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When the Mirror Cracks: Well-Being, Moral Responsibility, and the Post-Colonial Soul

Grant Gillett^{[a],*}

^[a]Bioethics Centre, University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand.
*Corresponding author.

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Abstract

The human *psyche* (soul) is jointly created by the actual world and the “mirror image of the world” (Wittgenstein). Culture creates a mirror of the world by constituting layers of discursive connection in which we are all immersed and which engender lived human experience. Lacan uses “the mirror phase” to unravel the development of human identity and self-conception and locate in it many roots for the psychological characteristics seen in adult life. When the mirror crack’d from side to side for the lady of Shalott, her world began to unravel. A post-colonial setting fractures the indigenous mirror of life such that the broken image at the heart of the alienation that results has damaging effects on the moral being of those belonging to a colonised culture as they try to articulate their lived experience. The fracture disconnects meanings, *myths of origin and destiny*, *cultural icons* and the *discourses in which connections to place are affirmed* by treating them as unreal and irrelevant to modern life. Colonisation is therefore potentially destructive to identity, self-worth, and the moral being of a colonised people because connections between self-worth and the roots of being have been disrupted in ways that are difficult to articulate. That results in deep wounds alienating self from world and undermining the informed dialogue that creates social and personal responsibility.

Key words: Post-colonialism; Alienation; Moral responsibility; Identity

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INTRODUCTION

“The soul,” announces Foucault, “is the present correlative of a technology of power over the body” (FR, p.176). In this he picks up a strand in Aristotle and Heidegger whereby the psyche (or soul) is seen as moulded, informed, inscribed, and given content through its many dealings with objects (Heidegger, 1953, p.12, 12; DA; 431b21). Foucault expands this basic insight by noting that the soul, seen in this way, relates to objects both actually and through perception and thought and these modes of engagement combine to adapt an individual to the discursive contexts in which, as an epistemological and moral subject, that individual has to function. The techniques of adaptation therefore arise from discourse and the discursive positions that have shaped one’s subjectivity as a living soul (we see this beautifully explored in Du Bois’ *The souls of black folk*.)

In “The Lady of Shalott” we read of a creature of faery cursed so that if she should ever look on the real world and down to Camelot she will die. She sees the world in her mirror and she is happy; she sings her songs, she provokes wonder in those who glimpse her alien existence in her enchanted tower, and she weaves her tapestry of all she sees in her mirror. Then she spies Lancelot riding by and is drawn to look full at him.

Out flew the web and floated wide;
The mirror crack’d from side to side;
“The curse is come upon me,” cried
The Lady of Shalott.¹

Janet Frame describes herself as an adult as the envoy from mirror city (Frame, 1989). As she unfolds her story of a disadvantaged child in a small New Zealand town, we see her emerge into the world of literature and culture. She becomes the envoy whose place in the real human life-world is to bring to her fellow human beings a reflection of themselves discernible in the mirror world

¹ Alfred Lord Tennyson, “The lady of Shalott”, 1842.

the world of discourse, literature, and the articulation of culture.

Discourse changes us every day as we are mirrored and moulded by it. Literature, as part of that mirror world, tells us our stories and, through its artistry, reflects a subset of our cherished creative skills. Contemporary literary experience is becoming more and more multi-stranded and reflects voices not our own but, though unfamiliar, imbued with a similar level of artistic beauty.

The complex experience of speaking oneself into being using the resources of discourse is a site of both revelation and restoration for those who have been colonised and whose culture has been displaced from its situation - the place in which its roots are buried. Life forms are adapted to their place of origin and the forms of life that allow human beings to occupy and understand their niches also provide the roots through which human souls are nourished and grow (Weil, 1952).

