

# **WESTERN METAPHYSICS**

## **(PHL2 C05)**



**STUDY MATERIAL**  
**II SEMESTER**  
**CORE COURSE**

**MA PHILOSOPHY**  
(2020 Admission onwards)

**UNIVERSITY OF CALICUT**  
**SCHOOL OF DISTANCE EDUCATION**  
Calicut University P.O, Malappuram Kerala, India 673 635

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**UNIVERSITY OF CALICUT**

**SCHOOL OF DISTANCE EDUCATION**

**STUDY MATERIAL  
SECOND SEMESTER**

**MA PHILOSOPHY (2020 ADMISSION ONWARDS)**

**CORE COURSE:**

**PHL2 C05: WESTERN METAPHYSICS**

**Prepared by:**

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## SEMESTER -II

### PHL2 C05: WESTERN METAPHYSICS (Core)

6 Hrs/week.

108 Contact Hrs.

Credit 5

Unit 1. The concept of Metaphysics

Hrs.30

Aristotle's View; Metaphysics as the Science of Being, Qua Being; Descartes's view; Spinoza's view, Kant's view, Positivist view.

Unit II Approaches to Metaphysics

Hrs.40

Metaphysics as a pseudo-science (a body of non-sensical utterance Metaphysics as protoscience (pre-scientific thinking)  
Metaphysics as going beyond science  
Metaphysics as thrusting beyond the limits of language (Heidegger; Wittgenstein)  
Metaphysics as presuppositionlessness (Phenomenology)

Unit III Problems of Metaphysics

Hrs.38

Appearance and Reality  
Being ,Essence and  
Existence Mind and Body  
Space and  
Time Part and  
Whole

Reference;

Walsh.W.H , *Metaphysics*,

Russell.B, *Problems of Philosophy*, OUP

A.E. Taylor, *An Introduction to Metaphysics*

Taylor, Richard (ed) *Introductory reading in Metaphysics*

Sclesinger, G.N, *Metaphysics*

Bergson *Introduction to Metaphysics*

Hiedegger, *An Introduction to Metaphysics*

Bradley, *Approach to Reality*

(Introduction) Camap. R, *Elimination of Metaphysics in Ayer.*

Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, relevant chapters from Book A and E

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## PHL2 C05: WESTERN METAPHYSICS

### Unit I

#### The concept of Metaphysics

##### Introduction

Metaphysics is the philosophical analysis of the nature and the structure of certainty. The source term of metaphysics is *ta meta ta phusika*. Andronicus of Rhodes, who was the early editor of Aristotle's works, first used this term. The term 'metaphysics'—literally, 'after the Physics or 'wisdom' (*Sophia*), very likely indicated the place the topics discussed therein were proposed to occupy in the philosophical curriculum. The subject is definite as the theoretical discipline of the causes and principles of what is most knowable. This makes metaphysics a limiting case of Aristotle's generally used difference between what is better known to us and what is better known by nature. The term metaphysics can be thought of as an inquiry into the essence of reality. Metaphysics is concerned with the outlines of the categories of entity presupposed by any possible, adequate, interpretation of the world, whether of the physical world or any other characteristic of the world. Based on the nature of philosophical queries metaphysics can be divided into two: ontology and Cosmology. Ontology deals with questions about the problem of Reality, the problem of being. Cosmology deals with the questions about the nature of the cosmos or the universe, space and time, etc.

Ontology is the most general science or study of Being, Existence, or Reality. The Latin term *ontologia* was introduced in the seventeenth century for a branch of metaphysics to be distinguished from other branches. Ontology deals with the vital characteristics of being itself. The term "The term "ontology" (or ontologia) was coined in 1613, independently, by two philosophers, Rudolf Göckel (Goclenius) in his *Lexicon philosophicum* and Jacob Lorhard (Lorhardus) in his *Theatrum philosophicum*." Ontology seeks to deliver a conclusive and comprehensive classification of entities in all spheres of being. The classification should be conclusive in the sense that it can serve as an answer to such queries as What classes of entities are needed to give an account of what makes true all certainties.

Different schools of philosophy offer different methodologies to ontology. One large division is substantialists and fluxists, which is to say between those who consider ontology as an element- or thing-based discipline and those who favour an ontology centered on events or processes. Another large division is between what we might call adequatists and reductionists. Adequatists seek a taxonomy of the beings in reality at all stages of accumulation, from the microphysical to the cosmological. Reductionists see reality in a relation to someone's advantaged level of existents; they seek to establish the “ultimate furniture of the universe” by decomposing reality into its simplest constituents, or they seek to “reduce” in some other way the apparent variety of categories of entities prevailing in reality. Adequatists transcend the difference between substantialism and fluxism since they admit categories of both continuants and occurrents. Ontology, for the adequatist, is then a descriptive enterprise. It is thus distinguished from the special sciences not only in its radical generality but also in its goal or emphasis: it seeks not predication and explanation but rather a taxonomy and description.

### **Aristotle's View**

Metaphysical enquires traces back to Aristotle's eponymous treatise—is the philosophical inquiry of the vital nature of being as such. He emphasized that philosophy as a science of being *qua* being. In *Metaphysics*, Aristotle proclaims that the study of being and the categories of such beings should rely on the fundamental substances or essential nature. The metaphysical inquiry also extends to questions regarding the perception of reality, such as Are there things that actually exist outside of our perception? and “How do these things (or things-in-themselves) vary from our precepts of them. *Metaphysics* was established based on what Aristotle inherited from Plato, although in some respects Aristotle departed from Platonic thinking *Metaphysics*. Plato and his followers distinguish between the material world and the timeless and unchanging realm of immaterial forms, “Plato turns Socrates' search for definitions, aimed at understanding the nature of what we are talking about, into an ontological claim whereby the real meaning of classificatory terms requires a reference in a transcendent object or Form (eidos).”

Aristotle came into his own as a philosopher through his denial of the fundamental doctrines of Platonism and his provision of a more naturalistic and less dualistic world view. Aristotle considered the scheme of wisdom as searching for divine substances to replace the Platonic Forms. For Aristotle metaphysics is the most important kind of explanatory knowledge;



itis the knowledge of the most fundamental explanations and the explanations of all things. But this, precisely, is the knowledge of what it is for something to be, i.e. it is the knowledge of the essence of being and the answer to the question ‘What is being?’. Metaphysics reflect things as beings or as existents and attempt to specify the properties or features they illustrate just insofar as they are beings or existents. Consequently, it follows to understand not only the concept of being, but also very comprehensive notions like harmony or identity, difference, similarity, and dissimilarity that apply to the whole thing that there is. Aristotle also does not himself use this term, ‘metaphysics’, and when he wants to indicate what his present study is about, he uses terms such as ‘wisdom’ (Sophia), ‘first philosophy’ (prōtēphilosophia), and ‘first science’ (prōtē epistēmē). Aristotle repeatedly speaks of metaphysics as a search for ‘scientific knowledge’ he says that they are explanations of all beings (panta) and everything there.

