Wordpress Security

Not ~~just~~an oxymoron - Steve Lord

MANDALORIAN
SECURITY SERVICES LTD



Wordpress ~~VulnSecurity~~?

What you talking about, Willis?

- Who is this guy?
  - slord@mandalorian.com
  - @stevelord on twitter
  - http://www.mandalorian.com/
- I test pens and kick out the bad guys



A Word about WordPress

.com that is

- It's easy to point and laugh
  - Good incident handling
  - Open responses
  - Passwords encrypted
  - 'low level root exploit' used
- Wordpress.org not affected

Who uses it?

How to spot Wordpress

Who uses it?

How to spot Wordpress



Common Wordpress Security Fail (and how to avoid it)



PHP Error Reporting

Start at the bottom of the barrel

- Obligatory Google Dork
  - "php fatal error" inurl:wp-content -error_log -php_errorlog
- The fix (in php.ini)
  - display_errors = Off
  - Restart HTTP server daemon



Roll Your Own Auth

Please don't

- “We can't use the standard login/registration page for our users!”
  - Enterprise Solution: Rewrite the login/registration mechanism from scratch
  - Better: Let's download a plugin that lets us change the page
- The fix:
  - ~~Rape~~Modify wp-login.php HTML
  - ~~Pillage~~Change wp-register.php HTML
  - ~~Defile~~Tweak wp-admin/wp-admin.css



SQL Injection

Someone get mustlive on the phone quick!



SQL Injection

The 90s called and want their framework back

- Wrong

```
<?php
   $wpdb->query(
      "UPDATE $wpdb->posts
      SET post_title = '$title'
      WHERE ID = $id"
   );
?>
```



SQL Injection

The 90s called and want their framework back

- Less Wrong

```
<?php
   $title = esc_sql($title);
   $id = absint($id);
   $wpdb->query(
      “UPDATE $wpdb->posts
      SET post_title = '$title'
      WHERE ID = $id”
   );
?>
```



SQL Injection

The 90s called and want their framework back

- Right

```
<?php
   $wpdb->update(
      $wpdb->posts,
      array('post_title' => '$title'),
      array('ID' => $id)
   );
?>
```



SQL Injection

Getting it right

- Useful functions
  - esc_sql() - escape SQL queries
  - absint() - convert id to positive integer
  - $wpdb->update()
  - $wpdb->insert()
  - $wpdb->prepare()
  - $wpdb->get_var()



SQL Injection

wpdb->prepare() hotness

```
<?php
   $key = “some input”
   $val = 1337
   $wpdb->prepare(“
      INSERT INTO $wpdb->postmeta
      (post_id, key, val)
      VALUES (%d, %s, %s)”,
      array(10, $key, $val))
   );
?>
```

Cross-Site Scripting

When input validation gets too hard

XSS

Not just a way for appsec guys to earn ££££s

- Wrong

```
<?php
   $foo = $_GET[“echo”];
   echo 'You submitted:' . $foo;
   );
?>
```

XSS

Not just a way for appsec guys to earn ££££s

- Less wrong

```
<?php
   $foo = htmlspecialcharacters(
   $_GET[“echo”]);
   echo 'You submitted:' . $foo;
   );
?>
```





XSS

Not just a way for appsec guys to earn ££££s

- Right

```
<?php
   $foo = $_GET[“echo”];
   echo 'You submitted:' .
   esc_html($foo);
   );
?>
```



XSS

Getting it right

- Useful functions
  - esc_attr_e() - for translated tag attributes
  - esc_html() - for general HTML
  - esc_attr() - tag attributes
  - esc_url()
  - esc_js()

CSRF

Serious business



CSRF

Pronounced 'Sea Surf' according to the Internet

- Cross Site Request Forgery ({C|X}SRF)
  - User is tricked into what looks like action A
  - Site receives request for action B
    - Doesn't distinguish between action and intent
  - Action B happens

- e.g: http://bank.com/transfer.php?amount=10000&to=steve



CSRF

Nonces and other HTTP perversions

- The fix:
  - 'Nonces'
    - One-off user-specific time-limited secret keys
    - Used where actions occur (e.g. CRUD)
      - This is what POST is for, but is not exclusive



CSRF

Getting to grips with Wordpress Nonces

```
<?php wp_nonce_field(
      $action, $name, $referrer, $echo)
      ?>
```

- $action – What you're doing (default -1)
- $name – Nonce field name (default _wpnonce
- $referer – Set referer field for validation (default true)
- $echo – return hidden form field? (default true)



CSRF

Verifying the Nonce

```
<?php wp_nonce_field(
   if ( empty($_POST) || !
   wp_verify_nonce($_POST['name'],
   'action') )
   {
      die ('Bad nonce.');
   }
   else
   {
      // process form data
   }
?>
```



CSRF

Some extra value

- When in admin
  - Use check_admin_referer()
- When not in admin
  - Check referer generally
- AJAX submission?
  - $nonce = wp_create_nonce('action');
  - &ajax_nonce=$nonce
  - check_ajax_referer('action');

3rd Party Plugins/Themes

Would you trust code written by these guys?