Picking up Aristotle's thought, we conceptualise the soul as a form, something that is ideational and essential to the human life lived by each human being in his or her own way (Gillett, 2008). Thus the soul and its roots are cultural as much as geographical (indeed the two are organically connected, as many indigenous people remind us). If a culture is the source of the mirror in which each human being can see and reflect upon their lives and their values, then colonisation cracks the mirror in such a way that causes the image to be distorted and lives begin to unravel. We act on the basis of our thoughts about ourselves and our situations and those thoughts take shape in the mirror world and what it shows us about contexts in which social and personal life take on meaning (Williams, 1985, p.201). A crack'd mirror and the disrupted images it presents fracture all of a person's thought including the moral framework of a people and that causes their tapestry of life to unravel. It is within the stories woven into the tapestry of our shared life that we create inter-personal connections and the responsiveness and that is the basis of moral responsibility. Tracing those stories and their disruptions is therefore an urgent challenge facing those concerned for the restoration of a caring society of responsible individuals in a post-colonial context. As we think responsibly about the ethics of responsibility we must therefore consider the problems of self, identity, and moral responsibility that follow when a mirror is crack'd from side to side.

1. THE MIRROR WORLD AND MEANING

Wittgenstein uses a telling metaphor to characterize our thinking about our being-in-the-world, one that is prior to any theory of society or culture.

Logic is not a body of doctrine, but a mirror image of the world. (Wittgenstein, 1922, TLP, 6.13)

He goes on to describe the structure of connected meanings that we use to describe or conceptualize our

world in the following terms: All-embracing logic ... an infinitely fine network—the great mirror. (TLP, 5511). But in a post-structuralist context we can no longer think of a unitary “infinitely fine network”, rather we should be limning a multiply layered mesh of interconnected stories that articulate the events that happen in the world so as “to differentiate the networks and levels to which they belong and to reconstitute the lines along which they are connected and engender one another” (Foucault, 1984, FR, p.56).

Logic for Wittgenstein draws on a structured “web of belief” (Quine & Ullian, 1978) but the pattern of multiplex and interwoven connections we forge in discourse to trace paths of thought and meaning affect not only belief but worth and moral being. These connections, and the patterns of thought they produce, articulate our engagements with one another (as *dasein-mitsein*)². In this sense “logic” and the structure of knowledge it brings with it is all-embracing and is our means of displaying the world as thinkable. The ways we think of ourselves and the world dictate the ways in which we act even though that process itself is problematic to understand and reflect upon: “What expresses itself in language, we cannot express by means of language” (TLP, 4121).

As we try to make visible what expresses itself in language, we are forced beyond the simplistic view that language is an “objective” and even-handed depiction that leaves all questions of value and power yet to be decided. That is because a change in “logic” or the structure of truth in ascendancy at a given point in human history,

... is not a change of content (refutation of old errors, recovery of old truths), nor is it a change of theoretical form (renewal of paradigm, modification of systematic ensembles). It is a question of what governs statements, and the way in which they govern each other so as to constitute a set of propositions which are scientifically acceptable, and hence being capable of being verified or falsified by scientific procedures. In short, there is a problem for the regime, the politics of the scientific statement. (FR 54)

In any critical examination of our knowledge of ourselves as beings-in-the-world, we need also to bear in mind the fact that the systematicity (or regimen) of knowledge is a product of praxis and its components which “stem from three broad areas: relations of control over things, relations of action upon others, relations with oneself.” (FR, 48) These systems of praxis, underpinning discourse, introduce a technology of the self, a science and art of self-formation and care of the self in which humankind questions itself and each of us “speaks” and writes the self into being as *zoon logon echeion* (HB&T, 25; Hacking, 1995). Each of us as a human being and all of us as humankind, therefore produce ourselves in an image. That image of self is then the basis for self-attribution and the constructions that

² “Being there with others” as in Heidegger's *Being and Time*.

give significance to our actions as socio-political or moral beings.

The insight that human soul articulates itself according to an image leads Jacques Lacan to posit the *imago* or image-ego as a fundamental structure of human existence. It comes into existence through our reflection on the “mirror” created by the discourses in which we are immersed. Hacking writes, in a similar vein, of “the writing and re-writing of the soul” and “The looping effect of human kinds” thereby articulating the circular and reflective ways in which we conceive of ourselves and then enact and make real that nature which is self-attributed according to an image we construct of our modes of being in the world. The *imago* as, in part, a product of the mirror world identifies each of us as a subjective locus of action responding to situations, what happens to us in them, and the subjectivity that results. As agents we act and respond to the effects of our actions on the basis of the *imago*. Subjective self-positioning and self-articulation therefore plays a key role in deciding how or even whether to perform an action. We are variably responsive to their likely effects on ourselves and others when we make those decisions and therefore responsible to varying extents for what we do in ways that reflect our state of mind at the time. For instance, consider an agent whose state of mind is as follows:

You think I am no 'count and don't know nuthin and what I do don't amount to nuthin and I can be left on the scrapheap. You think I don't ought to do anything about the way my mum gets beaten up and my dad is angry all the time becoss' people disrespect him. You think I'm just a nuthin' kid, and I got to know my place and do better for myself and then youse all laugh cos' you think I can't do nuthin anyhow but I am gonna show you guys, am I ever! And then you won' be able to say I'm a nuthin and my folks are too. I tell you, you gonna see, good and sure that I am somethin' you got to respect.

These self articulations are slightly at odds with the requirements of the image that fits the system of moral and socio-legal accountability (or giving an account of oneself) that is found in “upper decile society”. But what kind of *responsivity* is this - how has it been produced so that it responds to the world in this way? And how should responsibility be parcelled out when we see it in that light?

As we acknowledge the structural interconnections that criss-cross the images seen in the mirror world, we notice that they differ between differently situated individuals and the often radically different discourses they inhabit (Harre & Gillett, 1994). We then begin to see the complexity of social, personal and moral responsibility. These different levels of interconnectedness and engenderment and the explanations they subtend articulate our actual dealings with the lived world and its moral structure in which we move and have our being. The mirror world and its reflection of actuality has an uncertain and problematic relation to who we are and what we do because

signifiers and their significance (particularly for terms like responsibility) have a potentially “sliding” relation to our embodied, subjective, being-in-the-world where, as real individuals we form part of each others' lives. This uncertainty or sliding of signifiers undermines the uniformity of meaning and the possibility of a universal rationality or morality (at a certain level) in such a way that we must explore Lacan's *point de capiton* or “quilting point” (Lacan, 1993).

2. QUILTING AND THE SUBJECT

Lacan's term “point de capiton” recognises the disparity between psychotic speech and “sane” speech and notes that they can fail to connect despite the fact that psychotic patients earnestly use language they share with their interlocutor. He links this fact to two thoughts regarding language (and therefore the world of meaning) and the role of *difference* in that analysis:

- (i) *difference* marks a deferral of meaning such that the meaning of any term in part defers to the meanings of the other terms surrounding it in logical or semantic space; and
- (ii) *difference* draws our attention to the fact that an item in the world of meaning (the mirror world) marks a difference in the actual things and conditions in relation to which it is used without itself constituting that difference.

These two observations taken together mean that the way an event in the world impinges on me and is signified by me may not be commensurate with the way it impinges on another person who is with me in “the same situation”. Therefore, until we achieve a coming together of our two systems of meaning as they frame the mutual events, we will not understand one another. We can see this at work in an interview with a psychotic person whose speech and thought are bizarre and incomprehensible such that one cannot follow the (often disordered) stream of thought until a moment of discourse connects us in our relationship to the situation. It is differently engendered, in a post-colonial setting, when problems may arise, for instance, because traditional understandings of customary and sacred places and the boundaries proper become obliterated in contemporary socio-legal patterns of land use.

Wittgenstein lays out some helpful thoughts in this regard when he explicitly connects words to a fragment of a language (just as the pieces in a game of chess take on their significance in the context of the game) (Wittgenstein, 1953). Understanding the word, phrase, or sentence depends on one appreciating what is being attended to as the thing being spoken about and the way that the words are framing that thing according to a subset of language or a discursive context (hence his affinity to structuralism or limited linguistic holism). But the structuralist move, and the thought that all signifiers slide over their signifieds, such that they only fix the meaning of the terms in an

utterance holistically, severs the one-to-one links between words and what they stand for. Thus when you and I speak of “that mountain” our thoughts may significantly miss one another (e.g. I think of a useful source from which granite for building could be quarried and you think of the grandfather who nourishes us, shelters us, and gives us a place to stand). That rift poses a seemingly intractable problem of incommensurability between differently nested knowledge claims (because the meaning of the knowledge claim is yielded only by accepting the holistic system—or structure—that determines the meanings of the terms comprising it). The most discussed corollary of that claim is in philosophy of science where it is posited that two different scientific theories cannot ever talk about the same things to the point that even two (so-called) “observation statements” depend for their significance on the system of observations and theory in which they are nested (this was made famous by Quine as the indeterminacy of reference or ontological relativity) (Quine, 1968). But in post-colonial settings a problem arises as we notice the predicament of human beings who find themselves in discordant systems of understanding identity and moral responsibility.