Aristotle's constantly rebuked Plato's principles and proclaim that the universal as universal does not exist, the universe is not a substance. He separated the world into categories. *Categories* treat the basic kinds of things that exist and their interrelations. Each uncombines the term, Categories are the highest or most general kinds under which things fall. What the metaphysician is supposed to do is to recognize those highest kinds, to specify the features peculiar to each category, and to identify the relations that tie the different categories together; and by doing this, the metaphysician delivers us with a record of the structure of all that there is. Aristotle characterized the universe into two categories, substance and accident. Substance, is the truest and primary and most definite sense of the word, is that which is neither predicable of a subject nor present in a subject. Aristotle implies essentially something in one of ten categories – a substance, a quantity, a quality, a relative, a place, a time, a position, a having, a doing, or a being affected. In the *Categories*, Aristotle is apprehensive to classify the primary substances. These are the ontologically basic materials, the things such that they do not depend on anything else for their existence, but everything else depends on one or more of them for its existence. What Aristotle tells us is that the primary substances are the ultimate subjects of predication; that is, the things that are subjects of predication, but not themselves predicated of anything else. substance (*ousia*) is distinguished from the accidental categories by the fact that every accident is *present in* a substance and, therefore, cannot exist without a substance in which to inhere. the category of the substance itself is divided into ordinary individuals or primary substances, such as Socrates, and secondary substances, such as the species man and the genus animal. Secondary substances are *said of* primary substances and specify what kind of thing the subject is. By present in a subject, Aristotle means the mode of being of accidents such as

"white,". Not only is the substance in the primary sense not an accident of a subject, but it also is not the species "man" or "horse." However, the species and genus can be called a substance. But in a secondary sense, those things are called substance within which, as species, the primary substances are included; also, those which, as genera, include the species." In this extended sense of the word, "man" and "animal" can be called a substance.

### **Being qua being**

Aristotle articulates that in generally what motivates one to raise questions about being and to search for answers, are particular aporiai that present themselves to us about being—aporiai in the sense of particular problems and puzzles that we are puzzled about. He argues that it is precisely such aporiai about being that motivates us to search for what being is and that if we are not puzzled about such problems and puzzles, then we cannot even begin to search for what being is. In general, it will emerge that aporiai about being is absolutely central in the *Metaphysics* and indeed to the whole project of the *Metaphysics*, the project of searching for what it is for something, anything, to be.

Aristotle divided being into many categories, being *qua* being deals with being in each category. Ontology, as the science of being *qua* being, considers how each of these categories can be a kind of being and how different senses of beings are related to each other. A study of being *qua* being does not involve questions of content but addresses only the nature of being itself. It is universal science, compared with the special sciences that study different classes of being. Because according to the focal meaning pattern all senses of being are related to substance, the study of substance (ousiology) is the chief and central subject-matter of the science of being *qua* being. In his *Categories*, he discusses ten senses of being and says that substance is the primary sense, while other categories such as quality, quantity, and relation are secondary senses. Thus, in in search of to determine “what is being” Aristotle focused his investigation on substance. A primary being is a primary substance, which in turn is the primary essence.

Aristotle wants to Investigate ‘being qua being’, by which he means that he wants to examine beings and to explore them simply in so far as they are beings, things that are. But this is precisely to investigate what it is for something to be the essence of being. So, metaphysics, as Aristotle understands it, is not so much the search for a complete and general description of

what there is; it is above all the search for an explanation of why something that is is, or in virtue of what something that is is.

Aristotle's ontology is the basis of the dichotomy between substance and attributes and between essential and accidental properties. In some of his discussion, he ascribed primary substance, that is, primary being, to God. Aristotle thinks that just as a statue is a kind of composite of form and matter, so a human being is a complex of a soul and a body, which Aristotle, in turn, symbolizes as connected as a form to matter. The soul is the form of the body; the body the matter of the soul., Aristotle positions his methodological framework to describe a central philosophical problem – the relation of soul and body – in an outstandingly anti-Platonic means.

Aristotle hypothesized that things other than substances depend for their existence on substances, and supports the theory by upholding that a non-substantial element is called a thing that is because it is an affection of a substance, or because it is a quality of a substance, and so on. For the predominance of substance is related to explaining, for everything else that is, what it is to be a thing that is. Aristotle also insists on the point that substances are the primary things that are and, further, that dependence on the primary kind of explaining why the dependent items are called things that are and how substances can be the one thing that unifies everything in the domain of that which is. The primary being is substance, while all other beings are attributes of substance. Hence the study of substance, the primary being, is the center of the science of being. The substance can be analyzed into form, matter, and the composite of form and matter. Of these, form /essence is the primary substance or ultimate reality. Each thing has its peculiar nature, that is, its internal principle of motion and form and matter are two natures. The relation between soul and body should be understood in terms of the relation between form and matter. To know each thing, one needs to know its four causes.

1. *Material Cause*: the matter of which the statue is made, e.g., bronze.
2. *Formal Cause*: the structure of the statue, taken in one way, its shape, though taken more robustly, its essence or nature, e.g., the attribute of being a statue.
3. *Efficient Cause*: the actual agent which brought it about that the matter, the bronze, came to have the form it has, e.g., the sculptor.
4. *Final Cause*: the function or purpose of the statue, what the statue is for, e.g., to honor a president

In natural things, the formal cause, efficient cause, and final cause coincide, and they are diverse operations of the same form. Natural things progress from potentiality to actuality. The whole universe is ordered, for everything in the world, in its pursuit of eternity, is moved by the Prime Mover.

### **Descartes's view;**

Descartes excluded the approaches and assumptions of scholasticism and sought to set knowledge on a firm basis by demanding certainty in the justification of our beliefs. His philosophical system, founded on his method of systematic doubt, accepted nothing as true that could not be evidently and distinctly perceived to be true. It is a procedure by which he attempted to demolish all prejudices and preconceived opinions to establish a firm and stable metaphysical basis for his system. He apprehended that for each of us the first indubitable truth is "I am thinking, therefore I exist" (cogito ergo sum) The first principle or first truth of Descartes's metaphysical system. I can doubt everything, including whether I have a body. But as long as I am engaged in the process of thinking, I exist. Even if I doubt my existence, there must exist an "I" who can doubt. Descartes established the method of doubt to eliminate doubt and find something indubitable. Doubt is employed to lead the mind away from the senses and toward rational truth.

