the Union realized that they could ultimately bleed the South dry in the Civil War.)

This was the *first thing* I noticed when I started reading about the 1814 campaign. How the hell can Napoleon win, or even make a contest, when he's facing those kind of numbers?

How the hell did he manage to win a single battle?

That was my starting place and the first question to research.

The answer came when Chandler,<sup>2</sup> on page 955, mentioned "attrition." Non-combat losses almost always exceeded losses on the battlefield. Most designers to this day avoid the topic of attrition, for the same reason that the 1814 campaign is rarely if ever touched on in a game design. (Is there another game on this campaign besides NAB?)

Combat losses on the battlefield are not the main determinant of victory. The focus on losses is a red herring.

Napoleon advises, casualties on the battlefield are always about equal (between 50/50 and about 60/40). It is only when one side retreats that additional pursuit losses accrue to that side. For that reason Napoleon advises generals to hold onto the battlefield, if at all possible, even if you have the higher loss.

So if you are just looking at overall losses (include pursuit), they seem to be predictive, when actually the imbalance comes during pursuit. You have to separate out the pursuit losses from the battlefield losses.

If casualties in battle are not the determinant of victory, then what is? Terrain and maneuver.

In the Sun of Austerlitz, that battle has to be resolved as several separate combats each lasting multiple rounds of attack and counterattack. (An Example of play based on Austerlitz is at the back of the *Sun of Austerlitz* Exclusive Rules pp. 29-30—a page and a half of step-by-step AAR.) The CRT would be consulted 8 or 9 times per player in resolving the whole battle. So you'd have to take your Austerlitz casualty statistics, break out the pursuit losses, and then assign the battlefield losses to one or another of the separate battles.

What is important is whether the Coalition achieves the breakthrough between Telnitz and Sokolnitz, allowing Weyrother's wheel maneuver to reach Napoleon's LOC. Not likely, but that would be one way to win that battle and force a French retreat.

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<sup>2</sup> David G. Chandler, *The Campaigns of Napoleon*

## Antiquated Principles of 18th Century War

Napoleon was one of the very few generals on either side actually understood which principles of war were no longer valid.

Mack, for instance, thought he had discerned one key to Napoleon's success (prior to 1805 they only had the Italian campaigns to look at). In October of 1805 Mack sent his troops into the field undersupplied, reasoning that if Napoleon could get away with it, he could too! In a simplistic way, it was true; Napoleon was able to get away with it, but only for short periods, after which the supply line had to be hooked up again real fast.



The point here is that Napoleon would plan ahead what days he would be operating without supply, and he would have the wagons on their way even at the start of the campaign, moving slowly toward the expected rendezvous. The time spent out of supply would usually be the exact time when his troops would be crossing the enemy's LOC. So the enemy depots could be seized and operated by his own admin.

When you see the assertion that Napoleonic armies marched faster because they were willing to go without supply, that statement is incomplete. It was only for a critical 10 day period (the backpacks had 4 days bread and there was more in the caissons of the arty.) and all Napoleonic Operations had to be completed in 10 or so days.

The real reason the French marched faster (until the allies caught on) was because of a massive public works project: the network of post-roads—raised, straightened, and graded—that allowed much quicker movement than the doctrine of the Frederickan era. Napoleon was the first general to notice how to make use of these new roads.

The most important of all the "antiquated" principles of war, that had held true for eons, was the length of a standard day's march or force march. No one else had put this into effect before Napoleon.

It is sometimes suggested that the coalition was also out of date by their reliance on a functioning LOC. However, Napoleon's own Maxims give the lie to that. The LOC was always of the first importance to every army. As Napoleon states, it was *changing* the LOC that was the province of only a few great generals.

Finally, the division of the science of war into tactical and strategic levels was superseded by Napoleon's evolution of the operational level, which undermined the linear idea of the battlefield. Napoleon timed his arrival on the battlefield with separate forces converging from different directions. When once deployed, the thin red line had no ability to redeploy and respond to such a maneuver. That is how maneuver and morale became more important than firepower.