The second sense of *différance*—the gap between signification and our lived existence—makes vivid the whole “mirror-world” picture of meaning whereby our words are not just names for the actual things and conditions they signify or depend on for their meaning. Meaning, the mirror world, and the structural interconnectedness of any item that emerges from the two senses of *différance*, can only be “completed” by something that secures their application to the actual lived in world and thereby connects the discourses of two different speakers. That potential connection underpins the quilting points at which the signifier and signified can be linked to moments of engagement in the actual world in a way that also gives us access to each others’ discourses. That mutuality or connection enables both participants in a conversation to become grounded or rooted in a shared experience which gives them (and their words) life.

Every sign *by itself* seems dead. What gives it life? – in use it is alive. Is life breathed into it there? – Or is the use its life? (Wittgenstein, 1953, PI, 432)

Points de capiton link the mirror world and the lived world and provide us with a means of negotiating our way around in a shared human world in which we articulate our being as creatures who are attuned to it in diverse ways. In that sense the mirror world in-forms our ways of belonging and our powers of understanding and acting. Those conceptions and the points at which they connect us to what we do and say constitute the lived space as one in which the self understanding required for moral responsibility can develop. But these discursive links are vulnerable in various ways that emerge from Lacan’s analysis of the shaping of human psychology, or what Nietzsche calls

“the development-theory of the will to power” (Nietzsche, 1886/1975, p.35).

3. LACAN’S MIRROR PHASE

Lacan notes that the human infant is “born untimely” and, for that reason, is and, at a primal level, feels insufficient to the challenges of life (E, 4). Something therefore has to happen to correct the “organic insufficiency in his natural reality”. What happens is a process of self-formation that includes what Lacan refers to as “the mirror stage” (Lacan, 1977). The mirror stage, in fact, is not so much a stage of psychological development but the basis of an ongoing mode of becoming-in-the-world-with-others whereby connections are forged between the *Innenwelt* and the *Umwelt* - the inner world of the psyche and the outer, surrounding world in which one acts and becomes effective as an identifiable individual. The mirror stage is therefore “a drama whose internal thrust is precipitated from insufficiency to anticipation” whereby one transforms oneself from “a fragmented body-image to a form of its totality” and ultimately assumes an identity. But this is not just a simple identity of an organic or given nature, rather it is “an alienating identity” the site of “the ego’s verifications.” (E, 4) In these “verifications” of who one is by the reflection of oneself in the faces and discourse of the other, the ego/*imago* becomes potentially subject to *meconnaissance* organized by “the ‘reality principle’ – a principle that is the expression of a scientific prejudice most hostile to the dialectic of knowledge” (E, 6). This is not the reality principle of Freud’s ego but an objectivization of the self that can override and even negate the lived experience of the self so that one’s knowledge of oneself can be distorted by the forms in which it is articulated. Lacan here echoes and analyses the possibility of bad faith fore-grounded by Jean Paul Sartre and derived from Heidegger’s analysis of the human being as the *zoon logon echon*,³ the being who uses the word to question lived existence and come to formulations of it that may not be attuned to lived reality but are formative for self understanding. The medium in which these understandings can be formulated is discursive and falls under “a regime” that determines the governance of statements—the episteme of the dominant group in a human situation and its power/knowledge (FR)⁴.

Lacan’s short essay on the mirror stage argues for several theses about human beings.

- (i) Any human being in his or her lived being is completed by the context s/he inhabits in the human life-world. This process is, paradoxically, never finished but always dynamic such that the situated self is always re-configuring itself in the light of the context in which s/he functions and finds her “verifications”. For most of us the

³ The living being whose essence is the word *Zoon logon echo*.

⁴ Foucault’s power/knowledge is summarised in FR.

context is perfused by familiar cultural meanings which enunciate our links to our own origins and the sources of signification, celebration, memory, and order that hold things firm for us and give us a place to stand. These things also articulate, energise and in-form the network of meaning that is a mirror in which one can trace out or intuit one's own reflection and thus they form the basis of action and responsibility.