Descartes divided the world into extended substance, or matter, and thinking substance, or mind or soul. Geometric extension in length, breadth, and depth is the defining characteristic of Matter or corporeal substance, A body may extend in many ways and this is the foundation of the various properties of matter. But all these are simply modes of extension. He appealed that the nature of the mind is entirely alien to the nature of matter. Consequently, the soul is entirely distinct from the body. He used the terms mind and soul interchangeably. For him, the mind is identical to self, person, the substance that thinks, believes, doubts, desires, and acts. Although it joins the body during life, the soul is incorporeal, not extended, and can survive the death of the body. Descartes also claimed that souls are "simple," or without parts. Since he believed that everything in space was infinitely divisible, this was another way in which souls were unlike anything made of ordinary matter This is Descartes's most eminent metaphysical doctrine and, as the main form of dualism, it has significantly influenced modern European philosophy. Descartes held that mental phenomena cannot be mechanistically explained based on physical properties. Extension and thought are respectively the principal properties or attributes of the two substances, for they constitute the essence of matter and mind. His dualism

considered a human being is not an organic whole, but the amalgam of two distinct elements, mind and body. Despite this difference, however, both Aristotle and Descartes took rationality as the essential characteristic of human beings.

Descartes emphasized that consciousness is the essence of the mind or the general property of mental states, inferring that all mental states are conscious. On a Cartesian view, consciousness is irreducibly subjective in the sense that the individual with that consciousness seems to have privileged access to it in a way that no one else can achieve. Illustrates that although mind and body are two separate substances, they causally affect one another. Cartesian souls are not dependent upon the behavior of matter for their continued existence or ability to think. They have no position in space.

The mind and the body are two sovereign things, but throughout life, they interact with each other. Interactionism contrasts with another dualist position, parallelism, which repudiates any causal relationship between mind and body. Descartes appealed to the pineal gland as the locus of mind-body interaction. Descartes's dualism by forwarding a doctrine of occasionalism to explain the interaction between mind and body. There is no true causation between mind and body or among bodily or physical movements. Descartes occasionally used the phrase "regular concurrence" to account for the conservation of motion in the world whose quantity was imparted to matter while it was created.

Descartes's distinct substance as that whose existence does not depend on other things and appealed that there is, firmly speaking, only one substance, namely God. Though, although God is the only uncreated substance, created substances may be recognized because, although they need the consensus of God to exist, they are independent of any other created things, such as accidents or modes. Since doubt is an imperfect state, he inferred the existence of God as a Perfect Being. God causes every event and acts on the proper occasion to make things harmonious. Reflecting on his nature as a doubter, and an imperfect, he raises queries that how could we acquired the notions of things other than himself. Most of them, have been created by themselves. But the idea of God is an exemption. He used the phrase "divine concurrence" to express the view that things are allowed by God to act under their systems as they were created. He implies that an imperfect being cannot cause itself to have the idea of a perfect being. Therefore, God must be the cause of his idea of God. God, therefore, must exist. To this causal argument he added a form of the ontological argument: If God is a perfect being, as we conceive him to be, then he cannot lack the perfection of existence and everything real and true in an

individual comes from a perfect being, the general rule he had provisionally adopted is correct: All our clear and distinct ideas must be true. And even those ideas that are not clear and distinct must have *some* foundation in truth

### **Spinoza's view**

Spinoza did not refer to created things as substances. For him, the substance was *causasui*, its cause. Spinoza claimed that there is only one substance in which all attributes and modes here, and that substance has two names: God or nature. The substance is necessary, infinite, eternal, unique, and all-inclusive. Spinoza called substance God or nature. Substance for Spinoza was therefore identical with a wholly self-sufficient, all-embracing reality. This pantheistic notion of a substance allowed Spinoza to challenge Descartes's dualism, although the relation between substance and attributes in Spinoza is much disputed. Spinoza introduces *causa sui* as one of the major characteristics of substance or God. God is caused not by anything else, but by itself. Here "cause" is not used in its ordinary sense as the agency that brings something into being. the meaning of Spinoza's *causa sui* is that the reason for God's existence lies in his nature or essence. God or substance does not owe its existence to anything else but is rather the source of its existence.

This is the first principle of Spinoza's metaphysical system and the chief characteristic of his pantheism, Extension, and thought are attributes that constitute the essence of substance. But two attributes do not constitute two beings or two different substances. One substance can instantiate more than one attribute. There cannot be two distinct substances of the same nature. God might be considered to be the creator of the world, and nature might be conceived to be that which God created, but God is nature, and nature is God. There is no formal distinction. Spinoza thus denied the contrast between God and the world. The methodological basis of his metaphysical arguments the standard definition Spinoza offered for substance is something which is "in itself" and "conceived through itself.

The concept of the attribute to plays a significant role in rationalism, particularly in the philosophy of Spinoza. For him, attributes were the things that constitute, express, the essence or nature of God or substance. The substance has an immeasurable number of attributes, each of which expresses one infinite and eternal essence. Though, the human intellect knows only two attributes, thought, and extension. that there is a real distinction between thought and extension, and he developed a theory of psycho-physical parallelism to explain their interactions.

Spinoza's philosophy of mind, is often called parallelism, is occasionally said to be more adequately named a dual-aspect or double-aspect theory, he claims that mind and body are attributes of the same substance, and sometimes even says that a mode of thought and a mode of the extension are the same things. Psycho-physical parallelism, claims that the mental realm and the physical realm, or thought and extension, do not affect each other in any way. Instead, they are independent of each other, although there is an exact correspondence between them. "The order and connection of ideas are the same as the order and connection of things". According to which God has an idea of everything that follows from any of his attributes. Because the notions in God themselves are amongst the things following from his attribute of thought, there is necessarily in God an idea of every idea that there is in him. This process can go on *ad infinitum*. The levels of these ideas are distinct from one another because what they represent is different. Spinoza's monism argued that God-Nature was the single ultimate reality.