3rd Party Plugins/Themes

A quick and dirty sanity check

- Did you write it yourself?
- Did you get it from Wordpress.org?
- Have you had direct contact with the author?
- Did you have to pay for it?
- Have you got the 'pro' version?
- Has the author released an update in the past year?
- Is it compatible with current wordpress?

- The more you answered no to, the more you need to audit *all* of the code



3rd Party Plugins/Themes

A quick and dirty sanity check

- Check for code obfuscation
  - `find . | xargs grep -i base64 > base64.txt`
- Check for links to external sites
  - `find . | xargs grep '\<[[:alpha:]]*://[^/]*' > urls.txt`
- Check for potentially malicious content
  - `find . | xargs grep -Ei 'iframe|src|javascript:|eval|include' > dodgy.txt`



3rd Party Plugins/Themes

A quick and dirty sanity check

- Use the previous slide as a starting point
  - Things can be hidden anywhere
    - Don't assume a .gif is a .gif until you've seen it in a text/hex editor
  - Make sure you cover all code (php, JS) and data

- http://wpmu.org/why-you-should-never-search-for-free-wordpress-themes-in-google-or-anywhere-else/



Miscellaneous Mistakes

Entering the mouth of madness

Miscellaneous Mistakes

Entering the mouth of madness



Can the user do that?

Authentication != Authorization

```
<?php current_user_can($capability);?>
```

- $capability – the capability you're checking for e.g. 'manage_options'
- Use this everywhere if you don't want public access
- Options for more granularity
  - Role scoper plugin
  - Members plugin
- User levels deprecated in 3.0



Exec() and it's kin

Here be dragons

- exec(), passthru(), proc_*, shell_exec(), system(), popen() and backticks (`) are evil
  - Do not use them



Exec() and it's kin

Here be dragons

- If you must use them
  - Don't use user-input for arguments
  - Set safe_mode_exec_dir in php.ini
  - Specify the full executable path
  - Use escapeshellcmd() on $cmd before execution



Exec() and it's kin

Here be dragons

- If you must ~~use~~pass them user-supplied input
  - Set safe_mode_exec_dir in php.ini
  - Specify the full executable path
  - Use escapeshellcmd() on $cmd before execution
  - Use escapeshellarg() on arguments before execution



Exec() and it's kin

Here be dragons

- If you must ~~use~~pass them user-supplied input
  - Set safe_mode_exec_dir in php.ini
  - Specify the full executable path
  - Use escapeshellcmd() on $cmd before execution
  - Use escapeshellarg() on arguments before execution
  - Consider a career change



Remote File Include (RFI)

Or week 2 of Learn PHP in 21 days

```
<?php
   $inc = $_GET['inc'];
   include($inc);
;?>
```

- Don't do it. Ever.
- Use switch/case with hardcoded (from a config file) values



Fun with .htaccess

A few bits to take away

```
Order Allow,Deny
Deny from all
<Files ~ "\.(css|jpe?g|png|gif|js)$">
 Allow from all
</Files>
ServerSignature Off
```

- Limits access to specific file extensions
- Add your own extensions as needed
- Tells Apache not to report version



Fun with .htaccess

Add to /wp-admin/.htaccess

```
<Files ~ "\.(php)$">
Order Deny,Allow
Allow from 127.0.0.1
Deny from all
</Files>
```

- Limit /wp-admin/ access to localhost
- Access via SSH tunnel
- Change/Add IP for remote access from fixed network



Testing Wordpress

Yes, you can

- Useful tools
  - Plecost
    - http://code.google.com/p/plecost/
  - Netsparker
    - http://www.mavitunasecurity.com/
  - Acunetix (free edition, XSS only)
    - http://www.acunetix.com/
  - Burp Suit Pro
    - http://www.portswigger.net/
  - OpenVAS (with local checks)
    - http://www.openvas.org/index.html



Before you go live

Things to do

- Some ideas
  - Use rewrite rules to redirect wp-login.php and /wp-admin to SSL only
  - Lock down wp-admin, phpmyadmin etc.
  - Minimise use of 3rd party plugins and themes
- Must do's before going live
  - Audit your own code
  - Audit 3rd party plugins and themes



After you go live

Things to do

- Audit plugin/theme upgrades prior to application
  - At least have a security process
- App test on major upgrades
- Read the changelog
  - Hunt the bug
  - Verify the fix

- **Use liberal volumes of common sense**

Thanks for having me

It keeps me off the streets



This presentation brought to you by DJ Shadow, UNKLE, Death in Vegas and Caffeine. Lots of sweet, sweet caffeine. My next talk will be at Bsides London on Breaking, Entering and Pentesting on April 20th and at DC4420 that evening about evading defences.