- (ii) The real world abounds in a variety of discourses and relationships in which any individual is multiply enmeshed and that implies that a human being is not simply reflected in a unitary mirror but that the image one has of oneself may be multiple and require some integration in order to be a suitable basis for conscious or coordinated action (Hughlings-Jackson, 1887)⁵. Thus the possibility of *meconnaissance* is inherent in the multiplicity of meanings and layers of signification that are vital to becoming somebody, somewhere, and it may be intensified if those meanings are only discernible in a mirror that has crack'd.
- (iii) The real world is a domain of thought and action or the enaction of an identity. Therefore the *imago* empowers an individual, on the basis of his or her belonging and articulation of self, to craft a subjective life among others. The extent to which one's primary insufficiency has been genuinely transformed into efficacy and a sense of ease with oneself (as a being-among-others or *dasein-mitsein*) is the extent to which one can be somebody with a place in the world and a sense of relationally supported self-adequacy. That is not a fiction but a point of grounding or resistance that stabilizes one's being as a being who is worth something and supports stable patterns of action.
- (iv) The possibility of alienation means that the elaboration of the *imago* can become bound by what seem to be illusions, such as the illusion of autonomy, whereby one forgets that one's being is rooted in belonging and only on that basis can one nourish and strengthen oneself in anticipation of the challenges that one will have to face. These illusions represent a falling apart of the world and its image so that one is lost in the *aporia* created by that schism. If the lived self cannot reconcile thought and reality so as to be attuned (or adapted) to the context of one's life, one becomes defensive, insecure, resentful and hostile, constantly anticipating betrayal and

unable to achieve a good-enough mode of being-in-the-world-with-others.

The child, born prematurely, draws on its image to see who it is, and from then on the mirror world is its source of knowledge and power (or sufficiency and attunement to the world). Through that mirror and the tools it provides, the drama of self development and then care of the self⁶ can be played out. Normally the mirror world is established through a form of life in touch with its actual place of human adaptation, and grounds the sense of belonging and situation that equips a human being to fashion a subjective trajectory through the human life-world⁷. Despite the fact that each of us is encouraged to differentiate him/herself from his/her context, contexts constitute our world "from which he cannot fall" (Freud, 1930/1985). I (especially as my *imago*) am completed by my world (and the mirror in which I see it) therefore the fit between the mirror world and the world of my actual life enables me to occupy the quasi-stable and elusive position of somebody somewhere with (at its best) poise and skill.

4. ARTICULATING ONE'S BEING-IN-THE-WORLD AS A REFLECTED SELF

The discourse of truth is our means of holding each other to a legitimated conception of what is going on in the world and what we are all doing to each other. To do so, we take the rules that govern our meanings and convey them to each other as a framework of action and interaction. Abiding by those rules creates a ground of being-with-others as members of a human group who cooperatively adapt to the world and share techniques for doing so. Foucault remarks that a human being cultivates him or herself by using "accepted texts" originating and shared among one's associates so that, in caring for one another, we "arm the subject with a truth it did not know" one that can be "progressively put into practice" (Foucault, 1997, p.101) Thus we can gloss the care of the self as resting on the dictum: "The essence of ethics is to connect the subject to the truth". But we need to be clear that the truth at stake here is multiple and arises from "accepted texts" which may be different for two peoples who meet in a shared space. Foucault's dictum is highly relevant to the development of life skills and the enduring need for human beings to learn to take care of themselves. Through the life skills that constitute the care of the self we learn to combine care of the self and care of others in terms of what is needed for us both to become

⁵ This is prefigured by Hughlings-Jackson in his theory of the evolution and dissolution of nervous function; Hughlings Jackson, J. Remarks on the evolution and dissolution of the nervous system. *Brit. J Psychiatry*, 1887, 33, 25-48.

⁶ Foucault uses this term to refer to the work needed to produce oneself as a liveable subjectivity among others in the "human life-world" (*Lebenswelt*), itself a term derived from Edmund Husserl (*Crisis in the European Sciences* (Tr D. Carr) Chicago: Northwestern University Press, 1970).