### **Kant's view**

Kant measured metaphysics as a system of knowledge arising out of pure reason, that is, knowledge which is attained *a priori* and comprehends only *a priori* concepts. It is divided into a hypothetical part, the metaphysics of nature, and a practical part, the metaphysics of morals. In a strict sense, metaphysics is kept to the metaphysics of nature, but in a larger sense, metaphysics also contains the metaphysics of morals and criticism, that is, the investigation of the faculty of reason in respect of all its pure *a priori* knowledge, and is propaedeutic. Metaphysics in this wide sense is the same as the philosophy of pure reason. The metaphysics of nature discourses the principles of pure reason that are derived from mere concepts and employed in the theoretical knowledge of all things. It is further divided into transcendental philosophy, which deals with understanding and reason without taking into account the objects given, and the physiology of pure reason, that is, the rational physiology of objects that can be given in experience. The latter is divided into transcendent and immanent parts.

The metaphysics of morals, also called morals proper, deals with the *prior* principles of morality, that is, the principles that determine and make necessary all of our actions. In both the metaphysics of nature and the metaphysics of morals, there is a transcendental analytic, which concerns the authentic application of their *a priori* principles within the bounds of experience, and a transcendental dialectic, which disclosures the fallacies in traditional metaphysics arising when the pure reason applies these principles to things in themselves beyond experience. The *Critique of Pure Reason* reveals in detail the illusions or errors of traditional metaphysics,

especially of rational cosmology, rational psychology, and rational theology. The analytic and dialectic represent both sides of Kant's attitude toward metaphysics. He scorns the claim of traditional metaphysics to be the queen of the sciences but believes that the metaphysics of his critical philosophy can inquire into the properties of things and show the limits of human reason. Hence, rather than being totally demolished, metaphysics needed redefinition or reconstruction.

Kant, who maintains on the "empirical" reality of what he calls "appearances", perhaps sometimes treats them as representing, albeit in a special and highly problematical sense, a "transcendent" reality Kant also condemned transcendent metaphysics. For he said that the human understanding was so created that it lost itself in paradoxes once it ventured out beyond the limits of possible experience and attempted to deal with things in themselves. Thus, he made the impossibility of a transcendent metaphysic not, as a matter of logic, but a matter of fact. He asserted, not that our minds could not conceivably have had the power of penetrating beyond the phenomenal world, but merely that they were in fact barren of it.

In Kant's philosophy, transcendence has two diverse senses. First, there are principles that go beyond the boundaries of possible experience, including the psychological, cosmological, and theological ideas discussed in the transcendental dialectic. Secondly, things-in-themselves, which occur beyond the limits of possible experience are transcendent. Kant also called this transcendent reality. When transcendental ideas are thought to be transcendent realities, we have what Kant calls transcendental illusions. The transcendent is cautiously illustrious by Kant from the transcendental, which concerns the circumstances for the possibility of experience.

### **Positivist view**

For logical positivists, the study was engrossed in the logical forms of scientific discourse, and much traditional philosophical discourse was excluded as nonsense. The logical positivists acknowledged an empiricist principle of meaning known as the verification principle. Nonanalytic statements, that is, synthetic empirical statements, are meaningful if and only if their truth can be verified in experience. In slogan form, the meaning is the way of verification. The logical positivists used this measure to show that statements of traditional metaphysics were meaningless since their truth or falsity made no difference in experience. Carnap and Ayer, both exponents of positivism, apprehended that the duty of philosophy was not to uncover elusive metaphysical truths but to provide analyses of scientific sentences.



logical positivism representative of the culmination of the anti-metaphysical tradition in the history of Western philosophy, the logical positivists tried to show that there can be no synthetic a priori at all. They extended conventionalism to logic and mathematics, arguing that the only difference possible is between empirical (synthetic a posteriori) principles and conventional (analytic a priori) ones. In particular, though they assumed that empirical science requires a logico-mathematical outline to being place before theories can get any grip on reality, this conventional and analytic framework is purely formal and is empty of factual content.

Carnap and other logical positivists defined metaphysics as the arena of alleged knowledge of the essence of things that transcends the realm of empirical sciences and believed that this field should be eradicated as nonsensical. According to logical positivists, however, many words are deprived of any sense through their metaphysical use. Terms such as Principle, God, the Absolute, the Infinite, Being as Being, and Essence are all pseudo-concepts. Although metaphysicians think that they have meaning, these words cannot be used in judgments to assert anything. They are purely suggestions to associated images and feelings that do not discuss the meaning of the expressions. They fail to satisfy the empirical measures of meaningfulness, and the definitions given to them in metaphysics are pseudo-definitions. The sentences that comprehend a pseudo-concept are pseudo-sentences. On the other hand, they considered that their work was constrained to logic and experience and should be called scientific philosophy. "If it only seems to have a meaning while it does not, we speak of a 'pseudo-concept'." Carnap,

logical positivists entitlement that there are only two kinds of meaningful propositions: formal propositions, which are logical and mathematical principles, and factual propositions, which are empirically verifiable. Metaphysical propositions, which are about such things as the complete, essences, transcendent articles, and fortune, are nonsensical or hollow because they comprehend pseudo-words or because they are pseudo statements, with the preparation of words violating the rules of logical syntax, and lack any criteria of the application. All metaphysical queries and answers are incompatible with logic and scientific thinking. The root of the awkwardness is that metaphysics creates an impossible mission for itself, that is, to discover a kind of knowledge that is beyond experience. Ontological queries will always turn out to be hopelessly insignificant. As such, they cannot be attributed to the significance the metaphysician means for them. These questions are trivial because once one chooses to use a given linguistic framework, the answers to ontological questions are always obvious.

According to logical positivists, metaphysics does not contribute to knowledge. Under signifying that metaphysics is composed of pseudo-propositions, they attempted to show that philosophy, as a genuine branch of knowledge, must be distinguished from metaphysics. For logical positivists What significances to be a factual proposition has cognitive sense if and only if it is empirically verifiable. If it cannot be revealed to be true or false, it is factually insignificant, although it can maybe have emotive meaning for those who utter it. We can discriminate between practical verifiability and verifiability in principle. Many propositions could, with sufficient effort, be verified in practice

Carnap endorsing a verifications theory of truth and meaning. The verificationist theory of meaning says that a sentence's meaning is given by its means of verification. According to the logical positivists, there are two kinds of verification: verification by sense experience or empirical observation (synthetic means) and verification by logical methods (by analytic means) where the latter includes mathematical reasoning. If a claim cannot be confirmed either using logic (or mathematics) alone or empirical observation, then it is unverifiable and hence meaningless. In general, the only statements that are meaningful for the verificationist are, on the one hand, the synthetic statements those that may be directly verified by sensory experience or verified indirectly through a chain of verification leading ultimately back to sensory experience— or, on the other hand, analytic statements, those verified by logic alone. In a final case Carnap considers, the problem is one of the form or structure of the metaphysical statement (its syntax). Sometimes, Carnap notes, it is not that the metaphysician uses a word that doesn't have a clear verificationist-style meaning, but instead that she is perversely using a perfectly meaningful expression to form a sentence that cannot be appraised for truth or falsity.