## Editorial

(continued from page 2)

the Pope played no tricks, as he had with Charlemagne a thousand years before. The mistake had been to let the pontiff place the crown on the neo-imperial locks, thereby asserting his *Cakravartin* function.<sup>1</sup>

Napoleon took the crown in his own hands and placed it on his head himself. Now he was the Roman emperor of the West, with Paris full of sacred objects stolen from Rome. He knew from the ancient script that he had to turn his attention to a rival eastern Rome.<sup>2</sup>

The wars from 1805 to 1815 were, at least in part, the reaction of the royal houses of Europe to the usurpation of their symbols of status and control. “I saw the crown of France lying in the gutter, and I picked it up.” Millions died due to a disagreement whether Napoleon had the right to crown himself Emperor or not. Those who fought either supported the original hallucinations of the old crowned heads, “the divine right of kings,” or the new hallucinations of the heir to the revolution.

Anil Seth, a professor of neuroscience at the University of Sussex, UK, points out that everything we perceive is a result of the brain interpreting the sensory information that comes in in a particular way. “Now you could say that all of our experiences are all hallucinated. It's just that whenever we agree about what's out there, that's what we call reality.”

### “The Social Construction of Reality”

Nietzsche developed his own theory of 'false consciousness' in his analyses of the social significance of deception and self-deception, and of illusion as a necessary condition of life.<sup>3</sup>

“In sociology and psychology, mass hysteria (also known as *mass psychogenic illness*, *collective or group hysteria*) is a

phenomenon that transmits collective illusions of threats, whether real or imaginary, through a population in society as a result of rumors and fear.

“In May 2006, an outbreak of the *Strawberries with Sugar* virus was reported in Portuguese schools, named after the popular teen girl's show *Morangos com Açúcar*. 300 or more students at 14 schools reported similar symptoms to those experienced by the characters in a then recent episode where a life-threatening virus affected the school depicted in the show. Symptoms included rashes, difficulty breathing, and dizziness. The belief that there was a medical outbreak forced some schools to temporarily close. The Portuguese National Institute for Medical Emergency eventually dismissed the illness as mass hysteria

“A study conducted by the University of Michigan proved that Swine Flu, also known as H1N1, did lead to mass hysteria. The experiment, conducted in May 2009, found that people perceived the H1N1 disease to be even more deadly than the Ebola outbreak in Africa, when the opposite was true.

“The results of the experiment proved that when the perception of risk increases, the feelings and anxiety around our risk also increases, even if there is no actual increased risk involved.

“We can see the same Swine Flu-esque hysteria beginning to happen in 2020 with COVID-19.

“Mass hysteria isn't only about your mind convincing you that you have symptoms—it's a collective state of mind that can convince entire populations of things that aren't based in evidence or logic.”<sup>4</sup>

—Kevin Zucker

<sup>1</sup> He who turns the wheel of destiny.

<sup>2</sup> Elemire Zolla, *Archetypes*, p. 86

<sup>3</sup> Berger and Luckman, 1966



*Kevin Zucker at Talavera*

## Unstuck in Time

In Kurt Vonnegut's novel, *Slaughterhouse Five*, the protagonist becomes unstuck in time and has flashbacks from former lives.

For a few hours I'd like you to forget which decade you're living in, and find yourself back in the fields of 1815. Not to *stay* there! You look down on that map and suddenly you're seeing bayonets glinting in the morning sunlight, dust kicked up by thousands of marching feet.

OSG is a company of ideas. History is made of human beings, their quirks and failings. People are not just cogs in a machine. They have their own separate desires, ambitions and goals. Everybody on your side, everybody on the other side, has their own agenda. In the experience of the power of limits, you come away learning something of the mental and emotional states that buffet an actual commander in the chaos of battle. How do you prevail in spite of all that?