⁷ Husserl.

fully human. The becoming actualises potentiality in the unimpaired way that underpins mutual responsibility (or proper responsiveness to the effect of our actions and interactions on each other). Absent a shared framework of understanding, or a mirror in which the world is revealed, we cannot discern the effects of what we do to each other and thereby a sense of responsibility that takes account of what is sustainable.

It seems therefore that we have to democratize or liberate “the care of the self” as a vital component of that resistance (or persistence and sustainability of self-worth) that each of us needs in order to be somebody in contexts threatening marginalisation or anonymity. The discourse of the self explored by Lacan, Foucault and others, in that guise, is highly relevant to the post-colonial setting in which there are a series of fractures to be overcome in articulating the self and its powers as is clearly evident from the markers of marginalisation – poverty, ill-health, and imprisonment.

- (i) There is a fracture in the mirror that shows us ourselves-in-the-world because the traditional or pre-colonial mirror through which the people of the land have been attuned to the land of their belonging has been crack’d - displaced and devalued by the “logic” of the colonizers with its layers of meaning and legitimated discourses or “regime of truth”.
- (ii) There is a fracture in the land that they are connected to which has become divided up according to the political agenda of the colonizer rather than retaining its pre-colonial contours of entanglement, indwelling, attunement, affinity, and belonging. It has, to use Deleuze’s terminology, been transformed from a smooth to a striated space (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987).
- (iii) There is fracture in the structures of the pre-colonial life world whereby people know how to deal with things and have come to some accommodation with them (albeit unsatisfactory in various ways and with fossilized injustices and distortions). These have established patterns of care of children, the organisation of resources and entitlements, obligations, established supports at times of trial, the maintenance of personal space and inter-relationships and so on.
- (iv) There is a fracture between the differences in meaning and the differences in the human life world that they have been crafted to recognise, track and make discursively contestable. Thus when a young man fails in a way that leads to trouble and harm to others, that young man may be seen as a cherished promise for the future of his family and a current avatar of the spirits of his ancestors with certain responsibilities and chains of accountability or as an individual responsible for his own actions and their

effects and needing to use his own resources to correct who he is toward others and what he has done (Elliot, 1999). These views may result in very different responses and patterns of responsibility.

Heidegger’s conceptualisation of the human organism is a “being there” – *Da-sein* - that articulates itself through questioning its involvement or engagement with the world and others because it cares what happens to it (therefore a being-in-the-world-with-others). A human being is a creature who speaks, questions, explores, anticipates, and projects thought into the future on the basis of what is seen in that mirror of the world that we call known reality. That reflection reveals things for what they are in relation to critters like us. My location of myself as somebody related to the things so revealed means that the soul of a human being is in a certain way the beings that it identifies and relates to in ways that constitute its being among them (HB&T, 22). This engagement is “mirrored” engagement, articulate, questioning, and constitutive of one’s being-in-the-world and, within that complex reality, one has a place that can be understood. On the basis of that understanding and the responses it potentiates, *Dasein* is entangled in a tradition which it more or less explicitly grasps (HB&T, 18), and in terms of which it has attachments and involvements. These constitute its value – the difference it makes by being there – and serve as the basis for its enaction of identity. The attachments and involvements also carve out a landscape of responsibility – things to which one ought to respond in acting thus and so.

The discourse of value and responsibility is therefore the discourse of the soul and the technologies of power – political, rhetorical, social, and academic – to which I have been exposed and that have inscribed the contours of my attunement to a place in the historico-cultural domain that is the human life-world. There I always/already find myself located according to a structure of meaning and power that has made me what I am and reflected the result of that poiesis back to me. Within this situation I may or may not be able to forge a good enough life. When there are multiple fractures, in the way I am reflected, grounded, nurtured, and empowered, my life may not make sense to me (or to anybody else). But sense, coherence, identity and moral engagement are inevitable and demanded, so then I become alienated, disrupted in my being, and my ability to assess my own worth and that of the things around me atrophies. I feel that deep wound or pain in my soul and it may cripple me as a moral being but once my situation, the complex relation between my *Innenwelt* and my *Umwelt*, is restored then there may be ways in which my crack’d soul can find an integrity that will ground a sustainable way of being-in-the-world and the responsiveness and responsibility that are part of it. Until those issues are addressed the notion of responsibility must remain problematic.

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