Carnap then turned to one of the most pervasive and important problems to arise in both the philosophy of science and the theory of meaning. To say that the meaning of a sentence is given by the conditions under which it would be verified or that a scientific theory is verified by predictions that turn out to be true is clearly to speak loosely. Total verification does not happen. To carry out the program of scientific philosophy in a realistic means, we must be able to speak of the support given by inconclusive evidence, either in providing epistemological validation for scientific knowledge or in illustrating the meanings of many of the terms of our scientific language. This calls for an understanding of possibility, or as Carnac preferred to call it, a degree of validation. We must distinguish between two senses of probability: what he termed probability 1, corresponding to credibility, and probability 2, corresponding to the frequency or

empirical conception of probability defended by Reichenbach and von Mises. 'Degree of confirmation' was to be the formal concept corresponding to credibility.

In the initial place, it is essential to differentiate practical verifiability and verifiability in principle. Normally in propositions, we have not taken steps to verify. Several significant propositions, concerning matters of fact, which we could not verify even if we chose; simply because we lack the practical means of placing ourselves in a situation where the relevant observations could be made. A simple and familiar example of such a proposition is the proposition that *there are mountains on the farther side of the moon*.

Verifiable should divide into a strong and a weak sense of verifiable. According to the strong sense, held by Schlick, a proposition is verifiable if and only if its truth is conclusively or practically established in experience; according to the weaknesses, developed by Ayer, a proposition is verifiable if experience can render it probable. "The criterion which we use to test the genuineness of apparent statements of fact is the criterion of verifiability." Ayer, *Language, Truth, and Logic*. Ayer was famous for the attack on metaphysics in his *Language, Truth, and Logic* according to the verification criterion of, only analytic or synthetic statements were meaningful, and synthetic statements were understood to be ultimately verifiable in sense experience. One intention of the verification criterion was to rule out as meaningless the wordy.

## Unit II

### Approaches to Metaphysics

#### Metaphysics as a pseudo-science

pseudo-science is a doctrine that falsely claims the status of science or knowledge. In unhealthy academic circumstances, especially where an enforced orthodoxy exists, all other schools can be convicted without justification as pseudo-sciences. Karl Popper claimed that the criterion for demarcating science from pseudo-science is that of falsifiability. To be scientific, a theory essential to be falsifiable, that is, in principle, there must be some observation statements that would oppose the theory.

Popper proposed a criterion of falsifiability to demarcate empirical science from metaphysics and pseudo-sciences. He held that science advances by proposing daring conjectures and then testing them by seeking falsifying instances, in contrast to the traditional empiricist view that science grows by finding inductive support for hypotheses. In this way, he sought to circumvent the traditional problem of induction and saw science to be provisional rather than dogmatic. His propensity theory of probability understood probability as the propensity or disposition of an individual situation to produce a given result.

Popper was determined to identify some criteria by which to distinguish scientific theories from pseudoscientific theories. This criterion, known as falsifiability, the mark of a scientific theory. According to Popper, a theory is scientific only if it makes predictions that can be tested and potentially shown to be false. If a theory is not falsifiable in this way and can only be confirmed with cumulative supporting evidence, then it is pseudoscientific.

In contrast to the verifiability criterion of meaning put forward by logical positivists, Popper proposed a criterion of falsifiability to demarcate empirical science from metaphysics and pseudo-sciences. He held that science advances by proposing daring conjectures and then testing them by seeking falsifying instances, in contrast to the traditional empiricist view that science grows by finding inductive support for hypotheses. In this way, he sought to circumvent the traditional problem of induction and saw science to be provisional rather than dogmatic.

Popper claimed that the criterion for demarcating science from pseudo-science is that of falsifiability. To be scientific, a theory must be falsifiable, From this perspective, the truthfulness of individual investigators and the institutions of the scientific community is a more important consideration in distinguishing science from pseudo-science.

### **Metaphysics as protoscience**

Fichte, Johann Gottlieb claimed that the absolute ego and itself-legislating activity are the eventual subjective reality. Of its two interacting drives, practical and theoretical, the practice is more determining. In positing the non-ego, it makes self-consciousness possible through a dialectical process.

Fichte walks out on the traditional designation, *philosophy*, or *love of wisdom*, changing it with the coinage *Wissenschaftslehre*, or *Science of Knowledge*. He clarified his conception of philosophy as “the science of science,” to be presented in a deductive system founded on a self-evident first principle. The basic “foundations” of this system, which Fichte termed *Wissenschaftslehre*. The term is not an orientation to epistemology in the modern sense but to the protoscience that is to attain a meta-knowledge of the circumstances of the possibility of all object-knowledge and that then denotes everyone to their own experience for the contingent content of such properly functioning consciousness. In a broader sense, all parts of Fichte’s projected and partially implemented philosophical system are termed *Science of Knowledge*. But Fichte especially employs the term for his various presentations of the *first philosophy*, which contains only the basic principles of all knowledge and its objects.

Among the doctrinal additions of Fichte’s alternative presentation of the Science of Knowledge are the systematically prominent position of the will and the foundational role accorded to intersubjectivity in the constitution of the subject and its relation to the world. Fichte’s transcendental philosophy presents itself as a theory of the principal forms and conditions of practical activity (willing and doing), into which the main features of cognitive activity.

## **Metaphysics as going beyond science**

Metaphysics, perceptive about what lies beyond science, can come under attack exactly because it does not appear to have any approved method or settled procedures for settling arguments. In origin, the word denoted to the subject of Aristotle's great work, as a title given to the book following his *Physics*, which dealt with the things of nature. In Greek, the word "meta" also carries with it the essence of not just what lies after but of what lies beyond. Certainly at the beginning of *Metaphysics*, Aristotle relays the idea of wisdom to deal with "*the first principles and causes of things*," and later attaches this to the knowledge of those things that are universal, "which are the hardest for humans to know since they are furthest from the senses." For him, such metaphysics as "*first philosophy*," while the empirical discipline we now call science was "*second philosophy*." He did not see the sharp distinction between empirical work and philosophical understanding

along with empiricist skepticism of demands to rational intuition, and to try to do metaphysics in a way that is coarsely continuous with science and that goes beyond science as little as possible. Those who recognize the tradition of philosophical naturalism manifest a deep skepticism about appeals to rational intuition. So they confine themselves to a sort of metaphysics that aims purely to fill explanatory breaks in our scientific theories and to draw out some of the motivating logical significances of those theories. However, it is surely a fine thing for metaphysicians to spend their time filling gaps in scientific theories and sketch out interesting logical consequences. All science presumes some metaphysical system of beliefs, and mystical beliefs have been an important part of most systems. Galileo's novel postulate of natural circular motion on earth was at least partly founded on and justified by his metaphysical views. He asserted it as a metaphysical *truth*, not merely as a methodological rule, and he used it as a foundation for his physics.

## **Metaphysics as thrusting beyond the limits of language (Heidegger; Wittgenstein)**

Heidegger's attention turned progressively to thought and language as disclosive events. Truth, means as we have seen, the enactment of self-showing; the truth of thought and language is found as thought and language, in their manifestations, give place and occasion to self-showing phenomena. The life of thought and language is institute in the ways they engross the manifest lives of things. He discovered and experimented for many years with potentials for

language and thought that is prejudiced by poetic rather than traditionally philosophical categories of consciousness.

He searches for a novel beginning for thinking, an effort to think in the obscure questions of being and truth, to express in their modern wake, rather than to represent them. Heidegger invites the reader to involve in strange and often twisting movements of language as he attempts to let the questions emerge and turn thought and language from the tracks that move them inevitably away from what most threatens and yet impels the remarkable occurrence of European thinking.

He describes that texts could lead people to misapprehend thoughts and their intentions. The systematic rationality of “onto-theology,” that is, of traditional philosophy, appeared to institute anxious attempts to overcome the queries of truth and of the meaning of being which gave European philosophy its beginning. Methods called materialistic, idealistic, empirical, and analytical seemed dedicated to forgetting those questions. Post-Cartesian thought gave forms of subjectivity and objectivity ontological priority. In his philosophy, he tries to wobble the dogmas of philosophy.

### **Ludwig Wittgenstein's**

A forceful rejection of metaphysics is to be instituted in Ludwig Wittgenstein's thoughts, who tried to demonstrate that the impulse to ask metaphysical questions was grounded in confusion about the nature of language. By emphasizing that traditional metaphysical problems are nonsensical he means that they violate logical syntax. The mode of thinking is marketed as the ‘linguistic turn’, the trend in philosophy for thinking that philosophical puzzles were to be solved by linguistic analysis. In a broad sense, a movement claiming that the investigation of thought and knowledge must be conducted through the analysis of language and, henceforth, that language should be the essential concern of philosophy. Through which traditional philosophical problems can be explained by reducing them to issues in the philosophy of language. This movement was initiated by Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein and characterizes twentieth-century analytic philosophy. It suggests that we should deal with philosophical problems by appealing to language as it is used. Philosophy must find the logical form of ordinary language, and expose those natural imperfections that have given rise to so many philosophical questions.

Ludwig Wittgenstein's *Tractates* (1922), rallying under the banner of Logical Positivism and waving a verificationist criterion of meaning—professed all metaphysical discourse completely meaningless. They argued that sentences that cannot be either verified by observation or proven by pure logic and are not merely beyond our knowing but are strictly speaking, *meaningless*.

He held that the world is a world of facts rather than things and that a perspicuous illustration of facts required language in which every genuine proposition is a truth-function of elementary propositions. Propositions can picture facts in virtue of facts and propositions having the same logical form. The logical form itself cannot be said, but, like the propositions of metaphysics, ethics, and religion, can only be shown. Philosophy is an activity of illustrative thought and of distinguishing between what can be said and what can only be shown. The *Tractatus* ends with the injunction: “Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.”

### **Metaphysics as presuppositionlessness (Phenomenology)**

The phenomenological method demands that one be a participant and not simply an observer with and that this, in turn, demands that one's. The one must oneself have that experience in front of one, and so, to begin, the reader must him - or herself attends to experiencing simply this moment, now. The now is itself not practiced as an isolated instant, but is experienced as a passage: it is experienced as coming into being and passing away in a chronological flow. But the notion of “passage” is more complex than the notion of “is”—it is becoming, a motion-defined as “from ... to,” and not just an unqualified immediacy of being. He openness the effort to describe the experience in a presuppositionlessness means without introducing a dominant interpretation and lets objects to disclosing themselves to us in such a way that it demonstrates the insufficiency of our initial approach to it, demonstrating that it is becoming and not simply being as our initial apprehension implies. The object as becoming goes hand in hand with a transformation of perspective, a transformation in one is prepared to recognize now it is only through its realization that the real meaning of the originating intention can be determined.

The object, demands individuals be active in certain ways in order to receive it, in order to be passive. This passivity, however, is not a relinquishment of intelligence, effort, or learning, but is rather a passivity enabled by the most rigorous engagement. Phenomenology initiated as



a recognizable movement with Edmund Husserl's proclamation that philosophy takes as its fundamental task the description of the structures of experience as they present themselves to consciousness. This description was meant to be carried out on the axis of what the "things themselves" required, without assuming or implementing the theoretical outlines norms, or terminologies established in the study of other domains.

## Unit III

### Problems of Metaphysics

#### Appearance/Reality

Since the beginning philosophy, served to structure debates about what there is to know and how, if at all, it can be known. The distinction between appearance and reality is firmly rooted in everyday experience and discourse. The concept of Appearance and reality is a major distinction in philosophy, and different philosophers offer different accounts of the relationship between appearance and reality. Appearance is seen or what is instantly given to consciousness, corresponding to Greek, *phenomenon*, to appear to be so, but also to be so manifestly. Thus, Aristotle took the view of the middle-of-the-road, exclusively of wisemen, as *phenomenon* Appearance, what things seem to be, is often contrasted to reality, what things are themselves. the Sophist asserts that whatever appears must be real the idealist maintains that only what is real can appear. For both, the real must be just as it appears to be; either way, the common-sense distinction is rendered philosophically debatable

philosophers, such as Plato, say that appearance is an incomplete and imperfect copy of reality Philosophy derived from the spirit of the thinking of Plato, in particular from his Theory of Forms, which contrasts reality with phenomena; the soul with body; knowledge with opinion; reason with sensation; and rationality with emotion. It then claims that the first member of each contrasting pair is superior or more real than the second member. In contemporary philosophy, all positions that suggest the independent existence of abstract objects are called Platonism. Platonism in this sense is virtually synonymous with realism

Aristotle, says that reality is in appearance. For Descartes, appearance is regrettable and even spurious. Some, such as Kant, say that our knowledge is restricted to appearance (phenomena), but that for morality we can make sense of a more fundamental reality(noumena). Hegel and Bradley, say that appearance is a fractional aspect of reality. In metaphysics, appearance is generally regarded as less valuable than reality. Contemporary linguistic philosophers differentiate two groups of appearance idioms. Seeming idioms, such as “appears to be” or “give the appearance,” are not strictly related to Metaphysics

Descartes, struggled with the sceptic's challenge, the risk posed by that challenge was the possibility that that same gap was too great, that no reliable evidence about reality was ever furnished by what appeared in experience, perhaps a majority, have held that there is nothing real except minds and their ideas. Such philosophers are called 'idealists'. When they come to explaining the matter, they either say,

The first serious attempt to establish idealism on such grounds was that of Bishop Berkeley. the matter is really nothing but a collection of ideas, that what appears as matter is really a collection of more or less rudimentary minds. It remains to ask whether any general philosophical arguments are enabling us to say that, if the matter is real, it *must* be of such and such nature. As explained above, very many philosophers, perhaps most, have held that whatever is real must be in some sense mental, or at any rate that whatever we can know anything about must be in some sense mental.

He proved first, by largely valid arguments, that our sense-data cannot be supposed to have an existence independent of us, but must be, in part at least, 'in' the mind, in the sense that their existence would not continue if there were no seeing or hearing or touching or smelling or tasting. one empiricist strain strangely echoed in a late flowering of rationalism, concludes that what appears to the well-functioning mind is, and must be, the real, and it must be just as it appears.

The appearance/reality distinction must be seen as an entirely general one. While its most obvious illustrations involve sense perception, it extends naturally to all dimensions of thought and experience. Traditionally, appearance/phenomenon is contrasted to reality. Appearances are thought to be the object of perception or belief, while the reality is characterized as the object of knowledge. Kant transformed this contrast in his distinction between appearance and thing-in-itself /*noumenon*. Appearances are objects as we experience them with our spatial and temporal methods of sensibility and our categories of understanding, while things-in-themselves are those objects as they might be in themselves and known by a pure intellect. He defines that appearance should be distinguished from illusion An illusion is an abnormal perception of a present object and implies a depiction to which nothing real resembles. In contrast, appearance is always the appearance of a given object and is relentless and universal. Divergent to the traditional view, he argued that appearance is the only object of science and is that to which the concepts of the understanding apply. In contrast, the thing-in-itself is beyond knowledge, although Kant argued that its existence is a necessary condition for an object of one's awareness to count as an

appearance, for appearance itself presupposes that there is something that appears. He held that if the objects of experience were not appearances, then all the problems of reason falling into conflict with itself would re-emerge.

Reality Occasionally means what there is in contrast to appearance. One characteristic of the realism and anti-realism discussion concerns how much we can count as reality. Reality is a synonym for the world or the total of all that there is. Some philosophers distinguish between objective reality, to which our language and perception denote, and formal reality, which is the mode of our language or thought. Sometimes reality is used for objective existence that is independent of our consciousness and will. The question of reality arises also in a wide variety of realist doctrines.

### **Being, Essence, and Existence**

Philosophy proceeds in part by asking large, imprecise, and over general questions. In the effort to respond to them, the queries themselves come to be redeveloped with better clearness, and one large inquiry frequently comes to be substituted by numerous minor ones. In philosophy Being “may be assumed to name a property controlled by everything that is. Or it may be thought to name of an object or a realm beyond, above, or behind the objects of the physical world; in this case, physical objects somehow exist by their relationship to “Being.” Or again, “Being” may be the name of the genus to which everything belongs in virtue of the possession of the property of Being or of standing concerning Being.

The history of pre-Socratic philosophy is the best illustration of this progression, and Being first seemed on the philosophical act as part of it. To the question “What is Being?” the Parmenidean reply that there is Being and nothing else besides, Being seems to have the merit of truth, even if it is tautological truth. Being is one, unchanging, and external is appropriate. Meanwhile, the objects we perceive are numerous, changing, and transient, they do not belong to the realm of Being.

Plato acknowledged the identification of Being with the unchanging. As a consequence, he denies that physical objects “are”—they belong to a stage intermediate between Being and Not-Being, that of becoming. This is not the only paradox in Plato’s analysis of the subject: The Form of the Good, which exists at a higher level than that of the other Forms, cannot just “be,” either; it must exist “beyond being. one of the distinctive consequences of treating Being as

either a special kind of object or a special kind of attribute, namely, that all kinds of ordinary uses of the verb “to be” must be qualified or redrafted.

Aristotle completed three crucial arguments about the study of Being as Being. The first is that the special sciences may make use of the concept of Being and of other similar essential concepts, but these ideas are not the objects of their inquiries—only philosophy has such fundamental concepts as the appropriate object of its studies. Another point is that to inquire about Being as Being is to attempt to isolate the combining element of meaning in the diverse senses in which the word “is” is used. The third point is that this inquiry can be carried on only as an inquiry into a whole range of closely related essential notions, in which the diverse species of cause and the notions of unity and plurality are primary.

Thomas Aquinas returned to the pure Aristotelian tradition. Thomas refuted once again the view that Being can be either a genus or a property according to Thomas, with all finite creatures it is the case that what they are—their essence—is one thing and that they are—their existence—is another. But God simply is Being. Hegel argued that Being is the most fundamental of concepts because the most elementary forms of judgment must involve some assertion of existence, no matter how bare. For him, the notion of Being by itself is the emptiest of all notions. For Hegel, Being is a notion expressed in our judgments of experience at a certain level, not the name of a realm beyond all judgments about the experience. Parmenides considered that Being was One; Plato, that it was One and Many; Aristotle, that it was Substance; Descartes, that it was Substance in the modes of thought and extension; and so on

This pure essence for Plato was an 'idea' or 'form'. The 'idea' *justice* is not identical to anything that is just: it is something other than specific things, which particular things partake of. Not being particular, it can not itself exist in the world of sense. Moreover, it is not fleeting or changeable like the things of sense: it is eternally itself, immutable and indestructible. For Aristotle, the essence of an object was what finds countenance in the concept that the object embodies, the concept under which it must be identified if it is to be identified as what it is

if we cannot be certain of the independent existence of objects, we cannot be sure of the independent existence of other people's bodies, and so still less of other people's minds, since we have no grounds for believing in their minds except such as are derived from observing their bodies. Descartes conceived a method that may still be used with profit the method of systematic doubt. He determined that he would believe nothing which he did not see pretty clearly and

distinctly to be true. Whatever he could bring himself to doubt, he would doubt, until he saw the reason for not doubting it. By applying this method he progressively became convinced that the only existence of which he could be *quite* certain was his own. Descartes' argument. 'I think, therefore I am' says rather more than is strictly certain.

Berkeley repudiates matter; in the meantime, he does not deny that the sense-data which we commonly take as signs of the existence of the table are signs of the existence of *something* independent of us, but he does repudiate that this something is nonmental, that it is neither mind nor ideas entertained by some mind. He admits that there must be something that continues to exist when we go out of the room or shut our eyes and that what we call seeing the table does give us the reason for believing in something which persists even when we are not seeing it. But he thinks that this something cannot be radically different from what we see, and cannot be independent of seeing altogether, though it must be independent of *our* seeing. He is thus led to regard to the 'real' table as an idea in the mind of God

### **Mind and Body**

The *mind-body problem*, a vital metaphysical one in the philosophy of mind, is the problem of whether mental phenomena are physical then, if not, how they are linked to physical phenomena. Other metaphysical problems in the philosophy mind include the free will problem, the problem of personal identity, and the problem of how. The dogma that the soul is separate from the body is found in Plato and discoursed all over the history of philosophy

Anaxagoras describes that the mind is accountable for the beginning of the cosmic vortex. He illustrates it as “boundless, autonomous, and mixed with no object”. If it were not “by itself” it would be mixed with everything, by Universal Mixture, which would hinder it from ruling things. As it is, the mind is “the finest of all objects and the purest, and its movements complete oversight over everything and prevail above all” The mind is existing in somethings, namely those things that have a soul, but it does not mix with them. Thus the mind is not immaterial, but it is not material in the same way as the categories of stuff are. Its movements control over the pieces of stuff of the world and grasp all things

Aristotle describes the mind as the place of forms because it can grasp objects apart from matter. The mind has no organ because it is not the form or first actualization of any physical structure. So, unlike perceptual capabilities, it is not solidly dependent on the body. Though the mind thinks of its objects by way of images, which are something like internal representations, and these are physically based. Insofar as it depends on imagination the mind is weakly dependent on the body. The division between the active and passive intelligence advocates that the mind is separable from the body.

Descartes used the terms mind and soul interchangeably. For him, the mind is equal to self, person, the substance that thinks, believes, doubts, desires, and acts. He upheld that the essence of the physical is an extension of space. Minds are unextended substances and thus are distinct from any physical substances. The essence of a mental substance is to think. Descartes's claim that the mind is a substance, arguing that only God or Nature is proficient of independent existence, and took all mentality and physicality to be different modes of God or Nature. Descartes inquires, "What am I?" He answers, "a thing that thinks", a thinking substance. For Descartes planets and trees, not as substances, but as modes, ways extended matter is prepared. On the one hand, we have extended substance and its modes: material bodies. On the other hand, we have thinking substances, minds, and their modes: thoughts, images, feeling. Just as minds and bodies are irreconcilable, so modes of thought and modes of extension are incommensurable.

*"The substance in which thought immediately resides is called mind. I use the term 'mind' rather than 'soul' since the word 'soul' is ambiguous and is often applied to something corporeal".*

For Spinoza man is not a substance, but a mode of substance; that the human soul/mind is a mode of thought, the idea of its body, which is, a mode of extension. Leibniz has begun to think of minds as the only cause of motion and activity in the world; minds in non-human substances are temporary while human minds persist and have memory.

*"Since every mind is like a mirror, there will be one mirror in our mind, another in other minds. Thus, if there are many mirrors, that is, many minds recognizing our goods, there will be a greater light, the mirrors blending the light not only in the [individual] eye but also among each other. The gathered splendor produces glory"*

The individual mind of monads perpetually mirrors the entirety of the world and each does so from its perspective. That is, consistent with the principle of the identity of indiscernibles, no two substances mirror the world from the same perspective.

### **Space and Time**

Physics assesses the world as a manifold of four dimensions: length, width, height, and interval. Space-time can too be considered a four-dimensional tenseless space, in contrast to our ordinary conception of space as something which endures through time. Many matters, such as infinity, continuity, and their absolute or relational nature, are common to space and time and can be dealt with in a unified theory.

Space is regarded as a continuant that gives form to the possible relations in which things and events stand in the world. It is instituted by all spatially related places. In ancient Greece, the major dispute about space concerns whether it is substantial or relational. The Eleatics denied the possibility of empty space. They also denied that space is material, for otherwise, space itself would have to be in another kind of space. Atomists argued that a void exists which separates atoms. Zeno's paradoxes show the puzzling nature of space and time, mainly regarding the problem of infinity. Plato defined space as a receptacle that does not have any characteristic itself. Aristotle did not distinguish space from the place, which he defined as the adjacent boundary of the containing body. Both seem to take space as an objective container.

Descartes claimed that the essence of the matter is an extension and thus identified space with the matter. In his interpretation of absolute space, Leibniz argued that, rather than being a substance, space is a system of relations in which indivisible monads stand next to one another. Kant, echoing Eno, claimed that antinomies result if we think of space and time as objectively real, and contended that space and time are forms of intuition by which sensibility organizes sensibly given materials into the experience. In Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. The metaphysical explanation of the notion of space comprehends four arguments: (1) "space is not an empirical concept which has been derived from outer experiences"; (2) "space is a necessary *a priori* representation, which underlies all outer intuitions"; (3) "space is not discursive . . . but a pure intuition"; and (4) "space is represented as an infinite given magnitude." The first two claim that space is *a priori*, and the latter two claim that space is an intuition



Space is not a concept, because unlike the different instantiations of concepts, all spaces are parts of one space. If one part of space is diverse from another part, this is not because of differences in space itself, but because of the things that occupy space. Absolute space is also separate from time. In contrast to absolute space, relative space depends on its character upon the nature of the things it relates. It would vanish were there no spatially related entities and in principle, it is subject to change.

Time concerns the progression and order of events in terms of before and after or in terms of past, present, and future. Time is commonly conceived to be a passage or a flowing stream, but this gives rise to the criticism of the myth of passage. Time is generally thought to have one dimension and an irreversible direction, but it is unclear what gives time its direction, whether there can be a backward temporal order, or how to account for the asymmetry between the past and the future.

Plato claimed that time is created and is the moving image of eternity. Aristotle in *Physics* articulated many puzzles about the existence of time. Kant argued that time, like space, is a form of intuition and understood mathematical knowledge to be determined in relation to these forms. Kant gave time a crucial role in his account of the categories and their application to experience.

Heidegger's account of temporality is fundamental to his account of a human being. In existentialism, time is more subjectively conceived through its connection with the problem of human experience

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